49 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 236,142 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 216,254 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
475 U.S. 574 (1986) Cited 113,092 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that, on summary judgment, antitrust plaintiffs "must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed" them
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 52,185 times 95 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,256 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 19,944 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Austin v. City County of Honolulu
488 U.S. 852 (1988) Cited 367 times
Holding that the plaintiff could not recover unless it established that the defendant's actions were motivated by malice toward the plaintiff rather than by the presence of its own economic interests
Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc.
47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995) Cited 933 times
Holding "that an employer cannot be held liable under the ADA for firing an employee when it indisputably had no knowledge of the disability"
Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory
407 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2005) Cited 568 times
Holding that exclusion of expert was appropriate sanction for failure to comply with Rule 26(C) where sanctioned party "failed to offer any explanation as to why he did not make the report available failed to offer any argument as to why his failure . . . should be considered harmless"
Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago
282 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2002) Cited 532 times
Holding that the plaintiff's allegations that her supervisor twice rubbed her back and stared at her chest during a uniform inspection while telling her to raise her arms and open her blazer were isolated incidents that, even when taken together, did not create a sufficient inference of a hostile work environment
Section 12111 - Definitions
42 U.S.C. § 12111 Cited 8,023 times 60 Legal Analyses
Adopting the definition of "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e for purposes of Title I of the ADA

Sharp, David v. Stoughton Trailers, Llc

49 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that, on summary judgment, antitrust plaintiffs "must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed" them

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that the plaintiff could not recover unless it established that the defendant's actions were motivated by malice toward the plaintiff rather than by the presence of its own economic interests

Holding "that an employer cannot be held liable under the ADA for firing an employee when it indisputably had no knowledge of the disability"

Holding that exclusion of expert was appropriate sanction for failure to comply with Rule 26(C) where sanctioned party "failed to offer any explanation as to why he did not make the report available failed to offer any argument as to why his failure . . . should be considered harmless"

Adopting the definition of "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e for purposes of Title I of the ADA