N.M. R. Prof'l. Cond. 16-804
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
N.M. R. Prof'l. Cond. 16-804
Committee commentary. -
[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph A, however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, which have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
[3] Discrimination and harassment by lawyers in violation of Paragraph G undermine confidence in the legal profession and the legal system. Such discrimination includes harmful verbal or physical conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others. Harassment includes sexual harassment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct. Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. The substantive law of antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may guide application of Paragraph G.
[4] Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers, and others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business, or social activities in connection with the practice of law. Lawyers may engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without violating this rule by, for example, implementing initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining, and advancing diverse employees or sponsoring diverse law student organizations.
[5] A lawyer does not violate Paragraph G by limiting the scope or subject matter of the lawyer's practice or by limiting the lawyer's practice to members of underserved populations in accordance with these rules and other law. A lawyer's representation of a client does not constitute an endorsement by the lawyer of the client's views or activities. See Rule 16-102(B) NMRA.
[6] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 16-102(D) NMRA concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
[7] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.
[Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 08-8300-29, effective November 3, 2008; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 19-8300-012, effective December 1, 2019.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2008 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 08-8300-29, effective November 3, 2008, deleted former Paragraph E which provided that it is professional misconduct to willfully violate the Supreme Court Rules on Minimum Continuing Legal Education or the New Mexico Plan of Specialization or the board regulations promulgated under the authority of the rules or the plan; relettered former Paragraph F as Paragraph E; in Paragraph E, added the phrase "or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law"; relettered former Paragraph G as Paragraph F; and deleted former Paragraph H which provided that it is professional misconduct to engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Compiler's notes. - The old ABA Comment was replaced by the 2008 committee commentary. Preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to prove intentional misrepresentation without fraudulent intent. - Where respondent did not exhibit a selfish motive or seek to profit personally from respondent's conduct, the allegations that respondent engaged in misrepresentations in violation of Rule 16-804 NMRA only needed to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In the Matter of Convisser, 2010-NMSC-037, 148 N.M. 732, 242 P.3d 299. Misrepresentation supported by substantial evidence. - Where the founder and benefactor of two organizations died; respondent was a board member and officer of the organizations; respondent solicited a relative of the personal representative of the founder's estate to retain respondent to pursue a lawsuit against the personal representative for mishandling of the probate of the estate; the relative rejected respondent's offer of representation; after respondent reviewed the probate file, respondent misrepresented to the personal representative that respondent represented clients with standing and interest to reopen the founder's estate and that the statute of limitations had not yet run on claims respondent threatened to bring against the personal representative for breach of fiduciary duty; neither respondent nor respondent's purported clients brought a civil action against the personal representative; respondent sent a letter to the New Mexico attorney general requesting an investigation and legal action to remove the board members of the organization; respondent attached to the letter an unsigned affidavit of a person who purportedly made statements that supported the factual allegations contained in the letter; the affidavit had not been reviewed by the affiant; and the affidavit contained statements that the affiant did not make or set forth information of which the affiant had no knowledge, substantial evidence supported the hearing committee's findings that respondent engaged