Trinidad v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. et al

MOTION for Summary Judgment

D.N.J.June 23, 2017

# 3267541 v. 1 STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS &YOUNG, LLP A Pennsylvania Limited Liability Partnership By: Eric M. Hurwitz (N.J. I.D.: 030681999) Jessica A. Kolansky, Esquire (N.J. I.D.: 018622012) 457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 100 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 T: (856) 321-2400 F: (856) 321-2415 E: ehurwitz@Stradley.com; jkolansky@Stradley.com Attorneys for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY MANUEL TRINIDAD, Plaintiff, v. PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG NOTICE OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Motion Date: July 17, 2017 Filed Electronically TO: Sofia Balile, Esquire Lember Law, LLC 43 Danbury Road Wilton, CT 06897 Attorney for Plaintiff PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 17, 2017 at 9:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 28 2 # 3267541 v. 1 (“Pioneer”), will move for judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and Local Rule 56.1, in its favor and against Plaintiff, Manuel Trinidad. Pioneer relies upon the accompanying Brief, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Declaration of Matthew George, and attached Exhibits. A proposed form of Order is attached. Date: June 23, 2017 /s/ Jessica A. Kolansky Eric M. Hurwitz, Esquire Jessica A. Kolansky, Esquire Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP 457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 100 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 Attorneys for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 29 # 3267541 v. 1 STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS &YOUNG, LLP A Pennsylvania Limited Liability Partnership By: Eric M. Hurwitz (N.J. I.D.: 030681999) Jessica A. Kolansky, Esquire (N.J. I.D.: 018622012) 457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 100 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 T: (856) 321-2400 F: (856) 321-2415 E: EHurwitz@Stradley.com; jkolansky@Stradley.com Attorneys for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY MANUEL TRINIDAD, Plaintiff, v. PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Motion Date: July 17, 2017 Filed Electronically Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 17 PageID: 30 i # 3267541 v. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS…………………………….2 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT…………………………………………………………………5 A. Standard of Review ............................................................................................5 B. Pioneer Did Not Violate the FDCPA In Making the Telephone Calls to Trinidad at Issue. ................................................................................................6 1. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692c(a)(1). .................................................8 2. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692c(a)(3). .................................................9 3. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692d.........................................................10 4. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692f. ........................................................12 5. Trinidad Did Not Comply With § 1692c(c). ........................................12 II. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................13 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 17 PageID: 31 ii # 3267541 v. 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) .......................................................................................... 5-6 Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358 (3d. Cir. 1992) .............................................................................. 5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) .............................................................................................. 5 Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, 2011 WL 2971540 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011) ......................................................... 10 Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) .................................................................. 12 Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1992) ............................................................................... 5 Lightfoot v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 2015 WL 1103441 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2015) .......................................................... 9 Turner v. Professional Recovery Services, Inc., 956 F.Supp.2d 573 (D.N.J. 2013) ................................................................. 11-12 Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3d Cir.2005) .................................................................................. 6 RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ....................................................................................................... 5 CODES 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ............................................................................................ 1 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2), § 1692a(6) .............................................................................. 8 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) ......................................................................................... 8-9 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 17 PageID: 32 iii # 3267541 v. 1 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1), §1692c(a)(3), §1692d, and § 1692f ................................... 6 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3) ....................................................................................... 