Striplin v. FBI et al

MOTION to Dismiss Case as Frivolous

D.D.C.February 21, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _____________________________________ AAREN STRIPLIN ) 1355 New York Avenue, N.E. ) Washington, D.C. 20001 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 17-0241 (EGS) ) FEDERAL BUREAU OF ) INVESTIGATION ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR PROTECTION ORDER The United States of America, by and through the undersigned United States Attorney, on behalf of Defendant, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), moves the Court to deny Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective order and to dismiss the Complaint filed herein, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because the complaint is frivolous. I. INTRODUCTION Pro se Plaintiff, Aaren Striplin, is a resident of the District of Columbia suing the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges unbelievable, fictitious, and bizarre claims of some sort of government conspiracy. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is a confusing and disjointed narrative, Defendant has had difficulty determining what the claim is. Plaintiff asserts Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 1 of 10 2 that, “he was kidnapped for ransom by FBI police, and that “FBI police assaulted him for trying to file an FBI report with evidence.” ECF at 2. He claims that he was “kidnapped from a middle school in California in 1993, held as a sex slave hostage until 1999. ” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff indicates, in several places in the complaint, that Defendant FBI “will not allow Plaintiff to file a FBI report.” Id. Overall, the complaint contains illegible tirades that are extremely difficult to read and understand. Id. Although Plaintiff’s claim stretches on for a paragraph, Defendant FBI is only explicitly named in a few places and otherwise the alleged actors are various “Metropolitan police officers.” Similarly, Plaintiff’s Request for a Restraining Order against Defendant FBI contains illegible diatribes that are extremely difficult to follow. See ECF 4. In this filing, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “has illegally blocked the entrance way to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation main headquarters, FBI Field Office, United States Post Office….in order to stop proceedings in both civil and criminal matters.” Id. In his request, Plaintiff asks this Court to grant him the right to appear in a “jury trial.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that on February 8, 2017, Defendant “kidnapped, assaulted, and threatened” him, and “illegally searched” him, and took evidence from him,” consisting of “blood and sperm,” as well as “ass urine,” after collecting “a ransom of court filings…” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “set up a scam to complete intelligent home invasion of victim’s grandmother and mother.” Id. Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 2 of 10 3 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard for Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction A motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold challenge to the court’s jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1), the court must accept the complainant’s well pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Thompson v. Capitol Police Board, 120 F.Supp.2d 78, 81 (D. D.C. 2000). “The court is not required, however, to accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp.2d 61, 64 (D. D.C. 2001), affd, 346F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809 (2004). Furthermore, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Oppermann v. U.S., 2007 WL 1748920, *2 (D. D.C. 2007); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Kempthorne, 2007 WL 1703431, *4 (D. D.C. 2004); Rann, 154 F. Supp.2d at 64; Thompson, 120 F. Supp.2d 78 at 81 (observing that “on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to establish subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence”). A court also has an “independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). “For this reason ‘the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C.2001) Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 3 of 10 4 (alterations in original) (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed.1987)). “[T]he federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 37 (1974) (internal quotation omitted). The D.C. Circuit has indicated that dismissal under 12(b)(1) is proper “when the complaint is ‘patently insubstantial’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Best v. Kelly, 39 F. 3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir.1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989)). Manifestly flimsy complaints are not simply doubtful or questionable, but rather are “essentially fictitious,” such as “bizarre conspiracy theories,” “fantastic government manipulations of [one’s] will or mind,” and “any sort of supernatural intervention.” Id. A “district court has the power to dismiss a case sua sponte if it is frivolous.” Brown v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 411 F.Supp. 1001, 1001-02 (D.D.C. 1975). A court may decide a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) in two ways. First, the court may determine the motion based solely on the complaint. Herbert v. Nat’l Academy of Science, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Alternatively, to determine the existence of jurisdiction, a court may look beyond the allegations of the complaint, consider affidavits and other extrinsic information, and ultimately weigh the conflicting evidence. Id. Ultimately, a court may not entertain any claims without adequate jurisdictional basis. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. D.C. 1987). Pro se complaints are held to less rigorous standards than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 4 of 10 5 (1972) (stating that the court must view a pro se litigant’s complaint under a lenient standard). Accordingly, the court should construe the complaint liberally, drawing fair inferences and applying the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se plaintiff has mentioned it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). However, even a pro se plaintiff must be able to prove a “set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard for Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Moreover, a complaint must contain sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to avoid dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. 570. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. Twombly applies to all civil cases. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). A court should dismiss a complaint if the complaint is unsupported by specific factual allegations sufficient to support a viable claim. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86. A court should also dismiss a complaint if it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 5 of 10 6 set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. See, e.g., Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002). III. ARGUMENT A. The Complaint Fails for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) A court can invoke Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint that is “ ‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). This standard requires that the “claims be flimsier than ‘doubtful or questionable’ – they must be ‘essentially fictitious.’ ” Id. Claims that fall into this category include “bizarre conspiracy theories, any fantastic government manipulations of [the] will or mind, [and] any sort of supernatural intervention.” Id. As a general rule, this procedural vehicle is “reserved for complaints resting on truly fanciful factual allegations,” while 12(b)(6) dismissals “cull legally deficient complaints.” Id. at 331 n. 5. In this case, it is clear that the complaint meets the Best v. Kelly standard for dismissal. The Plaintiff asserts that, “he was kidnapped for ransom by FBI police, and that “FBI police assaulted him for trying to file an FBI report with evidence.” ECF at 2. He claims that he was “kidnapped from a middle school in California in 1993, held as a sex slave hostage until 1999. ” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff indicates, in several places in the complaint, that Defendant FBI will not allow Plaintiff to file an FBI report. Id. Overall, the complaint contains illegible accusations that are extremely difficult to understand.” Id. Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 6 of 10 7 B. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Relief Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a claim may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although, in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007), the complaint must contain sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to avoid dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. 570. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. A court should dismiss a complaint if the complaint is unsupported by specific factual allegations sufficient to support a viable claim. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86. A court should also dismiss a complaint if it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. See, e.g., Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002). Taken at face value the complaint states that the FBI “kidnapped him for ransom” and “assaulted him for trying to file an FBI report.” Complaint. Clearly, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim(s) that would entitle him to relief. As a result, the complaint is entirely devoid of allegations sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted. C. The Complaint should be Dismissed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as Frivolous 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) provides “[N]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious.” No elucidation is required to Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 7 of 10 8 establish that the allegation--“. . .“he was kidnapped for ransom by FBI police, and that “FBI police assaulted him for trying to file an FBI report with evidence,” “kidnapped him from a middle school in California in 1993, held him as a sex slave hostage until 1999,” and “would not allow Plaintiff to file an FBI report” – is frivolous. Furthermore, complaints that lack “an arguable basis in law and fact” are also subject to dismissal as frivolous. Brandon v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (DC. Cir. 1984). Id. The complaint in the present case should be similarly dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). D. The Complaint Does Not State a Claim for Which Relief May be Granted Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for damages resulting from the actions of any person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. Defendant is a federal agency and not subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore, this case should be dismissed against it. Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 8 of 10 9 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint and deny his request for a Protective Order. The complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because the complaint is frivolous. Respectfully submitted, CHANNING D. PHILLIPS D.C. Bar # 415793 United States Attorney for the District of Columbia DANIEL F. VAN HORN, D.C. Bar # 924092 Chief, Civil Division By /s/ PATRICIA KING MCBRIDE, PA Bar # 54561 Assistant United States Attorney Office of the United States Attorney 555 4th St., N.W., E4804 Washington, D.C. 20530 Ph: (202) 252-7123 patricia.mcbride@usdoj.gov Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 9 of 10 10 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss to be served, on this 21st day of February, 2017, by first class mail to pro se Plaintiff: Aaren Striplin, pro se 1355 New York Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002 Respectfully submitted, _____/s/_______________ PATRICIA K. MCBRIDE, PA Bar # 54561 Assistant United States Attorney Case 1:17-cv-00241-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/21/17 Page 10 of 10