Wiener v. Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc. et al

REPLY to Response to 27 MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

D. Mass.September 10, 2010

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS JEFFREY WIENER, derivatively on behalf of EATON VANCE MUNICIPALS TRUST, Plaintiff, v. EATON VANCE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., BENJAMIN C. ESTY, ALLEN R. FREEDMAN, WILLIAM H. PARK, RONALD A. PEARLMAN, HELEN FRAME PETERS, HEIDI L. STEIGER, LYNN A. STOUT, RALPH F. VERNI, and THOMAS FAUST, Defendants, and EATON VANCE MUNICIPALS TRUST, Nominal Defendant. Civil Action No. 10-10515-DPW Leave Granted on July 13, 2010 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF THE INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE DEFENDANTS AND NOMINAL DEFENDANT EATON VANCE MUNICIPALS TRUST IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT GOODWIN PROCTER LLP Stacey B. Ardini (BBO #663161) 53 State Street Boston, MA 02109 (617) 570-1000 Mark Holland (pro hac vice) Mary K. Dulka (pro hac vice) The New York Times Building 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 (212) 813-8800 Attorneys for the Independent Trustee Defendants and the Trust Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 1 of 18 LIBNY/4932664.1 i Table of Contents Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1 ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................................2 I. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 AND MASSACHUSETTS LAW..................................................2 A. Plaintiff Cannot Evade His Burden By Alleging “Ongoing Illegal Activity” ........... 2 B. The ICA Does Not Preempt Application of the Massachusetts Demand Statute. ....................................................................................................................... 6 II. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST THE INDEPENDENT TRUSTEES.........................................................9 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations of an Intentional Breach of Fiduciary Duty Fail to Satisfy the Applicable Pleading Standards ................................................................ 9 B. Plaintiff Does Not Allege that the Trust Received No Benefit From the Rule 12b-1 Payments, Thus Failing to Plead a Claim for Waste ..................................... 10 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................11 Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 2 of 18 ii LIBNY/4932664.1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).............................................................................................................10 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) ........................................................................................................11 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979)........................................................................................................... 1, 6-8 Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, 2002 WL 31888343 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002)...........................................................................4 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)..............................................................................................9, 10 Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007)....................................................................................................4 Evangelist v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1982) ...............................................................................................5 Gantler v. Stephens, 2008 WL 401124 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2008) ...............................................................................4 Gerber v. Bowditch, 2006 WL 1284232 (D. Mass. May 8, 2006) ........................................................................ 9-10 Gray v. Barnett (In re Dehon, Inc.), 334 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) .........................................................................................5 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) ........................................................................................................4 Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003)....................................................................................................4 Halebian v. Berv, 931 N.E.2d 986 (Mass. 2010) .......................................................................................... passim Hendersen v. Axiam, Inc., 1999 WL 33587312 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 22, 1999)...................................................... 10-11 Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 3 of 18 iii LIBNY/4932664.1 Independent Cellular Tel., Inc. v. Barker, 1997 WL 153816 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1997).............................................................................11 Kahn ex rel. DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Roberts, 679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996) ..........................................................................................................4 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991).....................................................................................................................8 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 939 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991) .....................................................................................................8 Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 2004)....................................................................................................4 Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).......................................................................................................4 N. Am. Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009)........................................................................................................10 In re Sabine, Inc., 2006 WL 1045712 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2006)...............................................................11 Sachs v. Sprague, 401 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Mass. 2005) ......................................................................................10 SEC v. Keating, 1992 WL 207918 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 1992)........................................................................... 8-9 Stern v. General Electric Co., 1992 WL 8195 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1992) ................................................................................11 Swingless Golf Club Corp. v. Taylor, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ...................................................................................11 In re Teu Holdings, Inc., 287 B.R. 26 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) ..........................................................................................11 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 2004 WL 2050138 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) ............................................................................4 Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 4 of 18 iv LIBNY/4932664.1 STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) ......................................................................................................................8 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1..........................................................................................................2, 10, 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ........................................................................................................................10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ................................................................................................................2, 9, 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1..........................................................................................................................4 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B, § 61 .....................................................................................................5 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, §7.44(a)...............................................................................................1 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 7.44(d) ................................................................................. 2-3, 6, 9 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 8.30 ..............................................................................................3, 5 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 8.42 ..................................................................................................3 Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 5 of 18 LIBNY/4932664.1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT In our moving papers, we demonstrated that where, as here, the board of trustees of a Massachusetts business trust has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry to reject a shareholder’s demand, his derivative suit should be dismissed.1 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently confirmed that this is the rule under Massachusetts law. Halebian v. Berv, 931 N.E.2d 986 (Mass. 2010). Plaintiff does not even attempt to argue in his opposition that the Independent Trustees lacked independence, did not act in good faith, or failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry. Instead, he argues that his claims are exempt from the requirements of the Massachusetts demand statute. His arguments are without merit. Plaintiff cannot evade his burden under Massachusetts law by arguing that the conduct he complains of involves “ongoing illegal activity.” In virtually every case in which a board is called upon to investigate a demand, alleged “illegal activity” is involved. The Massachusetts demand statute does not exempt cases alleging ongoing illegal activity from the requirement that courts dismiss derivative actions where the board has properly rejected a demand. Plaintiff does not -- and cannot -- cite to a single case that refused to uphold a board’s reasonable, good faith determination that a derivative lawsuit should not proceed simply because the plaintiff alleged ongoing illegal activity. Plaintiff’s argument that federal law preempts the Massachusetts demand statute is also a non-starter. The U.S. Supreme Court, in the very case Plaintiff relies upon, among others, has recognized the authority of an investment company’s board of trustees under state law to terminate shareholder derivative litigation. E.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). And Plaintiff does 1 See Independent Trustees’ Moving Memorandum (“Trustee Mem.”), Docket No. 28, at 12-17; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, §7.44(a). Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 6 of 18 2 LIBNY/4932664.1 not -- and cannot -- cite a single case in which a court has held that the Massachusetts demand statute conflicts with the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”). Finally, Plaintiff fails in his Opposition to explain how he has stated a claim on the merits. He concedes that his breach of fiduciary duty claim alleges intentional conduct, yet he does not point to any facts alleged in his Complaint that demonstrate such conduct, let alone allegations that would satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He also does not -- and cannot -- argue that the Trust did not receive any benefit from the challenged Rule 12b-1 payments, and thus cannot support his claim for waste. The Complaint therefore should be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. ARGUMENT I. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 AND MASSACHUSETTS LAW A. Plaintiff Cannot Evade His Burden By Alleging “Ongoing Illegal Activity” Plaintiff concedes that his Complaint “makes no attempt to allege facts that rebut any business judgment” of the Trust’s Board.2 Instead, Plaintiff claims that because he has alleged ongoing illegal conduct, the Board’s independence and “other factors pertinent to the business judgment rule . . . can all be disregarded.”3 This argument completely ignores the express requirements of the Massachusetts demand statute. Section 7.44(d) states that a court “shall dismiss” a derivative action following a board’s rejection of the plaintiff’s demand “unless the plaintiff has alleged with particularity facts rebutting the corporation’s filing” showing the board’s independence and “that the independent directors made the determination [to reject the demand] in 2 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint by the Independent Trustee Defendants and Nominal Defendant Eaton Vance Municipals Trust (“Opp.”) at 2. 3 Id. Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 7 of 18 3 LIBNY/4932664.1 good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which their conclusions are based.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 7.44(d) (emphasis added). The statute does not contain any exception for derivative suits alleging “ongoing illegal conduct.” The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts very recently construed Section 7.44 for the first time in Halebian v. Berv, 931 N.E.2d 986 (Mass. 2010). Halebian held that Section 7.44 applies regardless of whether a derivative complaint was filed before or after a board rejected a shareholder’s demand. In so doing, the Supreme Judicial Court reiterated that the statute gives the board the power to decide whether to bring a lawsuit, and that a derivative lawsuit must be dismissed unless the plaintiff pleads facts showing that the board’s decision to reject the demand was not made in good faith after reasonable inquiry. Id. at 995.4 Plaintiff’s argument that the Trust’s Board cannot make “a business decision to insulate itself from any judicial review of its ongoing decisions to violate the law” confuses two separate concepts, as the Halebian court makes clear.5 In Halebian, the Supreme Judicial Court distinguished between (i) the business judgment “rule,”6 which protects officers and directors from liability for conduct taken in good faith and reasonable care in the best interest of the corporation, and (ii) the business judgment “doctrine” set forth in the Massachusetts demand statute, which “protects a corporation’s decision that prosecution of the claim demanded by the shareholder is not in the best interests of the corporation where the decision is made in good faith by independent decision makers after reasonable inquiry.” Halebian, 931 N.E.2d at 991 n.11. The “rule” may not shield directors or officers from liability for ongoing illegal activity, whereas the “doctrine,” which 4 The Halebian court also confirmed that the demand statute applies to Massachusetts business trusts, such as the Trust here. See 931 N.E.2d at 988 n.4. 5 Opp. at 2 (emphasis in original). 6 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, §§ 8.30, 8.42. Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 8 of 18 4 LIBNY/4932664.1 is the basis for the Independent Trustees’ motion here, protects the decision not to pursue a claim alleging ongoing illegal activity. Thus, in Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) upon which Plaintiff relies (Opp. at 4-5, 9), the court distinguished between the two concepts outlined in Halebian and rejected Plaintiff’s logic here. In Miller, the shareholder plaintiff alleged that a telephone company’s provision of services to the Democratic National Convention (“DNC”) without charge amounted to an illegal contribution which violated campaign finance laws and “involve[d] the corporation in criminal activity.” Id. at 763. At issue was whether the decision not to collect the money owed by the DNC was subject to the directors’ business judgment under New York law. The court held it was not. Unlike this case, in Miller no demand was made on the company’s board to take action. Nor did the board investigate the allegations of illegal conduct. The Miller court noted, however, that “[h]ad plaintiffs’ complaint alleged only a failure to pursue a corporate claim, application of the sound business judgment rule would support the district court’s ruling that a shareholder could not attack the directors’ decision.” 7 7 Id. at 762; see Opp. at 5. None of the other cases Plaintiff cites involved a board’s decision not to pursue a claim demanded by a shareholder, let alone held that such a decision was invalid because of ongoing illegal conduct. (See Opp. at 6 and n.2.) E.g., Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, 2002 WL 31888343, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) (court found that the plaintiff adequately alleged that conduct relating to re-pricing of stock options fell outside of the board’s authority, and thus demand was excused); Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs., Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004) (non-derivative case involving claims between members of a limited liability company); In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 2004 WL 2050138, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (granting summary judgment dismissing claim that defendant breached his fiduciary duty when he negotiated his employment contract). Indeed, many of Plaintiff’s cited cases upheld the board’s business judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1220 (Del. 1996) (discussed in the Trustees Mem. at 12-13 n.48); Kahn ex rel. DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Roberts, 679 A.2d 460, 466 (Del. 1996); Gantler v. Stephens, 2008 WL 401124, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2008); see also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (dismissing complaint for failure to satisfy particularity requirement of Rule 23.1); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007) (dismissing complaint because demand was not excused). Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 9 of 18 5 LIBNY/4932664.1 Gray v. Barnett (In re Dehon, Inc.), 334 B.R. 55, 66 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (Opp. at 5-6, 9), also involved the “rule” described in Halebian -- not the “doctrine” at issue here -- and thus does not support Plaintiff’s argument. Gray is not even a derivative action, and thus does not address whether the board made a good faith, reasonable decision that maintenance of a lawsuit was not in the company’s best interest.8 Rather, in Gray the company’s bankruptcy plan administrator alleged that the company’s directors illegally made distributions to the company’s stockholders when the company was insolvent, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B, § 61. The defendants argued that the business judgment rule (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 8.30) protected them from liability because they believed that the distributions were in the corporation’s best interest. The court disagreed, explaining that the business judgment rule would only protect the directors’ determination that the company was not insolvent and that the distributions would not render it insolvent, but would not shield them from illegally making distributions to stockholders. Id. at 66. The Massachusetts demand statute was never at issue in the case. Plaintiff thus fails to cite a single case decided before or after enactment of the Massachusetts demand statute that overturned a board’s decision to not pursue litigation because the plaintiff had alleged ongoing illegal conduct. By contrast, the Independent Trustees have cited authorities involving demand futility that hold that conclusory allegations of illegal conduct do not undermine a board’s right to determine whether to bring a lawsuit on the company’s behalf.9 8 Compare Opp. at 9 (characterizing Gray as a “derivative complaint”) with Gray, 334 B.R. at 65 (“Defendants rely primarily on language from Massachusetts decisions discussing the business judgment rule presumption in the context of shareholder derivative suits…The claims made here are not derivative.”). 9 See Trustee Mem. at 16. Indeed, Plaintiff’s cited authority recognizes that “directors, despite being defendants, are still capable of making an honest decision about whether to sue on the corporation’s behalf,” and that a derivative suit can be barred entirely “upon a showing that the directors’ refusal to sue was in good faith.” Evangelist v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87, 90-91 (D. Mass. 1982) (discussed in Opp. at 8). Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 10 of 18 6 LIBNY/4932664.1 Plaintiff’s contention that his Complaint “does not have to prove his allegations of ongoing illegal conduct” also misses the mark.10 The basis for the Independent Trustees’ motion is that Plaintiff must plead with particularity sufficient facts to show that the Board’s decision to reject his demand was not made in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry, and that he has not done so.11 Plaintiff acknowledges that allegations of past illegal conduct are subject to the Board’s business judgment not to pursue such claims.12 And he cannot point to any exemption in Section 7.44(d) for cases alleging “ongoing illegal conduct.” That is not surprising, as such an exception would eviscerate Section 7.44’s policy of vesting the power to manage the business and affairs of a trust, including the power to pursue or terminate litigation, in the hands of the board of directors. See Halebian, 931 N.E.2d at 995. As discussed in their Moving Memorandum, the Independent Trustees conducted a detailed and thorough review of Plaintiff’s demand, and acting in good faith exercised their reasonable business judgment in concluding that Plaintiff’s claims had no merit.13 Plaintiff’s allegations of purported ongoing illegal conduct do not satisfy his burden under Section 7.44(d) to plead with particularity facts rebutting that showing. B. The ICA Does Not Preempt Application of the Massachusetts Demand Statute Plaintiff also argues that the ICA preempts application of Massachusetts’ demand statute. He relies principally on Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).14 Plaintiff is correct that Burks “is controlling authority here.”15 Burks, however, held quite the opposite of what Plaintiff contends: 10 Opp. at 9 (emphasis in original). 11 See Trustee Mem. at 6-11, 14-15. 12 See Opp. at 5. 13 See Trustee Mem. at 6-11, 14-15. 14 Opp. at 11. 15 Opp. at 11. Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 11 of 18 7 LIBNY/4932664.1 it recognized that federal courts should respect a board’s decision under state law to terminate a shareholder derivative suit alleging violations of the ICA. In Burks, the plaintiff brought a derivative action on behalf of a registered investment company, alleging that the fund’s investment adviser and directors breached the ICA, the Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”), and contractual and common law duties when the fund purchased commercial paper issued by a railway company that went bankrupt. Id. at 473. The district court held that the independent directors had properly exercised their business judgment under Delaware law to terminate a derivative action asserting federal as well as state law claims. The Second Circuit, echoing the logic Plaintiff employs here, reversed and held that “as a consequence of the ICA, disinterested directors of an investment company do not have the power to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by shareholders . . . .” Id. at 475 (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, and explained that the ICA and IAA do not “forbid director termination of all nonfrivolous actions.” Id. at 486. The Court ruled that “federal courts should apply state law governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits to the extent such law is consistent with the policies of the ICA and IAA.” Id. In so doing, the Court emphasized Congress’ purpose in structuring the ICA to place a fund’s unaffiliated directors in the role of “independent watchdogs” overseeing the fund’s internal affairs, including the decision whether to bring litigation: [T]he structure and purpose of the ICA indicate that Congress entrusted to the independent directors of investment companies, exercising the authority granted to them by state law, the primary responsibility for looking after the interests of the funds’ shareholders. There may well be situations in which the independent directors could reasonably believe that the best interests of the shareholders call for a decision not to sue – as, for example, where the costs of litigation to the corporation outweigh any potential Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 12 of 18 8 LIBNY/4932664.1 recovery . . . . In such cases, it would certainly be consistent with the [ICA] to allow the independent directors to terminate a suit, even though not frivolous. Indeed, it would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon “watchdogs” to protect shareholder interests and yet, where the “watchdogs” have done precisely that, require that they be totally muzzled. Id. at 484-85. Burks thus embraces the principle that a fund’s independent directors may, in the exercise of their business judgment, refuse a demand to bring litigation under the ICA. The Supreme Court later reiterated these principles in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991). There, a mutual fund shareholder brought a derivative suit alleging that a fund’s proxy statement contained misleading facts in violation of Section 20(a) of the ICA. Rejecting an argument similar to the one Plaintiff asserts here -- that the ICA preempts state law on the issue of demand -- the Court ruled that courts should apply state law in determining whether shareholders are required to make a demand before bringing claims under the ICA. The Kamen Court emphasized the importance of the demand requirement “to protect the directors’ prerogative to take over the litigation or to oppose it,” and explained that the board’s decision to do the latter is an exercise of their business judgment. Id. at 101 (citations omitted).16 Plaintiff cites SEC v. Keating, 1992 WL 207918 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 1992), for the proposition that the business judgment rule cannot “supersede the requirements” of the federal securities laws.17 Keating was not a derivative action. In Keating, the SEC sought to enjoin violations of the federal securities laws, and an individual defendant asserted the business judgment rule as an affirmative defense to the SEC’s charges. The court held that such a defense “is inapplicable to an injunctive action brought by the SEC to enforce the securities laws.” Id. at 16 On remand, the Seventh Circuit, applying Maryland law as directed by the Supreme Court, upheld the decision by the fund’s independent directors to terminate the derivative litigation alleging violations of the ICA. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 939 F.2d 458, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1991). 17 Opp. at 11. Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 13 of 18 9 LIBNY/4932664.1 *4. Keating’s refusal to allow assertion of the business judgment rule as a defense to securities claims brought by the SEC does not in any way preclude application of the business judgment doctrine (as explained in Halebian) to terminate private shareholder derivative actions alleging violations of the ICA. Plaintiff’s preemption argument thus also lacks any merit. Since Plaintiff has not complied with Section 7.44(d) or shown any reason why he is exempt from complying with that statute, his Complaint should be dismissed. II. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST THE INDEPENDENT TRUSTEES A. Plaintiff’s Allegations of an Intentional Breach of Fiduciary Duty Fail to Satisfy the Applicable Pleading Standards Plaintiff’s Opposition attempts to avoid Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements by arguing that his breach of fiduciary duty claim is not based on intentional conduct that sounds in fraud.18 Yet, Plaintiff also argues that he asserts more than a Caremark failure of oversight claim because the Trustees knowingly made illegal payments out of Trust assets.19 Plaintiff thus undermines his own argument. Plaintiff cites to Gerber v. Bowditch, 2006 WL 1284232 (D. Mass. May 8, 2006) (Opp. at 12), where this Court made clear that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard “extends to all claims of fraud, whatever may be the theory of legal duty statutory, tort, contractual or fiduciary.”20 In Gerber, this Court applied Rule 9(b) to the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims arising from, among other things, the defendants’ purported nondisclosures in connection 18 Opp. at 12-13; see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 19 Id. at 13-15. 