WILLIAMS v. S.C. (MARSHALLS OF CA)

Petitioner’s Opening Brief on the Merits

Cal.November 17, 2015

No. $227228 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA MICHAEL WILLIAMS,anindividual, Plaintiff and Appellant, . y. fists Ae SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. NOV Ae 201 MARSHALLSOF CA, LLC, Soaks ire Terk Real Party in Interest. ge AFTER DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, CASE B259967 FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CASE No. BC503806, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO JUDGE WILLIAM F. HIGHBERGER, DEPARTMENT322 APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITS CAPSTONE LAW APC GLENN A. DANAS (SBN 270317) RYAN WU(SBN (SBN 222323) ROBERT DREXLER (SBN 119119) LIANA CARTER (SBN 201974) STAN KARAS (SBN 222402) 1840 CENTURY PARK EAST, SUITE 450 LOS ANGELES, CA 90067 TELEPHONE:(310) 556-4811 FACSIMILE: (310) 943-0396 GLENN.DANAS@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM RYAN.WU@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM ROBERT.DREXLER@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM LIANA.CARTER@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM STAN.KARAS@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant MICHAEL WILLIAMS No. 8227228 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA MICHAEL WILLIAMS,an individual, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. MARSHALLS OF CA, LLC, Real Party in Interest. AFTER DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, CASE B259967 FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CASE NO. BC503806, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO JUDGE WILLIAM F. HIGHBERGER, DEPARTMENT 322 APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITS CAPSTONE LAWAPC GLENN A. DANAS (SBN 270317) RYAN WU(SBN (SBN 222323) ROBERT DREXLER (SBN 119119) LIANA CARTER (SBN 201974) STAN KARAS (SBN 222402) 1840 CENTURY PARK EAST, SUITE 450 LOS ANGELES, CA 90067 TELEPHONE:(310) 556-4811 FACSIMILE: (310) 943-0396 GLENN.DANAS@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM RYAN.WU@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM ROBERT.DREXLER@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM LIANA.CARTER@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM STAN.KARAS@CAPSTONELAWYERS.COM Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant MICHAEL WILLIAMS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 0.0...ccccccccccssssssssssecscssscscsrsssecssesseeceseececeeceeseccece. iv ISSUES PRESENTED ooo... eeseccccssesssssssssstssvesscassassssasessisssssessesecseseeecesceseccec 1 INTRODUCTION oo... ..ccceecessesesssesessesscssssassesarsusscasasssssssesaresseeseseseesceceecescceswl STATEMENT OF THECASE..........c.cc0.0.. strsesetessensesscceosesestacsenensessesatssneeneees 4 ARGUMENT 0.0... cceccsssssssssesssnsssessessscsusssssssussussusstssssuestesessasstserscessesceseeeeccccce, 9 I, THE COURT OF APPEAL COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DENYING WILLIAMS ACCESS TO DISCOVERY RELEVANT TO HIS PAGA CLAIMS wo. cceceecceecsssssesesssssssusscsrsssssaratsusssesssssvaseesenercesseseceesecec, 9 A. In Resolving Discovery Disputes, Courts Must Heed The Liberal Policy Favoring DiSCOVELY 0.0.0... teescctesesescecsssescsssssacessesssscssesssresssatevesesecsesceceeececccc. 10 B. The Court ofAppeal Committed Reversible Error By Denying Williams Access To Contact Information Of Percipient ~ Witnesses And Other Aggrieved Employees In The First Instance .........cccccccsscesssssessesesssssesseseseceececceeecccccece, 12 1. The Court of Appeal Failed To Apply Controlling Law Authorizing Discovery of Contact Information of Percipient Witnesses And Potential Participants to Aggregate Litigationeeeececcescsssssssssssssevecsesessesressessoseseseseseceseec. 12 (a) Pioneer and Its Progeny Hold That Contact Information of Percipient Witnesses and Potential Class Members is Discoverable 0.0.0.0... ceeeccsessscssssesseceeceseeseeeeceeece. 13 (b) Pioneers Holding Extends To PAGA Enforcement Actions With At Least As Much Force As Other Aggregate Litigation oo... ccccccssssecessssesessssseccecsecsececeeses. 15 2. The Court ofAppeal Erred By Imposing An Inapplicable Good Cause Standard To Interrogatories ..0....c.ccccccceccccccecccccc, 20 II. A. (a) (b) “Good Cause” Does Not Apply To A Motion Compelling Responsesto Interrogatories .............ccccccccccsesssssessenseecccesceeeeeeeseess 20 Even If “Good Cause” Were Applicable, Williams Has Met That Standard......0...000............. 23 The Court ofAppeal Committed Reversible Error By Denying Discoverable Information Relevant To TheAllegations In Williams’s PAGA ACOION 0..........cccsessccsesesseeeccceessseeceesecssesecceceveveseseuscs25 The Court OfAppeal Committed Reversible Error By Requiring Williams To Make a Preliminary Merits Showing Before He Can Obtain Contact Information... ccccccccssssccceeesscesecceseevceseesses 30 The State’s Enforcement Rights Would Be Undermined If The Court Of Appeal’s Ruling Stands...............cccccscccsesssnscceccnesnssceccessecececesesssssececeseuassues 35 THE COURT OF APPEAL COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY HOLDING THAT THE NON-PARTY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEES’ PRIVACY RIGHTS PRECLUDED DISCLOSURE OF THEIR NAMES AND CONTACT INFORMATION...ceeeeeescceessceecereceeesnseeereseeecseeseescsessaeessesesssaeeceaeens40 Disclosure of Non-Party Employees’ Names and Contact Information Has Repeatedly Been Ordered Notwithstanding The Right To Privacy Under The California COmMStitUtiOn...........cccccsccscecceessssceceeeecceeecececesscecsessessesceseseeseeeceesees 41 The Court of Appeal Misapplied And — Ignored Controlling Law By Denying Access To Marshalls’s Employees’ Names And Contact Information On Privacy Grounds................:00eeeeeeeeeeeee49 1. Applying The Hill/Pioneer Privacy Analysis, The Court of Appeal Should Have Reversed The Trial Court And Compelled Disclosure Of The Aggrieved Employees’ Names And Contact Information...............ccccsssscecccccsescccseccceeceeuee49 il 2. The Court Below Relied On Inapposite Case Law In Its Privacy ANALYSIS .0....cccccccssccesscceessetececessssnsneecesscsecseessscascsssssacceessaees 52 C. Even If The Aggrieved Employees’ Privacy Rights Were Implicated, A Privacy Notice And/OrA Protective Order Would Have Addressed Any Possible Concerns.0................:.:0sessseeeeseseeeeesweDD CONCLUSION. .....cccccscsescssescscescscsesssssscsssssssssesesecsessesssscssssecevecsevevacsevereeerseeses 57 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT......cccccccssssssssssesessssecscssesecsevecseseseceeseveeeees 58 iil TABLE OF AUTHORITIES STATE CASES Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412 ...... 32, 48, 49 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1991) 16 Cal.4th 307 wooo.ccccececceceeeececccccccccecssssestecseneaaes A2 Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969........... 34, 36, 37, 39 Atari, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 867............... 10, 30 Belaire-West Landscape Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554.00... eeeeeeeeeeeeesseees 14, 47, 50, 51 Board ofMedical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini . (1979) 93 CaLApp.3d 669 ..........cccccecccsessssscccsceseessssecesceeesnstasers 53 Brownv. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489.000.0000eoseseneeseenees 17, 18, 36 Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th Q1Goo. ccccccccecsscccscccecseccesececsssccesessaeseceaea 22 Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365 0...cccccccsssssccssssssssesssscessssesseccessesssevesteceesens 33 Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d. 785.0... cccccsccssescscessssssssecssssseecentsseececs 11, 27 Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210 oceeececsccecsecsseceeseeeee 3, 21 Crab Addison, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2008) 169 CalApp.4th 958 0...cccccccccsssccccssssssssessscssvesssssesesssssseeeaespassim Craib v. Bulmash (1989) 49 Cal.3d 475..........cccccccceeeeeseeeeseeeee 37, 38 Davies v. Super. Ct. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291 oo.....ccccccccccccccessesccseceeeee 11 Emerson Electric Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th LLODoccccceeececececscecessvsccscssssssscseseeccessenseesscessecsceeseseceecs 10 Gentry v. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443.00cecesssccesseees 18 Glenfeld Develop Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 a CalApp.4th 1113occccccccecessccssscessessssssssssessserseccerstseeses 24 Greyhound Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355............passim lv Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7 o.....ccccccccccccccsssscccccccsceccccenecessccesssccscesceseseeseeeeees 46 Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Super. Ct. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 589.0...eeeeeeeeeee 25 Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (1994).7-Cal.4th 1 occccccceccssssssssssensesceessessesesssssceeseeeepassim Hooserv. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997.0... 51 Imperial Merchant Sves., Inc. v. Hunt ; (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381 ooo... ccccccceeseseesecessesesesssssesscestessssenes 21 Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 oo.icceccessesccceesssesssssesssereeseeeseespassim Johnson v. Superior Court (2000) 80.Cal.App.4th 1050.......000... 50 Kirby v. ImmoosFire Protec. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244wo. 21 Kramerv. Super. Ct. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 758...eee 21 Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839.......... 3, 8, 49 Lee v. Dynamex, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1325.......... 15, 18, 48 Milan v. Restaurant Enterprises Group, Inc. - (1998) 14 Cal.App.4th 477...ccccccccccssssccssecessscsusesseseeeees 37 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1970) 2 Cal.8d 161 ou...cececccceesesscesceeeeescsesssesssesseseecs 28, 29 Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285... 42 Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 5638...........cccccccccccccecceesssssesesssssreeeees 47,51 Pioneer Elecs (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360.00...cccccccccccceseeeeceesessseeeseseesenerspassim Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347...ccccccessseesseesseeccereceeeeeeess 47, 49 Puerto v. Super. Ct. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242.0...passim Rope v. Auto-Chlor Sys. of Wash. (2013) 220 . ~ CalApp.4th 635.00... ccccccceecselecseeeceseeeeeeeeeseeneceecssnsseeseeceeseneers 33 Rust v. Roberts (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 772 ........cccccccesssceesseeseeeee 11 Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1978) 80 CalApp.3d Loiccccecsccccsccceesessseneeesees 28, 29, 31 Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652.0... ccccccccceeseceecessscssecseeesecsssrseeeeseeeesees 56 West Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d AOT woe cccccceccccceeccccssecececcceccceccecccsseseneececscesceccsccccecesetesesseeseceeees 22, 34 Williams v. Super. Ci. (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2015) 236 CalApp.4th L151 oo...ccccccccccssscceccessnsscceceseceeneeeeespassim FEDERAL CASES Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680 oo... c ee cceccseccsccceceeseccceessccseesenseseesssceesseeesess 24 Jeske v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc. (E.D.Cal. Jan. 10, 2012, No. CVF11-1838 LJO-JLT) 2012 U.S.Dist.Lexis 2963 ....ccsccescsesescesesecssseesseeeeesesuessessaseeesnees 35 Sakkab v. Luxoitica Retail N. Am., Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 803 F.3d 425, 2015 U.S.App. Lexis L707] oc ececseeessseccenseececeeeeessesseesseceeeeseeseceeaessassenseseeeess 16, 17, 19, 24 STATE STATUTES Cal. Civ. Code § 3530 ............cccccccccccsccssscsesceeesecesssceesesssseseeeeceeaeens 21 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 166. Lecceccssssccsscssecssecseservecssssesssessssscsesesssesssvee 7 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.10(a) ..........cccccccecccccecessesecceceeeeeeceseeaneees 28 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2016-2036 (Civ. Disc. Act of 1986) ................ccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeveeeeeceeeeeeeeeeespassim Cal. Lab. Code § 21 oo... cece ccccccccscccccsseeeccencccsseeseseseceeeecececeeenenseees 37 Cal. Lab. Code § 50 u.........ecccceccsccccccccccccnssecccesseeceesssseesssssssesnesesenees 37 Cal. Lab. Code § 56 ..............cccccccccccccccscesesccceecesesssnnsssssssecseceeanens 37 Cal. Lab. Code § 61 oo.cccccccccccccccceeenseesseseeessecssseeesessssessseees 38 Cal. Lab. Code §74 oo... cccccccccccccsseccccesseeccnsecececessssescceeeeeeesecernenaess 38 Cal. Lab. Code § 79 ...........cecccsessccccceeeeeeesSevsceeescuceeeeceucsseseseseeeeceeeuee 37 Cal. Lab. Code § 82(D)......... cc ccccccccsssseecceseeececeesssneccecceeceseeeneaesess 37 Cal. Lab. Code § 90 uu... cecccecccccccccececeeeseccceeeseeeees becececeesseseeeeeneese 38 Cal. Lab. Code § 90.5 u..........cccccscccccccccecessseececesceesssscessesestececeeeeaeess 38 Cal. Lab. Code § 92 o..........ccccccccccccccccccsceseseecsseeeceessceesssesssteceeseeanens 38 Cal. Lab. Code § 95(a)...........ccccccccccssssecceeecesececessssescecseccsseeeeeeeess 37 Cal. Lab. Code § 204 uo... ..eccceccccccccecnscssescecesessssenssssssseseeeeeesssneeseeeees 5 Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a) ......ccccccccccesssssssessnseeeeesssesesensssseeceeceseeees 5 Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7 .......cccccccscccccccscsssseccccsssesssessessnsnssecsessssceeeeees 5 Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a) oo... cccccccccccssssssssncececccessssssssssssereceeceseeeees 5 