Wilson v. District of Columbia, et al

MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment

D.D.C.February 16, 2017

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RORY CAVANAUGH WILSON : : Plaintiff, : : Case No. 16-cv-1580 (JEB) v. : : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., : : Defendants. : ___________________________________ : DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants District of Columbia (the District), and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), by and through undersigned counsel, hereby move this Court, pursuant to Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(6), for partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint on the grounds that: 1. Metropolitan Police Department is non sui juris; 2. Plaintiff’s Municipal Liability claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law; 3. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law. 4. The Eighth Amendment is not applicable to Plaintiff’s claims; 5. Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims merge and therefore dismissal of his Fifth Amendment claim is appropriate. 6. Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages against the District of Columbia Dated: February 16, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia GEORGE C. VALENTINE Deputy Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 1 of 13 2 ___/s/ Patricia A. Oxendine__________ PATRICIA A. OXENDINE D.C. Bar No. 428132 Chief, Civil Litigation Division, Section I /s/ Kerslyn D. Featherstone__________________ KERSLYN D. FEATHERSTONE D.C. Bar No. 478758 Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 630 South Washington, D.C. 20001 Phone: (202) 724-6600; (202) 727-6295 Fax: (202) 715-8924 Email: kerslyn.featherstone@dc.gov; Counsel for Defendants District of Columbia, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 2 of 13 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RORY CAVANAUGH WILSON, : : Plaintiff, : : Case No. 16-cv-1580 (JEB) v. : : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., : : Defendants. : ___________________________________ : MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants District of Columbia (the District), and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), by and through counsel, herein submit this memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2015, while at the Walmart Store on Georgia Avenue, N.E., in the District of Columbia, he was approached by D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Officer Michael Fisher, who was working a security detail. See Am. Compl., at ¶ 7. Plaintiff avers that Officer Fisher told him to leave the premises, and as he began to leave and while walking with a cane, he was pushed by Officer Fisher. Id. Plaintiff avers that Officer Fisher then dragged him by one foot out of the doors of the store. Id. Plaintiff submits that after reaching outside, he was approached by seven additional MPD officers, who detained, handcuffed and arrested him without probable cause. Id., at ¶ 8. Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 3 of 13 4 On February 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging claims of constitutional violations (Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth), false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages. On February 15, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint. See February 15, 2017, Minute Order. Defendant now moves to partially dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint as to Defendants District and MPD. STANDARD OF REVIEW A dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper if the Complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The determination of whether a dismissal is proper is made on the face of the pleadings alone. See Telecomms. of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A plaintiff is required to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 559 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Complaint, therefore, “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do” in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). Courts, thus, “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932 (1986)). To survive a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state a claim “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, but not the legal conclusions. Id. In Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 4 of 13 5 addition, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. While plausibility does not equate to the “probability requirement, [a plaintiff must show] more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. In construing a complaint liberally in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court grants the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in a complaint, nor must the Court accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusion. Id. ARGUMENT I. THE D.C. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT (MPD) IS NON SUI JURIS. As an agency within the District of Columbia Government, MPD is non sui juris and cannot be a party to this lawsuit. The law is clear that "agencies and departments within the District of Columbia government are not suable as separate entities." Does I through III v. District of Columbia, 238 F.Supp.2d 212, 222 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Gales v. District of Columbia, 47 F.Supp.2d 43, 48 (D.D.C. 1999) (in turn citing Fields v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corr., 789 F.Supp.2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1992)); see also Arnold v. Moore, F. upp.28, 33 (D.D.C. 1997) ("governmental agencies of the District of Columbia are not suable entities") (citing Robertson v. District of Columbia Bd. of Higher Educ., 359 A.2d 28, 31, n.4 (D.C. 1976); Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250, 251, n.1 (D.C. 1974); see also Wilson-Greene v. Dep't of Youth Rehab. Servs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49073, * 5 (D.D.C. 2007), citing Daskalea v. Washington Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 5 of 13 6 Humane Society, 480 F.Supp.2d 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2007)(quoting Kundrat v. District of Columbia, 106 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2000). Plaintiff has cited no authority by which he may independently file suit against this individual agency, as no such authority exists. See D.C. Code § 5-101.01, et seq. Therefore, MPD is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. II. PLAINTIFF’S MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINS THE DISTRICT FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the District is infirm. As a threshold matter, municipal liability under § 1983 is severely limited and does not allow for respondeat superior liability. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A § 1983 plaintiff must identify a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused the plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury. See Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); see also Bush v. District of Columbia, 595 F.3d 384, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2010) As explained in Monell, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom … inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 436 U.S. at 694. The Supreme Court has further instructed that “at the very least there must be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.” See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985). Stated otherwise, the municipal policy, practice, or custom must be the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658. Section 1983 liability is not imposed where the municipality merely employs an alleged tortfeasor, see id., or “when the municipality was not itself at fault.” City of Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 6 of 13 7 Oklahoma, 471 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet these stringent standards. See Complaint, generally. The four corners of Plaintiff’s amended complaint contain no facts from which the Court could reasonably infer that he suffered constitutional harm as a result of any unlawful policy, practice, or custom of the District. Instead, the crux of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is that Defendant Fisher engaged in constitutional misconduct that led to his claimed injuries. See Am. Compl., generally. Because the amended complaint is devoid of any facts that link the alleged constitutional misconduct of Defendant Fisher to a particular District custom, practice or policy, the District is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional claim(s) against it. III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IS INAPPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AS HE WAS NOT A CONVICTED PERSON DURING THE EVENTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. Plaintiff seeks to proceed against the Defendants under the Eighth Amendment. However, the Eighth Amendment bans cruel and unusual punishment of convicted persons. See Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d 1184, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Estate of Gaither v. District of Columbia, 655 F.Supp.2d 69, 85–86 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 593 (1979) (holding that Fifth Amendment is applicable to pretrial detainees). Since Plaintiff makes no allegations that he was a convicted person at the time of the events set forth in the amended complaint, Plaintiff cannot proceed against these Defendants under the Eighth Amendment, and dismissal of this claim is appropriate. See generally Am. Compl. IV. PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS MERGE, AND THE DISMISSAL OF HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM IS APPROPRIATE. Plaintiff’s amended complaint purports to allege both a Fourth Amendment, as well as a Fifth Amendment, claim against Defendant Fisher. Specifically, he contends that Defendant Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 7 of 13 8 Fisher violated the constitution when he falsely arrested Plaintiff and used excessive force against him during the arrest. Am. Compl., at ¶ 7. However, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process “is intended to prevent government officials from abusing their power or employing it as an instrument of oppression.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998). A plaintiff may make a substantive due process claim for misconduct so long as his claim is not “covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843. “Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular source of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process must be the guide for analyzing these claims. Id. at 842. Here, Plaintiff’s claim for relief arises from the alleged false arrest and excessive force used during the arrest which is governed by the Fourth Amendment. See Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (search of her home or the seizure of documents is not a claim under the Fifth Amendment because plaintiff’s remedy is expressly governed by Fourth Amendment). As a result, the Fifth Amendment claim is duplicative and merges into the Fourth Amendment one. See Matthews v. District of Columbia, 730 F.Supp.2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2010) (Fifth Amendment claim merges with Fourth Amendment claim). For this reason, the Fifth Amendment claim against these Defendants should be dismissed. V. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THESE DEFENDANTS. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against these Defendants fails as a matter of law. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “No State shall… deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law….” U.S. CONST. 14TH AMEND. Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 8 of 13 9 States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia or its employees. See Poindexter v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 891 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . .is not applicable to the actions of the District or its officials or employees”); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inv. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21 (1987) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a state”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia). Therefore, because the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims in this case, dismissal of this claim is appropriate. VI. PLAINTIFF’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW. For a plaintiff to state a claim for malicious prosecution in the District of Columbia, the plaintiff must show: “(1) termination of the underlying suit in plaintiff’s favor; (2) malice on the part of the defendant; (3) lack of probable cause for the underlying suit; and (4) special injury occasioned by plaintiff as a result of the original action.” Harris v. District of Columbia, 696 F.Supp.2d 123, 133 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). All four elements must be pled and proven for a claim of malicious prosecution to be successful. Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980). For the underlying suit to be considered terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, the termination “must reflect on the merits of the underlying action.” Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. 1986) (quoting Lackner v. Lacroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 750 (1979)). A full trial on the merits is not required but the termination may not be technical or procedural in nature. Brown, 503 A.2d at 1245 (noting that favorable termination should “indicate the innocence of the accused, and coupled with the other elements of lack of probable cause and malice, establish [ ] the tort of malicious prosecution.” (quoting Lackner, 25 Cal.3d at 750)). When the prosecutor Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 9 of 13 10 enters a Nolle Prosequi, dismissing the charges in the underlying action, it is “without prejudice unless otherwise stated.” Harris v. District of Columbia, 696 F.Supp.2d 123, 134 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding plaintiff failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution when relying on prosecution’s entry of Nolle Prosequi). “[A] dismissal without prejudice renders the proceedings a nullity and leave[s] the parties as if the action had never been brought.” Id. (quoting Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Company, 809 A.2d 1204, 1210 (D.C. 2002)) (internal quotations marks omitted). To prove the underlying suit terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff “bears the burden of alleging that his charges were dismissed with prejudice.” Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1223 n.29 (D.C. 1987)). Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any of the four elements necessary to proceed on a claim of malicious prosecution. Namely, Plaintiff has not pled within the four corners of the amended complaint that he was prosecuted and that there was a termination of the criminal action in his favor. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this claim because Plaintiff failed to properly assert a claim of malicious prosecution against these Defendants. VII. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES Plaintiff also seeks an award of punitive damages from the District. See Am. Compl., at ¶ 11. This claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot meet the stringent evidentiary standard for the award sought. In Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained that: absent “extraordinary circumstances” punitive damages are unavailable against the District of Columbia. (Citations omitted.) The term “extraordinary circumstances” is a term of art in this context. (citations omitted). In Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court following Fact Concerts, clarified the meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” such as “when a jurisdiction’s taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating the polices that cause the plaintiff’s injuries” or “where a municipality or Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 10 of 13 11 its policymakers have intentionally adopted the unconstitutional policy that caused the damages in question. Butera, 235 F.3d at 658. Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support a punitive damage claim against the District. See Am. Compl., generally. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages should be dismissed as to the District. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ respectfully requests that this Court grant Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss. Date: February 16, 2017 Respectfully submitted, KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia GEORGE C. VALENTINE Deputy Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division /s/ Patricia A. Oxendine PATRICIA A. OXENDINE D.C. Bar No. 428132 Chief, Civil Litigation Division, Section I /s/ Kerslyn D. Featherstone KERSLYN D. FEATHERSTONE D.C. Bar No. 478758 AKUA D. COPPOCK D.C. Bar No. 1032665 Assistant Attorneys General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 630 South Washington, D.C. 20001 Phone: (202) 724-6600; (202) 724-6522; (202) 727-6295 Fax: (202)-741-8924; (202) 730-1888 E-mail: kerslyn.featherstone@dc.gov; akua.coppock@dc.gov Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 11 of 13 12 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RORY CAVANAUGH WILSON : : Plaintiff, : : Case No. 16-cv-1580 (JEB) v. : : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., : : Defendants. : ___________________________________ : ORDER Upon consideration of Defendants District of Columbia and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department’s Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s Opposition thereto, if any, and the Defendants’ Reply, it is by this _________ day of __________________ 2017; ORDERED: that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED for the reasons set forth therein; and it is FURTHER ORDERED: that Plaintiff’s claims against MPD are dismissed with prejudice; and it is, FURTHER ORDERED: Plaintiff’s claims asserted under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are dismissed with prejudice; and it is, FURTHER ORDERED: that Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim against the District under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed with prejudice, and it is, Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 12 of 13 13 FURTHER ORDERED: Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against the District is dismissed with prejudice. SO ORDERED. __________________________________________ JUDGE JAMES E. BOASBERG U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 13 of 13