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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MELISSA SETTLEMYER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 11-150J
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
rv-
AND NOW, this ~F day of June, 2012, upon due consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to
plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for
supplemental security income ("SS1") under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment (Document No.9) be, and the same hereby is,
granted, and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment
(Document No. 13) be, and the same hereby is, denied. The case
will be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with this Memorandum Judgment Order pursuant to
sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
When the Commissioner determines that a claimant is not
"disabled" within the meaning of the Act, the findings leading to
such a conclusion must be based upon substantial evidence.
"Substantial evidence has been defined as 'more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
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might accept as adequate.'11 Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427
(3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) .
Despi te the deference to administrative decisions required by
this standard, reviewing courts '" retain a responsibility to
scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the
[Commissioner's] decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. II' Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000),
quoting, Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981). In
evaluating whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ's
findings, "'leniency [should] be shown in establishing the
claimant's disability, and ... the [Commissioner's] responsibility
to rebut it [should] be strictly construed. , /I Reefer v.
Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003), ~~==~, Dobrowolsky
v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979). These well-
established principles dictate that the court remand this case to
the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
Memorandum Judgment Order.
Plaintiff filed her application for SSI on April 24, 2008,
alleging disability beginning on October 1, 2005, due to bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia and stomach problems. Plaintiff's
application was denied. At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a
hearing on May 17, 2010. On June 23, 2010, the ALJ issued a
decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals
Council denied plaintiff's request for review on June 16, 2011,
making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
The instant action followed.
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Plaintiff, who has an eleventh grade education, was 36 years
old when the ALJ issued his decision and is classified as a
younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §416.963(c).
Plaintiff does not have any past relevant work experience, and she
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since
filing her application.
After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing
testimony from plaintiff at the hearing, the ALJ found that she
suffers from the severe impairments of a hiatal hernia, esophageal
ulcer erosive esophagitis, obesity, major depression, generalized
anxiety disorder and a partner relational problem. However, the
ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairments, either alone or in
combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the
listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart
P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 111).
The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional
capacity to perform medium work, but she is limited by certain
non-exertional limitations. Plaintiff is limited to simple,
routine, repetitive tasks that are not performed in a fast-paced
production environment. In addition, she requires work that
involves only simple work-related decisions, relatively few work
place changes, and work that involves primarily objects rather
than people. Finally, plaintiff is limited to only occasional
interaction with supervisors and no interaction with co-workers
and the general public (collectively, the "RFC Finding").
Based on testimony by a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded
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that plaintiff's vocational factors and residual functional
capacity permit her to perform work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as a scrap sorter,
industrial trash collector and equipment washer. Accordingly, the
ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the
Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (A). The
impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is
not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering
[her] age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy . " 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (B).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activi ty; (2)
if not, whether she has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether
her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from
performing her past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the
claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy, in light of her age, education, work experience and
residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (4). If the
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claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further
inquiry is unnecessary. Id.
Here, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision that she has
the residual functional capacity to perform work that exists in
the national economy on the following grounds: (1) substantial
evidence does not support the ALJ's RFC Finding; and, (2) the ALJ
failed to adequately explain why he found plaintiff's testimony,
and the written statements of her husband and children, not
entirely credible. After reviewing the ALJ's decision and the
record, the court finds that this case must be remanded for
consideration of the written statements made by plaintiff's family
members and how, if at all, those statements might affect the
ALJ's assessment of her credibility and residual functional
capacity.
Plaintiff submitted written statements by her husband, Robert
Settlemyer, and her daughter and son, in advance of the
administrative hearing for consideration by the ALJ. Plaintiff's
husband and children stated, inter alia, that she becomes annoyed
easily and she cries frequently, and that it is difficult for her
to go out in public, thus she primarily stays at home. (R. 168
70) .
Although the ALJ stated in his decision that the statements
of plaintiff's husband, daughter and son concerning her
impairments and their impact on her ability to work are not
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entirely credible, 1 (R. 26), the ALJ failed to provide any
explanation for that adverse credibility finding. Likewise, the
statements by plaintiff's relatives were not taken into account in
the ALJ's analysis of plaintiff's credibility nor in his
assessment of her residual functional capacity.
It is axiomatic in social security cases that, although the
ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, he must give some
indication of the evidence that he rejects and his reasons for
discounting that evidence. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43
(3d Cir. 2001). Where an ALJ fails to consider and explain his
reasons for discounting all of the relevant evidence before him,
both medical and non-medical, he has not met his responsibilities
under the Act and the case must be remanded. Burnett v. Apfel,
220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000)
Here, the ALJ provided no explanation whatsoever for
rejecting or discounting the written statements of plaintiff's
husband, daughter and son. Thus, it is not possible for this
court to conduct meaningful judicial review of the ALJ's decision
when he failed to offer any reasons for rejecting this evidence.
Although the Commissioner suggests in his brief that the
statements of plaintiff's relatives were out of proportion with
the level of severity supported by the objective evidence, this
IThe ALJ's entire analysis of the written statements provided
by plaintiff's family members consisted of one sentence: "The
statements of the claimant's husband, daughter, and son concerning
the claimant's impairments and their impact on her ability to work
are not entirely credible." (R.26).
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court can only analyze the ALJ's decision itself and determine if
it is supported by substantial evidence. An ALJ' s decision cannot
be upheld based on an after-the-fact justification raised by the
Commissioner on judicial review.
Moreover t the written statements of plaintiff's husband,
daughter and son cannot be deemed irrelevant. The Regulations
explicitly provide that the Commissioner is to consider "all
evidence in your case record" in making a disability
determination. See 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a) (3). Indeed, numerous
Regulations underscore the relevance of non-medical source
testimonYI and in particular l the testimony of a claimant's spouse
and other relatives, as it relates to a claimant/s impairments and
ability to work, see 20 C.F.R. §416.913 (d) (4) I a claimant's
credibilitYt see 20 C.F.R. §§416.929(a) and (c) (3), and a
claimant/s residual functional capacitYI 20 C.F.R.
§416.945(a) (3). SSR 96-7p (explaining that other
sources, including non-medical sources such as family and friends l
may provide information from which inferences and conclusions can
be drawn about the claimantts credibility).
In addition to the Regulations the Third Circuit Court ofI
Appeals has emphasized the importance of non-medical testimony
from other sources and has ruled that a case must be remanded to
the Commissioner where the ALJ failed to address t or failed to
explain the rej ection of t non-medical testimony. See Burnett 220t
F.3d at 122 (on remand, ALJ instructed to consider the testimony
of claimant/s husband and neighbor); Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717
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