Stevanus Edward v. President Obama et alNOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to FRCP 12C.D. Cal.December 22, 20161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES S. FRANK HARRELL - SBN 133437 sharrell@lynberg.com PANCY LIN - SBN 239684 plin@lynberg.com CHARIESE R. SOLORIO - SBN 309753 csolorio@lynberg.com LYNBERG & WATKINS A Professional Corporation 1100 Town & Country Road, Suite 1450 Orange, California 92868 (714) 937-1010 Telephone (714) 937-1003 Facsimile Attorneys for Defendant City of Fontana, erroneously sued as “Police Fontana, CA” UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA STEVANUS EDWARD, Plaintiff, vs. PRESIDENT OBAMA, D.C.; OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, D.C.; FBI AGENCY, D.C.; NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, D.C.; NSA AGENCY, M.D.; ATTORNEY GENERAL CALIFORNIA; JUDGE CATHERINE COUTTS, CA; POLICE FONTANA, CA; WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD; DOCTORS DAVID WOOD, M.D., CA; LWP CLAIM SACRAMENTO, CA; U.S. FIRE INSURANCE, CA; ATTORNEY TELLERIA & LEVY, CA; ATTORNEY RMKB, CA; ARROWHEAD HOSPITAL, CA; HOAG NEWPORT HOSPITAL, CA; BAPTIST HOSPITAL, TEXAS; PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL, WA; HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, CA; GROVE IMAGING, CA; DMG IMAGING, SAN GABRIEL, CA; DMG, MONTEREY PARK, CA; SPECTRUM IMAGING, CHINO, CA; ENVISION, PALM DESERT, CA; ENVISION, IRVING, TEXAS; ENVISION, OMAHA NEBRASKA; JAMBA JUICE, CA; HENGKY SUALANG, CA; BEATRICE SUALANG, CA Defendants. CASE No. SACV16-01677JVS (KES) Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. James V. Selna - Courtroom 10C DEFENDANT CITY OF FONTANA’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(5) AND 12(b)(6), OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FRCP 8 AND 12(e); MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF PANCY LIN IN SUPPORT THEREOF; [PROPOSED] ORDER; EXHIBITS Date: January 23, 2017 Time: 1:30 p.m. Courtroom: 10C Trial Date: Not set Complaint filed: September 9, 2016 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 1 of 39 Page ID #:1343 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 23, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Courtroom 10C of the above-entitled Court, located at 411 West Fourth Street, Santa Ana, California, 92701, Defendant CITY OF FONTANA, erroneously sued herein as “Police Fontana, CA,” (“Fontana”), will, and hereby does, move this Court for an order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint or for a more definite statement. Fontana brings this Motion on each of the following grounds: 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal for insufficient service of process because Fontana never received an acknowledgement of receipt of service from Plaintiff. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(5); ATS Claim, LLC v. Epson (In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig.), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93448, at *7-8 (N.D.Cal. 2009) (“Although California state law allows for service of summons by mail, such service is only valid if a copy of the summons and complaint are accompanied by two copies of the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons.”); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30(a). 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to a motion for a more definite statement because it is so vague and ambiguous that Fontana cannot reasonably be required to frame an answer. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e); Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp., 491 F.Supp.1364, 1384 (N.D.Cal. 1980) (“If a party cannot reasonably be required to frame an answer because the complaint is too vague or ambiguous, he may move for a more definite statement before answering.”). 3. Plaintiff’s entire Complaint against Fontana is subject to dismissal for its failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”). Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 2 of 39 Page ID #:1344 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Defendant’s Motion is based on this Notice, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declaration of Pancy Lin, and Exhibits filed herewith, Plaintiff’s Complaint and Proof of Service, and upon such other and further matters as may properly come before the Court. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, Defense counsel initiated the meet-and-confer process with Plaintiff through emailed correspondence dated December 2, 2016 and December 5, 2016, regarding Plaintiff’s defective service of process. (See, Emails to Plaintiff dated December 2, 2016 and December 5, 2016, Exhibit “A”, Declaration of Pancy Lin (“Lin Decl.”), ¶ 2). On December 5, 2016, Defense counsel left a voicemail for Plaintiff in a further attempt to informally resolve the procedural issues with Plaintiff. (See, Lin Decl., ¶ 2). On December 14, 2016, Defense counsel sent a follow-up letter via email and mail to Plaintiff regarding its intent to file the instant Motion. (See, Letter to Plaintiff dated December 14, 2016, Exhibit “B”, Lin Decl. ¶3). Again on December 14, 2016, Defense counsel attempted to contact Plaintiff at the phone number he listed on the Proof of Service he filed with the Court. (See, Lin Decl. ¶ 3). As of the date of this filing, Defense counsel has not received any response from Plaintiff to Fontana’s multiple meet and confer efforts. (See, Lin Decl., ¶ 4). DATED: December 22, 2016 Respectfully submitted, LYNBERG & WATKINS A Professional Corporation By: /s/ Pancy Lin S. FRANK HARRELL PANCY LIN CHARIESE SOLORIO Attorneys for Defendant CITY OF FONTANA erroneously sued herein as “Police Fontana, CA” Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 3 of 39 Page ID #:1345 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS; TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TABLE OF CONTENTS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ............................................. 1 I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ....................................................................... 1 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS. ..................................................... 3 III. PLAINTIFF’S VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS COMPLAINT IS SUBJECT TO A MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT. ........ 4 IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS SUBJECT TO A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR ITS FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. ......................................................................... 7 A. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for “Abuse of Power” Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts Under a Cognizable Legal Theory. ................... 8 B. Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action for “RICO” Fails to Allege All Elements Required to Establish a Claim under RICO. ........................... 9 C. Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action for “Civil Rights Violation” Fails to State Any Viable Claim Against Fontana. ............................... 10 D. Plaintiff’s Eleventh Cause of Action for “Attempt and Conspiracy” Is Conclusory and Devoid of Specific Factual Allegations Required to Sustain a Claim Under Section 1349. ............ 11 E. Plaintiff’s Twenty-Third Cause of Action for “Equal Protection” Fails Because Plaintiff Has Not Established He Was Treated Differently Than Any Similarly Situated Person. ................................. 12 F. Plaintiff’s Twenty-Fourth Cause of Action for “Pattern and Practice” Should Be Dismissed for Its Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.................................................... 13 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 13 DECLARATION OF PANCY LIN ............................................................................ 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 4 of 39 Page ID #:1346 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS; TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Anderson v. District Board of Trustees, 77 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996) ....................... 6 Anderson v. District Board of Trustees, supra, 77 F.3d at 366-67 .............................. 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................................................................... 2, 7 ATS Claim, LLC v. Epson (In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig.), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93448 (N.D.Cal. 2009) .................................................................................. 2, 4 Ayala v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150045 (E.D.Cal. 2016) .................................................................................... 7 Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998)................................................ 12 Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2000) .................................. 6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................... 7 Buckley v. Gomez, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23433 (S.D.Cal. 1997) ......................... 11 Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... 6 Colen v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124879 (C.D.Cal. 2008) .................. 4 De Witt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966) ......................................................... 2, 6 Doan v. Singh, 617 F.App’x 684 (9th Cir. 2015) ........................................................ 9 Gustafson v. City of W. Richland, 559 F.App’x. 644 (9th Cir. 2014) ...................... 13 Langston v. 20/20 Cos., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151477 (C.D.Cal. 2014) ............. 