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JAIKUMAR RAMASWAMY, Chief
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS)
LINDA M. SAMUEL, Deputy Chief
DANIEL H. CLAMAN, Assistant Deputy Chief
WOO S. LEE, Trial Attorney
STEPHEN A. GIBBONS, Trial Attorney
United States Department of Justice- Criminal Division
1400 New York Avenue, N.W., 10th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 514-1263, Woo.Lee@usdoj.gov
ANDRÉ BIROTTE, JR.
United States Attorney
STEVEN R. WELK (Cal. Bar No. 149883)
Assistant United States Attorney
312 North Spring Street, 14th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-6166, Steven.welk@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ONE WHITE CRYSTAL-COVERED “BAD
TOUR” GLOVE AND OTHER MICHAEL
JACKSON MEMORABILIA;
REAL PROPERTY LOCATED ON
SWEETWATER MESA ROAD IN
MALIBU, CALIFORNIA; ONE 2011
FERRARI 599 GTO,
Defendants.
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No. CV 2: 11-3582-GW-SS
Hon. George H. Wu
UNITED STATES’ SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANTS
TEODORO NGUEMA OBIANG MANGUE’S
AND SWEETWATER MALIBU, LLC’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE LIMITED ISSUE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ORDER
FINDING THE GOVERNMENT LACKED
PROBABLE CAUSE AT THE TIME IT
INSTITUTED THE ACTION FOR
FORFEITURE IN REM
Hearing: August 19, 2013 (8:30 a.m.)
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Table of Contents
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT…………………...………….………………1
DISCUSSION……………………………….…………………………………2
I. THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED CLAIMANTS’ SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION AS TO THE SAC’S BANK FRAUD
CLAIMS ……………………………………………………………………2
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE GOVERNMENT’S
RIGHT TO FILE A NEW ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
ASSETS………………….......................................................……………..6
CONCLUSION……………………………………………….………………..10
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Court directed the parties to address two specific issues:
(1) Whether the Second Amended Complaint’s (“SAC’s”) allegations of bank
fraud satisfy 19 U.S.C. § 1615’s (“Title 19’s”) probable cause requirement,
see Reporter’s Transcript (“R.T.”), June 20, 2013, at 21-22; and
(2) If the Court determines that the Government did not have probable cause on
April 28, 2011 (the date the Government filed its original complaint) (“Filing
Date”) for its non-bank fraud allegations, what impact such a ruling would
have on the Government’s ability to file a new action, id. at 22.
As to the first issue, there is no genuine dispute: Claimants do not contest that the
Government had probable for its bank fraud claims as of the Filing Date. Claimants also
do not contest that this Court determined that the bank fraud claims plead a valid claim for
relief. Instead, Claimants concoct — without citing any applicable legal authority — a
novel legal theory to support their Rule 56 motion. Claimants contend that they are
entitled to summary judgment because Title 19 purportedly requires the Government to
plead all of its actionable claims in its initial complaint. But, this is not the law. As noted
in the Court’s Tentative Ruling (“Tentative” or “T.R.”), ECF No. 98, at 18, all that is
required under Title 19 is that the Government have in its “possession” evidence sufficient
to demonstrate probable cause at the time the action is instituted. Nothing in Title 19
requires the Government to plead all of its actionable claims in its initial complaint.
The second issue is no more complicated. Claimants do not dispute that probable
cause is a “threshold” issue. The Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that if an action
is dismissed for failure to satisfy a “threshold” precondition to suit, “the judgment
rendered will prove no bar to another suit.” Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 286
(1961) (emphasis added). Yet, Claimants suggest that if judgment is entered on these
grounds, the Defendant Assets are forever immunized. Again, Claimants’ arguments lack
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merit. When judgment is entered against a plaintiff for failure to satisfy a “threshold”
issue, such as Title 19’s probable cause requirement, it is a bedrock principle of federal
practice that plaintiff’s right to have its claims adjudicated on the merits is not prejudiced.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court Properly Denied Claimants’ Summary Judgment Motion as to
the SAC’s Bank Fraud Claims
On September 6, 2012, this Court held that the SAC’s bank fraud claims state a
valid claim for relief. 1 The SAC’s First, Second, Third and Fourth Claims for Forfeiture
are all premised in-part on bank fraud. See SAC, ECF No. 50, ¶¶ 238, 245, 252, 260. In
alleging bank fraud in its amended pleadings, the Government simply did that which it
was entitled to do under the law: assert properly pled causes of action for which it had
probable cause on the Filing Date. The fact that these claims were not pled on the initial
Filing Date has no bearing on the Government’s right to proceed.
