McMILLIN ALBANY v. S.C.

Real Parties in Interest, Carl Van Tassell and Sandra Van Tassell, Reply to Answer to Petition for Review

Cal.November 20, 2015

$229762 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA McMILLIN ALBANY,LLC,et al., ) Kern County Superior Court j Case No. S-1500-CV- Petitioners, ) 279141 ) Vv. ) , Honorable David Lampe, SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN ) Judge Presiding, Dept. 11 COUNTY, ) ___ SUPREME COURT ; >. - FILED Respondent, ) ‘ a™“4 j Si0)s NOV 20 2015 CARL & SANDRA VAN TASSEL,et al., ) . Frank A. McGuire Clerk Real Parties in Interest. ) Deputy From the Published Opinion of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 5" Civ. No. F069370 REPLY TO ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW MILSTEIN ADELMAN,LLP Mark A.Milstein, SBN 155513 Fred M. Adelman, SBN 131658 *Mayo L. Makarczyk, SBN 203035 (mmakarezyk@milsteinadelman.com) 2800 Donald Douglas Loop North Santa Monica, California 90405 Phone: (310) 396-9600 Fax: (310) 396-9635 Attorneysfor Real Parties in Interest Carl & Sandra Van Tassel, et al. $229762 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA _ McMILLIN ALBANY,LLC,et al., ) Kern County Superior Court 4 Case No. S-1500-CV- Petitioners, ) 279141 ) Vv. ) 4 Honorable David Lampe, SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN ) Judge Presiding, Dept. 11 COUNTY, ) ) ) Respondent, ) ; CARL & SANDRA VAN TASSEL,et al., ) ) Real Parties in Interest. ) From the Published Opinion of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 5" Civ. No. F069370 REPLY TO ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW MILSTEIN ADELMAN,LLP Mark A. Milstein, SBN 155513 Fred M. Adelman, SBN 131658 *Mayo L. Makarezyk, SBN 203035 (mmakarczyk@milsteinadelman.com) 2800 Donald Douglas Loop North Santa Monica, California 90405 Phone: (310) 396-9600 Fax: (310) 396-9635 Attorneysfor Real Parties in Interest Carl & Sandra Van Tassel, etal. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTIONoceceeccecenesecnecsevessesesesesessseseseecassesessesesacesescsesacsesesstsessveverees 1 1. McMillin Does Not Deny the Existence of a Conflict as to Either of the Two Issues Stated in Plaintiffs’ Petition for REViOW .0........ccccccsceccsccccecceceessscscececcecccessssccecevestcecese 2 2. McMillin’s Suggested Revisions to the Issues Presented for Review Are Only Partially Correct ....0.00..0cccccceeseeeseceeeeees 5 3. This Court Should Ignore McMillin’s Request to Depublish Liberty Mutual and Burch .w.....ccccccceccecceeceecesecsseascseesecscvaseseesens 8 4, The Fifth District’s Opinion Is Incoherent, Raises More Questions than It Answers, and Will Cause Confusion Among Trial Courts... ccccccccccssesseessessessesssscensecesecsesesecssssvsecoseusseaesuarseneaees 10 a. The Fifth District’s Invention of a Cause of Action Under Civil Code Section 897 Is Baseless and Confusing o.....ccecccssesecsesscsecssessesescesevsvseseavsrsaseaes 10 b. The Fifth Districts Opinion Is Already Causing Confusion Regarding Warranty and Contract Causes of ACtiOn .........cccccccccecsececsececesecsecesserseccccecececess 12 CONCLUSION2cceccccceecessseseceessnsensscscsevsvenssesscassecesesssssensustsecesseseusenrisseseseceessece 14 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT..o.icccccceccscssscessssscccscecssesssessssceccsacerereesesescs 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Burch v. Superior Court 223 Cal.App.4™ 1411 (2014) .ucccscsssssssssesssesssssesseesesereeans passim Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC 219 Cal.App.4"” 98 (2013)..c.cccccccscccccesseseessessesevstsstsveessseeeee passim Statutes Cal. Civ, Code SCCTION 895 oooeee seensesencesescscseeseseseesessessessesseecetstscucsscseesnsenesasees passim SECTION 896 oo... .cccccsssccecsessesesseccrsesenscessessvsasscsessscaueeaeeeeesenseeeecessntsaess 11,12 SECTION 897 o...ececcecsccscccsscssssscssesecarsecssecsssessasevssessarsstacsereseeserenseees 7, 10,11 SOCHON 910 eeeeeeesesseeeseeseseseseseceesecsecsesseesesetsnensnessessessesaevereassess passim SECTION 913 occecceececccssccessccesscevsesecsessaeeceseessssersesacseesessrasecesuecuteeesserss 4 SECTION O17 oo. ee eeesccssstccssecesscessecsssesesacesseeceecssecsussssnscecsursvesuseerensecsreesssens 4 SECTION 918 ooo. ccccceescsesssessecseceseeceucsessesessesssvvserssasevsresessuaaeertassersieeseees 4 SECTION 930(D) ose eeeeecseeseeesecseessescescesseeseeesaecsesacsesscesccseessesesscesecevevstaneas 6 SCCHION 943 woe