RAND RESOURCES v. CITY OF CARSONAmicus Curiae Brief of League of California Cities and California State Association of CountiesCal.February 28, 2017FILED IN THE FEB 28 2017 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Case No. S8235735 Jorge Navarreie Clerk Deputy RAND RESOURCES,LLC,etal. Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Respondents, Vv. CITY OF CARSON,et al. Defendants, Respondents, and Petitioners. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES AND CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES’ APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICI CURI4E BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CITY OF CARSON; PROPOSED AMICI CURIAE BRIEF On Review From the Court ofAppeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One Appellate Case No. B264493 After An Appeal From The Superior Court for the State of California County ofLos Angeles, Case No. BC564093 Hon. Michael L. Stern, Judge Presiding Thomas B. Brown, Bar No. 104524 *Amy E. Hoyt, Bar No. 149789 Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1600 Iowa Avenue, Suite 250 Riverside, CA 92507-7426 Tel: 951-788-0100 / Fax: 951-788-5785 Email: ahoyt@bwslaw.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES and CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES Case No. 8235735 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA RAND RESOURCES,LLC,etal. Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Respondents, V. CITY OF CARSON,et al. Defendants, Respondents, and Petitioners. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES AND CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES’ APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORTOF CITY OF CARSON; PROPOSED AMICI CURIAE BRIEF On Review From the Court ofAppeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One Appellate Case No. B264493 After An Appeal From The Superior Court for the State of California County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC564093 Hon. Michael L. Stern, Judge Presiding ThomasB. Brown, Bar No. 104524 *Amy E. Hoyt, Bar No. 149789 Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1600 Iowa Avenue, Suite 250 Riverside, CA 92507-7426 Tel: 951-788-0100 / Fax: 951-788-5785 Email: ahoyt@bwslaw.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIACITIES and CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF To The Honorable Presiding Justices: Pursuant to Rule 8.520, subdivision (f), of the California Rules of Court, the League of California Cities (League) and California State Association of Counties (CSAC) submit this application to file an Amici Curiae brief in support of Petitioner and Defendant City of Carson (City or Carson). This application is made within 30 days after the reply briefwas filed and is thus timely. Identity OfAmici Curiae And Statement Of Interest: The Leagueis an association of 475 California cities dedicated to protecting and restoring local control to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents, and to enhance the quality of life for all Californians. The League is advised by its Legal Advocacy Committee, comprised of 24 city attorneys from all regions ofthe State. The Committee monitorslitigation of concern to municipalities, and identifies those cases that have statewide or nationwidesignificance. The Committee has identified this case as having such significance. The California State Association of Counties (CSAC)is a non-profit corporation. The membership consists of the 58 California counties. CSACsponsorsa Litigation Coordination Program, which is administered by the County Counsels’ Association of California and is overseen by the Association’s Litigation Overview Committee, comprised of county counsels throughoutthe state. The Litigation Overview Committee monitors litigation of concern to counties statewide and has determinedthat this case is a matter affecting all counties. The League and CSACbelievethat their joint submittal will assist the Court in deciding the issues on review regarding the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure! section 425.16. The League and CSAC represent the hundreds of California cities and counties that frequently engage in speech and conduct protected by the anti-SLAPPstatute. As such, the League and CSAC havea strong interest in the issues presented in this case and will provide a unique and important perspective. Cities and counties often face meritless lawsuits arising from their protected speech and conduct and, typically, these lawsuits are defended with taxpayer dollars. Cities and counties thus havea critical interest in ensuring that a special motion to strike under section 425.16 remains a viable option to dispose of meritless claimsat the early pleading stage. If the Court ofAppeal’s interpretation is adopted, however, section 425.16 would no longer present such an option. That interpretation departs from the well-established rule that section 425.16 must be interpreted broadly. Adoption of the Court ofAppeal’s interpretation would undermine and frustrate section 425.16’s purpose and lead to extendedlitigation of ' Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the California Code of Civil Procedure. meritless lawsuits against cities and counties at the taxpayer’s expense. This would negatively