Under established precedent, that should end the inquiry. Claimants however mint
a new and novel pleading requirement that they insist entitles them to summary judgment.
Under Claimants’ new theory, Title 19 requires the Government to plead all of its claims
in its initial complaint or be forever barred from doing so. Cl. Reply, ECF No. 94, at 24
(“The fatal flaw in that argument is that the government did not plead bank fraud when it
instituted this action.”). This argument fails for several reasons.
First, it has no support in this Circuit or any other. Claimants fail to cite, and the
Government cannot find, a single case, where any court has – ever – construed Title 19 as
requiring the Government to plead all of its legal claims in its initial complaint.
1 See R.T., Sept. 6, 2012, at 40 (denying Claimants’ motion to dismiss bank fraud claims,
the court stated: “Let me stop you. I agree with the government on the potential point of
the potential basis for them to go forward in this [bank fraud] area and I have indicated
that I was inclined to let them go forward on this, so I will. So the answer is no.”).
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Second, Claimants’ argument that Title 19 contains a pleading requirement is not
correct. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. $191,910, 16 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir.
1994), explicitly considered and rejected that argument, explaining:
This argument simply misses the point. Under [Title 19], the government must
have probable cause at the time it institutes forfeiture proceedings, not merely
plead probable cause. Whether probable cause exists to institute proceedings is
solely a question of what information is in the government’s possession. Id.
(emphasis added).
Claimants, as noted by this Court, seek to “conflate[] the issue of what the Government
knew at the time it filed the initial complaint with the issue of what was pled in the initial
complaint.” T.R. at 17. Indeed, even if “the government pled probable cause . . . at the
time it instituted the proceedings, this fact alone would not protect the government against
dismissal where the government did not actually have probable cause.” $191,910, 16 F.3d
at 1068 n. 33. $191,910 clarified that Title 19 requires the Government to have probable
cause for the “action that is being adjudicated.” Id. at 1066 (emphasis added). Here, the
SAC’s allegations, including the bank fraud claims, which the Court determined state a
valid claim, and whose allegations Claimants answered, comprise the action that is “being
adjudicated.” Accordingly, because the Government “possess[ed]” ample evidence of
bank fraud as of the Filing Date, which Claimants do not contest, this motion fails.
Third, pursuant to Federal Rule 15(a), a plaintiff is permitted to amend — as the
Government did here — its complaint to add new causes of action. DCD Programs v.
Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (“This liberality in granting leave to amend is
not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes of action or parties”); Supp. R.
G Adv. Comm. Note (2006) (“Rule 15 applies, in light of the circumstances of a forfeiture
action.”). Indeed, Rule 15(a)’s policy of permitting litigants to “freely” amend their
pleadings “is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital v. Aspeon, 316
F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). Nothing in Federal Rule 15 precludes this practice, and
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courts routinely grant the Government leave to amend forfeiture complaints to add new
claims. See, e.g., United States v. Item 1, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19326, at *5-6 (10th Cir.
Sept. 7, 2005) (granting Government leave to add new forfeiture claim); United States v.
Wells Fargo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126901, at *2 (E. D. Wis. Nov. 16, 2010) (permitting
Government to add new forfeiture cause of action); United States v. U.S. Currency, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22917, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1997) (same). Under Claimants’
approach, no forfeiture complaint could ever be amended to add additional claims.
Fourth, Claimants’ arguments have no foundation in the statutory text. Title 19
requires only that “probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such suit or
action . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1615. Nothing in that language even hints that Congress
intended to require the Government to plead all of its actionable claims in its initial
pleadings, let alone prohibit courts from granting the Government leave to amend its
pleadings, as the Court permitted the Government to do here.2 ECF No. 47. As this Court
recognized, “the Ninth Circuit noted in forfeiture actions, subsequent complaints can fix
original pleading defects.” T.R. at 17 (citing $191,910, 16 F.3d at 1068). Had Congress
intended to promulgate such a rule, it “easily could have written” that the Government
must “plead” all of its actionable claims in its initial complaint. See Ali v. BOP, 552 U.S.
