Summerfield, Jessica v. Colvin, Carolyn

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

W.D. Wis.July 29, 2016

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN JESSICA SUMMERFIELD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 15-cv-0623 ) CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY I. Summary of Argument The ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical opinions, as the ALJ did not apply all of the factors required by 20 CFR 404.1527, and gave insufficient reasons for the weight given to the opinions. Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Summerfield is capable of frequent use of the right upper extremity, and Plaintiff requests that this court reverse the ALJ’s decision and award benefits based on medical opinions limiting Ms. Summerfield to occasional use of the right upper extremity, and vocational expert testimony that this would preclude full-time competitive work. The ALJ did not properly evaluate Ms. Summerfield’s allegations, as the ALJ gave only two reasons for not crediting her allegations of limited use of the right arm, and both were improper and incorrect. Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 1 of 17 2 II. Procedural History Ms. Summerfield filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on May 16, 2005, alleging disability beginning April 14, 2004. (AR 236.) This application was denied by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Peter Erickson on January 17, 2008. (AR 233-43.) Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council remanded the case for another hearing on May 29, 2008. (AR 250-52.) Following a second hearing, ALJ Sherwin Biesman issued a decision denying benefits on June 28, 2011. (AR 13- 24.) Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, but was denied on June 9, 2012. (AR 8-11.) Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin on August 8, 2012. (AR 460-61.) The case was remanded by the District Court for another hearing. (District Court order not included in the record, but referenced in Appeals Council Order at AR 463-66.) After holding a third hearing, ALJ Brenton Rogozen issued a decision denying benefits. (AR 413-424.) Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 USC 405(g). III. Statement of Facts In November 2002, Ms. Summerfield was walking up a set of steps and used her right shoulder to keep herself from falling down the steps, and wrenched her shoulder. (AR 214.) On examination in June 2003, she had tenderness in the shoulder, and impingement signs were positive; Dr. Morris gave her a steroid injection, diagnosed impingement syndrome, and limited Ms. Summerfield to four-hour workdays. (AR Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 2 of 17 3 214.) On July 9, 2003, she stated that the injection had given her two weeks worth of relief, but the problem had returned since she went back to work. (AR 212.) On July 29, 2003, Dr. Morris gave Plaintiff another steroid injection. (AR 210.) She attended physical therapy from July 30 through August 28, 2003. (AR 204-09.) AN EMG done January 13, 2004 was normal. (AR 200-02.) On February 3, 2004, Dr. Wikenheiser limited Ms. Summerfield to working 6 hours per day. (AR 197.) On March 9, 2004, Dr. Wikenheiser recommended surgery, an arthroscopic subacromial decompression with a partial distal clavicle extension if necessary, and then either a labral repair or debridement depending on findings at the time of surgery. (AR 190.) The surgery was performed on April 14, 2004. (AR 182-84.) Ms. Summerfield attended physical therapy until June 15, 2004; at discharge, “she continue[d] to have deep anterior pain with elevation and internal rotation movements.” (AR 162.) On July 22, 2004, Dr. Wikenheiser opined that Ms. Summerfield should remain off work for two months, and should not use her right hand. (AR 163.) On September 29, 2004, she continued to have pain and discomfort in the shoulder, but Dr. Wikenheiser did not recommend further surgery. (AR 131.) On examination on August 4, 2005, she had limited range of motion, decreased strength, and decreased sensation in the right arm. (AR 128-29.) On September 20, 2008, Ms. Summerfield complained of pain with use of the right arm, and examination showed limited range of motion and pain on range of motion testing. (AR 319-20.) On November 6, 2008, Ms. Summerfield has constant Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 3 of 17 4 shoulder pain, and on examination she had tenderness, decreased range of motion, poor grip strength, and poor muscle strength in the right arm. (AR 317.) On July 20, 2009, her chronic neck and shoulder problems were noted to be “unchanged from her usual.” (AR 506.) On August 25, 2005, Pat Chan, M.D., a non-examining State agency physician opined that Ms. Summerfield was capable of performing work at the light exertional level with occasional overhead reaching on the right. (AR 136-43.) On February 7, 2006 Syd Foster, M.D., another non-examining State agency reviewing doctor opined that Ms. Summerfield was capable of light exertional work, but she was limited in both overhead reaching and extended reaching on the right. (AR 144-51.) On February 26, 2013, Plaintiff again presented to Dr. Beyer with shoulder pain; on examination, she had