it held that Coleman had procedurally defaulted on 34 of the 50 claims raised in his habeas petition; (2) his constitutional due process rights were violated because of prosecutorial misconduct and the introduction of "other acts" evidence; and (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing because his attorneys failed to fully investigate his background and mental health for purposes of offering evidence in mitigation. Petitioner procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, and does not show "cause and prejudice" for that default, the ineffective assistance claim cannot serve as "cause" to excuse defaulted claims.Coleman waited 16 months afterMurnahanwas decided before filing his delayed motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals on July 9, 1993, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the application because it was more than 90 days after the court's 1986 decision and Coleman had not shown good cause for the delay, as required by Ohio App. R. 26(B).On July 1, 1993, Ohio App. R. 26(B) was amended to provide, in pertinent part:(B) Application for reopening(1) A defendant in a criminal case may apply for reopening of the appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Isham v. Randle, No. 99-3412 (6th Cir. 09/13/2000) "Defendant appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing his habeas corpus petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Defendant argues that, pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), the time during which his Ohio R. App. P. 26(B) application was pending, as well as the time during which he could have potentially petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, should have stayed § 2244(d)(1)'s one year limitations period. In order for defendant's habeas corpus petition to be timely, defendant would have to prevail on both of these arguments.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit may well conclude on remand that respondent can meet that standard in this case (although we should note that respondent has not argued that he can, preferring instead to argue that he does not have to). Or it may conclude, as did the District Court, that Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B) does not constitute an adequate procedural ground to bar federal habeas review of the ineffective-assistance claim. We express no view as to these issues, or on the question whether respondent’s appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in the first place.Petitioner [PDF] Respondent [PDF] Petitioner - Reply [PDF] Amicus: States of Texas et al. [PDF]Bond v. United States The groping of luggage without cause in a public space by the police violates the Fourth Amendment.Held: Agent Cantu’s physical manipulation of petitioner’s carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, the district court was correct in denying Mr. Barnes' petition for habeas corpus relief.Dupuy v. McCain (5th Cir) Cage claim does not meet the standard required for abuse of the writ.Goodson v. Corpus Christi (5th Cir) District Court improperly concluded that plaintiff looked like a cowboy mentioned in a BOLO ("be on the look out") where whether plaintiff did or did not match the BOLO was in contention.White v. Schotten (6th Cir) Ohio criminal defendants have a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during an application for reopening and that the petitioner's counsel in this case was constitutionally ineffective in failing to file such an application in a timely fashion, thus constituting cause to excuse any failure to comply with the procedural requirements contained in Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B).Peterson v. Gammon (8th Cir) For purposes of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitations period, state court post-conviction relief proceedings are pending during the interval between a trial court's denial of post-conviction relief and the filing of a timely appeal; district court erred in counting the period against the one-year time limit.Zacher v. Tippy(8th Cir) Bureau of Prisons could apply regulation excepting Zacher from early release program based on a prior state court conviction, as application of the regulation did not implicate ex post facto or equal protection considerations.Section 1983 & Related FilingsWilliams v. Kelso (8th Cir) Plaintiff's claim that jailers failed to check his decedent's vital signs within the time period required by doctor's directions did not establish deliberate indifference to medical needs, and defendants were entitled to summary judgment; defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that they were liable for