31 Cited authorities

Blum v. Stenson
465 U.S. 886 (1984) Cited 9,115 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that fee shifting is “to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel”
TRW Inc. v. Andrews
534 U.S. 19 (2001) Cited 1,215 times 11 Legal Analyses
Holding a cardinal principal of statutory interpretation is that “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant”
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert
444 U.S. 472 (1980) Cited 1,058 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that the district court properly assessed attorney's fees based on the total fund available to the prevailing class rather than the amount actually recovered
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.
290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) Cited 1,115 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding state law governing underlying claims in a diversity action “also governs the award of fees”
In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) Cited 1,168 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that nothing in Rule 23 "can be read to authorize separate, liberalized criteria for settlement classes"
Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.
209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000) Cited 913 times
Holding that risk must be measured at the time the lawsuit is filed
Reed v. Rhodes
179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999) Cited 556 times
Holding that "[the lodestar] amount can then be adjusted based on the Johnson factors"
Sprague v. Ticonic Bank
307 U.S. 161 (1939) Cited 1,050 times
Holding that because a petition for fees is "an independent proceeding supplemental to the original," the suggestion "that it came after the end of the term at which the main decree was entered and [is] therefore too late" was unavailing
Skwira v. U.S.
344 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2003) Cited 230 times
Holding discovery rule applicable to wrongful death claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) despite statutory language indicating that such claims “shall be forever barred” absent written notice “within two years after such claim accrues” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b))
Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.
9 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 1993) Cited 261 times
Holding that use of either the lodestar or percentage method of calculating attorney's fees is appropriate in common fund cases

White v. CRST, Inc.

31 Cited authorities

Holding that fee shifting is “to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel”

Holding a cardinal principal of statutory interpretation is that “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant”

Holding that the district court properly assessed attorney's fees based on the total fund available to the prevailing class rather than the amount actually recovered

Holding state law governing underlying claims in a diversity action “also governs the award of fees”

Holding that nothing in Rule 23 "can be read to authorize separate, liberalized criteria for settlement classes"

Holding that risk must be measured at the time the lawsuit is filed

Holding that "[the lodestar] amount can then be adjusted based on the Johnson factors"

Holding that because a petition for fees is "an independent proceeding supplemental to the original," the suggestion "that it came after the end of the term at which the main decree was entered and [is] therefore too late" was unavailing

Holding discovery rule applicable to wrongful death claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) despite statutory language indicating that such claims “shall be forever barred” absent written notice “within two years after such claim accrues” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b))

Holding that use of either the lodestar or percentage method of calculating attorney's fees is appropriate in common fund cases