Cal. Lab. Code § 1174.........004.seeceuecnscessesssesesesenereecseseseesssnesenes 38 Cal. Lab. Code § 1193.5 uo... ccccccceseccccceeceeceeeeeeeeceeeeeaseesansaeaeeees 38 Cal. Lab. Code § 1193.6 oo... cccccceccccceeseeceecaeeeeeceeeeseeseeeseneneees 37 Cal. Lab. Code § 1194 uo... ccccssesesssssssssnsrersesesssssesesesensnenseeees 37 Cal. Lab.Code § 1197.1 oo... ccccccccssssssecessseessnececeessnessesssecenseeenees 37 Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq. (Priv. Attys. Gen. Act (PAGA))..........cccccccceseecceceeeeeeeeeeeeeespassim Cal. Lab. Code § 2800 o.oo... ceceeecceceeesseeceeeseceeseeeesssneeeesssssseeees 5 Cal. Lab. Code § 2802 00.0... cccccescsececccccecceseseeeeceeeeeeeceeeeereeeessssaees 5 vill ISSUES PRESENTED (1) Is the plaintiff in a representative action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code,§ 2698 et seq.) entitled to discovery of the names and contact information of other “aggrieved employees” at the beginning of the proceedingoris the plaintiff first required to show good cause in order to have accessto such information? (2) Inruling on such a request for employee contact information, should thetrial court first determine whether the employees have a protectable privacy interest and, if so, balance that privacy interest against competing or countervailing interests, or is a protectable privacy interest assumed? (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1; Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360.) INTRODUCTION Employees pursuing aggregatelitigation, including class actions, have long been entitled to contact information of other employees who are potential percipient witnesses to the wage and hourviolations at issue. In this enforcement action brought under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), Appellant Michael Williams sought the names and contact information of Marshalls’s current and former California employees so that he could investigate and prove his claims. Departing sharply from well-settled authority, including this Court’s decision in Pioneer Elecs (USA), Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360 (“Pioneer”), the court below denied nearly all of the discovery sought. The Court ofAppeal granted Williams’s motion only as to less than one percent of Marshalls’s employees’ contact information,! holding that Williams could only obtain additional employee contact information by satisfying a series of preliminary hurdles related to the merits of his suit. According: ~ to the court below, before he can obtain what other courts have called “basic discovery,” Williams must: (1) prove through a deposition that he personally suffered Labor Code violations;(ii) demonstrate “personal knowledge” of Marshalls’s wage and hour practices at locations throughout California; and (iii) prove that Marshalls’s employmentpractices are in fact uniform throughout the state. Under the decision below, Williams, whois the state’s proxy in enforcing California labor laws under PAGA, mustin effect establish his a priori knowledge of Marshalls’s violations before he can properly investigate, through interviews with other employees, his allegations that Marshalls violated the Labor Code on a state-wide basis.2 The reasoning of this decision, at once circular and contrary to all of the analogouscaselaw,is clearly erroneous and must be reversed. The court below committed several critical errors. First, it found that Williams’s motion to compel interrogatory responses wasproperly denied because hefailed to show “good cause.” But the Discovery Act requires a moving party to show “good cause” only to compel production of documents for inspection, not to 1 The court below granted contact information for employeesat just onestore location out of Marshalls’ 129 locations statewide. 2 Petitioners Appendix [“PA”] 14 [942]; PA 15 [947]. compel responsesto interrogatories. This violates this Court’s? explicit instruction to lower courts to avoid reading a “good cause” requirementinto a discovery provision that does not contain that term. Underthe controlling standard, relevanceis the touchstone for discoverability. The contact information of employees who maybe percipient witnesses to Marshalls’s violative statewide practices is clearly discoverable because that information is relevantto the allegations set forth in Williams’s complaint. oo. Moreover,even if a good cause requirement wereto apply here, Williams’s request amply satisfies it. Without access to aggrieved employees’ contact information, Williams would be put at an unfair disadvantage as Marshalls would maintain exclusive and unfettered access to its employees in preparingits defense. And because PAGAcivil penalties are measured by violations against all aggrieved employees, Williams cannot be deprived of his ability to ascertain the amountof civil penalties the state and aggrieved employees may recoverattrial through interviews with aggrieved employees. Second, the court below erred by applying the wrongtest in concluding that employees’ privacy interests outweigh the need for disclosure at this time. In so holding, the court below relied on the “compelling need”test from Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, rather than the Hill test adopted by this Court in Pioneer and subsequently applied by numerousother California courts. For relatively nonsensitive information like 3 See Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d, 210, 220. contact information of percipient witnesses, this Court in Hill rejected any showing of “compelling need” or “compelling © interest.” Rather, under the Hill/Pioneer line of cases, courts have ordered the disclosure of percipient witnesses’ and class members’ contact information, subject to a privacy notice. The Mill/Pioneer holdingextends to the contact information of aggrieved employees in a PAGAaction. If anything, PAGA plaintiffs should be entitled to even greater discovery rights thanclass action plaintiffs, particularly considering the importance of the public rights and state interest at the core of the PAGA. Instead, by diminishing Williams’s PAGArepresentative action as a mere “parochial claim” and imposing unique, unprecedented preliminary merits hurdles to obtain “basic discovery,” the decision below,if affirmed, would cripple the PAGA mechanism, thereby degrading oneof the “primary mechanismsfor enforcing the Labor Code.” Uskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383.) Thedecision below is at odds with the Pioneer and Hill line of cases governing discovery and the important PAGApolicies recently affirmed in Jskanian and mustbe reversed. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Marshalls is a retailer of discount clothing, housewares and personal items. (PA 9 [{16].) Marshalls employs hourly-paid, non-exempt workers at retail stores throughout California averaging 31,000 square feet in size. (PA 9 [17 and 19}.) Williams was employed as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee from approximately 2012 to 2013 at Marshalls’s Costa Mesa, California location. (PA 9 [418].) 4 Williamsfiled this action on March 22, 2013, andfiled the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on November19, 2013, alleging one cause of action under PAGA. (See generally PA 6-19.) This PAGA claim is for civil penalties for violations of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512(a)4 for the failure to provide Williams and other aggrieved employees with mealor rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof; section 226(a) for failure to provide accurate wage statements to Williams and other aggrieved employees; sections 2800 and 2802for failure to reimburse Williams and other aggrieved employeesforall necessary business-related expenses; and section 204 for failure to pay all earned wages owed to Williams and other aggrieved employees during employment. (PA 12 [[36].) The SAC alleged statewide Labor Codeviolations based on systematic, company-wide policies. (See, e.g., PA 14 [942] [“Defendants implemented a systematic, company-wide policy to erase and/or withdraw meal period premiumsfrom the time and/or payroll records when Plaintiff and aggrieved employees’ records reflected that they did not receive compliant meal periods.]; PA 15 [47] [“Defendants did not schedule sufficient employees to handle the volumeofcustomer transactions and... there were times that Plaintiff and aggrieved employees had to continue working without a rest period,” yet “Defendants implemented a systematic, company-widepolicy to not pay rest period prémiums’}; PA 17 [54] [Marshalls had “policy and 4 Statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless otherwiseindicated. practice” of not reimbursing employees regarding necessary business-related expenses, such asfor travel to banks to obtain cash, changeor deliver bank deposits].) During discovery, Williams sought production of the names and contact information of Marshalls’ non-exempt California employees who had worked since March 22, 2012 (corresponding to PAGA’s one-year statute of limitations) so that he could investigate and obtain evidence to substantiate his claims. (PA 54.) Williamsserved his Special Interrogatories, Set One, on Marshalls on February 5, 2014. (PA 53-54.) Special Interrogatory No. 1 asked for the following information: Set forth the first, middle and last name, employee identification number, each position held, the dates each position was held, the dates of employment, last known address, and all known telephone - . numbers of each and every person whois or was employed by Defendant Marshalls of CA, LLC in California as a non-exempt employee at any time since March 22, 2012. (Id.) Marshalls’ response to Special Interrogatory No. 1 consisted solely of objections. (PA 59-60.) As a result, Williams met and conferred with Marshalls and offered to address any privacy concerns with a “Belaire-West notice,” which is a privacy notice procedure commonly used in class action cases allowing employees the option to opt out of having their contact information produced. (PA 64.) Marshalls rejected this solution and thereafter continued to refuse to produce the requested employee contact information. (PA 67.) Williamsfiled a motion to compel Marshalls’s response to this interrogatory (see generally PA 27-43), which Marshalls opposed. (See generally PA 94-112.) At the motion hearing on September9, 2014, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling denying the vast majority of Williams’s motion, but grantingit in part. Specifically, the trial court held that Marshalls need not produce employee contact information for 128 of its California stores, but did have to produce contact information for its employees at its Costa Mesa store. (PA 229; PA 234.) Thetrial court ordered this discovery subject to a Belaire- West notice process, with the costs to be shared by the parties equally. (PA 229.) It also held that Williams could renew his motion to seek any additional employees’ names and contact information, but only after he was deposed “for at least six productive hours,” and that Marshalls couldreferto this deposition testimonyin its opposition if Marshalls believed the deposition “shows the claims presented herein have no factual merit” or whether the challenged corporate policy was uniformly applied throughout the state. (PA 230.) | The trial court requested that the Court ofAppeal review the matter and address the scope of discovery in a PAGAaction, finding it is the “legitimate subject of an early writ.” (PA 257:10.) Thetrial court certified the question under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 166.1 as presenting a controlling question of law concerning which there are substantial groundsfor difference of opinion. (PA 257.) | Wilhamsfiled a petition for writ of mandate on November10, 2014. The Court ofAppeal held oral argumenton April 22, 2015, and published its opinion on May 15, 2015, denyingthe petition for writ of mandate. First, the Court of Appeal ruled that discovery of Marshalls’s employee contact information statewide was premature, as Williams had failed to establish “good cause” under Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1). (Williams v. Super. Ct. (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157.) The court held that Williamsfailed to “evince knowledge of the practices of Marshalls at other stores” or demonstrate that Marshalls has a uniform statewide policy, and thus failed to establish good cause for the contact information for Marshalls’s California employees. The court below also found that “[nJothing in the PAGA suggests a private petitioner standingin as a proxy for the DLSEis entitled to the same access,” as the DLSE,and thusrejected the argument that PAGA’s purpose authorized the discovery sought. (Ud. at p.1157.) Second, the court held that Williams hadfailed to demonstrate a “compelling need [that is] so strong as to outweigh the [employees’] privacy right” under the California Constitution, applying the test articulated in Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839. Cd. at pp.1158-1159.) Despite the fact that the Court of Appeal stated “discovery in a civil action brought under the PAGA be subject to the samerules as discovery in civil actions generally,” the court did not cite, much less analyze, any of the controlling casesfrom this Court or the Court of Appeal regarding the production of non-party employee names and contact information in the context of a wage and hoursuit. (Jd. at p.1158.) Applying the “compelling need” test, the Court of Appealheld that Williams’s “need for the discovery at this timeis practically nonexistent.” (Id at p.1159.) The Court of Appeal concluded by finding that Marshalls’s employees’ privacy interest will outweigh Plaintiffs interest in disclosure of the employees’ namesand contact information until Williams(1) sits for a deposition, (2) establishes that he was subjected to Labor Code violations and (8) establishes that Marshalls’s employment practices are uniform throughout the company.