USA v. Safavian

RESPONSE

D.D.C.February 10, 2006

UNITED STATESDISTRiCT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATESOF AMERICA V. Cr, No 05-370(PLF) DAVID HOSSEINSAFAVIAN Defendant GOVERNMENT’SOPPOSITIONTO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT TheUnited States of America,by andthrough its undersignedattorneys,hereby respectfullysubmitsits Oppositionto Defendant’sMotion to DismissIndictment. As explained in theaccompanyingMemorandumofPoints andAuthorities,becausetheIndictmentclearlyand properlyallegesthat Defendantcommittedtheoffensescharged,andbecauseit is for thejury — afterhearingtheevidenceattrial to decidethesufficiencyof theevidence,Defendant’sMotion to DismisstheIndictmentshouldbe denied. Respectfullysubmitted, (*~ç~r /C * N. I IN -3 NATHANIEL B. EDMONDS Trial Attorney,FraudSection Criminal Division UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice zfl~ ~ /7 /7~i PETERR. ZEIDENBERG / Trial Attorney,Public Integrity Settion Criminal Division UnitedStatesDepartmentof Justice Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 1 of 57 TABLE OF CONTENTS FACTUAL BACKGROUND .2 RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS 16 RESPONSETO DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT 19 1. COUNT TWO SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED BECAUSETHE INDICTMENT FAIRLY INFORMS DEFENDANT OF THE CHARGES 19 l.A CountTwo fairly informstheDefendantofthecharges 19 I.B Defendantmadea falsestatementhrougha trick, schemeor device 21 I.B.1 Juryshoulddeterminetheliteral truth of Defendant’sstatements 21 I.B.2 No fundamentalambiguitiesexist 24 I.C Defendantconcealedmaterialinformationthat he hada legal duty to disclose 27 I.C. 1 Indictmentsufficiently allegesaffirmativeactsfor concealment 28 I.C.2 Defendanthad aduty to makefull disclosureto theethicsofficer 30 I.D Defendant’sStatementsWereMaterial to GSA EthicsOfficer’s Official Decision, .. 32 II. COUNT ONE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED BECAUSETHE INDICTMENT ALLEGES OBSTRUCTIONOF THE GSA-OIGINVESTIGATION 34 In. COUNT THREE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED BECAUSETHE INDICTMENT ALLEGES THAT DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFIED AND CONCEALEDMATERIAL FACTS DURING THE GSA-OIGINVESTIGATION 38 III.A Indictmentsufficiently allegesatrick, schemeor device 38 iII.A.1 h~dictmentallegesaffirmative acts 38 III.A.2 Defendanthad aduty to disclose 39 III.B AllegedConcealedAssistanceWasMaterial 39 IlI.C DefendantFalsifiedMaterialFacts 40 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 2 of 57 IV. COUNT FOUR SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSEDBECAUSETHE STATEMENTS ARE PERTINENTTO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION OF F~L~DAND INFLUENCE PEDDLING 41 IV.A SCIA’s jurisdictionincludedDefendant’sinvolvementin theScotlandtrip 41 IV.B Defendant’sfalsestatementswere corruptlydesignedto obstruct 45 V. COUNT FIVE SHOULDNOT BE DISMISSEDBECAUSEINDICTMENT ALLEGES DEFENDANT’S FALSIFICATION AND CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS . 46 V.A Indictmentallegesaffirmative actssufficient to establishatrick schemeor device. . 46 V.B Defendantmadeinaccuraterepresentationsto SCIA 48 V.C Defendant’sstatementswerematerial andwithin the SCIA’s jurisdiction 48 VI. AIDING AND ABETTING SHOULDNOT BE DISMISSEDAT THIS TIME 48 CONCLUSION SO Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 3 of 57 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES ArthurAndersenLLP v. UnitedStates,125 S.Ct.2129 (2005) 36 UnitedStatesv. Adler, 623F.2d 1287 ( 8 th Cit. 1980) 18 Bronstonv. UnitedStates,409U.S.352 (1973) 25 UnitedStatesv. Carter,917 F. Supp. 1(D.D.C. 1995) 16 UnitedStatesv. Cliapin, 515F.2d 1274(D.D.C. 1975) 18 UnitedStatesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp.2d24 (D.D.C. 1998) passim UnitedStatesv. Cisneros,169 F.3d763 (D.C. Cir. 1997) passim UnitedStatesv. Conlon,628F.2d 15 (D.C. Cit 1980) 16 Costellov. UnitedStates,350U.S. 359 (1956) 2, 17 UnitedStatesv. Crop GrowersCorp., 954F.Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1997) 21,31 UnitedStatesv. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074( 9 th Cit. 2003) 24,25 UnitedStates‘i’. Curran, 20F.3d 560(3d Cit. 1994) 31 UnitedStatesv. Dale, 782 F.Supp. 615 (D.D.C. 1991) passim UnitedStatesv. Dale, 991 F.2d819(D.C. Cit. 1993) 22,37,48 UnitedStatesv. Gaudin, 515U.S. 506(1995) 32,41 UnitedStatesv. Gimbel,830F.2d621(7thCir. 1987) 31 United States.v. Haldeman,559F.2d31 (D.C. Cit. 1976) 16 UnitedStatesv. Hamblin, 911 F.2d551(11thCit. 1990) 49 Hamling v. UnitedStates,418U.S. 87(1974) 16,20 UnitedStatesv. Hansen,772 F.2d940(D.C. Cit. 1985) 20,33,40 UnitedStatesv. Hess,124 U.S. 483 (1866) 49 -ill- Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 4 of 57 UnitedStatesit. Kelley,36 F.3d 1118(D.C. Cit. 1994). 35, 36 UnitedStatesv. Lattimore,127F. Supp.404(D.D.C. 1955) 24,25 UnitedStatesit. London,550F.2d 206(Sth Cit. 1977) 29,38,46 UnitedStatesv. Manapat,928F.2d 1097 (1 1 th Cir. 2001) 24,25 UnitedStatesv. McBride, 362 F.3d360( 6 th Cit. 2004) 46 UnitedStatesv. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517 (lOth Cit. 1994) 27 UnitedStatesit, Milton, 8 F.3d39(D.C. Cit. 1993) 18, 20,21,22 UnitedStatesit. Moses,94 F.3d182 (Sth Cit. 1996) 27 UnitedStatesv. Muntain, 610F.2d964(D.C. Cit. 1979) 23 UnitedStatesit. North, 708F. Supp. 364(D.D.C. 1988) 20 UnitedStatesit. North, 910F.2d 843 (D.C. Cit. 1990) 36 UnitedStatesit. Poindexter,725 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1989) 20,25,37,46 Riceit. UnitedStates,356F.2d709 ( 8 th Cit. 1966) 35 UnitedStatesit. Rodgers,466U.S.475 (1984) 20 UnitedStatesv. Se(/ 2 F.3d 1071 ( 10 th Cit. 1993) 49 UnitedStatesit. Shah,44 F.3d285 ( 5 th Cit. 1995) 20 UnitedStatesit. Shannon,836F.2d 1125 ( 8 th Cit. 1988) 28 UnitedStatesv. Shorter,608 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1985) 16 UnitedStatesit. Sinsk.ey,119F.3d712 ( 8 th Cit. 1997) 49 UnitedStatesit. Stephenson,895F.2d 867 (2d Cit. 1990) 24 UnitedStatesit. Tonelli, 577 F.2d194 (3d Cit. 1978) 25 UnitedStatesit. Torkington, 812F.2d 1347 (lith Cit. 1987) 17 -iv- Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 5 of 57 UnitedStatesit. Trie, 23 F. Supp.2d55 (D.D.C. 1998) 17,27 UnitedStatesit. Yakou,428 F.3d241 (D.C. Cit. 2005) 17 Watkinsit. UnitedStates,354U.S. 178(1957) 42 Woodwardv.UnitedStates,469U.S. 105(1985) 29 FEDERAL STATUTES 5 C.F.R. § 2635 31 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 31,34,39 5C.F.R.*2635.107 20, 21, 31, 34 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203 34 5 U.S.C.App. 3 § 6(a) 36 18 U.S.C.§ 1001 passim 18U.S.C.§ 1505 35,42,49 18U.S.C.*1515 36 18U.S.C.*2 49 28 U.S.C.§535 21,32 FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES FederalRuleof CriminalProcedure12(bX3)(B) 19 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 6 of 57 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Cr, No 05-370 (PLF) v. DAVID HOSSEIN SAFAVIAN Defendant GOVERNMENT’SMEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITIONTO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT TheUnitedStatesofAmerica,by andthroughits undersignedattorneys,hereby respectfullysubmitsits MemorandumofPoints andAuthorities in Oppositionto Defendant’s Motion to DismissIndictment. In his motion, Defendantpostulateswhathebelievesthe Government’sevidencewill be at trial, and, finding this evidencelacking,arguesthat the hidictmentshouldbe dismissedfor lackof evidence.In advancingthis argument,Defendant referencessnippetsof notes,portionsof selectivec-mails, andheavily editedinvestigativereports that he believeswill comprisetheGovernment’sevidence.Defendanthenmakeswishful assumptionsand strainedinferenceswhile disregardingthefact that it will up to thejury to decidethestrengthoftheGovernment’sevidence. BecausetheIndictmentclearlyandproperly allegesthat Defendantcommittedtheoffensescharged,andbecauseit is for thejury after hearingtheevidenceat trial -~ to decidethe sufficiencyof theevidence,Defendant’sMotion to Dismissshouldbe denied. Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 7 of 57 FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 DefendantbecametheChiefof Staff for theGeneralServicesAdministration(“GSA”) in May, 2002. Within daysofbecomingChiefof Staff, Defendantbegancommunicatingwith an old friend and formercolleague,JackAbramoff, awell-known andvery successfulobbyist in Washington,D.C. AbramoffadvisedDefendanthat he wasinterestedin acquiringor leasingthe Old PostOffice Building (“OPO”) locatedon PennsylvaniaAvenue,NW. for someofhis clients. Abramoffrevealedto Defendanthat he wantedto buy or leasetheOPOandturn it over to a developerwho couldconvertit into a luxury hotel. Abramoffalsoexpressedto Defendant his interestin acquiringor leasingaportionoftheNaval SurfaceWarfareCenter-WhiteOak (“White Oak”), apropertyconsistingof approximately600 acresin Silver Spring,Maryland. Abrarnoffwas interestedin obtainingtheWhiteOakpropertyto houseaprivateschoolthat he hadstarted. BoththeOPOandWhite Oakweremanagedandtheir fatescontrolledby GSA. Many,butby no meansall, of thecommunicationsbetweenDefendantandAbramoff wereby e-mail. Themostsignificant andrelevantc-mailsweresentby Abramoffto Defendant’s homee-mailaccount,evenonessentduring normalbusinesshours. See,ç~gL,G. Exh. 3 (titled “Leasingof HistoricBuildings”). This e-mail traffic revealstheextentandnatureof Abramoff’s businessinterestin both theOPO andWhite Oak,aswell as theadviceandassistanceDefendant providedAbramoffto helphim obtain controlof theproperties. ‘Typically, a full factualrecitationwouldnotbe necessaryin amotionto dismissbecauseall that is necessaryis to reviewtheallegationsin theIndictment.Costello v. UnitedStates,350 U.S. 359,364 (1956)(An indictment“valid on its face [] is enoughto call for trial of thechargeon the merits.”). Nevertheless,to theextentthat theCourt agreeswith theDefendant’scontentionthat it is appropriateto considerthelikely evidenceattrial, theDefendant’sviewofwhatwill comprisethe evidenceagainsthim ignoresthe most compelling evidenceof Defendant’sguilt. We takethis opportunityto corectDefendant’sincompletedescriptionof therecord. 2 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 8 of 57 On May 24,2002,Abramoffsentan e-mail (G. Exh. 1) to Defendant’shomee-mail address: Thereis a facility which isunderthe controlofthe GSA in silver Sprin~Maryland,which isthe former Naval SurfaceWeapons center(off NewHampshire Avenue). They arenowgoingto put the FDA there. it isa hugeproperty. I waswondering if it is possiblegetsomeofthatpropertyfor a school. Doyou know if that isdoableand how? On or about June 14,2002,Abramoff invitedDefendantto join him andothers for a week-longgolf trip to Scotlandin early August,wheretheywouldplay golfat St. Andrewsand then, at the endofthe week,spendseveralnights in London. On thatsamedate,Abramoffe- mailedan associated(0. Exh. 2), informinghim that Defendantwas“going to join us in Scotland.” The associatereplied, “Why dave? I like him but didn’tknow u did asmuch. Businessangle?” Abramoff respondedon thenext day: “Total businessangle. HeisnewCOS ofGSA.” On June 19,2002,Abramoff forwardedan e-mailto Defendant’shomee-mailaccount entitled ‘teasingofHistoric Buildings,” (0. Exh. 3) in which it isnotedthat the General PostOffice Buildin& alsoknownasthe USTariff Commission Building wasleasedto adeveloperfor conversioninto a luxury hotel under the authority ofsection111 ofthe NationalHistoricPreservation Act (NHPA). It would be veryhelpful if wecouldobtain a copy ofthe solicitationthat wasusedin that case(without any fill sizearchitectural drawings) to selectthe developer. ... It would be usefulto know wither therehasbeensucha consultation with respecto the Old PostOffice Building at 1 2 th and PennsylvaniaNW and whether a MOA hasbeen issuedandwhetherwe cangeta copyof it. In a messageattachedto this e-mail,Abramoff wrote: “David, can you getus this stuffso wecanput together the bid specs?” 