impact cities and counties, their taxpayers, and judicial economy. Counsel for the League and CSAC have examinedthe briefs on file in this case and are familiar with the issues involved and do notseek to duplicate that briefing. The League and CSACconfirm that no one and no party other than Proposed Amici and their counsel of record made any contribution of any kindto assist in preparation of this brief or made any monetary contribution to fund the preparation ofthe brief. Because the League and CSAC havea stronginterest in ensuring the viability of special motionsto strike under section 425.16 as a means of disposing ofmeritless litigation, they respectfully request that the Court accept the accompanying amici curiae brieffor filing in this matter. Dated: February 23, 2017 Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1600 Iowa Avenue, Suite 250 Riverside, CA 92507-7426 py Ciny Ebfowt Thomas B. Bréwh J *Amy E. Hoyt Attorneys for Amici Curiae LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIACITIES and CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES Case No. 8235735 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA RAND RESOURCES, LLC,et al. Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Respondents, V. CITY OF CARSON,et al. Defendants, Respondents, and Petitioners. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES AND CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES’ PROPOSED AMICI CURIAE BRIEF On Review From the Court ofAppeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One Appellate Case No. B264493 After An Appeal From The Superior Court for the State of California County ofLos Angeles, Case No. BC564093 Hon. Michael L. Stern, Judge Presiding ThomasB. Brown, Bar No. 104524 *AmyE. Hoyt, Bar No. 149789 Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1600 Iowa Avenue, Suite 250 Riverside, CA 92507-7426 Tel: 951-788-0100 / Fax: 951-788-5785 Email: ahoyt@bwslaw.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES and CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT............... 1 Il. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 0.00. ccceesssceseeeeseesseessceeseeeessesneensens 2 TH. LEGAL ANALYSIS ooocceeesscesseeeseeecessesssesseesensesseeeaeenseees 3 A. The Court OfAppeal Ignored The Legislature’s Mandate That Section 425.16 Must Be Interpreted BroadLy.0........eeeeeseceseceesecccesscessncceessscessecesseeesseecsseeessseessseees 3 B. The Causes OfAction Arise From A Public Issue And An Issue Of Public Interest.0........ cc cccssccsssessessccssseeseeseeseeees 5 l. The Court ofAppeal’s narrow characterization of the issue as solely related to the identity of the City’s representative lacks legal foundation......... 5 2. But even assumingthe issueis only the identity of the City’s representative, the representative’s identity is still a public issue and an issue of public interest 0...ceecccesseeseeceeeeseeseeeseseeessesreees 6 C. The Causes OfAction Arise Out Of Communications MadeIn Connection With An Issue Under Consideration By The City And The Court Of Appeal’s Conclusion To The Contrary Impermissibly Adds A Temporal Limit To The Statute Not FoundIn The Statute’s Express Language...........:...:ccssessscsssessseessessenes 9 V. CONCLUSION....ce ceecesecesessesseeesssseessesssecsessessceseesaseseeseseaseaasseeeeenaes 11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) State Cases Briggs v. Eden Councilfor Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 oo.eesecesessecseesesseecseeeseeeesseessseseeessssaeeaserses 4 Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 CalApp.4th 1138 ooeeeeneeseeeseeeseeeeeseersseessessesatenseees 7 City ofMontebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.Sth 409 oooeeecececssessceesseeeessessseessesesceseeseesesesssensensees 2,4 Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 9 Cal4th 47 ooecececeesceseceeseeneceesseeeecesseceanesessnersnsenseas 4,8, 10 Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services Inc. (2005) 129 CalApp.4th 1050 oo... ecceeceesscesecesscesseeesseeeseeeseessesseessess 7 Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 78 oo...secscccsseescessceseceseeeseeeeeeesaceeesaesenseseessesseeesese 4 McGarry v. University ofSan Diego (2007) 154 CalApp.4th 97 oooceeesesseseeseceseseseeeeceeeseeessseseassesseeseeess 7 Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 CalApp.4th 175 ooo.eeceeeeseceseceseesseeseeecessessseeesenses 10, 11 Sipple v. Foundationfor National Progress (1999) 71 CaLApp.4th 226 ooo. ceeccsceesessessesssesssessnesessesessesssesseaeensenees 7 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court (2008) 159 CalApp.4th 381 ooo.cescseesseesseesseeeesceeesressessnesseseeess 10 State Statutes Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16 oooeeeseseeesceeceessetsecesseseteneeesceeeesentsespassim Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16(€)........ cc cccccccessecessecsseeeeesseeeeesesseeseesssersnsaes 2,10 Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16(€)(2) 0... eeeeesceesssceccestsesensessreeesteseeseeess 2, 10, 11 Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16(€)(4) ......ccccesscsssssssessnsessseessseecesatessneeseeeseesues 2,5 -ii- I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Legislature adopted the anti-SLAPPstatute in response to what it called a disturbing increasein the use oflitigation to chill protected speech and petitioning activity. It created an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike that could be used to quickly dispose of meritless lawsuits that arise from protected activity and stated emphatically that the anti-SLAPP statute is to be broadly interpreted. The Court ofAppeal’s decision does grave harm to the Legislative’s explicit mandate by concluding, without reasoned analysis,that the identity of the City’s representative charged with negotiating a multi-billion dollar NFL stadium dealis not a public issue. To the contrary, the identity of the representative is absolutely a public issue because the negotiator’s skill, experience, and contactsarecritical in achieving a favorable outcometo the negotiations. The League and CSACsubmitthis brief because the Court of Appealclearly erred in concluding that Rand Resources, LLC and Carson El Camino, LLC’s (Rand) causesof action for breach of and interference with an exclusive agency agreement (EAA)to negotiate on the City’s behalf for development of an NFL stadium in the City do not arise out of a “public issue or an issue of public interest” or communications made “in connection with an issue under consideration” by the City. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion ignores (1) the Legislature’s mandate that section 425.16 must be interpreted broadly; (2) the majority of cases that have analyzed the “public issue” and “issue ofpublic interest” language found in section 425.16(e)(4); and (3) the plain language,“in connection with,” found in section 425.16(e)(2). As the League and CSAC explain below,the identity of the company or person(s) responsible for negotiating a multi-billion dollar deal on the City’s behalf is an issue of public interest because the negotiator’s skills, contacts and experience will directly impact whether a dealis ultimately struck and whatthe termsofthat deal will be. Moreover, the meaning of the phrase “in connection with an issue under consideration or review”clearly encompasses the terms of the EAA. The League and CSACtherefore urge this Court to reject the Court ofAppeal’s interpretation and affirm the trial court’s decision. Il. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK In section 425.16(e), the Legislature described the type of activities it intended the anti-SLAPPstatute to protect. City ofMontebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422. Section 425.16(e) identifies four categories of conduct and speech that constitute “acts in furtherance of a person’s right ofpetition or free speech.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §425.16(e). /f/ The issues on review correspond to two ofthose categories, as follows: e Subdivision (e)(2), which identifies “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review bya legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any otherofficial proceeding authorized by law;” and e Subdivision (e¢)(4), which includes “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise ofthe constitutional right ofpetition or the constitutional right of free ‘speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Rand argues and the Court of Appeal concluded that neither of these subdivisions covers the City’s speech and conduct here. The City has ably demonstrated whythatis incorrect and the League and CSACagree with those arguments. The League and CSACwrite separately to further explain whythe Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 425.16 should be rejected. Il. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. The Court OfAppeal Ignored The Legislature’s Mandate That Section 425.16 Must Be Interpreted Broadly. The overarching problem with the Court ofAppeal’s statutory interpretation is that it completely ignores the Legislature’s explicit mandate that section 425.16 be interpreted broadly. This Court recently confirmed that mandate in City ofMontebellov. Vasquez, supra, | Cal.Sth 409. Noting the Legislature’s directive that “the anti-SLAPP statute is to be ‘construed broadly’ so as to ‘encourage continued participation in matters ofpublic significance,’” this Court held that the “statutory protection of acts ‘in furtherance’ of the constitutional rights incorporated by section 425.16 may extend beyond the contours of the constitutional rights themselves.” City ofMontebello v. Vasquez, supra, at 422, citing Code of Civ. Pro § 425.16(a) and (b)(1). City ofMontebello v. Vasquez does not stand alone in recognizing the Legislature’s mandate to broadly interpret section 425.16. For example, in Briggs v. Eden Councilfor Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117, 1118, this Court explained that the “Legislature’s stated intent is best served, therefore, by a construction of section 425.16 that broadly encompassesparticipation in official proceedings ....” See also, Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 78, 36-737 (noting that the Legislature intended the statute to “broadly”protect petitioning activity); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 9 Cal.4th 47, 60 (noting Legislative mandate to broadly interpret the anti-SLAPPstatute). In sum,thereis clear direction from both the Legislature andthis Court that section 425.16 must be broadly interpreted to effectuate its -4- purpose ofproviding a method to promptly dispose of meritless lawsuits that arise from protected speech and conduct. Despite this, the Court of Appealelected to narrowly construe subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4). B. The Causes Of Action Arise From A Public Issue And An Issue Of Public Interest. In addition to failing to recognize the mandate to broadly interpret section 425.16, the Court ofAppeal also departed from case law interpreting section 425.16(e)(4)’s “public issue” and “issue ofpublic interest” category. Contrary to the Court ofAppeal’s finding, Rand’s causes of action arise from a public issue and an issue of public interest. 