(/d. at p.1159.) Based on its conclusions regarding lack of “good cause” and the privacy interests at stake, the court below denied the writ petition. Williams timely filed a petition for review in this Court on June 25, 2015. This Court granted the petition on August19, 2015. ARGUMENT I. THE COURT OFAPPEAL COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DENYING WILLIAMS ACCESS TO DISCOVERY RELEVANT TO HIS PAGA CLAIMS At issue on appeal is whether Williams, in prosecuting this PAGAsuit, is entitled to obtain the names and contact | information of Marshalls’s non-exempt California employees who had worked since March 22, 2012. (PA 54.) In the proceedings below, the Court of Appeal erred by affirming thetrial court’s order denying Williamsaccéssto this basic, eminently discoverable information. In so holding, the Court of Appeal flouted the Civil Discovery Act’s “relevance standard” while erroneously requiring that Williams show “good cause”’—a requirement inapplicable to Williams’ motion compelling answers to interrogatories. Moreover, by requiring that a PAGAplaintiff establish his knowledge of his allegations before he can gain access to witness contact information—thatis, that he have to prove up his elaims before he can obtain evidence to investigate his claims—the court below madeit difficult, if not impossible, to effectively prosecute his action to enforce the Labor Code. A. In Resolving Discovery Disputes, Courts Must Heed The Liberal Policy Favoring Discovery The Civil Discovery Act (the “Act”), enacted in 1957 and amended numeroustimessince, liberalized pre-trial discovery procedure to “take the ‘game’ elementout of trial preparation” and “do away‘with the sporting theory of litigation—namely surprise at trial.” (Greyhound Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 376 [citations omitted].) By freely allowing facts to be disclosed in the pretrial phase, the Act aims to “educate the parties concerning their claims and defenses so as to encourage settlements and to expedite and facilitate trial.” (Emerson Electric Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1107.) The expansive scope of discovery under the Act allows both sides to be able “to investigate the case fully.” (Atari, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 867, 871.) Underthe Act, “relevance”is the sole standard for discoverable information. As provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any- matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pendingaction . . . if the matter eitheris itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to 10 the discovery of admissible evidence.” Thus, the scope of discovery extends not only to admissible evidence, but also to any information that might lead to evidence admissible attrial. (Davies v. Super. Ct. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301.) The Act specifically makes discoverable the identity and contact information of persons with knowledge of discoverable matters. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010 [“Discovery may be obtainedof the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.”].) Section 2017.010 “provides a broad right to discover any relevant information thatis not privileged, includingthe identity and location of witnesses.” (CrabAddison, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 958, 965-966.) In lightof this strong policy favoring discovery, the scope of discovery mustbe construedliberally, and any doubtis generally resolved in favor of permitting discovery—“especially when the precise issuesofthe litigation have not yet been clearly established.” (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Super.Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790, fn.8 [finding that “[cJourts may appropriately give the applicant [for discovery] substantial leeway”in that instance (citation omitted)].) In Greyhound, this Court had specifically singled out an intermediate court that sustained objections to interrogatories, including, inter alia, to interrogatories seeking contact information that “were clearly discoverable by deposition.” (Greyhound, 56 Cal.2d at pp.381-82 [citing Rust v. Roberts (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 772].) Greyhound emphasized that the courts below cannot“stultify the purposes of 11 discovery” by suppressing discovery and failing to consider other ways in which the discovery may be obtained. (/d. at p.381.) Ultimately, Greyhoundinstructed lower courts, in the proper exercise of discretion, to give effect, rather than thwart, the policy favoring discovery, and “liberally construef] [facts] in favor of discovery, rather than in the most limited andrestrictive mannerpossible.” (/d. at p.383.) “Any record which indicates a failure to give adequate consideration to these concepts is subject to the attack of abuse of discretion.” (d. at p.384.) B. The Court ofAppeal Committed Reversible Error By Denying Williams Access To Contact Information Of Percipient Witnesses And Other Aggrieved Employees In The First Instance 1. The Court ofAppeal Failed To Apply Controlling Law Authorizing Discovery of Contact Information of Percipient Witnesses And Potential Participants to — Aggregate Litigation The Court ofAppeal committed reversible error by denying Williams’s request for contact information of potential percipient — witnesses and aggrieved employees without mentioning, much less applying, any of the cases addressing discovery of contact information, includingthe controlling case that extends that broad right to plaintiffs pursuing aggregate litigation, Pioneer. Instead, the Court of Appeal baldly asserted that Williams,. through his basic interrogatory request, sought to “wage litigation rather thanfacilitate it.” (Williams, 236 Cal.App.4th at p.1157.) 12 (a) Pioneer and Its Progeny Hold That _ Contact Information of Percipient Witnesses and Potential Class Membersis Discoverable In denying Williams access to over 99% of the requested contact employee information, the courts below flout Pioneer, which declared that “[c]ontact information regarding the identity of potential class membersis generally discoverable, so that the lead plaintiff may learn the namesof other persons who might assist in prosecuting the case.”5 (Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at p.373 [citing cases].) Finding that “many of Pioneer’s complaining customers would be percipient witnesses to relevant defects in the DVD players,” this Court held that the contact information for all complaining customers who purchased the sameallegedly defective DVD player was discoverable so long as an opt-out was provided. (Id. at pp.364, 374 [emphasis in original].) Evaluating the competing interests in determining whether to allow discovery, the Pioneer Court made several observations. The Court pointed out that by “contact[ing] those customers and learn[ing] of their experiences,” the plaintiff could improvetheir chances of succeedingin litigation “thus perhaps ultimately benefiting some,if not all, those customers.” (Pioneer, 40 Cal. 4th at p.374.) The Pioneer Court also noted that denying discovery of contact information would place plaintiffs at an unfair disadvantage, as “Pioneer would possessa significant advantage if it could retain for its own exclusive use and benefit the contact 5 Pioneer andits progeny will be discussed in greater detail below, in connection with the balance between privacy and discovery. (See infra, Section II.) 13 information of those customers who complained regarding its product.” ([bid.) Weighing the interests of promoting discovery and encouragingfair litigation against the right to privacy, Pioneer concluded that the interests weigh in favor of allowing discovery. (/bid.) Courts have applied Pioneer’s reasoning to various types of wage and houractions, each time reaffirmingtheplaintiffs right to discovery of current and former employees’ contact information. In one case, a group of individual employees alleged that that their former employer committed wage and hour violations and by interrogatory sought to discover the names and contact information of non-party employee witnesses. (Puerto v. Super. Ct. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1245-46.) The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel further responses after the defendant provided only employee names but no contact information. (Id. at p.1247.) Puerto found such routine contact information was discoverable, as the plaintiffs would “need to talk to the witnesses.” (Ud. at p.1254.) The court noted that “it is only under unusual circumstances that the courts restrict discovery of nonparty witnesses’ residential contact information.” (Id.) Likewise, in a wage and hourclass action involving restaurant workers, the court held that the requested names and contact information of all employees in California were discoverable. (Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at p.966 [“The disclosure of the names and addressesof potential witnessesis a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery.” [citations omitted].) And in Belaire-West Landscape Inc.v. Super.Ct. 14 (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, another wage-and-hourclass action, the court allowed production of the names and contact information for all current and former employees subject to an opt-out privacy notice. (Ud. at p.565.) The court found that “current and former employees are potential percipient witnesses to [the defendant employer’s] employment and wagepractices, and as such their identities and locations are properly discoverable.” (Id. at p.562.) Finally, relying on Pioneer and Puerto, the court in Lee v. Dynamex, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1325 reversed an order denyingclass certification based, in part, on the trial court’s abusingits discretion in denying theplaintiff access to witness contact information. (/d. at p.1338.) Lee underscored that disclosure of class membercontact information is critical to the plaintiffs ability to “develop evidence capableof supporting class certification motion.” (bid.) The Pioneer line of cases firmly hold that non-party employees’ contact information—including those who are putative absent class members—is well within the proper scope of discovery pre-certification and is thus discoverable irrespective of whether a class wasevercertified or whether a fiduciary relationship was ever formed. (b) Pioneer’s Holding Extends To PAGA EnforcementActions With At Least As Much Force As Other Aggregate Litigation The fact that a PAGAaction is brought solely in the public interest would militate in favor of a PAGA plaintiff having greater discovery rights than thatof a plaintiff in a class action 15 seeking only money damages. Asthis Court declared, the PAGA action is one of the “primary mechanismsfor enforcing the Labor Code.” (Uskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383.) PAGA wasenacted to “augmentto the limited enforcementof the [Labor Workforce Development] Agency by empowering employeesto enforce the Labor Code as representatives of the Agency.” (/d.) An action under PAGAto recover civil penalties “is essentially a law enforcementaction designed to protect the public and not benefit private parties.” -Ud.at p.381 [citation omitted].) Fundamentally, “a PAGA action is a statutory action in which the penalties available are measured by the numberof Labor Code violations committed by the employer.” (Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 803 F.3d 425, 2015 U.S.App.Lexis 17071, *24.) “As the state’s proxy, an employee-plaintiff may obtain civil penalties for violations committed against absent employees[citation], just as the state could if it brought an enforcement action directly.” ([bid.) Under the PAGApenalties scheme, 75% ofthe civil penalties recovered goes to the state while the remaining amount is given to the aggrieved employees. (Lab. Code § 2699, subd.(i).) The PAGA litigant’s right to pursue civil penalties on behalf of others is unwaivable based on public policy. U/skanian, 59 Cal.4th at p.384.) Because PAGAis aimedat “deter[ring] and punish[ing] employer practices that violate the rights of numerous émployees under the Labor Code,” it would not “serve the purpose of the PAGA”to foreclose the right to bring representative PAGA claims. (Ud. [quoting Brown v. Ralphs 16 Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 502].) As a Ninth Circuit panel recently observed, any attempt to limit “representative PAGA claims—thatis, claims for penalties arising out of violations against other employees—[would] effectively...limit the penalties of an employee-plaintiff may recover on behalf of the state.” (Sakkab, 2015 U.S.App.Lexis 17071, at ‘p.