3, 4 Lexington Ins. Co. v. Energetic Lath & Plaster, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27408 (E.D.Cal. 2016).................................................................................................. 5 Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern. Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) ............ 6 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) ...................................................... 5 McHenry v. Renne, supra, 84 F. 3d at 1176 ................................................................ 6 Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp., 491 F.Supp.1364 (N.D.Cal. 1980) ............................................................................................. 2, 4 Peterson v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 451 F.Supp.2d 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2006). ... 11 Rendon v. City of Fresno, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31623 (E.D.Cal. 2005) .............. 11 Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. Recontrust Co., NA, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18807 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................................ 10 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 5 of 39 Page ID #:1347 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS; TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Williby v. City of Oakland, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19737 (N.D.Cal. 2008) ........... 12 Wooten v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 649 F. App’x 394 (9th Cir. 2016) ....... 10 STATUTES 18 U.S.C. § 1962 .......................................................................................................... 9 18 U.S.C. § 241 .......................................................................................................... 10 18 U.S.C. § 242 .......................................................................................................... 10 18 U.S.C. § 248 .......................................................................................................... 10 18 U.S.C. Chapter 13 ................................................................................................. 10 22 U.S.C. § 2304 .......................................................................................................... 9 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(3) ............................................................................................ 9, 10 28 U.S.C. § 595 ...................................................................................................... 9, 10 42 U.S.C. § 14141 ............................................................................................ 8, 10, 13 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .............................................................................................. 9, 10, 11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................................................................. 10, 12 42 U.S.C. § 1985 .................................................................................................... 8, 10 42 U.S.C. § 9501 .......................................................................................................... 8 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30 ................................................................................. 2, 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) ............................................................................................... 2 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................. passim Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e) ................................................................................. 2, 4, 6, 13 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8 .................................................................................................. 2, 7 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 6 of 39 Page ID #:1348 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff Stevanus Edward (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se, filed the instant action against 29 defendants, including President Obama, the FBI, the NSA, various judges, doctors, lawyers, and hospitals, and Defendant CITY OF FONTANA, erroneously sued herein as “Police Fontana, CA,” (“Fontana”). Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of 62 pages of factual and legal text that Plaintiff apparently believes support his 30 purported causes of action, which range from “abuse of executive power” to “attempted murder” to “RICO” to “radical terror act.” (See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 87, 158, 169, and 268). Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, contains “unintelligible and nonsensical allegations and claims” and appears to be “legally and/or factually patently frivolous.” (See, Order dated June 24, 2016, by United States District Judge Jesus G. Bernal dismissing a nearly identical lawsuit filed by this same Plaintiff, Lin Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. “C”). Indeed, Plaintiff’s claims are so jumbled to such an intolerable degree, that Fontana and this Court are required to guess at the facts and claims being alleged. As best as Fontana can tell from the chaotic nature of Plaintiff’s Complaint, it appears that with respect to Fontana, Plaintiff takes issue with Fontana police officers’ alleged refusal “to provide a police report” and “to investigate the incidents.” 1 (See, Complaint ¶ 56). Yet, confusingly, Plaintiff then proceeds to identify two police reports taken by Fontana police officers. (See, Complaint ¶ 56, wherein Plaintiff identifies “Police report #14-1006494,” and “Police report incidents #101104914.”). Frankly, Fontana is hard-pressed to decipher what exactly Plaintiff is claiming it did or did not do. 1 By “incidents” it seems Plaintiff is referring to an incident that allegedly occurred at a Jamba Juice in Sierra Lake, Fontana, where Plaintiff found “triangle broken glasses design like a knife inside [his] drink.” (See, Complaint ¶¶ 55-56). Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 7 of 39 Page ID #:1349 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Fontana’s understanding of Plaintiff’s claims is severely limited by the convoluted, vague, and ambiguous nature of Plaintiff’s allegations. Where, like here, a party cannot intelligently determine the nature of the allegations it faces, a Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement lies. See, Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp., 491 F.Supp.1364, 1384 (N.D.Cal. 1980) (“If a party cannot reasonably be required to frame an answer because the complaint is too vague or ambiguous, he may move for a more definite statement before answering.”); De Witt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 1966) (A Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is proper where a complaint fails “to set forth the claim by means of a short and plain statement, as required by Rule 8(a) (2).”). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims levied against Fontana are subject to a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). The allegations pleaded against Fontana are full of impermissible conclusory statements, are scattered with inapplicable statutory provisions, and are devoid of the requisite “short and plain statement” required by Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8. Accordingly, dismissal is warranted. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Finally, apart from the glaring substantive issues, Plaintiff’s Proof of Service of Summons presents procedural defects that subject his Complaint to dismissal. Specifically, according to the Proof of Service of Summons, Plaintiff served a copy of his Summons and Complaint on Fontana “by mail and acknowledgment of receipt of service.” (See, Proof of Service of Summons, dated November 2, 2016, Lin Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. “D”). Fontana has not, however, received any acknowledgment of receipt of service from Plaintiff. (See, Lin Decl. ¶ 6). Because Plaintiff has not properly effected service on Fontana, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal for insufficient service of process. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(5); ATS Claim, LLC v. Epson (In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig.), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93448, at *7-8 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 8 of 39 Page ID #:1350 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES (N.D.Cal. 2009) (“Although California state law allows for service of summons by mail, such service is only valid if a copy of the summons and complaint are accompanied by two copies of the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons.”); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30(a). In short, Plaintiff’s attempted Complaint is riddled with defects. Accordingly, as set forth in further detail below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or for a More Definite Statement should be granted as prayed. II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS. According to the “Proof of Service” filed by Plaintiff on November 3, 2016, service of the summons, complaint, and “Scheduling Conference” documents were delivered to “Police Fontana, CA Chief Rodney Jones” via “mail and acknowledgment of receipt of service” on “01/2/2016.” (See, Proof of Service, Docket 46, filed on November 3, 2016, Lin Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. D). As noted in the docket entry by the clerk, however, the date written on the Proof of Service appears to be a clerical error. (See, Docket Entry 46) (“Due to a clerical error from Postarena, the incorrect date of 1/2/2016 was written down. The correct date should be 11/2/2016.”) Compounding this error is the portion of Plaintiff’s Proof of Service that indicates Fontana was served “by mail and acknowledgment of receipt of service.” (Proof of Service, Docket 46, filed on November 3, 2016, Exh. D). “In California, ‘service by mail’ is governed by California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.30, which requires that a summons be accompanied by two copies of a ‘notice and acknowledgment’ of receipt.” Langston v. 20/20 Cos., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151477, at *6 (C.D.Cal. 2014). According to Section 415.30, service of a summons “is deemed complete on the date a written acknowledgement of receipt of summons is executed, if such acknowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30(c). Accordingly, “service by mail is not complete until the Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 9 of 39 Page ID #:1351 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES recipient signs the acknowledgment of receipt and thereafter returns it to the sender.” Langston v. 20/20 Cos., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151477, at *7; see, Colen v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124879, at *6-7 (C.D.Cal. 2008) (“merely mailing copies of the amended summons and the FAC to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the University of California Board of Regents did not constitute the effectuation of proper service on either of those defendants.”) Here, Fontana never received an acknowledgement of receipt and service from Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s attempted service on Fontana was ineffective, and a motion to dismiss lies. See, ATS Claim, LLC v. Epson (In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig.), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93448, at *7-8 (N.D.Cal. 2009) (“Although California state law allows for service of summons by mail, such service is only valid if a copy of the summons and complaint are accompanied by two copies of the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30. Defendants contend, and plaintiff does not dispute, that plaintiff did not provide defendants with copies of the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons. Since plaintiff’s service by certified mail does not satisfy Rule 4(h)(1)(B) or California service rules, it has not effected service on these domestic defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process with leave to properly serve defendants within 30 days of the filing of this order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).”). Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for insufficient service of process and order that Plaintiff properly effect service on Fontana in accordance with the rules set forth above. III. PLAINTIFF’S VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED. Where a complaint is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame an answer, the party may move for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e) before answering. See, Nelson v. Quimby Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 10 of 39 Page ID #:1352 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp., 491 F.Supp.1364, 1384 (N.D.Cal. 1980); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Energetic Lath & Plaster, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27408, at *5 (E.D.Cal. 2016) (“The rule permits a party to move for a more definite statement when a pleading ‘is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.’”). Here, Plaintiff has filled his Complaint with vague and ambiguous allegations such that Fontana is unable to decipher what exactly Plaintiff is claiming it did. For example, Plaintiff takes issue with Fontana police officers’ alleged refusal “to provide a police report” and “to investigate the incidents.” (See, Complaint ¶ 56). Yet, confusingly, Plaintiff then proceeds to identify two police reports taken by Fontana police officers. (See, Complaint ¶ 56, wherein Plaintiff identifies “Police report #14-1006494,” and “Police report incidents #101104914.”). Then, Plaintiff states that on November 11, 2010, he “could get Police report in Fontana, CA, about the incident harassing phone calling from My wife friends and the officer handled by called My wife friends also leave message to her friends. Officer gave us Police report incidents #101104914.” (See, Complaint ¶ 56). The ambiguous, and frankly unintelligible, allegations levied against Fontana have left it struggling to decipher what exactly Plaintiff claims it did or did not do. Exacerbating the confusion is Plaintiff’s “chain letter” pleading whereby Plaintiff attempts to “incorporate” preceding paragraphs into each new claim. (See, Complaint ¶¶ 82, 91,102, 113, 128, 139, 150, 159, 170, 188, 201, 207, 214, 222, 230, 240, 245, 251, 257, 261, 269, 281, 291, 299, 307, 316, 322, 333, 343). By the end of the Complaint, Plaintiff has “incorporated” 342 paragraphs of text spanning over 57 pages that reference 30 independent claims (each of which has its own pleading standards to be satisfied, and all of which raise doubt as to who Plaintiff attempts to sue for what). This shotgun style of pleading violates the rules that require a complaint to clearly set forth who is suing whom, for what relief, and on what theory, and with enough detail to guide discovery. McHenry v. Renne, 84 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 11 of 39 Page ID #:1353 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). In such circumstances, no defendant can intelligently determine the nature of the allegations s/he/it faces, and a Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement lies. See, De Witt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 1966) (A Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is proper where a complaint fails “to set forth the claim by means of a short and plain statement, as required by Rule 8(a) (2).”); Anderson v. District Board of Trustees, 77 F.3d 364, 366-367 (11th Cir. 1996) (a “more definite statement, if properly drawn, will present each claim for relief in a separate count,…and with such clarity and precision that the defendant will be able to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading.”); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128, n. 100 (11th Cir. 2001) (“To say that the allegations of the complaint were vague and ambiguous-leaving the reader to guess at precisely what the plaintiff was claiming-is an understatement.”); McHenry v. Renne, supra, 84 F. 3d at 1176 (affirming dismissal where “no attempt is made to match up the specific factual allegations and the specific legal claims to a specific defendant.”); Anderson v. District Board of Trustees, supra, 77 F.3d at 366- 67 (rejecting a plaintiff’s “reincorporation” complaint as impermissibly confusing under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e)). Thankfully, federal pleading rules do not require Fontana to guess at the meaning of Plaintiff’s garbled pleading. Plaintiff is required to provide Fontana with fair notice of each claim against it, and he should be ordered to set forth “a short and plain statement” in support of his claims so that clarity is maintained. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8; Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern. Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986); Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840-841 (9th Cir. 2000). / / / / / / / / / Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 12 of 39 Page ID #:1354 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS SUBJECT TO A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR ITS FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. Even if any sense could be made out of Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff’s Complaint is still subject to a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that he has failed to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, and a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(1) and (2). While Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does “demand[ ] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint that sets forth “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or tenders “’naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” does not meet the pleading standards required by Rule 8 and “will not do.” Id. A plaintiff cannot “plead facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” as “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id.; see, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (internal citations omitted). Thus, a Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will lie when there is a “failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must set forth factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Ayala v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150045, at *5 (E.D.Cal. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has merely pleaded vague and conclusory allegations that Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 13 of 39 Page ID #:1355 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES violate the foregoing principles clearly established by the Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s Complaint is full of “labels and conclusions” and “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” such that dismissal is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Specifically, Plaintiff has asserted six causes of action against Fontana. (See, Plaintiff’s Third, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Fourth Causes of Action). Plaintiff’s causes of action are full of impermissible conclusory statements and are scattered with inapplicable statutory provisions, none of which allege a cognizable legal theory. Nor do Plaintiff’s claims against Fontana set forth sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Notably, Fontana is only vaguely mentioned once within the body of those six causes of action, i.e. in the Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff states “Defendant violated Plaintiff rights by blocking to attempt report at Police Department & FBI.” (See, Complaint ¶ 105). Accordingly, as set forth herein, and in further detail below, Plaintiff’s claims against Fontana must be dismissed. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). A. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for “Abuse of Power” Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts Under a Cognizable Legal Theory. Taking each of Plaintiff’s claims against Fontana in serial order, Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for “abuse of power” fails to allege sufficient facts to support his claim that Fontana “abuse[d] [its] power,” nor does he establish how Fontana allegedly violated the numerous statutes listed within the Third Cause of Action. Instead of clearly identifying an applicable statutory basis for “abuse of power,” the Third Cause of Action sets forth the following inapplicable, or insufficiently- pleaded, statutory provisions: 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (enables the United States Attorney General to bring a civil action), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (in order to bring a claim under Section 1985, a party must allege specific facts to support a conspiracy claim, which Plaintiff has not done), 42 U.S.C. § 9501 (this statute “contains only hortatory language and thus creates no substantive federal rights that are enforceable under 42 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 14 of 39 Page ID #:1356 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES U.S.C.S. § 9501”), 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(3) (refers to “submission of information in response to Congressional request”), 28 U.S.C. § 595 (refers to congressional oversight), 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (refers to human rights and security assistance in the context of foreign policy), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (to establish a violation of Section 1962, Plaintiff must allege either an agreement that is a substantive violation of RICO or that the defendant agreed to commit a violation of two predicate offenses, neither of which Plaintiff has done), and “Equal Protection” (Plaintiff fails to plead facts alleging he was treated differently than any similarly situated person). Plaintiff has simply set forth “labels and conclusions” devoid of factual enhancement, making it impossible for Fontana to know exactly what it did to Plaintiff in “abuse [of its] power.” B. Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action for “RICO” Fails to Allege All Elements Required to Establish a Claim under RICO. Next, Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action for “Racketeer Organized Crime Enterprise and RICO” alleged against “All Defendants,” is likewise vulnerable to dismissal. To establish a claim under the civil RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c): [A] plaintiff must allege ‘(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” “In addition, the conduct must be (5) the proximate cause of harm to the victim.” A “’pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). “’[R]acketeering activity; is any act indictable under several provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code . . . . Doan v. Singh, 617 F.App’x 684, 685 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). Nowhere in the Ninth Cause of Action does Plaintiff allege the elements required to establish a claim under RICO. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to establish how, if at all, Fontana has engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Instead, Plaintiff conclusively states “[a]ll Defendants violated Plaintiff rights by conspiring against Plaintiff rights under the U.S. Constitution First amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” (See, Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 15 of 39 Page ID #:1357 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Complaint ¶ 160). This conclusory allegation devoid of further factual enhancement requires dismissal of this Ninth Cause of Action. Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. Recontrust Co., NA, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18807, at *1 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Despite being given several opportunities to amend her complaint, Ho’s allegations regarding a RICO enterprise were consistently conclusory and implausible. She never explained what the alleged enterprise was or how it was distinct from the individual defendants. Thus, Ho’s RICO claim must fail.”); Wooten v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 649 F. App’x 394, 394 (9th Cir. 2016) (Affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s RICO claim because he “failed to allege with sufficient particularity a pattern of racketeering activity.”). C. Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action for “Civil Rights Violation” Fails to State Any Viable Claim Against Fontana. Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action for some alleged “Civil Rights Violation” fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In an apparent attempt to establish a claim for “Civil Rights Violation,” Plaintiff inserts the following inapplicable and/or insufficiently pleaded statutory provisions: 18 U.S.C. Chapter 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 242, and 248, “U.S.C. section 1981,” “U.S. section 248,” “section 1985,” “section 1986,” “U.S. Constitution Title 42 section 1997f,” “28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(3),” “Title U.S.C. section 595,” “U.S.C. § 371,” and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (See, Complaint, ¶¶ 172-179, 184). Even if these statutes applied to Fontana, Plaintiff’s claim for “Civil Rights Violation” is devoid of any specific facts as to what, if anything, Fontana did that actually resulted in Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injuries. (See, Complaint ¶¶ 170-187). Instead, Plaintiff merely pleads vague and conclusory allegations that violate principles clearly established by the Supreme Court. For example, Plaintiff alleges “[a]ll Defendant” violated his rights under “U.S.C. section 1981.” (See, Complaint ¶ 172). To establish a claim under Section 1981, “a plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 16 of 39 Page ID #:1358 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES intended to discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., the right to make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence, etc.).” Peterson v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 451 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Fontana intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges “[a]ll Defendant violated [his] rights by knowing to broke the law under the U.S.C. section 1981.” (See, Complaint ¶ 172). This conclusory allegation, like the others that fill his Tenth Cause of Action, fails to specify how Fontana violated Plaintiff’s civil rights, and accordingly, should be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). D. Plaintiff’s Eleventh Cause of Action for “Attempt and Conspiracy” Is Conclusory and Devoid of Specific Factual Allegations Required to Sustain a Claim Under Section 1349. Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for “attempt and conspiracy” against all Defendants is likewise subject to a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for its failure to allege specific facts under a cognizable legal theory. There is a heightened pleading standard required of plaintiffs who set forth claims of conspiracy. “To recover under a conspiracy theory, plaintiff’s complaint must contain specific factual allegations to support a theory of conspiracy. Where a complaint contains merely conclusory, vague, or general allegations of a conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights, it must be dismissed.” Buckley v. Gomez, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23433, at *11 (S.D.Cal. 1997) (internal citations omitted); see also, Rendon v. City of Fresno, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31623, 15, 16 (E.D.Cal. 2005) (“conspiracy claims are subject to a heightened pleading standard in the Ninth Circuit. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging the existence of a conspiracy must meet a standard that is more demanding than that set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).”) (citations omitted). Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 17 of 39 Page ID #:1359 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Here, Plaintiff alleges “[a]ll Defendant violated Plaintiff rights by conspiring to attempts to destroy Plaintiff health, financial, life, freedom, liberty and justice,” without providing specific facts regarding what Fontana did. (See, Complaint ¶ 189). He conclusively states that all Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 1349 without providing specific factual allegations required to sustain a claim for “attempt and conspiracy.” (See, Complaint ¶ 190). Like the preceding causes of action, Fontana is not specifically mentioned in this section at all, making it impossible for Fontana to determine what actions, if any, constitute “attempt and conspiracy.” Accordingly, this cause of action should likewise be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). E. Plaintiff’s Twenty-Third Cause of Action for “Equal Protection” Fails Because Plaintiff Has Not Established He Was Treated Differently Than Any Similarly Situated Person. Plaintiff’s Twenty-Third Cause of Action brought pursuant to Section 1983, fails to plead facts alleging he was treated differently than any similarly situated person. “To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause “‘a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’” Williby v. City of Oakland, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19737, at *13 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also, Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.”). Here, even assuming Plaintiff is part of a “protected class,” he has not made any allegation that Fontana intentionally discriminated against him or that they treated him differently than a similarly situated person. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory, and his claim for Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 18 of 39 Page ID #:1360 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES “Equal Protection” should be dismissed. F. Plaintiff’s Twenty-Fourth Cause of Action for “Pattern and Practice” Should Be Dismissed for Its Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted. Plaintiff’s Twenty-Fourth Cause of Action for “Pattern and Practice” is apparently brought under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (See, Complaint ¶ 292). As stated herein, Section 14141, enables the United States Attorney General, not a private party plaintiff, to bring a civil action. See, 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b); see also, Gustafson v. City of W. Richland, 559 F.App’x. 644, 645 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The district court properly granted summary judgment on Gustafson’s 42 U.S.C. § 14141 claim because the statute only provides for civil actions brought by the United States Attorney General.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and this claim should be dismissed accordingly. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, Fontana respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiff Stevanus Edward’s Complaint or, alternatively, order Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement of his claims against Fontana. See, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) and (e). DATED: December 22, 2016 Respectfully submitted, LYNBERG & WATKINS A Professional Corporation By: /s/ Pancy Lin S. FRANK HARRELL PANCY LIN CHARIESE SOLORIO Attorneys for Defendant CITY OF FONTANA erroneously sued herein as “Police Fontana, CA” Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 19 of 39 Page ID #:1361 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 DECLARATION OF PANCY LIN DECLARATION OF PANCY LIN I, Pancy Lin, do declare as follows: 1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before this Court and am a partner in the Law Firm of Lynberg & Watkins, a Professional Corporation, specially appearing for City of Fontana on behalf of “Police Fontana, CA.” I have personal knowledge of the following facts and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto. 2. In an effort to informally resolve the aforementioned procedural defects related to Plaintiff’s Proof of Service of Summons, Defense Counsel attempted to contact Plaintiff through the following email addresses, which Plaintiff listed on his Complaint: Elshaddaipsalm23@gmail.com, Stg2810@yahoo.com, and Exodus1414faith@gmail.com. Defense counsel also found an additional email for Plaintiff from a public records search, and also attempted to contact Plaintiff at that email: stevanus_edward@animail.com. Attached collectively hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the email correspondence sent to Plaintiff on December 2, 2016, and December 5, 2016. Defense counsel also further attempted to contact Plaintiff at the phone number he listed on the Proof of Service he filed with the Court. 3. As is required by Local Rule 7-3, in an attempt to informally resolve the issues addressed within this Motion, Defense counsel attempted to contact Plaintiff via email and mail. Attached collectively hereto as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of the email correspondence and letter sent to Plaintiff on December 14, 2016. Defense counsel also further attempted to contact Plaintiff at the phone number he listed on the Proof of Service he filed with the Court. 4. As of the date of this Motion, Plaintiff has not responded to any of Defense Counsel’s attempts at contacting him. Neither has Plaintiff indicated whether he will oppose the instant Motion. 5. On September 9, 2016, Plaintiff Stevanus Edward, appearing pro se, Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 20 of 39 Page ID #:1362 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 DECLARATION OF PANCY LIN filed the instant action in which he purports to sue 29 defendants, including President Obama, the FBI, the NSA, and various judges, doctors, lawyers, and hospitals. Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of 62 pages of factual and legal text that Plaintiff apparently believes support his 30 purported causes of action. Almost the exact same complaint filed by the same Plaintiff was dismissed by United States District Judge Jesus G. Bernal on June 24, 2016, because it contained “unintelligible and nonsensical allegations and claims,” rendering “Plaintiff’s action [] legally and/or factually patently frivolous.” Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Judge Bernal’s Order. 6. Like his Complaint, Plaintiff’s “Proof of Service” is indecipherable. According to the Proof of Service of Summons, Plaintiff served a copy of his Summons and Complaint on Fontana “by mail and acknowledgment of receipt of service” on or around November 2, 2016. Fontana has not, however, received an acknowledgment of receipt of service. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Proof of Service of Summons, Docket 46, filed on November 3, 2016. I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States, that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was made and executed this 22nd day of December 2016, in Orange, California. By: /s/ Pancy Lin PANCY LIN Declarant Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 21 of 39 Page ID #:1363 A Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 22 of 39 Page ID #:1364 Chariese Solorio From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Chariese Solorio Friday, December 2, 2016 10:23 AM 'elshaddaipsalm23@gmail.com'; 'stg2810@yahoo.com'; 'exodus1414faith@gmail.com' Shelton Harrell; Pancy Lin; Susan Susebach; Isabella Rivera Stevanus Edward v. President Obama, D.C., et al. - Ex Parte Application Dear Mr. Edward: My name is Chariese Solorio, and I am one of the attorneys representing the City of Fontana, erroneously sued as "Police Fontana, CA," in the matter Stevanus Edward v. President Obama. D.C., et aI., Case No. SACV16-01677JVS(KESX), which you filed in federal district court on September 9,2016. Our office is in receipt of your Proof of Service, Summons, and Complaint, which was apparently served on our client. I am reaching out to you because there is some confusion as to when our client was served. For this reason, our office will be filing an ex parte application requesting additional time to respond to your Complaint. We will be hand serving you a copy of the Ex Parte Application. Once you have been hand served a copy of the Ex Parte Application, your opposition, if any, must be filed within 24 hours. Please let us know, however, if you are in agreement with our Ex Parte Application. If you are in agreement, you do not need to file an opposition, and we will advise the court of your agreement. Please contact me either by reply email or at the telephone number below as soon as possible so that we may resolve these issues in a timely manner. Sincerely, Chariese R. Solorio Lynberg & Watkins A Professional Corporation 1100 Town & Country Road, Suite 1450 Orange, CA 92868 (714) 937-1010 (714) 937-1003 FAX ************************************************************** The information transmitted is intended only for the person(s) or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged material. Delivery of this message to any person other than the intended recipient(s) is not intended in any way to waive privilege or confidentiality. Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you receive this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 23 of 39 Page ID #:1365 Chariese Solorio From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Chariese Solorio Monday, December 5, 2016 11:06 AM 'stevanus_edward@animail.com' Shelton Harrell; Pancy Lin; Susan Susebach Stevanus Edward v. President Obama, D.C., et al. - Ex Parte Application Dear Mr. Edward: My name is Chariese Solorio, and I am one of the attorneys representing the City of Fontana, erroneously sued as "Police Fontana, CA," in the matter Stevanus Edward v. President Obama, D.C., et aI., Case No. SACV16-01677JVS(KESX), which you filed in federal district court on September 9,2016. Our office is in receipt of your Proof of Service, Summons, and Complaint, which was apparently served on our client. I am reaching out to you because there is some confusion as to when our client was served. For this reason, our office will be filing an ex parte application requesting additional time to respond to your Complaint. We will be hand serving you a copy of the Ex Parte Application. Once you have been hand served a copy of the Ex Parte Application, your opposition, if any, must be filed within 24 hours. Please let us know, however, if you are in agreement with our Ex Parte Application. If you are in agreement, you do not need to file an opposition, and we will advise the court of your agreement. Please contact me either by reply email or at the telephone number below as soon as possible so that we may resolve these issues in a timely manner. Sincerely, Chariese R. Solorio Lynberg & Watkins A Professional Corporation 1100 Town & Country Road, Suite 1450 Orange, CA 92868 (714) 937-1010 (714) 937-1003 FAX ************************************************************** The information transmitted is intended only for the person(s) or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged material. Delivery of this message to any person other than the intended recipient(s) is not intended in any way to waive privilege or confidentiality. Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you receive this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 24 of 39 Page ID #:1366 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 25 of 39 Page ID #:1367 Chariese Solorio From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Attachments: Susan Susebach Wednesday, December 14, 2016 12:16 PM Elshaddaipsalm23@gmail.com; Stg2810@yahoo.com; Exodus1414faith@gmail.com Shelton Harrell; Pancy Lin; Chariese Solorio Edwards v. President Obama et al 001 Edward Rule 7-3 Ltr re Complaint 12-14-16.pdf Dear Mr. Edward: Attached please find correspondence prepared in connection with the above referenced matter. Please advise if you have difficulties receiving/opening the attachment. Please be further advised that a hard copy of the attached correspondence has also been forwarded to you via US Mail. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Susan M. Susebach Assistant to Philip H. Lo, Esq. Nicole M. Charney, Esq. Jesse K. Cox, Esq. LYNBERG& WATKINS 1010 Town & Country Rd., Suite 1450 Orange, CA 92868 714/937-1010 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 26 of 39 Page ID #:1368 Los Angeles 1150 S. Olive Street Eighteenth Floor Los Angeles, California 90015 Tel 213'624-8700 Fax 213'892'2763 Orange County 1100 Town & Country Road, Suite 1450 Orange, California 92868 Tel 714'937'1010 Fax 714'937·1003 LYNBERG ~WAT INS ATTORNEYS AT LAW Reply to: Orange A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION December 14, 2016 BY EMAIL AND MAIL Elshaddaipsalin23@gl11ail.com Stg28 'I O@yahoo.com Exodus '1414fa ith@gmail.com Stevanus Edward 10808 Foothill Blvd. #160671 Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 Re: Edward v. President Obama, et ale Date of Loss: Unknown Our File No.: 1307-0060 Dear Mr. Edward: This office represents the interests of Defendant City of Fontana, erroneously sued as "Police Fontana, CAli ("Fontana") in the above-captioned matter. In follow up to the emails our office sent you on December 2,2016 and December 5,2016, as well as the voicemail we left for you on December5,2016,this correspondence will serve as Fontana's further meet and confer attempt, pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, to informally resolve issues raised by your Complaint against Fontana, prior to Fontana filing a Motion to Dismiss your Complaint, as well as a Request for a More Definite Statement. I. Plaintiff's Complaint is Subject to Dismissal for Insufficient Service of Process. As an initial matter, service of Plaintiff's Summons and Complaint on Fontana is defective. Specifically, the Proof of Service of Summons is dated November 2, 2017. According to the Proof of Service of Summons, Plaintiff served a copy of his Summons and Complaint on Fontana "by mail and acknowledgement of receipt of service." Fontana did not receive a copy of the Proof of Service, Summons, and Complaint until on or around November 7, 2016. However, Fontana never received the acknowledgment of receipt of service. California law requires that a summons be accompanied by two copies of a notice of acknowledgement of receipt. See, California Code of Civil roc dure § 415.30(a). Indeed, service by mail is not complete until the recipient signs the acknowledgement of receipt and returns it to the sender. See, 9allfornia_Code of Civil Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 27 of 39 Page ID #:1369 Stevanus Edward Re: Edward v. President Obama, et at. December 14, 2016 Page 2 Proce ure § 415.30(c); Langston v. 20/20 Cos., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151477, at *7. A party's failure to comply with these service requirements hinders a defendant's ability to determine when their response is due and a Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismiss for insufficient service of process lies. See, ATS Claim. LLC v. EpsoniLn re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig.), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93448, at *7-8 (N.D.Cal. 2009) ("Although California state law allows for service of summons by mail, such service is only valid if a copy of the summons and complaint are accompanied by two copies of the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30. Defendants contend, and plaintiff does not dispute, that plaintiff did not provide defendants with copies of the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons. Since plaintiff's service by certified mail does not satisfy Rule 4(h)(1 )(8) or California service rules, it has not effected service on these domestic defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process with leave to properly serve defendants within 30 days of the filing of this order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)."). II. Plaintiff's Complaint is Subjectto a Motion for a More Definite Statement. Where a complaint is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame an answer, the party may move for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) before answering. See, Nelson v. ,Quimby Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities CorQ., 491 F.Supp.1364, 1384 (N.D.Cal. 1980); see also, Lexington Ins. Co. v. Energetic Lath & plaster, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27408, at *5 (E.D.Cal. 2016) ("The rule permits a party to move for a more definite statement when a pleading 'is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response."'). Here, Plaintiff has filled his Complaint with vague and ambiguous allegations such that Fontana is unable to decipher what exactly Plaintiff is claiming it did. Exacerbating the confusion is Plaintiff's "chain letter" pleading whereby Plaintiff attempts to "incorporate" preceding paragraphs into each new claim. (See, Complaint mT 82, 91,102,113,128,139,150,159,170,188,201,207,214, 222,230,240,245,251,257, 261, 269, 281, 291, 299, 307, 316, 322, 333, 343). By the end of the Complaint, Plaintiff has "incorporated" 342 paragraphs of text spanning over 57 pages that reference 30 independent claims (each of which has its own pleading standards to be satisfied, and all of which raise doubt as to who Plaintiff attempts to sue for what). This shotgun style of pleading violates the rules that require a complaint to clearly set forth who is suing whom, for what relief, and on what theory, and with enough detail to guide discovery. McHemyv.Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.1996). Ih such circumstances, no defendant can intelligently determine the nature of the allegations s/he/it faces, and a Fed. R. Clv. PrDC.12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement lies. See, Anderson v. District 0 rd f Trustees, 77 F.3d 364, 366-367 4835-1663-8397, v. 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 28 of 39 Page ID #:1370 Stevanus Edward Re: Edward v. President Obama, et a/. December 14, 2016 Page 3 (11th Cir. 1996) (a "more definite statement, if properly drawn, will present each claim for relief in a separate count, ... and with such clarity and precision that the defendant will be able to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading."); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128, n. 100 (11th Cir. 2001) (liTo say that the allegations of the complaint were vague and ambiguous-leaving the reader to guess at precisely what the plaintiff was claiming-is an understatement."); McHenry, supra, 84 F. 3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal where "no attempt is made to match up the specific factual allegations and the specific legal claims to a specific defendant."); Andersonv. District Board of Trustees, 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a plaintiff's "reincorporation" complaint as impermissibly confusing under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e)); see also, Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, C I. PI' c. Guide: Fed. Civil ProC. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2008), ,-r 9:354 (Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(e) implicated where "ambiguity arises in determining the nature of the claim or the parties against whom the claim is made ...."). Thankfully, federal pleading rules do not require Fontana to guess at the meaning of Plaintiff's vague pleading. Plaintiff is required to provide Fontana with fair notice of each claim against it, and he should set forth separate claims for relief alleged against each Defendant so that clarity is maintained. See, Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1482 (9th Gir. 1986); Bautista V. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840-841 (9th Cir. 2000). III. Plaintiff's Complaint [s Subject to a Motion to Dismiss for its FailUre to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. Next, Plaintiff's claims levied against Fontana are subject to a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the ground's for the court's jurisdiction and a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(1) and (2). While Rule 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations," it does "demand[ ] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawful1y-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft V. 19b I. 