16. While TILA and Regulation Z define “credit” as the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14), TILA does not define “debt.” In its Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z, though, the Federal Reserve Board has excluded certain situations from the definition of credit.

See Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) Official Staff Commentary to 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10), pt 226, Supp. I, cmt 2(a)(10) (Declaration of Jonathan Shub in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (‘Shub Decl.’, Exhibit 1). Yet, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have confused APR with actual interest rate, when Plaintiffs made no such contention.

) In California, a vehicle sale is “deemed completed and consummated whenthe purchaser of the vehicle has paid the purchaseprice,or, in lieu thereof, has signed a purchase contractor security agreement, and has taken physical possession or delivery of the vehicle.” (Veh. Code, § 5901, subd. (d).) Importantly, however, it is not the consumer’s obligation to the sale of the vehicle that is relevant to determining the term of a credit transaction under Regulation Z. As noted, “consummation”in the meaning of Regulation Z refers to when the consumer becomes“contractually obligated on a credit transaction” (12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13), italics added),)—that is, when the consumer “becomeslegally obligated to accept a particular credit arrangement.” (Official staff interpretations, 12 C.F.R. § 226, supp. I, subpt. A(2)(a)(13)(2) (2014), italics added.)

Under TILA, a consumer is limited to a natural person “to whom credit is offered or extended.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i); see also 12 CFR § 226.2(a)(11). Likewise, RESPA only provides for claims by individuals who receive a loan.

at 9. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s Response 1 Plaintiff also claims that Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(24) is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Resp.

See Walsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 09-cv-04387, slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009) ("Walsh I") (attached as Exhibit C); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1647(c) (governing "open end consumer credit plan[s]"); 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (defining "consumer" when used with reference to a credit transaction); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12) (Under Regulation Z, "[c]onsumer credit means credit offered or extended to a consumer primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.").

But that is not the same as issuing a “single credit device” such as a card, coupon book, or plate that can be exchanged for services. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14- 15) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 1602(k). Because Plaintiff has not alleged, and cannot allege that DIRECTV issued a credit device or credit card in her name, and simply makes a conclusory and factually unsupported (and incorrect) statement that DIRECTV has issued a “credit card”, Case 1:10-cv-00117 Document 30 Filed 03/09/10 Page 10 of 14 11 her TILA claim must be dismissed.

The evidence affirmatively establishes that U.S. Bank is not a “creditor” as defined by TILA. TILA provides that “[t]he term ‘creditor’ refers only to a person who both (1) regularly extends, whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise, Case 9:17-cv-80525-KAM Document 158 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/09/2019 Page 6 of 16 7 DM1\9229894.1 consumer credit which is payable by agreement in more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially payable on the face of the evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of indebtedness, by agreement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (emphasis added); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i) (“A person who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more than four installments (not including a down payment), and to whom the obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreement when there is no note or contract.” (footnote omitted)).

The “date of consummation” of the transaction is considered to be when the loan is created. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (“Consummation means the time that a consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction”).2 Accordingly, absent any TILA violation at Loan origination, Plaintiff had three days, not three years, to properly exercise a right to cancel. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). Further, even if Plaintiffs allege such a TILA violation at origination, their right to rescind a loan expired no later than three years after the loan agreement was consummated.

For purposes of TILA, a loan is consummated at “the time that a consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13). As evidenced by the Deed of Trust, the Loan was consummated on April 7, 2005.