*24.) In light of the above, the principles of Pioneer must apply to a PAGAaction with at least as muchforce as they do to a class action. First,“permitting access to relevant information necessary to pursuethelitigation” is partly driven by the “the fundamental public policy underlying California’s employment laws.” (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1256; see also Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at p.974 [finding that the policy favoring enforcemént of unwaivable right to wages and overtime supports disclosing contact information of class members].) Here, the policy preserving employees’ right to pursue a representative PAGAaction to enforce labor laws on behalf of the stateis, if anything, even greater—as suchactions “directly enforce the state’s interest in penalizing and deterring employers whoviolate California’s labor laws.” (Uskanian, 59 Cal.4th at p.387 [emphasis in original].) The state’s proxy in a PAGA enforcementaction cannot have dramatically reduced discovery rights compared to that conferred on a private plaintiff alleging Labor Code violations. Second, courts have made class membercontact information discoverable partly because those very class 17 members may benefit from a successful litigation. For instance, Pioneer observed that contacting witnesses is more likely to lead to a successful class action, which would benefit those witnesses whoare also class members. (Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at p.374.) Indeed, disallowing the disclosure of class member contact information is reversible error when it thwarts a plaintiff from developing evidence supporting class certification. (Leev. Dynamex, 166 Cal.App.4th at p.1338.) Underthe same reasoning, aggrieved employees’ contact information should be disclosed because they standto benefit if the PAGAaction is successfully prosecuted. Aggrieved employees not only would share in 25% of civil penalties recovered, their participation would also further PAGA’s objective of achieving maximum deterrence of employer misconduct throughcivil penalties imposed for violations against all aggrieved employees. (Brown, 197 Cal.App.4th at p.502.) Without the involvementof non-party aggrieved employees, which usually comesafter the plaintiff has been able to contact them using contact information obtained from the defendant, the PAGA enforcementaction would lose its effectiveness, depriving aggrieved employeesof the benefits of a successful PAGA suit. Third, just as wage and hourclass actions benefit workers by informing class membersof their employmentrights while shielding individual employees from retaliation through the collective action (see Gentryv. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-461), so too would Williams’s (and his counsel’s) communications with fellow aggrieved employeesin the course of 18 his PAGAinvestigation advance California’s policy protecting workers’ rights. Fourth, it would makelittle sense for a class representative in a putative class action to have broaderdiscovery rights than a PAGAlitigant. Plaintiffs in putative class actions have broad discovery rights that stem, in part, from the policy promoting class actions to enforce labor laws. (See Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at p.974 [public policy “favor[s]...enforcing [labor] rights through class action litigation’].) However, as Iskanian underscored,.“a PAGAlitigant’s substantive role in enforcing our labor laws”exists to further public interests, and is thereby preserved even under circumstances in which the right of a private party to seek recovery througha classactionis extinguished (such as through a‘class action waiver in an arbitration agreementin that case). (See Iskanian, 59 Cal.4th at pp.387-388.) Thus, in light of “PAGA’s centralrole in enforcing California’s labor laws” (Sakkab, 2015 U.S.App.Lexis 17071, at p.*34), a PAGA plaintiff cannot face morerestrictions in discovery vis-a-vis a class plaintiff. Finally, if the Legislature had wishedto limit discovery for PAGAplaintiffs or engraft new hurdles to obtaining basic discovery beyondthe applicable relevancy standard of the Act, the Legislature would have done so. Because the Legislature has enacted no suchlimitations, PAGA litigants cannot be handcuffed by a rule that denies them discovery tools necessary to effectively prosecute their enforcement actions. 19 In short, the Court of Appeal, betraying a fundamental misunderstanding of the importance of the PAGArepresentative action in enforcing labor laws, diminished Williams’s action as representing the mere “parochial claim” of “one local individual.” (Willliams, at pp.1157, 1159.) Failing to considerthis Court’s precedents andother relevant cases, the Court ofAppeal reached a decision at odds with Iskanian, Pioneer, and their progeny. 2. The Court ofAppeal Erred By Imposing An Inapplicable Good Cause Standard To Interrogatories (a) ~ “Good Cause” Does Not Apply ToA Motion Compelling Responses to Interrogatories The Court of Appeal also wrongly imposed on Williams the burdenof “set[ting] forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery...” (Williams, at pp.1151,-1156.) Section 2030.300 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs motions | to compel further responses to interrogatories, does not impose a good cause requirement on the moving party. Instead, the Court of Appeal wrongly relied on Section 2031.310 subdivision (b)(1), which imposes a good cause requirement only with respect to motions to compel further responses to demandsfor production of documents, not interrogatories. (See id. at p.1156 [citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310].) By misapplying the “good cause” requirementhere, the Court of Appeal committed reversible error.- In construing a statute, a court must “first look to the wordsof the statute. [Citations] If the statutory languageis clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends.” (Imperial Merchant Svcs., Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 20 47 Cal.4th 381, 387.) The court may also construe the statutory language “in light of related statutes.” (Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protec. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1254.) Here, because the applicable statute, Section 2030.300, does not contain a “good cause” requirement while a related statute does contain such a requirement, “good cause” cannot be read into that section. (Civ. Code § 3530 [“That which does not appearto exist is to be regarded asit if it did not exist.”].) This Court has cautioned against engrafting a good cause requirement onto provisions of the Discovery Act where there is none: The statute does not require any showing of good cause for serving and filing interrogatories. Thus, the burden of showing good cause, which the authorities mention in regard to motions for inspections and some other discovery procedures, does not exist in the case of interrogatories. It would be anomalous to hold that the mere interposing of an objection creates a burden where none existed before. (Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220 ; see also Kramerv. Super. Ct. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 753, 758 [holding that no “good ~ cause” showingis required to compel answersto a deposition because theat-issue statute did not contain such language].) Thus, in compelling responsesto interrogatories, a moving party does not bear the burden of showing good cause. The mere interposing of an objection cannot create a burden where none existed before. (Coy, 58 Cal.2d at pp.220-21.) Rather, the Act “allows interrogatories as a matter of right unless the opponent 21 can state a valid objection thereto.” (West Pico Furniture Co.v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 414 fn.2 [citing Greyhound, 56 Cal.2d at p.388].) Noprior opinion of this Court or any published intermediate court authority has engrafted a heightened “good cause” requirement onto the general relevance standard invoked by courts to authorize discovery of basic non-party employee contact information. (See Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at p.374 [citing Section 2017.010 and finding that “[o]ur discovery statute recognizes that‘the identity and location of persons having [discoverable] knowledge’ are proper subjects of civil discovery”]; Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp.965-966 [“[S]ection 2017.010[]... provides a broad right to discover any relevant informationthat is not privileged, including the identity and location of witnesses”].) Omitting any discussion of Pioneer, Crab Addison, Puerto, Belaire- West, or any other similar case law, the Court of Appeal instead cited only Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, which dealt with a demandfor inspection of documentsandis not relevant to an interrogatory response.® (Williams, at p.1156.) 6 Calcoris readily distinguishable because it addressed a demandfor inspection of documents not applicable here. (See Calcor, 236 Cal.App.4th at p.218 [“We hold a subpoena under Code of Civil Procedure section 2020, subdivision (d) ... must describe the documents to be produced with reasonable particularity.”].) The Court of Appeal’s exclusive reliance on Calcor, a commerciallitigation case, to the exclusion of the Puerto line of cases that expressly addressed discovery of employee contact information, is ill-considered. 22 Furthermore, even in those instances where a party is required to show good cause for the discovery sought, an appellate court that denies the discovery because the party “fail[ed] to show a specific need for the requested information” has gone “beyondthe statutory intent of ‘good cause,” and haslikely “place[d] the burden on the wrong party.” (Greyhound, 56 Cal.2d at p. 378 & fn.6 [expressly disapproving such appellate rulings].) Yet thatis precisely what the Court of Appeal concluded by stating that Williams's“needfor the discoveryat this timeis practically nonexistent.” (Williams, at pp.1151, 1159.) Not only wasthis conclusion based on the imposition of a “good cause” standard that does not apply and should not have been applied in this case, butthe good cause standard imposed was nearly word- for-word that which this Court categorically rejected more than fifty years ago in Greyhound. | (b) Even If “Good Cause” Were Applicable, Williams Has Met That Standard Even if a good cause requirement were to apply, Wilhams amply demonstrated “good cause” underprior California precedent. Onebasis for “good cause” is the unfairnessof allowing the employer exclusive access to potential percipient witnesses. (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1256 [“The trial court imposedno order preventing {the defendant] from using the addresses and telephone numbers of these individuals in preparingits case, creating an inequitable situation in which one party has accessto all, or nearly all potential witnesses...”].) With exclusive and unfettered access to its own employees,atall 23 locations, Marshalls likely will interview employees from these locations in itsown investigation of Williams’s allegations. However, this inverts the normal presumptions attaching in wage and hourlitigation, where the employer generally is requiredto produce important information tothe plaintiff out of a recognition that many types of data are solely in the employer's possession.” Here, however, the Court of Appeal’s decision forces PAGAplaintiffs to litigate without any way of knowing the extent of the employer’s LaborCodeviolations, while presumably the employeris fully aware of these facts, thus creating an unfair litigation advantage for the employer. A second basis for “good cause” is that the information soughtis necessary for trial preparation. (See Glenfeld Develop Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Here, the names and contact informationof all non-exempt, hourly employees in California are essential to determining how many “aggrieved employees” there are for calculating potential civil penalties. (See Sakkab, 2015 U.S.App.Lexis 17071, at p.*30 (“The amountof penalties an employee may recover is measured by the numberof violations an employer has committed, and the violations may involve multiple employees.”].) Obtaining discovery to determine damagesis a necessary partoftrial preparation. (See, e.g., Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Super. Ct. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 589, 598 7 (Cf. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680, 687-88 [instructing courts to draw negative inferenceif the employer, who has a duty to keep wage and timerecords,fails to furnish them].) 24 [holding that liability insurance of defendantis discoverable partly because it provides a “measure of damages” wereplaintiff to prevail at trial].) Thus, this contact information, integral to Williams’s being able to calculate the potential amountin civil penalties, should be disclosed. A third basis for “good cause” relates to the collateral estoppel effect the PAGAaction will have on the non-party aggrieved employees who are represented by a PAGAplaintiff. (See Iskanian, 59 Cal.4th at p.381[holding that “a judgmentin [a PAGA]action binds all those, including nonparty aggrieved employees, who would be bound by a judgment in an action brought by the government.”].) The fact that any judgment obtained by Williams will bind the non-party aggrieved employees provides “good cause” for allowing a PAGAplaintiff ~ access to these employees in case they wantto assist in the suit. In short, the Court of Appeal erred in imposing a “good cause” requirement, but even if one applied, Wiliams has met that standard. 3. The Court ofAppeal Committed Reversible Error By Denying Discoverable Information Relevant To The Allegations In Williams’s PAGA Action Undercontrolling authority, Williams need not establish “good cause” to obtain witness contact information—he must simply establish that this information is relevantto his claims. Williamshaseasily met this standard, and none of the reasons provided by Court of Appeal for denying statewide discoveryis valid. First, the Court ofAppeal misconstrued the allegations in 25 Williams’s PAGA complaint, deeming that the factual allegations were “insufficient” to support the disclosure of percipient witness contact information. (Williams, at p.1157.) But these supposed pleading deficiencies are either rooted in an overly narrow and restrictive reading of the allegations in the complaint, or they were a pure invention of the Court of Appeal. In eithercase, Williams’s allegations cannot justify denying the requested discovery. The Court of Appealfirst found that Williamshad alleged in his complaint only that “he and perhaps other employees” at the Costa Mesa Marshalls location (where he had worked) “were subjected to violations of the Labor Code.” (Williams, at p.1157.) This is simply incorrect. In fact, Williams made numerous statewide allegations including that Marshalls employs non- exempt hourly paid employees “in various locations throughout California” (PA 9 [§19]) and that it “implemented systematic, company-widepolicfies]’ (which Williamsfactually described) that violated certain provisions of the California Labor Code.’ According to Williams’s complaint, one or more these violations were committed against him and Marshalls’s current or former . employees, rendering them all “aggrieved employees”:® 8 See, e.g., PA 14 []42], 15 [947], 17 [954]. 9 PAGA defines an “aggrieved employee” as “any person who was employedby the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations occurred.” (Lab. Code §2699(c).) Plaintiff made such allegations. (See PA 11 [929] [“Plaintiff and other employees are ‘aggrieved employees’ as defined by the California Labor Code section 2699(c) in that they are all current or former employees of Defendants and oneor moreofthe alleged 26 e “Defendants implemented a systematic, company-wide policy to erase and/or withdraw meal period premiums from the time and/or payroll records when Plaintiff and aggrieved employees’ records reflected that they did not receive comphant meal periods...” (PA 13-14 []42]); e “Defendants did not schedule sufficient employees to handle the volume of customer transactions and . . . there were times that Plaintiff and aggrieved employees had to continue working without a rest period,” yet “Defendants implemented a systematic, company-wide policy to not pay rest period premiums...” (PA 15 [[47)); e “Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of not reimbursing employees, including Plaintiff and aggrieved employees, for said business-related expenses andcosts...” (PA 17 [954)); The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Williams did not allege statewide violations is flatly belied by the record, andits construction of Williams’s factual allegations in a light that disfavors discovery flouts well-settled policy governing discovery. (See Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 31 Cal.3d at p.790, fn.8.) The Court of Appeal also concluded that because Williams’s operative complaint did not allege that he had “any knowledgeof the. practices of Marshalls at other stores, nor any fact that would lead a reasonable person to believe he knows whether Marshalls violations were committed against them”].) 27 has a uniform statewide policy,” Williams’s right to discovery could be restricted to information concerning the Costa Mesa store where he worked only. (Williams, at pp.1151, 1157.) Buta complaint only needs to contain “a statementof the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ.Proc. § 425.10 subd. (a).) Thus, alleging the ultimate facts of a cause of action, not the evidentiary facts,is all that is required. There is no legal basis supporting the court’s conclusion that Williams's “knowledge”of Marshalls’s statewide policies is an element of a PAGA causeofaction or any of the underlying Labor Codeviolationsalleged. Again, under California law, a matter is discoverable ifit “is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion madein that action, if the mattereither is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” (Code Civ.Proc. § 2017.010 [emphasis added].) It is well-settled that allegations in a complaint—evenif legally insufficient to state a claim—will suffice to suggest “the subject matter involved in the pendingaction,” although the subject matter of the action “is not restricted to the issues formally raised in the pleadings. Relevancyto the subject matter is determined by the potential as well as actual issues in the case.” (Union Mut. Life Ins.. v. Super. Ct. (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [citing Pacific Tel. & Tel. v.Super. Ct. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 174].) In Union Mutual, the plaintiff sought information by interrogatory concerning potential class members who were not California residents even 28 though he had not yet alleged a national class action. (d. at p.11.) The defendant, like Marshalls in this case, claimed that the plaintiff could not maintain a valid national class action in state court and therefore information concerning thepotential class members wasirrelevant to the subject matter of the action. (Id.) The court rejected the notion that the validity of a national class action wasa threshold issue precluding discovery until the issue was resolved. (/d.) The court firmly held that the plaintiff “should not be denied the opportunity to obtain further information simply because of the uncertainty as to whether or not such information will enable him to bring a national class action.” (/d. at pp.11-12.) “Discovery should only be denied on the grounds of ‘irrelevancy’ only where there is no reasonable possibility that the answers sought... will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or be helpful in preparation fortrial.” (Id. at p.11 [citation omitted].) In the context of aggregate litigation, California appellate authority clearly establishes the plaintiffs right to discover the names and contact information of these potential percipient witnesses without the limitation imposed on Williams (and future PAGA plaintiffs) by the Court of Appeal.. Yet under the skewed logic of the Court of Appeal, Williamsrepresents these aggrieved employees throughout California but cannot contact them outside of the store location for which he worked. Rather, Williams must prove the validity ofhis claims first. The decision below also allows Marshalls to retain exclusive access to the contact information of the percipient witnesses from all stores, giving 29 Marshalls the opportunity to interview these employeesin its own investigation of Williams’s allegations, while Williamsis precluded from doing so. Such a result runsafoul of the fundamental discovery principle that “both sides should be permitted to investigate the case fully.” (Atari, 166 Cal.App.3d at p.871.) Absent the ability to interview employees from all locations, including employees outside the locations where Williams worked, and potentially obtain declarations from those willing to submit testimony,his ability to support his action is severely compromised. C. The Court Of Appeal Committed Reversible Error By Requiring Williams To Make a Preliminary Merits Showing Before He Can Obtain Contact Information The Court of Appeal committed reversible error by endorsing the trial court’s order requiring Williams—before he can obtain “basic” discovery such as percipient witness contact information in order to conduct proper investigation—to sit for a deposition to establish his own knowledge of Marshalls’s violative policies. (Williams, at p.1157.) The trial court also expressly allowed Marshalls to oppose any discovery request by showing that Williams’s substantive claims have no merit. Ud.) At the deposition, moreover, Williams must establish several elements of his case before he can obtain contact information. Only after Williams satisfies each and every element maythetrial court - entertain the possibility of allowing the discovery of contact information. The decision below is improper. At the outset, the requirementthat a plaintiff sit for deposition first before he can 30 obtain basic contact information cannot be reconciled with the other decisions holding that “our discovery system is founded on the understanding that parties use discovery to obtain names and contact information for possible witnesses as the starting point for further investigations.” (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1250 [emphasis added]; Union Mutual, 80 Cal.App.3d at pp.11-12 [holding that initial discovery should only be denied if there is no “reasonable possibility” of that discovery leading to admissible evidence].) In fact, the court in Puerto rejected an argument raised by the defendant that such information could not be disclosed unless the petitioners demonstrated a compelling need and the information could not be obtained through depositions first. (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1251.) No depositions were required prior to allowing the discovery requested in Puerto. The specific elements that the Court of Appealrequired Williamsto satisfy before he can apply to obtain further discovery are also improper. First, the Court ofAppeal required Williams to “evince knowledgeof the practices of Marshalls at other stores” in his deposition testimony before he can obtain statewide discovery. (Williams, at p.237.) But in his operative complaint, Williams has already made goodfaith allegations regarding Marshalls’s policies and practices throughout its California locations. (See PA 14 [942], 15 [947], 17 [§54].) Assuming the Court of Appeal is requiring a PAGAplaintiff to allege specific evidentiary facts at the outset of the case, this inverts the normal civil litigation process, forcing a PAGAplaintiff to already possess facts about the employer’s policies and practices before 31 beinggiventhe tools to begin his investigation. Under the Court of Appeal’s flawed approach,a plaintiff must prove that he has knowledge of practices at other stores priorto obtaining the contact information necessary to - preliminarily investigate and collect proof regarding the practices at other stores. But courts have repeatedly rejected such an impractical, and circular, approach to discovery. (See Alch v. Super. Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1429 [“Real parties in interest’s argumentis, in effect, a claim that, because privacy interests are involved, the writers must prove that the data they seek will prove their case before they may haveaccess to the data. But there is no support in law,orin logic, for this claim.”].) Second, the Court of Appeal requires Williamsto “establish that he was himself subjected to violations of the Labor Code.” (Williams, at p.1157.) As set forth above, requiring a plaintiff to prove up his owncasefor liability and damagesbefore his can obtain discovery is utterly unreasonable. To the extent that the court below wants Williams to further demonstrate standing as a PAGAplaintiff, it is still unreasonable. There are only three standing requirements for bringing representative PAGAclaims: (1) the PAGAplaintiff was “employed by the alleged violator;” (2) the PAGA plaintiff complied with section 2699.3(a)’s notice and administrative exhaustion requirements andpled his or her compliance ’ therewith; and (3) “one or more of the alleged violations was committed” against the PAGAplaintiff.!° Aside from the 10 The PAGAstatute sets out the requirements for standing 32 administrative exhaustion requirement, pleading sufficient facts alone will suffice to establish PAGA standing. (See Rope v. Auto- Chlor Sys. of Wash. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 635, 650 [finding a plaintiff must plead facts supporting underlying Labor Code violations].) - ~ Here, Williams hasalreadysatisfied all three requirements by having alleged that Marshalls was his employer (PA 9 [418]), having alleged that he filed and served a notice letter to the LWDAandthe employer (PA 11-12 [§31-32]), and having alleged that he has suffered one or more violations committed by Marshalls. (PA 11 [929].) The Court of Appeal cites to no authority suggesting that a PAGAplaintiff must meet some heightened, non-pleading standardin order to become a proxy of the state, such as by proving his case. Indeed, there is no case of which Williams is aware where a plaintiff must meet a fictitious to bring PAGA claims. The statute provides that a PAGA- plaintiff must be an “aggrieved employee.” (Lab. Code §2699, subd.(a).) The statute defines an “aggrieved employee” as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (Lab. Code §2699, subd. (c).) The statute also requires that the PAGA-plaintiff send written notice by certified mail to the Agency and the employerofhis or her intent to bring an action under PAGA,stating the specific provisions of the [Labor] code s/he allege the employerviolated, including facts and theories in support (the “PAGA Notice”). (Lab. Code §2699.3, subd. (a)(1).) If the LWDAeither declines to investigate or fails to respond to thePAGA Notice within 33 days, the aggrieved employee may - allege PAGA claims. (Lab. Code §2699.3(A)(2)(a).) In addition, the PAGA-plaintiff must “plead compliance with the pre-filing notice and exhaustion requirementsin section 2699.3, subdivision (a).” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 385.) 33 heightened standing requirementin order to obtain basic discovery. Third, the Court of Appeal required Williamsto “establish [that] Marshalls’s employment practices are uniform throughout the company.” (Williams, at p.1157.) To require a plaintiff to do so prior to obtaining statewide discovery is absurd. Whether Marshalls’s policies are implementedacrossall stores is properly the subject of discovery, and a worker cannot be expected to have _ apriori knowledgeof the extent of the defendant’s practices. (See Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1256 [placing evidentiary burden on employer who hasaccessto all information].) To hold otherwise runs afoul of the longstanding principle that “the fact that a triable issue has not yet been determined cannot bar the disclosure of information sought for the very purpose oftrying that issue.” (West Pico, 56 Cal.2d at p.419, fn.4.) | Moreover, by requiring that Williams establish “uniform practices” in order to obtain further discovery, the Court of Appeal implicitly imposed a “commonality” requirement inapplicable to PAGA actions. (See Arias v. Super. Ct. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 975, 981-82 [holding that a PAGA representative action does not need to meet class action requirements].) The PAGAstatute requires no showing that Williamsis “typical” of other aggrieved employees or that his grievances are common or the result of uniform policies applied to other aggrieved employees. (Lab. Code, § 2699(c) [defining an aggrieved employee as “any person who was employedby the alleged violator and against whom one or moreof the alleged violations was committed”].) Indeed, a PAGAplaintiff “need not be an aggrieved employeefor all alleged PAGAviolations in that section 2699(c) uses the phrase ‘against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (Jeske v. Maxim Healthcare Servs. (E.D.Cal. Jan. 10, 2012, No.CVF11-1838 LJO-JLT) 2012 U.S.Dist.Lexis 2963, *37.) However, under the Court of Appeal’s confused ruling, Williamsis placed in the worst of all worlds. He must bear discovery burdens far more onerous than those faced by a class action litigant for precertification discovery, including having to clear preliminary merits hurdles to obtain basic discovery to which no othertypesof litigants are subject. At the same time, Williams must make showings of “commonality” and “typicality” that do not apply to a PAGArepresentative action. Such a rule makes no sense and mustberejected. | D. The State’s Enforcement Rights Would Be Undermined If The Court OfAppeal’s Ruling Stands Finally, denying Williams contact information as to the vast majority of Marshalls’s California non-exempt employees prevents Williams from proceeding with his PAGAclaims, given that he does not knoweither the identity or the numberof aggrieved employees. This frustrates the very purposeof the PAGArepresentative action specifically designed to allow “g plaintiff employee to collect penalties not only for himself, but also for other currentand former employees.” (Brown, 197 Cal.App.4th at p.499.) In particular, Williams will have the burden at trial to present prima facie evidence that individuals 35 are “aggrieved employees” who suffered Labor Code violations. The contact information of such employeesis necessary in meeting this burdenat trial. As it currently stands, Williams does not even have list of employees from which to determine the general number of aggrieved employeeslet alone the identity of those who would recover these penalties. The court below’s holding also frustrates California’s ability to enforce its labor laws. PAGA actions are necessary to ensure adequate labor law enforcementin a timeof diminished public budgets. (Arias, 46 Cal.4th at p.980 [underscoring the importance to a resource-strappedstate of having its labor laws enforced through private attorneys general].) The state’s power to enforce labor laws through a proxy would be weakened,if not crippled, were the state’s proxy deprived of the requisite investigative tools while seeking to enforce labor laws. Theplaintiff bringing suit under PAGA “doesso as the proxy or agentof the state’s labor law enforcementagencies.” (Arias, 46 Cal.4th at p.986.) Thus, a PAGA plaintiff stands in the identical position as these agencies when they enforce the Labor Code. Uskanian, 59 Cal.4th at p.380 [“In a lawsuit brought underthe act, the employee plaintiff represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies. ..” (emphasis added)].) “[A]n aggrieved employee’s action under the [PAGA] functionsas a substitute for an action brought by the governmentitself.” (d. at p.381 [citation omitted].) Although the actual powers between the state and its proxy may not be coextensive in every respect, a plaintiff serving as a private attorney general in a PAGA enforcementaction must be given the minimumlitigation tools necessary to enforce the Labor Code. California’s labor law enforcement agencies possess plenary authority to investigate and prosecute Labor Code violations. (See Lab. Code § 2699(a).) One agencywithin the LWDA,the DLSE,!! is “charged with enforcing Labor Code provisions (§ 1171 et seq.) and Industrial Welfare Commission orders governing wage, hour, and working conditionsof California employees. (§ 61.)” (Craib v. Bulmash (1989) 49 Cal.3d 475, 478.) The DLSEis the mainentity for public enforcement of California’s wage and hourlaws, and is vested with wide authority. (See Milan v. Restaurant Enterprises Group, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 477, 486-487.) Among the DLSE’s broad enforcement poweris filing a civil action against the employeror, in the alternative, conduct an audit and assess civil penalties. (Lab. Code §§ 1193.6, 1194, 1197.1.) Such wide authority is based on the Legislature’s mandate that the Labor Commissioner andhis or her deputies and agents “shall have free accessto all places of labor.”!2 (Lab. Code § 90.) 11 Pursuant to the Labor Code, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (““DLSE’), a subdivision of the Departmentof Industrial Relations that is headed by the Labor Commissioner (the DLSE’s chief), has broad authority to enforce all labor laws in California that are not specifically vested in another state agency. (Lab. Code §§ 95(a), 21, 79, 82(b).) The Department of Labor Relations, in turn, is a division of the LWDA. (See Lab. Code §§ 50, 56.) 12 The DLSE’s Bureau of Field Enforcement (BOFE) investigates employers’ places of business, checks postings and employee records, and conducts audits for unpaid wages and 37 Likewise, the courts have upheld the broad, plenary authority of the state agencies to investigate and prosecute. For instance, in Craib, this Court upheld enforcement of a DLSE subpoena requiring the employer to “produce time and wage records, and names and addresses,for all persons employed by [a] trust over the previous three-year-period.” (Craib, 49 Cal.3d at p.479 [emphasis added].) The Court found that “there is no dispute, of course, that the Commissioneris entitled to . investigate the type of alleged wage-order violations at issue here (§§ 61, 1193.5), and that such investigations are within the power of the Legislature to command.” (Ud. at p.483.) The Court noted that the subpoena “sought only those records which the Commissioner could minimally expect would be available in light of pertinent record-keeping requirements.” (/d. at p.483 [citing Lab. Code § 1174].) ” . To illustrate the practical exercise of DLSE’s plenary power to investigate Labor Code violations and obtain employment records from employers, Williams also submitted testimony from Miles Locker, who served in the DLSE for sixteen years and held positions such as Chief Counsel to the Labor Commissioner. (See PA 156-161.) Locker attested to: (1) the DLSE’s broad authority to issue subpoenas to compel employers to producerecords and to testify in order to carry out the provisions of the Labor Code (PA issues citations for civil money penalties when violations are found. (Lab. Code § 90.5.) The DLSE hasthe authority to issue subpoenas for the production of books, papers and records, take depositions and affidavits, and compel the attendanceof witnesses and parties. (Lab. Code §§ 92, 74.) 38 159-160, 9); (2) that DLSE deputies “are instructed to obtain employment records for... all locations” to determine “whether the potential violations are localized to one location or systemic throughoutall of the employer’s California locations” (PA 160, 11); (8) DLSE’s work in the investigation of the Brinker Restaurant Corporation as an example of a statewide investigation where the DLSE usedits subpoena powerto obtain Brinker’s statewide employee recordsfor its workforce of 30,000 California employees, based only on its belief that the employer ~ had committed Labor Codeviolations throughout its many California locations. (PA 160-161, §12.) To limit the DSLE’s investigations of multi-location employers to just one location, Locker opined, would competitively disadvantage smaller employers who operate only at one location. (Id.) At a minimum,that the DLSE would be able to obtain the same information that was denied to Williams further supports a reversal of the decision below. It would make nosense for the Legislature simultaneously to handicap such enforcement by placing the limits on discovery imposed bythe court below. However, despite acknowledging the arguments madethat, under Iskanian and Arias, a PAGAplaintiff occupies the precise position and represents the samelegal interest as the state’s labor law enforcement agencies, and further, that the state enforcement agencies would havefree access to the affected ‘ employees’ namesand contact information, theCourt of Appeal simply brushed the argumentaside. (Williams, at pp.1157-58.) Thus, while the Legislaturehas empowered the PAGAplaintiff to 39 enforce the Labor Code on the state’s behalf, the decision below leaves the state’s proxy without the tools effectively to do so. Il. THE COURT OF APPEAL COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY HOLDING THAT THE NON-PARTY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEES’ PRIVACY RIGHTS PRECLUDED DISCLOSUREOF THEIR NAMES AND CONTACT INFORMATION The court below held that, even if discovery of Marshalls’s employees’ contact information had been “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence,” the employees’ right to privacy under the California Constitution provided a sufficient basis for affirming the trial court’s order denying nearly all the sought discovery. (Williams, at p.1158.) The court below mistakenly held that once the constitutional right of privacy is implicated, the party seeking to compel discovery must show a “compelling need” for the discovery that is “so strong as to.outweigh the privacy right’—even whenthediscoverable information is nonsensitive. Compoundingthis error, the court below held that Williams’s needfor the disclosure was “practically nonexistent” and outweighed by employees’ privacy interests until he has been deposed and satisfied the three elementsset forth above. The court below departed markedly from this Court’s jurisprudence, relying ona small group of outlier opinions from other appellate courts withoutfollowing nor evenciting this Court’s controlling decisions in Pioneer or Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1. Had it applied the proper analysis, the court below would have reversed the trial court and compelled disclosure of Marshalls’s employees’ names and contact information. Disclosure of such relatively 40 nonsensitive information has been held not to be a “serious invasion of privacy,” especially when balanced against the policies underlying the Labor Code, PAGA andthe general public interest in “facilitating the ascertainmentof the truth” in legal proceedings, none of which wasconsidered by the court below. A. Disclosure of Non-Party Employees’ Names and Contact Information Has Repeatedly Been Ordered Notwithstanding The Right To Privacy Under The California Constitution Ourstate constitution establishes the right of privacy as an “inalienableright”: All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. ~ . (Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 [emphasis added].) The phrase “and privacy” was addedto the California Constitution,article I, section I, by an initiative adopted by the voters on November7, 1972. An invasion of privacy may be demonstratedif each of the following is established: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct ... constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill, 7 Cal.4th at pp.39-40 [emphasis added].)!° If all three prongs are 13 In Hill this Court found no violation of the constitutional right of privacy from a nonconsensual drug testing program, including observation of urination, the medical testing of urine, and the exchangeof confidential medical information attendant 41 satisfied, a court will perform a “balancingtest,” measuring the privacy interest against countervailing interests in disclosure. (Id. at p.37; see also Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285, 300-301 [balancing privacyrights of putative class members against discovery rights ofcivil litigants].) The court may resolve as a question of law whetherthere is a legally protected privacy interest and, if the facts are undisputed, whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and whetherany invasion of privacy is serious. (fll, 7 Cal.4th at p.40.) Moreover, not every invasion of privacy transgresses the state constitutional privacy right, and no violation occurs if the intrusion on privacy is “justified by a competing interest” (id. at p.38) or “substantively furthers one or more countervailing . interests.” (Id. at p.40.) The three privacy elements identified in Mill may be usedto “screen out” situations that “do not involve a significant intrusion” on constitutionally protected privacy “as not even to require an explanation orjustification”; otherwise, the justification of the intrusion must be considered in the balance. (American AcademyofPediatrics v. Lungren (1991) 16 Cal.4th 307, 331 [citations omitted.].) This Court has applied the above-outlined framework to aggregate litigation, and specifically to the context of disclosure of identifying information of non-parties as part of civil discovery, against a defendant’s assertion of the non-parties’ privacy rights, including in Pioneer. upon the administration of the drug-testing, for persons participating in college athletic programs.(Hill, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 52-57.) 