20 Gerber, 2006 WL 1284232, at *13 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 14 of 18 10 LIBNY/4932664.1 with a tender offer and their failure to ensure that the plaintiffs received a fair value for their partnership interests.21 Here, Plaintiff asserts that Caremark does not apply because he is alleging that the Trustees were “aware that [they] were deciding to make asset-based compensation payments to broker- dealers” which purportedly were illegal, thus breaching their fiduciary duties “arising from their own misconduct in using Trust assets improperly” to the Trust’s detriment.22 Such allegations are precisely the type of “intentional breaches of fiduciary duties” which this Court has stated are subject to Rule 9(b). Sachs v. Sprague, 401 F. Supp. 2d 159, 170 n.15 (D. Mass. 2005). Far from satisfying Rule 9(b), Plaintiff has not even alleged “sufficient factual matter” under Rule 8(a) that the Trustees knowingly made illegal payments in order to survive a motion to dismiss.23 And, to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging something less than knowing, intentional conduct, such as the Trustees’ purported failure to ensure the Trust’s compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, he similarly has failed to plead facts to support the requisite conscious disregard of duties for such a Caremark claim.24 B. Plaintiff Does Not Allege that the Trust Received No Benefit From the Rule 12b-1 Payments, Thus Failing to Plead a Claim for Waste Plaintiff contends that he has adequately alleged a waste claim because Trust assets were used “for unlawful compensation payments to broker-dealers.”25 Yet even Plaintiff’s own cited authority holds that to state a claim for waste, a complaint must allege conduct “for which the 21 Id. at *14. Plaintiff’s other cited authority, N. Am. Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2009) (Opp. at 12), likewise applied Rule 9(b) to the breach of fiduciary duty claims. 22 Opp. at 14. 23 See Trustee Mem. at 17 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). 24 See Trustee Mem. at 18-19. 25 Opp. at 16. Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 15 of 18 11 LIBNY/4932664.1 corporation receives no benefit.” Hendersen v. Axiam, Inc., 1999 WL 33587312, at *53 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 22, 1999) (emphasis added) (discussed in Opp. at 16). See also In re Teu Holdings, Inc., 287 B.R. 26, 34 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (Opp. at 17) (“[a] corporate waste claim must fail if the corporation received any benefit from the challenged transaction”).26 Plaintiff’s waste claim does not and could not allege that the Trust failed to receive any distribution services from EVD or the broker-dealers in exchange for the Rule 12b-1 payments. Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts that because the broker-dealers did not register as investment advisers and establish advisory accounts, the Trust and its shareholders only had brokerage accounts which were “not a comparable service.”27 That hardly constitutes an “unconscionable case” of Trustees irrationally squandering away the Trust’s assets for no consideration, requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s waste claim. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000). CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the Independent Trustees’ Moving Memorandum and in EVD’s and Thomas Faust’s Moving and Reply Memoranda, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. 26 Thus, in In re Sabine, Inc., 2006 WL 1045712 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2006) (Opp. at 17), the court upheld a waste claim alleging a diversion of a subsidiary’s funds to cover expenses from the corporate parent’s other operations because the subsidiary “did not receive any benefit” from those transfers. Id. at *9 (emphasis in original). See also Independent Cellular Tel., Inc. v. Barker, 1997 WL 153816, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1997) (Opp. at 17) (alleging that the corporation’s payment of a finder’s fee “is not justified by any service provided”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s other cases are also distinguishable. (Opp. at 15-17.) See Swingless Golf Club Corp. v. Taylor, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1071 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2009) (alleging that the corporation failed to use any of the investors’ funds to develop and sell its namesake product); Stern v. General Electric Co., 1992 WL 8195, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1992) (challenging corporation’s payments to support anti-business politicians whose positions harmed the interests of the company’s shareholders). 27 Opp. at 16 n.8. Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 16 of 18 12 LIBNY/4932664.1 Dated: September 10, 2010 Respectfully submitted, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP /s/ Stacey B. Ardini Stacey B. Ardini (BBO #663161) 53 State Street Boston, MA 02109 Tel: (617) 570-1000 Fax: (617) 523-1231 sardini@goodwinprocter.com Mark Holland (admitted pro hac vice) Mary K. Dulka (admitted pro hac vice) The New York Times Building 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 Telephone: (212) 813-8800 Fax: (212) 355-3333 mholland@goodwinprocter.com mdulka@goodwinprocter.com Attorneys for the Independent Trustee Defendants and the Trust Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 17 of 18 13 LIBNY/4932664.1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Stacey B. Ardini, certify that this document filed through the ECF system will be sent electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) and paper copies will be sent to those indicated as non registered participants on September 10, 2010. /s/ Stacey B. Ardini Case 1:10-cv-10515-DPW Document 36 Filed 09/10/10 Page 18 of 18