KIRCHNER (KRISTOPHER) ON H.C.

Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits

Cal.September 12, 2016

IN THE SUPREME COURTOF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COUR? No.: 8233508 SEP { 2 2016 No.: D067920 Frank A. McGuire Clerk In re KRISTOPHER KIRCHNER —— eon on Habeas Corpus (Super. Ct. Nos. eputy HC21804, CRN26291) a n e e e PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS From the Court of Appeal, Fourth District Division One, Reversing the Trial Court’s Grantof Petitioner’s Habeas CorpusPetition --0000000-- RANDYMIZE, Chief Deputy Office of the Primary Public Defender County of San Diego ABBEYJ. NOEL State Bar #239258 Deputy Public Defenders 250 East Main Street, Sixth Floor E] Cajon, CA 92020 Telephone: (619) 441-4804 Attorneys for Petitioner KRISTOPHER KIRCHNER IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re KRISTOPHER KIRCHNER on Habeas Corpus No.: 8233508 No.: D067920 (Super. Ct. Nos. HC21804, CRN26291) N e e \o ae ne \e ae ee !e n e S a n e r e e e e e e ! na ge ! e t t ! g e e ! PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS From the Court of Appeal, Fourth District Division One, Reversing the Trial Court’s Grantof Petitioner’s Habeas CorpusPetition --0000000-- RANDYMIZE, Chief Deputy Office of the Primary Public Defender County of San Diego ABBEYJ. NOEL State Bar #239258 Deputy Public Defenders 250 East Main Street, Sixth Floor El Cajon, CA 92020 Telephone: (619) 441-4804 Attorneys for Petitioner KRISTOPHER KIRCHNER TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 0...ceeecccesesseeseceseeseneeecsseseasessesssesesesesessssenseenes 3 SUMMARY uu... eeccescesstecessesceesesesseesseeeaecnaeceeetseceessevsaeesseeeeseceecesensessuesasenseseseersessees 5 ARGUMENT. .......ccceccsccsssesseeseccseeescecscaceeseeecsaceseesesenseceeneecsseessaseseesesesessesessessseenneses 6 I. SECTION 1170, SUBDIVISION (d)(2) DOES NOT REMEDY MILLER ERROR...ec eecessccessersceseesesterseeeceaesesaeescesseestensessssacssseesseasenss 6 A.Post-Conviction Conduct at a Miller Resentencing Hearingis Relevant but Not the Controlling Factor 0.0.0... .ccccccccssccsessecesssesseesenes 7 B. Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(2) Is Not the Constitutional Equivalent of a Miller Resentencing Hearing «00.0.0... ccccceeseeseeseeeeeee 8 C.The Unconstitutional Sentence Creates A Classification Resulting in Unequal Opportunities to Rehabilitate oo.ee 10 II. BARRING COLLATERAL RELIEF TO A SELECT GROUP OF JUVENILES VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTSOF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION..Weee 12 A.Requiring Offenders to Seek Relief Via Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(2) Violates the Eighth Amendmentas Defined by Miller/Gutierrez/Montgomery ........... cc ssceeeecseseeteeneennes 12 B.Barring Collateral Relief To a Select Group of Offenders Violates Due Process and Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment ...0..... cc ccceecceseeeeeeseceeeeeeeeeneeesseenseeeseeeneees 13 lI. THE GUTIERREZ COURT REJECTED SECTION 1170, SUBDIVISION (D)(2) AS A LAWFUL CORRECTION OF MILLER ERROR 1... eccceeeseeeseeteceeseeeseesneeecseecsorssessaeseneceeeenee 14 CONCLUSION 0... eeeeeccceereneeneeeneceneeesneecnsaecuneseecneseeseeesessecseeesssesisosaessageseneceeetenes 15 WORD COUNT PROOF OF SERVICE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Eighth Amendment...csc secceessseseceseeseesssesenecneeenseseesesseesessecseesenes 13, 14, 15, 18 Fourteenth Amendment ..........:ceceescceessseccsresseeseecnseeseasesesnsersnsecseeneeegs 12, 13, 14, 18 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION Article [, SeCtion 7 ....ccccccccessssessecseeesseeecsceeesseesseceeesseeeceeeecseeerseessecenetseesseeseatessesersas 12 FEDERAL CASES Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48...eeecteneeetescesecnscessssseeseessnesecsecastesssssseenesasenseaeets 8, 16 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. [132 S.Ct. 2455] oeccceeeeneteeteteteeseeeeeeeeeeenes passim Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016)US. [136 S.Ct. 718) cecesecece eens eetereeeseseneseeneneneenes passim STATE CASES In re Berg (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 418 (petition for review granted on July 27, 2016, S235277)0...passim In re Kirchner (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1398 .cccccccsseseseeseeseeseseteteeeeecenenseseeseseeneneeeeatees 14, 16 Pederson v. Superior Court (2003) 105 CalApp.4th 931 oc ccccceccesesesssessscseeeeneneseensienssssesrsrsessseeeseseesnenes 13 People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal4th 1266 wo. ccccssscsesesessesescenesenecensesenseensesseeseeneeesasiseasienenenetaes 14 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 oecccccsscsecssesesseesereeessensersserseseeeesesesereteeesieney 10, 16, 18 People v. Gibson (Aug. 10, 2016, No. E062624) Cal. App. Sth___ [2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 660)... cccccccsesseseenenenseeeetetsteeereenseeseseeneneeeeees 17, 18 People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 