42 In Pioneer, the plaintiff filed a motion to compeldisclosure of unredacted complaints with the names and contact information for each complainant after the defendant produced only redacted complaints it had received from 700 or 800 customers regarding the DVD players. (Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at p.364.) In refusing to produce the requested contact information, the defendant asserted, on the customers’ behalf, their privacy rights under California Constitution’s privacy provisionart.I, section I. ([bid.) The trial court in Pioneer ordered the defendantto disclose the names and contact information for the customers, so long as the parties sent the customers a privacy notice allowing them the option affirmatively to “opt-out” of the disclosure. (Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at p.365.) This Court concluded that the trial court had not abusedits discretion and reversed the intermediate court, - which held that the trial court’s order granting discovery infringed on the defendant’s customers’ privacy rights. Applying the balancing test weighing privacy interests against the right to discovery, the Court madeseveral holdings. First, this Court found that, although the customers’ identifying information wasentitled to “some privacy protection,” the customers had a reduced expectation of privacy given that they had,in the past, complained and therefore “might reasonably expect, and even hope”that their contact information would be given to a class action plaintiff. (Id. at p.372.) Second, ° the Court held that the disclosure did not involve a “serious invasionof privacy,” given that it only involvedrelatively non- 43 sensitive contact, and especially because it followed notice and an opportunity to opt-out. (/d. at p.373.) In balancing these interests, the Pioneer court placed great weight on discoverable information, finding “contact information regarding the identity of potential class membersis generally discoverable, so that the lead plaintiff may learn the namesof other people who might assist in prosecuting the case.” (Id. at p.373 [citations omitted]:) The court emphasized that this sort of disclosure does not involve “personal or businesssecrets, intimate activities, or similar private information, and threatens no undueintrusion into one’s personallife.” Ud.) The Pioneer Court then explained that, because there was no “serious invasion of privacy,” and the customers did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, no balancingofthe interests was even required. Ud.) However, the Court further reasoned| that, even if a balancingof the interests had been required, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the plaintiffs interest in obtaining contact information for potential percipient witnesses outweighedthepossibility of disclosure of some numberof customers’ contact information against their wishes. (Id. at p.374 [citing Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010].) The Court | finally noted that to allow the defendant to retain exclusive access to complaining customers’ contact information would also simply be unfair. (/d. at p.374.) ' In the years since this Court’s decision in Pioneer,a numberof intermediate courts have uniformly applied the Hill/Pioneer rubric to wage and houractions to assess purported 44 claimsof privacy under the California Constitution as a defense to disclosure of non-party employees’ contact information. In every one of these wage and houractions, the court ordered the employees’ names and contact informationto be disclosed. For instance,-in Puerto, the court applied the “Pioneer and Hill privacy framework” to the wage and hourplaintiffs’ request for contact information fora list of identified potential percipient witnesses. (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp.1251-52.) The trial court had ordered the defendant in Puerto to disclose the witnesses’ contact information, albeit pursuant-to an “opt-in” privacy notice. The appellate court reversed, holding that ordering an opt-in privacy notice “unduly hamper[ed]”[plaintiffs] in conducting discovery to which they are entitled” and was an abuseof discretion. (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th p.1252.) The Puerto court drew a direct parallel between the Pioneer customers’ reduced expectation of privacy in their contact information being shared with a class action plaintiff seeking to vindicate similar interests and the “current and former Wild Oats employees [ ] similarly situated to plaintiffs, who might be supposed to want their information disclosed to counsel.” (/d. at p.1253.) The Puerto court noted that that the employees’ contact information was “not particularly sensitive,” and was “basic civil discovery” thereby implicating no “serious invasion”of privacy. (Id. at pp.1253-54.) Like Pioneer, the Puerto court also found that, because there wasno “serious invasionof privacy,” there was no need to conduct a balancingof interests, yet it did so anyway. The court found that “the fundamental public policy 45 underlying California’s employment laws” further tipped the ’ balance in favor of permitting access to relevant information necessaryto the litigation, and cited Pioneer’s point that requiring an “opt-in” privacy waiver would greatly advantage the employer, unfairly resulting in Wild Oats’ enjoying exclusive access to the witness’ contact information. (/d. at p.1256.) Importantly, the employer-defendant in Puerto had argued that the Hill/Pioneer privacy framework did not apply, and insteadargued that “once an elementofprivacyis in the mix, information may not be disclosed unless the petitioners demonstrate a compelling need for the particular information and that the information cannot be reasonably obtained through depositionsor from nonconfidential sources.” (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1251 [citing Wild Oats’ reliance on Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10].) The Puerto court flatly rejected the employer’s position, instead holding that the cases cited by Wild Oats could be harmonized with Hill. Indeed, the Puerto court held that such cases involved “unusual circumstances” where the nature of the disclosure and the surrounding circumstances were fundamentally different, such as where disclosure could cause “true danger” or involved “vastly more serious privacy intrusions.” (/d. at pp.1254 & 1258 [distinguishing Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Super. Ct. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347 based on its dealing with names and addressesof abortion clinic staff that could have placed the employees in physical danger].) Like Puerto, other courts have broadly permitted the 46 discovery of names and contact information of potential witnesses by stressing that a trial court should not refuse to compel disclosure of such information absentidentification of a particular privacy concern. In Belaire-West, the court, in affirming the discovery of contact information after the dissemination of an opt-out letter, applied the Pioneer/Hill privacy framework. (Belatre-West, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp.560-61.) In so holding, the court noted that although the employees may not have expectedbroad dissemination of their contact information, they could be expected to want that information to be shared with a class action plaintiff seeking to recover unpaid wageson their behalf. Ud. at p.561.) The court further held that there wasno “serious invasion of privacy” because the contact information was “not particularly sensitive” and had been preceded by a privacy notice. (/d. at pp.561-62.) Finally, the Belaire-West court noted that, even if a balancingof interests were required, it would tip even more sharply in favorof disclosure because the employees were potential percipient witnesses and due to the “fundamental public policy” of prompt payment of wages due an employee underlying California’s employment laws. (Id. at p. 562 [citing Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 563, 571].) A numberof other courts have reached similar conclusions. (See, e.g., Lee v. Dynamex, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp.1336-38 [holding trial court’s denial of motion to compel names and contactinformation of potential class members ina wage and houraction was an abuse of discretion absent particular privacy concerns or potential 47 discovery abuses].) Indeed, even where there has been evidence of the employees’ objections to disclosure of their names and contact information, and thus a greater expectation of privacy under Hill, disclosure hasstill been ordered. In Crab Addison, the employer arguedin its writ petition that disclosure of employees’ contact information, subject to an opt-out privacy notice, should not have been compelled by the trial court because someof the employees had signed formsindicating that they did not wanttheir contact information to be shared with third parties, includingin the contextof class action lawsuits, and therefore had a heightened expectation of privacy in their contact information under the Hill rubric. (Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp.962-63.) The Crab Addison court rejected that argument, in part because public _” policy concerns favoring enforcement of unwaivable statutory wage and overtime rights through classaction litigation outweigh the privacy interestin “relatively nonsensitive [contact] information.” (Ud. at p.974.) The court also relied on Alch, an employment discrimination class action in which the court had ordered the trial court to compel disclosure of the names and contact information of 47,000 union membersoverthe objection of approximately 7,700 of them. (d. at pp.973-974 [discussing Alch, 165 Cal.App.4th at p.1412].) The Crab Addison court noted that the non-party union members in Alch likely held a greater expectation of privacy than the employeesin the case beforeit, since they had objected to release of their contact information with full knowledge of the pending litigation. (Ud. at p.974.) 48 B. The Court ofAppeal Misapplied And Ignored Controlling Law By Denying Access To Marshalls’s Employees’ Names And Contact Information On Privacy Grounds 1. Applying The Hill/Pioneer Privacy Analysis, The Court ofAppeal Should HaveReversed The Trial Court And Compelled Disclosure Of The Aggrieved Employees’ Names And Contact Information Despite the numerous cases dealingspecifically with the proper analytic framework within whichto decide.a motion seeking to compeldisclosure of names and contact information of non-party employees in aggregate wage and hourlitigation, the court below did not cite—muchless distinguish—anyof them. Instead, the court below held that, once a constitutional right of privacy is implicated, the party seeking disclosure can only obtain the at-issue information by demonstrating a “compelling need”thatis “so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two competing interests are carefully balanced.” (See Williams, at p.1158 [citing Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853-1854].) The court below clarified that such a “compelling need”can be established by showing that the discovery soughtis “directly relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the underlying lawsuit.” (d. [citing Planned Parenthood, 83 Cal.App.4th at p.367 and Johnson v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1071].) The court below then held that Mr. Williams’ interest in the sought discovery was _ . “practically nonexistent,” outweighed by the employees’ right to be free from “unwanted attention and perhapsfearof 49 retaliation.” Ud. at pp.1158-59.) The court below failed to apply the correct legal analysis, which is the three-part test applied in Hill and Pioneer. Under the Hill/Pioneer framework, while Marshalls’s employees do have someprivacy interest in their contact information and would not necessarily expect it to be “broadly disseminated”to third parties, they may “reasonably be supposed to want their information disclosed to counsel” who mayalert them to similar claims that they may have or who maybe seekingrelief on their behalf. (Gee Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1253; Belaire-West, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 561; Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at pp.371-72.) Moreover, the information Williams sought here is limited to employees’ names and contact information. As this Court held in Pioneer, and as other appellate courts have repeatedly held, -the mere disclosure of names and contact information, while personal, does not implicate “medical information or financial details, political affiliations, sexual information, or personnel information,” and therefore does not amountto a “serious invasion of privacy” under Hill. (Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at p.373; see also Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp.1253-54 [citing Pioneer and holding that the names and contact information of non-party employeesis “not particularly sensitive” and “basic civil discovery’|; Belaire-West, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp.561-562.) Under Hill, if there is no “legitimate expectation of privacy” or no “serious invasion of privacy” a court need not even engage in a balancing of competing interests. (Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at | p.378 [citing All, 7 Cal.4th at pp.39-40].) Because there was a 50 diminished expectation of privacy and no “serious invasion”here, the court below should not even have reached the balancing of interests. However,if a balancing were necessary, the Court of Appealerred in that respect as well. The court below failed to consider the key considerationsthat the courts have used to perform the balancingof interests under the Hill/Pioneertest. The court below did not consider the “fundamental public policy underlying California’s employmentlaws.” (Belaire-West, 149 Cal-App.4th at p.562 [citing Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 563, 571].) Aggregate employment litigation such as class and PAGAactions “notonly benefit[ ] the individual employee[s], but also serve[ ] the public interest in the enforcementof legal rights.” (Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at -p.971.) Indeed, this Court specifically held that a PAGA action “is fundamentally a law enforcement action designedto protect the public and notto benefit private parties.” ([skanian, 59 Cal.4th at p.387.