9-10 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) ................................................................................................ 12 15 U.S.C. § 1692f ..................................................................................................... 12 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 4 of 17 PageID: 33 # 3267541 v. 1 Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. (“Pioneer”), by and through counsel, Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP, respectfully submits the following Brief in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff, Manuel Trinidad (“Trinidad”), contends that Pioneer violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”), by allegedly improperly contacting him at his place of work. Trinidad claims he instructed Pioneer not to contact him at work because it was against company policy. He further claims that he told Pioneer not to contact him on his cell phone between the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Pioneer is now entitled to summary judgment because the allegations in the Complaint are patently false, and are proved wrong by the recordings of the calls at issue. There are three calls at issue in this case – two on January 6, 2016, and a one on January 13, 2016. In neither call on January 6, 2016, did Trinidad discuss any policy of his employer regarding calls at work. Nor did he ask Pioneer not to contact him at work or at any particular times. The call on January 13, 2016, was not made to Trinidad’s known work number at all. Rather, Pioneer called Trinidad at a number from which Trinidad previously called Pioneer. During the January 13, 2016 call, Trinidad stated that he was being contacted at his “place of work” Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 5 of 17 PageID: 34 2 # 3267541 v. 1 and that he “can’t be accepting these kind of calls here.” As a result, Pioneer marked that number as a bad number for Trinidad, and did not call it again. Plaintiff’s claims are entirely refuted by the recordings of the calls at issue. Pioneer did not violate the FDCPA, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS Pioneer was retained for collection of Trinidad’s past due student loans. (Statement of Undisputed Materials Facts (“SOF”) at ¶ 3.) On December 21, 2015, Pioneer mailed a letter to Trinidad alerting him that the defaulted loans had been placed with Pioneer for collection purposes. (Id. at ¶ 4.) The letter also included a telephone number for Pioneer so that Trinidad could contact Pioneer to resolve the default. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Trinidad did not contact Pioneer, and Pioneer attempted to call Trinidad at various telephone numbers that were provided on Trinidad’s loan documents but discovered that the numbers were bad numbers. (Id. at ¶ 6.) After conducting a search, Pioneer identified a number thought to be Trinidad’s work telephone number, ending in 3331. (SOF at ¶ 7.) Pioneer called the 3331 number and was able to speak with Trinidad on January 6, 2016 at 10:29 a.m. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Trinidad stated that he intended to pay his student loans but commented that he was at work at the time. Despite stating that he was at work, Trinidad continued the conversation several more minutes. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Trinidad Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 6 of 17 PageID: 35 3 # 3267541 v. 1 then provided an accurate cellular telephone number ending in 8430, which Pioneer added as a good number in its system. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Trinidad also asked if Pioneer could e-mail him information regarding his loans but Pioneer explained that they needed to discuss repayment options first and provided a telephone number and reference number so that Trinidad could call Pioneer back to discuss available options. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Trinidad promised to call Pioneer at a more convenient time review repayment plans. (Id. at ¶ 12-13.) Trinidad called Pioneer back later the same day, January 6, 2016, at 12:25 p.m. from a telephone number ending in 2871 and the number was saved as “unknown” in Pioneer’s system. The 2871 number did not match the work telephone number on which Trinidad was reached earlier that day, 3331, or the cellular telephone number provided by Trinidad, 8430. (SOF at ¶ 15-16.) The second call on January 6, 2016 lasted for more than forty minutes, during which Trinidad and Pioneer discussed various payment plan options to assist Trinidad with the defaulted loans. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Trinidad agreed to enter into a repayment plan that would bring him out of default but was uncomfortable providing his banking information over the telephone to enroll in the plan. (SOF at ¶ 19.) Trinidad promised to call Pioneer back on January 11, 2016 to update his banking information in order to enroll in the repayment plan. (Id. at ¶ 20.) At no time during either call on January 6, 2016 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 7 of 17 PageID: 36 4 # 3267541 v. 1 did Trinidad indicate that his employer prohibited personal calls at work, nor did he ask Pioneer not to contact him at work. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 21.) Trinidad failed to call Pioneer back on January 11, 2016 as promised, and did not provide his banking information in order to enroll in the repayment plan. (SOF at ¶ 22.) Pioneer attempted to contact Trinidad on January 13, 2016 at 10:31 a.m. on his cellular telephone number, 8430, but there was no answer. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Pioneer then called the 2871 number from which Trinidad had called on January 6, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 24.) When Trinidad answered the 2871 number, he stated that he was being contacted at his “place of work” and that he “can’t be accepting these kind of calls here.