tenderness and decreased range of motion of the right shoulder, with limited abduction and minimal internal and external rotation. (AR 502- 03.) On October 13, 2013, Ms. Summerfield continued to have pain, and on examination she had limited range of motion, with “extremely poor” forward elevation, and positive carpal compression test. (AR 497.) On November 23, 2013, Ms. Summerfield had a consultative examination at the request of the Administration with S. Danish Hasan, M.D. (AR 511-15.) On examination, Ms. Summerfield had reduced strength in the right deltoids (3/5), biceps (4/5), and hand grip. (4/5.) (AR 513.) She “could not dress and undress adequately well due to right Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 4 of 17 5 hand and shoulder pain,” and had limited range of motion with the right upper extremity. (AR 514.) Dr. Hasan stated “the claimant has some severe restrictions in loss of strength mainly in the right shoulder and associated functions related to that.” (AR 515.) Dr. Hasan opined that Ms. Summerfield would be limited to occasional reaching, handling, feeling, grasping, and fingering on the right side. (Id.) However, in a form completed the same day, Dr. Hasan opined that she could never reach overhead or in any other directions with the right upper extremity. (AR 518.) IV. The ALJ’s Decision The ALJ made the following findings: Ms. Summerfield last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2011. (AR 418.) She did not engage in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date of April 14, 2004, through her date last insured. (Id.) Her severe impairments were right shoulder impingement, status post arthroscopic surgery with subacromial decompression and partial distal clavicle excision on April 14, 2004, chronic regional pain syndrome, and obesity. (AR 418-19.) Through the date last insured, she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments which met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 419.) She had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with some exceptions. (Id.) She could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She could sit, stand, and/or walk without limitation in an eight-hour Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 5 of 17 6 workday. She was precluded from all overhead work with the dominant right upper extremity, but could frequently reach up to shoulder level on the right for up to two thirds of an eight-hour workday. She had no limitation in the use of her non-dominant left upper extremity. (Id.) Her medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. (AR 421.) Based on this residual functional capacity assessment, Plaintiff was capable of returning to her past relevant work as an accounting clerk, and thus was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (AR 423.) V. Standard of Review The Social Security Act states that the Commissioner’s findings should be reversed if they are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Micus v. Bowen, 979 F.2d 602, 604 (7th Cir.1992). An ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony in the record. See, e.g., Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d at 473, 480 (7th Cir.2008). However, a court “cannot uphold a decision by an administrative agency . . . if, while there is enough evidence in the record to support the decision, the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.1996). An ALJ’s Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 6 of 17 7 opinion must also be reversed if she has committed a legal error, regardless of how much evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. Binion on Behalf of Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997). An ALJ commits a legal error when he fails to comply with the Commissioner’s regulations and rulings. Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir.1991). VI. Argument A. The ALJ Did Not Properly Evaluate the Medical Opinions. The ALJ adopted the opinion of Dr. Lorber and rejected the opinions of Drs. Beyer and Hasan, but did not evaluate these opinions as required by the factors listed in 20 CFR 404.1527. The factors include whether the doctor has examined the claimant, whether the doctor has a treating relationship (and if so, the nature and extent of the treating relationship and the length of treatment and frequency of examination), the supportability of the opinion, the consistency with the record evidence, and the specialization of the medical source. The ALJ gave two reasons for adopting the opinion of Dr. Lorber: that his opinion was “wholly consistent with the relevant medical evidence of record, and that he was “a medical expert who is familiar with Social Security Administration rules and regulations.” (AR 422.) As discussed above, these reasons were insufficient. Further, the ALJ did not address all the factors. The ALJ did not explain how Dr. Lorber’s “status” Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 7 of 17 8 as a non-examining medical expert entitled his opinion to greater weight than opinions from treating sources. The ALJ stated that the opinion of Dr. Hasan, a consultative examining doctor, was “not inconsistent with medical expert testimony at the hearing,” and the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the opinion. (AR 422.) However, Dr. Hasan’s opinion was inconsistent with Dr. Lorber’s opinion, and the limitations in Dr. Hasan’s opinion would lead to a finding of disability. Dr. Hasan stated “[t]here are manipulative limitations on the right side only on reaching, handling, fingering, and the claimant will be able to perform these occasionally due to right upper extremity pain, weakness, and decreased range of motion.” (AR 515.) The ALJ generally states that Dr. Hasan “indicated that the claimant has some manipulative limitations on the right.” (AR 422.) This is not sufficiently specific, and it is unclear from the decision whether the ALJ was even aware of the specific limitations from Dr. Hasan’s opinion. Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009) (an ALJ may not adopt portions of an opinion without explaining why he rejects the remainder) citing Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000); accord Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ may not selectively discuss portions of a physician's report that support a finding of non- disability while ignoring other portions that suggest a disability;” citing Myles.) The ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Beyer, a treating source, for two reasons: the opinion was “unsupported by relevant medical records in evidence, such as those from Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 8 of 17 9 the St. Croix Medical Center,” and the opinion was inconsistent with the opinion of the medical expert at the hearing. (AR 421.) First, the ALJ is incorrect that the opinion is unsupported by the medical records from St. Croix. On September 20, 2007, she had decreased range of motion in the shoulder with pain. (AR 315.) On December 4, 2007 she had tenderness and pain on range of motion testing of the shoulder and was diagnosed with chronic regional pain syndrome. (AR 231-32.) On November 6, 2008, she had decreased range of motion in the shoulder, muscle spasm in the scapular area, and decreased muscle strength in the right arm. (AR 317.) On February 26, 2013, she had decreased range of motion and tenderness in the right shoulder. (AR 503.) On October 3, 2013, she had very limited range of motion in the shoulder with significant pain. (AR 496-98.) The ALJ generally states that these treatment records are inconsistent with Dr. Beyer’s opinion, but does not cite to anything in particular that the ALJ finds inconsistent. In fact, the findings are consistent over time and support Dr. Beyer’s opinion. The ALJ’s failure to identify the inconsistencies he refers to warrants reversal of the ALJ’s decision. See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing where ALJ stated a treating source’s opinion was inconsistent with the record, but did not explain what was inconsistent); see also Corliss v. Colvin, 2015 WL 7573251 *1 (W.D.Wis., Nov. 25, 2015) (“The ALJ may have had reasons to discount the mental impairment opinions, but the ALJ did not adequately justify his decision, cite to specific inconsistencies in the record, or identify and apply the pertinent regulatory factors, as Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 9 of 17 10 required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.”) Further, the ALJ did not address the length of the treatment relationship, as Dr. Beyer had treated Ms. Summerfield from at least April 2004 (AR 135) through November 21, 2013. (AR 495.) The ALJ did not explain why the opinion of a non-examining source was entitled to greater weight than a treating source with a nearly 10-year treatment relationship. See Glodowski v. Colvin, 2016 WL 3595732 *4 (N.D.Ill. Jul. 5, 2016) (ALJ erred by not mentioning the length of a medical source’s treatment relationship). B. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the ALJ’s Conclusion that Plaintiff Could Frequently Reach and Handle with the Right Upper Extremity. The ALJ found that Ms. Summerfield could not reach overhead with the right upper extremity, but could reach up to her shoulder level for up to two-thirds of the workday. (AR 419.) The ALJ’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Lorber, a medical expert who testified at the most recent hearing, stating that his opinion was “wholly consistent with the relevant medical evidence of record,” without citing anything specific to support this conclusion. (AR 422.) A review of the record shows that Dr. Lorber’s opinion was actually inconsistent with much of the evidence in the record, and the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Summerfield was capable of frequently reaching and handling is not supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ’s finding is inconsistent with the findings of two prior ALJs in this case, both of whom opined that Plaintiff was limited to occasional use of the right upper Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 10 of 17 11 extremity. (AR 19, 239.) Medical evidence is generally consistent with the prior ALJs’ findings. Dr. Beyer, a treating source, opined on November 26, 2007 that Ms. Summerfield was limited to occasional reaching at or below shoulder level, and occasional grasping and fine manipulation. (AR 229.) On examination on December 4, 2007, she had tenderness in various