in ethical misconduct involving misrepresentations. In the Matter of Convisser, 2010-NMSC-037, 148 N.M. 732, 242 P.3d 299. Conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation. - Where respondent advised his client, who was charged with incest, criminal sexual contact, and criminal sexual penetration of his granddaughter, to consider paying off his accusers, and where respondent prepared affidavits for granddaughter, granddaughter's father, and another witness based on their statements to respondent in which they all claimed that client was innocent of the crimes for which he was charged, and where respondent knew that his client had committed incest and knew the affidavits contained perjured statements was sufficient to support the conclusion that respondent engaged in professional misconduct, including conduct involving dishonesty, misrepresentation and conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re Venie, 2017-NMSC-018. Attorneys found to have committed criminal acts are generally suspended or disbarred. In re Key, 2005-NMSC-014, 137 N.M. 517, 113 P.3d 340. ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. - While the Supreme Court has not formally adopted the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the standards are looked to for guidance in determining appropriate sanctions for attorneys found guilty of misconduct and to insure a certain degree of consistency, although each case is decided on the basis of its own merits. In re Key, 2005-NMSC-014, 137 N.M. 517, 113 P.3d 340. Denial of due process. - Respondent's contention that, in some way, he had been denied procedural and substantive due process of law and equal protection of the law has no validity since the conduct charged against him is wholly and entirely concerned with his activity as an attorney. In re Nelson, 1969-NMSC-012, 79 N.M. 779, 450 P.2d 188. True question in disbarment. - Whether the misconduct with which a person is charged is a crime involving moral turpitude or, if a crime, whether it is malum prohibitum or malum in se or, for that matter, if the act is neither a felony nor misdemeanor, is not the issue. The true question in considering disbarment is: was the act to which respondent pleaded guilty "contrary to honesty, justice or good morals"? In re Morris, 1964-NMSC-235, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475, 17 A.L.R.3d 681. Moral turpitude is not necessary element to support discipline, and, it may not be synonymous with "conduct contrary to honesty, justice or good morals". In re Morris, 1964-NMSC-235, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475, 17 A.L.R.3d 681. Relation of attorney and client is one of the highest trust and confidence, requiring the attorney to observe the utmost good faith towards his client, and not to allow his private interests to conflict with those of his client. Very strict and rigid rules have always been enforced, under which an attorney could not maintain a purchase from his client, unless he was able to clearly show that he had made a full communication to his client of all that he knew of advantage to the client regarding the subject of the negotiations. Van Orman v. Nelson, 1967-NMSC-069, 78 N.M. 11, 427 P.2d 896, rev'd on other grounds, 1969-NMSC-035, 80 N.M. 119, 452 P.2d 188. With respect to transactions between attorney and client involving the acquisition of property from the client, a heavy burden is imposed upon the attorney to establish the absolute fairness of the transactions. Van Orman v. Nelson, 1967-NMSC-069, 78 N.M. 11, 427 P.2d 896, rev'd on other grounds, 1969-NMSC-035, 80 N.M. 119, 452 P.2d 188. Standard of proof when fraud not alleged. - In disciplinary proceedings when fraud has not been alleged, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. In re D'Angelo, 1986-NMSC-052, 105 N.M. 391, 733 P.2d 360. Misappropriation of funds. - Attorney's conversion to his own use of money received from a client to have a liquor license transferred to her name violated Rules 1-102, 6-101, 7-101 and 9-102 NMRA of the Code of Professional Responsibility (now Rules 16-102, 16-104, 16-115 and 16-804 NMRA of the Rules of Professional Conduct). In re Gallegos, 1986-NMSC-058, 104 N.M. 496, 723 P.2d 967. Attorney's misappropriation of client funds and failure to cooperate with disciplinary counsel warranted disbarment. In re Krob, 1997-NMSC-037, 123 N.M. 652, 944 P.2d 881. Failure to maintain trust account. - Failure of an attorney to properly maintain his trust account records constituted a violation of Rule 16-115 NMRA and Paragraph H of this rule and, coupled with other violations, such failure warranted disbarment. In re Greenfield, 1996-NMSC-015, 121 N.M. 633, 916 P.2d 833. Attorney's failure to docket an appeal and lying to his client for seven years about the status of the appeal violated numerous rules and