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) Pioneer explained that it had called the 2871 number, from which Trinidad had called Pioneer on January 6, 2016. The 2871 number was not associated with Trinidad’s workplace. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Following the January 13, 2016 call, Pioneer marked both the 2871 and 3331 numbers as “do not call” in its systems. (SOF at ¶ 27.) Pioneer did not make any additional calls to either the 2871 or the 3331 numbers after the conversation on January 13, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Thereafter, Pioneer attempted to contact Trinidad several more times on his cellular telephone number ending in 8430, and Trinidad finally answered a call on January 28, 2016. (SOF at ¶ 29.) During the January 28, 2016 call, Trinidad instructed Pioneer to contact his attorney and then ended the call. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 8 of 17 PageID: 37 5 # 3267541 v. 1 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Standard of Review Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit as determined by the substantive law.” Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). For a dispute to qualify as “genuine,” the evidence must be such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The moving party carries “the burden to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362-3 (3d. Cir. 1992). The nonmoving party, in turn, “may not rest on the allegations set forth in its pleadings but must counter with evidence that demonstrates a genuine issue of fact.” Id., citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must present “more than a scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 9 of 17 PageID: 38 6 # 3267541 v. 1 Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir.2005). “If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted). B. Pioneer Did Not Violate the FDCPA In Making the Telephone Calls to Trinidad at Issue. Pioneer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it did not violate the FDCPA in making the telephone calls to Trinidad at issue in this case. Trinidad purports to assert claims against Pioneer for the alleged violation of four separate provisions of the FDCPA: § 1692c(a)(1), §1692c(a)(3), §1692d, and § 1692f. Regardless of the particular section of the FDCPA on which his claims are based, the Complaint is based on five factual allegations: 12. On or around January 6, 2015 [sic], Pioneer called Plaintiff at his place of employment in an attempt to collect the Debt. 13. Plaintiff advised Pioneer that the calls to his workplace were inconvenient and prohibited by the policy of his employer and requested that all calls to his work number cease immediately. 14. Plaintiff further provided Pioneer with his cellular telephone number, however directed Pioneer not to call him during his business hours of 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. 15. Thereafter, Pioneer continued calling Plaintiff at his place of employment. 16. Furthermore, on January 13, 2016, Pioneer called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone at around 10:35 a.m., contrary to Plaintiff’s request. Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 10 of 17 PageID: 39 7 # 3267541 v. 1 (Complaint at ¶¶ 12-16.) The transcriptions of the calls at issue, which were recorded with Trinidad’s knowledge, show that these allegations are patently false. Trinidad stated during the first call on January 6, 2016 that he was at work, but he continued speaking with Pioneer for more than two minutes. At no time during that call did Trinidad state that the calls were “inconvenient and prohibited by the policy of his employer.” Trinidad also did not provide specific times during which Pioneer should not contact him. There was simply no discussion related to an employer policy about personal calls, nor was there a request not to be contacted between 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. The same is true on the second call on January 6, 2016. At no time during that call did Trinidad mention any policy of his employer regarding calls at work, nor did he ask Pioneer not to contact him at work or at any particular times. Rather, the 40 minute call concerned a discussion on potential payment plans to assist with the defaulted loans. Trinidad was supposed to call back with information to enroll him in the payment plan; when he failed to call back, Pioneer tried to reach him. The only other call at issue is January 13, 2016. On that day, Pioneer first tried calling Trinidad on his cellular telephone number ending in 8430, and when there was no answer, Pioneer then called at the 2871 number – a number from Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 11 of 17 PageID: 40 8 # 3267541 v. 1 which Trinidad previously had called Pioneer, and which was not associated with Trinidad’s workplace. When Trinidad then stated he was being contacted at his “place of work,” Pioneer marked the number as “do not call” and, in fact, never called it again. Finally, Trinidad’s allegation that he was prohibited from speaking with Pioneer while at work is contradicted by the fact that he previously called Pioneer from a work number (the 2871 number), on January 6, 2016. In short, the entire factual predicate for the Complaint is false. Trinidad’s Complaint fails for this reason alone. Pioneer is also entitled to summary judgment based upon the specific language in each of the FDCPA provisions identified in the Complaint discussed below. 1. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692c(a)(1). Trinidad contends Pioneer violated § 1692c(a)(1), which prohibits a debt collector from contacting a debtor “at any unusual time or place or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.”1 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1). This Court has held that “a plaintiff is required to plead facts that plausibly support the conclusion that the communication from debt collectors is either inconvenient generally according to § 1692c(a)(1) or inconvenient to them 1 For purposes of this motion, Pioneer does not dispute that it was a “debt collector” as defined under the FDCPA with respect to its calls to Trinidad at issue in this case. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2), § 1692a(6). Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 12 of 17 PageID: 41 9 # 3267541 v. 1 particularly as provided in § 1692c(a)(3), or some other case-specific way.” Lightfoot v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 2015 WL 1103441, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2015). Here, Trinidad makes a conclusory statement that the telephone calls he received at work were inconvenient and that he asked Pioneer not to contact him at work. He also alleges that he informed Pioneer that “calls to his workplace were inconvenient and prohibited by his employer,” and that he “requested that all calls to his work number cease immediately.” (Compl. at ¶ 13.) As explained above, these allegations are false. And, to the extent that Trinidad suggested on January 13, 2016, that he should not receive calls at work to the 2871 number, the undisputed facts show that Pioneer stopped calling that number after January 13, 2016. Thus, there is no FDCPA violation based on § 1692c(a)(1), and Pioneer is entitled to summary judgment. 2. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692c(a)(3). The FDCPA prohibits contacting a debtor “at the consumer’s place of work if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3). Trinidad alleges that Pioneer violated § 1692c(a)(3) because Pioneer contacted him at work when it knew his employer prohibited such calls. This allegation is also false. At no time did Trinidad mention any employer’s policy Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 13 of 17 PageID: 42 10 # 3267541 v. 1 regarding calls at work. In fact, his allegation that personal calls were prohibited by his employer is directly contradicted by the fact that he called Pioneer from the 2871 number, which he apparently claims was a work telephone number. To be clear, only after speaking with Trinidad on January 13, 2016, did Pioneer learn the 2871 number was (allegedly) a work telephone number. Pioneer marked the number as “do not call,” and made no other calls to that number after the January 13, 2016 call. Thus, the undisputed facts show that there was no § 1692c(a)(3) violation, and Pioneer is entitled to summary judgment. 3. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692d. Trinidad next contends that Pioneer violated § 1692d by engaging in behavior the “natural consequence of which was to harass, oppress, or abuse.” “The District of New Jersey has specifically addressed the evidentiary burden that a plaintiff carries in a FDCPA case: ‘[A] [p]laintiff must provide evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that such calls were caused by Defendants with an intent to harass. Absent such evidence, Plaintiff's mere allegations of hang up calls is insufficient to survive summary judgment.’” Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, 2011 WL 2971540, at *3 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011) quoting Bey v. Daimler Chrysler Servs. of N. Am., LLC, 2006 WL 361385, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2006). Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 14 of 17 PageID: 43 11 # 3267541 v. 1 Here, Trinidad cannot establish a § 1692d claim as a matter of law. “There is no consensus as to the amount and pattern of calls necessary for a court to infer a debt collector intended to annoy, abuse, or harass a debtor.” Turner v. Professional Recovery Services, Inc., 956 F.Supp.2d 573, 578 (D.N.J. 2013). However, the number of calls at issue in this case is so minimal that it cannot possibly suggest Pioneer intended to annoy, abuse, or harass Trinidad. In large measure, Pioneer continued to try to reach Trinidad because he failed to call back to discuss the information needed to enroll in into a payment plan. In that regard, Pioneer called Trinidad on his work telephone number ending in 3331 only once on January 6, 2016, and Trinidad provided his cellular telephone number ending in 8430 during the call. Trinidad then called Pioneer from another number ending in 2871 on January 6, 2016 to discuss repayment options. When Trinidad did not follow through with his promise to call Pioneer, Pioneer called Trinidad on January 13, 2016, to obtain the needed information. When Trinidad asked Pioneer to stop calling the 2871 number, it did so. Under these undisputed facts, Trinidad cannot show that Pioneer intended to “harass, oppress, or abuse” him. As a matter of law, Pioneer is entitled to summary judgment on Trinidad’s § 1692d claim. Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 15 of 17 PageID: 44 12 # 3267541 v. 1 4. Pioneer Did Not Violate § 1692f. Trinidad next pleads a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, which bans “unfair practices,” without even stating what unfair and unconscionable practices Pioneer may have used. In fact, Trinidad cannot support this claim, as none of Pioneer’s actions constituted unfair or unconscionable practices. Courts have found that a “complaint is deficient [when] it does not identify any misconduct beyond that which Plaintiffs assert violate other provisions of the FDCPA.” Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 643, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); cited by Turner, at 580-81. Here, Trinidad makes no assertion that Pioneer violated a specific provision of § 1692f that is separate and apart from the other statutory provisions discussed above. Because those claims fail as a matter of law, any claim for violation of § 1692f also fails. 5. Trinidad Did Not Comply With § 1692c(c). Finally, the FDCPA contains specific instructions on how to request that a debt collector cease communications. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c), “if a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer… wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer…” (emphasis added). Trinidad has not sent any written communications asking that Pioneer cease communications. Trinidad suggests that his statement to Pioneer, “this is my job, sir,” was a request Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 16 of 17 PageID: 45 13 # 3267541 v. 1 that he not be contacted at work. Even if that statement could be construed as a verbal revocation of permission to contact him, the FDCPA specifically requires written requests that a debt collector cease communication. Regardless, to the extent that Trinidad suggested orally on January 13, 2016, that he should not receive calls at work to the 2871 number, the undisputed facts show that Pioneer stopped calling that number after January 13, 2016. Trinidad did not comply with the requirement of the FDCPA and therefore cannot avail himself of its protections. II. CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, Pioneer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it did not violate the FDCPA. Pioneer respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion for Summary Judgment, dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, and grant Pioneer such other relief as is just and proper. Respectfully submitted, Date: June 23, 2017 /s/ Jessica A. Kolansky Eric M. Hurwitz, Esquire Jessica A. Kolansky, Esquire Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP LibertyView 457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 100 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 (856) 321-2400 (Phone) Attorneys for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 17 of 17 PageID: 46 # 3267541 v. 1 STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS &YOUNG, LLP A Pennsylvania Limited Liability Partnership By: Eric M. Hurwitz (N.J. I.D.: 030681999) Jessica A. Kolansky, Esquire (N.J. I.D.: 018622012) 457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 100 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 T: (856) 321-2400 F: (856) 321-2415 E: ehurwitz@Stradley.com; jkolansky@Stradley.com Attorneys for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY MANUEL TRINIDAD, Plaintiff, v. PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Motion Date: July 17, 2017 Filed Electronically Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-2 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 6 PageID: 47 2 # 3267541 v. 1 Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. (“Pioneer”), through its undersigned counsel, submits the following Statement of Uncontested Material Facts pursuant to L. Civ. R. 56.1. 1. Plaintiff, Manuel Trinidad, filed his Complaint on January 12, 2017, alleging violations of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”) by Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. (“Pioneer”). 2. On February 21, 2017, Pioneer filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses, denying Plaintiff’s substantive allegations. 3. Trinidad defaulted on his student loans and Pioneer was retained for collections purposes. (See Declaration of Matthew George at ¶ 4.) 4. Pioneer mailed a notice to Trinidad that the loans were in default and had been placed with Pioneer for collections on or about December 21, 2015. (See George Decl. at ¶ 5 and Exhibit A, Letter, attached thereto.) 5. Pioneer’s December 21, 2015 letter also included a telephone number for Trinidad to contact Pioneer to resolve the deficiency. (See George Decl. at ¶ 6.) 6. When Pioneer did not hear from Trinidad, Pioneer attempted to contact Trinidad several times beginning in December of 2015, at telephone numbers ending in 4991, 7419, and 5116, before discovering Trinidad provided incorrect contact numbers. (See George Decl. at ¶ 7.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-2 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 6 PageID: 48 3 # 3267541 v. 1 7. Pioneer searched for a correct phone number and found a telephone number thought to be Trinidad’s place of employment, at the number ending in 3331. (See George Decl. at ¶ 8.) 8. On January 6, 2016, at 10:29 a.m., Pioneer spoke with Trinidad on the 3331 number, and the call was recorded with Trinidad’s knowledge. (See George Decl. at ¶ 9.) 9. Trinidad indicated that he intended to pay his student loans during the January 6, 2016 call and, although he stated that he was at work, he continued the telephone call for an additional two minutes. (See George Decl. at ¶ 10.) 10. During the call, Trinidad also provided a cellular telephone number on which Pioneer could reach him, ending in 8430, which was marked as a good number for Trinidad in Pioneer’s system. (See George Decl. at ¶ 11.) 11. Finally, Trinidad requested information related to the defaulted loans during the call. Pioneer explained that it needed updated financial information from Trinidad and intended to discuss repayment plans; after which Trinidad would receive the requested email. (See George Decl. at ¶ 12.) 12. Pioneer also provided Trinidad with a telephone number and a reference number so that Trinidad could call Pioneer back to discuss available options at a time that was more convenient for him. (See George Decl. at ¶ 12.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-2 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 6 PageID: 49 4 # 3267541 v. 1 13. Trinidad promised to call Pioneer back to discuss repayment options and to update his financial information. (See George Decl. at ¶ 13.) 14. Trinidad did not ask not to be contacted at work; nor did he discuss any policy of his employer regarding personal calls at work during the January 6, 2016 call. (See George Decl. at ¶ 14.) 15. Approximately two hours later, on January 6, 2016 at 12:25 p.m., Trinidad called Pioneer from a telephone number ending in 2871, and the call was recorded with Trinidad’s knowledge. (See George Decl. at ¶ 15.) 