BRIGGS v. BROWN

Respondents, Xavier Becerra and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Written Return

Cal.February 27, 2017

Iu the Supreme Court of the State of California RONBRIGGSand JOHN VAN de KAMP, Reis Case No. $238309 ve JERRY BROWS,inhisofficial capacityas SUPREME the Governor of California; XAVIER FILED BECERRA, inhis official capacityas the Attorney General of California, and California's Judicial Council, and Does1 through XX, FEB 27 2017 Jorge Navarrete Clerk Respondents, Deputy RETURN TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE; SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM XAVIER BECERRA Atlomey General ofCalifornia Dow . Woops Senior Assistant Attorney General MarcA. LeForesticr Supervising Deputy Atomey General *Josi A. ZELIDON-ZEPEDA Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 227108 453 Golden Gate Avenue,Suite 11000 SanFrancisco, CA. 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 703-5781 Fax: (415) 703-123 Jose. ZelidonZepeda@do}.ca, gov Attorneys for Respondents Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., and Attorney General Xavier Becerra RECEIVED FER 272017 CLERK SUPREME COURT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTIONocccceseessseseessesesesesessscscscsasscsssssessssaracsaveracasavsesesessevass 13 RETURN BY ANSWER TO AMENDED AND RENEWED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDATEuuu. ccceccccsccssssesssesesssssscesseesess 14 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES......c.ccccccccccsssssssscscnsesessssacsescecsssusavavsestecsssesens 19 PRAYER.eiccccscssseseessesecssecssesseeseersseseeeeesesenessneeneneetdeeneretssseesneseneesens 19 STATEMENTOF FACTS.....eccsccscsssesssssesssssscsscscsecsescsnstssscacasseseacsvscacessas 19 A. Under Proposition 66, HabeasPetitions Filed in Courts Other Than the Sentencing Court Should Be Transferred to That Court, Absent Good Cause. ....scecccsscssssscsscsscssccscessessecassesssessarsatsevecersueees 20 B. Proposition 66 Requires Expedited Resolution Of State Direct and Collateral Review, .....cccccesese 21 C. The MeasureDirects Streamlined Execution of . Death Sentences, ........ccccecccesecsscecssecsecesestesecsesceeccecces 22 D. Proposition 66 Requires That Condemned Inmates Work to Pay Outstanding Restitution Orders, and Disbands the Board of the Habeas Corpus Resource Center. ........ccccsscsessssssssscssesseseerees 23 LEGAL STANDARD w.cceccesssssssssscsssesscssssssssssssseassessasseacersasissessseessesees 24 ARGUMENT... cccscsesessecsseesssesssecssseserssscssscsssssessarscesasecsasessateceavevsnscavsae 24 I. Proposition 66 Does Not Violate the Single-Subject RUIC. oe ecccesessesssceeeecsesssesseseeesesessecsessssvscsesvaecstaeverscaeeseanaeess 26 A. This Court Reviews Challenges to Initiatives Under A Deferential Standard... eeeeeeseesseeee 26 B. Proposition 66’s Provisions Address Death Penalty Reform and Cost Savings. ........cccccececeeeees 27 C. The Proposition Does Not Violate the Single- Subject Rule. oo. ccccssssssscssesesssssvscssssssssseeeceeseaeeens 28 D. Under the Liberal Interpretative Tradition Applied in Single Subject Claims, Petitioners’ Challenge Fails... cccssesessssessseseecssssssscsssceseaseeees 33 Il. IIL. TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Petitioners Are Not Entitled to Invalidation Under Their Remaining Arguments. 0.0... eeseeseseseeeeeeereeeeesasessees 35 A. Proposition 66 enacts A Lawful Rule of Procedure That Does Not Interfere with the Jurisdiction of California’s Courts. .........ccccccseeeerenees 36 1. The Measure Does Not Mandate That HabeasPetitions Be Transferred to the Sentencing Court, and Thus Does Not Divest Appellate Courts of Original JULISCICTION, .....cccceececccessesscceseessceeeesseseesaeseceess 37 2. Even if Proposition 66 is Interpreted to Require Transfer of Petitions to the Sentencing Court, It Merely Codifies A Procedural Rule That Directs How Habeas Petitions Should Be Processed By the Courts. .....c.cccccssssscseccssesecseeetseaseeeeeees 39 3. Petitioners’ Challenges to Proposition 66’s Limits on Successive Petitions and Other Provisions Do Not Implicate the Original Jurisdiction Clause...eeeeeeee42 B. The Separation of Powers Claim Lacks Merit.......... 43 l. The Legislature Can Enact Reasonable Restrictions on the Constitutional Functions of the Court. ...... ce eecceeesecssseeeeeees 44 2. Limitations on Untimely and Successive Habeas CorpusPetitions Do Not Violate Separation of POWETS..........cceeceeesseeceseeeeeees 46 C. Petitioners’ Equal Protection Claim Fails. ............... 50 If the Court Concludes That Proposition 66 Unlawfully Interferes with the Jurisdiction of California’s Courts, Violates Separation of Powers, or Violates Equal Protection, the Court Can Sever the Offending PLOVISIONS. .......csscesesscceeseeeesttaeceneceeeeeeseneeereanecesaseeusesesssaneonnens 54 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page COnclUSION .....eeeccccescccccccessscececscessessessssesecssssesesessueseseseccecuuausssesssscessceusanens 55 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Alexander v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 723oeeececscseeeessessssecssssstssesseseseatsenenneenes 42 Application ofHillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.4th 293 ....ccseceseeseseeeereeees 39 Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236... eesecsesesnsescesscsserscsecssessseseeeseceeesseeeeseespassim Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 335 oieeseeestsesecssessssssessesesecesesescseeseeessesseeenesenesees 26 Brydonjack v. State Bar ofCal. . (1929) 208 Cal. 439.eects eeeeteseeeseeeenesseeneacaaeacauansetsrenceacercereeseveees 43 Cal. Trial Lawyers Assoc. v. Eu (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 35 Loci cccccsccsetecsseseessestesesesesiesteraessesteeteesas 33 Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805... eeeeceencetsesecsensesseecssscneeseestseserenaeeas 25, 34, 53 California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231 oescesssessesssecrereceteecssecsesssesseestesseseas 37, 38, 41 Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Ass’n, Inc. v. Deukmejian (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 663... ccscscccsessessnecstessessestecstertsesesteeraeeats 26, 34 Coffman Specialities, Inc. v. Dep’t ofTransportation (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th L135... cccccseseereesressesereeeneetteeseseeeeerneents 23, 48 Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228 oe iccccesssescseseeeeessestessenssteceeetectereseesseesenerees 50 County ofSan Diego v. State ofCalifornia (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68 wccecceseeeceteseesessessesseeectereraseesessenereenenassessees 37 Crater v. Galaza (Oth Cir. 2007) 491 F.3d L119.ececeeseeeeteeeeeeseneeerseenersenetsetssassessess 47 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Evans v. Superior Court In & For Los Angeles County (1932) 215 Cal. S58... ececsceccssecnecsseesssesssecssecssseesessecsseesessseseessasensnes 33 Fair Political Practices Com. v. Sup. Ct. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33... cecesscssecseccssssescsssssssseecsescsscseeesseteseessneeseses 25, 28 Felker v. Turpin (1996) 518 U.S. 651 oecceesnecetceeeecesesescesecsesseaescsseseseesstsesesseeesees 47 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (2016) 247 CalApp.4th 284.0.icccscssssessreesesssscsesseessessesecseeseeeees 36 Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341oecesceeesesseseeceteeesseceeesseseseeseeesees 38, 39, 40 Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078... eeseststeeeesesneesssnteneeneneateneneensenss 26, 27, 33 In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750 ooeeesessceessceeseeeeesceeeessessssceseeesseecnseeseseaeenspassim In re Guardianship ofAnn S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110oeeeecssesectesneeceneseresseeeesetstesesesseenaes 23, 47 In re Kler (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1399.eeesesecenecetecereeseeeteteeees 37, 39, 40 In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8...ecceeceesceecsseeteeceeeseeeesseecsecesareesseecseetesesetesenes 44 In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428 oocecseeeesecesecseeeseeeessessseeeensssessassreseas 46, 51 In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 vecessecsssesseesecsseeeeteecsesceeeseeaeessereeecsesesesseees 47 In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575 oo eecceecesssceeessecseceeseeesseesseeeeesnes 36, 37, 39, 40 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page In re Shafter-Wasco Irrigation District. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 484...cecssssessessssseecescnsesesessessnereeeneey 43,45 In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251eeeeccessesssssssesseseseseeseesseseseesesteseeseesteetaeeaes 37 In re Steele — (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 oecccccessessssessceseesssecsssessesnensesessetssresnerenennens 39 Johnson v. Dep’t ofJustice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871 occccccccssssesscsesesseeeneeeeessessessessrssesereereerersens 52 Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 693... esccssesssessesesesseseeecsessecseeesseeneesasiessaraeeseerens 44 Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424.icccessesesseeeesesesessseessecssnseesseseeseneneresteseseeass 51 Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094 iccecccecesseesseeeeesesesecssesteenersereenestens 44,45 Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658... csscsecscssscessesesesseseeessestesssecerseeenecereeseetesegens 38 Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492... cccccscsseeseteeeneseeeeneereseeneesteeeeeenetes 25, 32, 34 Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 we iccecescseseeecesecteeeeteeseseeeseeseesterereseesereens 33 Lorraine v. McComb (1934) 220 Cal.753 ..ceccsescsssesssesssseseesseesessssneseeenetetsenereteessesseneseeseey 45 Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 wiccccsscscesessereetsssessneeersserasererereessseeseenspassim Millholenv. Riley (1930) 211 Cal.29..ececsssecseceseeseeesseeseseeesectenacsecseesnerateenseseseeeess 45 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Morales v. California Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation (2008) 168 CalApp.4th 729.0eeeseesesscsecsneecteerseeesseseastaessaeesseees 22 Muller v. Muller (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 815 ....ccccccccesesssessestsscsssssssessssssesesssssesssseseseeees 46 Murray v. Giarratano (1989) 492 U.S. Leeecenesecsecseeseecneeerserseceeetesceseesessneceaetaseateeraresses 46 Oppenheimer vy. Ashburn (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 624... ecccesccsceseteestersneseeessseeetersateneeees 44,45 People’s Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 316...eeecssesseeseeneerseesenereaeeeeeeteesanteeseeens 53 People v. Bernal (2002) 101 CalApp.4th 155.eeeeesseeeeneeeceeetserseeeesaserstersaseseeeens 28 People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664.00... eccccesseeseeteecesseessaeeecesseeeseataeeeesaeees 53 People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464 oo ccccccsesssecsseeseeeaesscesesscesaeeseeaeeceesneseeessaneres 46 People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 oieecseeeesseeessecteesseeeeseeeessseeeeeasestereaneesenaes 45 People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644 ooccccccesssecsseeeneceerseesaserterssseersescnsssseseneesentes 29 People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616 oo. ceeeseceseeereeereerenieseeseesesseasetsssssrserteeeegs 50 People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547 occccccecceseeeceseeseesesssesssrsssesesescsssessssseneeseeens 50 People v. Moreno (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934.0.cessesesereteesesseeereeseeneeesresseeees 52 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728 vceecesseseessessesesessescessssssssersessseeseesrenseesseees 38 People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820...eeeseeduaaaeeaeesaneeeeessesaesaaeceanesesnaeseaesnaeeeenes 51 People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063 ceceesescesssesssesesecessesessesssssesssesssseresessesneees 42 Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336....cccscscecseceeteerecttesetresessessssssssssserstane 21, 30, 49 San Francisco Forty-Niners v. Nishioka (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 637.0... ccecccsccsssecsecsscsssesccnsensessessecnsessessesseenees 31 San Joaquin Helicopters v. Dep’t ofForestry & Fire Protection (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1549.eccsssecseessescssssenesesssesseesecsenerseenees 27 Senate State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142iecececsessesscseesseesseesscsesseseeenrsseseeeespassim Solberg v. Superior Court . (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 192.ececsceecsescsseeesssesseneetesnesesessesesseseenees 43 Superior Court v. Cty. ofMendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45 icccccseseseceessseeseecssensesesssesssserssnesesaeneeens 44,48 Thurmondv,. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 836.0... cessesesssesssssesesssressecesesesssseeeseseeeesnecseasseseeeses 45 Tobe v. City ofSanta Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069 oo.eeescseesecssssssesesseeesesereseseseseseeeeeasieeneen ld STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ec ccccscescsseseecesceteeecscnscnsssessnsecsesseceeseseesessaeeseeseenssneseeeeseeenseneasenenees 36 § 2244, Subd. ()(3) oe esessessscseseessesseeesseeeseeseaseeeseessstereeneceesserseneesetees 47 § 2255, SUDA. (€)..ececesescscseereseeecsessetensteessneseeetsetasienersesneserensssaseeseens 36 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Administrative Procedure ACt .......cccsccsssessecsssessesssesesecessetessueeessnsesnteespassim Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act... eeeesecssesneeteeteeenens 47 Code of Civil Procedure § 904.1 (8) eeeeeereererereereeetecseeenenssneretersaceessnsasseensiesensnsaseneneesenesesnsensess 4] Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act Of 2016.0... ccecccccsscesestecsssessseeeens 12 Elections Code | § 9092eeeceseestecsneessseeenecestcnsesssaeseseeeseeseesetesaeseeeeetesneseaeeseteneeenaees 31 Government. Code § 08662 oseeceececccscccseecseeesenneceaeeteeessaeeceecsserseeseeseaeesseeessessseesereneeeas 19, 51 § 68664, SUD. (D)...ecescesteeseresseectseeseeseceesearecseeenseeeaneessesseessneenies 23 § 68664, SUDA. (C)... eee eeccsceserseeseeceseatecaesaesstesseesaneceneeraresssersnesenseeneseats 23 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Penal Code § 190.6, SUD. (C)oc eeececeseeseesceeessesesserssesecessessseberesssensessseeseeseeeenees 20 § 1202.4 oe cecccscccsseecseeccssceseesseeesecneeeeeeesesssceseessesssecseeseseusesesensteaeeeseeeegs 22 § 1239, SUDA. (BD)... eesccseeeecseeneeeecnssesersssseseseessessseesessessesseeeresseeaeenenes 51 § 1473 ecccsecsccssnecssseeeeteeeseeeseceesserseressecseessesssseneescssteeseeeeesecasaeseneeeass 41, 50 ~ §§ 1473 through 1508 0.cecsssssscsssseesessesessesseesseeessesesessesesseesseenes 38 § 1485.55 Lc ccscesccsesccescecsesecesesessecnesesssssssgesesecseseseesetesssesesenseneeeas 49, 50 § 1509ecccccsscssseceteecenecnsceeecereneeeesesassssessssssesesneaesseseeeesseeesesees 19, 20, 36 § 1509(a) ..eeecsescsccsseseeecscetseeseeetesessesassucsssscssssessssessecsessaesaeseesesseesseesanenes 4] § LS09(D) oe eeccecccceseseeersecseesecseserseesesseesssesesseeeseseeessessseseeesessessserseeaeeae® 51 § 1509, SUDA. (8)... cee eeeeeseesceeeecseteesesesseersreetessesssesseessseneeenasenenees 19, 36 § 1509, SUD. (C)... eee eeceeeeeeseeetessecessssesecsseeeseeenesarensaeeensesssesensessaeeeneners 21 § 1509, SUDA. (d)..c cece eeceseeeesreneseeessecseseesscnensccseeeseessseessessseenes 21, 48, 52 § 1509, subd. (€)... eee ecesteesseceseteeeneeeens seeseeenececsuaecsaneeseceeeaeeeeeeatesessenses 21 § 1509, SUDA. (f) nec eeeecesccneceeeseeeeseessetssecssseeesseerseesesseesaesersneseenseetseeees 21 § 1509.1, SUDA. (A)...eeeeteesscesscsseesssenseseseessseeseesseeneeteeeseneeteeey 19, 36 § 1509.1, SUDA. (D).cecccscsssssssssssssssssssssssessssssssssesessssssssnseesee | ceesssecntesees 20 § 1509.1, SUD. (C)oc ee eeceseeseeseesessrsscssstessseseeessaseeseseensessesseseeesentesteeeety 20 § 2700.1 .eeecscccscccceeeseseecessessssesseesnsssussesesseecsseseesesessasaeesseseseseeseeneeags 22, 23 § 3604, SUDA. (8)...eee eeeeseesceseesesessseseseseenesseecssesrceeseeeseceaersetersanseatenes 22 § 3604, Subd. (€) oo. eceeeccecseesseeeessereeees Jeasesnaeeeteceeeesneetceeseneacesensceetassesses 21 § 3604.1, SUD. (A).eee eecsesssetesectseteessseeseseseaseneeseesteeeneeneens peeesenes 22, 29 § 3604.1, SUD. (C) ocr eeeeeessesetsessesseestseseseesesessesnesesessesesessesennereaeenes 22 § 3604.1, SUDA. (C)o.cceeescccssresretsssserscteserseseeeseesnestsesseseeensentereetnesnaeceeay 22 § 3604.3, SubdS.(a), (D).. ce ceccssesessetessenseeecnseeesteseseneteresesnseneecneetaes 22 § 3604.3, SUDA. (C)...cceeeceeeeesereeereeneseeteeeeaeedeca cecauessanecueeesseseseneceeseats 29 § 3604.3, SUDA. (C) ie eecescesseessessstecsesesensesressecsscsereeesesseneenecaeneseaeeneeses 22 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS California Constitution Article I, § 11 voce ccccsseseesecseeesseessessrcsstecsereeseeensecsesesseseesssensennaestineres 35 Article I, § 28 w.cccccccscesesecssececsseesssssersssessesessaeecsessesneeseceensseaseessseesseess 22 Article II, § 8, SUD. (A) .ccsccesessesssessesssscsssssnesneneceenreaneneerssesatsatesseaseneseenss 25 Article TV, § 1 c.ccccsecccscceseceeessensessseesscnssesscsssesasesessesseeseesneseeeseseeseneneneees 25 Article VI, § 10 cesussuesucausesuvavenssucanesssavsvcsuseasssesesesesecseacaetsceseaesesseeeespassim Article VI, § 11 .ccciccccccccestceseseseeessssscssssssssestesesessecsssesecssesrenneeseaneens 41 1] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page COURT RULES California Rules of Court Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) ...ceeccccssccsssescssesecsececssecsesecsessscsessesasssssavasesseassasene 32 Rule 8.385(C)(1)(A)... ecesessstssssescesssecsesecesseseesesececseessecsseeesesasssssecseasae 35 Rule 8.385(C)(2) ..ceeccceccssessssesessssseseessessessseseessessenes deeteseseasaeseeseseseeass40 Fed. R. App. P. 22, subd. (€)....ccccccccsessesscesessscssecsecsesssssssssecsecsecseevasesareeaes 36 OTHER AUTHORITIES PYOPOSItiON 66 oo... scececeseeeseeeestscsetececseesesseseseesessscsesscseceseeessesssenrsnsespassim Proposition 66 § Gi iiieescccscesecsseseeeesaeersseessesssssceeeeseessecesessusessesssesaeesseseseecateesenausuanss 16, 17 STecceeccceesseeeseeseeseeetetsetseeaeseseeessessesssesseessssesseeeeseaeseeceesesseesecenens 16 Senate Bill 1134... ceesecesssecsesccssssceessescssteeccsssseetececeettseesteseaceueees 49, 50 12 INTRODUCTION Petitioners Ron Briggs and John Van de Kampsueas taxpayers, asserting that Proposition 66, the “Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016,” is facially invalid on four separate grounds, and requesting that the entire measure be invalidated. First, they argue that the measure violates the California Constitution’s single-subject rule. Focusing on the provision pertaining to victim restitution, the provision exempting the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s execution protocol from the Administrative Procedure Act, and the provision disbanding the Habeas Corpus Resource Center’s Board of Directors, they contendthat these provisions do notrelate to the measure’s purpose. But the single-subjectrule is interpreted liberally, and courts resolve any reasonable doubts in favor ofthe initiative. A measure does notviolate the single-subjectrule if, its various effects notwithstanding, all of its components are “reasonably germane”to each other, and to the overall purpose of the measure. In this case, the “liberal interpretative tradition” applicable to initiatives showsthat the provisions are reasonably related to death penalty reform, including time reductions and cost savings, the Proposition’s stated goal. For this reason, the single- subject rule is not a basis to invalidate the measure. Second, petitioners contend that the Proposition improperly interferes with the grant ofjurisdiction to appellate courts to handle habeas corpus petitions by requiring that these be transferred to the court which issued the judgmentof conviction. But on its face, the measure does not divest the | appellate courts of original jurisdiction to consider habeaspetitions. It merely providesthat a petition filed in a court other than the sentencing court “should”be transferred to that court unless good cause is shown, with languagethat courts have previously determined does not defeat jurisdiction. 13 Third, petitioners argue that the measure violates separation of powers principles by, amongother things, imposing strict deadlines for processing the habeas corpuspetitions of individuals sentenced to death. But, as the petition acknowledges, the Legislature may place “reasonable restrictions” upon the courts’ constitutional functions, as long as these restrictions do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those functions. The challenged restrictions do not materially impair the courts’ functions. Andpetitioners cite no case authority in which a court has struck down under separation of powers principles a statute governing court procedures. Lastly, petitioners contend that the measure violates the equal protection rights of individuals convicted of capital crimes by limiting their ability to file successive habeaspetitions. As petitioners concede, this claim is subject to deferential rational basis review becausecapital | defendants do not form a suspect class. Under this deferential standard,. petitioners cannot show that the measure unconstitutionally infringes upon their equal protection rights because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants. Ultimately, petitioners cannot meet their burden to negate every conceivable basis underlying any disparate treatment, as they must for their facial challenge. | Forthese reasons, the Court should deny the AmendedPetition. RETURN BY ANSWER TO AMENDED AND RENEWED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE Respondents Governor Edmund G. BrownJr., and Attorney General Xavier Becerra answer the Amended and Renewed Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Including Writ of Mandate,as follows. All allegations not expressly admitted are denied. 1. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 14 2. Respondents admitthat petitioners request that this Court issue a stay of the implementation of Proposition 66. Except as expressly admitted, respondents have no information or belief regarding the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 3. Respondents lack informationor belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 4. Respondents lack informationor belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 5. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 6. Respondents lack informationor belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 7. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 8. Respondents lack information orbelief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 9. Respondents lack informationor belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 10. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 11. Respondents admit that Edmund G. BrownJr. is the Governor of the State of California, and that the California Constitution vests him with the responsibility that the laws of the State of California be faithfully executed. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 12. Respondents admit that Attorney General Xavier Becerrais the Attorney General of the State of California, and that the California Constitution vests him with the responsibility to see that the laws of the 15. State are uniformly and adequately enforced. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 13. Respondents admit that the California Constitution tasks the Judicial Council with surveying judicial business and making recommendationsto the courts, making recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopting rules for court administration, practice and procedure, and performing other functions prescribed by statute, in order to improve the administration ofjustice. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 14. Respondents lack informationorbelief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 15. Admit. 16. Respondents admit that Proposition 66 makes changesto state law, including judicial procedures governing death penalty appeals, requirements for and remuneration for counselin direct appeal and state habeas corpus proceedings, housing of death row inmates, compensation of victims of death row inmates, and the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to California execution standards. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack informationor belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 17. Admit. . 18. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, andonthat basis deny then. 19. Respondents admit that Proposition 66 requires the Judicial Council to adopt rules and standards designed to expedite processing of capital appeals and state habeas corpus review, within 18 monthsofthe measure’s effective date. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack 16 information orbelief sufficient to admit or deny the allegationsof this paragraph, and onthat basis deny them. 20. Respondents admit that Proposition 66 requires that state courts complete the state appeal andstate habeas corpus review within five years of the adoption of the Judicial Council’s initial rules, or within five years of ~ entry ofjudgment, whicheveris later. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and onthat basis deny them. 21. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 22. Deny. | 23. Respondents lack informationorbelief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 24. Respondents lack informationor belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 25. Respondents admit that Section17 of Proposition 66 disbands the Habeas Corpus Resource Center’s Board of Directors. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack information orbelief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 26. Respondents admit that Section 17 of Proposition 66 states that Habeas Corpus Resource Center’s attorneys (other than the Executive Director), shall be compensated at the same level as comparable positions in the Office of the State Public Defender. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 27. Respondents lack informationor belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations ofthis paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 28. Respondents admit that section 6 of Proposition 66 requirestrial courts to offer counsel to criminal defendants sentenced to death. Except as 17 expressly admitted, respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 29. Deny. 30. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and onthat basis deny them. 31. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 32. Respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 33. Respondents admit that section 6 of Proposition 66states that, “When necessary to remove a substantial backlog in appointment of counsel for capital cases, the Supreme Court shall require attorneys whoare qualified for appointmentto the most serious non-capital appeals and who meet the qualifications for capital appeals to accept appointmentin capital cases as a condition for remaining on the court’s appointmentlist.” Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack informationorbelief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 34. Respondentslack information orbelief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 35. Respondents admit that Proposition 66 requires that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation “maintainat all times the ability to execute” death sentences, and exempts execution standards from the Administrative Procedure Act. Except as expressly admitted, respondents lack information or belief sufficient to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and on that basis deny them. 36. Deny. 37. Deny. 18 38. Deny. 39. Deny. 40. Deny. 41. Deny. 42. Deny. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 1. The petition fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. PRAYER Respondents praythat: 1. Judgment be entered in favor of respondents and against petitioners, and that petitioners take nothing by thepetition. 2. Respondents be awardedcosts of suit and any otherrelief that the Court deemsproper. STATEMENT OF FACTS | Proposition 66, approved by the voters in the November2016 election, declares that the death penalty system “is ineffective because of waste, delays, and inefficiencies.” (Pets.” App. of Exhibits, Exh. 1 at p. 1.) It modifies the current death penalty process through a number of measures relating to “timely justice” for murder victims, and the process by which capital defendants mayraise their claims. (/d. at p. 2.) It concludesthat, “Tb]ureaucratic regulations have needlessly delayed enforcementof death penalty verdicts,” and seeksto curtail repetitive challenges to death penalty proceedings. (Ibid.) The measure’s Findings and Declarationsstate that, “{d]eath row killers should be required to work in prison and payrestitution to their victims’ families consistent with the Victims’ Bill of Rights (Marsy’s Law).” (/bid.) Theyalso state that, “[t]he state agencythat is supposedto expedite secondary review of death penalty cases is operating 19 without any effective oversight, causing long-term delays and wasting taxpayer dollars.” (Ibid.) Proposition 66 enacts changes to the Government Code and Penal Code. As relevant to the claims raised in the Amended Petition, the measure enacts a numberof changes, relating to (1) where habeas corpus petitions are filed; (2) expediting the resolution offiled petitions; (3) streamlining the execution of death sentences; (4) amending proceduresfor capital inmates to work whilein prison to pay restitution obligations; and (5) changing the way the Habeas Corpus Resource Center is supervised, as explained below. A. Under Proposition 66, Habeas Petitions Filed in Courts Other Than the Sentencing Court Should Be Transferred to That Court, Absent Good Cause. Underthe California Constitution, each of the State’s courts has original habeas corpusjurisdiction. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10 [The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings”].) Proposition 66 adds section 1509 to the Penal Code, whichstates in part, “{a] petition filed in any court other than the court which imposedthe sentence should be promptly transferred to that court unless good causeis shownfor the petition to be heard by another court.” (New Pen. Code, § 1509, subd. (a).) Relatedly, the proposition allows, but does not require, habeaspetitions already pending in the Supreme Court to betransferredto the trial court for resolution. (/bid.) | With respect to the appointmentof counsel, the proposition requires the superior court, rather than this Court, to offer to appoint sounsel to state prisoners subject to a capital sentence. (New Gov. Code, § 68662.) It also allows for appellate review of superior court rulings granting or denying habeasrelief. (New Pen. Code, § 1509.1, subd. (a).) Reviewable issues are 20 limited to those presented to the superior court, except that the reviewing court could also “consider a claim ofineffective assistance oftrial counsel if the failure of habeas counsel to present that claim to the superior court constituted ineffective assistance.” (/d. at § 1509.1, subd. (b).) Any superior court decision granting relief on a successive petition could be appealed by the People, but a decision denyingrelief could not be appealed by the petitioner unless the superior court issuesa certificate of appealability. (Ud. at § 1509.1, subd. (c).) To obtain a certificate, the petitioner must show “both a substantial claim for relief, which shall be indicated in the certificate, and a substantial claim that the requirements of subdivision (d) of section 1509 [regarding actual innocenceorineligibility for death] have been met.” (/bid.) B. Proposition 66 Requires Expedited Resolution of State Direct and Collateral Review. Proposition 66 requires expedited resolution of direct and collateral review of death sentences by implementing three changesrelevantto this action. First, it requires state courts to complete the state appeal and theinitial state habeas corpus review in capital cases in five years. The Judicial Council must, within 18 months of the effective date of the Proposition, adoptinitial rules and standards of administration to expedite the processing of capital appeals and state habeas review. (New Pen. Code, § 190.6, subd. (d).) “Within five years of the adoption ofthe initial rules or the entry ofjudgment,whicheveris later, the state courts shall complete the state appeal andtheinitial state habeas corpus review in capital cases.” (Ibid.) Second, the measure imposesa deadlineforfiling and for resolving habeaspetitions. It requires that capital habeas petitions generally be filed in the trial court within one year following that court’s order appointing 21 habeas counselor the effective date of the proposition, whicheveris later. (New Pen. Code, § 1509, subd. (c).) Under new Penal Code section 1509, subdivision (f), the superior court mustresolvetheinitial petition within oneyearoffiling “unless the court finds that a delay is necessary to resolve a substantial claim of actual innocence, but in no instance shall the court take longer than two yearsto resolve the petition.” Proposition 66also restricts successive and untimely petitions. Previously, untimely and successive petitions were barred, subject to a variety of exceptions. (Jn re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 797-98 [noting that, absent allegations of fact that would establish “a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice”in the conviction or sentence, the generalruleis that successive or untimely petitions should be summarily denied].) Under Proposition 66, any untimely petition must be dismissed unless the petitioner can demonstrate by “the preponderanceofall evidence, whether or not admissibleattrial,” that he is factually innocentor ineligible for death. (New Pen. Code, § 1509, subd. (d).) The proposition also (1) requires any petitioner attempting to pass through this “gateway”for considering a successive or untimely petition to “disclose all material information relating to guilt or eligibility in the possession of the petitioner _ or present or former counsel for petitioner,” and (2) authorizes (but does not require) dismissal of a successive or untimely petition for any “willful failure” to makeorfacilitate the required disclosure. (/d. at § 1509, subd. (e).) C. The Measure Directs Streamlined Execution of Death Sentences. Under Proposition 66, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is required to “maintainat all times the ability to execute [capital] judgments.” (New Pen. Code, § 3604, subd. (e).) If the Department“fails to perform any duty needed to enable it to execute the 22 judgment, the court which rendered the judgment of death shall orderit to perform that duty on its own motion, on motion of the District Attorney or Attorney General, or on motion of any victim of the crime ....” (Jd. at § 3604.1, subd.(c).) The Penal Code tasks the Department with developing standards for implementing the death penalty. (Pen. Code, § 3604, subd.(a).) In 2008, the Court of Appeal held that these standardsare a “rule of general application,” and thus must comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). (Morales v. California Department ofCorrections and | Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 729, 739-740.) Proposition 66 exempts the Department’s execution protocols from the APA. (New Pen. Code, § 3604.1, subd. (a).) It further states that a physician may attend an execution and provide advice to the Department for developing an execution protocol, and that a pharmacist or other professional handling pharmaceuticals can dispense drugsto carry out an execution. (/d. at § 3604.3, subds. (a), (b).) The measure prevents a licensing board or other such accreditation agency from revoking the license or otherwise disciplining a health care professional “for any action authorized by this section.” (/d. at § 3604.3, subd. (c).) Finally, the measurestates that “the court which rendered the judgment of death” has “exclusive jurisdiction” for method-of-execution challenges. (New Pen. Code, § 3604.1, subd.(c).) D. Proposition 66 Requires That Condemned Inmates Work to Pay Outstanding Restitution Orders, and Disbands the Board of the Habeas Corpus Resource Center. | The California Constitution requires that convicted criminals pay restitution to their victims. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28; See also Pen. Code, § 1202.4.) Proposition 66 states that all death sentenced inmates “shall be required to work” while incarcerated by the Department. (New Pen. Code, § 2700.1.) It also sets the percentage of funds that can be drawn from a 23 condemned inmate’s trust account to pay for a restitution fine or restitution order. (/bid.) Further, the measure amendsstate law to disband the Habeas Corpus Resource Center’s Board of Directors, and makes other changesto the way in which the HCRCoperates. (New Gov. Code, § 68664, subds. (b), (c).) LEGAL STANDARD Petitioners bring a facial taxpayer challenge to Proposition 66. This Court has notarticulated a single test for facial challenges. (dn re Guardianship ofAnn S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1126.) Under thestrictest formulation, a challenged statute must be upheld unlessthe party establishes that the statute “inevitably pose[s] a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (Jbid., citation omitted.) Under the more lenient standard, petitioners mustestablish at a minimum that Proposition 66 is unconstitutional “in the generality or great majority of cases.” (In re Guardianship ofAnn S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1126, citation omitted; Coffman Specialities, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transportation (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145.) Such a challenge “considers only the text of the measureitself, not its application to the particular circumstances ofthe individual.” (Tobe v. City ofSanta Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.) Accordingly, to establish facial invalidity, “netitioners cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems maypossibly arise as to the particular applicationofthe statute.” (bid., citation omitted.) ARGUMENT Petitioners bring various claims against Proposition 66. They seek wholesale invalidation of the statute and a court order precluding enforcementofall its provisions. But petitioners can only achieve 24 invalidation of the entire measureifthey succeed on their claim thatit violates the California Constitution’s single-subject rule. As explained below,this claim fails because all of the measure’s challenged provisions are reasonably germaneto one object, namely death penalty reform, including time reductions and costs savings. Although petitioners challenge four of the measure’s provisions, they cannot show that the Proposition “clearly and unmistakably”violates the Constitution, particularly given the deferential standard this Court applies when assessing a challenge to an initiative. Petitioners raise other challenges to the measure, arguing that certain provisions violate the original jurisdiction clause of the California Constitution and separation ofpowers, and other provisions violate the equal protection clauses under both the California and federal constitutions. But the measure doesnot violate the asserted constitutional provisions, instead making modest changesto procedural and venueprovisions, including creating a presumption in favoroftransferring habeas corpus petitions to the court which entered judgment, and limiting successive habeaspetitions in ways analogous to what the case law already provides. Finally, petitioners’ equal protection claim is subject to a deferential rational basis review, and must be rejected because the measurerationally distinguishes between successive petitions filed by capital versus non- capital convicts. Moreover, unlike the single-subject claim, petitioners cannot obtain wholesale invalidation of the measureif they succeed on any of these other claims. To the extent this Court agrees with the petitioners that any of these legal claims have merit, the Court can sever the offending provisions. Ultimately, petitioners’ legal claimsfail, and the Court should deny the petition in its entirety, and enter judgment for respondents. 25 I. PROPOSITION 66 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE. A. This Court Reviews Challenges to Initiatives Under A Deferential Standard. Although the California Constitution vests the legislative powerin the Legislature, “the people reserve to themselves the powersofinitiative and referendum.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) “Accordingly, the initiative power must be /iberally construed to promote the democratic process.” (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 501.) The courts’ “solemn duty [is] to jealously guard the precious initiative power, and to resolve any reasonable doubts in favor ofits exercise.” (bid.) Underthe single-subjectrule, “An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.” (Cal. Const.,.art. II, § 8, subd. (d).) This rule is designed to prevent voter confusion and manipulation, which can arise when a single initiative encompassesdisparate subjects. (Senate State ofCal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, 1168; Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 251.) It . was “not enacted to provide meansfor the overthrow of legitimate legislation.” (Fair Political Practices Com. v. Sup. Ct. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 38.) Whenassessing a challengeto an initiative, this Court applies a presumption in favorofits validity. (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 814 [in case challenging initiative measure, noting that “Statutes must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears”].) “If the validity of the measureis ‘fairly debatable,’ it must be sustained.” (Jbid., citation omitted.) This applies with even greater strength to initiative measures regarding public safety. (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3dat p. 248.) 26 B. Proposition 66’s Provisions Address Death Penalty Reform and Cost Savings. Petitioners argue that Proposition 66 violates the single-subject rule because someofits provisions are allegedly unrelated to death penalty reform. (Am.Pet. at 41-52.) But courts analyze initiatives broadly, in order to preserve this right. In light of the measure’s overall goal of death penalty reform and costsavings, petitioners cannot showthatit is “clearly and unmistakably” unconstitutional. In assessing whether a challenged measure passes the single-subject test, the Court looksat the extent to which its provisions are germaneto the general subject as reflected in the title and the field of legislation it suggests. (Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Ass’n, Inc., supra, 227 Cal.App.3dat p. 667; Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3datp. 246 (“Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly indicatedin thetitle, may be united in one act.”].) Taking the measure’s purposeas identified byitstitle, its findings, and declarations, courts apply the “reasonably germane”test. (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 575-76 [rejecting challengers’ overbroad characterization of a proposition’s purpose based on the purposereflectedin its title, findings, and declarations].) “[A]n initiative measure will pass the constitutional single subject test ‘so long as challenged provisions meet the test of being reasonably germaneto a commontheme, purpose, or subject.’” (Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 335, 350, citation omitted; Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1100 [“[A] measure complies with the rule if its provisions are either functionally related to one another or are reasonably germaneto one anotheror the objects of the enactment.”].) Proposition 66’s title clearly announcesthe following: death penalty reform and cost savings. (Pets.’ App. of Exhibits, Exh. 1 at p. 1.) Its findings and declarations state that the death penalty system “is ineffective 27 because ofwaste, delays, and inefficiencies,” and that it seeks to balance the rights of capital defendants and those of their victims. (/d. at pp. 1-2.) Its provisionsrelate to these broad purposes, encompassing reform in a numberof areas. (/bid.) Petitioners acknowledge the measure’s stated purpose, but they seekto set this aside and construe its purpose aslimited to expediting the death penalty process. (Am. Pet. at 43.) They argue that the measure’s stated goal is too general for purposesofthe single-subject rule. (Jbid.) Although courts have struck initiatives employing inappropriately broad or general purposesas their subject, Proposition 66 does not run afoul of this case law. (See Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1100-01 [holding invalid subjects of “fiscal affairs” and “statutory adjustments”]; San Joaquin Helicopters v. Dep’t ofForestry & Fire Protection (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1549, 1559-1560 [describing subjects of excessive generality under single-subject rule, including “government, public welfare, fiscal affairs, the business of insurance, or truth in advertising”’].) Particularly given this Court’s case law upholding “initiatives containing various provisions related to even broadergoals in the criminal justice system,” Proposition 66 passes constitutional muster. (Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 576.) The subject of this measure is death penalty reform and costs savings, a subject that is not excessively general. The Court should adoptthis identification of the purpose of the measurein assessing the single-subject challenge. C. The Proposition Does Not Violate the Single-Subject Rule. Under the case law, a measure doesnot violate the single-subject rule if, “despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are reasonably germaneto each other, and to the general purpose or object of the initiative.” (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 245, citations and quotations omitted; Accord Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 347 28 [upholding initiative under “reasonably germane” test where the challenged provisions “unite[d] to form a comprehensive criminal justice reform package”].) Aninitiative’s provisions need not be “interlocking”or “interdependent”so long asthey fall under a single purposeortopic. (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 249; Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1157.) As long as aninitiative’s provisions are “auxiliary to and promotive of its main purpose, or [have] a necessary and natural connection with such purpose,” they are germane within the meaningof the single-subjectrule. (Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 39.) Petitioners contend that a numberof Proposition 66’s provisions are not reasonably germaneto the goal of reforming the death penalty process by expediting it. (Am.Pet. at 43-46.) As noted above, the measure’s “common purpose”is death penalty reform and cost savings, andits various provisions reasonably relate to and further that purpose. (Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 575.) All of the challenged provisions are geared towardsthese stated goals. Petitioners challenge the section increasing victim restitution from individuals sentenced to death and requiring them to work,a provision bearing a commonsenserelationship to death penalty reform by ensuring that individuals convicted of capital offenses spend their time productively, and in a way that promotes paymentoftheir restitution fines and restitution orders.! The imposition ofrestitution fines generally supports indemnification of crimevictims and “ensures that amends are made to society for a breach ofthe law, serves a rehabilitative purpose, and acts as a deterrent for future criminality.” (People v. Bernal (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th ' Notably, Proposition 62, which sought to repeal the death penalty, also included a provision regarding capital inmates’ restitution obligations. (Proposition 62 [as of Feb. 20, 2017].) 29 155, 161-162,citation omitted.) As the Proposition’s findings and declarations note, the voters concluded that “Death row killers should be required to work in prison andpayrestitution to their victims’ families consistent with the Victims’ Bill of Rights (Marsy’s Law).” (Pets.’ App. of Exhibits, Exh. 1 at p. 2.) This provision ensures that individuals sentenced to death are not exempted from the general requirement under California law that inmates pay restitution. Requiring capital inmates to pay for the costs of their crimes during the time they are awaiting execution is therefore “reasonably germane”to death penalty reform.” Petitioners also challenge the provisions waiving the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act for execution protocols, (New Pen. Code, § 3604.1, subd. (a)), and barring medical licensing organizations from disciplining individuals whoassist in the death penalty process, (New Pen. Code, § 3604.3, subd. (c)). (Am.Pet. at 47-49.) These provisions are also “reasonably germane”to death penalty reform and cost savings, because they seek to remove obstacles to implementing the death penalty, including subjecting execution standards to expensive and protractedlitigation under | the APA. Likewise, the provision stating that medical professionals cannot be disciplined merely for participating in lawful executions helps ensure that executions will not be thwarted by threats from organizations that seek -* Petitioners argue that the money that is collected from death row inmates goesto the victims, rather than taxpayers and thus does not impact “the cost of capital appeals for the state.” (Am. Pet. at 46-47.) This misses the point. Restitution fines “are paid into the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury [citation], which is used to compensate victims for specified ‘pecuniary losses they suffer as a direct result of criminal acts.”” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651.) Thus, taking money from an inmate’s trust account will offset the taxpayer costs doled out from the Treasury to crime victims. 30 to dissuade their members from suchparticipation.’ These provisions “fairly disclose a reasonable and commonsenserelationship . . . in furtherance of a common purpose.” (Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 579 fn.12.) 3 Petitioners argue that the Proposition’s language andthe Official Voter Information Guide did not provide information about the APA,thus allegedly failing to “help voters discover the function of the APA or the practical effects of exempting a state agency from its oversight.” (Am.Pet. at 48-49.) This misstates the record. In fact, the “Background”section of the Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, under the heading “Executions Currently Halted by Courts,” specifically discusses the APA, its purposes, and its effect on executions. (Pets.’ App. of Exhibits, Exh. 2 at p. 9.) This section explainsthat “[t]hese procedures require state agencies to engage in certain activities to provide the public with a meaningful opportunity to | participate in the process of writing state regulations.” (/bid.) In turn, the “Proposal” section, under “Enforcement of Death Sentence,” makesclear that “[t]he measure also exempts the state’s execution procedures from the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act.” (/d. at p. 10.) Likewise, the Official Title and Summary informedthe voters that the measure “[e]xempts prison officials from existing regulation process for developing execution methods.” (/d. at p. 8.) Courts assumethat voters “duly considered and comprehended these materials.” (Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 580.) Becausethe voters here were properly informed about the measure’s effects, the single-subject claim fails. (/bid.; Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 349 [rejecting single-subject challengein light of the information provided * Petitioners posit that this provision mightviolate the organizations’ “right to free speech.” (Am.Pet. at 49.) Whatever merit this argument might have, it does not impact the single-subject challenge at issue here. 31 to the voters, including a summary of the measure, a detailed analysis by the Legislative Analyst, and a complete text of the proposed measure, along with argumentsfor and against it.) Notably, petitioners point to no evidence that the voters were unaware of Proposition 66’s effects.’ Lastly, petitioners claim that disbanding the Habeas Corpus Resource Center’s Board of Directors is not related to the Proposition’s purpose. (Am. Pet. at 49-50.) But the measure’s declaration andfindings state concernsthat the “state agency that is supposed to expedite secondary review of death penalty cases is operating without any effective oversight, causing long-term delays and wasting taxpayer dollars.” (Pets.’ App. of Exhibits, Exh. 1 at p. 2.) In context, the voters would have understood that provisions reorganizing the HCRC,including disbanding its Board of Directors, were aimed to reform the death penalty by expediting review and saving taxpayer money. Petitioners also contend that the measure was misleading becauseit states that the HCRC was “operating without any effective oversight,” and claim that the “Official Voter Information Guide provides no information as to how and whether the dissolution” of the Board would lead to savings. (Am.Pet. at 50-51.) This disagreement about the accuracy of the measure’s factual assertions was more properly an issue for an argumentagainst the Proposition in the Ballot Pamphlet, or a challenge to the accuracy of the Proposition’s language before it was submitted to the voters. (Elections Code, § 9092; San Francisco Forty- Niners v. Nishioka (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 637, 649 [“Evenafter a petition ‘ Aspetitioners point out, neither the Proposition nor the Official Voter Information Guide provides “‘a citation to the governing statutes.” (Am.Pet. at 48.) But there is no case law requiring such specificity, or holding that failing to include this information violates the single-subject rule. (Cf. Manduley, supra, 27 CalAth at p. 579 [rejecting single-subject claim premised on the fact that voters were not informedthat statutory revisions “amendedstatutes adopted through priorinitiative measures”’].) 32 t qualifies for the ballot, opponents have an opportunity to dissuade the electorate in the media, with debates, advertisements, circulars and ultimately with opposing statements in the ballot pamphlet.”].) Whatever their merit as a matter ofpolicy, these disagreementsare nota basis for striking down the law underthe single-subject rule. And petitioners cite no case law to support the contention that an initiative may be struck because the informationit provided did not havethis level of specificity. Requiring such minute detail would be at odds with the liberal interpretation courts afford the initiative process, and would be counterto the presumption courts apply in favor of the validity ofinitiatives. | D. Underthe Liberal Interpretative Tradition Applied in Single Subject Claims, Petitioners’ Challenge Fails. Ultimately, “the single-subject provision does not require that each of the provisions of a measure effectively interlock in a functional relationship,”andit is instead sufficient that “the various provisions are reasonably related to a commonthemeor purpose.” (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 513.) The four provisionspetitioners specifically challenge’ fall far short of the type of situations where courts have struck initiatives under the single-subject rule—invalidation has been reserved for only the most extreme cases. For example, in Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4that 1142, a ballot measure was struck down where it implemented two comprehensive, yet entirely separate schemes,the first focused on reapportionmentof state and federallegislative districts, the second regarding compensation and benefits of state legislators and other state > Althoughpetitioners ostensibly raise a blanket challenge to sections 8 through 14 and 17 and 18, (Am.Pet.at 46), their argument focusses on the four areas discussed. Respondents in turn focus on these sameareas. Petitioners have waived any challenge for which they do not provide any argument. (Cal. Rules of Court 8.204(a)(1)(B).) 33 officials. In another case, the law at issue failed because it amended, added, or repealed 150 sections in over 20 codesorlegislative acts. (Harborv. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1097; See also Cal. Trial Lawyers Assoc. v. Eu (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 351 [finding single-subject violation where 120-pageinitiative regarding insurance included a provision regarding campaign contributions and conflicts of interest of elected officials], disapproved on another ground in Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232.) Proposition 66, on the other hand, enacts modest changes to only a handful of Government and Penal Code sections which all relate to death penalty reform. In contrast, courts have found that laws pass muster under the “reasonably germane”test when their subject matter has been much more diverse than whatis at issue here. In Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, the court found that the provisions concerning (1) more severe punishmentfor, and more effective deterrence of, criminal acts, (2) protecting the public from the premature release into society of criminal offenders, (3) providing safety from crimeto a particularly vulnerable group ofvictims, namely school pupils and staff, and (4) assuringrestitution for the victims of criminalacts, all fell under the single subject of “promoting the rights of actualor potential crime victims.” In Evans v. Superior Court In & For Los Angeles County (1932) 215 Cal. 58, the Court upheld a law with over 1,700 sections that dealt with the general subject of “probate law.” These cases areillustrative of the “liberal interpretative tradition” surrounding the single-subjectrule, and the reluctance of courts to use it as a means of striking down laws. (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 253.) “[T]he single-subject requirement shouldnot be interpreted in an unduly narrow or restrictive fashion that would preclude the use ofthe initiative process to accomplish comprehensive, broad-based reform in a particular area of public concern.” (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1157.) Accordingly, courts 34 “liberally construe the initiative power and ‘resolve any reasonable doubts infavor ofthe exercise ofthis precious right.’” Manufacturers Ass’n, Inc. vy. Deukmejian (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 663, 667, citation omitted.) (Chemical Specialties Atheart, petitioners challenge the wisdom of the measure’s provisions.° (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 814 [in adjudicating constitutionality of an initiative, this Court “do[es] not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or general propriety of the initiative”].) “Whether or not these various provisions are wise or sensible, and will combine effectively to achieve their stated purpose, is not our concern in evaluating the present single-subject challenge.” (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 514; Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 841-42 [single-subject rule does not require determination whethereach section effectively will further the measure’s overall purpose].) Petitioners have not established “clearly and unmistakably”that Proposition 66 is unconstitutional. II. PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INVALIDATION UNDER THEIR REMAINING ARGUMENTS. Petitioners raise three additional claims against Proposition 66, claiming that it improperly interferes with the jurisdiction of the courts, that it violates separation ofpowers principles, and that it violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. These 6 Notably, despite their strenuous insistence that the measure violates the single-subject rule, petitioners did not challenge the measure beforeit was submitted to the voters. (See Senate ofState ofCal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1154 [noting that “[w]hen a court determines that the challengers to an initiative measure have demonstrated that there is a strong likelihood that the initiative violates the single-subjectrule, it is appropriate to resolve the single-subject challenge prior to the election.”].) 35 claimsall fail. Moreover, none of them is sufficient to invalidate the entire measure, but would at most warrant invalidation of a severable provision. A. Proposition 66 Enacts A Lawful Rule of Procedure That Does Not Interfere with the Jurisdiction of California’s Courts. Petitioners contend that habeasjurisdiction is constitutionally based, and that Proposition 66 improperly tries to “strip the state courts of their authority to entertain and decide” habeas corpuspetitions. (Am.Pet. at 20.) This argument exaggerates Proposition 66’s effects; the measure merely enacts rules ofjudicial procedure, establishing a strong preference for channeling habeas claims to the court of conviction. By its own terms,it preservesthe ability of the Courts of Appeal and this Court to accept appropriate cases, and to review a lower court’s ruling on habeaspetitions, through the appellate process. Suchrules ofjudicial procedure are within the purview ofthe Legislature, and thus properly a subject for the initiative process. The California Constitution states that “[h]abeas corpus may not be suspended unless required by public safety in cases of rebellion or invasion.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11.) And every level of the state courts “and their judges haveoriginal jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.” (Id. art. VI, § 10.) Nevertheless, by rule, Courts of Appeal already have the authority to deny without prejudice habeaspetitions challenging judgments of courts based outsidetheir district. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(c)(1)(A); 8.385(c)(2).) Althoughoriginal capital habeaspetitions are usually filed in this Court, the Court is not required to retain these cases. Proposition 66, adjusts the existing procedural presumption that such cases will remain in this Court, in favor of a presumption that sentencing courts will handle these petitions in the first instance. The measure provides that “a petition 36 filed in any court other than the [sentencing court] should be promptly transferred to that court,” absent good cause. (New Pen. Code, § 1509, subd. (a).) Proposition 66 further provides that a “successive petition shall not be used as a meansofreviewing a denial of habeasrelief.” (New Pen. Code, § 1509.1, subd. (a).) These provisions are not invalid encroachments on the courts’ habeasjurisdiction. (Am.Pet. at 23-24.)’ 1. The measure does not mandate that habeas petitions be transferred to the sentencing court, and thus does not divest appellate courts of originaljurisdiction. Proposition 66 provides only that a petition filed in any court other than the sentencing court “should”be transferred to that court “unless good cause is shownforthe petition to be heard by another court.” (New Pen. Code, § 1509.) Onits face, this provision does not divest the appellate . courts ofjurisdiction to consider habeaspetitions, does not mandatethat a petition filed in appellate courts be transferred to the sentencing court, and does not mention jurisdiction. (Cf. Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural LaborRelations Bd. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 284, 289 [holding that a challenged statute’s “absolute preclusion of superior court jurisdiction, even in exceptional circumstances”violates California Constitution.) _ Rather, it tracks the language used by this Court in Jn re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 593, which directs that “amongthethree levels of state courts, ’ This preference for the sentencing court is similar to that found in federal law. Under 28 U.S.C., section 2241, “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” Despite this broad jurisdiction, any of these three entities “may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and maytransfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.” (Ud., subd. (b); See also 28 U.S.C., § 2255, subd. (e); Fed. R. App.P. 22, subd. (a).) 37 a habeas corpuspetition challenging a decision of the parole board should be filed in the superior court, which should entertain in the first instance the petition.” (Emphasis added.) The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that this language in Roberts “does not divest the courts of appeal of original jurisdiction in petitions for writ of habeas corpus, as granted by article IV [sic], section 10 of the California Constitution. Nor does it dictate that in all cases such habeas corpus petitions mustbe filed in the superior court— only that challenges to parole ‘should’first be filed in the superior court.” (Un re Kler (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1403.) Asit has in the past with other challenged statutes, this Court should construe Proposition 66 to avoid an impairmentof constitutional jurisdiction. Where a regulation appearsto interfere with the exercise of a court’s constitutional jurisdiction, this Court has avoided constitutional conflict by construing the legislation “strictly against the impairment of constitutional jurisdiction.” (See California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 253; See also In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1270 [the commonpractice of the California Supreme Court is to “construe[] statutes, when reasonable, to avoid difficult constitutional questions”].) “An intent to defeat the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction will not be supplied by implication.” (County ofSan Diegov. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 87.) In Matosantos, a statute providedthat all challenges to its validity must be brought in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 253.) A petition challenging the statute, however, was broughtdirectly in this Court. (/bid.) This Court held that it has original jurisdiction, provided by the Constitution, “in all proceedings for extraordinaryrelief in the nature of mandamus,certiorari, and prohibition.” (Zbid.; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) This Court thus construed the challenged statute narrowly as applying only to actions over whichit retains appellate jurisdiction and having no bearing 38 over “special proceedings.” (Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 253.) The same considerations counsel in favor of construing Proposition 66 similarly. 2. Even if Proposition 66 is interpreted to require transfer of petitions to the sentencing court, it merely codifies a procedural rule that directs how habeaspetitions should be processed by the courts. As explained above, Proposition 66 does not mandate that habeas petitions be transferred to the sentencing court in all instances, does not limit or even mention jurisdiction, and therefore does not implicate the original jurisdiction provision. But even if the measure is interpreted as mandatory,it merely codifies rules ofprocedure governing how habeas petitions should be handled. Where the California Constitution vests courts with original jurisdiction, the Legislature cannot defeat or impair that jurisdiction, but can still regulate matters ofjudicial procedure. (Cal. Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 252-53.) The same limitation applies to laws passed bytheinitiative process. (Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 674.) As noted above, every level of the state courts “and their judges haveoriginal jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) Nevertheless, this constitutionally granted jurisdiction is properly subject to procedures enacted by statute. (Peoplev. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737 [in exercising original jurisdiction, Courts of Appeal “must abide by the proceduresset forth in Penal Code sections 1473 through 1508”, citation omitted.) Petitioners’ constitutional challenge to Proposition 66 must be assessed in the contextofthe legislative history of the original jurisdiction provision. This provision wasrevised in 1966. (Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 344.) Before the revision, “it was recognized that a superior court had powerto issue a writ of habeas corpus only on a petition by or on behalf of a person in custody within the same county.” (/bid.) 39 The 1966 revision did away with this geographical limitation, “and imposed no expresslimitation on the current powerofthe courts to exercise ‘original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.’” (/bid.) Although Griggs did not addressthe grant oforiginal jurisdiction to this Court and the Courts of Appeal, it noted that the grant oforiginal jurisdiction to the superior courts to entertain a habeas corpus petition withoutterritorial limitation did not preclude the Court from setting out “rules ofjudicial procedure to be followed by superior courts in the exercise of that unlimited jurisdiction.” (/d. at pp. 346-47; In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583 [analyzing Griggs and noting that “the constitutional expansion of jurisdiction to considerthe issuance of writs of habeas corpusdid not signify that a superior court should give such consideration in every instance’’].) | The original jurisdiction clause meansthat “a petition for writ of habeas corpus maybefiled in the first instant [sic] in the superior court, Court of Appeal, or the California SupremeCourt.” (Jn re Kler (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1403.) But, although a party mayfile a petition in any court, the court need not adjudicate it in every instance. (bid. [“Having original jurisdiction and exercisingit are two separate things”].) “It has long been the law in California that,while a Court of Appeal may have original jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding, it has the discretion to deny a petition without prejudiceif it has not been first presented to the trial court.” (/bid.) “{B]oth trial and appellate courts have jurisdiction over habeas corpuspetitions, but a reviewing court has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpuspetition that was notfiled first in a proper lower court.” (In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692; Application ofHillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.4th 293, 294 [interpreting prior version of the original jurisdiction clause].) And if the petition states a prima facie case for relief, and a petitioner challenges a particular judgment or 40 sentence, existing law is already that “the petition should be transferred to the court which rendered judgmentif that court is a different court from the court wherein the petition wasfiled.” (Griggs v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347; In re Kler, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403.) Thus, even after the 1966 grant of original jurisdiction to all superior courts to entertain any habeaspetitions, this Court enacted “rules ofjudicial procedure”to channelthe petition to the court that entered the judgmentbeing chailenged. Un re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 582 “In the wake ofthe constitutional amendment, this court issued several decisions providing ‘rules ofjudicial procedure to be followed by [the] superior courts in the exercise of[their] unlimited jurisdiction’”’].) Although this Court has not explicitly addressed whether the same authority holds for a grant of original jurisdiction to itself or the Court of Appeal, or whether that authority also inheres in connection with a law passed by the initiative process, the same rationale should apply. Petitioners erroneously argue that Proposition 66 suffers from the sameinfirmity as the rule of court at issue in In re Kler. (Am.Pet. at 26- 27.) There, the Court of Appeal struck a prior version of Ruleof Court | 8.385(c)(2), which stated that a “Court of Appeal must deny without prejudice a petition for writ of habeas corpusthat challenges the denial of parole or the petitioner’s suitability for parole if the issue was not first adjudicated bythetrial court that rendered the underlying judgment.” (Kler, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1402, emphasisin original.) The court noted that this Rule was mandatory on the appellate court, and thus inconsistent with the original jurisdiction provision and this Court’s rule in Inre Roberts. (Id. at p. 1404.) Contrary to petitioners’ argument, Proposition 66 does not mandate that habeas corpuspetitions be transferred in every single instance, instead providing that suchtransfer need not take 4] *o s es dg an ch en g place if “good cause is shown for the petition to be heard by another court.” (New Pen. Code, § 1509(a).) 3. Petitioners’ challenges to Proposition 66’s limits on successive petitions and other provisions do not implicate the original jurisdiction clause. Petitioners also challenge the provisions barring successive habeas petitions, allowingtrial courts to appoint counsel for capital defendants, and giving exclusive jurisdiction to the sentencing court over challenges to execution methods, claiming that these provisions somehow impairthis Court’s original habeasjurisdiction. (Am. Pet. at 24-25.) Notably, petitioners do not demonstrate that any of these provisions actually conflicts with the original jurisdiction clause. (Jbid.) Ultimately, petitioners cannot establish that Proposition 66’s provisions violate the original jurisdiction clause of the California Constitution.* Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the provision granting “exclusive jurisdiction” to the sentencing court over challenges to execution methods does not “rob” any court of habeas jurisdiction—both the Courts of Appeal and this Court retain jurisdiction to review such decisions on these cases through the appellate process. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1(a).)) Indeed, it should be noted that habeas corpus is not generally the appropriate vehicle for challenging execution methods. (Pen. Code,§ 1473 [Every person unlawfully imprisoned orrestrained of his liberty .. . 8 Althoughpetitioners do notraise this claim, the “exclusive jurisdiction” provision for reviewing challenges to a method of execution could be read to conflict with the California Constitution’s grant of original jurisdiction to all courts “in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus,certiorari, and prohibition.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) This Court should construe the provision to avoid any such conflict, just as it did with a similar provision in Matosantos. (Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 253.) 42 may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause ofsuch imprisonmentor restraint.”], emphasis added; People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1068.) | Further, this Court has previously pointed out that “[e]ntertaining the merits of successive petitions is inconsistent with [the] recognition that delayed and repetitious presentation of claims is an abuse of the writ,” and, to that end, imposedlimitations on successive habeas corpus petitions. (Jn re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 769.) Successive petitions “waste scarce judicial resources as the court must repeatedly review the record ofthe trial in order to assess the meritsofthe petitioner’s claims.” (Jd. at p. 770.) Petitioners do not explain whylimits on successive petitions developed by case law are proper, while statutory limits on the same vehicle violate the California Constitution. And courts have likewise approvedlegislation setting the appropriate venue for a given cause of action, which is all the exclusive jurisdiction provision essentially does. (Alexander v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 723, 73.1, citing Caminetti v. Superior Court Jor the City & Cty. ofS.F. (1941) 16 Cal.2d 838, 843.) Petitioners thus cannot show an entitlementto relief for this claim. B. The Separation of Powers Claim Lacks Merit. Petitioners argue that Proposition 66 violates the separation of powers principle by “dictat[ing] the manner in which California’s courts must control their dockets and decide cases when exercising constitutionally granted jurisdiction over automatic appeals and capital habeas corpus petitions.” (Am.Pet. at 30.) They specifically challenge the time limitations on courts considering habeas corpuspetitions’, and the ” The five-yearlimit is not unreasonable, as former ChiefJustice George noted. “[I]t makes sense to take the position that within five years, moreor less, we should know whether a death judgmentis valid and should (continued...) 