DAVID B. BARLOW, United States Attorney (#13117)
JARED C. BENNETT, Assistant United States Attorney (#9097)
185 South State Street #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
tel: (801) 325-3259; fax: (801) 325-3261
jared.bennett@usdoj.gov
ROBERT G. DREHER, Acting Assistant Attorney General
LUTHER L. HAJEK, Trial Attorney
SARA C. PORSIA, Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
Natural Resources Section
Ben Franklin Station, P.O. Box 7611
Washington, D.C. 20044-7611
tel: (202) 305-0503; fax: (202) 305-0506
sara.porsia@usdoj.gov
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
S.M.R. JEWELL, Secretary,
U.S. Department of the Interior, et al.,
Defendants,
SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
ALLIANCE, et al.,
Intervenor-Defendants.
___________________________________
Case No. 2:10-cv-970-DB-BCW
Case No. 2:11-cv-391-DB-BCW
(consolidated)
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
THEIR COMBINED MOTIONS TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS UINTAH
COUNTY, UTAH ET AL.’S SECOND
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF STATE
OF UTAH’S FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 1 of 64
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
S.M.R. JEWELL, Secretary, U.S. Department
of the Interior, et al.,
Defendants,
SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
ALLIANCE, et al.,
Intervenor-Defendants.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 2 of 64
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Plaintiffs’ Claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). .................................................................................................... 1
A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue Their Claims. ................................................... 2
1. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate Standing Based on an Alleged
Loss of Oil and Gas Revenue...................................................................... 2
a. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Show that the Challenged Policies Caused
a Reduction in Royalty Revenue. .................................................... 2
b. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Show that the Challenged Policies Caused
a Reduction in Bonus Bid Payments. .............................................. 7
c. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Economic Harm is Insufficient for Prudential
Reasons. ........................................................................................ 10
d. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Loss of Oil and Gas Revenue Is Not
Redressable. .................................................................................. 12
e. Alleged Procedural Injuries Alone Are Not Sufficient to
Establish Standing. ........................................................................ 17
f. The Parens Patriae Doctrine Does Not Provide a Basis for
Standing. ....................................................................................... 18
2. Utah’s Claims that the Value of SITLA Lands Will Be Diminished Is
Not Supported by Any Evidence. ............................................................. 21
3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Regarding Rights of Way Do Not Establish Standing
to Challenge the Policies at Issue in this Case. ......................................... 21
4. Plaintiffs’ Claims Regarding Wildlife Management Are Insufficient to
Establish Standing. .................................................................................... 24
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Challenge Final Agency Action. ................................... 25
1. Plaintiffs’ Improper Programmatic Challenges Must be Dismissed. ........ 25
2. The Challenged Internal Guidance Documents are not Final Agency
Actions. ..................................................................................................... 27
C. The Larson Exception is Inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ Claims. ................................ 34
D. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Ripe for Review. ........................................................ 38
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 3 of 64
iii
II. Alternatively, Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ........................................................................ 41
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Alleging that BLM Lacks the Authority to Inventory and
Manage Lands to Protect Wilderness Values are Incorrect and Fail to State a
Claim. .................................................................................................................... 41
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims for Violation of the APA Requirements for Rulemaking Fail
to State a Claim. .................................................................................................... 44
C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Alleging Violations of FLPMA’s Procedural Requirements
Fail to State a Claim. ............................................................................................. 47
D. Utah’s Eighth Cause of Action Fails to State a Claim. ......................................... 48
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 50
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 4 of 64
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................46, 47
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592 (1982) .....................................................................................................18, 19
Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C.,
493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) .........................................................................................41
Amigos Bravos v. BLM,
816 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2011) ................................................................................19
Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan,
969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992) .....................................................................................12, 14
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...........................................................................................................41
Baca v. King,
92 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 1996) .........................................................................12, 14, 16, 17
Ballesteros v. Ashcroft,
452 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2006) .........................................................................................45
Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154 (1997) ...............................................................................................28, 29, 30
Block v. North Dakota,
461 U.S. 273 (1983) ...........................................................................................................50
Bryant v. Yellen,
447 U.S. 352 (1980) ...........................................................................................................16
CSG Exploration Co. v. FERC,
930 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1991) .........................................................................................38
Chen v. Carroll,
48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995) .............................................................................................45
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 5 of 64
v
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971) ...........................................................................................................37
Colorado Envtl. Coal.,
161 IBLA 386 (2004).........................................................................................................44
Colorado v. Gonzales,
558 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (D. Colo. 2007) ...............................................................................19
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young,
818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ...........................................................................................45
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) ..................19
FDIC v. Schuchmann,
235 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2000) .........................................................................................45
FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11 (1988) .............................................................................................................15
Forest Guardians v. Forsgren,
478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007) .........................................................................................26
Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945) ...........................................................................................................20
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907) ...........................................................................................................19
High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton,
448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2006) ...............................................................................27
Holt v. United States,
46 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................1, 26
Howard B. Keck, Jr.,
124 IBLA at 55 ............................................................................................................29, 45
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co.,
287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002) ...........................................................................................41
Kane County v. Salazar,
562 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................................49
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 6 of 64
vi
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949) ...............................................................................................34, 36, 37
Lassen Motorcycle Club,
133 IBLA 104 (1995)...................................................................................................29, 45
Los Alamos Study Grp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy,
692 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................................1, 40
Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) .....................................................................................................16, 17
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871 (1990) .....................................................................................................25, 26
Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG,
543 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2008) ...........................................................................................1
Marathon Oil Co.,
139 IBLA 347 (1997)...............................................................................................3, 13, 15
Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt,
166 F.3d 1221, 1999 WL 3362 (10th Cir. 1999) .........................................................13, 16
Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt,
966 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1997), aff'd, 166 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) ..........13, 14, 15
Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923) ...........................................................................................................18
Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) ...............................................................................................18, 19, 20
Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Service,
670 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2011).........................................................................................31, 32
Montoya v. Chao,
296 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................2
Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan,
14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994) ...........................................................................................10
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus,
499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980) ......................................................................................18
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 7 of 64
vii
Nat’l Mining Ass'n v. Jackson,
880 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2012) .............................................................................32, 33
Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior,
538 U.S. 803 (2003) ...........................................................................................................38
Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. BLM,
625 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) .....................................................................................42, 43
Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. Civ. 03-381-HA,
2004 WL 1592606 (D. Or. July 15, 2004) .........................................................................27
Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Brong, No. Civ. 04-693-AA,
2004 WL 2554575 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2004) ..........................................................................27
Osborn v. United States,
918 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1990) .........................................................................................1, 26
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n,
506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) .............................................................................................45
Painter v. Shalala,
97 F.3d 1351 (10th Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................35, 36, 37
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606 (2001) ...........................................................................................................39
Pamela S. Crocker-Davis,
94 IBLA 328 (1986).....................................................................................................29, 45
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ...........................................................................................45
Park Lake Res. L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
197 F.3d 448 (10th Cir. 1999) ...........................................................................................26
Pennsylvania v. Kleppe,
533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .......................................................................................7, 11
Richard D. Sawyer,
160 IBLA 158 (2003).....................................................................................................3, 15
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt,
696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982) ...........................................................................................40
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 8 of 64
viii
SUWA,
150 IBLA 263 (1999).........................................................................................................44
SUWA,
163 IBLA 14 (2004)...........................................................................................................44
SUWA,
160 IBLA 225 (2003).........................................................................................................44
SUWA v. BLM,
425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005) .....................................................................................48, 49
SUWA v. Palma,
707 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) ...............................................................................8, 24, 40
In re Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litig.,
340 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................31
Sackett v. EPA,
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) .......................................................................................................30
Schweiker v. Hansen,
450 U.S. 785 (1981) ...........................................................................................................45
Sierra Club v. Peterson,
228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................................27
Sierra Club v. Yeutter,
911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990) .........................................................................................26
Sorenson Commc'ns, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
567 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................................45
Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria,
328 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................................2
Stewart v. Kempthorne,
554 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................................10
Sullivan v. Lujan,
969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992) .........................................................................13, 14, 18, 19
Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488 (2009) ...........................................................................................................17
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 9 of 64
ix
Texas v. United States,
523 U.S. 296 (1998) ...........................................................................................................40
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568 (1985) ...........................................................................................................40
Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 158 (1967) ...........................................................................................................38
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory,
534 U.S. 1 (2001) ...............................................................................................................37
Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1 (1965) .....................................................................................................3, 12, 14
Uintah Cnty.,
182 IBLA 191 (May 9, 2012) ............................................................................................23
United States v. Chemical Found. Inc.,
272 U.S. 1 (1926) ...............................................................................................................37
United States v. Kaycee Bentonite Corp.,
64 IBLA 183 (1982)...........................................................................................................45
United States v. Magnesium Corp.,
616 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2010) .........................................................................................46
United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States,
253 F.3d 543 (10th Cir. 2001) ...........................................................................................37
Utah v. Babbitt,
137 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) .............................................................................17, 22, 26
Utah v. Norton,
No. 2:96-cv-0870, 2006 WL 2711798 (D. Utah Sept. 20, 2006), aff’d, on ripeness
grounds by 535 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2008).........................................28, 29, 30, 35, 43, 47
Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar,
709 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 2013) .........................................................................3, 12, 14, 15
Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar,
No. 10-CV-237F, 2011 WL 3738240 (D. Wyo. Aug. 12, 2011) .......................................33
Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar,
No. 10-cv-0226, 2011 WL 37520 (D. Wyo. June 29, 2011) .............................................39
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 10 of 64
x
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................13, 16
Wyoming v. Dep't of Interior,
674 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) .........................................................1, 7, 10, 11, 19, 21, 26
Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437 (1992) .............................................................................................................6
Wyoming v. United States,
279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................34, 37, 49
STATUTES
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) ...........................................................................................................44, 46
5 U.S.C. § 704 ................................................................................................................................34
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) ...............................................................................................................25, 27, 34
16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) .......................................................................................................................35
16 U.S.C. § 1133 ............................................................................................................................35
30 U.S.C. § 226(a) .........................................................................................................................12
33 U.S.C. § 1313 ............................................................................................................................32
42 U.S.C. § 6217 ............................................................................................................................35
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) ...................................................................................................................42
43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) ........................................................................................................................15
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) .................................................................................................17, 42, 47, 48
43 U.S.C. § 1712(f) ..................................................................................................................47, 48
43 U.S.C. § 1782 ......................................................................................................................35, 43
Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. 106-469, Sec. 604,
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15927(b) ................................................34, 36
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, Div. E, Sec. 125 (Dec. 23,
2011) ..................................................................................................................................37
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 11 of 64
xi
Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-175, Sec. 101(a)(7) (Sept. 28, 2012) ...............37
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, Div.
F. Sec. 1101(a)(3) (Mar. 26, 2013) ...................................................................................37
REGULATIONS
43 C.F.R. § 1610.3 .........................................................................................................................17
Notice of Intent to Prepare Master Leasing Plan, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,141 (Mar. 5, 2012) ................17
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)....................................................................................................................2
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 12 of 64
xii
TABLE OF ACRONYMS
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 2000 (EPCA)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
Expression of Interest (EOI)
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Lands
Under Wilderness Review (IMP)
Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA)
Lands with Wilderness Characteristics (LWCs)
Master Leasing Plan (MLP)
Mineral Leasing Act (MLA)
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Record of Decision (ROD)
Resource Management Plans (RMP)
State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA)
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA)
U.S. Bureau of Land Management Instruction Memorandum (IM)
United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
United States Department of the Interior (DOI)
Wilderness Study Areas (WSA)
Wilderness Re-Inventory Areas (WIA)
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 13 of 64
1
Defendants, through undersigned counsel, hereby file this Reply Memorandum in Support
of their Combined Motions to Dismiss Uintah County, et al.’s Second Amended and
Supplemental Complaint and Plaintiff Utah’s First Amended Complaint.
I. Plaintiffs’ Claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
due to Plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy their burden to show that they have standing to assert their
claims, that their claims challenge a final agency action as is required by the APA, or that their
claims are ripe for review. Plaintiffs’ opposition memoranda misstate the standard of review
applicable to a Rule 12(b)(1) factual attack on Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs repeatedly and
incorrectly assert that their “factual allegations are presumed to be true,” that general allegations
are presumed to “embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim,” and that
the allegations in their complaints must be construed in their favor. Utah Opp’n at 50, 78, 79, 84;
UAC Am. Opp’n at 38. To the contrary, it is well settled that a court presented with a factual
attack pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) “‘may not presume the truthfulness of the [petition’s] factual
allegations.’” Wyoming v. Dep’t of Interior, 674 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holt
v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995)); Los Alamos Study Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 692 F.3d 1057, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 2012).1 Because the Court’s jurisdiction is at issue in
a Rule 12(b)(1) factual attack, it “is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the
existence of its power to hear the case.” Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729-30.
1 See also Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1990); Makro Capital of Am.,
Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). The cases cited by Plaintiffs are
inapposite as none provide the appropriate standard of review for a factual attack on the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002–
04 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining the difference between a facial attack and a factual attack).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 14 of 64
2
Moreover, Plaintiffs ignore the fact that they, not Defendants, bear the burden of
producing evidence sufficient to establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 328 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th
Cir. 2003); Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The burden of establishing
subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted). Defendants
first moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on July 8, 2011. ECF Nos. 66-68. Rather than
responding to Defendants’ motions, Plaintiffs moved for, and were granted, leave to conduct
jurisdictional discovery, representing to the Court that the documents sought in jurisdictional
discovery would reveal facts relevant to Defendants’ jurisdictional defenses. See ECF Nos. 83,
131. Despite Defendants’ production of over one hundred thousand pages of documents,
Plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidentiary support for many of their factual allegations and
have failed to meet their burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction exists over their claims.