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009). A complaint that sets forth "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or tenders '''naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement''' does not meet the pleading standards required by Rule 8 and "will not do." 1Q" Here, Plaintiff has merely pled vague and conclusory allegations that violate principles clearly established by the Supreme Court. A plaintiff cannot "plead facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability," as "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice." Ashcroft v. !qbal 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009); see, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007) ("[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide tile 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 4835-1863-6397, V. 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 29 of 39 Page ID #:1371 Stevanus Edward Re: Edward v. President Obama, et al. December 14,2016 Page 4 elements of a cause of action will not do.") (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff's Complaint is full of "labels and conclusions" and '''naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement,'" and dismissal is appropriate. Fed. . Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Specifically, Plaintiff has asserted six causes of action against Defendant Fontana. (See, Plaintiff's Third, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twenty-Third, and Twenty- Fourth Causes of Action). Plaintiff's causes of action are full of impermissible conclusory statements and are scattered with inapplicable statutory provisions that warrant a motion to dismiss. For example, Plaintiff's Twenty-Fourth Cause of Action for "Pattern and Practice" is apparently brought under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (See, Complaint ~ 292). Section 14141, however, enables the United States Attorney General, not a private party plaintiff, to bring a civil action. See, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (b); see also, Gustafson v. City ofW. Richland, 559 F.App'x. 644, 645 (9th Cir. 2014) (liThe district court properly granted summary judgment on Gustafson's 42 U.S.C. § 14141 claim because the statute only provides for civil actions brought bv the United States AttomeV' Genera!.") (emphasis added). Additionally, Plaintiff's references to 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 595 in his Third Cause of Action for "Abuse of Power" are likewise off-base, as these sections refer to "submission of information in response to Congressional request" and "congressional oversight," respectively. Frankly, it is patently unclear how these statutes apply to Plaintiffs allegation that Fontana "abuse[d] [its] power." In essence, Plaintiff's claims alleged against Fontana are devoid of the requisite "short and plain statement" required by Rule 8 and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss is warranted. See, Fed. R Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), 12(e). IV. Plaihtiff's Punitive DamagesClatm Should 8e Stricken. Finally, Plaintiff's attempt to state a punitive damages claim against Fontana is similarly feckless. (See, Complaint, "Prayer for Relief," 59:8). As a matter of settled Supreme Court law, punitive damages awards are not permitted against public entity defendants. See, Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (Rejecting punitive damages awards against public entities under the civil rights laws given that "an award of punitive damages against a municipality 'punishes' only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort.") Accordingly, Plaintiff's defective punitive damages claims should be stricken without leave to amend. See, Fed. R. Civ. . 12(f); California ex. ReI. State Lands Com. v. United States! 512 F.Supp.36, 38 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (A "motion to strike will be well taken" where the motion "may have the effect of .. . streamlining the ultimate resolution of the action."). In further pursuit of our on-going meet and confer efforts regarding Plaintiff's Complaint, I will contact you this afternoon to discuss the foregoing. It is our hope that we can resolve these disputes informally by agreement and that Plaintiff will file a First 4835-1863-8397, v. 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 30 of 39 Page ID #:1372 Stevanus Edward Re: Edward v. President Obama, et a/. December 14, 2016 Page 5 Amended Complaint. In the event we are not able to reach such an agreement, Defendant Fontana will have no choice but to proceed with the appropriate Motion. Thank you for your anticipated attention to the foregoing. Your cooperation is appreciated. Very truly yours, CRS/sms cc: S. Frank Harrell, Esq. Pancy Lin, Esq. 4835-1863-8397, v. 1 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 31 of 39 Page ID #:1373 EX C Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 32 of 39 Page ID #:1374 JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PLAINTIFF(S) EDCV 16-1312-JGB (KK) STEVANUS EDWARD, CASE NUMBER v. PRESIDENT OBAMA, et al., ORDER RE REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS DEFENDANT(S) IT IS ORDERED that the Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is hereby GRANTED. Date United States Magistrate Judge IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis be DENIED for the following reason(s): D Inadequate showing of indigency [gJ Legally and/or factually patently frivolous D Other: D District Court lacks jurisdiction D Immunity as to _ Comments: See attachment. June 23, 2016 Date United States Magistrate Judge IT IS ORDERED that the Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is hereby: D GRANTED ~ Date fJ DISMISSED. ,REMANDED. June 24, 2016 CV-73 (01/15) ORDER RE REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 33 of 39 Page ID #:1375 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Case No. EDCV 16-1312-JGB(KK) Title: Stevanus Edward v. President Obama, et aI. ATTACHMENT TO ORDER RE: REQUEST TO PROCEED WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEES (CV-73) PlaintiffStevanus Edward ("Plaintiff"), has filed a request to proceed in fonna pauperis in connection with his pro se non-prisoner, non-civil rights action. ECF Docket No. ("Dkt.") 1, CompI. Plaintiff names twenty-three defendants ranging from President Obama to J amba Juice, the NSA to HOAG Newport Hospital, and the Workers Compensation Board to Envision. Id. at 1. In the fifty-seven page complaint, Plaintiff's asserts thirty-three causes of action which include abuse of executive power, attempted murder, attorney misconduct, torture, harassment, and terror. ld.. Plaintiff's unintelligible and nonsensical allegations and claims include: • "President Obama abusing his executive power by using his power to help the insurance to do illegal action and provide government agents including FBI agency, NSA agency and Private military to spy, tracking also targeting Plaintiff with NSA Surveillance and other electronic device for 7 days/24 hours business conspiracy insurance." Dkt. 1, CompI. at 4. • "On May 26, 2014 Plaintiff tried to put all the incidents for attempted murder on Facebook but someone blocking Plaintiff Facebook for few days." Id. at 8. • "My Saviour Lord Jesus Christ the one give lives to fight NSA lucifer weapon." ld.. at 10. • "Plaintiff wife argue with her father about the white rice she cook already sweat and smell not good then she throwaway that rice but before that she asked her father if the still want to eat that rice, her father and her step sister Sarah not answer." Id, at 11. • President Obama, his administration, the FBI, and NSA spied on and harassed Plaintiff. Id. at 53. Plaintiff seeks various forms of relief, including declaratory relief" that the Mass Call Tracking violates the First and Fourth Amendments," thirty billion dollars in damages, past and future loss of income, and "Civil investigative demand under Title 18 U.S.c. § 1968." Id. at 57. Because Plaintiff's action is legally and/or factually patently frivolous, it is recommended that IFP status be DENIED. Page 1 of l CIVIL MINUTES-GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk_ Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 34 of 39 Page ID #:1376 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 35 of 39 Page ID #:1377 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 46 Filed 11/03/16 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:17Pbs-010 ATTORNEY OR PARTY WJTHOUT ATTORNEY rN~8, SIslo Bar (lumber, and lIddfIJSs): FOR COUffT USE ONLY S1tVANU5' e;DLJA~ '- 1010/6 rO>l~hii{ BLVP,SLlth.1bo611 • ('1 /(dneho t1.1CO"";~Cl) t'A ~11jl) -< tar ~ l ~ tr.""- ,. TELEPHONE NO.: 7' 11 551.,5 ir FAX NO. (Options/): <~,.-ir; :z: E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): :>Jc; C> AS:ATTORNEY FOR (Name): ,r-~ -< J! 'UNITeD 5TAns olsTlilcT C.O~T C.~1p..Al. DlS1PK1 c:l I rOf GA\.1 rofl.lJlA ~IF>;:;; t.,..,~ STREET ADDRESS: RoNALD ~Au1W ,I'I:/lI1l l./1~DINt.1 LV~· ~ f"1 MAlLiNGADDRESS: hl1 W. J1th gltt.el:, ;po 0;l:(i[lFi ::;.: ~~ ""1-J CITY AND ZIP CODE: SRN1'A ANA dA j'2.101 l") ., a;1>' , BRANCH NAME: r '5E CJ PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER: sr~ANU5 €l>WAflP CASE NUMBEll: ;.0 ....•...• DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT: poLlet FONTANA, fir 5Al!Vf6.0161r:JV5.K£S ReI. No. or File No.: PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS (Separate proof of service is required for each party served.) 1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this action. 