43 provisions. precluding review of certain habeas petitions, the availability of mandamusrelief to remedy undue delays, and provisions governing appointment of counsel and extension of time requests. Ud. at 30-32.) These provisions are valid regulations ofjudicial procedure.’° 1. The Legislature can enact reasonable restrictions on the constitutional functions of the court. It is well established that the Legislature “may put reasonable restrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts,” as long as these restrictions do not “defeat or materially impair the exercise of those functions.” (Brydonjack v. State Bar ofCal. (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 444) “The Legislature may regulate the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts, by all reasonable means.” (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 192.) (...continued) be carried outor, if it is not, the case should be remanded backto thetrial court for a new trial.” (George, Chief: The Quest for Justice in California (2013) p. 525.) '° Tn their reply in response to respondents’ preliminary opposition, petitioners enumerated 16 different provisions that they purport to challenge under separation ofpowers clause, most of which are not discussedin the petition itself. (Compare Pets. Repl. Supp. Pet. at pp. 13- 15 with Am.Pet. at pp. 35-40.) In any event, noneof these provisions violate the general rule discussed above that the Legislature can place reasonable limitations on the courts’ exercise ofjurisdiction. Instead, most of these provisions involve routine procedural matters, such as grants of extensions oftime, appointment of counsel, andprioritizing review of capital cases. Although someofthese provisions require courts to process these types of cases on an expedited basis, nonerises to the level of creating a constitutional problem. (Cf. In re Shafter-Wasco Irrigation District (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 484 [analyzing statute that required that appeal be heard within three monthsas not requiring dismissal, in order to avoid constitutionalfriction].) 44 This principle has been applied in more recent decisions. In Le Francois v. Goel, this Court stated that “[t]he Legislature may regulate the courts’ inherent powerto resolve specific controversies between parties,” subject only to the narrow limitation that the Legislature “may not defeat or materially impair the courts’ exercise of that power.” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1103-1104.) Therefore, in most matters “the judicial branch mustnecessarily yield to the legislative power to enact statutes.” (Ud. at p. 1104.) In Superior Court v. County ofMendocino, the Court acknowledged that while courts have “inherent power” in certain areas,“[i]t does not follow . . . that the Legislature necessarily violates the separation ofpowers doctrine wheneverit legislates with regard to such an inherent judicial poweror function.” (Superior Court v. Cty. ofMendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 57.) In this vein, this Court has upheld a statute allowing a party to disqualify a trial judge merely byfiling an affidavit, without a judicial determination (Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 693, 696), and a statute fixing punishment for contempt of court (in re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10-11). This Court has also upheld a statute designating days on which a court shall or shall not be in session. (Cty. ofMendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 58.) As this Court has noted, the Legislature has enacted numerousstatutes governing proceduresthat litigants must follow in California courts. (Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1104.) Petitioners cite no case where a court has struck downa statute that established court procedures undera facial challenge on separation of powersprinciples. (Am.Pet. at 31-35.) Instead, petitioners cite cases in as- applied contexts where courts expressed concernsaboutpotential violations of this principle, and adopted a construction of the statute that would avoid constitutional friction. (Am. Pet. at 32-35.) For example, in Oppenheimer v. Ashburn (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 624, the court confronted a statute 45 which imposedcivil liability on judges for refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus, and construed it to avoid separation of powers concerns. (Id. at p. 633 [We therefore concludethat if the section is construedto | mean that a judge in refusing to grant an order for a writ of habeas corpus. .. must do so at pain of forfeiture of the named amount, the section is unconstitutional.”].) In Jn re Shafter-Wasco Irrigation District (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 484, a statute required that an appeal “be heard and determined within three months”after it was filed. The court rejected a party’s argument that a court’s failure to meet this time limit divested the court of jurisdiction. (/d. at p. 488.) And this Court likewise interpreted a statute givingtrial preference to criminal cases in such a wayasto avoid a potential separation of powers problem. (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1152-53; Lorraine v. McComb (1934) 220 Cal.753 [same].) In Le Francois, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1105, this Court noted that a statute which precluded courts from sua sponte reconsidering their own rulings “would directly and materially impair and defeat the court’s most basic functions, exercising its discretion to rule upon controversies between the parties and ensuring the orderly administration ofjustice,” and accordingly adopted a saving construction. (See also Thurmond v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 836, 839-40 [interpreting statute granting automatic continuanceto be subject to the court’s discretion, in light of “serious constitutional questions which would ensue”); Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal.29 [statute allowing executive department to appoint and fix compensation construed as not applying to judicial secretary].) 2. Limitations on untimely and successive habeas corpus petitions do not violate separation of powers. Petitioners claim that limitations on untimely and successive habeas petitions are also “impermissible”restrictions on the ability of the courts to 46 adjudicate habeas corpuspetitions. (Am.Pet. at 35-36.) But they cite no constitutional provision at odds with these limitations, and indeed it would be highly anomalousto hold that an individual has a constitutional right to continually raise challenges to his conviction through a late or successive habeascorpuspetition.'! (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 769.) For one thing, habeas corpus “is no different from other types ofcivil writs that constitute extraordinary relief,” and so may also be subjecttostrict limitations. Wn re Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 453; People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [“Becausea petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeksto collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then to later prove them.”].) By requiring promptassertion of habeas challenges, “we vindicate society’s interest in the finality ofits criminal judgments, as well as the public’s interest ‘in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementationofits laws.” (id. at p. 459, citation omitted.) Moreover, that a party hasa right to file a habeas petition does not mean that the Legislature cannot imposelimitations on that right: “A constitutional right is always subject to reasonable statutory limitations as to the time within which to enforce it, if the constitution itself does not provide otherwise.” (Muller v. Muller (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 815, 819, citation omitted [rejecting constitutional challenge to statute requiring dismissal of civil actions not broughtto trial within 5 years].) This applies with even greater force to habeas petitions. (in re Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 452 [noting “the ample opportunities available to a criminal defendant 'l Indeed, state habeas corpusis not required by the federal constitution. (Murray v. Giarratano (1989) 492 U.S. 1, 10.) 47 to vindicate statutory rights and constitutional guarantees” and “the importanceofthe finality of criminal judgments”’].) In fact, petitioners acknowledge that the case law has developed analogouslimitations on habeaspetitions, including procedural default and bars on repetitious petitions. (/n re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 778,fn. 1; In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th atp. 767.)'* If the voters can enact changes to this Court’s case law throughthe initiative process, they can also codify these judicially-created limits on late and successive petitions. (See Brosnahanv. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 248 [upholding measure that purported to reverse court decisions, noting that “in the absence of some compelling, overriding constitutional imperative, we should not prohibit sovereign people from either expressing or implementing their will on matters of such direct and immediate importance to them as their own perceived safety.”’].) Furthermore, becausepetitionersraise afacial challenge, they have a particularly heavy burdento establish an entitlementto relief. This Court has not articulated a single test for facial challenges, but petitioners must establish at a minimum that Proposition 66 is unconstitutional “in the generality or great majority of cases.” (Un re Guardianship ofAnn S. " Notably, the United States Supreme Court has upheld similar limitations on federal habeas corpuspetitions, enacted as part ofthe Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. (Felker v. Turpin (1996) 518 U.S. 651, 664 [The newrestrictions on [federal] successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on whatis called in habeas corpuspractice ‘abuse of the writ’”]; Crater v. Galaza (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3d 1119, 1127 [rejecting challenge to AEDPA,noting that “judgments for the proper scope”of habeasrelief are within the purview of the legislative branch].) Under federal law, a successive petition must be dismissed unlessit relies on a new retroactive rule of constitutional law, or facts that could not have been previously discovered and that establish a petitioner’s innocence. (28 U.S.C. § 2244, subd. (b)(3).) 48 (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1126,citation omitted; Coffman Specialities, Inc.v. Dep't ofTransportation (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145.) “[T]he plaintiff has a heavy burden to showthestatute is unconstitutionalin all or most cases,” and cannotprevail simply by pointing out that “in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems maypossibly arise as to the particular applicationofthe statute.” (Coffman Specialities, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transportation, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145, citation omitted.) Yet that is precisely what petitioners rely on—alitany of hypothetical scenarios where Proposition 66 mightbarcertain capital defendants from raising a habeas claim does not meettheir burden. (Am.Pet. at 37-38.) This does not suffice undera facial challenge because it does not demonstrate that “under any andall circumstances,” the measure “necessarily will ‘defeat’ or ‘materially impair’ a court’s fulfillmentof its constitutional duties.” _ (Superior Court v. Cty. ofMendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Forthese reasons, this Court should reject the separation of powers claim. While Proposition 66 imposes limitations on the scope of habeas corpus appeals and sets timelimits for a court decision, those limitations do not “defeat”or “materially impair” the courts’ exercise of their constitutional functions to resolve appeals and habeaspetitions, and area . far cry from the statutes for which courts have expressed concerns about '? Petitioners contend, without any factual support, that Proposition 66’s provisions “make far more likely” the execution of an innocentperson. (Am.Pet. at 39.) This disregards the fact that capital defendants are afforded numerous opportunities to raise viable legal claims. And the measure explicitly preserves a safety valve for actual innocence claims. (New Pen. Code, § 1509, subd. (d) [providing for dismissal of untimely or successive habeaspetitions “unless the court finds . . . that the defendantis actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted oris ineligible for the sentence’’].) 