eeccecccsccssseecesecesseesecescusasacsssacessevsscuscseeessesesaucesuvtseeestreveesacsas 11 SCCUION 943(A)...ecccccecsescssccssssecesesssessccssesessessesssscscereseeseesnevsussecsneesaeeaees 13 SCCTION 944 ooo ccceesscccessecsssscssscesseescsuvsesuusesusscsesssteeersesestteceesenttseeses 11 Cal. Rules of Court Ue 8.1125 eeeecececesevensscecesssnccesovececessnscsseecessesersrsvassaceevesestnsass 8 ii Page(s) 5229762 IN THE SOPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA McMILLIN ALBANY,LLC,etal., Petitioners, ) ) ) ) ) ) , SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN ) COUNTY, } ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Respondent, CARL & SANDRA VAN TASSEL,ct al., Real Parties in Interest. Kern County Superior Court Case No. $-1500-CV- 279141 Honorable David Lampe, Judge Presiding, Dept. 11 From the Published Opinion of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 5" Civ. No. F069370 REPLY TO ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs’ Petition for Review is based upon the fact that the Fifth District’s opinion plainly conflicts with existing authority concerning two issues. These are the exclusivity of SB800(i.e., Title 7 of the Civil Code at e section 895, et seq.) for homeowners who bring defect claims, and whether a J homeowner who brings only non-SB800 causesof action and seeks norelief under SB800 is nonetheless required to comply with the SB800prelitigation procedure before bringing his or her action ion court. Plaintiffs also base their Petition on the fact that the Fifth District’s opinion is fraught with internal inconsistencies and lapses in reasoning, and thus will only cause confusion amongtrial courts. In its Answer, McMillin has donelittle to dispute these basic contentions. Importantly, it agrees that the conflict exists, and that it must be resolved by this Court. Plaintiffs believe this Court should simply depublish the Fifth District’s opinion, but if it does not do so, then review should be granted to avoid confusion amongtrial courts, and to resolve the conflict in the law applicable to California homeowners who wishto bring defect claims. 1. McMillin Does Not Deny the Existence of a Conflict as to Either of the Two Issues Stated in Plaintiffs’ Petition for Review In their Petition, the plaintiffs presented two issues for review by this Court. These are: (1) whether SB800(i.e., Title 7 of the Civil Code at section 895, et seq.) precludes a homeownerfrom bringing common law causes of action for defective conditions in his or her home when such conditions have resulted in physical damage to the home; and (2) whether a homeowner who states no cause gf action under SB800 and seeks no relief under SB800 must nevertheless comply with the statutoryprelitigation procedureset forth at Civil Code section 910 et seq. Asto the first question, McMillin concedesthe existence of a conflict. It states that it “does not deny that as a result of the Fifth District’s . . . opinion ... there exists a conflict of case law with... Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Brookfield Crystal Cove (2013) 219 Cal.App.4" 98... and Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4” 1411,” becausethe latter two cases both hold that “SB800 doesnot provide the exclusive remedy for residential construction defects, i.e., that common law caused ofaction are permitted.” (Answerat pp. 3-4.) However,as to the second question, McMillin claims that, “ostensibly,” Liberty Mutual does not holdthat the SB800 prelitigation procedure is inapplicable to a homeowner whoseeksnorelief under SB800, because no party in that case sought to enforce the procedure. (Answerat p. 5.) This logic is backward. In Liberty Mutual, the court found that when a homeis physically damaged becauseofa defect that violates one of the SB800 building standards, then the homeowner’s insurer--who steps into the homeowner’s shoes in a subrogation action--maystate causes of action for negligence and strict liability against the builder of the home. (Liberty Mutual, supra, 219 Cal.App.4" at pp. 102, 109.) In so holding, the Liberty Mutual courtstated: Manycodesections ingthe Act provide timeframesfor the homeownerto notify the builder (Civ.Code, § 910, subd. 3 (a)) and the builder to acknowledgereceipt of the notice of the claim (id., § 913), as well as inspection of the property by the builder (id., § 916), the builder’s offer to repair (id., § 917), the homeowner’sresponse to the offer to repair (id., § 918), and the completion ofthe repairs of the construction defects by the