16. Pioneer marked the 2871 number as “unknown” in its system, as it did not match the work telephone number ending in 3331, on which Pioneer had called Trinidad that morning. This number also did not match the cellular telephone number ending in 8430, that Trinidad provided during the earlier call on January 6, 2016. (See George Decl. at ¶ 16.) 17. The second conversation on January 6, 2016, lasted for approximately 40 minutes and Trinidad received additional information about potential payment plans to assist with the defaulted loans. (See George Decl. at ¶ 17.) 18. During the second January 6, 2016 call, Trinidad explicitly granted Pioneer permission to contact him on his cellular telephone number ending in 8430, and did not identify any specific times when Pioneer could not call him on his cellular telephone number. (See George Decl. at ¶ 18.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-2 Filed 06/23/17 Page 4 of 6 PageID: 50 5 # 3267541 v. 1 19. Also during the second January 6, 2016 call, Trinidad agreed to enter into a repayment program to assist in bringing his accounts out of default, but he was uncomfortable providing the requested banking information over the phone that was required to enroll him in the program. (See George Decl. at ¶ 19.) 20. The second January 6, 2016 call ended with Trinidad promising to call Pioneer back on January 11, 2016, to provide his banking information in order to enroll in the repayment program. (See George Decl. at ¶ 20.) 21. Trinidad did not discuss any policy of his employer regarding personal calls at work, nor did he ask not to be contacted at work, during the second January 6, 2016 call. (See George Decl. at ¶ 21.) 22. Trinidad did not call back to provide his banking information as promised. (See George Decl. at ¶ 22.) 23. Therefore, Pioneer attempted to contact Trinidad on January 13, 2016 at 10:31 a.m. on the 8430 cellular telephone number, but Trinidad did not answer. (See George Decl. at ¶ 22.) 24. Pioneer then called the 2871 number from which Trinidad had previously called Pioneer on January 6, 2016, and the call was recorded with Trinidad’s knowledge. (See George Decl. at ¶ 23.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-2 Filed 06/23/17 Page 5 of 6 PageID: 51 6 # 3267541 v. 1 25. When Trinidad answered the January 13, 2016 call, he stated that he was being contacted at his “place of work” and that he “can’t be accepting these kind of calls here.” (See George Decl. at ¶ 24.) 26. In response, Pioneer explained that it called the 2871 number, which was not previously associated with Trinidad’s workplace, but was the number Trinidad had called from on January 6, 2016. (See George Decl. at ¶ 25.) 27. Pioneer thereafter marked both the 2871 and 3331 numbers as “do not call” in its database. (See George Decl. at ¶ 26.) 28. Pioneer made no further calls to either the 2871 or 3331 numbers following the January 13, 2016 call. (See George Decl. at ¶ 27.) 29. Several more calls were made to Trinidad’s cellular telephone number ending in 8430, and Trinidad finally answered on January 28, 2016. (See George Decl. at ¶ 28.) 30. During the January 28, 2016 call, Trinidad directed Pioneer to contact his attorney and ended the call. (See George Decl. at ¶ 29.) Date: June 23, 2017 /s/ Jessica A. Kolansky Eric M. Hurwitz, Esquire Jessica A. Kolansky, Esquire Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP LibertyView 457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 100 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 (856) 321-2400 (Phone) Attorneys for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-2 Filed 06/23/17 Page 6 of 6 PageID: 52 # 3267541 v. 1 STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS &YOUNG, LLP A Pennsylvania Limited Liability Partnership By: Eric M. Hurwitz (N.J. I.D.: 030681999) Jessica A. Kolansky, Esquire (N.J. I.D.: 018622012) 457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 100 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 T: (856) 321-2400 F: (856) 321-2415 E: EHurwitz@Stradley.com; jkolansky@Stradley.com Attorneys for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY MANUEL TRINIDAD, Plaintiff, v. PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG DECLARATION OF MATTHEW GEORGE Filed Electronically I, Matthew George, swear or affirm as follows: 1. I am an adult individual, over the age of eighteen and am competent to make this Affidavit. 2. I am a Director of Operations for Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. (“Pioneer”), and I am authorized to make this Declaration on its behalf . Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-3 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 7 PageID: 53 2 # 3267541 v. 1 3. I have personal knowledge required to execute this Declaration based on my review of Pioneer’s business records, and can confirm the accuracy of the information contained herein. 4. Pioneer was retained to attempt to collect past due student loans owed by Plaintiff, Manuel Trinidad. 5. On December 21, 2015, Pioneer mailed a letter to Plaintiff notifying him that the defaulted student loans were placed with Pioneer for collection. (See Letter Dated December 21, 2015, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 6. Pioneer’s December 21, 2015 letter also provided a telephone number for Plaintiff to contact Pioneer to resolve the default. 7. When Plaintiff did not contact Pioneer, Pioneer attempted to call Plaintiff at telephone numbers provided by Plaintiff on the loan documents, ending in 4991, 7419, and 5116,. Pioneer’s attempted calls to these numbers did not connect, however, and Pioneer ultimately determined that they were bad numbers. 8. Pioneer then identified what it believed was Plaintiff’s work telephone number ending in 3331. 9. Pioneer called the 3331 number and was able to speak with Plaintiff on January 6, 2016, at 10:29 a.m. The call was recorded with Plaintiff’s knowledge. (Transcription of January 6, 2016 call at 10:29 a.m., attached hereto as Exhibit B.