3 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 9 of 57 On June30, 2002,Abramoffsentanothere-mail (C. Exh. 4) to Defendant’shomee-mail address.Abramoff wrote: Canyou find out if you guyshavecontrol ofanypartof a huge federalpropertycalledtheWhite OakFederalResearchCenter,off New HampshireAve in SilverSpring? I want to try to get40 acres of that tract if possiblefor anon-profit. Is it doable? On July2, 2002,Defendantc-mailedAbramoff(G.Exh. 5): We havenot fully allocatedall of theacreageat White Oak. We arestill surveyingwhetherany otherfederalagenciesare interested.If not, we wouldbegin disposal(i.e., saleor donation) proceedings.As for theotherproject,you shouldknow that aside from sectionSa preferences,Indiantribes alsohave“hub zone” status,which providesfor enterprisezone-liketax benefits. You will needto rampup on this asit is progressing.Let’s discuss. Dhs. On July 6, 2002,Abramoff receivedan e-mail from oneof his GreenbergTraurig(“GT”) lobbyingstaffers,relatedto theOPO. Thestafferstatedin thee-mail (G. Exh. 6): Whichevertribe goeswith this needsanewentity asap. Suggest (tribe)______HistoricPropertyDevelopment,LLC, orsome such. Thenweneedto get it certifiedasahubzonebusinessby sba;thatmaytakesomepushing. this would needto be donein July. weneedto put togethera team. GSA hastheauthorityto limit bids (atleastinitially) to hubzone businesses.Thestatutesaysthat canleasehistoric buildings “notwithstandingany otherprovisionoflaw”; I doubtthat limiting thebids to Indianownedtribeswould workpolitically without congressionaldirection. Hubzonesetasideshouldbe saleable politically, especiallyif theysay,heyif no onebidsor we don’t get a goodbid, we openit up for everyone. On July 16, 2002, Abramoff sentan e-mailto thesameCT lobbyist (C. Exh. 7). Abramoffwrote, “Can you join meandDavid Safavian,theCOSof GSA at Signatures?”The 4 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 10 of 57 CT lobbyist responded,“Of course.Topic is OPO? Preparation?”Abramoff responded,“Yes, OPO. We needto go meetthe[GSA] Administratorso this is aprep/questionlanswermeeting.” OnJuly 21, 2002,Abramoffsentan e-mail (C. Exh. 8) to Defendant’sGSA account: Thanksso muchfor today’sround. It wasreally fun. Perhapswe cango out Friday? I’ll be in touch mid week. If you cangetme anyinfo asto which land is still availableat White Oak,and whetherthereareanybuildingsthere,that would behuge. Thanks so much. A few minuteslater on July21,2002,Abramoffsentan e-mail (C. Exh. 9) titled “White Oak”to Defendant’shomeaddress: Thefacility is secured,as I understand.Any thoughtson how we couldgetatour therewithout giving a headsup to too manyfolks? Onthesameday,July21,2002,Abramoff c-mailedoneof his CT staff(C. Exh. 10): I just got doneseeingDavid Safavian,CoS of GSA now. thereis a federalproperty(usedto be theNaval Researchfacility, no[w] part of it is theFDA) in Silver Spring. Thepropertywould be perfect for our schoolandDavid is totally supportive.He saidthat the quickestwayto get this doneis to slip somethinginto a moving bill, which directstheCSA to transferthepropertyto theschool,or evenbetterto leaseit to theschool for long term? If we wereto craftsomethingoblique, any chanceof slipping into theelection reformbill? I know weareloading that up, but I thoughtI’d ask. Needlessto say, it would bethegreatestthing in theworld to me. OnJuly 21, 2002,Abramoffsentan e-mail (C. Exh. 11) to a CT lobbyist,with thesubject “urgentmatter- GSA.” Abramoffwrote: Theyhavecontrol ofa federalpropertyin Silver Spring. It is in White Oakandit wasthesiteof theNaval SurfaceWarfareCenter. It is approximately200 acresandapproximately60 of themare going to be thenewheadquartersoftheFDA. Therestof the propertyis not beingusedright now. I waswith David Safavian todayandwediscussedthis, andmy gettingit for our school. He saidthat onewayto do this (quickly) is to getsomethingin 5 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 11 of 57 legislation whichmandatesthat theGSA leasethepropertyfor 99 yearsfor anominalamountto theschool (or foundation,perhaps’?). I spokewith Neil this afternoonandwehaveachanceto slip this into theElectionReformbill, but haveto movemegafast. Can you get languagefor usto get approximately50 acresin this property(not surewhich acreswewant - ideallythosewith some buildingson them - I hopeto havesomemoreinfo on theproperty tomorrow)? We haveto move fast becausetheyarelocking this bill within thenextday or so. Also, canwehaveit so thatthe countyhasno sayon how thepropertyis usedetc? canwekeepit in fed controlwith thegreatestof latitudebeinggiven to the school? Call meon this andtherestof this. weneedto move megafaston this one. thanks!!! OnJuly 22, 2002, theCT lobbyist sentan e-mail (C. Exh. 12) to Abramoffcontaininga draft U.S. Representativeletterto theAdministratorof GSA relatedto theOPOandrequesting specialconsiderationfor HUBZonebusinesses.Theletterstated: I notethat theGeneralServiceAdministration’sNationalCapital Region on July 15th issuedadraft Requestfor Qualificationsfor redevelopmentof theOld PostOffice Building locatedin theFederalTriangle. As GSA proceedswith this importanthistoric reuseproject, I urgeyou to give considerationto providingadditionalopportunitiesfor Hubzone businessesin theredevelopmentprocess.Specifically, I would like you to considergiving Hubzonebusinessesan advanceopportunityto provide redevelopmentproposalsthat couldbe givenpriority if theyotherwise meettheRFQ andRFPrequirements. Abramoffforwardedthee-mail to Defendant’shomee-mail addressandwrote, “Does thiswork, or do you want it to be longer? Ifs theletter from [U.S. RepresentativeA], [U.S. RepresentativeB], et alto [GSA Administrator]Perry. On July 23,2002, Defendantsentan e-mail (G. Exh. 13) to a GSA CongressionalAffairs employeeresponsiblefor handlingtherequestfor athird U.S. Representative.Defendant receiveda responsethat he forwardedto Abramoffandstated: 6 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 12 of 57 Havent[sic] seenthepaperworkyet. I assumeI wil[I] get somethingtomorrowmorning. Sony. Bureaucracystrikesagain. Laterthat sameday,Abramoffsentan e-mail (G.Exh. 14) to Defendant’shomee-mail accountthat containeda draft schedulefor theAugust2002 Scotlandtrip. On July 24, 2002,anotherCT lobbyist sentan e-mail (C. Exh. 15) to Abramoffregarding theproblemsthat the lobbyistwasencounteringgettingthe informationfrom GSA on NSWC- White Oakandtheresultingdifficulties dueto thetiming of Congressionalbills. Abramoff forwardedthemessageto Defendant’shomee-mailaddressandwrote, “What do you advise?” OnJuly 25, 2002at4:31 A.M., Abramoffc-mailed(C. Exh. 16)Defendant’sofficee- mail andstated: Do you guyshavetheability to give ashort term(oneyear)lease on thepropertyat yourdiscretion?We are in a realbind on the schoolandI waswonderingif therewasawayto leasepartof the White Oaksitefor ayear? OnJuly 25, 2002at 8:30 A.M., Defendantforwardedan internalCSA e-mail (C. Exh. 17) entitled“Old PostOffice andLeases”to Abramoff Inane-maildatedJuly 25,2002at 10:19A.M., (C. Exh. 18), Defendantsoughtadvice from aGSA ethicsofficerregardingtheproposedAugust2002trip to Scotlandthat he hopedto takewith Abramoff Specifically,Defendantwrote to GSA’s GeneralCounselthefollowing e- mail: I am in needof an ethicsopinion. I (alongwith wto [sic] members of Congressand a few Congressionalstaff) havebeeninvited by a friend and formercolleagueon a trip to Scotlandto play golf for fourdays. I will be payingfor all my hotels,meals,andgreens fees. Theissueis airfare. Thehostofthetrip is charteringaprivatejet to taketheeight ofus 7 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 13 of 57 from BWI to Scottland[sic] andback. He is payingthecostfor the aircraft regardlessof whetherI go or not. In fact,noneof theother guest[sic] will be paying aproportionalshareoftheaircraft costs. I needto know how to treat this activity. Oneotherpointof relevance:thehost is a lawyerand lobbyist,but onethat hasno businessbeforeGSA (he doesall of his work on Capitol Hill). At no point did Defendantrevealto theethicsadviser,oranyoneelseworkingat GSA, that Abramoffhad enlistedhis helpin attemptingto obtain leasesatboth theOPOandat White Oak. Nor did Defendantrevealthat he, in fact, providedAbramoffassistanceandadvicein orderto helpAbramoffachievehis objectives. On July 26,2002at 5:06 P.M., GSA’s GeneralCounselsentDefendantan email containingethicsopiniondraftedby a GSA lawyer, (C. Exh. 19) that stated: This is in responseto your inquiry on whetheryou canacceptagift of freeair transportationfrom a friend to attenda[] golf trip. You statedthat a friend andformercolleague,JackAbramoff, invited you, alongwith severalmembersof Congressanda few Congressionalstaff, to Scotlandto play golf for four days. You statedthat you will be paying for all of yourhotel expenses,meals and greensfees. You noted,however,that your friend would be providingtheair transportationat no costto you andtheother guestsattendingtheevent. You statedthat your friend, who is a lawyerandlobbyistwith GreenbergandTraurig,is charteringa privatejet to takeyou andtheotherparticipantsfrom BWI to Scotlandandback. You statedthat neitherMr. Abramoffnorhis firm doesbusinesswith or is seekingto do businesswith GSA. Basedupontheinformationyou haveprovided,you mayacceptthe gift of free transportationfrom your friend. Section2635.202of theStandardsofEthicalConductfor Employeesof theExecutiveBranchstatesthat an employeeshall not solicit or accepta gift from a prohibitedsources[sic] oragift givenbecauseoftheemployee’sofficial position. A prohibited sourceis anypersonwho: (1) Is seekingofficial actionby theemployee’sagency; (2) Doesbusinessor seeksto do businesswith theemployee’sagency; 8 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 14 of 57 (3) Conductsactivitiesregulatedby the employee’sagency; (4) Has intereststhat maybe substantiallyaffectedby performanceor nonperformanceof theemployee’sofficial duties; and (5) Is an organizationa majorityof whosemembersaredescribedin paragraphs (1) and (4) above. Sincethegift is not beingofferedby a prohibitedsourceandtheit [sic] is not beinggivenbecauseof your official position,thegift acceptancerestrictionsunder S C.F.R.2635.202do notapply to you. Consequently,you mayaccepthegift of freeair transportation. On that sameday,July 26, 2002at 9:05pm,DefendantforwardedtheGSA’s General Counsel’se-mail,which includedDefendant’s“representations”Abramoffandstated:“Jack - fyi. It looks like Scotlandis ago.” Abramoff’s response:“Superb!” Earlierthat sameday at9:13 A.M., Defendantforwardedan internalGSA e-mail (G. Exh. 20) to Abramoffdiscussingalternativesof howto transferNSWC-WhiteOakto “a Jewishhigh schooland sportsacademy.”Defendantalsowrote to Abramoff: “This is thetypeof bureaucracy I’m dealingwith. I amstill runningthetrapson the[one] year lease.” Abramoffrespondedback not to Defendant’sGSA addressbut insteadto Defendant’shomee-mailaddressandwrote, “Maybewe shouldnot focuson theJewishpart?” On thesameday Defendantreceivedtheethicsopinion,July 26, 2002at 4:07 P.M., Abramoffsentan e-mail (G. Exh. 21) to Defendant’shomee-mail addresswith adraft letter to theGSA Commissionerof PublicBuildingsrequestinga leaseof NSWC-WhiteOakfor Eshkol. As an introductionto theattachment,Abramoffwrote: “Doesthiswork? I put in 3 yearsjust to be safe. Oncewe areset on thedraft of the letter, shouldI courierit over today,or wait until Monday(I don’t want it lost in themix)? On July 28, 2002, Defendantsentan e-mail (C. Exh, 22) from his homee-mail accountto 9 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 15 of 57 Abramoff Defendantprovidedsuggestionsof howto draft the letterto GSA regardingthe NSWC-WhiteOaklease. Defendantwrote: You will seethat 1 addedcommentsin a middle paragraph.I think you needto lay out a casefor this lease. It doesnt[sic] haveto be detailed. But you do needto explainwhat,why, where,andwhen. Seethebracketedcommentarybelow. [I would adda coupleof paragraphsconcerningtheschool’shistory (if thereis some),its mission,its annualbudget,etc. How is this uniqueor different thanschoolscurrentlyavailableto students from thearea. If you are comfortablewith it, I would alsoadd a paragraphexplainingwhat happenedwith MontgomeryCountyin order to drivehometheurgencyofthis issue. You needthe propertyaccesssoonerratherthanlater, Finally, I would includea shortgraphaboutyour long termplans -- to acquireland in thearea -- sinceso manystudentscomefrom MontgomeryCounty-- and build a permanentinstitution. In this section,I would NOT raise thepossibility of obtainingGSA land from White Oak. Thatcould be seenasan unofficial reasonto denyyour requestfor useofthe propertythisyear(i.e., oncetheygethere,it wil[l] []be hardto denythem a conveyanceofpropertylater).] OnJuly 28, 2002, Abramoffeditedhis original letterto theGSA Commissionerof Public BuildingsregardingNSWC-WhiteOakandincorporatedsomeof Defendant’ssuggestions. Abramoffsentan e-mail to Defendantcontainingtheseconddraft ofthe letter(G. Exh. 23). Abramoffthensentan e-mail, C. Exh.24 to his personalassistantat GT andwrote: Pleasenotethat theletter is edited. I alsofixed thespellingof [Eshkol HeadMaster’s]name,andremovedtherabbinictitles. We still needtheaddress/phone/websiteatbottom, and [CT staffer] is supposedto email that to you andmebefore8 am. Onceyou get it, makesureit is doneright (full text on full letterhead- call meif thereareANY questions)and thenput [Eshkol HeadMaster’s] signaturein the right place,andthencourierall copiesto the preciseroomsat GSA for eachof theCc people. Do not allow our firm’s nameor my nameto appearanywhere. Call meassoonas this is done,andoncethecourieris sent,pleaseemailDavid 10 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 16 of 57 Safavianthatit is onthe way. On July 30, 2002,Abramoff sentan e-mail (0. Exh. 25) to Defendant’sGSA e-mail accountstating:“Pleaselet meknow as soonasyou can regardingFriday’smeeting.afterwards, do you want to do aspecialfield examinationat a sitenearFedEx Field? :-)“ On thatsameday, Defendantsentan e-mail (0. Exh. 26)with the subjectline, “Eschkol [sic] Academy& White Oak,” to the AssistantRegionalAdministratorfor GSA’s Public Building Servicefor the National CapitalRegion, and the DeputyRegionalAdministratorfor the DC Capital Region. Defendantwrote: “Per ourconversation,how doyou folks look for a meetingonthis issueandpossiblya quick trip to WhiteOakon Fridaymorning?” In responseto Defendant’s e-mail,on July 30, 2002,the AssistantRegionalAdministrator for GSA’s Public Building Servicefor the NationalCapitalRegionsentDefendantane-mail (0. Exh. 27) thatoutlinedhow GSA land could beusedand indicated thatit wasunlikely that Esbicolcould receiveanyland fromNSWC-White Oak. Defendantforwardedthate-mail from hiswork e-mail addressto Abramoff. Abramoff respondednot to Defendant’swork addressbut insteadto Defendant’shomee-mail address.AbramofFs e-mail stated,“The religious proscriptionmakesmethink we shouldhavegonewith CapAthletic. Whatdo youthink?” On July 30,2002,Abramoffsentan e-mail (G. Exh. 28) to hiswife andtwo Eshkol representatives.Abramoffwrote: Ijust wentto David Safavian’soffice. He is the Chiefofstaffof the GSA andmy goodfiend. I sawamapoftheWhite Oak property. We identified somepotential sites. They want to meet downtownon Fridayat 11:30amat the GSA building (1800F Street,NW, room 6137). David doesnot think that I should be there, givenmy high profile politically. I agree. the threeofyou cango, though. 