occ cccccesessetecseseseeeeeseeeeseneeecteeeeesieeeseseseeeeeerteses passim People v. Lozano (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1126occeetenseneneesserene 8, 16, 18 People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1213 ccc cccescscseseceseneeeceteeeessneeeeeesseeisisseeeirnreerseney 14, 15 People v. Rhodes (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1374 occ cccccecscsesecscseteesnererscnenessseseeeserssseenensseeneens 13 People v. Wilder (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 90occcs eensceesseseerenecieetecsnesssseensneieneeesisessenens 13 PENAL CODE Section 190.5 ceeeeeeceeeceescscessssscceccccesessscessssseeeesseseeeeeeceeseeseeeeeesessnsesensteeseeseceeenens 15,17 Section 1170, subdivision (A)(2) ...... eeeees eeeeeeeeessseeeeseneeeseesessetseeerseaeeenaees passim Section 305] ......cccccccccccesscccceccccceccccesevecccceecsevscsnsceecuuseseecseeeesesseecssssucsessesseeusesers 10, 17 CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS Title 15, § 3375.Q.....ccccccsccscecseseececeresstersrcssessesessessssceseessecsessessessssseeesssaseeseeeennees 11 GOVERNMENT CODE Section 12838 ...c.ccccccccccccesseececosseeceusssunvccescsseceeececceeaeseesseeuseseseeeessseserseeesesesceenenerses 11 OTHER AUTHORITIES Wyo.Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(C) .ccccccceesecsceeeessenesecnseneceneneeneneeseeensnenesseneseneesenees 9,18 OTHER STATE CASES State v. Mares QOLE WY 126... ccccccccccccccccccccccccceccevesusueessusessnnaneneseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeesseeeeeeeeeeseseseeeeeeeqaaena 9 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA No.: $233508 Ct. App. No.: D067920 ) ) 3 In re KRISTOPHER KIRCHNERon ) Habeas Corpus ) (Super. Ct. Nos. ) HC21804, CRN26291) ) ) ) PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS SUMMARY Thelegislature intended California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2)', to allow juveniles who were /awfully determined to be incorrigible to prove the court wrong duringtheir life without parole sentence by rehabilitating themselves. The process underthestatute is rigorous, because after a determination of incorrigibility, public safety demandsan extreme vetting process. This is too rigorous a process for those juveniles unlawfully sentencedto life without parole, because it does not ensure a sentence that was imposedin violation of a juvenile’s constitutional rights will ever be corrected. ' All references are to the California Penal code unless otherwise noted. 5 Inre Kirchner — PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS Additionally, the correctional institutions in California provide limited access to rehabilitative programs, and prisoners who weresentencedto life without parole were given the least priority. Only an appropriately sentenced juvenile offender will be given a meaningful opportunity to rehabilitate because those deemedincorrigible are last in line for any meaningful programming. Juveniles who were illegally sentencedto life without parole, in violation of Miller, face much greater hurdles to prove their rehabilitation than those who committed the same crimes but were sentencedto life with the possibility of parole. Thus, an illegal classification of incorrigibility does not provide an equal opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation, violating any notion ofit being a fair measure as to the appropriateness of the classification. Requiring only some offenders to seek relief via section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), violates the Due Process and Equa! Protection Clauses. All juveniles sentenced under a presumptionof life without parole and without consideration of the Miller factors are entitled to a uniform procedurefor relief; a lawful sentence via collateral review. ARGUMENT I. SECTION 1170, SUBDIVISION(d)(2), DOES NOT REMEDY MILLER ERROR Miller/Gutierrez/Montgomerybar a life without parole sentenceforall but the rare incorrigible juvenile offender. Miller not only set out a list of factors for the court to consider prior to imposing life without parole for a In re Kirchner — PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS 66 juvenile offender, but also barredlife without parole “...for all but the rarest ofjuvenile offenders, those whose crimesreflect permanent incorrigibility.” (Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) __U.S.__ [136 S.Ct. 718] (Montgomery)at p. 734, interpreting Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller).) Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), requires an offender demonstrate remorse andrehabilitation along with many other miscellaneousfactors in an attempt to receive a resentencing hearing. Respondent acknowledges that section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), gives only “_.. reformed defendants a resentencing hearing.” (Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits (ABM)p.7, emphasis added.) However Miller and Montgomery do notlimittheir relief to only those offenders deemed “reformed.” (In re Berg (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 418, 442 (petition for review granted on July 27, 2016, S235277).) Since section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), does not ensure that a sentence of life without parole remains for only the rarest ofjuvenile offenders, it cannot provide “...all the rights demanded by Miller and Montgomery.” (ABM p.3.) A. Post-Conviction Conduct at a Miller Resentencing Hearing is Relevant but Not the Controlling Factor. Applying Miller on collateral review, as directed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Montgomery, does not “subvert justice.” Gutierrez specifically provides that amenability to rehabilitation must be consideredat a Miller sentencing. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1386-1387 (Gutierrez), People v. Lozano (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138; and Jn re Berg, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.) However, the courts in Graham and Gutierrez recognized that a juvenile offender’s failure to rehabilitate 7 Inre Kirchner ~ PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS while serving a sentence with no hopeofrelease will not retroactively justify an LWOPsentence. (Gutierrez at p. 1386, citing Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 73.) Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) rightly places an enhanced burden of proving remorse and rehabilitation for the lawfully sentenced offender, but it unfairly adds increased burdens on the unlawfully sentenced juvenile offender. B. Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(2) Is Not the Constitutional Equivalent of a Miller Resentencing Hearing. The Montgomery court held Miller applies retroactively because there is, “...a grave risk that many are being held in violation of the Constitution.” (Montgomery, supra, 136 S.Ct at p. 736.) Addressing the dissent’s concerns with conducting resentencing hearings yearslater, the Court suggested states could remedy anillegal life without parole sentence by converting the sentenceto life with parole. (/bid., citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c); State v. Mares 2014 WY 126.) This suggested remedy by the majority should not be confused with the holding in Montgomery thatillegally sentenced juveniles may seek collateralrelief. All juvenile offenders whoare sentenced to life without parole are entitled to seek collateral relief, and an immediate opportunity to have their unconstitutional sentence corrected. Respondentstates section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), providesrelief to “that changed juvenile — now anadult — with a life-with-parole sentence.” (ABM p. 4.) Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), places manyhurdlesin front of a petitioner that may or maynotlead to a resentencing hearing,let alone parole eligibility. Un re Berg, supra, 247 Cal. App. 4° at pp. 436-437.) Inre Kirchner - PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), was intended to have courts take a second lookat constitutionally sanctioned incorrigibility determinations by examining post-conviction conduct.” As the court in Jn re Berg, correctly pointed out, there is nothing in the text of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) referencing the Legislature’s intent to remedy Miller error. (In re Berg, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 441.) When the statute was written, the courts had not even recognized Miller error; thus the intent of the legislature was to give a second chanceto legally sentenced juveniles. The burdensplaced on an offender under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), are “...consistent with the statute's purpose of providing a defendant whois serving a lawfully imposed LWOPsentence with the opportunity to obtain a new sentence.” (Id. at p. 442.) In contrast, the Wyoming statute referenced in Montgomery, and section 3051, as discussed by this court in Franklin; were passed in response to Miller. Section 3051 and the Wyomingstatute cured the illegal sentences by legally changing the sentencesto life with parole at 25 years (or earlier.) (Montgomery, supra, 136 S.Ct at p. 736; Wyo.Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c); State v. Mares 2014 WY 126; People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 281.) Asthis court stated in Franklin, “section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), has no similar effect on a juvenile offender’s LWOPsentence...” (/bid.) Therefore, Montgomery dictates Mr. Kirchner’s sentence can be remedied by one of two means; granting his habeaspetition and affording him a Miller resentencing hearing or converting his sentenceto life with parole. 2 (See [as of September4, 2016].) 