warranted indefinite suspension from practice. In re Roberts, 1995-NMSC-037, 119 N.M. 769, 895 P.2d 669. Counsel's misconduct impeded the administration of justice and warranted suspension. - An indefinite suspension from the practice of law was warranted where defense counsel waited three years to file a notice of appeal for a client who was convicted of first-degree murder because counsel did not want the case transferred to appellate counsel, waited seven months to file a notice of appeal for a client who was convicted of drug trafficking, and failed to file docketing statements that meet the standards set forth in the appellate rules. Counsel's delays in filing appropriate appellate pleadings prevented his clients from accessing justice and fair process and impeded the administration of justice. In re Salazar, 2019-NMSC-010. Six-month suspension and other penalties were warranted since attorney accepted one-half of fee and failed to represent client, allowing default to be entered against client. In re Trujillo, 1990-NMSC-062, 110 N.M. 180, 793 P.2d 862. Attorney who stole approximately $62,500 from various clients by forging his clients' names on settlement checks and withdrawal slips on accounts maintained by clients was disbarred. In re Wilson, 1989-NMSC-021, 108 N.M. 378, 772 P.2d 1301. Refusal to release escrowed funds when required by the terms of the escrow agreement violated Subdivisions A(1) and A(4) of DR 1-102 (now Paragraphs A and C of this rule). In re Arrieta, 1987-NMSC-016, 105 N.M. 418, 733 P.2d 866. Failure to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings. - When attorney failed to file an answer or appear at the proceedings before the hearing committee, he did not request a hearing before the Disciplinary Board although advised of his right to do so, and failed to appear before the supreme court, such conduct violated Rules 16-803(D) NMRA and Paragraph D of this rule. In re Carrasco, 1987-NMSC-089, 106 N.M. 294, 742 P.2d 506. When attorney failed to pay complainant-physician certain funds reportedly withheld by attorney for physician from the settlement funds of three of attorney's clients, who were also physician's patients, and attorney later informed physician that he had spent the clients' funds but would be able to pay physician as soon as he received money in another settlement, and failed to respond to the board's inquiries after physician reported attorney's failure to pay to the disciplinary authorities, attorney violated this rule in that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. In re C'De Baca, 1989-NMSC-070, 109 N.M. 151, 782 P.2d 1348. Since additional acts of misconduct and failure to communicate came to light after suspension had been imposed, and the attorney failed to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings, the additional matters warranted adding time to the suspension from the practice of law previously imposed. In re Tapia, 1990-NMSC-092, 110 N.M 693, 799 P.2d 129. Attorney's convictions of embezzlement and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon warranted disbarment. In re Benavidez, 1991-NMSC-029, 111 N.M. 642, 808 P.2d 612. Forgeries on warranty deed. - By forging the signatures of her cotenants on a warranty deed and exchanging that deed for money and by causing a notary public to falsely acknowledge the forged signatures, attorney violated Paragraphs C and H of this rule. In re Siler, 1987-NMSC-088, 106 N.M. 292, 742 P.2d 504. Destruction of legal document. - That an attorney would destroy, without reading, a legal document served upon him, regardless of the real or imagined nature of the proceedings, would cast grave doubts upon his ability to appreciate his obligations as an attorney to uphold the law and facilitate rather than impede the administration of justice. In re Martinez, 1988-NMSC-033, 107 N.M. 171, 754 P.2d 842. Promise to probate upon death of clients. - Attorney defrauded his clients when he suggested that if they would each pay him $1,000 plus tax, he would probate their estates at the time of their deaths. In re Gallegos, 1986-NMSC-058, 104 N.M. 496, 723 P.2d 967 (1986). Lawyers are officers of court and are always under obligation to be truthful to the court. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483. Taking advantage of technical procedural errors. - This rule (former Rule 1-102) mandates "fair play" of opposing counsel in the administration of justice; lawyers should not attempt to take advantage of technical errors under the rules of procedure, as neither the trial court nor the appellate court will condone this practice. Gengler v. Phelps, 1976-NMCA-114, 89 N.M. 793, 558 P.2d 62. Using unauthorized subpoena to compel witness to produce documents amounts to perpetrating a deceit on the witness in violation of Paragraph C. State v. Eder, 1985-NMCA-076, 103 N.M. 211, 704 P.2d 465. Disbarment appropriate for attorney convicted of tampering with evidence and making false report. In re McCulloch, 1985-NMSC-117, 103 N.M. 542, 710 P.2d 736. Indefinite suspension warranted where attorney filed lawsuit on behalf of fictitious individual and committed conduct involving dishonesty. - Where an attorney, in an attempt to avoid summary judgment on claim preclusion grounds, knowingly made false statements to the district court regarding the identity of his client, representing that his client was not the same person as the plaintiff in a previously filed federal lawsuit against the Roosevelt County Detention Center, there was sufficient evidence to support the disciplinary board's determination that the attorney committed misconduct in violation of this rule where the attorney knowingly made false statements in multiple settings and over an extended period of time. The attorney's actions in the state lawsuit and in the disciplinary proceeding amounted to conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation, and because the attorney's conduct has delayed his client's state law claims and ultimately may preclude them altogether, the attorney committed misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re Dixon, 2019-NMSC-006. Disbarment for manufacturing evidence. - When an attorney, who is an officer of the court and whose duty is it to protect the integrity of the adversarial system, intentionally lies under oath and manufactures documents designed to achieve an advantage in litigation, he demonstrates a complete lack of fitness to practice law. In re Gabell, 1993-NMSC-045, 115 N.M. 737, 858 P.2d 404. Restitution generally irrelevant in determining punishment. - Generally, when an attorney engages in intentional conduct involving dishonesty, he or she is disbarred. This is true even where restitution has been made to persons injured by the lawyer's misconduct. In re Hartley, 1988-NMSC-056, 107 N.M. 376, 758 P.2d 790. Falsified statement in appellate brief constitutes misconduct. - If an attorney makes a statement in his brief on appeal as to the date of appointment of a trustee without examining the bankruptcy records and falsifies the statement made, the attorney is guilty of misconduct under this rule (former Rule 1-102). Cornell v. Albuquerque Chem. Co., 1978 -NMCA-079, 92 N.M. 121, 584 P.2d 168. Censure and fine for false and misleading brief. - Attorney was publicly censured and fined $1,000 for knowingly making false, misleading and inaccurate statements in a brief to the court of appeals in violation of this rule (former Rule 1-102). In re Chakeres, 1984-NMSC-088, 101 N.M. 684, 687 P.2d 741. Attorney knowingly making a false statement of material fact in a brief filed in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of deceiving the court warranted public censure. In re Richards, 1997-NMSC-035, 123 N.M. 579, 943 P.2d 1032. Attorney's tactics in pursuing a baseless claim and then ignoring efforts to dispose of the claim amounted to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of this rule. In re Bloomfield, 1996-NMSC-017, 121 N.M. 605, 916 P.2d 224. Threatening debtor with criminal charges. - When an attorney implied, during the course of a telephone conversation, that criminal charges were or would be pending in New Mexico against an alleged debtor so as to gain an advantage in pending civil litigation against the alleged debtor, such conduct warranted suspension from the practice of law for a period of 120 days. In re Frith, 1986-NMSC-003, 103 N.M. 792, 715 P.2d 65. Fraud warrants disbarment. - Unprofessional conduct involving fraud upon an insurance company in excess of $2,500 (a third degree felony) warrants disbarment. In re Rickard, 1979-NMSC-018, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248. Attorney violated this rule when he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation in his dealings with a former client, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and engaged in conduct adversely reflecting upon his fitness to practice law. In re C'De Baca, 1989-NMSC-070, 109 N.M. 151, 782 P.2d 1348. Suspension from practice for gross mishandling of trust funds. In re Privette, 1978-NMSC-034, 92 N.M. 32, 582 P.2d 804. Disbarment is appropriate sanction for attorney's conversion of his clients' funds to his own use. In re Duffy, 1985-NMSC-034, 102 N.M. 524, 697 P.2d 943. Disbarment was the appropriate sanction, where defendant commingled his own money with a trust account, issued checks to clients for whom no money was on deposit, issued checks against insufficient funds and transferred money from the trust account to his own accounts. In re Rawson, 1992-NMSC-036, 113 N.M. 758, 833 P.2d 235. Attorneys should not be allowed to practice law while on probation under a criminal sentence and the court may disbar