builder(id., § 921). In the case of an actual catastrophic loss, the detailed timeframes would be unnecessary and nonsensical. If, as Brookfield argues, the Right to Repair Act appliesto all claims involving construction defects regardless of actual damage, a homeowner whoseproperty was severely damaged or destroyed would be required to await a solution during a lengthy process. (Cd. at p. 106.) The Liberty Mutual court thus decided that SB800is not the exclusive remedy for homeownersin part becauseif it were, then homeowners would have to comply with the SB800prelitigation procedure even in instances where it makes no sense for them to do so. This holding cannot possibly be reconciled with the idea that a homeowner whoseeksnorelief under SB800is nevertheless required to comply with the SB800 prelitigation procedure. This issue was decided in Liberty Mutual, and the Fifth District reached precisely the opposite conclusion in the matter before this Court. Finally, McMillin does not deny the importanceofeither of these two issues. Indeed,it spends the next several pages if its Answerbrief decrying the fact that, because of Liberty Mutual and Burch, courts statewide have denied builders’ attempts to enforce the SB800prelitigation procedure against homeowners whostate no cause of action under SB800. (Answerat pp. 5-9.) e ME S RM UN EN Re R ot pa ce t e 4 2 a h d This is simply another way of expressing the same basis for granting review thatthe plaintiffs stated in their Petition--that disagreement on the two points set forth above will lead to confusion every time a builder demursto a complaint in which a homeownerstates non-SB800 causesofaction, or moves to enforce the SB800prelitigation procedure against a homeowner whoseeks no relief under SB800. (See Petition, pp. 21-22.) Forthis reason, there is no meaningful dispute betweenthe parties that a grant of review by this Court is warranted. 2. McMillin’s Suggested Revisions to the Issues Presented for Review Are Only Partially Correct In its Answer, McMillin states that if review is granted, thenthefirst issue, concerning whether SB800 excludes commonlaw causesofaction, should be worded more broadlytostate, ‘““Whatis the scope of causesofaction that are precluded by [SB800] for residential construction defects in non- condominium conversion homes, where the alleged defects have resulted in physical damage to the home?” (Answer, p. 35.) Plaintiffs concede that a more broadly-stated question is better to definitively resolve the conflict between the competing authorities. Accordingly, plaintiffs would suggest that the final clause in McMillin’s proposed formulation ofthe first question is superfluous. The question should simply read, “Whatis the scope of causes of action that are precluded by SB800 for residential construction defects in non- condominium conversion homes?” McMillin then claimsthatthe first issue subsumes the question of “whether the exclusivity issue was properly before the Fifth District independentof any analysis regarding McMillin’s right to a stay under Civil Code section 930(b), and in spite of there having been no dispositive motionat the trial court.” (Answer,p. 36.) Plaintiffs concur entirely with McMillin that this question should be taken up by this Court. However, this question is not “subsumed”bythe first issue. It is a precondition for the first issue. Plaintiffs contended before the Fifth District (just as they do in their pending Request for Depublication -- see pages 3-6) that the Fifth District should never have reached the question of whether SB800is the exclusive remedy for California homeowners, precisely because there had been no dispositive motion by McMillin. That is, McMillin sought only a stay under Civil Code section 930(b). It did not demur or moveto dismiss any of the causesofaction stated bythe plaintiffs. Accordingly, the only question before the court was whetheror notthe plaintiffs--who sought no relief under SB800-- were required under Civil Code section 910 to comply with the SB800 prelitigation procedure. The Fifth District should simply have answeredthis question by applying the plain language of section 910. There was no need for it ever to reach the issue of whether SB800is oris not the exclusive remedy for California homeowners. If this Court concurs in this analysis, then the proper remedyis to depublish the Fifth Districts opinion, on the groundthatit never should have reachedthe issuesthat it decided (and that it did so in a way that is incoherent, wrong, and