A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue Their Claims.
Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with evidence demonstrating that the Challenged
Policies2 have caused them an injury that is redressable by a court order. Therefore, their claims
should be dismissed for lack of standing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
1. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate Standing Based on an Alleged
Loss of Oil and Gas Revenue.
a. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Show that the Challenged Policies
Caused a Reduction in Royalty Revenue.
Utah and the Counties offer a similar theory as to how the Challenged Policies allegedly
caused them to lose oil and gas revenue. Utah argues that BLM has deferred offering parcels
within the area of the proposed America’s Red Rock Wilderness Act (“ARRWA”) for oil and gas
leasing. See Utah Opp’n at 25, 29-33. It further alleges that companies have submitted
2 The term “Challenged Policies” used herein refers to all BLM policy and guidance documents
challenged by Plaintiffs in this consolidated litigation. See Def. Exs. 1-6, 11-13.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 15 of 64
3
expressions of interest (“EOI”) in certain of these parcels and that BLM has deferred offering
them for sale because they were within the proposed ARRWA areas. Id. at 38-39. Utah claims
that the deferral of these parcels has caused it to lose royalty revenue and bonus bid payments that
would otherwise be owed to it under the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”). Id. at 37-39, 65-68.
Similarly, the Counties argue that BLM has declined to offer parcels for leasing in
response to EOIs if they are within the proposed ARRWA areas or contain lands with wilderness
characteristics (“LWC”). UAC Am. Opp’n at 17-18. Further, they argue that, as a result, the
number of leases issued has dropped and therefore caused the Counties to lose bonus bid
payments. Id. at 18-20, 23-24. In the absence of the Challenged Policies, the Counties argue that
additional parcels likely would have been leased and therefore they would have received higher
bonus bid payments. Id. at 33-36, 38-40.
As an initial matter, the deferral of lands from leasing is a lawful exercise of the Secretary
of the Interior’s discretion. It is well established that the Secretary retains the ultimate discretion
to lease or not to lease particular parcels. Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar, 709 F.3d 1040,
1044 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[The Mineral Leasing Act (‘MLA’)] continues to vest the Secretary with
considerable discretion to determine which lands will be leased.”); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 4 (1965). BLM is not required to lease lands merely because they are designated as
“open” in a resource management plan (“RMP”). See Marathon Oil Co., 139 IBLA 347, 356
(1997) (“BLM has authority to eliminate specific parcels from leasing even where they are
designated in an RMP as generally suitable for leasing.”); Richard D. Sawyer, 160 IBLA 158, 163
(2003) (same).
Lands identified in an RMP as available for leasing typically undergo additional analysis
before a decision is made to include them in a lease sale. See W. Energy Alliance, 709 F.3d at
1043 (“If the lands are determined to be available for oil and gas development under the
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 16 of 64
4
applicable RMP, the BLM field office conducts an interdisciplinary team review of the parcels,
focusing on conflicts with wildlife, habitat, wilderness, land characteristics, planning and other
resources values.”). “The [] pre-leasing review processes can result in parcel rejections, deferrals,
and/or stipulations being placed on the leases.” Id. at 1043. Accordingly, contrary to Plaintiffs’
repeated assertions, BLM has the authority to defer parcels from leasing in order to further
evaluate impacts to the environment or other reasons.
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how the lawful exercise of the Secretary’s discretion
has caused them to be injured. In their complaints, Plaintiffs alleged that the Challenged Policies
had caused them to lose oil and gas royalty revenue and bonus bid payments. See Utah Am.
Compl. ¶ 179 (BLM’s policies are “causing Utah to [lose] mineral leasing revenues, including
bonus payments . . . .”); UAC 2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 107 (“Oil and gas royalties paid to Utah from
production in Uintah County dropped almost 50% between the 2008 calendar year and the 2009
calendar year.”); see also id. ¶ 109. The Counties tied this reduction specifically to a decrease in
production. See id. ¶ 107 (“Following the implementation of de facto wilderness management in
2009 and the MLP proposals under IM 2010-117 in early 2010, crude oil and natural gas
production declined in Uintah County.”).
As it turns out, there was no decline in production. Instead, as Defendants have
demonstrated, the publicly available information shows that production of oil and gas on federal
lands in both Utah and Uintah County has steadily increased since 2009, the year that Defendants
allegedly instituted a policy of de facto wilderness management. See Def. Mem. at 23. Further,
Defendants demonstrated that, despite the increased production, the lower price of oil and gas
caused the value of the oil and gas produced to be lower in fiscal years (“FY”) 2008 and 2009,
before increasing in the following years. Id. at 24. The drop in the value of the oil and gas
produced, along with other economic factors, contributed to an overall decline in oil and gas
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 17 of 64
5
revenue in FY 2010 and 2011. Id. at 25.3 But Plaintiffs’ premise that the Challenged Policies
have caused a decrease in production, which then led to decreased royalty revenue, has been
shown to be false.
Faced with compelling evidence that royalty revenues over the past four years have not
suffered due to BLM’s existing policies, the Counties now abandon the claim that the Challenged
Policies have caused them to lose royalty revenue. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 34 (“DOI’s
arguments about royalty, energy prices, and production are, thus, irrelevant.”); see also id. at 39-
40. And while Utah maintains that the Challenged Policies have caused royalties to decrease, it
offers very little to support that assertion. See Utah Opp’n at 37-39, 65-68. The only evidence
offered is the Declaration of John Harja (ECF No. 83-12), Utah Ex. 31. The declaration shows
that royalty revenues for the six years leading up to FY 2011 were: FY 2006 - $129,461,187; FY
2007 - $129,301,505; FY 2008 - $134,488,479; FY 2009 - $176,907,089; FY 2010 -
$136,760,974; and FY 2011 - $144,338,711. Harja Decl. ¶ 5.4 In FY 2012, royalty revenues
were $153,597,800. See Budget Recommendations, Fiscal Year 2014, Fiscal Year 2013
Supplementals at 10, 28, Def. Ex. 31. Thus, despite lower oil and gas prices, royalty revenues did
not decrease after FY 2008 and actually increased quite significantly in FY 2009.
3 Utah’s total mineral leasing revenue actually increased from $150.3 million (royalty – $134.5
million / bonus – $15.8 million) (excluding a FY 2007 carryover of $5.5 million) in FY 2008 to
$189.1 million (royalty – $176.9 million / bonus – $12.2 million in bonus) in FY 2009. See
Compiled Utah Annual Budget Summaries (excerpts) (charts for Mineral Lease Funds and
Revenue Estimates), Def. Ex. 31; see also Harja Decl. (ECF No. 83-12).
4 Mr. Harja relies on Utah budget data and therefore the figures in his declaration are largely the
same as in the budget summary documents submitted by Defendants. See Compiled Utah Annual
Budget Summaries (excerpts) (charts for Mineral Lease Funds and Revenue Estimates), Def. Ex.
31. The only discrepancy is that for FY 2008, Mr. Harja excluded $5.45 million in exchanged
lands mineral lease carryover from FY 2007. Compare Harja Decl. ¶ 5 ($150,324,099 total
revenue in FY 2008) with Budget Summary, Fiscal Year 2010, Mineral Lease Funds Table Three
Year Comparison at 23 ($155,774,100 total revenue in FY 2008), Def. Ex. 31. But this
discrepancy is not significant for purposes of the arguments, and there is no dispute over the Utah
Budget figures, which are a matter of public record.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 18 of 64
6
Utah also argues that the Challenged Policies will cause it to lose oil and gas revenue,
including royalties and bonus bid payments, over the long term and attempts to liken this case to
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). Utah Opp’n at 66-68. In that case, Wyoming sued
Oklahoma over an Oklahoma law designed specifically to increase Oklahoma’s revenue from the
sale of coal and decrease Wyoming’s revenue. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 443-44. The
law did this by mandating that Oklahoma utilities use at least ten percent Oklahoma coal. Id.
One of the express purposes of the law was to “enhance[] the economy of the State of Oklahoma”
by taking coal purchases away from Wyoming. Id. at 443.
In support of its injury, Wyoming relied on data showing Oklahoma utilities’ purchases of
Wyoming coal had decreased following the enactment of the law. Id. at 444-45. Wyoming also
submitted affidavits showing that it had lost roughly $500,000 per year following the passage of
the law and that its excess capacity of coal could not be sold elsewhere. Id. at 445-46. Oklahoma
did not submit any evidence to dispute Wyoming’s injury, but it did submit the affidavit of an
economist who found that some of Wyoming’s losses could be attributed to the lowering of
Wyoming’s severance tax rate and that even prior to the law, Oklahoma utilities used some
Oklahoma coal. Id. at 445 n.6. Under these circumstances, the Court found that Wyoming had
standing. See id. at 446-54.
That case is significantly different from Utah’s case here and does not support standing.
The law in Wyoming v. Oklahoma was designed specifically to take coal tax revenue from
Wyoming and give it to Oklahoma and, in fact, did so. By contrast, the policies challenged in this
case have no direct affect on Utah’s right to revenues under the MLA or the percentage of
revenues that Utah receives. Instead, Utah argues that the policies will have the incidental effect
of discouraging oil and gas leasing in Utah, thereby decreasing the royalties that it will receive.
See Utah Opp’n at 68. Thus, these are precisely the type of generalized allegations of incidental
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 19 of 64
7
economic harm that are insufficient to support standing. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 674 F.3d 1220, 1234 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668,
672 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (State and local governments lack standing “where diminution of tax
receipts is largely an incidental result of the challenged action”).
Further, unlike Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the evidence submitted by Utah does not establish
that it has, in fact, lost tax revenue. As discussed above, the Harja Declaration does not show that
Utah’s royalty revenue decreased after FY 2008 despite lower oil and gas prices. Thus, Utah has
failed to offer evidentiary support for its claim that BLM’s policies “have directly deprived the
State of revenue.” Utah Opp’n at 67. This puts Utah in the same position as Wyoming and Park
County, Wyoming in the litigation involving winter use of Yellowstone National Park. In that
case, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Wyoming v. Oklahoma, stating, “Petitioners in this case
have presented us with no evidence that specific loss of tax revenues have occurred, and their
assertions of future lost tax revenues are merely speculative.” Wyoming, 674 F.3d at 1235. The
same is true here.
b. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Show that the Challenged Policies
Caused a Reduction in Bonus Bid Payments.
Both Utah and the Counties argue that they were injured by an alleged loss of bonus bid
payments and rely heavily on the Harja Declaration to establish that proposition. See Utah Opp’n
at 37-39, 68; UAC Am. Opp’n at 38-40. Utah claims that the Harja Declaration demonstrates “a
drop from $40,000,000 in bonus payments in 2007 to $9,000,000 in 2011” and implies that this
drop was due to the Challenged Policies. Utah Opp’n at 68. This assertion does not even
accurately represent the information in the Harja Declaration. But more importantly, the implied
assertion that a $31,000,000 drop in bonus bid payments can be attributed to the Challenged
Policies is not supported by the declaration itself.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 20 of 64
8
As stated in Mr. Harja’s declaration, the bonus bid payments to Utah beginning in FY
2006 were: FY 2006 - $40,583,333; FY 2007 - $31,552,661; FY 2008 - $15,835,620; FY 2009 -
$12,235,533; FY 2010 - $10,466,370; and FY 2011 - $8,440,420. Harja Decl. ¶ 5. Thus, prior to
the time Plaintiffs allege that the Challenged Policies were in effect, the bonus bid payments had
already decreased by roughly $25 million. None of that drop can be attributed to Defendants’
actions. In subsequent years, the bonus bid payments decreased by more modest amounts. Mr.
Harja states that the reduction in bonus bid payments “are directly related to the increased
difficulty in offering parcels of real interest to the oil and gas exploration industry.” Id. ¶ 6. But
that assertion is not supported by any analysis of the potential factors influencing the bonus
payments, including market factors.
Further, because Mr. Harja’s declaration was executed in September 2011 and Utah chose
not to update it, it omits data for FY 2012. As reported in Utah’s budget documents, Utah
received $40,392,500 in bonus bid payment in FY 2012, nearly as high as the record high of FY
2006. See Budget Recommendations, Fiscal Year 2014, Fiscal Year 2013 Supplementals at 10,
28, Def. Ex. 31. Utah claims that this information is irrelevant because it post-dates the filing of
the complaint. Utah Opp’n at 68. Certainly, injury must be established based on the actions
challenged at the time the complaint was filed and not on “subsequent events.” SUWA v. Palma,
707 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2013). But Utah is claiming that BLM’s policies have caused and
are continuing to cause it to lose bonus bid payments. See Utah Opp’n at 68 (arguing that “the
Secretary continues enforcing the unlawful wilderness policies . . . thereby denying the state
immediate bonus payments and longer term royalties”). Utah cannot claim that it continues to
lose money and, at the same time, exclude irrefutable evidence that contradicts its claims of
injury.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 21 of 64
9
Perhaps more significant than the amount of the bonus bid payment in FY 2012 is that it
shows that Mr. Harja’s (and Utah’s) underlying assumptions about the causes of the reduction in
such payments were just plain wrong. Mr. Harja theorized that the modest drop in bonus bid
payments between 2008 and 2011 could be attributed to BLM’s policies. See Harja Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.