2. I served copies of: a. ~ summons b. !){J complaint c. 0 Altemative Dispute Resolution (ADR) package d. 0 Civil Case Cover Sheet (served in complex cases only) e. 0 cross-complaint f. ~ other (specify documents): Sd,JttL,;t trJl1J{U,.,(.t 3. a. Party served (specify name of party as shown on documents served): PD~ICCFuNTnNfl,Ut thief '~Qdl'1~~J":rre5 b.D Person (other than the party In Item 3a) served on behalf of an entity or as an authorized agent (and not a person under item 5b on whom substituted service was made) (specify name and relationship to the party named in item 3a): 4. Address where the party was ,~rved: r~") IJP~AIJOP.Vflll'J~,f11NT/WAj CA ~1,.3~~ 5. I served the party (check proper box) a. 0 by personal service. I personally delivered the documents listed in item 2 to the party or person authorized to receive service of process for the party (1) on (date): (2) at (time): b. 0 by substituted service. On (date): at (time): I left the documents listed in item 2 with or in the presence of (name and title or relationship to person indicated in item 3): (1) D (business) a person at least 18 years of age apparently in charge at the office or usual place of business of the person to b,eserved. I infonned him or her of the general nature of the papers. , (home) a competent member of the household (at least 18 years of age) at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the party. I infonned him or her of the general nature of the papers. (physical address unknown) a person at least 18 years of age apparently In charge at the usual mailing address of the person to be served, other than a United States Postal Service post office box. I informed him or her of the general nature of the papers. I thereafter mailed (by first-class, postage prepaid) copies of the documents 10 the person to be served at the place where the copies were left (Code Civ. Proc., § 41j.20i' I mailed the documents on (date): from (city): or a declaration of mailing is attached. I attach a declaration of diligence stating actions taken first to attempt personal service. (2) D (3) D (4) D (5) D P-ue1of2 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judk:lal Council of California PDS-010 [Rev. January 1. 20071 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS Code 01 Civil Procedure. § 417.10 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 36 of 39 Page ID #:1378 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 46 Filed 11103/16 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:171 SACVl6.01611. JVS. K~S PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: S1GVAf'JUS E:DW/-l/tO roEFENDANTIRESPONDENT: potlCl. Flillt~<4"",tf, CASE NUMBER: 5. c. r:8J by mail and aCknowledgment of receipt of serVice. I mailed the documents lis1ed in item 2 to the party, to the address shown in item 4, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, (1) on (date): olh/~Jlb (2) from (city): £.di1c:J,O (:"('df'1(jtl;tl1 (3) 0 with two copies of the Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt and a postage-paid return envelope addressed to me. (Attach completed Notice and Acknowledgement of Receipt.) (Code Civ. Proc., §415.30.) (4) 0 to an address outside California with return receipt requested. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.40.) d. 0 by other means (specify means of service and authorizing code section): o Additional page describing service is attached. 6. The "Notice to the Person Served" (on the summons) was completed as follows: a. D as an individual defendant. b. D asfhe person sued under the fictitious name of (specify): c. 0 as occupant. d. 0 On behalf of (specify): under the following Code of Civil Procedure section: o 416.10 (corporation) o 416.20 (defunct corporation) o 416.30 Oointstock company/association) o 416.40 (association or partnership) o 416.50 (public entity) o 415.95 (business organization, fonn unknown) 0416.60 (minor) D 416.70 (ward or conservatee) o 416.90 (authorized person) o 415.46 (occupant) o other: 7. Person who served papers a. Name: b. Address: c. Telephone number: d. The fee for service was: $ e. lam: (1)8 not a registered CalifornIa process server. (2) exempt from reglstrallon under Business and Professions Code section 22350(b). (3) a registered California process server: (I) 0 owner 0 employee 0 independent contractor. (ii) Registration No.: (iii) County: POSTARENA 7349 MfJllkanAva. '140 Rancho Cucamonga Ca. 91730 8. If1 Ideclare under penalty of peljury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 9. D or Iam a California sheriff or marshal and Icertify that the foregoing is true and correct. )/lO'L-~LA (0Date: (NAME OF PERSON WHO SERVED PAPERSISHERIFF OR MARSHAL) (SIGNATURE) POS-010 !Rev. JIlIIU8I)I 1. 2007] PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS Pall- 2 of 2 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 37 of 39 Page ID #:1379 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case Name: Edward v. President Obama, et al. Case No.: SACV16-01677JVS (KES) i PROOF OF SERVICE PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 1100 Town & Country Rd., Suite 1450, Orange, California 92868. On December 22, 2016, I served the foregoing document(s) described as DEFENDANT CITY OF FONTANA’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(5) AND 12(b)(6), OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FRCP 8 AND 12(e); MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF PANCY LIN IN SUPPORT THEREOF; [PROPOSED] ORDER; EXHIBITS on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: Stevanus Edward 10808 Foothill Blvd. Suite 160671 Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 Plaintiff in Pro Se E-Mail STEVANUS_EDWARD@ANIMAIL.COM Elshaddaipsalm23@gmail.com Stg2810@yahoo.com Exodus1414faith@gmail.com BY MAIL: As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, I deposited such envelope in the mail at Orange, California. BY E-SERVE: The above listed document(s) were electronically served via the USDC Central District’s CM/ECF system and the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) indicates the registered party and/or attorney were served with the above documents. BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I caused all of the pages of the above-entitled document to be sent to the recipient(s) noted at the respective email address(es) indicated. BY FACSIMILE: I caused all of the pages of the above-entitled document to be sent to the recipient(s) noted via facsimile at the respective telephone numbers indicated above. Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 38 of 39 Page ID #:1380 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 2 - [TITLE/CAPTION] 4815-9104-4671, v. 1 BY FEDERAL EXPRESS/OVERNIGHT MAIL: I caused the above- described document to be served on the interested parties noted as follows by Federal Express/Overnight Mail. BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the office(s) of the addressee via messenger. I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. Executed on December 22, 2016, at Orange, California. /s/ Pia Boreto-Mosh PIA BORETO-MOSH Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114 Filed 12/22/16 Page 39 of 39 Page ID #:1381 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 [PROPOSED] ORDER S. FRANK HARRELL - SBN 133437 sharrell@lynberg.com PANCY LIN - SBN 239684 plin@lynberg.com CHARIESE R. SOLORIO csolorio@lynberg.com LYNBERG & WATKINS A Professional Corporation 1100 Town & Country Road, Suite 1450 Orange, California 92868 (714) 937-1010 Telephone (714) 937-1003 Facsimile Attorneys for Defendant CITY OF FONTANA, erroneously sued herein as “Police Fontana, CA” UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA STEVANUS EDWARD, Plaintiff, vs. PRESIDENT OBAMA, D.C.; OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, D.C.; FBI AGENCY, D.C.; NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, D.C.; NSA AGENCY, M.D.; ATTORNEY GENERAL CALIFORNIA; JUDGE CATHERINE COUTTS, CA; POLICE FONTANA, CA; WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD; DOCTORS DAVID WOOD, M.D., CA; LWP CLAIM SACRAMENTO, CA; U.S. FIRE INSURANCE, CA; ATTORNEY TELLERIA & LEVY, CA; ATTORNEY RMKB, CA; ARROWHEAD HOSPITAL, CA; HOAG NEWPORT HOSPITAL, CA; BAPTIST HOSPITAL, TEXAS; PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL, WA; HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, CA; GROVE IMAGING, CA; DMG IMAGING, SAN GABRIEL, CA; DMG, MONTEREY PARK, CA; SPECTRUM IMAGING, CHINO, CA; ENVISION, PALM DESERT, CA; ENVISION, IRVING, TEXAS; ENVISION, OMAHA NEBRASKA; JAMBA JUICE, CA; HENGKY SUALANG, CA; BEATRICE SUALANG, CA Defendants. CASE No. SACV16-01677JVS (KES) Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. James V. Selna - Courtroom 10C [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CITY OF FONTANA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(5) AND 12(b)(6), OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FRCP 8 AND 12(e) Date: January 23, 2017 Time: 1:30 p.m. Courtroom: 10C Trial Date: Not set Complaint filed: September 9, 2016 Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114-1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:1382 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 [PROPOSED] ORDER [PROPOSED] ORDER Defendant CITY OF FONTANA’s (erroneously sued herein as “Police Fontana, CA”)(“Fontana”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), or for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) came on for hearing before this Court on January 23, 2017. Having considered the Motion, any opposition thereto, and any reply in support thereof, and the arguments of counsel, this Court finds that the Motion should be GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint as to Fontana is dismissed, and Plaintiff is ordered to properly effect service on Fontana in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or (2) Plaintiff’s complaint as to Fontana is dismissed, and Plaintiff is ordered to provide a more definite statement; or (3) Plaintiff’s complaint as to Fontana is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: By: HON. JAMES V. SELNA United States District Court Case 8:16-cv-01677-JVS-KES Document 114-1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:1383