1. The Court of Appeal’s narrow characterization of the issue assolely related to the identity of the City’s representative lacks legal foundation. Asa preliminary matter, the League and CSACnotethat the Court ofAppeal characterized the issue not as involving the possibility of an NFL stadium in the City, which no one disputes is an issue carrying enormous public interest, but rather as solely involving the identity ofthe City’s representative in those negotiations. The Court ofAppeal failed to provide any legal justification for narrowing the issue so myopically. Giventhe fact that the anti-SLAPPstatute is to be interpreted broadly, and given the lack ofprincipled basis for narrowing the issue to solely the identity of the City’s representative, the Court ofAppeal’s characterization is flawed. 2. But even assumingtheissue is only the identity of the City’s representative, the representative’s identity is still a public issue and an issue of public interest. But even assumingthat the issue is properly narrowed to simply the identity ofthe City’s negotiating representative, the representative’s identity is still a public issue and an issue of public interest. The Court of Appeal concluded otherwise, but provided no analysis for why it reached that conclusion. To the League and CSAC,it seems obviousthat the identity of the party representing the City in its negotiations to bring an NFL team and stadium to the City is a matter of the highest possible public interest. Such negotiations are complex and will profoundly affect the City’s residents for generations to come. Successfulornot, the negotiations will directly impact the City’s finances, the local economy, whether hundreds of thousands of workers have jobs, and how the City’s physical environment is or is not developed. Accordingly, the parties seem to agree that the terms of the deal itself are plainly in the public interest. Those terms, however, are inextricably linked with the identity of the negotiator. With so muchat stake in negotiating a multi-billion dollar deal to bring an NFLstadium to the City, the identity, expertise, contacts, and experience of the negotiator are every bit as mucha part of the public interest as the deal itself. One cannot be separated from the other. This is so because the identity, competence, contacts, and experience ofthe -6- companyorperson(s) the City selects to represent it in such negotiations are outcome determinative of the City’s successful resolution of the negotiations. Therefore, because the decision as to the City’s representative in negotiations will in many ways determine the City’s very future,it is quintessentially in the public interest. Whenviewedin the context of other cases in which courts have found issuesto be of public interest, it becomes even more obviousthat the identity of the City’s negotiating representative for its stadium dealis a public issue. The courts have foundthere to be issues of public interest under muchless compelling circumstances. See, e.g Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1141-42, 1145-47 (derogatory comments made on websites about businessman an issue of public interest); McGarry v. University ofSan Diego (2007) 154 Cal-App.4th 97 (firing of college football coach an issue of public interest); Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050 (age discrimination lawsuit based on on-airridicule of plaintiff an issue of public interest); and Sipple v. Foundationfor National Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 236-240 (political consultant’s alleged domestic violence an issue of public interest). In light of this case law, there is simply no basis for concluding that the identity of the City’s negotiating representative for a multi-million dollar stadium dealis not a public issue or an issue ofpublic interest. To the contrary, the representative will be directly responsible for decisions and negotiations that will have profound impacts on the City’s (indeed the region’s) population, environment, economy, and finances for generations. One would be hard-pressed to imagine a decision that would more prominently affect the public interest in a community. Randand the Court ofAppeal warn that finding that the causes of action at issue here arise from a public issue would renderall business disputes subject to anti-SLAPP motions and makeall contracts with public agencies unenforceable. These warningsare absurd ontheir face. First, the anti-SLAPPstatute’s second prong—probability of success on the merits—protects against precisely this concern. Even if a cause of action arises