But that failed to account for the well documented decline in oil and gas prices and depressed
demand for oil and gas during the recession. See Def. Mem. at 28. The fact that bonus bid
payments rebounded nearly to an all time high in FY 2012 thoroughly undermines his conclusion
that BLM’s policies (allegedly in effect for nearly four years at the time) were causing a decrease
in bonus bid payments.
The Counties similarly argue that the deferral of parcels that were nominated through
EOIs harmed them economically because they would have obtained a share of the bonus bid
payments if the parcels were leased. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 33-36, 38-40. They argue that
“UAC members have lost and continue to lose bonus payment revenues.” Id. at 34. But the only
evidence that they offer to support that proposition is the Harja Declaration, id. at 19, 39, which,
as discussed above, fails to account for lower oil and gas prices and other market factors. The
Counties simply ignore the fact that bonus bid payments to Utah for FY 2012 were $40.4 million.
The Counties also argue that BLM’s data show that leases have been lower in recent years
and fewer new leases translates to lower bonus bid payments. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 18, 35; see
also UAC Ex. 110. The BLM data show that the number of new leases in Utah over the past six
years were: FY 2006 – 351; FY 2007 – 303; FY 2008 – 67; FY 2009 – 155; FY 2010 – 79; FY
2011 – 28; and FY 2012 – 40. UAC Ex. 110. Thus, the decline that the Counties allude to began
before FY 2009 when the Challenged Policies allegedly took effect. Moreover, as the Counties
recognize, the amount of the bonus bid per acre can vary greatly from a minimum of $2/acre to as
high as $10,000 per acre. UAC Am. Opp’n at 34. Due to this variation, the amounts of the bonus
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 22 of 64
10
bid payments do not correlate with the number of new leases issued. For example, in FY 2012,
there were only 40 new leases in Utah, but the bonus bid payments were near an all time high.
Thus, the Counties’ claim that any lease that is deferred causes it to lose money is not borne out
by the data.
The Counties also argue that parcels nominated by industry “invariably sell” and therefore
this case is like Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994). UAC Am. Opp’n
at 35; see also id. at 39-40. In Mount Evans, the court found that the county had established an
injury because it would receive a direct 25% royalty from a concession facility if a Forest Service
building was ordered to be rebuilt. 14 F.3d at 1451-52. The Tenth Circuit has subsequently
explained that a decrease in tax revenue may be sufficient to establish standing only if the
plaintiffs show a direct link between the action and a loss of specific source of revenue. See
Wyoming, 674 F.3d at 1234. The Counties cannot show such a direct link because their loss in
revenue was due largely to economic factors and not the Challenged Policies.
Moreover, their arguments regarding potential future losses rely on assumptions that BLM
would lease certain parcels in the absence of its alleged policies, which is simply speculation.
Stewart v. Kempthorne, 554 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We cannot make such
assumptions, and therefore, the injury argument at this stage is merely conjectural or
hypothetical.”). Finally, the court in Mount Evans found that the county’s injuries would be
redressable because “the County is guaranteed revenue sharing and sales tax money in the event
that its requested relief is granted.” 14 F.3d at 1451. As discussed in section I.A.1.d., infra, the
same is not true here because BLM has broad discretion whether to lease particular parcels and it
cannot be compelled to lease specific parcels by a court order.
c. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Economic Harm is Insufficient for
Prudential Reasons.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 23 of 64
11
Defendants’ arguments regarding prudential standing are addressed briefly by Utah and
ignored by the Counties. See Utah Opp’n at 69-71. In order to meet the prudential requirements
for standing, the Plaintiffs must “assert [their] own legal rights,” must not raise “generalized
grievances most appropriately addressed by one of the other branches of government,” and must
assert an injury within the zone of interest of the applicable statute or constitutional provision.
Wyoming, 674 F.3d at 1230-31 (citation omitted). The first two of these requirements are at issue
here.
As to the first requirement, Utah asserts that it is asserting “injuries that it alone has
suffered in its proprietary or sovereign capacities.” Utah Opp’n at 70. But that assertion is belied
by Utah’s own arguments. In support of its theory that it is being injured by BLM’s deferral of
parcels, Utah cites documents showing that particular companies – Bill Barrett Corp., Robert L.
Bayless, Producer LLC, Jones Lease Service, McCormick and Kendall, Summit Energy Co., and
Baseline Minerals, Inc. – submitted EOIs. See Utah Opp’n at 38-39. The Counties make similar
arguments and rely on similar documents. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 19-20, 23-24. Thus, Utah and
the Counties are attempting to assert “legal rights” to the EOIs submitted by independent
companies. As discussed below, the EOIs vest the companies with no legal rights to develop any
parcels. The Plaintiffs’ subsidiary interest in those same EOIs should fail for the same reason.
As to the second requirement, Utah claims that its interest in obtaining oil and gas
revenues under the MLA is unique to it and therefore is not a generalized grievance. Utah Opp’n
at 70-71. The Tenth Circuit, however, has adopted the reasoning of other circuits that due to the
nature of federal policymaking and the potentially broad economic implications to state and local
governments, “impairment of state tax revenues should not, in general, be recognized as sufficient
injury-in-fact to support state standing.” Wyoming, 674 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Kleppe, 533 F.2d
at 672). A generalized reduction in revenue that is incidental to BLM’s alleged policies is exactly
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 24 of 64
12
what Utah and the Counties are relying on in this case to support standing. Such allegations are
insufficient to support standing and “holding otherwise might spark a wave of unwarranted
litigation against the federal government.” Id.
d. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Loss of Oil and Gas Revenue Is Not
Redressable.
Even if the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the first two standing prongs, the
redressability prong is an insurmountable bar to Plaintiffs’ standing based on clear Tenth Circuit
precedent. The Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries relating to oil and gas revenues would not be redressed
by an order of this Court regarding their claims because the MLA gives BLM absolute discretion
as to whether to lease particular parcels. See 30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (“All lands subject to disposition
under this chapter which are known or believed to contain oil or gas deposits may be leased by
the Secretary.”) (emphasis added); Udall, 380 U.S. at 4 (“Although the [MLA] directed that if a
lease was issued on such a tract, it had to be issued to the first qualified applicant, it left the
Secretary discretion to refuse to issue any lease at all on a given tract.”); see also W. Energy
Alliance, 709 F.3d at 1044.
The Tenth Circuit has consistently found that parties lack standing where the redress of
their injuries depends on a leasing determination that is vested in the ultimate discretion of the
Department of the Interior. See Baca v. King, 92 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (10th Cir. 1996) (rancher’s
alleged loss of the ability to graze due to a land exchange was not redressable because the
decision to “renew grazing permits and whether public lands should even be designated for
grazing purposes are matters completely within the Secretary of Interior’s discretion”) (citation
omitted); Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868, 876 (10th Cir. 1992) (mining company’s
alleged loss of the opportunity to lease land subject to an exchange was not redressable because
“no court has the power to vest Ash Creek with mining rights to the exchanged lands”); Sullivan
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 25 of 64
13
v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 882 (10th Cir. 1992) (Wyoming’s alleged loss of revenue from coal
leasing was not a redressable injury because the decision whether to lease the land “is vested
absolutely in the federal government’s executive branch and not in its judiciary”); see also
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 2004) (a
company’s alleged loss of ability to log an area was not redressable because the Forest Service
“has complete discretion whether to offer the opportunity sought by plaintiff”). Utah and the
Counties are in the same position as the plaintiffs in those cases because, even if they obtain a
favorable ruling from the Court, the Secretary of the Interior retains the discretion to not lease
parcels for oil and gas development.
Further, a similar situation was addressed in Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 966 F. Supp.
1024 (D. Colo. 1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999). An oil company brought suit
challenging the Secretary’s removal of parcels from a list of parcels offered for a competitive
lease sale. See id. at 1024-25. As indicated in the related Interior Board of Lands Appeal
(“IBLA”) decision, the Secretary removed certain parcels prior to the lease sale in order to protect
lands with wilderness characteristics, and the plaintiffs alleged very much the same kind of de
facto management alleged here. See Marathon Oil Co., 139 I.B.L.A. 347, 352 (1997) (alleging
that an environmental group proposed that BLM “manage over 200,000 acres of BLM lands in
Colorado as if they were statutory wilderness areas”). Nevertheless, the Court found that
Marathon lacked standing because its alleged injury – the inability to competitively bid on the
parcel – could only be redressed by a decision “compelling the executive branch to make land
available for competitive leasing under the [MLA],” which the court lacked the power to do.
Marathon Oil, 966 F. Supp. at 1026. The Tenth Circuit affirmed relying on its prior precedents.
See Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 166 F.3d 1221, 1999 WL 3362, at *1-2 (10th Cir. 1999)
(unpublished).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 26 of 64
14
In response, Utah barely touches on redressability, except to state that “[a]n injunction and
declaratory relief by this court would redress the State’s economic injuries and free up these lands
as open for mineral leasing as defined in existing RMPs.” Utah Opp’n at 68. Based on the clear
Tenth Circuit precedent discussed above, however, Utah’s alleged injury is not redressable
because an order of this Court could not compel BLM to lease the lands at issue. Utah’s
response misunderstands BLM’s leasing process. By deferring certain parcels, BLM has not
closed them from leasing; rather, deferral allows BLM to conduct additional analysis of
environmental and other issues relating to those parcels. See W. Energy Alliance, 709 F.3d at
1043; BLM Handbook H-3120-1 at 9, Def. Ex. 10. The parcels remain open for leasing, but it is
entirely within BLM’s discretion to decide whether to lease them. See Udall, 380 U.S. at 4.
The Counties have a number of theories as to why their alleged injuries are redressable
despite the Tenth Circuit’s precedent to the contrary. First, they argue that they are not seeking
an order requiring BLM to issue leases. UAC Am. Opp’n at 41. Actually, that appears to be
exactly what the Counties are seeking – they are asking the Court to compel BLM to offer leases
in areas where parcels have been deferred. See, e.g., UAC Sec. Am. Compl. at 87 (asking the
Court to declare that Defendants must “end all deferral policies”). Even taking the Counties at
their word that they are not seeking such relief, the precise relief they are seeking is irrelevant.
As in Sullivan, Baca, Ash Creek, and Marathon Oil, only an impermissible order compelling
BLM to offer parcels in a lease sale could redress the Counties’ alleged injuries stemming from
the alleged loss of leasing revenue.5
Second, the Counties argue that BLM’s authority to issue leases under the MLA is limited
by FLPMA and the requirement that it act in conformance with an RMP. UAC Am. Opp’n at 41.
5 Plaintiffs argue that the plaintiffs in Marathon Oil and Ash Creek sought an order compelling
BLM to issue leases. See UAC Am Opp’n at 43. It is not apparent from the opinions that such
relief was actually sought. See Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 874; Marathon Oil, 966 F. Supp. at 1026.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 27 of 64
15
The fact that certain areas are “open” for leasing in an RMP, however, does not mandate that the
parcels be leased. Marathon Oil, 139 IBLA at 356 (“BLM is not strictly bound by the terms of an
RMP when considering whether to lease a particular parcel.”); see also Richard D. Sawyer, 160
IBLA at 163. Therefore, BLM acts in conformance with an RMP even when it chooses not to
lease parcels that are designated as open for leasing in the RMP.
Third, the Counties argue that BLM’s deferral of certain parcels from lease sales amounts
to a de facto withdrawal of land from leasing. UAC Am. Opp’n at 41. As discussed above, BLM
has the authority to defer parcels for additional environmental analysis. See W. Energy Alliance,
709 F.3d at 1043. Such deferrals do not constitute a withdrawal of land under 43 U.S.C. §
1702(j). Nor does the evidence support the notion that BLM has effectively removed the
ARRWA lands from leasing in order to protect LWCs. As even the Counties concede, BLM has
leased parcels in the ARRWA. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 17; see also UAC Ex. 32 (leasing
information memorandum indicating that sections of 7 parcels in the Price Field Office and all or
parts of 5 parcels in the Monticello Office within the ARRWA would be leased in the May 19,
2009 lease sale). Moreover, BLM may have any number of reasons for deferring parcels,
including concerns regarding sage grouse and white-tailed prairie dogs – reasons that are not
related to LWCs. See UAC Exs. 25, 38; Utah Ex. 20. Regardless of what Plaintiffs call BLM’s
deferrals, they lack standing to challenge the deferrals because a court order cannot compel the
leases to be issued. See Marathon Oil, 966 F. Supp. at 1026.