49 separation of powers.’ And noconstitutional provision cited prevents enactmentofstatutes limiting repetitive or other procedurally improper habeaspetitions.’° C. Petitioners’ Equal Protection Claim Fails. Lastly, petitioners raise an equal protection challenge to Proposition 66. They contend that the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1134 in 2016 to allow any criminal defendant, whether capital or non-capital, “to pursue a successive claim for habeasrelief regarding factual innocence.” (Am.Pet. at 52.) They argue that Proposition 66 violates the equal protection rights of capital defendants, because it somehow “removes[them] from the pool of persons who may pursue a successive petition” under Senate Bill 1134 by claiming factual innocence. (Jd. at 52.) This argument fails.’ ‘4 A defendant could seek individualrelief if there were groundsto contend that the time limits imposed by Proposition 66 were inconsistent with due process on the facts ofhis or her particular case. Petitioners do not raise any due process argumentsaspart oftheir facial challenge. (See Am.Pet. at 10 § 27.) 'S Petitioners claim that the time limitations that the measure imposes will be unworkable, result in increased expenditures, and “will result in confusion and upheavalin this Court.” (See, e.g., Am. Pet. at pp. 2-3 45; pp. 6-8 §F 18, 20-21.) Such predicted dire consequences and forecasts of “judicial chaos” do not suffice, without more,to invalidate a measure approved by the voters. (See Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 349 [rejecting constitutional challenge based on purported “great delays and soaring financial costs”]; Cf. Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 261 [“[P]etitioners’ forecast ofjudicial and educational chaos is exaggerated and wholly conjectural, based upon essentially unpredictable fiscal or budgetary constraints.”].) '6 Tn their Amended Petition, petitioners raised an argument under Penal Code section 1485.55. (Am.Pet. at 52-53.) As respondents’ preliminary opposition explained, this statute does not authorizethe filing of habeas corpuspetitions at all. (Resps.’ Prelim. Opp. at 20-21.) In their subsequentpleadings, petitioners have withdrawn any claim under section (continued...) 50 Although Senate Bill 1134 added provisions to the Penal Code to allow individuals to bring a habeaspetition in certain situations, it did not address successive petitions. Apart from amendingsection 1485.55 (which does not address habeaspetitions), Senate Bill 1134 amended Penal Code section 1473. But these amendments did not makeavailable to any criminal defendant, capital or otherwise, the ability to file successive habeas petitions. Petitioners’ factual premise for their equal protection claim is therefore faulty. Additionally, petitioners cannot establish that capital defendants are similarly situated to non-capital defendants for purposes oftheir equal protection claim. Whena lawis challenged under the equalprotection clause, the court first ascertains whether it affords different treatment to similarly situated groups. (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) “This initial inquiry is not whether personsare similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whetherthey are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’” (/bid., citation omitted.) As this Court has previously and unambiguously determined, “capital and non-capital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore maybetreated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due process of law.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [“Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.”].) (...continued) 1485.55, and respondents accordingly will not address that. (Pets.’ Reply Supp.Pet. at 45 fn.10.) 51 Here, there are numerous reasons why the voters could haverationally elected to limit the availability of successive habeaspetitions for individuals convicted of capital offenses. Death penalty cases are different, and are afforded a panoply of added protections that are not available to other defendants. For example, indigent capital defendants are entitled to appointed counsel for postconviction proceedings. (New Pen. Code, § 1509(b); New Gov.Code, § 68662.) They are entitled to seek second trial counsel. (Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 431.) Capital defendants also receive an automatic appealto this Court. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) On appeal, capital defendants are entitled to “an examination of the record and the preparation of a formal opinion and decision from whichit should appear that no miscarriage ofjustice has resulted.” (People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 833.) Indeed, as this Court has noted in thepast, “vis-a-vis other states, we authorize more moneyto pay postconviction counsel, authorize more money for postconviction investigation, [and] allow counselto file habeas corpus petitions containing more pages.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 456- 57, footnotes omitted.) In light of these and other robust procedural and substantive protections, the voters could properly choose to apply a more stringent standard to successive petitionsfiled in capital cases.” . '” Additionally, the voters could have reasonedthat successive habeas corpuspetitions rarely raise meritorious claims, a fact borne out by this Court’s past observations. (/n re Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 457 (“Absent the unusualcircumstanceof somecritical evidencethatis truly ‘newly discovered’ under our law, or a change in the law, such successive petitionsrarely raise an issue even remotely plausible, let alone state a prima facie case for actualrelief”); Jn re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 806 (“[D]eath row inmates have an incentive to delay assertion of habeas corpus claims that is not shared by other prisoners.”] (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) 52 Further, petitioners’ equal protection claim also fails because they: cannot meetthe high standard to showthat anylegislative distinction was irrational. Absent a legislative classification that treats similarly situated individuals “on the basis of race, gender, or someothercriteria calling for heightenedscrutiny, [courts] review the legislation to determine whether the legislative classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” (People v. Moreno(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934, 939.) “This standard ofrationality does not depend upon whether lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated.” (Johnsonv. Dep't of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881, citation omitted.) This Court may “engage in ‘rational speculation’ asto the justifications forthe legislative choice,’” andit is immaterial whether such speculation “has a foundation in the record.” (/bid., citation omitted.) Thus, underrational basis review,it eeis the petitioners’ burden to “‘negative every conceivable basis’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (/bid.) Andifthere is a “plausible basis” for the challenged disparity, ““courts may not second-guess its ‘wisdom,fairness, or logic.’” (Jbid., citation omitted.) In applying rational basis review, courts defer to the Legislature’s classifications. (Johnson v. Dep’t ofJustice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887.) “A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply becausethere is an 999‘imperfect fit between means and ends’” or because it may be underor over-inclusive. (/bid.) Here, any of the aforementioned reasonsare valid and rational distinctions why the voters could have decided to enact | limitations on the ability of capital defendants to bring successive petitions. And the measureretains a safety valve for claims of actual innocence. (New Pen. Code § 1509, subd. (d).) Petitioners have simply not ““negative[d] every conceivable basis’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Dep’t ofJustice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 53 881.) Under the deferential rational basis review, the measure amply meets the test.!® II. IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT PROPOSITION 66 UNLAWFULLY INTERFERES WITH THE JURISDICTION OF CALIFORNIA’S COURTS, VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS, OR VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION, THE COURT CAN SEVER THE OFFENDING PROVISIONS. Althoughpetitioners request that this Court invalidate Proposition 66 in its entirety, they are only entitled to that remedy if they succeed ontheir single-subject claim. The measure contains a severability clause, whichstates that if any of its provisions are deemedinvalid or unconstitutional, “the remaining provisions and applications which can be given effect without the invalid or unconstitutional provision or application shall not be affected, but shall remain in full force and effect.” (Pets.’ App. of Exhibits, Exh. 3 at p. 28.) Although such severability clauses are not conclusive, “a severability clause normally calls for sustaining the valid part of the enactment, especially when the invalid part is mechanically severable.” (CalfarmIns. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 821, citation omitted.) Three criteria are necessary for severability: “the invalid provision must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.” (/bid.) “The remaining provisions must stand on their own, unaided by the invalid provisions nor rendered vague by their absence norinextricably connected to them by policy considerations.” (People’s Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 316, 332.) '8 Petitioners raise an equal protection claim under the California and federal constitutions. (Am.Pet. at 15, 53.) Both equal protection clauses are “substantially equivalent and analyzed in a similar fashion.” (People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 674.) 54 To the extent the Court determinesthat any ofthe provisionsare unlawful, these provisions can be severedto allow the remaining aspects of the measureto take effect. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court should denythepetition. Dated: February 27, 2017 Respectfully submitted, XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California DOUGLASJ. WOODS Senior Assistant Attorney General MARC A. LEFORESTIER Supervising Deputy Attorney General Heys espondents Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., and Attorney General Xavier Becerra SA2016104414 20949587.doc 55 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached RETURN TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE; SUPPORTING MEMORANDUMusesa 13 point Times New Romanfont and contains 11,265 words. Dated: February 27, 2017 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California Attorneysfor Respondents Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., and Attorney General Xavier Becerra 56 DECLARATION OF SERVICE BYU.S. MAIL Case Name: Ron Briggs, et al. v. Jerry Brown,et al. No.: §238309 I declare: I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a memberofthe California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and nota party to this matter. Iam familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney Generalfor collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondenceplaced in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney Generalis deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business. On February 27, 2017, I served the attached RETURN TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE; SUPPORTING MEMORANDUMbyplacinga true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004, addressed as follows: Christina Von der Ahe Rayburn Attorney at Law Orrick, Herringon & Sutcliffe LLP 2050 Main St., Suite 1100 Irvine, CA 92614 Lillian Jennifer Mao Attorney at Law Orrick, Herringon & Sutcliffe LLP 1000 Marsh Rd. Menlo Park, CA 94025 David P. Mastagni Attorney at Law Mastagni Hoistedt, APC 1912 I Street Sacramento, CA 95811 Kent S. Scheidegger Attorney at Law Criminal Justice Legal Foundation 2131 “L”Street Sacramento, CA 95816 Charles H. Bell, Jr. Terry J. Martin Bell McAndrews & Hiltachk, LLP 455 Capitol Mall, Suite 600 Sacramento, CA 95814 | Michele A. Hanisee Attorney at Law Los Angeles County, District Attorney 555 West Sth Street, Suite 31101 Los Angeles, CA 90013 I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsof the State of California the foregoing is true and correct andthat this declaration was executed on February 27, 2017, at San Francisco, California. M.T. Otanes Declarant $A2016104414 20949698.doc gnature /