from protected activity, if the plaintiff can demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, the special motionto strike will be denied. The second prong thus ensures that only meritless lawsuits that arise from protected conduct are dismissed; those that have a probability of success may proceed. Second, finding that Rand’s causes of action arise from the very public issue ofwho is negotiating on the City’s behalf for an NFL stadium merely effectuates section 425.16’s plain language. As this Court explained in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 9 Cal.4th at 66, the judiciary is “well advised not to upset the Legislature’s carefully crafted scheme for disposing of SLAPPs quickly and at minimal expense to -8- taxpayers andlitigants.” In short, the identity of the City’s representative in negotiations to bring a multi-million dollar NFL stadium to the City is patently a public issue. One mustask,ifthat is not a public issue, what is? If such a cause of action is not subject to a special motion to strike, what cause of action would be? Cc. The Causes Of Action Arise Out Of Communications Made In Connection With An Issue Under Consideration By The City And The Court Of Appeal’s Conclusion To The Contrary Impermissibly Adds A Temporal Limit To The Statute Not Found In The Statute’s Express Language. In addition to its clear error in finding that the causes of action do not arise from a public issue, the Court of Appeal found that the communications were not made “in connection with an issue under consideration or review.” The Court ofAppeal reached this conclusion becausethe communications—speechthat allegedly breached the EAA—occurred more than twelve months before the City Council madeits decision not to renew the EAA. Opinion, p. 15. The Court of Appeal concluded that because of this time lag, the protected speech wassolely made in connection with the alleged breach of contract and not “in connection with an issue under consideration or review.” Opinion, p. 15. There are at least two significant flaws with this position. First, section 425.16’s plain language does not include any such temporal limitation. Section 425.16, subdivision (e) states that “acts in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech”include “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review bya legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(2). Subdivision (e)(2) does not require that the written or oral statement must be made within a certain number of days, weeks, or months ofthe official proceeding. It does not include any time constraints whatsoever. The Court of Appeal’s interpretation thus adds a temporal limitation that is not foundin the statute’s plain language. Neither the parties nor the courts may re-write the statute to add such a requirement. Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 9 Cal.4th at 59. In fact, this Court has expressly declined to inject additional requirements into section 425.16. See, id. at 57 (rejecting request to read an “intent to chill speech” requirement into section 425.16). Second, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation ignoresthat the “in connection with” language not only does not suggest a temporallimitation, it requires the opposite: a broad reading. See, e.g., Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 381, 389. Under the phrase’s ordinary meaning, it -10- broadly includes anything that relates to or regards any issue under review by the City. Section 425.16(e)(2) must be interpreted accordingto its plain language. Jd. at 59. The Court of Appeal’s narrow reading ofthe phrase is thus contrary to its plain meaning, and to the accepted understanding of the language “in connection with” the Legislature chose. In short, the Court of Appeal defied the Legislature in two ways. It invented a temporallimitation the Legislature did not impose,andit ignored the broad “in connection with” language the Legislature did use. Vv. CONCLUSION This Court should reject the Court ofAppeal’s incorrect interpretation of section 425.16. That interpretation violates the Legislature’s emphatic mandate to broadly interpret the anti-SLAPP statute as follows: e It illogically concludes, without reasoned analysis, that the decision about whowill negotiate a deal that will impact the City, and perhaps the region, for generations is somehowless important than the deal itself, and thus does not affect the public interest; and. e It impermissibly re-writes section 425.16(e)(2) to invent a temporal requirement that the Legislature chose not to impose and that actually conflicts with the broad “in connection with” languagethat the Legislature did use. -lil- If the Court ofAppeal’s interpretation is adopted, it is fair to say that the special anti-SLAPP motionto strike will no longer be a viable option for responding to many lawsuits arising from protected speech and conduct. Given that the purpose of section 425.16 is to allow these motions to avoid unnecessary expense to taxpayers, the League and CSACurgethis Court to reject the Court ofAppeal’s interpretation and affirm the trial court’s decision. Dated: February 23, 2017 Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1600 Iowa Avenue, Suite 250 Riverside, CA 92507-7426 By: Mey toe ThomasB. Boys *AmyE. Ho Attorneys for