The Counties also assert that they may satisfy the redressability prong by showing a
“plausible benefit” from a court order. UAC Am. Opp’n at 41 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,
25 (1988)). In Akins, the Supreme Court enunciated the principle that, in order to establish
redressability in a case against the federal government, a plaintiff need not prove that the agency
would reach a different conclusion if the decision were vacated and remanded. Id. at 25. A
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 28 of 64
16
similar principle was subsequently articulated in Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7
(1992) (a plaintiff may have standing to challenge an agency’s decision based on alleged
procedural violations “even though he cannot establish with any certainty that” the agency’s
decision would change). Fully cognizant of Lujan, however, the Tenth Circuit has, on multiple
occasions, found that litigants lack standing when redressability depends on the discretionary
leasing decision of a federal agency. See Marathon Oil Co., 166 F.3d at *1-2 (distinguishing
Lujan); Baca, 92 F.3d at 1035-36 (citing Lujan). Accordingly, the Counties cannot escape the
Tenth Circuit’s standing precedents through citation to Akins.6
In addition, there is no factual basis for the Counties’ assertion that a court ruling in their
favor “would make it likely that the currently deferred EOIs would be offered, because the 2008
RMPs have already determined that these lands are available for leasing.” UAC Am. Opp’n at
42. Again, the Counties are confusing “open” in an RMP with a requirement to lease the lands,
which does not exist. They cannot show that the Secretary would choose to lease the lands
because that decision lies within the Secretary’s discretion, and any such argument flies in the
face of the Tenth Circuit’s rulings on redressability.
The Counties also claim that they would obtain a benefit “if DOI proceeded to propose an
MLP rule, issue a withdrawal, and amend the RMPs.” UAC Am. Opp’n at 43. It is unclear what
the Counties mean by this, but if they mean that they want the ability to participate in the MLP
process, then that is already provided for in the MLP guidance documents. The MLP process and
the potential designation of an MLP will be conducted pursuant to the land use planning process
6 Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) is of no relevance here. There, the Court found that land
owners had standing to intervene in a suit challenging provisions affecting water rights because, if
the provision were applied, they would likely be able to purchase lands from private landowners
at below market prices. Id. at 368. Redressability did not depend on the absolute discretion of a
land management agency. Indeed, in Wyoming Sawmills, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Yellen
on that basis. 383 F.3d at 1249 (“As in Baca, the federal agency has complete discretion as to
whether to offer the opportunity sought by plaintiff . . . .”).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 29 of 64
17
and the requirements of NEPA. See Def. Exs. 2 & 3. Further, BLM has already initiated the
NEPA and land use planning processes to potentially amend the Moab RMP to designate an
MLP. See Notice of Intent to Prepare Master Leasing Plan, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,141 (Mar. 5, 2012).
The Counties will be able to participate in that process pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) and 43
C.F.R. § 1610.3 et seq., which will inform BLM’s decisions regarding the potential MLP.
e. Alleged Procedural Injuries Alone Are Not Sufficient to
Establish Standing.
The Counties argue that alleged violations of procedural rights designed to protect a
concrete interest are sufficient to establish standing. UAC Am. Opp’n at 44 (citing Utah v.
Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8). As already
discussed, the Supreme Court has recognized that in cases in which an agency’s decision is
challenged, the redressability standard is somewhat relaxed, meaning that a litigant need not
demonstrate that the agency would reach a different decision on remand. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572
n.7. While recognizing that principle, the Tenth Circuit has consistently ruled that redressability
is still lacking when redress is contingent upon the discretion of a land management agency. See,
e.g., Baca, 92 F.3d at 1035-36.
Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiffs allege a violation of procedural rights does not in any
way diminish their obligation to prove that they have been injured by Defendants’ actions. The
Supreme Court has explained that “deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete
interest affected by the deprivation – a procedural right in vacuo – is insufficient to create Article
III standing.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009). In addition, “[u]nlike
redressability, . . . the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that
cannot be removed by statute.” Id. at 497. Thus, regardless of the type of violation alleged –
procedural or substantive – the same standard for proving injury applies. As discussed above, the
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 30 of 64
18
Counties do not meet the standards for Article III standing, and their claims of injury are not
saved by recasting them as procedural injuries.7
f. The Parens Patriae Doctrine Does Not Provide a Basis for
Standing.
Utah argues in the alternative that its standing may be based on the parens patriae
doctrine. Utah Opp’n at 71-75. This assertion is without legal merit. In general, a state may sue
to protect its quasi-sovereign interests relating to the general welfare of its populace under the
doctrine of parens patriae. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601-
02 (1982). In lawsuits against the federal government, however, a state does not have standing to
protect quasi-sovereign parens patriae interests because the federal government is presumed to
represent the interests of the citizens as parens patriae. Id. at 610 n.16 (citing Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923)); Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 883.
Utah claims that this principle was altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Massachusetts, however, did
not turn on the parens patriae doctrine, nor did it even address that doctrine. Instead, the State of
Massachusetts was found to have standing in that case based on a different interest than the ones
being asserted by Utah here. The Supreme Court, relying on prior precedent that allowed a state
to sue under a nuisance theory, ruled that Massachusetts could sue the federal government to
protect its quasi-sovereign interest in all of the lands within its borders. 549 U.S. at 519 (“Just as
Georgia’s independent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported federal
jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its
7 The Counties also cite Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo.
1980). UAC Am. Opp’n at 44. That case, however, was decided before the Tenth Circuit
established the principle that an alleged injury is not redressable when such redress is contingent
upon an agency’s discretionary leasing authority. See Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 882. The district
court’s analysis of injury in Mountain States, see 499 F. Supp. at 396-97, did not take these later
precedents into account and therefore should not be relied upon by the Court.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 31 of 64
19
sovereign territory today.”) (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
(1907). By contrast, nothing in the Massachusetts opinion suggests that a state may sue to protect
its interest in the well being of its citizens, including economic interests, a principle that has
previously been rejected by the Supreme Court. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609-10 & n.16.
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has addressed this issue after Massachusetts and acknowledged
that this principle still applies. Wyoming, 674 F.3d at 1232 (“[A]s Petitioners concede, they
cannot bring a suit on behalf of local business owners, i.e., their citizens, but must instead sue to
protect their own sovereign interest.”) (citing Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 883). Nor do any of the other
cases cited by Utah following Massachusetts support the notion that a state may sue to protect its
quasi-sovereign economic interests against the federal government under the doctrine of parens
patriae. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 335-349 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
that states had met the requirements of the parens patriae doctrine and Article III standing in suit
against electrical power companies), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Colorado v.
Gonzales, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164-65 (D. Colo. 2007) (finding that Colorado lacked standing
to sue to compel the federal government to enforce federal immigration laws under the doctrine of
parens patriae); Amigos Bravos v. BLM, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125, 1138-39 (D.N.M. 2011)
(referencing the parens patriae doctrine in passing and finding that environmental groups lacked
standing to challenge a quarterly lease sale).
Utah points to language in a footnote in Massachusetts wherein the Supreme Court
indicated that a state may bring suit against the federal government in order to compel the
government to act in accordance with requirements of federal law. See 549 U.S. at 520 n.17
(“[T]here is a critical difference between allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from the
operation of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its
rights under a federal law (which it has standing to do).” In Massachusetts, the states sought to
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 32 of 64
20
compel the federal government to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act,
which the federal government was not doing. See id. at 510. By contrast, in this case, Utah is
challenging the Secretary’s discretionary decisions under the MLA to defer certain parcels rather
than lease them. Accordingly, even according to the footnote cited by Utah, this is a case that falls
into the category of cases for which a state is precluded from raising a parens patriae interest
against the federal government, i.e., it is a case challenging the application of federal law against
entities within the state.8
Finally, even if the Court were to find that Utah may assert a parens patriae interest in
this case, that does not relieve Utah of demonstrating Article III standing. Indeed, in
Massachusetts, after discussing the states’ quasi-sovereign (or sovereign) interest in protecting its
land and air, the Supreme Court proceeded to analyze whether the state had Article III standing.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521-26. Utah fails to demonstrate Article III standing for the reasons
discussed above, and its additional allegations of harm in its parens patriae argument are too
vague and speculative to support standing. Utah claims that “[s]urely the effects of Defendants’
actions have affected more than a thousand job opportunities in Utah.” Utah Opp’n at 75. But
that assertion is pure speculation and is not supported by any evidence.
The Counties acknowledge that they may not sue the federal government under the
doctrine of parens patriae to protect the general welfare of their citizens. See UAC Am. Opp’n at
69-70. They claim, however, that they are not asserting such rights. See id. Defendants interpret
this to mean that the Counties are not relying on any allegations of injury relating to the well
being of county citizens. Defendants note that the Counties appeared to be making such
allegations in their complaint. See UAC Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 109 (“Reduced revenues and fewer
8 Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) is of no help to Utah because it was a suit
brought against railroad companies, not against the federal government. See id. at 443-45.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 33 of 64
21
high paying jobs is an impact repeated throughout Utah . . . .”). Those allegations (even if
proved) cannot establish standing to sue the federal government because they fall within the
doctrine of parens patriae. Wyoming, 674 F.3d at 1232 (“Petitioners’ asserted interest in the jobs
of their citizens implicates standing pursuant to parens patriae, which, as the parties agree, is not
available when a state sues the federal government . . . .”).
2. Utah’s Claims that the Value of SITLA Lands Will Be Diminished Is
Not Supported by Any Evidence.
Utah argues that it has suffered an injury for purposes of Article III standing due to the
diminished value of SITLA lands, but those claims are not supported by any evidence. See Utah
Opp’n at 40-41. Utah simply asserts without any evidentiary support that “840,233 acres of state
trust lands” will be diminished in value because they are located in the area subject to the
proposed ARRWA. Id. Because Utah offers no evidence to support the diminution in value of
SITLA lands, it should not be considered by the Court in response to a factual challenge to Utah’s
standing. See Wyoming, 674 F.3d at 1231 (in response to a factual challenge, “a district court
may not presume the truthfulness of the . . . factual allegations”) (citation omitted). Moreover,
SITLA’s publicly reported financial information does not demonstrate that SITLA revenues have
decreased significantly over the last four years. See Def. Mem. at 33. Further, Utah has not
demonstrated that the fluctuations in SITLA’s revenue have been caused by a decrease in
production or that the alleged injury to SITLA is redressable.
3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Regarding Rights of Way Do Not Establish
Standing to Challenge the Policies at Issue in this Case.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have been injured by the Challenged Policies
due to the effects of those policies on the processing of right of way applications. They point to
few concrete examples of right of way applications that they claim have been affected, and none
of those examples are sufficient to demonstrate an injury caused by BLM’s policies.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 34 of 64
22
Utah argues that right of way applications for Cedar Mesa and Indian Canyon in San Juan
County are not being processed. See Utah Opp’n at 34 (citing Turri Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4, Utah Opp’n
Ex. 34). But, as already demonstrated, BLM approved a right of way in the Cedar Mesa area in
June 2013 and is continuing to process the application in the Indian Canyon area. See Def. Mem.
at 34. Utah also claims that BLM failed to process an application for Notom Road in Garfield
County (Utah Opp’n at 41), but that application was approved nearly two years ago in February
2012. See Def. Mem. at 34.
Utah also claims that it has suffered an injury due to BLM’s use of a certain definition of
road in inventorying lands under its policies. See Utah Opp’n at 42. As discussed in section
II.D., infra, Utah’s arguments that BLM’s policies violate FLPMA are without merit. With
respect to injury, Utah claims that BLM’s use of a particular definition of road “has led to
unjustified road closures and restricted access to entire areas as detailed above.” Utah Opp’n at
42. But Utah fails to specify which roads have been closed or which areas have been restricted
and fails to offer any evidentiary support for those claims. Further, conducting an inventory of
public lands under FLPMA § 201, standing alone, does not give rise to an injury for purposes of
Article III standing. See Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1206-10 (10th Cir. 1998).
The Counties claim that certain right of way applications relating to energy development
projects have been affected by the Challenged Policies. UAC Am. Opp’n at 30 (referencing
applications relating to the Ruby Pipeline and the TransWest Express and Energy Gateway South
transmission lines). Even assuming that the modifications to the requested rights of way were
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 35 of 64
23
prompted by the Challenged Policies, the Counties have failed to show how they were injured by
the modifications.9
The Counties also point to BLM’s decision to close Saddletree and Atchee Wash Roads.
See UAC Am. Opp’n at 30-31, 40. That decision, however, was made in the Vernal RMP. See
Def. Mem. at 35-36.10 Therefore, it is not at issue here. Further, BLM’s decision regarding the
Saddletree and Atchee Wash roads did not prevent an oil and gas leasing project from moving
forward. See id. Moreover, the Counties already raised a separate challenge to BLM’s decision
regarding these roads, and their arguments were rejected by the IBLA. See Uintah Cnty., 182
IBLA 191, 194-96 (May 9, 2012).
As the Counties acknowledge, BLM approved the right of way application for Seep Ridge
Road within the area of the ARRWA. UAC Am. Opp’n at 31; see also Def. Mem. at 34-35.
They also point to the application regarding Rector Ridge, which remains pending. See UAC
Am. Opp’n at 31-32. But the reason that BLM has not yet made a decision on the application has
nothing to do with the wilderness policies challenged in this case. Rather, BLM required
additional time to conduct a Class III cultural resources survey. See Def. Mem. at 35. The
Counties also claim that BLM is not processing applications in the ARRWA area, see UAC Am.
Opp’n at 32, but that is not the case, as evidenced by the approval of the Seep Ridge Road right of
way – one of the few right of way applications the Counties identify.
9 The Counties allege that BLM has not completed an infrastructure and monitoring plan to
enable the opening of the Factory Butte and Caineville Play Areas to OHV use, but they offer no
evidence to support that claim. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 30.