such an attorney until he is no longer on probation. In re Norrid, 1983-NMSC-076, 100 N.M. 326, 670 P.2d 580. Involuntary manslaughter sufficient to support suspension. - When a member of the bar is guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter resulting from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, such offense is an act contrary to honesty, justice or good morals sufficient to support a suspension from practice. In re Morris, 1964-NMSC-235, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475, 17 A.L.R.3d 681 (1964). Conclusive proof of crime involving moral turpitude. - Since there was a judgment of conviction of second-degree murder preceded by a plea of nolo contendere, it amounted to conclusive proof of a crime involving moral turpitude, and disbarment was justified. In re Noble, 1967-NMSC-038, 77 N.M. 461, 423 P.2d 984. Criminal sexual contact upon client warrants disbarment. In re Stanton, 1985-NMSC-095, 103 N.M. 413, 708 P.2d 325. Bankruptcy practice. - An attorney's failure to address a potential secured claim against his client in a bankruptcy proceeding was a violation of Rules 16-101 and 16-804 NMRA. In re Elmore, 1997-NMSC-020, 123 N.M. 79, 934 P.2d 273. One-year suspension warranted. - Attorney's actions warranted a one-year suspension since he made misrepresentations to a court, failed to return unearned fees, failed to render an accounting to a client and acted otherwise to prejudice the administration of justice. In re Arrieta, 1986-NMSC-045, 104 N.M. 389, 722 P.2d 640. Attorney was suspended from practice for one year for engaging in conduct that adversely reflected upon his fitness to practice law, for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation, and for failure to give his full cooperation and assistance to counsel for the disciplinary board. In re Laughlin, 1986-NMSC-068, 104 N.M. 630, 725 P.2d 830. Attorney's actions warranted a one-year suspension since he took $6900.00 from his client on the pretense of needing it to cover the costs of litigation and converted it to his own use and thereafter demonstrated an apparent lack of concern about refunding the money. In re Everidge, 1983-NMSC-048, 105 N.M. 203, 730 P.2d 1185. By keeping money that erroneously was given to him and then refusing to respond to demands that he properly channel the funds, attorney's conduct warranted suspension from the practice of law for a definite period of one year, with suspension deferred under prescribed terms and conditions. In re Norton, 1990-NMSC-029, 109 N.M. 616, 788 P.2d 372. Actions by an attorney involving false statements of material fact to a bankruptcy court, representation of a client in bankruptcy when owed money by the client, deposit of monies in his operating account instead of his trust account, failure to produce required records for his trust account, and misrepresentations to the Internal Revenue Service when acting in his capacity as a CPA, warranted suspension. In re Archuleta, 1996-NMSC-039, 122 N.M. 52, 920 P.2d 517. Attorney's conduct involving two frivolous claims resulting in violation of Rule 16-301 and several other provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct warranted a one-year suspension. In re Richards, 1999-NMSC-030, 127 N.M. 716, 986 P.2d 1117. Indefinite suspension warranted. - Sixteen violations of nine rules governing professional responsibility, involving misrepresentation, neglect, improper fee-splitting, disrespect to various tribunals, and other conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice resulted in defendant's being suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. In re Quintana, 1986-NMSC-057, 104 N.M. 511, 724 P.2d 220. An attorney's apparent failure to complete several cases, to take steps to insure that the interests of her clients were protected upon her withdrawal from their cases, and to promptly refund any unearned portions of fees paid in advance, as well as her lack of cooperation with the disciplinary counsel, constitute conduct violative of the professional rules warranting an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. In re Roth, 1987-NMSC-004, 105 N.M. 255, 731 P.2d 951. Attorney was subject to an indefinite period of suspension of not less than five years since he had used a client's funds as collateral for a personal loan and had invested client's funds in a corporation in which he had an ownership interest, even though he made full restitution and fully acknowledged his misconduct. In re Thompson, 1987-NMSC-005, 105 N.M. 257, 731 P.2d 953. An attorney who collected a fee to represent a client in a criminal matter and who failed to return the fee even though the charge was dismissed without any action by the lawyer, who subsequently contended, knowingly and dishonestly, that he was entitled to the fee in disciplinary proceedings, and who