214, 227 (2008); cf. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 30 (1997) (courts “ordinarily
resist reading words . . . into a statute that do not appear on its face”).
Fifth, Title 19’s probable cause requirement is an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement (as Claimants contend). See, e.g., United States v. $186,416, 527 F.
Supp. 2d 1103, 1121 (C. D. Cal. 2007), rev’d on other grounds 583 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
2 If Claimants truly believe that the Government cannot add new claims in an amended
complaint, Claimants should have raised this issue in their motion to dismiss for failure to
satisfy the requisite pleading standards. During those proceedings, not once did Claimants
suggest that the Court erred in permitting the Government to plead additional causes of
action in the SAC. Cf. Yumul v. Smart Balance, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109952, at * 14
(C. D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) (a party which has already made a Rule 12 motion “must not
make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the
party but omitted from its earlier motion.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2).
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2009) (Title 19 is an “evidentiary requirement” and not a pleading requirement); United
States v. $11,500, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76868, at *7 (D. Or. Jul. 28, 2010) (same).
Although the Government must have probable cause when it institutes an action, it need
not plead each and every fact amounting to the probable cause, nor must it allege every
claim for relief that might be based on those facts establishing probable cause. Cf. In re
Morgan, 506 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 2007) (“deciding which charges to bring is a matter of
prosecutorial discretion”). This is further evidenced by Title 19’s caption, which reads
“Burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings”; Title 19 is an evidentiary standard—not a rule
of pleading.
Sixth, Claimants’ novel legal theory would lead to an absurd result. Even where the
Government alleges a well-pled claim in an amended complaint that is supported by
probable cause, as is the case here, that claim under Claimants’ approach would be forever
barred from being adjudicated on its merits. In addition to being contrary to law, these
arguments run afoul of the clear “preference expressed in the Federal Rules . . . for
resolving disputes on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494
(2010); Butner v. Neustadter, 324 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1964) (“it is the policy of the law
to bring about a trial on the merits whenever possible . . .”). Indeed, “[t]he Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate
a proper decision on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962).
Finally, it bears repeating that because Claimants did not even raise the bank fraud
issue in their initial brief, the Court – as noted in the Tentative – need not even consider
these arguments. T.R. at 18 (citing Civ. Local Rule 7-4). As such, insofar as the SAC’s
Claims for Forfeiture Nos. 1 through 4 are premised on bank fraud, the motion fails.
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT PREJUDICE GOVERNMENT’S
RIGHT TO FILE A NEW ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ASSETS
It is hornbook law that when a civil action is disposed of on a threshold issue, such
as Title 19’s probable cause requirement, or on “‘any [other] ground which [does] not go
to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit.’”
Costello, 365 U.S. at 286 (quoting Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall 232, 237 (1866)). This
fundamental principle of federal practice, which Claimants do not contest, has been
affirmed uniformly by court after court for over a century. It is also consistent with the
strong policy underlying the Federal Rules favoring the resolution of disputes on their
merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986); Littlejohn v. United
States, 321 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (collateral estoppel “inappropriate where the
parties have not had a full and fair opportunity to fully litigate the merits of an issue”).
Yet, although Claimants have conceded, as they must, that probable cause is a “threshold”
issue distinct from the merits, see Cl. Motion, ECF No. 78, at 6, they now contend that it
is something more. (R.T. at 10) (Court also noted probable cause is the “threshold”);
United States v. $405,089.23, 122 F.3d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 1997) (“probable cause is a
prerequisite” to instituting forfeiture action). They then compound this mistake by
arguing that the Defendant Assets are forever immunized from forfeiture if the Court
disposes of the instant action on these “threshold” grounds. This is simply not the law.
Nothing in Title 19, or any other statute, rule, regulation, or case, supports
Claimants’ novel theory of the law. On the contrary, Costello and its progeny have held
that a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a “precondition requisite to the Court’s going
forward to determine the merits of his substantive claim,” does not “operate as an
adjudication on the merits and as a bar to [a] subsequent complaint.”3 Criales v. American
Airlines, 105 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1997).
3 Similarly, Claimants’ contention that the Government made contrary arguments is false.
The Government agreed that if it cannot show probable cause, its action will be dismissed
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Indeed, consistent with these principles, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that where the
Government cannot satisfy Title 19’s probable cause “threshold” as of the Filing Date, but
later obtains additional evidence, the Government may institute “another action” based
upon this new evidence. $191,910, 16 F.3d at 1067 (emphasis in original). The court
explained:
If, in fact, the government can only show probable cause as of the time of trial . . . it
has not shown probable cause for the institution of such suit or action. Instead, it
has only shown that it has probable cause for . . . the institution of another action.