10 The Counties are incorrect that the RMP made no route designations. See UAC Am. Opp’n at
30-31, 40. BLM’s Record of Decision for the Vernal RMP states that “[t]he route designations
described in the Travel Management section of the Approved RMP and identified in Figure 15a
are effective upon issuance of this Record of Decision.” Vernal RMP at 22, Def. Ex. 7. BLM’s
State Director found over two years ago that “[u]nder the Vernal RMP, portions of the Saddletree
Draw and Atchee Wash Roads located within the White River corridor as shown in Figure 15a of
the RMP are closed to motorize travel unless authorized by BLM.” Modified State Director
Review Decision (Apr. 8, 2011), Def. Ex. 48.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 36 of 64
24
Plaintiffs argue that, even if BLM is processing right of way applications in the ARRWA
area, there has been a delay in the processing of those applications and they have been harmed by
that delay. See Utah Opp’n at 69; UAC Am. Opp’n at 37-38, 40. Plaintiffs have not shown that
the Challenged Policies have caused these alleged delays. The Counties (especially Uintah
County) have submitted numerous right of way applications over the past few years, and BLM
has expended considerable time and resources processing those applications. See, e.g., Def. Exs.
46-47. BLM has coordinated extensively with the Counties regarding those applications and has
attempted to process them according to the Counties’ priorities. See Def. Ex. 45.
Further, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how these alleged delays injured them. Utah
alleges obliquely that BLM’s delay has prevented it from conducting maintenance on roads and
“allowed natural forces to reclaim some of these roadways.” Utah Opp’n at 69. However, Utah
provides no specifics and no proof as to roadways that have been reclaimed by natural forces.
Similarly, the Counties assert that “Uintah County’s obligation to provide road services is unduly
burdened by these delays.” UAC Am. Opp’n at 37. They too, however, provide no evidence as
to what roads need to be repaired or what county obligations are being burdened.11
4. Plaintiffs’ Claims Regarding Wildlife Management Are Insufficient to
Establish Standing.
Utah argues that the Challenged Policies are preventing it from managing wildlife within
the state, and the Counties make similar allegations. See Utah Opp’n at 39-40; UAC Am. Opp’n
at 32. The basis for these allegations is a declaration from the Public Lands Director for Carbon
County, Utah. See Sacco Decl., Utah Ex. 43. Mr. Sacco claims that a sage grouse habitat
11 The Counties point to the applications for Saddletree and Atchee Wash Roads. UAC Am.
Opp’n at 40. But those applications were not submitted until May 2013. See Def. Exs. 38 & 39.
Therefore, the assertion that those claims have been delayed is without basis, and an alleged
injury based on those applications, filed well after the complaint, cannot serve as a basis for
standing. See Palma, 707 F.3d at 1153.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 37 of 64
25
improvement project relating to a Bill Barrett Corporation Energy Project in the Nine Mile
Canyon area has not been permitted to move forward. See Sacco Decl. ¶¶ 4-6. As Defendants
have already demonstrated, however, BLM is not holding up the energy project at issue and is
working with the applicant and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources to create a sage grouse
mitigation plan. See Def. Mem. at 36-37; Def. Ex. 40. Thus, Utah has not demonstrated that it
has been prevented from managing wildlife, and these allegations are insufficient to establish
standing.
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Challenge Final Agency Action.
1. Plaintiffs’ Improper Programmatic Challenges Must be Dismissed.
Plaintiffs fail to distinguish Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990),
wherein the Supreme Court expressly held that federal courts lack jurisdiction over programmatic
challenges because such claims do not challenge discrete final agency actions under the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2). Lujan deprives the Court of jurisdiction over all of the Counties’ claims as well
as Utah’s Ninth Cause of Action.
Plaintiffs contend that the case at bar “involves challenges on a smaller, more specific
scale” than that involved in Lujan and that the scope of this controversy has been reduced “to
manageable proportions.” Utah Opp’n at 78; UAC Am. Opp’n at 55-56. However, Plaintiffs’
characterization of their lawsuits as “small” or “manageable” does not make them justiceable.
Plaintiffs assert broad challenges to BLM’s alleged de facto management of millions of acres of
public lands within Utah. Utah. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 115, 170, 195; UAC 2nd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 208,
223, 251. These challenges are not limited to a single discrete decision or decisions, but generally
extend to, inter alia, management of oil and gas leasing, processing of Title V right of way
applications, management of sage grouse habitat, and BLM’s oil shale and tar sand land
allocations for leasing adopted in a 2013 ROD. See e.g., Utah. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 142, 170, 180,
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 38 of 64
26
253, 259, Prayer for Relief; UAC 2nd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84-85, 88, 114, 132, 164, Prayer for Relief.
The programmatic challenges asserted in this consolidated litigation are indistinguishable from
the challenge rejected by the Supreme Court in Lujan.12
Utah’s attempts to distinguish Lujan from the instant case based on the fact that Lujan
involved the resolution of a summary judgment motion, and it also argues that this case is
controlled by Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998), but those arguments both fail.13
These arguments rely on Utah’s misstatement of the standard of review applicable to Defendants’
Rule 12(b)(1) factual attack on Utah’s claims which, as explained supra on pp. 1-2, is not the
lenient standard reserved for Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Here, the Court “‘may not
presume the truthfulness of the [petition's] factual allegations’” and instead “is free to weigh the
evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Wyoming, 674 F.3d
at 1231 (quoting Holt, 46 F.3d at 1003); Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729-30. Moreover, because Lujan’s
holding that a plaintiff “cannot seek wholesale improvement of [a] program by court decree” was
not predicated on the standard of review it applied to the plaintiffs’ claims, the fact that Lujan
involved a summary judgment motion is a distinction without a difference. See 497 U.S. at 871.
12 Indeed, the Lujan plaintiffs’ allegations are strikingly similar to Plaintiffs’ broad allegations,
except the Lujan plaintiffs argued that BLM focused too heavily on mineral exploitation:
Respondent alleges that violation of the law is rampant within this program-failure to
revise land use plans in proper fashion, failure to submit certain recommendations to
Congress, failure to consider multiple use, inordinate focus upon mineral exploitation,
failure to provide required public notice, failure to provide adequate environmental impact
statements.
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891.
13 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Utah v. Babbitt did not consider or decide whether the de facto
wilderness management challenged in that case was an improper programmatic challenge barred
by Lujan. Utah does not dispute this fact. Utah Opp’n at 79. Moreover, Utah ignores other Tenth
Circuit precedent that explicitly recognized that programmatic challenges fail to challenge final
agency action under Lujan. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990);
Park Lake Res. L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 197 F.3d 448, 453 (10th Cir. 1999); Forest
Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 39 of 64
27
The district court cases cited by Utah (Utah Opp’n at 79-80) are inapposite as they all
involved specific challenges to discrete agency actions. See High Country Citizens’ Alliance v.
Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1248-49 (D. Colo. 2006) (plaintiffs challenged two separate
agreements entered into between the United States and the State of Colorado); Or. Natural Res.
Council Fund v. Brong, No. Civ. 04-693-AA, 2004 WL 2554575, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2004)
(plaintiffs challenged two timber sales); Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. Civ.
03-381-HA, 2004 WL 1592606, at *9 (D. Or. July 15, 2004) (plaintiffs challenged decisions to
authorize grazing activities on two allotments and alleged agency failures to act).
Finally, Utah’s attempt to distinguish the Fifth Circuit’s well reasoned decision in Sierra
Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2000), by arguing that Peterson “involved a challenge
under APA 706(1) instead of APA 706(2),” also fails. See Utah Opp’n at 80 n.7. The Peterson
court specifically considered whether the “Forest Service’s general allowance of even-aged
management in the Texas forests” constituted a final agency action under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2), and held that the plaintiffs’ challenge was “precisely the type of programmatic challenge
that the Supreme Court struck down in Lujan.” Peterson, 228 F.3d at 564-66. That the Fifth
Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ alternative theory that the Forest Service “failed to act” under
5 U.S.C. § 706(1), does not render the Peterson opinion any less persuasive with respect to the
case at bar. See id. at 568.
2. The Challenged Internal Guidance Documents are not Final Agency Actions.
Plaintiffs also contend that jurisdiction exists over their claims because the Challenged
Policies represent final agency action. Utah argues that the Challenged Policies “marked the
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” “changed the management of
approximately 6 million acres of public lands” and “impose an addition [sic] step in the planning
process.” Utah Opp’n at 81-82. The Counties contend that all agency manuals and handbooks
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 40 of 64
28
are final agency action because they are binding on BLM. UAC Am. Opp’n at 51-55. Plaintiffs’
arguments rely on misstatements as to the content and effect of the Challenged Policies, as well as
on a mischaracterization of the mineral leasing process, including BLM’s discretion to defer
parcels from leasing pending further analysis. Plaintiffs also misstate the applicable test for
determining whether agency action is “final agency action” established by the Supreme Court and
ignore this Court’s previous decision on point. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78
(1997); Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96-cv-0870, 2006 WL 2711798, at *15 (D. Utah Sept. 20, 2006),
aff’d, on ripeness grounds by 535 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2008). Under Bennett, Plaintiffs must
show that the action complained of “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking
process” and it “must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from
which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” 520 U.S. at 178 (citations omitted). The case law cited
by Plaintiffs is either distinguishable or inapposite.
The Challenged Policies simply do not mark the consummation of BLM’s decisionmaking
process with respect to any public lands. Neither Secretarial Order 3310 (which has been
defunded) nor its implementing manuals (which have been superseded) designate any Wild Lands
or preclude any project that may impair wilderness characteristics. Def. Mem. at 14, 43-45.
Manual 6310 simply supplies guidance to BLM regarding procedures for conducting wilderness
characteristics inventories under Section 201 of FLPMA. Id. at 44-45; Def. Ex. 5. Manual 6320
supplies guidance to BLM regarding the consideration of lands with wilderness characteristics in
conjunction with BLM’s land use planning under FLPMA § 202. Def. Mem. at 44-45; Def. Ex.
6. IM 2010-117 and the 2013 Handbook Insert provide guidance to BLM regarding an MLP
process. Def. Mem. at 45-46; Def. Exs. 2 and 3. Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that IM 2010-117
and the 2013 Handbook Insert do not identify any areas for MLP analysis, mandate specific
outcomes, or change the management of a single acre of public lands. See Utah Opp’n at 32;
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 41 of 64
29
UAC Am. Opp at 24, 53-54, 56, 72-73. Instead, these policies provide internal consideration for
identifying areas that could potentially benefit from preparation of an MLP—an analytical
process which may or may not result in any subsequent decisions. They also direct BLM to
comply with the procedural requirements of Section 202 of FLPMA, NEPA, and all other
applicable laws when considering the development of an MLP within an identified area.
The Counties incorrectly assert that all “[a]gency manuals and handbooks are final agency
action because they are binding on BLM.” UAC Am. Opp’n at 51.14 This argument misstates the
applicable test under Bennett, which requires Plaintiffs to show that the Challenged Policies
themselves bind BLM to a particular result that forecloses BLM’s options, determine rights or
obligations, or have specific legal consequences. 520 U.S. at 178. This Court rejected an
argument virtually identical to the Counties’ argument in Utah v. Norton, 2006 WL 2711798 at
*15. In that case, SUWA argued that the Wilderness Settlement was a final agency action
because it bound BLM to a particular interpretation of FLPMA regarding wilderness inventory
and protection of wilderness under Section 202 of FLPMA. Id. at *14. This Court rejected that
argument, finding that the inquiry as to whether an agency action binds the agency is focused on
whether the challenged action “bound the affected agencies so that certain actions were
foreclosed.” Id. at *15. This Court then held that the Wilderness Settlement was not a final
agency action because it did not “strip the BLM of its powers to protect lands it determines to
14 The Counties urge the Court to adopt a more expansive view of the term “binding” which
would extend to all BLM Manual sections, handbooks and instruction memoranda. The Counties
cite no support for the novel legal proposition that all internal guidance documents automatically
constitute final agency action. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 5, 49, 51, 73. While the IBLA has
repeatedly held that BLM is required to follow the direction in its manuals and handbooks, it has
also repeatedly and consistently held that these internal guidance documents “are not
regulations”, “do not have the force and effect of law”, and are not binding on “the public at
large.” Wyo. Outdoor Council James M. Walsh, 159 IBLA 388, 417 (2003); Howard B. Keck,
Jr., 124 IBLA 44, 55 (1992); Lassen Motorcycle Club, 133 IBLA 104, 108 (1995); Pamela S.
Crocker-Davis, 94 IBLA 328, 332 (1986).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 42 of 64
30
have wilderness characteristics in a manner substantially similar to the manner in which such
lands are protected when designated as WSAs.” Id. at *14. Here, the Challenged Policies do not
bind the agencies to certain actions, i.e., they do not mandate the protection of lands with
wilderness characteristics, nor do they foreclose any management actions.
More generally, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any “rights or obligations” determined by
any of the Challenged Policies or any “legal consequences” that flow from these Policies.
Plaintiffs complain that they have been aggrieved by or affected by the Challenged Policies, but
this is not the applicable standard. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178; Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367,
1371 (2012).15 As explained more fully in Section I.A.1.a. supra, Plaintiffs’ arguments as to the
alleged “effects” of the Challenged Policies rely on mischaracterizations of the mineral leasing
process, BLM’s discretion, and of the Policies themselves. None of the Challenged Policies
direct BLM to defer parcels located in lands with wilderness characteristics or MLP areas from
competitive lease sales. See Def. Exs. 1-6, 12-14. As explained supra in Section I.A.1.a. on pp.