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-3 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 7 PageID: 54 3 # 3267541 v. 1 10. During the call, Plaintiff stated that he intended to pay his student loans that had fallen into default. (Ex. B, January 6, 2016 call at 10:29 a.m., at pg. 2, line 20.) Plaintiff also stated that he was at work, but he nonetheless continued the call with Pioneer for more than two minutes to discuss his account. (Id. at 10:29 a.m., at pg. 2, lines 20-21.) 11. During the January 6, 2016 call, Plaintiff also provided a cellular telephone number on which he could be reached ending in 8430. (Ex. B, January 6, 2016 call at 10:29 a.m., at pg. 3, line 3.) The Pioneer agent then added the 8430 number as a good number for Plaintiff in its system. 12. Plaintiff also asked if Pioneer could send him an email with information related to his defaulted loans. (Ex. B, January 6, 2016 call at 10:29 a.m., at pg. 3, lines 14-15.) Pioneer explained, however, that an email would be sent after they discussed available repayment options and Plaintiff’s current financial situation. (Id. at pg. 3, lines 16-25.) Pioneer then provided Plaintiff with a telephone number and a reference number so Plaintiff could call Pioneer back to discuss repayment options at a more convenient time. (Id. at 10:29 a.m., at pg. 4, lines 13-17.) 13. The call ended with Plaintiff’s promise that he would contact Pioneer to discuss a potential payment plan and update his financial information. (Ex. B, January 6, 2016 call at 10:29 a.m., at pg. 4, lines 22-25, pg. 5, lines 1-9.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-3 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 7 PageID: 55 4 # 3267541 v. 1 14. At no time during the foregoing call did Plaintiff mention any policy of his employer regarding personal telephone calls at work. Plaintiff also did not ask Pioneer not to contact him at work. 15. Later in the day on January 6, 2016, Plaintiff called Pioneer at 12:25 p.m. to discuss repayment options. Plaintiff called Pioneer from a different telephone number ending in 2871. The call was recorded with Plaintiff’s knowledge. (Transcription of January 6, 2016, at 12:25 p.m., at pg. 2, lines 7-8, attached hereto as Exhibit C.) 16. Pioneer recorded the 2871 number as “unknown” in its system because it did not match the work telephone number on which Pioneer previously called Plaintiff (ending in 3331), nor did it match the cellular telephone number which Plaintiff provided earlier that day (ending in 8430). 17. The second conversation on January 6, 2016 lasted for approximately forty minutes, during which Plaintiff and Pioneer discussed various payment plans to assist Plaintiff with his defaulted loans. (Ex. C, January 6, 2016 call at 12:25 p.m., at pgs. 6-9, pg. 12, lines 16-25, pg. 13, lines 1-21.) 18. During the second call on January 6, 2016, Plaintiff granted Pioneer permission to contact him on his telephone number ending in 8430, and did not specify any times when he could not be called on his phone. (Ex. C, January 6, 2016 call at 12:25 p.m., at pg. 5, lines 13-25, pg. 6, lines 1-3.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-3 Filed 06/23/17 Page 4 of 7 PageID: 56 5 # 3267541 v. 1 19. During the call, Plaintiff agreed to enter into a repayment program to assist with his accounts. (Ex. C, January 6, 2016 call at 12:25 p.m., at pg. 6-9, pg. 12, lines 16-25, pg. 13, lines 1-21.) Pioneer asked Plaintiff for banking information to enroll him in the repayment plan, but Plaintiff was not comfortable providing that information at the time. (Id. at pg. 23, lines 10-25, pgs. 24-30.) 20. Therefore, Plaintiff promised to call Pioneer back on January 11, 2016, to provide banking information to enroll in the repayment program. (Ex. C, January 6, 2016 call at 12:25 p.m., at pg. 30, lines 20-21, pg. 31, lines 4-5, pgs. 33- 34.) 21. At no time during the second call on January 6, 2016, did Plaintiff mention any policy of his employer regarding personal telephone calls at work. Nor did Plaintiff ask Pioneer not to contact him at work. 22. Plaintiff did not call Pioneer on January 11, 2016 as promised, nor did he otherwise provide his banking information to begin the repayment plan. Therefore, Pioneer attempted to contact Plaintiff on January 13, 2016, at 10:31 a.m., on his cellular telephone number ending in 8430, but there was no answer. 23. Pioneer then called Plaintiff at the 2871 number because that was the telephone number from which Plaintiff previously called Pioneer on January 6, 2016. The call was recorded with Plaintiff’s knowledge. (Transcription of January 13, 2016 call at pg. 2, lines 4-5, attached hereto as Exhibit D.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-3 Filed 06/23/17 Page 5 of 7 PageID: 57 6 # 3267541 v. 1 24. Upon reaching Plaintiff at the 2871 number, Plaintiff stated that he was being contacted at his “place of work” and that he “can’t be accepting these kind of calls here.” (Ex. D, January 13, 2016 call at pg. 2, lines 9-10.) 25. Pioneer explained that it called the 2871 number, which was not previously associated with Plaintiff’s workplace, because Plaintiff had called Pioneer from that number on January 6, 2016. (Ex. D, January 13, 2016 call at pg. 2, lines 18-20.) 26. As a result of the call, Pioneer then marked both the 2871 and 3331 numbers as “do not call” in its systems. 27. Pioneer made no additional calls to either the 2871 or 3331 numbers following the call with Plaintiff on January 13, 2016. 28. Pioneer attempted to contact Plaintiff several more times on his cellular telephone number ending in 8430, and was finally able to speak with him on January 28, 2016. 29. During the January 28, 2016 call, Plaintiff directed Pioneer to contact his attorney. The call then ended. (Transcription of January 28, 2016 call at pg. 2, lines 18-20, 22-244-5, attached hereto as Exhibit E.) Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-3 Filed 06/23/17 Page 6 of 7 PageID: 58 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-3 Filed 06/23/17 Page 7 of 7 PageID: 59 # 3267541 v. 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY MANUEL TRINIDAD, Plaintiff, v. PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Motion Date: July 17, 2017 Filed Electronically THIS MATTER having been opened by Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., by its counsel, on notice for an Order granting Pioneer’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and upon consideration of the moving papers, response, and reply papers, and oral argument, if any, and for good cause shown: IT IS on this _____ day of ________________, 2017, ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant, Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc.; and IT IS further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. BY THE COURT: __________________________________ Honorable Peter G. Sheridan United States District Judge Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-4 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 60 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-5 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 61 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-5 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 4 PageID: 62 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-5 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 4 PageID: 63 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-5 Filed 06/23/17 Page 4 of 4 PageID: 64 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-6 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 6 PageID: 65 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-6 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 6 PageID: 66 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-6 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 6 PageID: 67 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-6 Filed 06/23/17 Page 4 of 6 PageID: 68 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-6 Filed 06/23/17 Page 5 of 6 PageID: 69 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-6 Filed 06/23/17 Page 6 of 6 PageID: 70 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 35 PageID: 71 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 35 PageID: 72 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 35 PageID: 73 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 4 of 35 PageID: 74 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 5 of 35 PageID: 75 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 6 of 35 PageID: 76 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 7 of 35 PageID: 77 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 8 of 35 PageID: 78 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 9 of 35 PageID: 79 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 10 of 35 PageID: 80 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 11 of 35 PageID: 81 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 12 of 35 PageID: 82 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 13 of 35 PageID: 83 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 14 of 35 PageID: 84 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 15 of 35 PageID: 85 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 16 of 35 PageID: 86 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 17 of 35 PageID: 87 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 18 of 35 PageID: 88 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 19 of 35 PageID: 89 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 20 of 35 PageID: 90 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 21 of 35 PageID: 91 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 22 of 35 PageID: 92 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 23 of 35 PageID: 93 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 24 of 35 PageID: 94 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 25 of 35 PageID: 95 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 26 of 35 PageID: 96 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 27 of 35 PageID: 97 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 28 of 35 PageID: 98 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 29 of 35 PageID: 99 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 30 of 35 PageID: 100 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 31 of 35 PageID: 101 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 32 of 35 PageID: 102 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 33 of 35 PageID: 103 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 34 of 35 PageID: 104 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-7 Filed 06/23/17 Page 35 of 35 PageID: 105 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-8 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 106 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-8 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 3 PageID: 107 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-8 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 108 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-9 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 109 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-9 Filed 06/23/17 Page 2 of 3 PageID: 110 Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-9 Filed 06/23/17 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 111 # 3268133 v. 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Jessica A. Kolansky, hereby certify that on June 23, 2017, the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system. The document is available for reviewing and downloading from the ECF system. /s/ Jessica A. Kolansky Jessica A. Kolansky Case 3:17-cv-00228-PGS-LHG Document 10-10 Filed 06/23/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 112