spots in the shoulder and “a lot of discomfort when actively arranging the extremity away from her side.” (AR 231-32.) Examination on November 6, 2008 showed decreased range of motion in the shoulder, specifically with moving the arm down and with adduction (moving the arm from shoulder height down to the side of the body1), poor grip strength, and tenderness in the scapular area. (AR 317.) On February 26, 2013, she had decreased range of motion, specifically reduced abduction (moving the arm from the side of the body to shoulder height2) and internal and external rotation, and tenderness in the right shoulder. (AR 503.) Examination on October 3, 2013, she had decreased range of motion in the right shoulder, with “extremely poor” forward elevation and 130 degrees of internal rotation “barely to her belt,” and positive carpal compression test. (AR 497.) An examination from November 23, 2013 showed weakness in the muscles and significantly reduced abduction, forward elevation, and external rotation. (AR 514.) Dr. Hasan stated “[t]here are manipulative limitations on the right side only on reaching, handling, fingering, and the claimant will 1 (Accessed July 27, 2016). 2 Ibid. Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 11 of 17 12 be able to perform these occasionally due to right upper extremity pain, weakness, and decreased range of motion.” (AR 515.) This evidence all supports Dr. Beyer’s opinion that Ms. Summerfield was capable of only occasional reaching, as well as the prior two ALJs findings which were consistent with that opinion. Directly contrary to ALJ Rogozen’s statement that Dr. Lorber’s opinion was “wholly consistent” with the record, the opinion is actually quite inconsistent with the other evidence in the file. The ALJ also stated that Dr. Lorber’s opinion was entitled to great weight due to his “status as a medical expert who is familiar with Social Security Administration rules and regulations.” But his “status” as a non-examining doctor is not sufficient to give great weight to his opinion, as this is nothing more than a general statement, and says nothing specific about this particular case. The fact that a non-examining source was hired by Social Security to give an opinion does not mean it is inherently entitled to greater weight than treating or examining sources, and in fact the Commissioner’s own regulation states the opposite. 20 CFR 404.1527 states that greater weight will generally be given first to treating sources, and then to examining sources. The regulation goes on to state that while nonexamining sources can be given the greatest weight, “because nonexamining sources have no examining or treating relationship with you, the weight we will give their opinions will depend on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for their opinions.” 20 CFR 404.1527(c)(3). But Dr. Lorber never provides Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 12 of 17 13 any specific explanation in support of his conclusion that Ms. Summerfield would be capable of using her right arm for reaching for up to two-thirds of the workday. (AR 541.) In addition to the question of the amount of time per day she could use the right upper extremity, the record establishes that Ms. Summerfield does not have full range of motion of the right shoulder, and the ALJ did not account for this reduced range in the residual functional capacity assessment. Ms. Summerfield’s shoulder impairment not only limits the amount of time she can use the arm, but the types of motion she is capable of. The only range of motion limitation the ALJ includes in the residual functional capacity assessment is no overhead reaching, but examination demonstrates that her range is far more limited than this, as she cannot raise her arm to shoulder height (AR 503) or lower her arm to the side of her body. (AR 317.) Cf. Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir.2003) (examination demonstrated limited range of motion in the lumbar spine, yet the ALJ found the claimant capable of occasional stooping); accord Thomas v. Colvin, 534 F. App'x 546, 551 (7th Cir.2013). Plaintiff contends that the current record supports a finding that Ms. Summerfield should be limited to only occasional use of the right upper extremity, and that remand is not necessary, and requests that this Court reverse the ALJ’s decision and award benefits to Ms. Summerfield. Kenneth Ogren, the vocational expert who testified at Ms. Summerfield’s most recent hearing, opined that if Ms. Summerfield Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 13 of 17 14 were limited to occasional use of the right upper extremity there would be no jobs in the economy she could perform. (AR 552.) This Court held in Worzalla v. Barnhart, 311 F.Supp.2d 782, 800 (E.D.Wis.2004) that a disability claim may be reversed for an award of benefits where (1) the record overwhelmingly supports a finding of disability; and (2) the delay involved in repeated remands has become unconscionable, or the agency has displayed obduracy in complying with the law as set down by the court. Even though the record contains a contrary opinion from Dr. Lorber, this does not prevent this Court from finding that the record overwhelmingly supports a finding of disability, as the Seventh Circuit has reversed and awarded benefits where the record contains contrary opinions from non-examining doctors hired by the Administration. See Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.2010). Ms. Summerfield initially filed this claim on May 16, 2005, and after numerous remands and over eleven years, the Administration continues to make errors on the same issue. See Wilder v. Apfel, 153 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing for an award of benefits based on the obduracy of the Agency and repeated remands on the same issue). Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 14 of 17 15 C. The ALJ Did Not Properly Evaluate Plaintiff’s Alleged Limitations Under SSR 16-3p.3 The ALJ gives two reasons for not crediting Ms. Summerfield’s alleged limitations: that she “was able to sustain seasonal employment as a tax secretary for AgStar Financial Services from 2005-2008,” and that “she could perform a wide range of activities of daily living, such as preparing basic meals, laundering clothes, and washing dishes, without significant issue.” (AR 420.) The ALJ fails to address uncontradicted testimony from Plaintiff’s mother, Janice Bystrom, that Plaintiff’s work as a tax secretary was accommodated. (AR 397-400.) Ms. Bystrom testified that her boss was very flexible, and hired Plaintiff seasonally despite her being unable to meet the demands of the job. (Id.) Ms. Summerfield testified that she couldn’t do things like staple, punch, or lift the tax returns, could only work at the computer for 10-15 minutes at a time, and needed help from her mother to complete many tasks. (AR 547-48.) It was improper for the ALJ to rely on this seasonal work, since the record contains uncontradicted evidence from two sources that Ms. Summerfield was actually capable of doing very little of this work. See Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir.2014) (“Even persons who are disabled sometimes cope with their impairments and continue working long after they might have been entitled to 3 SSR 16-3p became effective on March 16, 2016, and it replaces SSR 96-7p but not the Commissioner's policy. See https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/03/16/2016-05916/social-security-ruling-16-3p- titles-ii-and-xvi-evaluation-of-symptoms-in-disability-claims Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 15 of 17 16 benefits. This is especially likely when the work is part time—as was the plaintiff's work in the cafeteria.”), citing Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir.2012); see also Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.2004); Henderson v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir.2003); Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir.1998). Regarding her daily activities, the ALJ mischaracterizes Ms. Summerfield’s description of her abilities and fails to account for qualifications on those activites. The ALJ generally cites to Exhibit 6F to support the conclusion that Ms. Summerfield is capable of performing a “wide range” of activities “without significant issue.” (AR 420.) For example, Plaintiff stated that she did some laundry, dishes, and cooking, but she would “do a little at a time and take breaks to rest my shoulder. (AR 113.) “Everything takes twice as long as it used to.” (Id.) She could not “do anything repetitious.” (Id.) She needed help when going grocery shopping. (AR 114.) She had to drive with one arm. (AR 115.) She could not pour laundry soap unless the bottle was less than half full, since she could only use her left hand to lift it. (AR 116.) Her husband and children did much of the work around the house. (Id.) Nothing in this form is inconsistent with Ms. Summerfield’s alleged limitations, nor do these limited activities support a finding that she was capable of working full-time. Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir.2012) (reliance on daily activities “is a recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions by administrative law judges in social security disability cases.”); see also Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) (“her ability to struggle through the activities of daily Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 16 of 17 17 living does not mean that she can manage the requirements of a modern workplace”); Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The administrative law judge's casual equating of household work to work in the labor market cannot stand.”); Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872 (“minimal daily activities . . . do not establish that a person is capable of engaging in substantial physical activity.” ). The two reasons the ALJ gave for not crediting Ms. Summerfield’s allegations of limitation in the use of the right upper extremity were insufficient, and this error warrants reversal of the ALJ’s decision. VII. Conclusion Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for an award of benefits, or, in the alternative, for additional proceedings consistent with the arguments set forth above. July 29, 2016 s/Barry A. Schultz Barry A. Schultz The Law Offices of Barry A. Schultz, P.C. 1601 Sherman Avenue, Suite 500 Evanston, IL 60201 (847) 864-0224 Case: 3:15-cv-00623-jdp Document #: 20 Filed: 07/29/16 Page 17 of 17