23 Cited authorities

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
557 U.S. 167 (2009) Cited 4,477 times 83 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's language "because of such individual's age," required plaintiff show "age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's adverse decision"
People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)
14 Cal.4th 968 (Cal. 1997) Cited 1,375 times
Holding that a trial court's discretion under Cal.Penal Code § 17(b) to reduce a "wobbler" offense is not eliminated by the Three Strikes law but is reviewable
People v. Merriman
60 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2014) Cited 553 times
Rejecting defendant's argument victim's "heavy drug use" and "failure to report the incident to authorities until long after it had occurred" render evidence of uncharged sex crime inadmissible
In re Christian S
7 Cal.4th 768 (Cal. 1994) Cited 785 times
Holding that 1981 amendment did not eliminate imperfect self-defense
Harris v. City of Santa Monica
56 Cal.4th 203 (Cal. 2013) Cited 366 times 46 Legal Analyses
Holding Fair Employment and Housing Act "does not purport to outlaw discriminatory thoughts, beliefs, or stray remarks that are unconnected to employment decisionmaking."
People v. Towne
44 Cal.4th 63 (Cal. 2008) Cited 414 times
Finding "no unfairness in permitting the trial court, in selecting the sentence most appropriate for the crime, to take into account all of the evidence related to defendant's conduct in committing that offense," even "evidence that would have justified a guilty verdict on one or more of the crimes of violence of which defendant was acquitted"
Robert L. v. Superior Court of Orange County
30 Cal.4th 894 (Cal. 2003) Cited 442 times
Rejecting an argument the electorate intended for an existing statute to limit the scope of a statute enacted by initiative when the statute enacted by initiative did not refer to the existing statute or mirror the existing statute's language
People v. Floyd
31 Cal.4th 179 (Cal. 2003) Cited 365 times
Finding no equal protection violation in the expressly prospective application of Proposition 36 providing for mandatory probation for some convicted of nonviolent drug possession offenses
Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partn.
42 Cal.4th 1158 (Cal. 2008) Cited 286 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that an employer may be liable for retaliation under FEHA, "but nonemployer individual may not be held personally liable for their role in that retaliation"
People v. Scott
58 Cal.4th 1415 (Cal. 2014) Cited 169 times
Concluding in the context of similar language in Proposition 36 that “a defendant is ‘sentenced’ when a judgment imposing punishment is pronounced even if execution of the sentence is then suspended”

PEOPLE v. VALENCIA

23 Cited authorities

Holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's language "because of such individual's age," required plaintiff show "age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's adverse decision"

Holding that a trial court's discretion under Cal.Penal Code § 17(b) to reduce a "wobbler" offense is not eliminated by the Three Strikes law but is reviewable

Rejecting defendant's argument victim's "heavy drug use" and "failure to report the incident to authorities until long after it had occurred" render evidence of uncharged sex crime inadmissible

Holding that 1981 amendment did not eliminate imperfect self-defense

Holding Fair Employment and Housing Act "does not purport to outlaw discriminatory thoughts, beliefs, or stray remarks that are unconnected to employment decisionmaking."

Rejecting an argument the electorate intended for an existing statute to limit the scope of a statute enacted by initiative when the statute enacted by initiative did not refer to the existing statute or mirror the existing statute's language

Finding no equal protection violation in the expressly prospective application of Proposition 36 providing for mandatory probation for some convicted of nonviolent drug possession offenses

Holding that an employer may be liable for retaliation under FEHA, "but nonemployer individual may not be held personally liable for their role in that retaliation"

Concluding in the context of similar language in Proposition 36 that “a defendant is ‘sentenced’ when a judgment imposing punishment is pronounced even if execution of the sentence is then suspended”