3-4, BLM has absolute discretion to determine whether to offer a parcel for lease, which includes
the discretion to defer making a parcel available in a competitive lease sale in order to further
consider the potential consequences of development. Thus, Plaintiffs are incorrect to assume that
if BLM receives an EOI, it is required to offer such parcel for lease if it is within an area
designated as “open” to oil and gas leasing in an RMP. Further, Plaintiffs mischaracterize
deferrals (which are by definition temporary or intermediate steps in the decisionmaking process)
as denials or withdrawals of the lands subject to deferrals or as rejections of EOIs. See Utah
Opp’n at 35, 48, 84, 85, 86 (alleging “denials” of expressions of interest and applications); UAC
15 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sackett is instructive. In Sackett, the court found that
an EPA compliance order was a final agency action because it imposed on the plaintiffs “legal
obligation” to restore their property “according to an agency-approved Restoration Work Plan”
and because legal consequences flowed from the order, including exposure “to double penalties in
a future enforcement proceeding.” 132 S. Ct. at 1371-72.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 43 of 64
31
Am. Opp’n at 17, 24, 41 (alleging “rejections” of expressions of interest), 44-45 (alleging
withdrawals). 16
The Third Circuit’s decision in Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, 670 F.3d 236
(3d Cir. 2011), on which the Counties substantially rely, is distinguishable from the instant case.
In Minard Run, the U.S. Forest Service (“Forest Service”) entered into a settlement agreement
whereby it agreed to undertake appropriate NEPA analysis prior to issuing notices to proceed to
those seeking to develop privately owned minerals in the Forest. 670 F.3d at 245. The Forest
Service also issued a statement announcing that “no new drilling in the [forest] would be
authorized” until an EIS had been completed and subsequently warned mineral rights owners that
commencing new drilling operations without approval “may result in criminal penalties.” Id. at
245-46. Finding that “[a]n agency determination of a particular issue that will not be
reconsidered in subsequent agency proceedings may represent the consummation of the agency’s
decisionmaking process on that issue,” the Third Circuit held that the settlement agreement and
policy statement amounted to a final decision to impose a moratorium on drilling. Id. at 248.17
In contrast to the policy at issue in Minard Run, the Challenged Policies simply provide for an
internal process without determining the outcome of that process. Also, any parcels that are
currently deferred from leasing remain under consideration for future leasing. See In re Sac &
Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litig., 340 F.3d 749, 756 (8th Cir. 2003) (order
temporarily closing casino was not final agency action).
16 Utah also contends that IM 2011-154 was applied in the 2012 Oil Shale and Tar Sands Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) and 2013 ROD, but it barely mentions
this ROD in its Amended Complaint and fails to assert a claim challenging the EIS or ROD. See
Utah Am. Compl. The fact that Utah has only pointed to subsequent decisions by BLM
underscores the fact that the Challenged Policies were not themselves final agency actions.
17 Inasmuch as the Counties argue that all agency policy statements or internal guidance
documents are final agency actions, the above quoted language from Minard Run offers no
support for this contention.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 44 of 64
32
Moreover, Minard Run’s holding relied heavily on the Third Circuit’s finding that Forest
Service’s actions had “significant legal consequences for mineral rights owners” as “they must
stop all new drilling or face criminal penalties.” 670 F.3d at 247-48. Minard Run is thus
distinguishable from the instant case. Here, the minerals at issue are publicly owned. Neither the
companies that have submitted EOIs nor Plaintiffs have a property right in the public minerals
they seek to have developed by compelling BLM to lease certain parcels—much less a dominant
property right to the mineral estate. While Plaintiffs contend that they have suffered adverse
financial consequences, they have failed to identify “significant legal consequences” directly
resulting from the Challenged Policies.
National Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 880 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128-33 (D.D.C. 2012) also does
not support Plaintiffs’ claims. National Mining Ass’n involved a challenge to a final guidance
memorandum issued by the EPA, which the district court found effectively established region-
wide water quality standards to be applied by EPA regional offices in its limited review of Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) § 402 permits authorized by state permitting agencies. Id. at 138.18 The
district court found that EPA’s final guidance had the binding effect of forcing state permitting
agencies that had assumed exclusive authority to regulate § 402 permits to adhere to the new
standard established in the guidance or risk formal objection from EPA. Id. at 132-33. Unlike
EPA’s final guidance in National Mining Ass’n, the Challenged Policies do not alter any other
agency’s exclusive authority. The Challenged Policies merely prescribe internal guidance for
18 Section 402 of the CWA seeks to regulate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters
through a permitting program, including regulating the water quality by setting water quality
based effluent standards. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313).
Under the CWA, states can assume the authority from EPA to issue § 402 permits once EPA
approves the state permitting program, which provides the state with “exclusive authority” to
issue § 402 permits. Id. at 125-26. In such circumstances, EPA has only a limited authority over
permits, e.g., states must submit draft permits to EPA and EPA may object if the proposed permit
is inconsistent with the CWA or federal regulations. Id.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 45 of 64
33
BLM in conducting land inventories and potential future land management decisions, while
leaving room for land managers to exercise their discretion as to the content of the potential
decisions, and without prescribing a particular result.19 They are not comparable to the final
guidance memorandum at issue in National Mining Ass’n.
Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar, No. 10-CV-237F, 2011 WL 3738240, at *7 (D. Wyo.
Aug. 12, 2011), also does not support review of Plaintiffs’ substantive claims. In that case, the
court properly declined to address the plaintiff’s substantive claims asserted on the grounds of
ripeness, agreeing with the defendants’ “argument that a resolution of the substantive claims
would benefit from the specific facts surrounding any future [] submittal, and the choices made
by government employees in response to those facts.” Id. The court’s conclusion that the
plaintiff’s procedural claim challenged a final agency action, was predicated on its finding that
the challenged guidance document was a substantive, legislative rule that “adopted a final,
binding and substantive change to [the agency’s] past practices.” Id. at *6. Western Energy
Alliance is thus distinguishable from the instant case because the guidance document at issue
affected the legal requirements applicable to oil and gas lessees with legally protected property
rights by disallowing the application of a statutorily created categorical exclusion under NEPA
for certain applications for permits to drill wells on leased lands. See id.
19 To the extent the Counties argue that BLM’s compliance with its legal obligations under
NEPA for the Counties’ Title V permit applications satisfies the second element of the Bennett
test, that argument is without merit. See UAC Am. Opp’n at 55. First, the Challenged Policies do
not supply any guidance with respect to NEPA compliance for Title V permit applications. See
Def. Exs. 1-6, 12-14. Second, the Counties have not asserted a specific challenge to any Title V
permitting decision. Third, because BLM is obligated to comply with NEPA prior to issuing a
right of way, BLM’s NEPA compliance does not alter Plaintiffs’ rights or obligations under
Bennett.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 46 of 64
34
C. The Larson Exception is Inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ Claims.
Having failed to challenge final agency action, as is required to pursue a challenge under
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), the Counties argue that they are entitled to evade the requirements of
the APA and pursue claims of ultra vires agency action because they contend that BLM’s
“alleged de facto wilderness management” (1) is beyond the authority granted BLM to manage
public lands under FLPMA and is contrary to the Wilderness Act, as made applicable to BLM
through FLPMA and, (2) is contrary to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of
2000 (“EPCA”), Pub. L. 106-469, Sec. 604, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §
15927(b), and the appropriations acts defunding Secretarial Order 3310. UAC Am. Opp’n at 66-
68. Utah similarly contends that Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682
(1949), supplies jurisdiction for their Fifth and Ninth Causes of Action because BLM lacks the
authority to “manage for anything similar to wilderness” under both FLPMA and the Wilderness
Act. Utah Opp’n at 51-61. These arguments are all without merit.
Plaintiffs’ arguments that their ultra vires claims may proceed because BLM lacks
authority to inventory and manage for the protection of wilderness characteristics on public lands
rely on an improper and unsupportable construction of both the Wilderness Act and FLPMA. As
explained infra in Section II.A., Plaintiffs are mistaken that BLM lacks the authority, outside of
the FLPMA § 603 process, to inventory and manage lands to protect wilderness characteristics. 20
20 Utah offers a creative interpretation of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wyoming v. United
States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1235 (10th Cir. 2002). Under Wyoming, Utah argues, a plaintiff need not
satisfy the APA’s final agency action requirement if the plaintiff challenges an agency decision as
“in excess of statutory jurisdiction” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). However, this interpretation is
contrary to the plain language of the APA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(2). It is also contrary to the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wyoming, in which the state challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service’s refusal to authorize the state to conduct a vaccination program, which the Tenth Circuit
assumed, without deciding, constituted a final agency action under § 706(2). 279 F.3d at 1236
(stating that “we remain mindful that ‘[j]udicial review of final agency action by an aggrieved
person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 47 of 64
35
Plaintiffs are equally mistaken with respect to the Wilderness Act, which establishes a
National Wilderness Preservation System “composed of federally owned areas designated by
Congress as ‘wilderness areas,’” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a), and which was made applicable to BLM
managed lands by FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782. While only Congress has the power to designate
“wilderness areas” by enacting a law providing for such permanent designation, 16 U.S.C. §
1131(a), nothing in the Wilderness Act or in FLPMA prohibits BLM, or any federal agency, from
identifying or inventorying lands with wilderness characteristics and, once those lands are
identified, from managing those lands in order to protect those characteristics, where appropriate.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1131; 43 U.S.C. § 1782. Neither the Wilderness Act, nor FLPMA, support
Plaintiffs’ attempt to evade the requirements of the APA. Painter v. Shalala, 97 F.3d 1351, 1358
(10th Cir. 1996) (Larson exception unavailable where Medicare Act did not expressly prohibit
consideration of volume offsets).21
Section 604 of the EPCA, also relied on by the Counties and currently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 6217, merely provides for an inventory of all onshore Federal lands identifying “United
States Geological Survey estimates of the oil and gas resources underlying these lands,” including
an identification of any restrictions to the development of such resources. 42 U.S.C. § 6217.
This inventory was published in 2003. See http://www.blm.gov/energy/epca/EPCAfact.pdf.
Congress’”). Utah has cited no authority in support of its argument that § 706(2)(C) is an
exception to the final agency action requirement.
21 Plaintiffs also impermissibly conflate congressionally designated wilderness and WSAs with
lands with wilderness characteristics. See Utah Opp’n at 53-61; UAC Am. Opp’n at 57-63.
Though lands that fall within any of these three categories will have an undeveloped character
there is an important distinction. Congressionally designated wilderness is subject to the
prohibitions in the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133. Established WSAs “cannot be revised” and
“become, in effect de facto wilderness until Congress Acts,” Utah v. Norton, 2006 WL 2711798,
*23, and BLM is required to manage such lands “in a manner so as to not impair the suitability of
such areas for preservation as wilderness.” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). In contrast, BLM retains the
discretion to manage lands with wilderness characteristics in accordance with FLPMA’s multiple
use mandate. Utah v. Norton, 2006 WL 2711798, *23.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 48 of 64
36
Because nothing in the EPCA required the development of public lands, see Pub. L. No. 106-469,
Sec. 604, it cannot serve as a basis for the Counties’ claims asserting ultra vires agency action.
Painter, 97 F.3d at 1358.
The Counties’ assertion that the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15927(b),
supplies a basis for their claims of ultra vires agency actions also fails. The cited provision is a
general policy statement which is legally insufficient as a basis for invoking the Larson exception.
See Painter, 97 F.3d at 1358. It does not prohibit the implementation of the Challenged Policies,
or withdraw BLM’s authority and discretion to inventory and manage public lands to protect
wilderness characteristics. See 42 U.S.C. § 15927(b). Moreover, Plaintiffs ignore that 42 U.S.C. §
15927(b) also provides that any development of unconventional fuels “should be conducted in an
environmentally sound manner, using practices that minimize impacts” and “with an emphasis on
sustainability.” 42 U.S.C. § 15927(b). Thus, the Challenged Policies are clearly consistent with
the cited provision from the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15927(b).
BLM has not violated the appropriations acts defunding Secretarial Order 3310, which the
Counties cite in support of their claims of ultra vires agency action. The Counties do not contest
the fact that, on June 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Interior issued a memorandum to the Director
of BLM confirming that, pursuant to the appropriations act signed into law earlier that year, BLM
would not designate any “Wild Lands” under the Order. Defs. Ex. 15. Nor do the Counties
dispute that, on July 25, 2011, IM 2011-154 placed the manuals implementing Secretarial Order
3310 into abeyance, or that the Order’s implementing manuals were superseded by Manuals 6310
and 6320 on March 15, 2012. See Defs. Exs. 4-6. Instruction Memorandum 2011-154 and
Manuals 6310 and 6320 are markedly different than the Secretarial Order and implementing
manuals they replaced, and do not contain several of the provisions which form the basis for
Plaintiffs’ claims. Compare Defs. Exs. 1, 12-14 with Def. Exs. 4-6. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 49 of 64
37
note that although subsequent appropriations acts have continued to defund Secretarial Order
3310, they have remained silent as to IM 2011-154 and BLM Manuals 6310 and 6320. See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, Div. E, Sec. 125 (Dec. 23, 2011);
Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-175, Sec. 101(a)(7) (Sept. 28, 2012);
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, Div. F, Sec.