11 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 17 of 57 On July 30,2002, Abramoffsentanothere-mail (C. Exh. 29) to his wife, Abramoff wrote: Whenyou arein theroom with David [Safavian]and theother CSA folks, identify yourselfasPamAlexanderorPamClarke. David doesnot want Abramoffusedin themeeting. whenyou checkin atthedoor,however,you’ll needyour driver’s license, andit’s OK for you to be Abramoff there,sincethat won’t getup to theguy in themeeting(whoprobablydoesnot knowme, but David andI don’t wantto takea chance).OK? On or aboutAugust2, 2002, theAssistantRegionalAdministratorfor GSA’s Public Building Servicefor theNationalCapital RegionandDefendanthadameetingwith thetwo Eshkolrepresentatives,Mrs. AbramoffandanotherGT lobbyist in theGSA Administrator’s office to discussthepossibilityof leasingNSWC---WhiteOak to Eshkol. md. ¶ 16. Onthenext day,August 3, 2002, Defendant,Abramoff, Abramoff’s son,andsix other invited guestsboardeda charteredjet andflew to Scotland. Thegroupstayedat theSt. Andrew’s Inn andprimarily golfed from Sundayaftemoonto Thursdaymoming. Thegroupthenflew aboardthecharteredjet to London. After spendingThursdaynight in London,someguests returnedto theUnitedStatesvia commercialaircraft. Defendantremainedin Londonon Friday andSaturdaynights,stayingfor threenights attheMandarinOrientalHotel. Defendantreturned to theUnitedStateswith Abramoffvia charteredjet on Sunday,August11, 2002. The total cost of thetrip, which waspaidfor by fundsAbramoffobtainedfrom his Indiantribe lobbyingclients, wasin excessof$l 30,000. DefendantgaveAbramoffacheckfor $3,100which, ostensibly, coveredDefendant’sfull shareof expensesassociatedwith thetrip. On theScotlandtrip, DefendantandAbramoffconimunicatedaboutAbramoffacquiring an interestin CSA properties.For example,on August12, 2002, Abramoffforwarded aJune 12 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 18 of 57 29, 2002messagefrom Defendanton theOPOprojectto a lobbyingassociateat GT. C. Exh. 30. Abramoffcommented:“Had goodchatswith David during thetrip. Hewantsusto pushhardon thisproject [OPO] andhe thinkswecanget it.” After theScotlandtrip, DefendantandAbramoffcontinuedto communicateabout Abramoffacquiringan interestin White OakandOPO. Forinstance,on November18, 2002, Abramoffforwardedto Defendant’shomee-mailaccountan e-mail (G. Exh. 31) with asubject line that read:“OPO BUILDING PROJECT.” Thee-mailmessageread:“David, just wantedto let you seetheteamwehaveon theOPO, aswell astheChitimachatribe. Letmeknow if you think thereare anyproblems. Seeyou soon.” Attachedto thee-mailwasa list of the“team”that Abramoffhad put togetheron theOPOproject, includingthenamesof adeveloper,contractor, architects,designers,andhotel. On December8, 2002,Abramoffreceivedan e-mail (C. Exh. 32) from aCT lobbying associate.Thee-mailhad“OPO” in thesubjectline andread:“We needto figure out what info we canget from GSA. Groh [the developer]wantsplans,etc.,Couldyour contactdetermine what might bereasonablyavailableandwhattheir newtime frameis?” Abramoffforwardedthis e-mail to Defendant’shomee-mail accountwith thequery, “Any ideason this one? our developerwantsto get info if possible. thanksDavid.” The GSA-OlGInvestigation In theSpringof2003, GSA Office of InspectorGeneral(“GSA-OIC”) receivedan anonymoushotlinecomplaintregardingDefendant’sparticipationin an “internationalgolfing trip providedby lobbyists.” As aresultof this complaint,CSA-OIC openedan administrative investigation. md. ¶ 24. Theinvestigationsoughtto determine,interalia, thenatureof 13 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 19 of 57 Defendant’srelationshipwith Abramoff. Onboth March 27 andApril 25, 2003,theCSA-OIC RegionalInspectorGeneralfor InvestigationsinterviewedDefendantabouthis golf trip with Abramoff. md. ¶ 25. During theseinterviews,Defendantstatedthat atthetime he tookthetrip with Abramoff, Abramoffhadno businesswith GSA. Ind. ¶ 25. Defendantalsostatedthat he hadpaid Abramofffor thetotal costof the trip includingairfare, hotelsandgolf greenfees. Id. Defendant providedto GSA-OiGa $3,100checkto AbramoffdatedAugust3, 2002,which is thedate Defendantboardedthecharteredjet to Scotland. Id. At no point did Defendantrevealto the GSA-OIGagentthatAbramoffhad soughtDefendant’sassistancein obtaininga leasefor either theOPOor White Oak. Nor did Defendantrevealthat hehadprovidedassistanceandadviceto Abramoffbothbeforeandafterthegolf trip in orderto helpAbramoffachievehis objectives. Basedin parton Defendant’sstatementhat Abramoffhadno businesswith GSA atthe time ofthegolf trip andthat Defendanthad fully paid for his costof thetrip, GSA-OIG closedits investigation. lnd. ¶ 26. TheSenateInvestigation In March 2004, theSenateCommitteeon IndianAffairs (“SCIA”) beganan investigation into allegationsofmisconductby Abramoff andothersthat hadbeenmadeby severalNative Americantribes. Ind. ¶ 33. As amemberof SCIA, SenatorJohnMcCainandhis staffhad the responsibilityto gathermaterialsrelatedto thoseallegations. Id. SCIA heldpublic hearingson thismatteron September29, 2004 andNovember17, 2004. Ind. ¶ 34. Duringthecourseof the hearings,it waslearnedthat tribal fundswere usedby Abramoffto pay for aportionof the August2002 Scotlandtrip. Id. SCIA wasinvestigatingboth themisuseof Indiantribal fundsas 14 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 20 of 57 well asallegationsof influencepeddlingby Abramoff Acting in his capacityas Chairmanof SCIA, SenatorMcCainauthorizedhis staffto send to Defendanta letterdatedFebruary23, 2005 requestinginformationabouttheAugust 2002 Scotlandtrip with Abramoff md. ¶ 35. In March 2005, Defendantspokebytelephonewith an investigatorfrom SCIA and representedthat he hadreceivedapprovalfor theScotlandgolf trip in a GSA ethicsopinionand that he had fully disclosedall relevantfactsto theGSA ethicsofficer whopreparedtheopinion. hid. ¶ 36. On March 17, 2005, Defendantrespondedto ChairmanMcCain’s requestfor information abouthis golf trip with Abrarnoffwith a letterin which hestatedin part: [w]hen theinvitation wasmade,I wasthechiefof staffto theU.S. GeneralServicesAdministration(“GSA”). Mr. Abramoffdid not haveanybusinessbeforetheagencyatthat time. Prior to departure,I consultedwith theGSA Office of GeneralCounselto obtainguidanceon theproprietyof this trip. Counseldetermined that I couldacceptthevalueof thetrip gratis; it did not meetthe definitionof a ‘gift from a prohibitedsource’ undertheapplicable regulations,norwasit considereda gift givenbecauseof my official position. Ind. ¶ 37. Defendantenclosedwith his letterto SCIA his July 25, 2002email to theGSA ethics officer, theGSA ethicsopinionregardingtheAugust2002 Scotlandtrip andacopyof his $3,100 checkto AbramoffdatedAugust3, 2002. Ind. Il 37. Defendantneverrevealedto anyoneon SCIA thatbothbeforeandafterthegolf trip Abramoffhadbeenattemptingto gaincontrolof both OPOandWhite Oak. Nor did Defendant revealto Senatestaffersthat Abramoffhad enlistedDefendant’shelpand advicein gaining controloftheseproperties,or that Defendanthad actuallyprovidedAbramoffthis helpand 15 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 21 of 57 assistance.Finally, Defendantneverrevealedto theSenatestaffersthat hehad alsowithheld this informationfrom theGSA ethicsofficer at thetime he obtainedtheethicsopinion. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS An indictmentshouldbe a “plain, conciseand definitestatementof theessentialfacts constitutingtheoffensecharged.”Fed. Cr. Crim. P. 7(c). An indictment is sufficientlyspecific (andnot subjectto dismissal)if it, first, containstheelementsoftheoffensechargedandfairly informs a defendantof thechargeagainstwhich he mustdefend,and,second,enableshim to pleadacquittalor convictionin bar of futureprosecutionsfor thesameoffense. Hamling v. UnitedStates,418U.S. 87, 117-18(1974). SeealsoUnitedStatesv. Conlon, 628 F.2d 150, 155- 56 (D.C. Cir. 1980),cert.denied,454 U.S. 1149(1982)(“[a]n indictmentis sufficient if it clearly informs theDefendantof thepreciseoffenseofwhich he is accusedso that he maypreparehis defense.”)United States.v. Haldeman,559 F.2d31, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1976),cert. denied,454 U.S. 1149 (1977) (“theSupremeCourthasrecognizedthat the indictmentas acharginginstrument hastwo centralpurposes— to apprisetheaccusedof thechargesagainsthim sothat he may adequatelypreparehis defense,andto describethecrime with whichhe is chargedwith sufficient specificityto enablehim to protectagainstfuturejeopardyfor thesameoffense”); UnitedStatesv. Shorter,608 F. Supp. 871, 874 n.2 (D.D,C. 1985),affd, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,484 U.S. 817 (1987).2 2Courtsin theD.C. Circuit haveconcludedthat “[p]ractical, not technical,considerations governthevalidity ofan indictmentandthetestof thevalidity of an indictment is not whetherthe indictmentcou]d havebeenframed in a more satisfactorymanner,but whether it conformsto minimal constitutionalstandards.”UnitedStatesv. Carter,917F. Supp.1,2 (D.D.C. 1995);United Statesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp.2d 24,49(D.D.C. 1998)(discussingcasesin whichnoticebasedon thestatutealonewas foundto be sufficientbecausepractical,ratherthantechnicalconsiderations governthevalidity of an indictment). 16 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 22 of 57 Defendant’sargumentsplainly go to thesuffi.ciencyof theevid.enceon thecharges,and that is not a matterfor considerationat this stagein theproceedings.$,~,~ UnitedStatesv. Trie, 23 F. Supp2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (“To theextentthat [defendant]is arguingthat the grandjury maynot haveheardany evidencerelatingto [the crime], that would be an argument aboutthesufficiencyof thegovernment’sevidence,an argumentbestreservedfor trial. The sufficiencyof theevidencepresentedto thegrandjury maynotbechallengedif the indictmentis facially valid,[] andthe indictmentin this caseis faciallyvalid.”) citing Costellov. UnitedStates. 350 U.S. 359, 363-64(1956). In consideringamotion to dismiss,thecourtdoesnotattemptto determinewhethersufficientevidenceexiststo supporttheallegationsmadetherein. SeeUnited Statesv. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (1 1 th Cir. 1987)(insufficient indictmentsmayonlybe dismissed,pursuanto Rule 12 (b) oftheFederalRulesof Criminal Procedure,basedon a legal infirmity in theindictment,andnot uponadeterminationof thefactsthat mayor maynot be developedat trial). Rather,if therearedisputedfacts,theGovernmentis “usually entitledto presentits evidenceat trial andhaveits sufficiencytestedby a motion for acquittalunderRule29 of theFederalRulesof Criminal Procedure.”UnitedStatesv. Yakou, 428 F.3d241, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2005). TheSupremeCourt in Costellov. UnitedStates,350 U.S. 359, 363-64(1956) describeswhy a Courtshouldnot review theadequacyof theevidenceprior to trial: If indictmentswereto be heldopento challengeon thegroundthat therewasinadequate or incompetentevidencebeforethegrandjury, theresultingdelaywouldbegreatindeed. Theresultof sucha rulewould bethat beforetrial on themeritsa defendantcouldalways insist on akind ofpreliminarytrial to determinethecompetencyandadequacyof the evidencebeforethegrandjury. This is not requiredby theFifth Amendment.An indictmentreturnedby a legally constitutedand unbiasedgrandjury, like an information drawnby theprosecutor.if valid on its face, is enoughto call for trial ofthechargeon the merits. TheFifth Amendmentrequiresnothingmore. 