Amici Curiae LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES and CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES -12- CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.204(c)(1) I herebycertify that this brief has been prepared using proportionately double-spaced 13 point Times New Roman typeface. According to the word count feature in my Microsoft Word software,this brief contains 3,114 words. I declare under penalty ofperjury under the lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: February 23, 2017 Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 1600 Iowa Avenue, Suite 250 Riverside, CA 92507-7426 By: (A, etext ThomasB. Brown *AmyE. Hoyt Attorneys for Amici Curiae LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES and CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES PROOF OF SERVICE I declare that I am over the age of eighteen (18) and not a partyto this action. My business address is 1600 Iowa Avenue,Suite 250, Riverside, California 92507. On February 23, 2017, I served the following document(s): LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES AND CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES’ APPLICATION FOR LEAVETO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEFIN SUPPORT OF CITY OF CARSON; PROPOSED AMICI CURIAEBRIEFonthe interested parties in this action by placing a true and correct copy of such document, enclosedin a sealed envelope, addressed as follows: SERVICE LIST (Update: 01-26-17) Rand Resources, LLC,et al. v. City of Carson,et al. Supreme Court Case No.: S-235735 [2™! Appellate Case No. B264493 LASC Case No. BC564093} COUNSEL: REPRESENTING: VIA OVERNIGHT COURIER Joseph Ybarra, Esq. Aaron M.May,Esq. HUANG YBARRA SINGER & MAY 550 South Hope Avenue, Suite 1850 Los Angeles, California 90071 Attorneysfor Plaintiffs, Appellants & Respondents RAND RESOURCES, LLC and CARSON EL CAMINO, LLC (1 Copy) TEL : 213-884-4900 FAX : 213-884-4910 E-mail: VIA OVERNIGHT COURIER Sunny K.Soltani, Esq. William W. Wynder, Esq. *AnthonyR.Taylor, Esq. Christina M. Burrows, Esq. ALESHIRE & WYNDER 18881 Von Karman Avenue,Suite 1700 Irvine, California 92612 Attorneys for Defendants, Respondents & Petitioners CITY OF CARSONand JAMES DEAR (1 Copy) TEL : 949-223-1170 FAX : 949-223-1180 E-mail: ataylor@awattorneys.com VIA OVERNIGHT COURIERJohn V. Tamborelli, Esq.TAMBORELLI LAW GROUP21700 Oxnard Street, Suite 1590 Attorneys for Defendants andRespondents LEONARDBLOOM ANDU.S. CAPITAL,LLC COUNSEL: REPRESENTING: Woodland Hills, California 91367 (1 Copy) TEL : 818-710-3696 FAX : 818-710-3695 E-mail: Jtamborelli@lawtlg.com U.S. MAIL Court of Appeal Clerk of the Court Case No. B264493 COURT OF APPEAL (1 Copy) Second Appellate District — Division 1 Ronald Reagan State Building TEL : 213-830-7000 300 S. Spring Street 2™4 Floor, North Tower Los Angeles, California 90013 U.S. MAIL LASC Judge Hon. Michael L. Stern LASC Case No. BC564093 LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (1 Copy) . 111 N.Hill Street, Department 62 Los Angeles, California 90012 VIA OVERNIGHT COURIER AND Supreme Court ELECTRONICALLY (Original plus 8 copies and 1 Clerk of the Court copyelectronically submitted) SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 350 McAllister Street, Room 1295 Tel: 415-865-7000 San Francisco, California 94102-4797 (xX) (Xx) () BY U.S. MAILas noted. I am readily familiar with the business’ practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I know that the correspondence was deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same day this declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. I know that the envelope was sealed and, with postage thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date in the United States mail at Riverside, California. [CCP § 1012; 1013; 1013a] BY OVERNIGHT COURIER,as noted. I caused the above- referenced document(s) to be deposited in a box or otherfacility regularly maintained by the overnight courier, or I delivered the above-referenced document(s) to an overnight courier service, for delivery to the above addressee(s). [CCP §1013] BY FACSIMILE. Thefacsimile transmission of the foregoing documentwas reported as complete and withouterror. A copy of the transmission report as issued by the transmission facsimile machineis attachedpursuantto California Rules of Court, Rule 2.306(h)(4). [CRC 2.306(a)(b)(d)(f)\(g)(h)]. [Pursuant to Agreement between counsel — fax service pursuant to Rule 2.251(b)(1)(A), CRC]. ( ) BY EMAIL.I caused the document (without enclosures) described above,to be sent via email in PDF format to the above-referenced person(s) at the email addresses listed. [Pursuant to Agreement between counsel — electronic service pursuant to Rule 2.251(b)(1)(A), CRC]. ( ) BY PERSONAL SERVICE.I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the above-referenced person(s) at the above address(s). [CCP § 1011] (xX) BY E-FILING AND/OR E-SUBMISSION,I caused the document described above, to be sent via E-Filing and/or E- Submission in PDF format to the above-referenced person(s) via the Supreme Court’s E-Filing and/or E-Submission Portals. Executed February 23, 2017 Riverside, California. (xX) (State) I declare under penalty ofperjury under the laws ofthe State of California that the aboveis true and correct. / Ld! ug YECHENSLEY77
