Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations CommissionREPLY BRIEF re Response in Opposition, 52 Motion for Summary JudgmentW.D. Pa.July 26, 2016IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CHERYL WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Defendant, : : : : : : : : : : Civil Action No. 14-1290 Judge Nora Barry Fischer REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS JOSEPH RETORT ADAM STALCZYNSKI AND THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION (PHRC) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT And Now, comes the Defendants, above named, by the Office of Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Thomas L. Donahoe, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Mary Friedline, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and files the following Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and avers as follows: FULL FAITH AND CREDIT Defendants herein, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, have asserted that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Williams v. Unemployment Compensation Review Board, 2015 WL 5446802 (Pa. Commwlth. 2015) determined that Plaintiff herein did not leave her employment in August 2014 for a necessitous and compelling reason and further determined that the defendant herein, the PHRC, adequately accommodated Plaintiff‟s perceived and or actual disability. Defendants further argued that throughout the litigation of her claim for Unemployment Compensation benefits Plaintiff, Cheryl Williams, asserted that part of the necessitous and compelling reason for her leaving her job was a hostile work environment and Case 2:14-cv-01290-NBF Document 61 Filed 07/26/16 Page 1 of 5 the Commonwealth Court held that there was no necessitous and compelling reason for her to leave her employment in August 2013. (SMF 11, 12 and 13) Defendants respectfully submit the following further support for their position that the judgment of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court is entitled to „full faith and credit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1738 and at a minimum is admissible and probative evidence in this Federal Court action. See Helfrich v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. 03–5793, 2005 WL 1715689, (E.D.Pa. July 21, 2005) (acknowledging that a decision of the PUCRB can be admissible and probative, but finding it did not create a genuine issue of material fact of discrimination in a Title VII case because of the “divergent factual, legal, and policy considerations addressed by the Referee and this Court”). In Brown v. Tucci, 960 F.Supp.2d 544, 566 (W.D.Pa.2013) the Court discussed and explained the doctrines of Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion and the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 in both contexts. The Court explained that Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, refers “to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim.” Brown v. Tucci, supra, at 566 In determining the issue preclusive effect of a state court judgment, the Court applies the rendering state's law of issue preclusion. Thomas v. Parkway West Career and Tech. Ctr., 2013 WL 1195115, (W.D.Pa.2013) (citing Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381–382, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985)). “Issue preclusion occurs when: „(1) the issue presented in a later action is identical to the one decided in a prior action; (2) the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) the parties against whom issue preclusion is Case 2:14-cv-01290-NBF Document 61 Filed 07/26/16 Page 2 of 5 sought are the same or are in privity; and (4) the party against whom preclusion is sought had „a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Defendants acknowledge the recent decision of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Mathis v. Christian Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. 91 F.Supp.3d 651126 (E.D. Pa. March 12, 2015), finding that in light of the amendments in 2003 to the Unemployment Compensation Statute in Pennsylvania, at 43 P.S. §829, the findings of the Unemployment Compensation Review Board do not have preclusive Collateral Estoppel effect. Defendant herein submits that the findings of the Commonwealth Court in this matter are at a minimum admissible and can have a determinative effect in a Federal Court action under Title VII pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Spyridakis v. Riesling Group, Inc., 398 Fed.Appx. 793 (3d Cir. 2010), Nelson v. Allan's Waste Water Service, Inc., 2014 WL 109087, (W.D.Pa., Jan. 2014); Black v. City of Pittsburgh, 2013 WL 4041966 (W.D.Pa. 2013). Spyridakis v. Riesling Group, Inc., supra, is a Third Circuit Opinion issued in 2010 after the 2003 Amendments to 43 P.S. §829. In that case the Third Circuit considered a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's determination, made on appellate review in an unemployment compensation proceeding, that a teaching assistant was independent contractor, not employee, of a company that provided online professional development courses for educators. The Circuit Court held that a judicially reviewed decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Board was entitled to preclusive effect in a later Federal proceeding asserting claims under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment Collection Law (WPCL); citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738. The Third Circuit noted that the Plaintiff was represented by counsel before the Unemployment Compensation Review Board and appellate Court and the Court considered an extensive record, Case 2:14-cv-01290-NBF Document 61 Filed 07/26/16 Page 3 of 5 further noting that Plaintiff in the administrative proceeding had every incentive to litigate her case vigorously and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate issue of her employment status. See also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883,72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) discussing the general rule that decisions of state administrative agencies that have been reviewed by state courts are given preclusive effect in federal courts. In Long v. Valley Forge Military Academy Foundation, 2008 WL 5157508 (E.D. Pa. 2008) the Court noted that decisions by state unemployment compensation officials may have probative value when the parties dispute a defendant's reason for terminating a plaintiff's employment. In the case at hand the Plaintiff, Cheryl Williams, was represented by Counsel at all stages of the Unemployment Compensation proceedings. (Defendants‟ Exhibits 5-8 and 22) Additionally, the PHRC was a party to both proceedings. (Defendant‟s Exhibit 7) And there was a final adjudication on the merits. (Defense Exhibit 7) The issues decided by the Commonwealth Court and pursued throughout the Unemployment case were whether or not Plaintiff was the victim of disability discrimination and a hostile work environment which led her to quit her job in 2014 or whether she was not the victim of such discrimination and voluntarily left her employment with the PHRC. (Defense Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 22) Those issues are identical to the questions raised here in the Title VII Race and Gender Discrimination claim brought by Plaintiff against the PHRC. In this lawsuit Plaintiff claims that she was constructively discharged due to a refusal to accommodate her disability and due to a hostile work environment. The Referee, the Unemployment Compensation review Board and the Commonwealth Court reviewed testimony from Plaintiff and representatives of her employer. Case 2:14-cv-01290-NBF Document 61 Filed 07/26/16 Page 4 of 5 They reviewed exhibits and Plaintiff had the right to cross-examine. The Court affirmed the conclusion that the plaintiff did not leave her job due to a constructive discharge caused by discrimination, a lack of accommodation or a hostile work environment. The Commonwealth Court‟s scope of review included determining whether Constitutional Rights were violated, an error of law was committed, whether necessary findings of facts were supported by substantial evidence and whether Appeal Board procedure was followed. See Sheetz v. Unemployment Compensation Appeal Board, 708 A.2d 884 (Pa. Cmwlth 1998). Thus, Defendant respectfully suggests that the position of the Third Circuit even after the amendments in 2003 to 43 PS §829 is that a judicially affirmed Opinion by the Unemployment Compensation Review Board may be determinative in a later Title VII action involving the same parties and factual and legal issues and at a minimum is relevant and probative. RESPECTFULY SUBMITTED, BRUCE L. CASTOR, JR. First Deputy Attorney General /s/ Thomas L. Donahoe THOMAS L. DONAHOE Senior Deputy Attorney General Litigation Section KENNETH L. JOEL Chief Deputy Attorney General Chief, Litigation Section OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 6 th Floor, Manor Complex 564 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15219 July 26, 2016 Case 2:14-cv-01290-NBF Document 61 Filed 07/26/16 Page 5 of 5