17 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 23 of 57 Petitionerurgesthat this Court shouldexerciseits powerto supervisetheadministration ofjusticein federalcourtsandestablisha rule permittingdefendantsto challenge indictmentson thegroundthat theyarenotsupportedby adequateor competentevidence. No persuasivereasonsareadvancedfor establishingsucha nile. It would runcounterto thewholehistoryofthegrandjury institution, in which laymen conducttheirinquiries unfetteredby technicalrules.Neitherjusticenor theconceptof a fair trial requiressucha change.In a trial on themerits, defendantsare entitledto a strict observanceof all the rulesdesignedto bring abouta fair verdict.Defendantsarenot entitled,however,to a rule which would resultin interminabledelaybut add nothingto theassuranceof a fair trial. (citationsomitted). Defendant’smotion is actuallya requestthat theCourt to reviewthesufficiencyof the evidenceat this pre-trial stage,ratherthanat thecloseoftheGovernment’scase.Although Defendantstatesthat he is “relying on thegovernment’sallegations,documentsandwitness statementsastrue,” Def Mem. 4, his relianceon selectedpotionsof documentsandwitness statementsis an attemptto bypassthetypicalpre-trial challengesto an Indictmentand instead improperlyattackthesufficiencyof theevidence.Defendant’sintent andthemeaningofwhathe saidto, for example,theGSA ethicsofficer, is amatternot for thecourt to decidepre-trial,but ratherfor thejury to resolve. United Statesv. Milton, 8 F,3d39, 45-46(D.C. Cir. 1993)(jury to decidemeaningof defendant’sstatementsin section1001 prosecution);UnitedStatesv. Chapin, 515 F.2d1274, 1279-81(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1015(1975)(jury to decidemeaning of defendant’sstatementin perjuryprosecution).As discussedinfra, theIndictmentfairly informs Defendantof thecharges,andthat is theend ofthe inquiry atthis stagein the proceedings.See,~ UnitedStatesv. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 ( 8 1h Cir. 1980)(“This language[in the indictment]was sufficientto puthim on noticeof thenatureofthecharges againsthim; thereforethechallengeto thesufficiencyofthe indictmentin this regardmust fail.”). 18 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 24 of 57 Facedwith an Indictmentthat is legally sufficienton its face,Defendantattemptsto reach beyondtheIndictmentto predictwhatproofthe Governmentwill offer attrial. Defendant strugglesto find someambiguitiesandwhat he anticipateswill be shortcomingsin the Government’sproofat trial. Defendantnotably ignoresthebasisofan appropriatemotion to dismiss- FederalRuleof Criminal Procedure12(b)(3)(B)- “a motion allegingadefectin the indictment.”In doing so, Defendantinvites theCourtnot just to undertakea legal analysisof facial validity oftheIndictment,but to performthejury’s taskof evaluatingtheevidenceon the issueof whetherDefendantknowingly andwillftuly madefalsestatementsandobstructedboth a GSA-OIG investigationandSenateproceeding.Defendant’smotion to dismisssuffersfrom numerousmischaracterizationsofthestateoftheevidenceandthelaw. Weaddresseachof the Defendant’sarguments a. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT I. COUNT TWO SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSEDBECAUSETHE INDICTMENT FAIRLY INFORMSDEFENDANTOF THE CHARGES Defendantmovesto dismissCountTwo on numerousgrounds. In orderto assistthe Courtin addressingall of the Defendant’sconcerns,theGovermnentrespondspointby point. l.A CountTwo fairly informs theDefendantof thecharges Defendantclaimsthat CountTwo is an unprecedentedapplicationof 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that “utterly fails to satisfythestricturesof fair notice,dueprocessandtherule of lenity.” Def Mem. 14. Defendantmisappliestheappropriatelegal standardsandmisstatesthefactual record..~ 3Defendantinvokestheruleof lenity, Def Mem. 3-4,butneglectsD.C. caselaw that finds theruleof lenity inapplicableto unambiguousstatutessuchas 18 U.S.C. § 1001. ~ ~ United 19 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 25 of 57 CountTwo fairly informs theDefendanthathe is chargedwith making false statements andmisleadingtheGSA ethicsofficer regardingAbrarnoffsrelationshipwith GSA, and consequently,shouldnot be dismissedon that ground.BecausetheIndictmentclearlyand conciselyinforms Defendantof theprecisenatureofthechargeagainsthim, it suffersfrom no infirmities and shouldnot be dismissed. See,~ Hamlingv. UnitedStates,418 U.S. 87, 117- 118 (1974). 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)makesit a crimeif one“knowingly andwillfully falsifies, conceals,or coversup by any trick, scheme,or deviceamaterialfact” in anymatterwithin the jurisdictionof theexecutivebranch. Courtshaveupheldconvictionsin caseswherethefalse statementsat issuewereto officials of GSA. See,~ UnitedStatesv. Shah,44 F.3d285 ( 5 t~~ Cir. 1995) (affirming convictionof falsestatementunder§ 1001madeto GSA). Moreover,the SupremeCourt hasstatedthatjurisdictionwithin themeaningof 18 U.S.C. § 1001 shouldnot be narrowlyor technicallydefined. UnitedStatesv. Rodgers,466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984). TheD.C. Circuit hasfoundthat jurisdictionin an 18 U.S.C. § 1001 indictmentis sufficient if “there is a ‘statutorybasis’for theagency’srequestfor the informationallegedto containthefalse statement.”UnitedStatesv. Milton. 8 F.3d39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Federalstatutesrequirethat eachExecutiveAgencymaintainan ethicsofficial to answer questionsof employeesregardingproperconduct.~gçC. Exh. 33 (5 C.F.R. § 2635.107). As partofthedutiesin theGSA GeneralCounsel’soffice, theethicsofficer wasrequiredto opine Statesv. Hansen,772 F.2d940, 948-49(D.C. Cir. 1985);UnitedStatesv. North,708 F. Supp.364, 369 (D.D.C. 1988).Similarly, Defendant’srelianceon dueprocessfails because“dueprocessdoes notrequirethat thegovernmentcite a ‘litigated factpattemdirectlyonpoint’ asaprerequisiteto the institutionofcriminalproceedings.”UnitedStatesv. Poindexter,725 F.Supp. 13,28(D.D.C. 1989). 20 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 26 of 57 on theappropriatenessof situationsidentifiedin employee’sethicsrequests,includingquestions aboutthereceiptsofgifts. Without truthful information,ethicsofficials areunableto correctly analyzethesituationandprovideappropriateguidanceto GSA employees. Additionally, an agencyethicsofficial is requiredby28 U.S.C. § 535 to report anyinformationreceivedrelating to aviolation of thecriminal code. C. Exh. 33 (5 C.F.R. § 2635.107(b)).4Consequently, Defendantwason fair noticethat statementshe madeto ethicsofficials couldserveasthebasis of criminal prosecution. 113 Defendantmadea falsestatementthrouth atrick, schemeor device Defendantseeksto dismissCountTwo as amatteroflaw becausehe argues1) governmentcannotshowthat his statementswere not truthful and2) fundamentalambiguity, includinga fundamentalambiguousregulatoryframework. Def Mem. 17. Because1) a“literal truth” defenseis adefensefor thejury to decide,2) thestatementswerenot“literally true,” and 3) therewasno fundamentalambiguity,Defendant’smotion shouldbe denied. I.B.1 Juryshoulddeterminetheliteral truth of Defendant’sstatements Falsity is an essentialelementof acasebroughtunderSection1001. UnitedStatesv, Crop GrowersCorp., 954 F. Supp.335, 354(D. D.C. 1997). A statement’s“literal truth” canbe a defenseto a 18 U.S.C. § 1001prosecution.UnitedStatesv. Mihon, 8 F.3d39,45 (D.C. Cir. 1993). However,thequestionof“literal truth” is amatterfor thejury for thejury to determine. c~p~er~.954 F. Supp.at 354; seealsoMihon, 8 F.3d at45-46(“[H]ow might its meaning herebediscovered?Only by consideringthetermin context,taking into accountthesettingin 45 C.F.R.§ 2635.107(b)alsodiscussesan individual’s duty of full disclosurewhenseeking an ethicsopinion. $~Q,,sectionI.C.2 infra. 21 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 27 of 57 which it appearedandthepurposefor which it wasused.This wasamatterfor thejury.”). Consequently,Defendant’sargumentof “literal truth” is premature. Moreover,Defendant’sstatementsto theGSA ethicsofficerswerenot literally true. Defendantprovidesalengthy analysisof possibledefinitions of “business”relyingon numerous technicalandlegal sources.~ Def Mem. 19-21;23-30. But Courtshavefoundthat legalistic definitionsof termsmaybetoo restrictiveand insteaddeferto commonusageof aterm. United Statesv. Dale,991 F.2d819, 833 (D.C. Cir, 1993)(rejectingdefenseof “literal truth” if Defendant’sdefinition is “too restrictive” andaccepting“commonusage”asfoundin dictionary definitions). While theGovernmentcontendsthat Abramoffsactivity would fall within the Defendant’soverly legalisticdefinition of“businessor seekingto do business,”5Abramoffs activity with GSA clearly falls within acommondictionarydefinitionof“business.”6 Becauseof thenumerouspossibleinterpretationsof what Defendantmeantwhenhestated“business,”the questionshouldgo to thejury to determineat theappropriatetime. ~ ~ UnitedStatesv. Milton, 8 F.3d39, 45-46(D.C. Cir. 1993) (holdingthatin a 18 U.S.C. § 1001 prosecution,when aword hasseveralmeanings,its definition mustbe determinedby “consideringthetermin context,taking into accountthesettingin which it appearedandthepurposefor which it was 5A jury could consider,for example,Abramoffsrequeston June19, 2002 requestthat Defendantprovidehim with informationon theconversionof anothergovernment-ownedbuilding to a luxury hotel sothat Abramoffcouldprepare“bid specs”for theOld PostOffice. SeeC. Exh. 3. 6”business:Theoccupation,work, or tradein whicha personis engaged:thewholesalefood business;A specific occupationor pursuit: the best designerin the business.” The American HeritageDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage,FourthEditionCopyright2000by HoughtonMifflin Company. 22 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 28 of 57 used,”andthis is a “questionfor thejury.”); see~ UnitedStatesv. Muntain, 610 F.2d964, 971-73(D.C. Cir. 1979)(affirming 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)O)convictionsbyjury basedon possible broaddefinition of“businessenterprises”).7 Moreover, in the lengthyanalysisdiscussingthequestionof falsity, Defendantignoresthe secondphraseof Defendant’sstatementin theemail to theGSA ethicsofficer - that Abramoff “doesall ofhis work on Capitol Hill.” SeeC. Exh. 18. Unlike his parsingof “business,” Defendantfails to analyzeany Office of GovernmentalEthicsopinionsthat define“work” — perhapsbecausethereis no analysisthat would supportthepositionthat Defendant’sstatement that Abramoff“doesall his work on Capitol Hill” wasnot falseandmisleading.Abrarnoffs activitieswith respecto acquiringpropertyfrom GSA fall squarelywithin thecommon dictionarydefinition of “work.”3 Finally, ajurycould still find criminalliability under 18 U.S.C. § lOOl(a)(1) if “Defendantalso claimsthat it wasan impossibility for GSA to disposeof theWhite Oak property. Def Mem. 19. Again, this is an argumentbasedon inferencesthat ajurywill eventually haveto decide. We onlypoint out thaton July 21, 2002,fourdayspriorto Defendant’srequestfor an ethicsopinion,AbramoffsentDefendantan email in whichhe requestedofDefendanto “getme any info asto which landis still availableatWhiteOak,whetherthereareany buildingsthere.” G. Exh. 8. On July 24, 2002, one day prior to Defendantseekingthe ethics opinion, Abramoff forwardedto Defendantan email in which anassociateofAbramoff expressedhis frustrationover a proposedlegislative fix andtheinability to getdesiredinformation from GSA regardingWhite Oak. AbramoffsoughtDefendant’sadvice: “what do you advise.” C. Exh. 15. While Defendantwill be free to argueto a jury that it would havebeen“impossible” for Abramoff to haveobtainedtheWhite Oakproperty,theGovernmentanticipatesshowingthat one day prior to makinghis claim to his ethicsadvisorythat Abramoff “does all his work on Capitol Hill,” AbramoffwasactivelyseekingDefendant’sassistancein obtainingaleasefor theWhite Oak property, 8work: Physical or mental effort or activity directed toward the production or accomplishmentof something; A job; employment;A trade, profession,or other meansof livelihood.” TheAmericanHeritageDictionaryof theEnglishLanguage,FourthEdition Copyright2000by HoughtonMifflin Company. 23 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 29 of 57 defendant’sstatement,although“literally true,” wasdesignedto misleadandconceal. In United Statesv. Stephenson,895 F.2d867 (2d Cir. 1990),theSecondCircuit revieweda false statementsconvictionbaseduponthedefendant’sstatementhat a thirdpartyhad“offeredhim a bribe.” Thecourtaffirmedtheconvictionbecausewhile thestatementcould beconstruedas “literally true,” “it wasmeantto concealhis owninitiation of thebriberyscheme.”j~.at873. Consequently,thecourt foundthat he was“actively seekingto mislead,”andthat ajury could find thatthedefendant’sstatement“falsified, concealedor coveredup thefact of thesolicitation of his bribe.” . at 874. Similarly, it is for thejury to determinewhetherDefendant’sstatement regardingAbrarnoffs“business”beforeGSA was“literally true” or if Defendantwas “actively seekingto mislead.” Fortheforegoingreasons,Defendant’smotion on this groundshouldbedenied. I.B.2 No fundamentalambiguitiesexist Defendantclaimsthat CountTwo shouldbedismissedbecauseof thefundamental ambiguityof thequestionsaskedto Defendantandthelackof adefinition of“business”in the applicableregulations.Def Mem. 21 to 30. Defendant’sargumentshouldbe rejected. DefendantcitesUnitedStatesv. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074( 9 th Cir. 2003),UnitedStatesv. Manapat,928 F.2d 1097(lith Cir. 2001)andUnitedStatesv. Lattimore, 127 F. Supp.405,409- 10 (D.D.C. 1955) for thepropositionthatquestionsoffundamentalambiguitycanbedismissed asamatterof law.9 WhatDefendantfails to note,eventhough it is mentionedin oneof the “Notably, noneof thecasescited by Defendantappearto be chargedunder 18 U.S.C. § loom (a)( 1),but insteadfocusuponaspecificfalsestatementunder1001(a)(2)ora specificexchange in aperjuryprosecution.As evidentin theplain languageofthestatute,18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(1) does not requirean exact falsestatementlike 1001(a)(2)or aperjurycharge. Rather,merelyalleging a materialomissionor misleadingstatementis sufficient for a valid indictmentunder 18 U.S.C. § 24 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 30 of 57 primarycaseshe cites,is that “when aquestionis arguablyambiguous,thedefendant’s understandingofthequestionis a matterfor thejury to decide.” UnitedStatesv. Manapat,928 F.2d 1097, 1099(1 1 th Cir. 1991)(citationsomitted). Moreover,Defendantfails to cite the relevantD.C. caselaw, UnitedStatesv. Dale, 782 F. Supp.615 (D.D.C. 1991)”’ andUnited Statesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998),!! that find thatquestionsof ambiguityare bestleft for ajuryto determine.Consequently,Defendant’smotion baseduponthefundamental ambiguityis premature,and shouldbe denied. Moreover,asDefendantnotes,thedoctrineof “fundamentalambiguity” is primarily appliedin perjuryprosecutions.Def Mem. 22 citing Bronstonv. United States,409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). In perjurycases,theexactquestionandansweraretranscribedwith aprecise understandingofwhat questionswereaskedandwhatwasanswered.Defendantcitesthreecases involving perjuryfor thepropositionthat an indictmentcanbe disrnissedif thequestionwas ambiguous.UnitedStatesv. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194(3d Cir. 1978),UnitedStatesv. Lattimore, 127 F. Supp404 (D.D.C. 1955),UnitedStatesv. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074(9”’ Cir. 2003). In each of theeases,thetranscribedquestioncouldbe specificallyconsideredbecauseit wasundisputed lOOl(a)(1). United Statesv. Dale, 782 F. Supp.615, 626 (D.D.C. 1991) (“a person’sdeliberate failure to discloseto the governmentmaterial facts, in the faceof a duty to disclosesuchfacts, constitutesan ‘affirmativeact’ within thecontemplationofthestatute.”). Consequently,thelackof specific transcribedquestionsandanswersis not fatal to a 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)prosecution. In Dale, 782 F. Supp. at 627, theCourt revieweda motion to dismissbaseduponthe ambiguityofquestionsforchargesoffalsestatementson anapplicationfor securityclearance.Dale heldthat thequestionofambiguityshouldnotbe determinedby a motionto dismissindictmentpre- trial, butby amotionmadeat thecloseof theGovernment’scase, Id. “ In Cisneros,26 F. Supp. 2d at 42, the Court revieweda motion to dismissfor false statementswith respecto questionsaboutdefendant’spast. Cisnerosheldthat it presentedafactual questionthat shouldbedeterminedby thejury. Id. 25 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 31 of 57 evidenceof thequestionposed. In the instantcase,thereis a questionof fact aboutwhat questionswereaskedby theethicsofficer andtheresponsegenerated.”’ Defendantalsoclaimsthat becausetheregulationsdefining“business”and“seekingto do business”are unclear,theIndictmentshouldbe dismissedasa matterof law without considerationby thejury. Defendantspendsseveralpagesdiscussingthevariousdefinitions of “business”and“seekingto do business,”Def Mem. 24 - 30,but, as notedsunra,he fails to discussthesecondphraseof Defendant’sfalsestatement- “he doesall of his work on Capitol Hill.” Defendantneverevenattemptsto discusseswhat “work” means. Defendantcannotmake an argumentregardingaparticularizedandnarrowdefinitionof “work” becausethereareno regulationsdefining“work.” Indeed,it is impossibleto defineeveryaspectof a falsestatements case,andthedefendant’sunderstandingof arguablyambiguouswordsare mattersto be left to the jury. ~ ~ UnitedStatesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp. 2d 24, 441-42(D.D.C. 1998). As shownby thec-mailsbetweenDefendantandAbramoff,Defendantwasactively assistingAbramoff in his attemptsto do businesswith GSA. Indeed,asdescribedin the Indictment,andin thefactual summarysupra,thec-mails showthat Abramoffbegancontacting ‘2For example,ajurymight reasonablyinferthat theethicsopinionincorporatedDefendant’s responseto specific questionsaboutwhetherAbramoffhadbusinesswith or was seekingto do businesswith GSA. G. Exh. 19 (“You statedthatneitherMr. Abramhoffnorhis firm doesbusiness with or is seekingto do businesswith GSA.”). Otherfacts were includedin the responsefrom Ellison thatwerenot in Defendant’sinitial email. Forexample,theunnamedlobbyistin theinitial email becomes“Jack Abramhoff’ [sic] and the unnamedlobbying firm becomes“Greenberg Traurig.” Onelogical inferenceis that therewereadditional conversationsbetweena GSA ethics official and theDefendant,andconsequently,additionalinformation wasdisclosed- suchasthe nameof the lobbyist, wherehe worked and whetherhe did “business”or “was seekingto do business.”Consequently,factualdisputespersisthatpreventananalysisof fundamentalambiguity as amatterof law. 26 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 32 of 57 DefendantaboutacquiringWhite Oaklandfor Eshkol asearlyasMay24, 2002, a mereeight daysafterDefendantbeganasCOSof GSA. G. Exh. 1. In severalc-mails,Defendantactively assistsAbramoffin his pursuits. For example,on July 28, Defendantgives Abramoff suggestionsto improvea draftletter to theGSA Commissionof PublicBuildings. C. Exh. 22. Defendantseemsto be arguingthat becausehe believesthat he will beableto makea persuasivereasonabledoubt” argumento thejury,’3 theCourt shouldjust dismissthe indictment immediately. In making this argument,Defendantonceagainconfusestherole ofthecourt - which mustdecidewhethertheIndictmentproperlyinforms theDefendantoftheoffenses charged- andtherole of thejury, whichwill decidewhethertheGovernmenthasprovenits case beyondareasonabledoubt. Defendant’sargumentis premature.If it weretruethat Indictments couldbe dismissedif adefendantbelievedtheGovernment’sevidenceattrial would beweak, trials would be few andfar between. I.C Defendantconcealedmaterialinformationthat hehad ale2alduty to disclose Defendantclaimsthat he did not 1) concealany infornrntionand 2) that he did not havea dutyto discloseinformationto theGSA ethicsofficer. Bothof theseargumentsshouldbe rejected. “Defendantarguesthat that “the governmentcertainlycannotnegateany reasonable interpretationthat would makethe defendant’sstatementfactuallycorrect.”Def Mem. 28 citing UnitedStatesv. Migiiaccio, 34 F.3d 1517, 1525 (10”’ Cir. 1994);UnitedStatesv. Moses,94 F.3d 182, 188 (sth Cir. 1996). Defendant,however,confusestheburdenof a reviewpost-trialwith that of amotion to dismisspre-trial. Defendantis improperlyaskingthecourtto reviewthesufficiency of theevidenceratherthantheallegationsin theIndictment. ~ ~ United Statesv. Trie, 23 F. Supp2d 55,62(D.D.C. 1998)(rejectingdefendant’smotion to, in effect, reviewthesufficiencyof theevidenceprior to trial). 27 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 33 of 57 IC. 1 Indictmentsufficiently allegesaffirmative actsfor concealment As to thefirst, Defendantclaimsthat theIndictmentshouldbe dismissedbecauseit does notallegeany affirmative actsof concealment.In Defendants’view, his statemento theGSA ethicsofficer is, atmost, “a merefailure to disclose”informationand, as such,cannotconstitute theaffirmative actnecessaryfor a “trick, schemeor device”under 18 U.S.C. § lOOl(a)(1). Def Mem. at30-32. Defendant’sargumentshouldbe rejectedbecausein theD.C. Circuit, a failure to disclosecanconstitutean “affirmative act” under18 U.S.C. §1001(a)(1),andDefendant committednumerousaffirmative actsoutsidehis omissionto the GSA ethicsofficer. Defendantcitesan out of circuit casefor theargumentthat “the governmentmustallege andprovemorethanjust a ‘passivefailure on thepartof theDefendanto revealamaterialfact.” Def Mem. at 30 citing UnitedStatesv. Shannon,836 F.2d 1125, 1129-30(8” Cir. 1988). Defendantfails to mention theD.C. caselaw that holdsexactly theoppositeof what Defendant portraysthecaselaw to be: a deliberatefailure to discloseinformationcanconstitutean affirmative act. United Statesv. Dale,782 F. Supp.615, 626 (D.D.C. 1991)(“a person’s deliberatefailure to discloseto thegovernmentmaterialfacts,in thefaceofa duty to disclose suchfacts,constitutesan ‘affirmative act’ within thecontemplationofthestatute.”) In Dale,the defendantmovedto dismisstheindictmentbecausethetrick, schemeor devicechargedwasthe intentional failure to discloseinformation. Thecourt in Dalefoundthat suchan omissionwas sufficient to meetthe “affirmative act” necessaryfor thetrick, schemeor devicein I 001(a)(1).j~. In theinstantcase,in communicationsregardingAbramoffsinvolvementwith GSA, Defendant omitteda descriptionofAbramoffsbusinessinterestsin GSA properties.TheCourt should follow ~Q~jj~andfind that allegationof an omissionis sufficient for this chargeto proceedto the 28 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 34 of 57 jury.’4 DefendantcitesWoodwardv. UnitedStates,469U.S. 105, 108 (1985) for the propositionthat if oneis neveraskedaquestion,thentherecanbeno “trick, schemeor device” that triggerscriminal liability. Thedefendantin Woodwardneverconversedwith an executive official, but insteadpassedthroughcustomswithoutbeing questionedby anyone. TheCourt foundan omissionin theabsenceof anyinteractioncouldnot constitutean affirmative act. The factsof Woodwardstandin contrastwith whatis allegedin theIndictmentwhereDefendant soughtan ethicsopinionandprovidedinformationto theGSA ethicsofficials. ~ discussion supraat I.B.2 n. 13 (regardingreasonableinferencethat additionalmaterialin Ellison’s ethics opinionwasderivedfrom furtherconversationswith Defendant). Moreover,Defendantneglectsrelevant caselaw in this Circuit that discussa factual situationsimilar to the instantcase. In UnitedStatesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp.2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998),thedefendantprovidedsomeinformationto theFBI, but omittedmaterialfacts.Cisneros, however,foundthat oncean individualbeginsspeakingon a topic, thatindividual gains additionalresponsibilities: [W]hile thereis an optionof silence,oncea defendantvolunteersinformation,he hasan obligationto refrain from telling half-truthsor from excludinginformationnecessaryto makethestatementsaccurate.SinceCisnerosrespondedto thequestions,he hada duty to includeall informationnecessaryto makehis statementstruthful. ‘4At DefMem. 30-31,DefendantcitesUnitedStatesv. London,550F.2d206(5”’ Cir. 1977) for thepropositionthat“[i]n theabsenceofanyallegationestablishingan ‘affirmative actbywhich a material fact is activelyconcealed,’thegovernmenthasfailed to allegefactssufficient to support theconcealmentchargeunderCountTwo.” Def Mem.32. Defendantignorestheactualholdingof London in which the trial court’s dismissalof indictmentwasreversedbecausethe circuit court foundthatthe indictmentneednot providefactualelaborationon thespecific“trick, schemeor device”as long asthe indictmenttrackedthestatutorylanguage.London, 550 F.2d at 211. 29 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 35 of 57 Cisneros,26 F. Supp.2d at 42. Given theDefendantsoughtout an ethicsopinion,his failure to fully inform theGSA ethicsofficer of Abramoffsrelationshipwith GSA is an activeact of concealment.Additionally, Defendant’sotherstatementsregardingtheScotlandtrip, his relationshipwith AbramoffandAbramoffsrelationshipto GSA alsoareaffirmative acts that meettherequirementsof“trick, schemeor device.” Additionally, as allegedin theIndictment,Defendantook otheraffirmative actsaspartof theconcealmentfrom theGSA ethicsofficer. Defendantseeksto focus thechargeon the specificexchangeon July 25, 2002. Def Mem. at 17. Theindictment,however,allegesactsof concealmentandfalsity from May 2002 to August 2002, md. 1, 7. During that time period, Defendantook numerousaffirmative actsto concealhis relationshipwith Abramoffand Abramoffsinterestin propertiescontrolledby GSA. For example,DefendantandAbramoff utilized theDefendant’shomee-mailaddressratherthanhis GSA address.SeeInd. ¶ 11, 13; see also G. Exhs. 1,3,4,9,12, 15,20,21,22,23,27and30. DefendantandAbramoffconcealedthe Defendant’sinvolvementin editing a letterthat Abramoffsentto GSA askingfor land to be given to Eshkol. SeeInd. ¶ 12 and 14; seealso G. Exhs. 22-24. Additionally, Defendant informedAbramoffnot to let anyonementionAbramoffsnameata meetingwith otherGSA officials becauseof Abramoffspolitical profile. C. Exh. 28-29. Suchactionsmeetthe requirementsof an “affirmative act.” I.C.2 Defendanthadaduty to makefull disclosureto theethicsofficer. Defendantarguesthat theDefendantlackedany duty to discloserelevantandmaterial factsto theGSA ethicsofficer for thepreparationof an ethicsopinion. Def Mem. 33. DefendantneglectsrelevantD.C. caselaw andapplicablefederalregulations. 