Id. at 1066-67 (emphasis in original).4
Similarly, in other analogous procedural contexts where a forfeiture action is
disposed of on grounds other than the merits, courts have permitted the Government to
file new forfeiture proceedings against those same assets. For instance:
• Where the Government fails to give notice of a seizure to interested parties
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(e), which — like probable cause — is an important
procedural protection, the forfeiture is set aside “without prejudice to the right of
the Government to commence [another] forfeiture proceeding at a later time,”
see, e.g., United States v. $11,500, 710 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013);
• Similarly, where an attempt to administratively forfeit assets fail, the
Government may file a new civil forfeiture action against those same assets.
See, e.g., Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing right to file a civil forfeiture action against property that was the
and it “would never be allowed to enter the courthouse door.” (R.T. at 7). But, in the very
next sentence, the Government explained that the scope of that prejudice is limited to “those
items in the property and as to the allegations that are in that complaint.” Id. (emphasis
added). Moreover, the Government stated clearly that it intended to argue that a Title 19
dismissal “would be without prejudice” to the Government’s right to re-file based upon
additional evidence. Id. at 12: 18-20; see also id. at 18: 15-20 (“my understanding of the
government’s argument is, is that if there is any dismissal, they are saying . . . they are not
barred from going ahead with those items that now can give rise to probable cause”).
4 Analogously, it is well established that under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
when an application for a seizure or search warrant is denied, the Government’s right to re-
apply based upon additional evidence is not prejudiced. As the probable cause requirement
for forfeiture is the same as that required to obtain a warrant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, this
further suggests that a dismissal for lack of probable cause in the instant action is without
prejudice. See United States v. Piper Cherokee, 91 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996).
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subject of failed administrative forfeiture); Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 292
(7th Cir. 2000) (directing Government to return property or file a new forfeiture
action after failed administrative forfeiture); and
• Where an asset is seized illegally without probable cause, the Government may
still seek civil forfeiture of this same asset, see, e.g., United States v. $277,000,
941 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1991); $191,910, 16 F.3d at 1063 (“mere fact that
property was illegally seized does not immunize that property from forfeiture”).
The above principles militate strongly in favor of the Government’s position.
Likewise, in another analogous statutory context, courts have uniformly rejected the
notion that disposing of in rem actions on “probable cause” grounds prejudices a
plaintiff’s right to file a new action based upon additional evidence. Under admiralty law
– from which forfeiture law is derived – plaintiffs are permitted to seize property pursuant
to an arrest warrant in rem upon the filing of an in rem complaint and a showing of
“probable cause” under Rule E of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime
Claims and Asset Forfeiture. See, e.g., KTB v. M/V Cielo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26385,
at *4 (E. D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) (plaintiff “must meet a probable cause showing” to
institute maritime in rem action); SMS Yacht v. One Nautique, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
182870, at *3 (S. D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (same); see also United States v. $5,372.85, 283
F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing historical connection between forfeiture and
admiralty law). Where, however, a court determines that plaintiff’s in rem arrest warrant
was obtained, and the in rem action was filed, without “probable cause,” courts have
uniformly held that the appropriate remedy is to vacate the warrant and to dismiss the in
rem action without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to file another in rem action based
upon additional evidence.5 Admiralty cases are especially instructive because Congress
5 See, e.g., SPL Shipping v. Gujurat, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95674, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
10, 2008) (dismissal is “without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to file a new complaint . . . if
subsequent developments” show further evidence); Precious Pearls v. Tiger Int’l, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58453, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2008) (dismissal was “without prejudice
to the plaintiff’s ability to file a subsequent complaint” with more evidence); Sonito
Shipping v. Sun United, 478 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissal “without
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intended – as reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b) – that in adjudicating forfeiture actions
courts apply procedures “which shall conform as near as may be to proceedings in
admiralty.’” 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b).6 As such, these cases suggest strongly that if a
forfeiture action, like an admiralty in rem action, is dismissed on threshold “probable
cause” grounds, the effect of that dismissal is without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to
re-file based upon new evidence.