forged a physician's signature on a fitness to practice law form on an application to the Arizona bar, was suspended indefinitely. In re Cherryhomes, 1993-NMSC-044, 115 N.M. 734, 858 P.2d 401. Indefinite suspension was warranted because of an attorney's violation of Paragraphs C, D and H of this rule and other rules, such as Rule 16-101 NMRA, by failing to provide competent representation; Rule 16-103 NMRA, by failing to act with diligence and promptness in representing a client; Rule 16-104 NMRA, by failing to keep his client informed about the status of a matter and failing to respond to requests for information; and Rule 16-116(D) NMRA, by failing to surrender papers and property to which the client was entitled at the termination of the representation. In re Lally, 1999-NMSC-003, 126 N.M. 566, 973 P.2d 243. Indefinite suspension was warranted because of attorney's violation of Paragraphs C, D and H of this rule and other rules, such as Rule 16-101 NMRA, by failing to provide competent representation; Rule 16-105 NMRA, by charging an excessive fee; Rule 16-302 NMRA, by failing to expedite litigation; Rule 16-303(A)(1) NMRA, by making an untrue statement of fact to a tribunal; Rule 16-304(D) NMRA, by failing to comply with a discovery request; and Rule 16-505(A) NMRA, by practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates regulations. In re Righter, 1999-NMSC-009, 126 N.M. 730, 975 P.2d 343. Indefinite suspension was warranted because an attorney violated Paragraphs D and H by engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice and conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. The attorney also violated Rule 16-101 NMRA, by failing to provide competent representation; Rule 16-102(A) NMRA, by failing to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation; Rule 16-103 NMRA, by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; Rule 16-104(A) NMRA, by failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and by failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; Rule 16-116(D) NMRA, by failing to timely surrender papers and property to which a client was entitled and by failing to timely refund any advance payment of fee that had not been earned; Rule 16-801(B) NMRA, by failing to respond to lawful requests for information from the office of disciplinary counsel; and Rule 16-803(D) NMRA, by failing to cooperate with disciplinary counsel in the course of the investigation. In re Carlton, 2000-NMSC-001, 128 N.M. 419, 993 P.2d 736. Probation and indefinite suspension warranted. In re Gabriel, 1990-NMSC-091, 110 N.M. 691, 799 P.2d 127. Attorney disbarred for committing 79 violations of various rules. In re Ortega, 1984-NMSC-093, 101 N.M. 719, 688 P.2d 329. Attorney disbarred for having engaged in four acts of misconduct, including subornation of false statements, intimidation of witnesses, dishonesty and intentional misrepresentations to the disciplinary board in the form of false statements made to the board in the regular course of its proceedings. In re Ayala, 1984-NMSC-110, 102 N.M. 214, 693 P.2d 580. An attorney was disbarred for conviction of bribery in violation of 30-24-2 NMSA 1978. In re Esquibel, 1992-NMSC-007, 113 N.M. 24, 822 P.2d 121. Disbarment warranted. - Disbarment was warranted, despite mitigating factors, since the attorney converted client funds; engaged in conduct involving deceit, dishonesty and misrepresentation; failed to hold clients' funds separate from his own; failed to notify clients of the receipt of funds belonging to them; failed to maintain required trust account records; failed to protect clients' interests at the termination of the representation; failed to advise clients of the status of their legal matters; engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and engaged in conduct adversely affecting his fitness to practice law. In re Kelly, 1995-NMSC-038, 119 N.M. 807, 896 P.2d 487. Attorney's engaging in conduct involving deceit, dishonesty, misrepresentation, or fraud, conduct adversely reflecting upon his fitness to practice law, and other violations warranted disbarment. In re Hamar, 1997-NMSC-048, 123 N.M. 795, 945 P.2d 1013. Disbarment of an attorney was warranted where, based on his pleas of guilty to three counts of fraud and three counts of embezzlement, a hearing committee of the disciplinary board concluded that he violated Paragraphs B and H. In re Frontino, 2001-NMSC-010, 130 N.M. 175, 21 P.3d 635. Disbarment of an attorney for 20 months, with automatic reinstatement on a probationary basis, was warranted based on intervention in his law practice because he was abusing crack cocaine and on his admission that during his drug addiction he had misappropriated money from his attorney trust account in violation of Paragraph A of Rule 16-115 NMRA, by failing to safeguard a client's property, and Paragraphs