30 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 36 of 57 UnitedStatesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp.2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998) is asignificantD.C. case discussingthe IO0l(a)(l) falsestatementsprong. Cisnerosfoundthat ExecutiveOrder10450 createda legal duty for afederaljob applicantto be truthful to questionsposedby theFBI in conductinga backgroundexamination.Id. at 42. ExecutiveOrder10450 statesthat“all persons privilegedto be employedin thedepartmentsandagenciesoftheGovernment,shall be reliable, trustworthy,of goodconductandcharacter.” 18 FR 2489(1953WL 5976). Consequently, accordingto Cisneros,ahigh-levelemployeewho hasundergonea backgroundcheckhasgreater disclosureresponsibilitiesin adrninistrativeinquiriesthanaprivateindividual. Thisduty to be “reliable,trnstworthy,of goodconductandcharacter”is additionally reflectedin theCodeof FederalRegulationslaying out thedutiesof apublic service.5 C.F.R. 2635.101.(requiring,amongotherduties“honestefforts in theperformanceoftheirduties.” $~, ~ G. Exh. 34 (5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 statingin relevantpart: “(1) Publicserviceis apublic trust, requiringemployeesto placeloyalty to theConstitution,the lawsandethicalprinciplesabove privategain,*** (5) Employeesshall put forth honesteffort in theperformanceof their duties.”)”’ In addition,theCodeofFederalRegulationsspecifically identifiestheduty of disclosure for a public servantwhenseekingan ethicsopinion. Oncean individual hassoughtan opinion, theymustmakefull disclosureof all relevantcircumstances.~ C. Exh. 33; 5 C.F.R. § “’The defendantsin thecasescited by Defendantwerenot public servants,like Defendant, but insteadprivateindividuals. SeeDefMem. 33 citing UnitedStatesv. Gimbel, 830 F.2d621 ( 7 th Cir. 1987) (defendantwasa private lawyer representingnarcoticstraffickers); United Statesv. Curran,20 F.3d 560 (3t~Cir. 1994) (defendantwas lawyer and executiveof privatecompany); UnitedStatesv. Crop GrowersCorn, 954 F. Supp.335 (D.D.C. 1997)(defendantswerea private holdingcompanyand two of its executives).As setforth in 5 C.F.R. § 2635, apublic servanthas greaterresponsibilitieswith respecto thepublic trust thandoesaprivateindividual. 31 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 37 of 57 2635.107(b))which statesin relevantpart: Employeeswhohavequestionsabouttheapplicationofthis partor any supplemental agencyregulationsto particularsituationsshouldseekadvicefrom an agencyethics official. Disciplinary actionfor violating thispartor any supplementalagencyregulations will notbetakenagainstan employeewho hasengagedin conductin goodfaith reliance upontheadviceof an agencyethicsofficial, providedthat theemployee,in seekingsuch advice,hasmadefull disclosureof all relevantcircumstances.... Disclosuresmadeby an employeeto an agencyethicsofficial arenot protectedby an attorney-clientprivilege. An agencyethicsofficial is requiredby 28 U.S.C. 535 to reportanyinformationhe receivesrelatingto aviolation of thecriminal code. (emphasisadded).This obligationparallelsthat describedin Cisneros:“while thereis an option of silence,onceaDefendantvolunteersinformation,he hasan obligationto refrainfrom telling half-truthsor from excluding informationnecessaryto makethestatementsaccurate.”Cisneros, 26 F. Supp.2d at 42. Consequently,onceDefendantsoughtan ethicsopinion,he had aduty to discloseall relevantfacts in orderto allow theethicsofficer to provide an accurateopinion. I.D Defendant’sstatementswerematerialto GSA ethicsofficer’s official decision Defendantarguesthat Count2 shouldbe dismissedbecausehis statementsto theEthics officerwere notmaterial. This contentionshouldbe rejectedsummarily. It is theprovinceof thejury to determinemateriality. The SupremeCourt decided in United Statesv. Gaudin,515 U.S. 506, 522-23(1995)that thematerialityof a false statement under18 U.S.C. § 1001mustbe decidedby thejury ratherthanthecourt.”’ SeealsoUnited “’This is oneoftheclearestexamplesofDefendant’sfailure to cite relevantcontrollingcase law. Defendantdoescite Gaudin,butnot for thepropositionthat thequestionofmaterialityin a § loom prosecutionshouldbedeterminedby thejury, but ratherfor peripheralaspectsofGaudin. See Def. Men~.36 (“The centralobjectof anymaterialityinquiry is whetherthemisrepresentationor concealmenthad a ‘natural tendencyto influence,or [was] capableof influencing, thedecision makingbody to which it wasaddressed.”);DeL Mem. 36 (“Determiningwhethera statementis ‘material’ implicates two subsidiaryquestions:‘(a) what statementwas made?’ and (b) ‘what 32 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 38 of 57 Statesv. Cisneros,169 F.3d763,767-68(D.C. Cir. 1999)(“In § loom prosecutions,it is up to the jury to decidewhetherthematerialityelementhasbeenproven”;concludingthat deciding materialityon themotion to dismissstagewasprematurebecause“muchwill dependon thetrial evidenceandon the [] proposed[jury] instructions”). Consequently,sucha motion is foreclosed by controllinglaw and shouldbe rejected. Moreover,evenif thecourtchoseto reviewthefactualallegations,theallegedfacts supporta finding ofmateriality. “Thecentralobjectof any materialityinquiry is whetherthe misrepresentationor concealmentwaspredictablycapableof affecting,i.e., hadanatural tendencyto affect, theofficial decision.”Cisneros,169 F.3dat 766. Proofof actualrelianceon the statementis not required;theGovernmentneedonly makeareasonableshowingof its potentialeffects. UnitedStatesv. Hansen,772 F.2d940,949 (D.C. Cir. 1985). “Materiality is not concernedwith whetherthe allegedomissionwould haveaffectedtheultimate agency determination.”UnitedStatesv. Dale,782 F. Supp.615, 625-26(D.D.C. 1991). With thefactsallegedin theIndictment,ajurycouldconcludethat aDefendant’s statementwasmaterialto theGSA ethicsofficer.”’ Defendantattemptsto shoehorntheideathat GSA as“the Governmentlandlord,”DeL Mem. 36, cannotpossiblybeinterestedin thepropriety decisionwastheagencytryingto make.”). Defendantdevotesalmostaquarterofhismemorandum to assessingthematerialityof Defendant’sstatements,but neglectsto mentionrelevantSupreme Court precedenton whethermaterialityshouldbeconsideredby thejury or thejudge. “’Moreover, Defendant’slie wasmaterialbecauseit preventedthe ethicsofficer from openingan investigationintopotentialbriberyor illegal gratuity. See,~ UnitedStatesv. Hansen, 772 F.2d940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A lie influencingthepossibilitythat an investigationmight commencestandsin no betterpostureunder§ 1001 thana lie distortingan investigationalreadyin progress.”). 3 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 39 of 57 ofDefendantacceptinga gift from Abramoff Thatnarrowinterpretationis incorrect. Every ExecutiveAgencyis requiredto havean EthicsOffice asrequiredby C.F.R.Sec. 2635.107. An EthicsOffice is thereto ensurethat thosein publicservice“place loyalty to theConstitution, lawsandethicalprinciplesaboveprivategain,” G. Exh. 34(5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a)),and“not allow theimproperuseof [nonpublicgovernmentinformation] to furtheranyprivateinterest.” C.F.R.Sec.2635.l01(b)(3). In this case,theGSA ethicsofficerwasattemptingto evaluatethe proprietyofDefendant’sacceptanceof freeairfarefrom a lobbyistwho wasseekingstrategic adviceand internalnon-publicgovernmentinformationregardinghis attemptsto acquire governmentpropertyfor his personalbenefitandto thebenefitof his clients.”’ Fortheforegoingreasons,Defendant’sargumentto dismissCountTwo shouldbe denied. II. COUNT ONESHOULD NOT BE DISMISSEDBECAUSETHE INDICTMENT ALLEGES OBSTRUCTIONOFTHE GSA-OIG INVESTIGATION Defendantarguesthat CountOneshouldbe dismissedbecausethe“governmentdoesnot establishbeyondeonclusoiystatementsthat Mr. Safavianintentionallyendeavoredcorruptlyto “’Defendantalsocontendsthat his statementswere notmaterialbecausehe did not accept theoffered gift. DeL Mem. 37. He arguesthat by paying $3,100,he paid for thetrip. Defendant againusesselectedevidencefrom thediscoveryprovidedto paint themost favorablescenarioand ignoresthe allegationsasstatedin the Indictment. Indictment¶ 21 allegesthat thetrip for nine peoplecost at least$130,000,orapercapitacostof over $14,000. Indictment1] 25 allegesthat the Defendantwrote a checkto Abramoff for only $3,100. Fromwhatis allegedin theindictment,the Defendantpaid$10,000lessfor theScotlandtrip thanit wasworth. Payinglessthanfull valuefor anitem is consideredagift accordingto theCodeofFederalRegulations.5 C.F.R.2635.203(“Gift includesanygratuity, favor, discount,entertainment,hospitality, loan, forbearance,or otheritem havingmonetaryvalue. It includesservicesaswell asgifts oftraining,transportation,local travel, lodging and meals,whetherprovidedin-kind, by purchaseof a ticket, paymentin advance,or reimbursementaftertheexpensehasincurred.”)(emphasisupplied).Moreover,evenif Defendant paid full costof thetrip, theethicsofficer wasstill requiredto know all relevantfacts in orderto issuetheopinion,i.e. Abramoffhadbusinessorwasseekingto do businesswith GSA at thetime that Defendantacceptedtheoffer ofthe trip. 34 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 40 of 57 influence,obstructor impedthependinginvestigation.” D. Mem. 38. Defendant’sHeader “COUNT ONE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSETHE INDICTMENT DOESNOT DEMONSTRATEOBSTRUCTIONOF THE GSA-OIGINVESTIGATION,” (emphasis supplied),Def. Mem. 38., illustratesDefendant’smisunderstandingof the legal standard appropriatefor a motionto dismiss. At this stage,theGovernmentdoesnot “demonstrate”the facts supportingthecharge,butmust simply“allege” thefactssurroundingthecharge.$.çç discussionsupraat Section“RelevantLegal Standards”atpp. 16. A reviewof Indictment ¶11 1-27providesdetailednoticeto Defendantof thepreciseoffenseandthecircumstances surroundingtheoffenseandallows him noticeto preparehis defense. Defendanthasidentifiedthethreeelementsof an 18 U.S.C. § 1505 charge:1) pending proceedingbeforea departmentor agencyof theUnitedStates,2) defendant’sawarenessof the proceeding;and 3) defendantmustintentionallyendeavorcorruptlyto influence,obstructor impedethependingproceeding.TheIndictment’sallegationsaresufficient,andconsequently CountTwo shouldnotbedismissed. Courtshavefoundthat theterm “pendingproceeding”is broad in scopeandincludesall stepsandstagesin theproceeding,from startto finish. Ricev. United States,356 F.2d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1966). It encompassesboth theinvestigativeandadjudicativefunctionsof the departmentor agency.Id. Furthermore,bothpreliminaryandinformal inquiries, aswell as formal proceedingsarecoveredby the statute.UnitedStatesv. Poindexter,725 F. Supp.13,22 (D.D.C. 1989). Thecaselaw under18 U.S.C. § 1505 makesclearthat agencyinvestigations, including thoseconductedby an inspectorGeneral,constituteaproceedingfor purposesof section1505. UnitedStatesv. Kel~y,36 F.3d 1118, 1127(D.C. Cir. 1994) (AiD Inspector 35 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 41 of 57 Generalinvestigationis a proceedingundersection1505). In Kellev, the D.C. Circuit relied uponthe fact that theAID InspectorGeneral“was chargedwith thedutyof supervising investigationsrelatingto theproperoperationoftheagency,”andwasauthorizedto issue subpoenasandcompelsworntestimony. Similarly, theGSA-OIGhasthesameauthorityderived from S U.S.C.App. 3 § 6(a)(4)and (5) (defining theauthorityofan agencyInspectorGeneral). Pursuantto ahotline complaint,GSA-OIGopenedan investigationintowhetherDefendant attendedagolfing trip providedby lobbyists. As partof that investigation,GSA-OIG interviewedDefendantandnotified him that therewasahotline complaint. Consequently,the Defendantwould haveknowledgeof an appropriateproceedingfor § 1505. A cursoryoverviewillustratenumerousdeficienciesin theDefendant’sanalysisof this Count.”’ First, Defendantagainrelieson the “fundamentalambiguity” argumentdiscussedsupra at SectionI.B.2. Defendantcontortstherecordin an effort to showapparentdifferencesin the discoveryprovidedandtheallegationsin the Indictment. Suchchallengesto theindictmentare “’It is simplyprematureto engagein what amountsto a legal argumentaboutwhatshould be the appropriatejury instructions in this case. As is hopefully clear by now, the Indictment properlyallegeseachelementoftheoffensescharged.Nevertheless,wefeel compelledto pointout that Imowledgeof unlawfulnessis not requiredin order to convict a defendantof corruptly obstructingacongressionalinvestigation.United Statesv. North, 910 F.2d843 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Similarly, a defendantneednotbeawareoftheexactdetailsof§ 1505 if a reasonablepersonwould haverealizedthat theirconductwasunlawful.UnitedStatesv. Browning, 630 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1980). “Corruptly” asusedin §1505is definedin 18 U.S.C.