certain to create confusion amongtrial courts). This is why plaintiffs have taken the position in their Petition for Review that | the Petition should be granted only if the Court determines not to depublish McMillin. (See Petition, pp. 5, 6, and 22.) Finally, McMillin takes issue with the second question proposed by the plaintiffs. It claims that the first question is simply a “sub-issue” of the second. (Answer, pp. 36-37.) It states: [1]f SB800 is the exclusive remedy, then Real Parties cannotcontrol whether McMillin can enforceits “absolute right”to the prelitigation procedures. If it is nor the exclusive remedy, then Real Parties can simply plead common law causesofaction and avoid altogether MeMillin’s (suddenly ironically described) “absolute right to the prelitigation procedures. (Answer, p. 37. Emphasis in orig.) This is an oversimplification. As discussed below,plaintiffs maintain that the Fifth District’s invention of a “cause of action under section 897” makesno sense, and that even if SB800 is the “exclusive” remedy for homeowners, this exclusion certainly does not reach common law causes of action for defects that are not covered by the SB800 building standards and have resulted in damage to the home. It also certainly does not extend to 7 causes of action for breach ofcontract and breach of warranty (which McMillin has curiouslyfailed to discussin its lengthy Answer brief), regardless of whether the defects there at issue have resulted in any physical damage to the home. If some non-SB800 causesof action are excluded butothers are not, then, of course, the question becomes whether a homeowner who brings only non-SB800 causesof action is nonetheless required to comply with the SB800 prelitigation procedure. As explainedin plaintiffs’ Petition (see pp. 19-21), the Fifth District has not only failed to answerthis question, but it has doneso in a way that is certain to cause confusion amongtrial courts. Itis entirely separate from the first question, and should be addressed as such by this Court. 3. This Court Should Ignore McMillin’s Requestto Depublish Liberty Mutual and Burch California Rules of Court, rule 8.1125 states that a request to depublish an opinion of the court of appeal must be made within 30 days after the opinionis final. Therulealso states that such a request may not be made as part of a petition for review. McMillin willfully violates these rules by asking this Court in its Answerto Plaintiffs’ Petition for Review to depublish Liberty Mutual and Burch, which were decided in 2013 and 2014,respectively. Plaintiffs do not deny that this Court has the power to do whatit wishes on its own motion, but it is improper and contrary to rule 8.1125 for a party to make such a request years after the fact. Asit happens, this Court not only denied review in Liberty Mutual, but it also denied multiple requests for depublication on December 11, 2013. (See docket, Case No. $213718.) This Court likewise denied review and multiple requests for depublication in Burch, on June 11, 2014. (See docket, Case No. $217503.) McMillin’s current request that these opinions be depublishedis nothing more than an improper requestfor reconsideration of these years-old determinations, This Court should also ignore McMillin’s request that the Fifth District’s opinion remain published following the Court’s order granting review. It articulates to special need for such an order, other thanthatit believes the Fifth District’s opinion to be correct. Of course it does--al! litigants believe that opinions favorable to them were decided correctly. But this does nothing to distinguish McMillin from any otherlitigant before this Court. The entire purpose of granting review is to resolve a conflict. This purposeis not furthered by perpetuating the conflict for as longas it takes this Court to issue its opinion from the time when review is granted. This is particularly true in the present case, where (as discussed below) the opinion of the Court of Appeal not only conflicts with multiple existing authorities, but it is internally inconsistent, incoherent, and certain to cause confusion among trial courts, all on its own. 4, The Fifth District’s Opinion Is Incoherent, Raises More Questions than It Answers, and Will Cause Confusion Among Trial Courts In their Petition for Review (see pp. 17-21), the plaintiffs explain that in determining that it could not resolve the matter before it without “consider[ing] the scope of the Act and to what claims the requirements