9 Inre Kirchner —- PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS C. The Unconstitutional Sentence Creates A Classification Resulting in Unequal Opportunities to Rehabilitate. Respondentargues “section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), remedies cases on collateral review by accurately providing a retrospective measure of a defendant's capability to change.” (ABM p. 13.) Respondentfails to recognize that a sentence oflife without parole results in a prison classification that discourages rehabilitation. Offenders, such as Mr. Kirchner, have been serving a sentence of no hope withlittle opportunity for rehabilitation for the last 22 years. According to CDCRregulations an inmate serving a sentenceoflife without the possibility of parole shall not be housedin a facility with a security level lower than LevelIIT, except when authorized by the Departmental Review Board. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3375.2.) In 1994,the state prison system was knownasthe California Department of Corrections. It was not until 2005, that the Department of Corrections underwent a major overhaul and a focus on rehabilitation took place, along with a name change (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) to reflect such changes. (Government Codesection 12838, added 2005). Further, it was not until 2012, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller and ourstate legislature passed section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), that offenders such as Mr. Kirchnerdared to dream of a possible change in their sentence. This is why the U.S. Supreme Court repeated the admonition, “rehabilitation cannot justify the sentence, as life without parole forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” (Montgomery, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 733.) 10 In re Kirchner ~- PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS Mr. Kirchner woudlikely have been sentencedto life with parole. He was 16 years old with no recordat the time of the offense, convicted under the theory of felony murder, and had a co-defendant. He was deemed amenable to treatment at California Youth Authority (CYA). CYA warned the court that Mr. Kirchner was unsophisticated and would be disfavorably influenced in a prison population. How accurateis the retrospective measure of Mr. Kirchner’s ability to change when he wassentenced to be with adult prisoners who were alsoclassified as incorrigible? The retrospective review of his prison conduct has been disfavorably influenced by his constitutionally deficient sentence. Mr. Kirchner is being treated unequally under the law dueto his illegal sentence, particularly when comparedto a properly sentenced individual. Respondentstates, “Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), then, is not just an adequate remedybutalso the fairest and mostlogical one.” In order for Respondent’s theory to hold true, fundamental fairness would require that Mr. Kirchner have the same opportunities for rehabilitation as a juvenile who waslawfully sentenced. His illegal sentence caused arbitrary discrimination due to his classification of incorrigibility. “Guarantees of equal protection embodied in the Fourteenth Amendmentofthe United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution prohibit the state from arbitrarily discriminating among personssubjectto its jurisdiction.” (People v. Chavez (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) “The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws has been defined to meanthat all persons under similar circumstances 11 Inre Kirchner ~ PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS are given ‘equal protection and security in the enjoymentofpersonal and civil rights ... and the prevention and redress of wrongs...’ [Citation.] The - concept ‘compels recognition of the proposition that personssimilarly situated with respectto the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.’ [Citation.]” (Pederson v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.) “Under the equal protection clause, ‘[a] classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some groundsofdifference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all personssimilarly circumstancedshall be treated alike.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wilder (1995) 33 Cal-App.4th 90; People v. Rhodes (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1382-1383.) To require Mr. Kirchner to demonstrate rehabilitation when he was denied it due to his illegal classification is patently unfair. Only by being resentenced will he be put on equal footing with other life prisoners who are competing for the rehabilitative resources of the CDCR. IL. BARRING COLLATERAL RELIEF TO A SELECT GROUP OF JUVENILES VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTSOFTHEU.S. CONSTITUTION A. Requiring Offenders to Seek Relief Via Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(2) Violates the Eighth Amendmentas Defined by Miller/Gutierrez/Montgomery. The requirements of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), places many burdens on an offender. The Kirchner court recognized those burdens | violate Miller/Gutierrez/Montgomery. (In re Kirchner (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1418.) The Kirchnercourt effectively rewrote section 12 In re Kirchner — PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS 1170, subdivision (d)(2), by interpreting the statute as shifting the burden to the prosecution in order to find it to be an adequate remedyat law. (Ibid.; People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266; Jn re Berg, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 442) Respondent does not address the Kirchner court’s legal gymnastics, nor Petitioner’s claims that the statute’s burdensresult in continued violations of the Eighth Amendment. Thefailure to address these issues should constitute waiver. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1213, 1233, fn.6.) B. Barring Collateral Relief To a Select Group of Offenders Violates Due Process and Equal Protection Underthe Fourteenth Amendment. Requiring a select group of offenders, those who have served 15 years of their sentence, to seek relief via section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (In re Kirchner, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1405, fnl.) As the Berg court explained: To conclude that a statutory procedure for which the defendant is expressly disqualified affords an adequate remedy for an Eighth Amendmentviolation would violate basic principles of due process. On the other hand,if Kirchneris intendedto limit the habeas corpus remedies only for those defendants whoare notdisqualified from filing a section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) petition, this would raise equal protection concerns. (In re Berg, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438-439.) Why should someoffenders be required to seek relief via section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), while others are allowed to seek collateral relief? Miller factors are the controlling criteria for any offender currently facing 13 Inre Kirchner — PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS life without parole and for those who do not qualify via section 1170, subdivision (d)(2). Barring a select class of offenders from seeking collateral relief violates due process and equal protection; Respondent’s failure to address these concerns constitutes waiver. (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1233, fn.6.) Hil. THE GUTIERREZ COURT REJECTED SECTION 1170, SUBDIVISION (D)(2), AS A LAWFUL CORRECTION OF MILLER ERROR. In Gutierrez, this Court ruled section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), does not cure a Miller error. The Attorney General argued section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), provided juveniles with a meaningful opportunity at parole as defined in a Miller footnote. The court responded: A sentenceoflife without parole under section 190.5(b) remainsfully effective after the enactmentof section 1170(d)(2). That is why section 1170(d)(2) sets forth a schemefor recalling the sentence and resentencing the defendant... Neither Miller nor Graham indicated that an opportunity to recall a sentence of life without parole 15 to 24 years into the future would somehow make morereliable or justifiable the imposition ofthat sentence and its underlying judgment of the offender's incorrigibility “at the outset.” (citation).) (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1386.) The rationale used by this Court when rejecting section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), as a constitutional remedy stands today. (People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 281-282.) The Kirchner court erred in disregardingit. 14 Inre Kirchner — PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS The Lozano court did not hesitate to reject the Attorney General’s position that section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), was the only lawful remedy available to an illegally sentenced juvenile desiring to present post- conviction conduct at a Miller resentencing hearing. (People v. Lozano, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1138.) Further, in In re Berg, the same appellate court as Kirchner(including onejustice from Kirchner, who ultimately rejected his previous position) agreed Gutierrez’s rejection of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), as a constitutional remedy for Miller error was correct. (In re Berg, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 442, Justice McDonald concurring opinion.) Morerecently, People v. Gibson stated, “as Gutierrez makesclear, section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), is not a substitute for the initial exercise of discretion pursuant to section 190.5 at the initial sentencing, and does not eliminate the constitutional doubts arising from a presumption in favor of LWOPunderthe pre-Miller line of cases.” (People v. Gibson (Aug.10, 2016, No. E062624) Cal. App. 5th___ [2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 660],at *20, citing Gutierrez, supra, 54 Cal.4™ at p. 1385.) The court ruled, in order for Mr. Gibson to receive a lawful sentence as defined by Miller/Gutierrez, he