§ 1515(b) as“acting with animproper purpose,personallyorby influencinganother,includingmaking a falseormisleadingstatement,or withholding,concealing,altering,ordestroyinga documentorotherinformation.” Defendantcites therecentSupremeCourtdecisionin ArthurAndersenLLP v. UnitedStates,125 S.Ct.2129(2005), for thepropositionthat only one “consciousof wrongdoingcanbe said to “knowingly corruptly persuade.”DeL Mem. at 39. Andersen’sreasoningis inapplicable for a 18 U.S.C. § 1505 prosecution.Andersenheldthat thelanguage“knowingly...eorruptlypersuade”in 18 U.S.C. § 1512 requiresproofof consciousnessof wrongdoing,but theanalysisfocusedon thestatutorylanguage of”knowingly” whenjoinedin thestatutewith “corruptlypersuade.”Because§ 1505 lackstheterm “knowingly” any comparisonis notpersuasive. 36 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 42 of 57 inappropriateatthis stageof litigation. ~ discussionsupraat Section“RelevantLegal Standards”atp. 16. Second,theDefendantclaimsthathis representationsto theGSA-OIG areirrelevant becausethestandardofethicsprohibitsgifts not by “lobbyists” but by “prohibitedsources.” DeL Mem. 40. Suchparsingis irrelevantbecausean individual couldbe both a lobbyist anda prohibitedsource. In this case,Abramoffwasboth. Moreover,suchadistinction,wereit to exist, is notone thatwould allow for dismissalof theCountasamatterof law. UnitedStatesv. Pgk, 991 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (rejectingdefenseof “literal truth” if Defendant’sdefinition is “too restrictive” andaccepting“commonusage”). Third, Defendantpointsto theclosureof theinvestigationby GSA-OIG onceit learned thatDefendanthadpaid$3,100 for thetrip asan additionalreasonthat Defendant’sstatement thatAbramoffhadno businessbeforeGSA was“irrelevant.” D. Mem. 40. Defendantwould contendthat theclosureof theGSA-OIG investigationsupportsdismissal. Theoppositeis true. The fact that GSA-OIGclosedtheinvestigationbaseduponDefendant’sstatementis strong evidencethat Defendant’sstatementshadamaterialimpacton the investigation- it endedthe GSA-OICinvestigationinto whetherDefendantreceivedgifts from a lobbyists.”” Finally, Defendant’sclaimthat he did notpay for thefull costofthetrip is inaccurate,because,asthe Indictment1’ 21 alleges,the full costof thetrip wasover $130,000,resultingin aperpersoncost ““Moreover, asdiscussedin § IV.B, infra, it is not requiredthatDefendant’sactionsactually obstructedthe investigationat issue. See,~ UnitedStates v. Poindexter,725 F. Supp.13, 23 (D.D.C. 1989)(~1505“prohibits an ‘endeavorto’ obstructaswell asa completedobstruction.It follows that an obstructiveeffect is not aprerequisiteto a violation.”) (citationsomitted). 37 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 43 of 57 of over$14,000. Defendantbaseshis argumenton isolatedfactsculled out of thediscovery providedto theDefendantratherthanan analysisof the allegationsin theIndictment. Defendant’smotion to dismissCountOneshouldbe denied. III. COUNT THREESHOULD NOT BE DISMISSEDBECAUSETHE iNDICTMENT ALLEGES THAT DEFENDANTKNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFIED AND CONCEALEDMATERIAL FACTS DURING THE GSA-O1GINVESTIGATION Defendantarguesthat CountThreeoftheIndictmentshouldbe dismissedbecausethe Indictmentfails to establishknowing andwillful falsificationand concealmentofmaterial facts. DeL Mem. 42. Defendant’sargumentshouldbe rejected. 1II.A Indictmentsufficiently allegesa trick, schemeor device As discussedsupraatSectionsI.B andIC, theGovernmentmust allegethat the Defendantactedaffirmatively in concealingamaterialfactby atrick, schemeor device. Defendantapparentlybelievesthat theGovernmentmustsomehow“establish”priorto trial that the Defendantconcealedamaterial fact throughatrick schemeor device. DeL Mem. 42 (header) However,an Indictmentis faciallyvalid if it allegesthat theDefendantemployeda trick scheme or deviceto falsify andconcealmaterialinformation. See,~,.g,,UnitedStatesv. London,550 F.2d206 (5”’ Cir. 1977)(reversingdistrict courtand finding an indictmentvalid whenit tracked the statutorylanguagein alleging a“trick, schemeor device”eventhoughtheindictment providedno factual elaboration). lilA. 1 Indictmentallegesaffirmativeacts As discussedsupraat SectionIC., courts in this circuit haveheldthat an omissionto stateamaterial fact canbe an affirmative act. See,~g, United Statesv. Dale, 782 F. Supp.615, 38 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 44 of 57 626 (D.D.C. 1991). Moreover,Defendant’sstatementsto GSA-OIG regardingtheScotlandtrip, his relationshipwith Abramoff, andAbramoffsrelationshipto GSA, wereaffirmative actsthat meettherequirementsof“trick, schemeor device.” Similarly, Defendant’sstatementsregarding Abramoffsbusinessrelationshipwith GSA is an affirmative actsufficient to meetthe requirementsof concealmentunder18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1).”’ II1.A.2 Defendanthada duty to disclose As discussedsuprain SectionI.C.2, ahigh level public servantwho enjoysthepublic trustis obligatedto put thepublic’s interestbeforehis own andhasa duty ofdisclosureto answer questionsposedby officials from his agency.SeeG. Exh. 34 (5 C.F.R. § 2635.101discussing ethicalresponsibilitiesof public officials). DuringtheGSA-OIGinterviews,Defendantwas askeddirectlyabouttheScotlandtrip, his relationshipwith AbramoffandAbramoffs relationshipto GSA. OnceDefendantbeganvolunteeringinformation on thosetopics,he hadan ongoingdutyof disclosureto be fully forthcomingon thoseareasandto notmisleadthe investigators. See,~ UnitedStatesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp.2d 24,42(D.D.C. 1998). III.B AlleEed concealedassistancewas material Defendantarguesthat CountThreeshouldbe dismissedbecausetheinformation regardingAbramoffsinterestin GSA propertieswasnot a materialfact. D. Mem. 43. As discussedsuprain SectionI.D, materialityof a statementin § 1001 prosecutionis a factto be determinedby thejury. “‘Another affirmative actstemsfrom Defendant’sstatemento GSA-OIGthat he hadpaid for the total costof thetrip, andprovideda$3,100checkpurportingto be his share. Indictment¶ 25. In fact, thetotal costof thetrip exceeded$130,000. Indictment¶ 21. Defendant’spro-rated sharewasfar in excessof $3,100. 39 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 45 of 57 In anyevent,Defendant’scontentionthat theDefendant’sfalsity andconcealmentwas immaterialis unfounded. As identifiedin ahotline complaint,GSA-OIG ~vasinvestigating whethera lobbyistprovidedDefendanta golfing trip to Scotland. The factthat Abramoffhad interestsin GSA propertieswasa critical fact that GSA-OIG couldhaveconsideredin determiningwhetherAbramoff influencedDefendantin his official actsthroughthetrip or other gifts. A11y assistancethat Defendantprovidedto Abramoffwouldbematerialin allowingGSA- OIG to determineif theDefendantwasbribedby Abramoff, violatedthehonestservices Defendantowedto thepeopleof theUnitedStates,or in otherwaysusedhis official position for personalgain. See DefendantattacksthematerialityofDefendant’sfalsity andconcealmentby claiming that Defendantprovideddocumentationshowingthat he paidfor thetrip. D. Mem. 44. Defendant merelydemonstratedto GSA-OIG that he paid $3,100to Abramoff By so doing,Defendant succeededin misleadingGSA-OIG that he hadpaidthefull costofthetrip. If GSA-OIGhad beenawarethat AbramoffhadinterestsbeforeGSA, thenGSA-OIG couldhavecontinuedits investigationanddeterminedthetotal valueof thetrip andwhetherDefendanthad paidfair marketvalue. If providedwith truthftil information,GSA-O1Gcouldhaveuncoveredthe assistancethat Defendantwasprovidingto Abramoff in violationof Defendant’sethical responsibilities.See,~ UnitedStatesv. Hansen,772 F.2d940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(“A lie influencingthepossibilitythat an investigationmight commencestandsin no betterposture under§ 1001 thana lie distortingan investigationalreadyin progress.”). III.C DefendantFalsifiedMaterialFacts Defendantalsoarguesthat CountThreeshouldbe dismissedbecausetheinformation 40 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 46 of 57 provIdedto GSA-OIG wasnot falseandmaterial.As discussed~ at I.D, Defendant’s argumenthat his statementsareimmaterialis a questionfor thejury. ~ United Statesv. Gaudin,515 U.S. 506, 522-23(1995). Defendant’sattemptsto drawinferencesfrom selected factsprovidedin thediscoveryto provethathis statementswerenot falseis reallyan attemptto advancea sufficiencyof theevidenceargument,that is inappropriateatthis stageof litigation. IV. COUNT FOUR SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSEDBECAUSETHE STATEMENTS ARE PERTINENTTO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION OF FRAUD AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING Defendantclaimsthat Count Fourshouldbe dismissedbecauseA) theSenateCommittee on IndianAffairs (“SCIA”) did not haveauthorityto investigateDefendant’sactions,andB) Defendant’sstatementswere not falseor designedto obstructtheSCIA investigation. Defendant’sargumentis without merit andhis motion to dismissCountFourshouldbedenied.”” IV.A SCIA’s jurisdiction includedDefendant’sinvolvementin theScotlandtrip Defendant’scontentionof whetherSCIA hadauthorityto investigateDefendant’s involvementin theScotlandtrip shouldnot be examinedin light of all thesurrounding circumstances.UnitedStatesv. Cisneros,26 F. Supp.2d24 (D.D.C. 1998)providesan extensive analysisofthebroadreadingthat courtsshouldgiveto definingthescopeof inquiry in a § 1505 ““Defendant cites to reports from the CongressionalResearchService. DeL Mem. 50. CongressionalResearchServicereportsareonly availableto MembersofCongressandtheir stafL See What is the CongressionalResearchServices, (last modified December 29, 2005) (“The CongressionalResearchServiceis the publicpolicy researcharmoftheUnitedStatesCongress.As a legislativebranchagencywithin the Library of Congress,CRS works exclusively and directly for Members of Congress,their Committeesandstaffon a confidential,nonpartisanbasis.”). Consequently,the Governmentand theCourt do not haveeasyaccessto thosereports. TheGovernmentrespectfUllyrequeststhat the Defendantattachas exhibitsall cited CongressionalResearchServiceReports. 41 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 47 of 57 inquiry. In an effort to upholdthe intent ofCongress,courtshaveinterpretedbroadlythe“due and proper” requirementincludedwithin 18 U.S.C. § 1505. Thestatutorypurposeof§ 1505 is to preventany endeavor,whethersuccessfulor not, which is madefor thepurposeof corruptlyinfluencing,obstructingor impedingan agencyproceedingor congressional inquiry. [T]his statuteshouldnot be interpretedso narrowly asto defeatthepurposeand intent of the legislativebodythat enactedit. As a result,courtshavebeenunwilling to pardondefendantsbasedon technicalitiesor formalities....Thequestionof whethera congressionalinvestigationis due andproper cannotbe answeredby a myopic focuson formality. Rather,it is properlyansweredby a carefulexaminationof all thesurroundingcircumstances. Theinvestigativeauthorityofthe Senatecomprehendsprobesinto departmentsof theFederal Governmento exposecorruption,inefficiency orwaste.” Watkinsv. United States,354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957): Thepowerof theCongressto conductinvestigationsis inherentin thelegislativeprocess. Thatpoweris broad.It encompassesinquiriesconcerningtheadministrationof existing lawsaswell asproposedorpossiblyneededstatutes.It includessurveysof defectsin our social,economicor political systemfor thepurposeof enablingtheCongressto remedy them. It comprehendsprobesinto departmentsof theFederalGovemmento expose corruption,inefficiency or waste.But, broadasis this powerofinquiry, it is not unlimited. Thereis no generalauthorityto exposetheprivateaffairs of individuals withoutjustification in termsofthefunctionsoftheCongress. TheSenate’scommitteesare “restrictedto themissionsdelegatedto them,i.e., to acquirecertain datato be usedby [] the Senatein copingwith aproblemthat falls within its legislativesphere.” jj. at 206.”” Consequently,any analysisshouldcenteron whetherSCIA in contactingDefendant “‘Watkins v. United States,354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957), reversedthe convictionof an individual who refusedto answerquestionsof theHouseCommitteeon Un-AmericanActivities becausethe questionswereoutsideoftheirjurisdiction. TheCourt noted: “The legislatureis free to determinethe kinds of datathat should be collected. It is only thoseinvestigationsthat are conductedby useofcompulsoryprocessthat giverise to a needto protecttherights againstillegal encroachment.”Id. at 215. In this case,Defendantwasnot compelledto testify, but voluntarily respondedto SCIA’s letter. 