of the Act, in particular the prelitigation procedures of Chapter 4, apply,” (Opinion,p. 8) the Fifth District commenced a highly unnecessary analysis of SB800 thatis fraught with internal inconsistencies that are certain to confusetrial courts. McMillin’s brief, while lengthy, does little to address this contention. a. The Fifth District’s Invention of a Cause of Action Under Civil Code Section 897 Is Baseless and Confusing Civil Code section 897 states that, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intendedto address every function or componentofa structure. To the extent that a function or component ofa structure is not addressed by these standards,it shall be actionable if it causes damage.” In their Petition for Review,plaintiffs explained that the Fifth District had no basis for assumingthat, in stating such defects “shall be actionable,” the Legislature intended to create a cause of action “under section 897,” as 10 opposed to simply permitting homeowners to bring common law causes of action for such defects, as they would have donepriorto the enactment of SB800. (See Petition, p. 17.) McMillin spendsliterally 13 full pages of its Answer claimingthat, in fact, section 897 is a building standard under SB800. (See Answer, pp. 15-28.) This may comeas something ofa surprise to the Fifth District, which says no such thing anywherein its opinion. Indeed, the Fifth District’s commentary on the subject would suggest otherwise. At page 9 ofits opinion,it states: [T]he Legislature intended to create a comprehensive set of construction standards and to makethe violation of any of those standards actionable under the Act. To the extent it omitted some function or component, however, a deficiency in that function or component would not be actionablein itself, but would be actionableifit caused property damage. This is a far cry from McMillin’s determinationthat section 897is itself a building standard under SB800. Indeed,the Fifth District seems to be saying that section 897is notitself a standard, but just a provision that makes conditions that are omitted by the standards actionable. McMillin itself is forced to admit that, even though the Fifth District’s opinionis thefirst appellate authority ever to recognize a cause of action undersection 897, the court “does not go to the trouble of explicitly stating . . . in its own words”that the cause of action it has invented is based upon the very counterintuitive notion that section 897 is itselfa building standard. (Answer, p. 17.) 11 The fact that McMillin is forced to spend 13 pages of its Answerbriefin a misbegotten attempt to makesense of the Fifth District’s opinion merely provesthe plaintiffs’ point--that the opinion is bound to cause confusion amongtrial courts. And furthermore, while plaintiffs do not seek to argue the merits of the matter at this time, the contention that section 897 is itself a building standard is plainly wrong. It is not only contrary to the plain meaning ofthe term “building standard,” butit is unsupported by the text of SB800. The mere fact that some ofthe statutes in SB800 state that the building standards “commence with section 896” does not convert section 897 into somethingthatit clearly is not. If the Legislature had wantedtrial courts to understand section 897 to be itselfa building standard--when norational court would naturally do so--thenit would havesaid so, andit did not. b. The Fifth District’s Opinion Is Already Causing Confusion Regarding Warranty and Contract Causes of Action Notably, while McMillin spends third of its Answer defending the Fifth District’s creation of a cause of action under section 897,it says nothing about the other inconsistencies noted by the plaintiffs. For example, the plaintiffs note on page 21 of their Petition that it is not clear whether, under the Fifth District’s opinion, an action which consists only of claims for breach of contract and warranty that are based upon building 12 defects that do constitute violations of the SB800 building standards is subject to the SB800 prelitigation procedure. Plaintiffs point out that, on the one hand,the Fifth District acknowledgesperiodically in its opinion that Civil Code section 943(a) contains languagestating that, “In addition to the rights underthis title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision.” (Petition, p. 21, citing to Opinion, pp. 11 and 12.) But, on the other hand, the Fifth District holds, unequivocally, that, “Where the complaint alleges deficiencies in