mustfile a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (/d. at *22.) The court in Kirchner was wrong to disregard Gutierrez. CONCLUSION Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) offers hope to the lawfully sentenced juvenile offender serving life without parole. However, sinceit does not 15 Inre Kirchner — PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS guaranteethat only the rare incorrigible offender will continueto serve a life without parole sentence, it does not correct an illegal sentence as defined by Miller/Gutierrez/Montgomery. (Montgomery, supra, 136 S.Ct. 733-734, 736.) Miller/Gutierrez/Montgomery allowsa court to considerthe potential for rehabilitation; yet, relief is not limited to only the reformed offenderasit is under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2). Unlike section 3051 and the Wyomingstatute mentionedin dicta in Montgomery, section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) was not intended to, and does not, remedy Miller error. (See Montgomery, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 736; People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 281; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c).). Miller/Gutierrez/ Montgomery requirestheseillegal sentences to be remedied by a uniform procedureforrelief: either granting a habeaspetition and holding a proper Miller resentencing hearing, or allowing these individuals to beeligible for parole after 25 years. Gutierrez’s reasoning for rejecting section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), as a remedy for Miller error remains. (See Jn re Berg, supra; People v. Lozano, supra; People v. Gibson, supra.) Requiring a select group ofoffenders to seekreliefvia section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) results in continued violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendmentand the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thetrial court properly granted Mr. Kirchner’s habeas petition. Mr. Kirchner is currently serving an illegal sentence andis entitled to a 16 In re Kirchner - PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS resentencing hearing or, in the alternative, to be resentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Dated: September 8, 2016 Respectfully submitted, RANDY MIZE Primary Public Defender By: /s/ ABBEYJ. NOEL Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Petitioner KRISTOPHER KIRCHNER 17 In re Kirchner — PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT I, ABBEY J. NOEL, hereby certify that based on the software in the word processor program, the word count for this documentis _2,824_ words. Dated: 9/8/16 Respectfully submitted, RANDY MIZE Primary Public Defender /s/ ABBEYJ. NOEL Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Petitioner KRISTOPHER KIRCHNER CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Rule 1,21(c) CASE NAME:In re Kristopher Kirchner Case No.: $233508 Ct. Appeal 4" DCA,Div. 1 No.: D067920 Super. Ct No.: HC21804, CRN26291 I, Michael A. Owens, declare as follows: I am employedin the County of San Diego, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party to this action; my business address is 450 "B" Street, Suite 900, San Diego, California 92101-4009, in said County andState. On September8, 2016, I served the foregoing document: PETITIONER’S REPLYBRIEF ON THE MERITS on the parties stated below, by the following meansofservice: BY INTEROFFICE/U.S. MAIL: Pursuant to Rule 1.21(b), on the above- mentioned date I personally deposited in the United States Mail true and correct copies thereof, each in a separate envelope, postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed to the following [See Service List]. . BY PERSONAL SERVICE: Onthe date of execution of this document,I personally served true and correct copies of the above-mentioned document(s) on each of the following [See Service List}. BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:I caused each such documentto be transmitted electronically, to the parties indicated below, as authorized by California Rule of Court 8.71, through the TrueFiling service portal. [See Service List].. (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on 9/8/16 /s/ Michael A. Owens Declarant SERVICE LIST Clerk of the Superior Court °° JUDICIAL SERVICES 220 W. Broadway San Diego, Ca 92101-3409 Phone: (619) 450-5500 Appeals.central@sdcourt.ca.gov (TrueFiling electronic service) Kamala D.Harris California Attorney General Attn: Appellate Division 600 West Broadway,Suite 1800 San Diego, CA 92101 Phone: (619) 645-2001 sdag.docketing@doj.ca.gov (TrueFiling electronic service) Court of Appeals — 4"" DCA.Div.1 Attn: Clerk of the Court 750 “B”Street, Suite 300 San Diego, CA 92101 Phone:(619) 744-0760 (TrueFiling electronic service) Bonnie Dumanis San Diego County District Attorney Attn: Appellate Division Jennifer R. Kaplan 330 W. Broadway,8" Floor San Diego, CA 92101 Phone: (619) 531-3544 da.appellate@sdcda.org (TrueFiling electronic service) Mr. KRISTOPHER KIRCHNER (through counsel)