C and H of this rule, by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, and conduct adversely reflecting upon one's fitness to practice law. In re Zamora, 2001-NMSC-011, 130 N.M. 161, 21 P.3d 30. Agreements not to prosecute in exchange for restitution. - The practice by attorneys or their agents involving the payment of money as restitution to an alleged victim in exchange for the victim's execution of an affidavit not to prosecute the defendant constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Paragraph D, and adversely reflects on an attorney's fitness to practice law in violation of Paragraph H. In re Steere, 1990-NMSC-084, 110 N.M. 405, 796 P.2d 1101. Failure to notify appellate court of settlement. - The failure by counsel for either party to notify the Court of Appeals of settlement pending appeal adversely affected the operation of the court and may be "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." In the future the court will routinely advise disciplinary counsel of any instance in which appellate counsel have not forthwith informed the court of a settlement (in whole or in part) of a pending case. Riesenecker v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 1990-NMCA-100, 110 N.M. 451, 796 P.2d 1147. Rule violated. In re Canevaro, 1997-NMSC-033, 123 N.M. 576, 943 P.2d 1029; In re Chavez, 2000-NMSC-015, 129 N.M. 035, 1 P.3d 417; In re Dawson, 2000-NMSC-024, 129 N.M. 369, 8 P.3d 856. Administration of justice. - In a personal injury action for damages resulting from a pharmacist filling a child's prescription for Ritalin with methadone, where attorney, despite having prior knowledge that records showed a discrepancy between the number of methadone tablets prescribed and those dispensed, denied plaintiff's request for admission that records existed indicating a shortage of methadone tablets, failed to produce a report filed with the Board of Pharmacy, and failed to verify the authenticity of a forged prescription for methadone that was introduced into evidence, the attorney engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice and that adversely reflected on the attorney's fitness to practice law. In re Estrada, 2006-NMSC-047, 140 N.M. 492, 143 P.3d 731. Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law §§ 60 to 73. Attorney's verbal abuse of another attorney as basis for disciplinary action, 87 A.L.R.3d 351. Method employed in collecting debt due client as ground for disciplinary action against attorney, 93 A.L.R.3d 880. Attorney's conviction in foreign or federal jurisdiction as ground for disciplinary action, 98 A.L.R.3d 357. Narcotics conviction as crime of moral turpitude justifying disbarment or other disciplinary action against attorney, 99 A.L.R.3d 288. Election campaign activities as ground for disciplining attorney, 26 A.L.R.4th 170. Validity and enforceability of referral fee agreement between attorneys, 28 A.L.R.4th 665. Liability of attorney for improper or ineffective incorporation of client, 40 A.L.R.4th 535. Sexual misconduct as ground for disciplining attorney or judge, 43 A.L.R.4th 1062. Liability of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th 249. Right of attorney to conduct ex parte interviews with corporate party's nonmanagement employees, 50 A.L.R.4th 652. Legal malpractice liability for advising client to commit crime or unlawful act, 51 A.L.R.4th 1227. Attorney's liability under state law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486. Attorney's misrepresentation to court of his state of health or other personal matter in seeking trial delay as ground for disciplinary action, 61 A.L.R.4th 1216. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client's affairs in matters involving real estate transactions as ground for disciplinary action -modern cases, 65 A.L.R.4th 24. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client's affairs in tax matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 66 A.L.R.4th 314. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client's affairs in estate or probate matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 66 A.L.R.4th 342. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client's affairs in family law matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 415. Negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence of attorney in handling client's affairs in bankruptcy matters as ground for disciplinary action - modern cases, 70 A.L.R.4th 786. Legal malpractice in handling or defending medical malpractice claim, 78 A.L.R.4th 725. Criminal liability of attorney for tampering with evidence, 49 A.L.R. 5th 619. Propriety of law firm's representation of client in federal court where lawyer affiliated with firm is disqualified from representing client, 51 A.L.R. Fed. 678. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 77 to 87.