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal failed to consider the “general public interest in “facilitating the ascertainmentof truth in connection with legal proceedings’ and in obtaining just results in litigation.” (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1256 [citing Hooserv. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004].) Nor did the court below consider the unfairness to the litigants that wouldresult from allowing Marshalls to “retain for its own exclusive use and benefit the contact information”of potential witnesses to Williams’s claims. (See Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at p.374; 51 Puerto, , 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1256.) Finally, the court below did not consider that the non-party aggrieved employees are potential percipient witnesses to Marshalls’s employment practices under Codeof Civil Procedure section 2017.010 and, as such, their names andidentities are discoverable, further tipping the balance of interests in favorof disclosure. (Belatre-West, 149 Cal.App.4th at p.562.) This is especially true in hightof Williams’s allegationsin this action, which directly implicate Marshalls’s policies and practices throughout Marshalls’s California stores. - (See, e.g., PA 13-14 [942], PA 15 [947], PA 17 [54].) As the California courts have held, these numerous interests outweigh the employees’ right to privacy in “relatively nonsensitive contact information.” (Crab-Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at p.974 [citation omitted].) 2. The Court Below Relied On Inapposite Case LawIn Its Privacy Analysis In reaching its conclusion that Marshalls’s employees’ privacy interests outweigh Williams’s interest in litigating the instant action to enforce the Labor Code, the court below relied upon three cases (none of which wasa decision of this Court): Lantz, Planned Parenthood, and Johnson. (See Williams, at p.1158.) However, all three of those cases involved privacy interests of a much different nature than in the instantcase. Both Lantz and Johnson involved personal medical information. In Lantz the defendant soughtdisclosureof the plaintiffs doctor's records of a double mastectomyin their effort to prove that the plaintiffs surgery had been cosmetic andelective, while in Johnson the plaintiffs sought disclosure of an anonymous sperm 52 donor’s identity and medical history, as well as that of the donor’s family, and notwithstanding written agreements between the donor and the sperm bank promising nondisclosure, to prove that the sperm bank should have knownofthe donor’s kidney disease. In Planned Parenthood, the plaintiff sought to discover the names and addressesofstaff and volunteers at an abortionclinic. Noneof these cases have any bearing on a court’s determination of whether names and contact information of non- party employees should be disclosed in an aggregate employment action. As the California courtshave held, “[a] person’s medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than manyareasalready judicially recognizedand protected.” (Board ofMedical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 678.) Therefore, to the extent Lantz and Johnson appeared to apply a privacy analysis more rigorous than in Hill and Pioneer, the much more intrusive natureof the privacy interest at stake would explain such a difference.'4 The proposed invasion of the privacy interest in Planned Parenthood was even moreserious and distinct from the instant case. The trial court in Planned 14 It is also worth noting that neither Lantz nor Johnson expressly held that disclosure of the at-issue information should not be compelled. In Lantz, the court simply found that thetrial court had failed to conduct any balancing of the plaintiffs privacy interest as against the need for disclosure, and remanded the matter for the trial court to conduct the requisite balancing in the first instance. (Lantz, 28 Cal.App.4th at p.1857.) In Johnson, the court actually granted the writ and ordered the trial court to compel disclosure of most of the information sought. (Johnson, 80 Cal. App.4th at p.1072.) 53 Parenthood had balanced the interests in favor of nondisclosure due to the “unique concerns”of the “emotionally charged and often violent” abortion debate, and where thepetitioner and his counsel had in the past protested at the homesof clinic workers, the court found that disclosure of the workers’ names and addresses could have placed them in physical danger. (Planned Parenthood, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp.362-64.) Indeed, the court observed that “human experience distinguishes Planned Parenthood’s staff and volunteers from potential witnesses in ‘routine’civil litigation.” (Ud. at p.364.) In stark contrast with this line of authority, the instant case involves no intimate personal or sensitive information. Whenno such sensitive information is implicated, courts should not depart from the Hill/Pioneer analysis to apply a different test that presumes information cannot be disclosed unless the petitioner demonstrates both a compelling need andthat the requested information cannot be obtained through depositions or nonconfidential sources. (Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1242.) The Puerto court found that the cases upon which Wild Oats relied for its purportedly different test (including Planned Parenthood) could be harmonized with the Hill/Pioneerline insofar as in those unusual cases “the existenceof a legitimate privacy interest and the fact that a serious invasion of privacy would result from the release of the information involved were both so facially apparent that the court did not need to béelabor them with drawn-out analysis.” (/d. at pp.1242, 1254-55.) The Court of Appeal failed to engage with the reasoning of 54 Puerto, a case that expressly found the Planned Parenthoodline of cases inapplicable in determining whether contact information for witnesses in an employmentaction is discoverable. By wrongly applying the Planned Parenthood/Laniz test instead of -the applicable Hill/Pioneer framework, the Court of Appeal committed reversible error. C. Even If The Aggrieved Employees’ Privacy Rights Were Implicated, A Privacy Notice And/Or A Protective Order Would Have Addressed Any Possible Concerns The Court may decide as a matter of law that the state constitutional right of privacy is not impingedby the disclosure in civil discovery of the names and contact information of current and former employees of a defendant employer in a law enforcement action brought under the PAGA. However,if the Court were to conclude that the privacy concern cannot be excluded, then providing the aggrieved employees notice and a chanceto opt-out of having their contact information disclosedis a standard procedure that would allay any remaining privacy concern. The court below did not consider whethera notice might have mitigated the privacy concernsthat it found to exist.5 This 15 The trial court had ordered use of an opt-out privacy notice for the narrow group of employees whose contact information it held would be produced. (PA 229.) The court below mostly ignored the privacy notice issue, mentioningit once in connection with its analysis of “good cause,” stating that “mailing Belaire-West notices and tabulation of responsesis costly,” militating for limiting disclosure. (Williams, at p.1157.) The cost of sending privacy notices, however, was neverbriefed by the parties, and there is no evidence regarding such costs in 55 is despite the fact that an opt-out privacy notice procedure, established by this Court in Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, was implemented in Pioneer and each of the wage and hourcases cited above. Indeed, the courts have held that an opt-out privacy notice imposes “vital limits” on proposed disclosure where anostensible privacy interestis at stake, “requiring written notice of the proposed disclosureto all current and former employees and providing them with the opportunity to object to the release of their contact information to the plaintiffs.” (Belaire-West, 149 Cal.App.4th at p.562 [holding that the trial court’s use of an opt-out privacy notice supportedits finding that there had been noserious invasion of privacy].) By concluding that nearly all of the information sought should not be disclosed, despite the well-known availability of an opt-out privacy notice, the court below staked out an extremeposition that is inconsistent with the case law and should be reversed. Finally, in addition to a privacy notice, the courts below also could have utilized other tools to have tipped the privacy analysis in favor of disclosure, such as a protective order. A protective order could have been entered requiring Williams and his counsel to keep the employees’ names and contact information confidential, restricting access only to the attorneys andtheir agents only as neededin investigating and pursuing the the record. Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s statement appears to assumethat this cost would fall on Marshalls, which lacks a basis. Parties often share the costs of sending privacy notices (as the trial court had ordered in this case) and in some instances plaintiff will pay the entire cost of such notice. 56 litigation. (See Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1259; see also, Crab- Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp.968-69 [holding that trial court’s “opt-in” privacy procedure was an abuseof discretion, but that “the trial court was not without the ability to enter a protective order limiting the dissemination of the witnesses’ contact information.”].) As with the privacy notice, the Court of Appeal did not consider how a protective order might address any _ pYivacy concernsin this case. The Court ofAppeal compoundedits erroneous privacy analysis by failing to utilize (or consider) either an opt-out privacynotice or protective order as a meansfor amelioratingits privacy concerns. This provides an additional basis for reversing the decision below. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be reversed. Dated: November 16, 2015 Respectfully submitted, Capstone Law APC » AFaud Glenn A. Danas Ryan H. Wu Robert Drexler Liana Carter Stan Karas Attorneys for Plaintiff- Appellant MICHAEL WILLIAMS 57 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ‘Counselof record herebycertifies that, pursuant to the California Rules of Court, Rule 8.504(d)(1) and 8.490, the enclosed Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits was produced _using 13-point Century Schoolbook type style and contains 13,975 words. In arriving at that number, counsel has used Microsoft Word’s “Word Count” function. Dated: November 16, 2015 58 Respectfully submitted, Capstone Law APC Qiat- Glenn A. Danas Ryan Wu Robert Drexler Liana Carter Stan Karas Attorneys for Plaintiff- Appellant MICHAEL WILLIAMS o f e N A O A O F e W Y N O N O N O N O N D N Y N V Y N N O | | | F F F F F F K F E F S S N R a R F S F 8 S F F S& F C e n A a a R B H F S S o PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employedin the State of California, County of Los Angeles. I am overthe age of 18 and nota party to the within suit; my business address is 1840 Century Park East, Suite 450, Los Angeles, California 90067. On November16, 2015, I served the document described.as: APPELLANT’S OPENINGBRIEF ON THE MERITSontheinterestedparties in this action by sending on the interested parties in this action by sending [ ] the original [or] [v’] a true copy thereof to interested parties as follows [or] as stated on the attached servicelist: See attached servicelist. [LJ] BY MAIL (ENCLOSEDIN A SEALED ENVELOPE): I deposited the envelope(s) for mailing in the ordinary course of business at Los Angeles, California. I am “readily familiar” with this firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, sealed envelopes are deposited with the U:S. Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California. {_]] BY E-MAIL: I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known e-mail address or e-mail of record in this action. {]] BYFAX:I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by facsimile delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent fax numberofrecordin this action. [LJ] BY PERSONAL SERVICE:I personally delivered the document, enclosed in a sealed envelope, by handto the offices of the addressee(s) namedherein. [<1] BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY:I am “readily familiar” with this firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery. Underthat practice, overnight packages are enclosed in a sealed envelope with a packing slip attached thereto fully prepaid. The packages are picked up by the carrier at our offices or delivered by our office to a designated collection site. ; I declare under penalty of perjury underthe laws ofthe State of California that the foregoingis true andcorrect. oS Executed this November16, 2015, at Los Angeles, California. Natalie Torbati / 2 Type or Print Name , 7 Signature Page 1 PROOFOF SERVICE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SERVICE LIST Frederick Bennett Superior Court of Los Angeles County North Hill Street, Room 546 Los Angeles, CA via FedEx Hon. William F.. Highberger Los Angeles Superior Court 600 S. Commonwealth Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90005 via FedEx Robert Gordon Hulteng Joshua Joseph Cliffe Emily Erin O'Connor Scott D. Helsinger Littler Mendelson, PC 650 California Street, 20th Floor San Francisco, CA via FedEx Page 1 Superior Court of Los Angeles County: Respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County: Respondent Marshalls of CA, LLC : Real Party in Interest PROOF OFSERVICE