construction that constitute violations of the standards set out in Chapter 2 of the Act, the claims are subject to the Act, and the homeowner must comply with the prelitigation procedures, regardless of whetherthe complaint expressly alleges a cause of action under the Act.” (Petition, p. 21, citing to Opinion, p. 15.) McMillin does not addressthis question in its Answer--probably because it cannot guess howto resolveit based upon the Fifth District’s opinion. And, even more troubling, as plaintiffs pointed outin their pending Request for Depublication (see pp. 7-8), at least one trial court has already read the Fifth District’s opinion to mean that actions for breach of contract and breach of warranty are barred altogether by SB800, notwithstanding the language of section 943(a). This matter is presently the subject of a Petition for Reyiew before this Court. (See Moose v. Superior Court, Case No. 13 5230342.) This trial court ruling was the direct result of confusion over how to interpret the Fifth District’s opinion, and there is no question that such confusion will continue for as long as the opinion remains a reported authority. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing,plaintiffs respectfully ask that in the event this Court does notgrant plaintiffs’ pending Request for Depublication,that it grant review of the Fifth District’s Opinion in this matter, in order to resolve for the benefit of homeowners statewide the two questions discussed above. Dated: November19, 2015 MILSTEIN ADELMAN, LLP MarkA. Milstein Fred M. Adelman Mayo L. Makarezyk : Li By: [| py wes) fy MAYO Li MAKARCZYK ° Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest CARL & SANDRA VAN TASSEL,etal. Pooul gfe Popp.PoE 14 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT I certify that, under California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1), the preceding Reply to Answerto Petition for Review contains 3,103 words. Dated: November 19, 2015 15 Respectfully submitted, MILSTEIN ADELMAN, LLP Mark A. Milstein Fred M. Adelman Mayo L. Makarczyk By: / Avo LIMAKARCZYK Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest CARL & SANDRA VAN TASSEL,et al. PROOF OF SERVICE I declare that I am over the age of eighteen (18) and not a party to this action. My business address is 2800 Donald Douglas Loop, Santa Monica, California 90405. On November 19, 2015, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: REPLY TO ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW onall interested parties in this action by placing a true copy of the document(s), enclosed in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows: () () (X) () See Attached Service List BY MAILas follows: I am “readily familiar” with the firm’s practice of collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I knowthat the correspondence was deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same daythis declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. I know that the envelope wassealed and, with postage thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date in the United States mail at Santa Monica, California. BY PERSONAL SERVICE:I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand to the above addressee(s). BY OVERNIGHT COURIER: I am “readily familiar” with the firm’s practice of collecting and processing overnight deliveries, which includes depositing such packagesin a receptacle used exclusively for overnight deliveries. The packages were deposited before the regular pickup time and marked accordingly for delivery the next business day. BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted to the above-named person(s)at the telecopy number(s)listed. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the aboveis true and correct. Executed on November 19, 2015 at Santa Monica, California. Lf ff ee ee eee GAG X“Seat eo Mellinda Hensley “ /y 16 SERVICE LIST Calvin R. Stead Andrew M. Morgan BORTONPETRINI, LLP 5060 California Ave., Suite 700 Bakersfield, California 93309 Attorneys for Petitioners MCMILLIN ALBANY, LLC; and McMILLIN PARK AVENUE, LLC Kathleen F. Carpenter Amy R. Gowan DONAHUEFITZGERALD LLP Growers Square 1646 N. California Blvd., Suite 250 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae CALIFORNIA BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION Clerk of Court Kern County Superior Court 1415 Truxtun Ave. Bakersfield, California 93301 Clerk of the Court of AppealFifth Appellate District2424 Ventura StreetFresno, California 93721 17