1101(a)(3) (Mar. 26, 2013). Had Congress found that IM 2011-154 and Manuals 6310 and 6320
ran afoul of its prohibition on expending funds to “implement, administer, or enforce Secretarial
Order No. 3310,” Utah Opp’n at 16, it could easily have included a similar prohibition with
respect to these policy and guidance documents; however, it chose not to do so. Painter, 97 F.3d
at 1358 (“Because we may presume Congress knew how to preclude consideration of such offsets
had it so desired, its failure to do so is telling.”).
Because the Challenged Policies are within BLM’s management authority and not
contrary to applicable substantive law, Larson is unavailable as a basis for jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ claims.22 Plaintiffs disagree with the Challenged Policies, as well as with Defendants’
implementation of their statutorily delegated authority. Plaintiffs’ disagreement with agency
policy does not allow them to evade the requirements of APA review by asserting that those
policies are ultra vires. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1233 (rejecting argument that an agency lacks the
power to make a decision “when a State, for whatever reason, disagrees with that decision”).23
22 Moreover, Plaintiffs seek to compel BLM to offer all lands subject to an EOI for mineral lease
sale and to expediently grant Plaintiffs’ Title V right of way applications without NEPA review.
See e.g., Counties’ 2nd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 71, 108, 164, 166, Prayer for Relief; Utah Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 146-150, 253-61, Prayer for Relief. Because the relief implicitly requested by
Plaintiffs would require “affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably
sovereign property,” Larson does not supply jurisdiction over their claims. Painter, 97 F.3d at
1359 (quoting Larson, 337 U.S. at 691 n.11); Blackbear v. Norton, 93 F. Appx. 192, 194 (10th
Cir. 2004); United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543 (10th Cir. 2001).
23 Plaintiffs also ignore the presumption of regularity generally accorded to agency
decisionmaking and to the official acts of public officers whereby, and “in the absence of clear
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 50 of 64
38
D. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Ripe for Review.
As explained in Section I.B. supra, because Plaintiffs have failed to challenge final
agency actions, the Court lacks jurisdiction over their claims under the APA. This failure also
renders Plaintiffs claims unripe for review. Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs could satisfy
the final agency action requirement, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that their
claims are ripe for review.
Despite Plaintiffs’ unsupported and conclusory assertion that their claims present “purely
legal” issues, see UAC Am. Opp’n at 71-72, Utah Opp’n at 84, resolution of the merits of
Plaintiffs’ claims will necessarily involve numerous factual issues. For example, the Court will
need to consider whether BLM’s handling of EOI’s and right of way applications constitutes de
facto wilderness management, as Plaintiffs claim. Because resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims will
necessarily involve the consideration of numerous factual scenarios relating to BLM’s
implementation of the Challenged Policies, Plaintiffs’ claims do not present “purely legal”
issues.24
Moreover, Plaintiffs ignore precedent holding that generalized challenges to agency
policies or regulations are not ripe for review unless raised “in the context of a specific
application” of the challenged regulation or policy. Def. Mem. at 50 (citing Toilet Goods Ass’n v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1967); Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S.
803, 812 (2003); CSG Exploration Co. v. FERC, 930 F.2d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Secretarial Order 3310 has been defunded, its implementing manuals have been superseded, and
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”
United States v. Chemical Found. Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001).
24 Utah’s contention that even “factual questions should be considered legal questions at this
time,” Utah Opp’n at 84, is incorrect. See supra at pp. 1-2.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 51 of 64
39
it has not been applied in a specific context.25 Def. Mem. at 43-44. Plaintiffs’ claims also do not
challenge any specific application of the rest of the Challenged Policies;26 rather, Plaintiffs assert
generalized challenges to the Policies themselves or to alleged de facto wilderness management
or alleged de facto mineral withdrawals. UAC 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 147-260; Utah Am. Compl. ¶¶
190-261.27
The Counties incorrectly contend that “[t]here is no additional agency process or
application to occur” with respect to the Challenged Policies and that “individual lease sale
decisions will not change.” UAC Am. Opp’n at 72. Plaintiffs complain of parcels temporarily
deferred from being offered at a lease sale pending further evaluation28 and right of way
applications currently being processed, all of which are subject to additional agency processes.
See supra Sections I.A.1.a. and I.A.3. With respect to the areas currently undergoing MLP
review, none of these reviews has yet been completed and no land management decisions have
been made based on these reviews. In fact, since Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on
September 17, 2013, BLM has significantly revised the area to be analyzed through the land use
25 The lone action that Plaintiff Utah contends is directly attributable to Secretarial Order 3310 is
an alleged rejection of a request to use mechanical means to improve sage grouse habitat in
Carbon County. See Utah Opp. at 39-40, 80; Utah Ex. 43. As explained supra in Section I.A.4,
BLM is working with the applicant and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources to create a sage
grouse mitigation plan. Further, Utah has not asserted a claim challenging this alleged action or
failure to act by BLM. See Utah Am. Compl.
26 As noted in fn.16 supra, Plaintiffs’ have failed to assert a claim specifically challenging the Oil
Shale and Tar Sands ROD.
27 Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar, No. 10-cv-0226, 2011 WL 37520, at *1-2 (D. Wyo. June
29, 2011), which is referenced by the Counties but inaccurately cited, did not involve BLM’s
deferral to offer certain parcels in a competitive lease sale, but instead considered the legal
question as to whether BLM’s delay in issuing leases sold to the highest bidder at a competitive
lease sale constituted “agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” under the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Western Energy Alliance thus does not support the Counties’ argument
that their claims are ripe for review.
28 As explained supra in Section I.B.2. on pp. 30-31, Utah incorrectly characterizes deferrals as
“denials” or “rejections.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 621 (2001), is thus inapposite.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 52 of 64
40
planning process as part of the proposed Glen Canyon MLP. The proposed Glen Canyon MLP
was reduced from 650,000 acres to 360,000 acres. Compare Def. Ex. 17 (Glen Canyon-San Juan
River Assessment) with Def. Ex. 49 (Glen Canyon MLP (Revised)). As a result of this revision,
parcels located within areas previously included in the proposed Glen Canyon MLP are currently
on BLM’s preliminary competitive oil and gas lease sale list for the May 2014 lease sale and are
being evaluated for lease. See Def. Ex. 50 (Excerpts from Environmental Assessment). If a claim
“rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
at all,’” it is not ripe for adjudication. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-581 (1985)); Palma, 707 F.3d at
1160. Because BLM’s decisionmaking process is ongoing, the effect of the Challenged Policies
is not yet known.
As explained in Section I.A. supra, Plaintiffs have not suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is fairly traceable to Defendants’ challenged actions and thus failed to
meet their burden to show standing. Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate standing, the contingent
indirect effects complained of as a result of the Challenged Policies (alleged loss of bonus
payments, alleged loss of projected revenue, and delay in processing right-of-way applications)
are not the type of direct and immediate effects required to show that an action is ripe for review.
See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 742 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding that
rejections of applications for permits to drill caused companies to suffer irreparable financial
harm as a result “of the loss of monies previously invested and the halting oil and gas exploration
and development”); Los Alamos Study Grp., 692 F.3d at 1068 (holding that the plaintiffs claim
was not ripe).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 53 of 64
41
II. Alternatively, Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs’ opposition memoranda rely heavily on the fact that, in reviewing a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pled facts are accepted as true and construed in Plaintiffs’
favor. See Utah Opp’n at 50-51; UAC Am. Opp’n at 38. However, many of the “facts” alleged
by Plaintiffs are merely legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, and thus the Court is not
required to accept them as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, because
the Court may consider documents referred to in Plaintiffs’ complaints that are central to their
claims, the Court need not accept Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations as to what the Challenged
Policies state, but may instead consider the documents themselves as the best evidence of what
they provide. See Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiffs’ conclusory
allegations fail to state any claim for relief. Thus, even if the Court concludes that it has
jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs’ claims, they should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Alleging that BLM Lacks the Authority to Inventory and
Manage Lands to Protect Wilderness Values are Incorrect and Fail to State a
Claim.
Central to the Counties’ First, Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action, and to
Utah’s First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Causes of Action is Plaintiffs’ contention that BLM lacks
the authority to manage lands to protect wilderness characteristics outside of the FLPMA § 603
process.29 As explained in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 57-63, there is ample authority in
29 As explained supra at p. 35 n. 21, Plaintiffs improperly conflate congressionally designated
Wilderness and WSAs with lands with wilderness characteristics. Plaintiffs also improperly
conflate the non-impairment standard in FLPMA § 603 with any consideration of wilderness
characteristics in the land use planning process. Plaintiffs have cited no authority in support of
this contention and a review of the Challenged Policies shows that they do not import the
mandatory non-impairment standard in FLPMA § 603. Secretarial Order 3310 and its
implementing manuals specifically allow BLM to utilize its discretion to determine whether
impairment of wilderness characteristics is appropriate and consistent with legal requirements and
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 54 of 64
42
FLPMA, and in judicial decisions interpreting FLPMA, supporting BLM’s authority to identify
lands with wilderness characteristics and, if appropriate, to preserve those lands “in their natural
condition.” 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8); Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. BLM, 625 F.3d 1092, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“hereinafter ONDA”). Plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation of FLPMA is unpersuasive
and contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in ONDA. Plaintiffs’ opposition memoranda either
ignore relevant judicial decisions or fail to distinguish them.
In ONDA, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the relationship between inventory requirements in
FLPMA § 201 and the Wilderness Act as made applicable to BLM by FLPMA. 625 F.3d at 1098-
99. The ONDA court found that because FLPMA § 603 made clear that lands having wilderness
characteristics were to be identified through the general resource inventory process in FLPMA §
201, wilderness characteristics were necessarily “among the ‘resource and other values’ of the
public lands to be inventoried under [Section 201].” Id. at 1098.30 The ONDA court further held
that “BLM’s land use plans, which provide for the management of these resources and values, are
[] to ‘rely, to the extent it is available, on the inventory of the public lands, their resources, and
other values[,]’” id. at 1099 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(4)), and that “[w]ilderness values are
among the resources which the BLM can manage under [FLPMA].” Id. at 1111.
Plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation ignores ONDA and relies on Plaintiffs’ incorrect
contention that BLM’s interpretation of FLPMA renders FLPMA § 603 “superfluous in the
scheme of public land management.” UAC Am. Opp’n at 59; Utah Opp’n at 54. This argument
management considerations. Def. Exs. 1, 12, 13, 14. Manuals 6310 and 6320 provide guidance
for conducting and maintaining an inventory for wilderness characteristics and for land use
planning for identified lands with wilderness characteristics. Def. Exs. 4, 5, 6. None of the
Challenged Policies impose a mandatory nonimpairment standard similar to that imposed by
FLPMA § 603 for WSAs.
30 The ONDA court found it significant that FLPMA “does not direct that areas with wilderness
characteristics be identified only as part of recommending such areas for ‘preservation as
wilderness,’” and that FLPMA “contemplates a ‘review’ of areas already so ‘identified’” in the
course of the ongoing inventory process. 625 F.3d at 1113 (emphasis in original).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 55 of 64
43
ignores a critical distinction between FLPMA §§ 603 and 202. Section 603 contains mandatory
requirements for conducting a wilderness review, and for managing wilderness study areas “so as
not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness[.]” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
In contrast, Section 202 allows BLM to use its discretion to protect wilderness characteristics, but
exercises of this discretion are subject to change. Indeed, this distinction was critical to this
Court’s decision in Utah v. Norton, 2006 WL 2711798, at *23:
Although FLPMA limits the BLM’s authority to designate and manage lands as WSAs, it
provides expansive authority to protect and to preserve public lands in other ways. Thus,
the proper level of wilderness preservation can be attained without having to bleed
together section 603’s wilderness review authority with section 202’s multiple-use and
sustained-yield land use provisions. The only real difference between managing land
under section 202 to protect its wilderness character and managing land as a WSA to do
the same thing—and this distinction is at the crux of this lawsuit—is that a WSA, once
established, cannot be revised; it becomes, in effect, de facto wilderness until Congress
acts, whereas under section 202, the land will be subject to possible changes in
management plans.
(emphasis in original); see also ONDA, 625 F.3d at 1113-1114 (recognizing the distinction
between the permanent preservation of wilderness through FLPMA § 603 and BLM’s
management discretion to preserve wilderness characteristics in non-WSA areas).
Utah’s brief fails to even cite the Ninth Circuit’s decision in ONDA. The Counties attempt
to distinguish ONDA on the basis that it involved a NEPA claim, contending that “the precedent
is that wilderness issues that are raised in the NEPA process need to be addressed.” UAC Am.
Opp’n at 62. However, the Counties ignore the Ninth Circuit’s specific holding that “wilderness
characteristics remain a resource that BLM has authority to manage,” which was the necessary
predicate for their holding that wilderness characteristics must be considered in a NEPA analysis
“concerning areas which may have such characteristics[.]” ONDA, 625 F.3d at 1116.
Utah also ignores this Court’s prior decision in Utah v. Norton, 2006 WL 2711798 at *23,
wherein this Court expressly recognized BLM’s ability to inventory federal land “including for a
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 56 of 64
44
determination of wilderness characteristics” as well as BLM’s “expansive authority to protect and
to preserve the natural values of lands.” The Counties acknowledge that “this Court has
recognized BLM’s authority to manage lands in a manner that protects wilderness
characteristics,” but unsuccessfully attempt to diminish the Court’s prior holding. See UAC Am.