In the face of such clear precedent, Claimants only response is to cite four cases –
none of which discuss the specific issue this Court directed the parties to address; namely,
what impact judgment on Title 19 grounds would have on the Government’s ability to file
a new action. See R.T. at 19: 19-23. Specifically, Claimants cite United States v.
$32,000, 2007 WL 1297098 (D. Az. Apr. 30, 2007), United States v. $31,999, 1992 WL
209542 (N.D.N.Y. Jun. 1, 1992), and United States v. $186,416, 590 F.3d 942, 955 (9th
Cir. 2010). These cases stand for the unremarkable proposition that a claimant is entitled
to judgment if he prevails at summary judgment. But, as Claimants’ brief makes clear,
(Cl. Supp. Brief, at 18-19), these cases are noticeably silent on whether judgment on these
“threshold” grounds prejudice a plaintiff’s right to file a new action.7
Likewise, Claimants’ contention that Costello does not apply here fails. Claimants
argue that because they were required to incur the “inconvenience” of having to propound
prejudice to the plaintiff filing a complaint . . . at a later date” with more evidence); CSL
Australia v. Britannia, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81173, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009)
(dismissal without prejudice directing plaintiff to designate any “new action” it commences
concerning same dispute as related action).
6 Similarly, Supplemental Rule G(1), which governs civil forfeiture, provides “To the extent
that this rule does not address an issue, Supplemental Rules C and E and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure also apply.” As noted above, these rules govern admiralty cases.
7 The Government acknowledges that “district courts are normally under no compulsion to
specify the precise issues to which the ‘with prejudice’ label applies.” See Le Bron-Rios v.
U.S. Marshal Serv., 341 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2003). It is also true that this issue may not be
ripe for adjudication. But, in cases where an action is dismissed for failure to satisfy a
“threshold” issue, some courts have explained “it would have been better had the district
court made clear” what specific issues were decided (or not) with prejudice. Id.
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discovery and file a motion, Costello requires that this Court bar the Government from
filing a new action. Not so. As noted in Criales, 105 F.3d at 96, Costello means that:
[T]he preclusive effect afforded dismissals by Rule 41(b) was intended to apply
only to those situations in which a defendant must incur the inconvenience of
preparing to meet the merits of the plaintiff’s claims because there is no initial
bar to the court’s reaching the merits as there would be, for illustrative purposes, if
there were a defect in pleadings or parties.
But, here, the thrust of Claimants’ motion is that Title 19’s threshold preconditions
constitute an “initial bar to the court’s reaching the merits” of the action. (Cl. Motion at
6). Claimants simply cannot have it both ways. In any event, given that this suit has not
progressed beyond the pleading stage, and Claimants have not been the subject of
significant discovery (other than Supp. Rule G(6) interrogatories), any purported
“inconvenience” incurred was certainly not related to the “necessity of preparing a
defense” on the merits. Costello, 365 U.S. at 287; see also U.S. v. $237,632.92, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 165213, at *4 (N. D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012) (defendant’s “lack of effort and
expense in preparing for trial strongly supports dismissal without prejudice”).
Finally, the primary policy concern underlying Title 19’s probable cause
requirement is largely not implicated here. The Ninth Circuit explained that Title 19 was
an important procedural protection promulgated to ensure that the Government does not
seize property without evidence. Similarly, this Court noted, “I would have trouble with
the government seizing property without a basis . . .” R.T. at 7: 9-11. In the instant
action, only one asset has been seized — the Defendant Ferrari. Both the Defendant
Sweetwater Property and the seventy-four items of Defendant Michael Jackson
Memorabilia remain in Claimants’ custody.8
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Claimants’ motion for summary judgment fails.
8 A lis pendens was filed in connection with the Defendant Real Property. ECF No. 25.
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DATED: August 9, 2013 JAIKUMAR RAMASWAMY, Chief
LINDA M. SAMUEL, Deputy Chief
DANIEL H. CLAMAN, Assistant Chief
CRIMINAL DIVISION
/S/ Woo S. Lee______________________
WOO S. LEE
STEPHEN A. GIBBONS
Trial Attorneys
United States Department of Justice
ANDRÉ BIROTTE, JR.
United States Attorney
STEVEN WELK
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Asset Forfeiture Section
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Case 2:11-cv-03582-GW-SS Document 103 Filed 08/09/13 Page 13 of 13 Page ID #:3572
