is viewed by the U.S. government, including the operation of the automotive-specific sections of the USMCA. Whether justified or not, the characterization of China as a non-market economy, as well as suspicions that China is looking for ways to circumvent restrictions on the ability of its automotive industry to gain access to the U.S. market, are shadows that will color the mobility industry scenarios in the incoming USMCA 2026 joint review.See “A Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/07/10/a-proclamation-on-adjusting-imports-of-steel-into-the-united-states-7/. Moreover, USMCA-originating vehicles would not be subject to the forthcoming increase in Section 301 import duties on Chinese products, most notably, the duty increases that apply to electric vehicles, semiconductors, and batteries.Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles, 89 FR 15066 (March 1, 2024).US to issue rules on Chinese connected vehicles this autumn. Reuters.com. May 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-issue-rules-chinese-connected-vehicles-this-fall-2024-05-15/ USMCA Article 32.2.1.(b). USMCA Article 34.7. International Trade Commission, Investigation No. 332–600, USMCA Automotive Rules of Origin:Economic Impact and Operation, 2025, 89 FR 26919 (April 16, 2024). Written submissions are open until November 18, 2024. Press conference addressing the recent Section 301 measure. May 14, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/05/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-united-states-trade-representative-katherine-tai/United States, Canada, and Mexico Joint Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the USMCA//CUSMA//T-MEC Free Trade Commission. May 23, 2024, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/united-states-canada-and-mexico-joint-statement-fourth-meeting-usmcacusmat-mec-free-trade-com

d closely monitor this inquiry and, where appropriate, contribute views and comments to the U.S. government to help shape the policy environment for automotive trade going forward.1Statement from President Biden on Addressing National Security Risks to the U.S. Auto Industry, White House (Feb. 29, 2024), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/02/29/statement-from-president-biden-on-addressing-national-security-risks-to-the-u-s-auto-industry/.2Other “foreign adversaries” include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and the Maduro regime in Venezuela.3Statement from President Biden on Addressing National Security Risks to the U.S. Auto Industry, White House (Feb. 29, 2024), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/02/29/statement-from-president-biden-on-addressing-national-security-risks-to-the-u-s-auto-industry/.4Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles, 89 Fed. Reg. 15066 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 1, 2024).5Cars, Observatory of Economic Complexity, available at https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/cars.6Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built On Local Protections, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2017) at 6-8, available at https://www.uschamber.com/assets/documents/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf; State Council Decision on Accelerating the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, No. 32 (Oct. 10, 2010), available at https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8570.7Made in China 2025, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, available at https://english.www.gov.cn/2016special/madeinchina2025/.8Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related To Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Mar. 22, 2018), at 29-32, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%

critical infrastructure sectors; andthe economic impacts to US business or the public of regulations contemplated by the ANPRM.The BIS ICTS RegulationsThe ICTS regulations at 15 CFR 7.4 identify China (including Hong Kong), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and the Maduro Regime in Venezuela as foreign adversaries for purposes of the ICTS regulations. Under these existing regulations the Secretary of Commerce may prohibit transactions involving ICTS that has been designed, developed, manufactured or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary if the Secretary determines that the ICTS poses an undue or unacceptable risk to US national security or the safety of US persons. If the ANPRM leads to final regulations prohibiting certain ICTS for CVs, it would be the first prohibition action that BIS has taken under the ICTS regulations.1 "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles," 89 FR 15066 (March 1, 2024); see also the BIS press release announcing the action. 2 "Biden-⁠Harris Administration Takes Action to Address Risks of Autos from China and Other Countries of Concern," February 29, 2024. 3 EO 13873 of May 15, 2019, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain," 84 FR 22689 (May 17, 2019) and EO 14034 of June 9, 2021, "Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries," 86 FR 31423 (June 11, 2021). The implementing regulations can be found at 15 CFR Part 7.[View source.]