Opp’n at 61. 31
Plaintiffs have failed to establish the Counties’ First, Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth
Causes of Action, and Utah’s First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Causes of Action state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. These claims rely on an incorrect and unsupportable
interpretation of FLPMA and accordingly must be dismissed.
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims for Violation of the APA Requirements for Rulemaking
Fail to State a Claim.
Utah’s Second and Sixth Causes of Action and the Counties’ Fifth Cause of Action assert
claims that the Challenged Policies violate the APA because BLM failed to conduct notice and
comment rulemaking prior to adopting them. Plaintiffs concede that APA does not require notice
and comment rulemaking for “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice[,]” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). Utah Opp’n at 8; UAC
Am. Opp’n at 63. Plaintiffs instead argue that notice and comment rulemaking was required for
31 The Counties cite several opinions by the IBLA, none of which support the proposition for
which they are cited (that BLM lacks authority to manage lands with wilderness characteristics in
order to protect such characteristics). See SUWA, 150 IBLA 263 (1999) (BLM is not required to
consider citizens’ group’s wilderness finding in NEPA document); SUWA, 163 IBLA 14, 24-27
(2004) (same); SUWA, 160 IBLA 225, 230-31 (2003) (“[L]and use planning decisions are
committed to the discretion of the Director of BLM, and we have no supervisory authority to
compel BLM to conduct a reinventory or to treat the lands on which the parcels are located as
wilderness.”); SUWA, 159 IBLA 220, 244 (2003) (same); Colorado Envtl. Coal., 161 IBLA 386,
393 (2004) (finding that BLM “retains authority to consider wilderness characteristics when
amending its RMPs.”); SUWA, 158 IBLA 212, 214 (2003) (BLM may administer lands not
included in a WSA for other purposes). A holding that BLM is not required to consider an
outside group’s wilderness findings in a NEPA document is not tantamount to a holding that
BLM lacks authority to inventory for and mange lands for the protection of wilderness
characteristics.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 57 of 64
45
the Challenged Polices because they are not general statements of policy, but are in fact
legislative rules. However, Plaintiffs misstate the relevant standard for determining whether an
interpretive rule, procedural rule, or general statement of policy constitutes a legislative rule.
Because none of the Challenged Policies “ha[ve] the force of law, and create[] new law or
impose[] new rights or duties[,]” they are not legislative rules for which notice and comment
rulemaking was required. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir.
2009) (quoting FDIC v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000)); Ballesteros v.
Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 2006) (legislative rules are those that “affect[]
individual rights and obligations”) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)); Chen v.
Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1340 (4th Cir. 1995) (legislative rules “create new rights and have the
force and effect of law”).32
Although Plaintiffs generally contend that the Challenged Policies are binding on BLM in
the sense that BLM employees are generally required to comply with BLM guidance and policy
statements, the IBLA has consistently held that the BLM manuals and handbooks “are not
regulations,” “do not have the force and effect of law,” and are not binding on “the public at
large.” Wyo. Outdoor Council James M. Walsh, 159 IBLA at 417; Howard B. Keck, Jr., 124
IBLA at 55; Lassen Motorcycle Club, 133 IBLA at 108; Pamela S. Crocker-Davis, 94 IBLA at
332; United States v. Kaycee Bentonite Corp., 64 IBLA 183, 214 (1982); accord Schweiker v.
32 The cases cited by Utah apply the same standard. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C.
Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in determining whether an interpretive rule is
actually a substantive rule, courts “look to whether the interpretation itself carries ‘the force and
effect of law’”) (quoting Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Saftey & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106
(D.C. Cir. 1993)); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (in
determining whether a policy statement is a legislative rule, courts consider whether it imposes
any rights or obligations and whether it “genuinely leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free
to exercise discretion”) (quoting Am. Bus Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir.
1980)); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“A
properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law.”).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 58 of 64
46
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (finding that a claims manual was not a regulation, had no
legal force, and did not bind the agency).33 Moreover, the Court is not required to accept
Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions that the Challenged Policies are “binding” at face value, but may
consider the guidance documents themselves. Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions, it is clear that none
of the Challenged Policies are legislative rules for the reasons explained in Defendants’
Combined Motion to Dismiss – they do not bind the agency’s discretion as to the management of
a single acre of public lands. Def. Mem. at 63-64.
Utah’s alternative argument, that the Court should adopt the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Alaska Professional Hunters Ass’n v. Federal Aviation Administration, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1999), which Utah contends requires “an agency to follow APA rulemaking
requirements when issuing a new nonlegislative rule that amends or repeals a previous
nonlegislative rule,” is also without merit. In United States v. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d 1129,
1141 (10th Cir. 2010), the Tenth Circuit expressly declined to reach the issue as to whether it
would adopt the holding in Alaska Professional Hunters because it found that, even under Alaska
Professional Hunters, “before an agency adopts a definitive interpretation of its own rule it
remains free to hear new arguments, make adjustments, and change directions, all without having
to undergo notice and comment.”34 Here, Utah contends that the Settlement Agreement is (1)
tantamount to a legislative rule and (2) at odds with Secretarial Order 3310 and Manuals 6310
33 The Counties argue that all instruction memoranda and BLM Handbooks are “binding on
BLM” and thus require notice and comment rulemaking. The Counties’ interpretation of the APA
would render the exceptions in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) completely meaningless, and require
formal rulemaking for any policy statement or guidance document. The Counties have failed to
cite a single case holding that similar guidance documents required formal rulemaking. See UAC
Am. Opp’n at 63-64.
34 On the facts before it, the Tenth Circuit concluded that because the agency’s prior position was
a “tentative” interpretation of a statute, the agency was not required to undergo notice and
comment rulemaking prior to adopting an interpretation at odds with its previous interpretation.
Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1141-42.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 59 of 64
47
and 6320. This argument fails because, as this Court has already held, the Wilderness Settlement
“does not affect the BLM’s ability to prepare and maintain an inventory of any federal land,
including for a determination of wilderness characteristics,” and it also allows BLM to exercise
its “discretion to manage lands in a manner that is similar to the non-impairment standard by
emphasizing the protection of wilderness characteristics as a priority over other potential uses.”
Utah, 2006 WL 2711798 at *20, *23. The Wilderness Settlement is not at odds with any of the
Challenged Policies.35 Alaska Professional Hunters is thus inapposite because Utah points to no
previous BLM interpretation of FLPMA that is contrary to the interpretation in the Challenged
Policies.
C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Alleging Violations of FLPMA’s Procedural Requirements
Fail to State a Claim.
In response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Counties’ Eighth Cause of Action and
Utah’s Third and Seventh Causes of Action challenging BLM’s compliance with alleged FLPMA
procedural “requirements” and “mandates” under 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(f), 1712(c)(9), 1739(e),
Plaintiffs assert that the Challenged Policies are tantamount to a revision of the relevant RMPs
without following the procedures required by FLPMA. Utah Opp’n at 77; UAC Opp’n at 65-66.
However, these arguments rely on Plaintiffs’ consistent mischaracterization of the mineral leasing
process and of BLM’s discretion. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, BLM is not required to offer
any parcel identified in an EOI for lease simply because it lies within an area designated as
“open” to oil and gas leasing in an RMP. See supra Section I.A.1.d at p. 16. Instead, BLM
retains the discretion to determine whether to offer any parcel for lease, even if it is within an area
designated as “open” to oil and gas leasing. See supra Section I.A.1.a at pp. 2-3. Thus, the mere
35 Indeed, BLM policies issued since the Wilderness Settlement have consistently recognized
BLM’s authority to inventory public lands for wilderness characteristics and to manage lands to
protect such characteristics. Def. Mem. at 62.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 60 of 64
48
deferral of certain parcels pending additional evaluation does not, as a matter of law, equate to a
revision of the relevant RMP. Moreover, Plaintiffs ignore that under the MLP Policy and
Manuals 6310 and 6320, any proposed changes to existing land use plans will be carried out in
accordance with both FLPMA, including compliance with 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(c)(9) and 1712(f),
and NEPA, which requires public involvement. Def. Exs. 2, 3, 5, and 6.
D. Utah’s Eighth Cause of Action Fails to State a Claim.
Utah devoted approximately 14 pages of its 94 page opposition memorandum to its Eighth
Cause of Action, but in that space completely failed to address the basis for Defendants’ motion
to dismiss this claim. See Utah Opp’n at 41-46, 87-94. In this claim, Utah asserts that Manual
6310, which provides guidance on inventorying lands for wilderness characteristics, is arbitrary
and capricious because it does not use the definition of a road adopted by the Court in SUWA v.
BLM, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005). However, as Defendants previously explained, this claim is
predicated upon a misinterpretation of SUWA, which considered the standard of acceptance for
“public highway” rights of way in Utah under R.S. 2477, but did not purport to redefine the term
“road” for all purposes (such as BLM inventories of lands with wilderness characteristics). See
Def. Mem. at 66-67.
Manual 6310 expressly states that the definition of a “road” used therein applies “[f]or the
purpose of inventorying wilderness characteristics only[.]” Manual 6310 at 11, Ex. 5. Contrary
to Utah’s assertion, Utah Opp’n at 88, the Tenth Circuit in SUWA did not offer a universally
applicable definition of the term “road.” In considering the standard of acceptance for the grant
previously offered under R.S. 2477 for the construction of “public highways” over unreserved
public lands, the SUWA court held, in relevant part, “that evidence of actual construction
(appropriate to the historical period in question), or lack thereof, can be taken into consideration
as evidence of the required extent of public use, though it is not a necessary or sufficient element”
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 61 of 64
49
to prove such acceptance. 425 F.3d at 764, 778. This limited holding in the R.S. 2477 context in
no way requires BLM to change its definition of a “road” when inventorying for wilderness
characteristics, or gives rise to a cognizable cause of action challenging BLM’s failure to do so
under the APA.36
Moreover, Utah’s position conflicts with the Tenth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Kane
County v. Salazar, 562 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2009), in which certain Utah counties sought to
compel BLM to administratively adjudicate the validity of all outstanding R.S. 2477 claims in
preparing a management plan. In Kane County, the Tenth Circuit reiterated its prior holding “that
the BLM lacks the authority to conclusively resolve R.S. 2477 claims.” Kane County, 562 F.3d at
1087 (citing SUWA, 425 F.3d at 757). The court explained that, while SUWA recognized that
“BLM possessed the authority to ‘determin[e] the validity of R.S. 2477 rights of way for its own
purposes’ . . . importantly, nothing in federal law requires the BLM to do so.” Id. (quoting
SUWA, 425 F.3d at 757)). It similarly dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that there was a “long-
standing procedural requirement that the Federal Defendants consider valid existing rights during
planning[,]” stating “we are aware of no provision of federal law that imposes such a procedural
requirement.” Id. Thus, to the extent Utah suggests that BLM is required to administratively
review the validity of its R.S. 2477 claims in inventorying lands with wilderness characteristics,
36 Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239, thus does not support Utah’s Eighth Claim for Relief. Wyoming
involved a previous judicial determination that federal agencies had acted negligently in
managing wildlife with respect to the brucellosis disease. Id. Here, no court has held that BLM
must consider a “route that was established or has been maintained solely by the passage of
vehicles” to be a road for the purposes of a wilderness inventory. See Manual 6310, at 11, Ex. 5.
Indeed, contrary to Utah’s allegation that BLM has supplied no “explanation or justification” for
the definition in Manual 6310, Utah Opp’n at 91, the Manual clearly explains that its definition of
the term “road” is based on the definition in FLPMA’s legislative history:
The word ‘roadless’ refers to the absence of roads that have been improved and
maintained by mechanical means to insure relatively regular and continuous use. A way
maintained solely by the passage of vehicles does not constitute a road.
Id. (quoting House of Representatives Committee Report 94-1163 at 17, May 15, 1976).
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 62 of 64
50
this argument has already been rejected by the Tenth Circuit. Although the BLM may consider for
its own planning purposes the existence of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in completing its inventories,
it is under no duty to do so. The agency therefore has no obligation to utilize a definition of
“road” in inventorying lands with wilderness characteristics that would effectively result in R.S.
2477 determinations.37
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), or alternatively for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of January, 2014.
DAVID B. BARLOW
United States Attorney (#13117)
JARED C. BENNETT
Assistant United States Attorney (#9097)
ROBERT G. DREHER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
/s/ Sara C. Porsia
SARA C. PORSIA (admitted pro hac vice)
Trial Attorney
LUTHER L. HAJEK (admitted pro hac vice)
Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
Natural Resources Section
Ben Franklin Station, P.O. Box 7611
Washington, D.C. 20044-7611
tel: (202) 305-0492; fax: (202) 305-0506
sara.porsia@usdoj.gov
luke.hajek@usdoj.gov
37 The Quiet Title Act is the “exclusive means by which adverse claimants [may] challenge the
United States’ title to real property.” Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983). Because
the approximately 12,000 R.S. 2477 right of way claims referenced by Plaintiff Utah have not yet
been adjudicated, Utah’s allegation that “[t]he Tenth Circuit has held that these roads have
already vested in the State and counties” is incorrect. See Utah Opp’n at 92.
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 63 of 64
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 17, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of this filing to all
counsel of record.
/s/ Sara C. Porsia
Sara C. Porsia
Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Case 2:10-cv-00970-DB-BCW Document 182 Filed 01/17/14 Page 64 of 64