42 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 48 of 57 wastrying to gatherdatato assistin aproblemwithin its legislativesphere. DefendantmischaracterizestheSCIA inquiryasan investigationintowhetherDefendant lied to theGSA, DeL Nem,45, orpossibleinfluencepeddlingonly at theDepartmentofInterior, DeL Mem. 48. Defendantarguesthat SCIA’s jurisdictionwaslimited to Abramoffsdefrauding of theIndiantribes,and that Defendant’sconductfalls outsidetheirjurisdictionbecause“SCIA doesnot havecarteblanche to investigateallegedgovernmentcorruption.” D. Mem. 50. Defendantcitesselectedportionsof Senators’statementsfor two pagesfor thepropositionthat thehearingsfocusedsolelyon the fraudagainsttheIndians,andspendsonly oneshortparagraph discussingwhattheSCIA investigativestaffunderstoodtheirpurposeto be.Def, Mem. 50-52. DefendantmischaracterizesSCIA’s investigatorypurpose.The title of thehearingswere “OversightHearingIn re Tribal LobbyingMatters,et al .“ DeL Mem. 51. SCIA was investigatingnot just whetherIndiantribesweredefraudedby Abramoffin termsof kickbacks paidby Michael Scanlon,but alsotrying to gatherdataregardingpaymentsby Indiantribesto AbramoffandScanlon. Tribal funds solicitedby Abramoffwere usedto payfor thetrip to Scotlandin 2002that Defendantattended. SCIA wasgatheringinformationon theflow of funds,theactivitieson thetrip, andwho paidfor theactivitieson thetrip. Consequently,evenin Defendant’snarrowlydefinedscopeof SCIA’s investigationofjust “fraudagainstIndiantribes,” Defendant’sparticipationin theScotlandtrip wasa legitimateinquiry into misuseof tribal funds by AbramofL However,SCIA hadjurisdiction to pursueabroaderinquiry thansimply Abramoffs defraudingof theIndiantribes. TheunderstandingoftheSCIA staffspurposeof the investigationis clearly illustratedin the302sandstandsin markedcontrastwith whatthe 43 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 49 of 57 Defendant’sselectiveexcerpts.”4 Throughouttheinvestigation,SCIA wasinvestigatingnot simply fraud againsttheIndians,butalso“influencepeddling”amongpublic officials. During the investigation,theycameacrossevidenceof an entity controlledby Abramoffi Tribal money went into theentityand, amongotherthings, fundedthe2002Scotlandtrip. Baseduponthelist of attendees,SCIA beganlooking into whethertherewasany improperinfluencepeddling amongthepublic officials on thetrip resultingfrom tribal funds. Consequently,SCIA senta letterrequestinginformationfrom Defendantfor thepurposeof 1) obtainingrecordsofthe2002 trip, 2) determiningif Defendanthadpaidhis ownway; 3) determiningif Abramoffhadbusiness beforeGSA at thetime ofthetrip; and4) determiningif thetrip wasjust a vacation. SeeDocket # 34 (Motion to inspectGrandJuryRecord),DeL Exhs. 9 and 11. Defendantwasprovidedthefull 302sofboth ParkerandCarillo, but Defendant,at DeL Mem. 52, hasfailed to providean accuraterepresentationoftheSCIA’s staff’sown understandingof theirinvestigativepurpose.As notedin their interviews,Docket# 34 (Motion to inspectGrandJuryRecord),DeL Exhs. 9 and 11, thescopeof the inquirywasnot limited to funds defraudedfrom theIndiantribes,but alsowhetherAbramoffusedthosetribal fundsto influenceDefendant’sactionsat GSA. Suchan inquiry is within “thedue andproperexerciseof inquiry” ofSCIA. “4In general, this type of factual briefing is unnecessaryat this stageof litigation. Additionally, theGovernmentdoesnotacknowledgethata 302is a statementoftheinterviewee,but rathera statementoftheagentpreparingthereport.Nevertheless,theDefendanthasrepresentedthat heis relyingon thefactsprovidedin the302 in seekingto dismissCountsFourandFive. Because Defendanthasmisrepresentedthefactsin therecord,theGovernmentseeksto clarify therecordand referstheCourtto the302sofParkerandCarillo includedasDocket# 34 (Motion to InspectGrand JuryRecord),DeL Exhs. 9 and 11. 44 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 50 of 57 IV,B Defendant’sfalsestatementswerecorruptlydesi~nedto obstruct Defendantclaims that Defendant’sstatementswerenot falseor designedto obstruct,and that, as amatteroflaw, Count4 shouldbe dismissed.First, any interpretationof the falsity of thestatementis amatterfor thedeterminationof thejury. ~ discussionsupraI.B.1. Similarly, the impactof thestatementson theSCIA investigationshouldsimilarlybe decidedby thejury becauseit is a factualanalysisthat cannotbe determinedasamatterof law baseduponthe allegationsin theIndictment. Moreover,Defendantblatantlymisrepresentstherecordbefore him in arguingthatDefendant’sstatementshadno impacton theSCIA investigation. Any factualreviewregardingthematerialityofthe statementto SCIA’s investigation,which should only consideredby thejury, stronglysupportstheallegationsthat theDefendant’sstatementsto SCIA werefalseand corruptlydesignedto obstructtheSCIA investigation. With respecto theDefendant’sstatementimpacton theSCIA investigation,Defendant onceagainignoresavailablefactsthat aredetrimentalto his position. Defendantclaimsthat “neitherChiefCounselCarillo nor Dep. CounselParkerbelievedthat Defendant’sletterimpeded theinvestigation,”D. Mem. 53. Defendantoverlooksreferencesin otherportionsof their 302s. For example,Parkerbelievedthat Defendantwas trying to get thefocusoff of him andwas trying to parsewordsto getout of the investigation. Similarly,Carillo thoughtthat Defendant madeaknowing misrepresentationmaterialto SCIA’s investigation. Docket# 34 (Motionto inspectGrandJuryRecord),DeL Exhs. 9 and 11. In any event,it is irrelevantwhetherDefendant’sobstructionattemptwasultimately successfulin achievingits goals. A defendantmust“undertakeactionfrom which an obstruction 45 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 51 of 57 ofjusticewasareasonablyforeseeableresult,but heneednot be successfulin his endeavor.” United Statesv. McBride, 362 F.3d360, 372 ( 6 Th Cir, 2004);seealsoUnitedStatesv. Poindexter 725 F. Supp. 13,23 (D.D.C. 1989)(~l505“prohibits an ‘endeavorto’ obstructaswell asa completedobstruction.It follows that an obstructiveeffect is not aprerequisiteto a violation.”) (citationsomitted). V. COUNT FIVE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSEDBECAUSEINDICTMENT ALLEGES DEFENDANT’S FALSIFICATION AND CONCEALMENT OFMATERIAL FACTS Defendantclaimsthat CountFive shouldbe dismissedbecauseDefendantA) did not concealby meansofa trick, schemeor device,norwasthereaduty to discloseinformationto SCIA, B) accuratelyrepresentedthat Abramoffhad no businessbeforeGSA; C) madestatements that wereimmaterialto SC1A andnot within SC1A’s jurisdiction. Defendant’sargumentsare without merit, andhis motion to dismissCountFive shouldbe denied. V.A Indictmentallegesaffirmative actssufficient to establisha trick schemeor device Thefact that theGovernmenthasallegedthat Defendantemployeda trick schemeor device is sufficient,andtheCourtshouldlook no further, Scc discussionsupraat IC; ~ g2.g~, UnitedStatesv. London,550 F.2d206 (5”’ Cir. 1977)(reversingdistrict courtandfinding an indictmentvalid whenit trackedthestatutorylanguagein alleginga“trick, schemeor device” eventhoughtheindictmentprovidedno factualelaboration). Evenif thecourtwereto look to thefacts,in theD.C. Circuit, as discussed~gp~atI.C, an omissionto statea material fact canbe an affirmative act. See,~ United Statesv. Dale, 782 F. Supp. 615,626(D.D.C. 1991). Defendantwassenta letter regardinghis attendanceon 46 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 52 of 57 the Scotland2002trip andaskingfor anyrecordsrelatingto the trip. Defendantrepresentedto SCLk staff that he had fully paid for the trip, thathe had receivedapprovalfor the Scotlandgolf trip in a GSA ethicsopinion andthathe had fully disclosedall relevant factstothe GSA ethics officerwho preparedthe opinion. hid. ¶36. BaseduponDefendant’svolunteeringof that information,Parkerrequestedacopyofthe ethicsrequest,which includedDefendant’sstatement “thehost isa lawyerandlobbyist, but onethat hasno businessbeforeGSA (hedoesall ofhis work on Capitol Hill).” md. ¶37. Defendantrespondedto SCIA’s requestwith alettersaying,in part,thatAbramoff“did not havebusinessbefore[GSA] at that time.” N. Defendantfailedto inform SCIA that AbramoffhadnumerousbusinessinterestsbeforeGSA. A jury couldconclude that suchan omissionconstitutesan affirmative actsufficient to establisha “trick, schemeor device” in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ lOOl(aXl) and that by forwardinga copyofthe ethics letter - a letterobtainedthroughdeceit- Defendantwasattemptingto misleadSCIA. Defendantalsobaseshis argumentfor a lack of duty to discloseto SCIAuponthe fact that the SCIA letterto Defendantmerely asksfor documents,andthus,Defendantargues,hehad no furtherdutyto discloseadditional information. D. Mem. 56. As discussedsupraat I.C, once Defendantprovided someinformationto SCIA, he “had a dutyto includeall information necessaryto makehis statementstruthful.” Cisneros.26 F. Supp.2d at 42. Defendant’s failure to provide full andaccurateinformationregardingnot only the truecostsofthe Scotlandtrip, but alsothe circumstancesurroundinghis acquiringthe ethicsopinion,supportsthe allegationsof Count Five, andconsequently,CountFiveshouldnot be dismissed. Additionally,Defendantclaimsthathe could not haveconcealedany informationbecause the requestwasoutsideofSCIA’s purview. As discussedsunraat lV.A, SCIA’s investigation 47 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 53 of 57 wasnot only “to investigatefraud againstthetribes,” D. Mem. 56, but alsoto investigate “influencepeddling” in theExecutiveBranch,includingGSA. V,B Defendantmadeinaccuraterepresentationsto SCIA Defendantfurtherclaimsthat CountFive shouldbe dismissedbecauseDefendant’s statementsto SCIA were“true on their face” andDefendantdid not employa “trick schemeor device.”D. Mem, 57. As discussedsupraat I.B.l, theDefendant’srelianceon technical definitionsof “business”are not appropriatein theD.C. Circuit, see,~g., UnitedStatesv. Dale, 991 F.2d819 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(rejectingdefenseof“literal truth” if Defendant’sdefinition is “too restrictive” andaccepting“commonusage”),or in an 18 U.S.C. § l001(a)(l)prosecution wheremisleadingstatementsaresufficient for a criminalviolation. Moreover,as theIndictment alleges,md. ¶ 36, Defendantvolunteeredthat he hadreceivedan ethicsopinionapprovingthe trip andthat lie had fully disclosedeverythingto theGSA ethicsofficer, A jury couldconclude that sucha statementwasdesignedto mislead. V.C Defendant’sstatementswerematerialandwithin SCIA’s jurisdiction Defendantmovesto dismissCountFive on thebasisthat Defendant’sstatementswere immaterialto SCIA andoutsideofSCIA’s jurisdiction. D. Mem. 58. Theseargumentshave beenpreviouslydiscussedsupraatm.D (materiality) andIV.A (SCIA’s jurisdiction). Defendant’s motion on theseargumentsshouldbe denied. VI. AIDING AND ABETTING SHOULD NOTBE DISMISSEDAT THIS TIME CountsOneandFourallegedthat theDefendantviolated 18 U.S.C. § 2, aiding and abettingstatute,with respecto the 18 U.S.C. § 1505 charges.Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, “whoever 48 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 54 of 57 commitsan offenseagainstheUnitedStatesor aids, abets,counsels,commands,inducesor procuresits commission,is punishableasaprincipal.” jç~“To proveaiding andabetting,the govemmentmustdemonstratethat a substantiveoffensewascommitted,thatthedefendant associatedhimselfwith thecriminal venture,andthathe committedsomeactwhich furtheredthe crime.” UnitedStatesv. Hamblin, 911 F.2d551, 557 (11th Cir. 1990). “Encouraging”a violation and“discouraging”thereportingof theviolation,UnitedStatesv. Sinskey,119 F.3d 712, 718 (8thCir. 1997),and“personallyattemptingto avoid [a violation’s] detection,”United Statesv. Self, 2 F.3d1071, 1089(10th Cir. 1993),havebeenheldsufficient to showthat a defendantaidedandabettedthecommissionof acrime. Defendantprematurelymovesfor dismissalbecausetheIndictmentallegeswith sufficient particularityfor theDefendanto be put on notice asto howtheconductallegedconstitutesthe elementsof theoffensecharged.UnitedStatesv. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888). In the instant case,Defendantis informedof theactionsthat hetook andcausedothersto take. If theCourt wereinclinedto dismisstheaiding andabettingcharges,thepropertime would be at theRule29 stageaftertheevidencehasbeenreceived. 49 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 55 of 57 CONCLUSION Forthe foregoingreasons,theUnited Statesrespectfullyrequeststhat theCourt deny Defendant’smotion to dismisstheIndictment. Respectfullysubmitted, I I \\ ~ V~2~’ ~ N HANIEL B. EDMONDS PETERR. ZEIDENBERG Trial Attorney,FraudSection Trial Attorney,Publich~tcgrity~4tion Criminal Division Criminal Division UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice UnitedStatesDepartmentof Justice 50 Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 56 of 57 CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE I herebycertify that on this 10th day ofFebruary,2006, a copyof theforegoingwas servedon thefollowing counselby electronicserviceand first classmail to: BarbaraVan Geldcr,Esq. RoderickL. Thomas,Esq. Albert C. Lambert,Esq. Mark B. Sweet,Esq. Wiley Rein& Fielding 1776K StreetNW Washington,DC 20006 Tel: 202-719-7032 Facsimile:202-719-7049 I r—~r—~,( NATHANIEL B. EDMONDS Trial Attorney, FraudSection UnitedStatesDepartmentof Justice Case 1:05-cr-00370-PLF Document 45 Filed 02/10/2006 Page 57 of 57