IN RE R.V.

Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits

Cal.May 12, 2014

Jn the Supreme Court of the State of California IN RE ROSARIO V., a Person Coming Underthe Juvenile Case No. 8212346 Court, y SUPREMECOURT FILE THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, . MAY 1 22014 Plaintiff and Respondent, Frank A. McGuire Clerk ROSARIOV., pene Deputy Defendant and Appellant. Appellate District Division Three, Case No. G046961 Orange County Superior Court, Case No. DL034139 The Honorable Deborah Chuang, Judge RESPONDENT’S ANSWERBRIEF ON THE MERITS KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California DANER. GILLETTE Chief Assistant Attorney General JULIE L. GARLAND Senior Assistant Attorney General CHARLES C. RAGLAND Supervising Deputy Attorney General KATHRYN KIRSCHBAUM Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 279694 110 West A Street, Suite 1100 San Diego, CA 92101 P.O. Box 85266 San Diego, CA 92186-5266 Telephone: (619) 645-2106 Fax: (619) 645-2191 Email: Kathryn.Kirschbaum@doj.ca.gov Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Issues fOr reVICW .......cccccessccessssssesccseceneeseecseecesaeecssaseseeceaceesecesecesensaeeseeneenass 1 Introduction ........ccceeeececcesnecesseeseecessceceeeeneeseecesaaeeseseeseeessseseneeeseaeees seeesaeeeees ] Statement of the Facts and Case ..... cc ceccsessecesccceseeseeseeesseeesessareeaeeeneeesaeeaes 2 ASLQUMENL 00... eee eeeesseteeccceeeccesseeevsccessneesesssueeesesaaaaaeeeceseteceserssaaeasceeesaaneeaesesnes 4 I. A minor subject to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 or 602 petition is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving incompetenceby a preponderance ofthe evidence o.oo... ee eeeeeeceseessseesereeeeseeenaee 4 A. Background: competencyin the adult context........... 5 B. The relevant law and statutory framework for JUVENILES oooeee cece ceceeseeeeneeeseeserseseseesenseesesseesaeens 8 C. In a juvenile proceeding, the minor is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance ofthe CVIGENCEoeeeeeseeeenecneessneeceeessseseeecseesseesaeeesasereeerseey 10 1. Section 709 contains an implied presumption of competence; the party alleging incompetence bears the burden Of PLOOF oo... eeeesceeseseeeeteeeneeeeeseeetsereseneeteeeeeaee 10 2. Thelegislative history indicates that in enacting section 709, the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the presumption of competence and burden of proofthat is used in the adult context ..0.... ec eeeeeeeeeseens 17 3. Policy concerns support minor bearing the burden of proof...cee esseeeteeeseceeenneees 20 a. The minor and his attorney have superior access to information relevant to COMpEetENCY......eee 20 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page b. A system that does not allocate the burden to either party or that places the burden on the People would provide the minor with the WIONG INCENTIVES... eseeeeneeseeenen ees 22 C. Placing the burden on the People would be inconsistent with existing presumptions in juvenile LAW woe eeeceeeeeeeeesceecsececeeeesaeeeseeesnaesensaeees 25 I. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that minor failed to prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence .......... ce eececcceseeseeeseeesseneees 26 A. Standard Of reVieW ........ceeccescesstsceseeeeeceseeeetsneeneeenes 27 B. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile COUMT’S FINGING......... es ceesccceesecessseenseeesecenseetsaeeseeneeeees 35 Conclusion .........cccessssccstecssecceeesececesnececeeneccessneseessnaeeeeesaeesesueessaneeeesseeeeees 37 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Brownv. Allen (1953) 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 occceeseeeneees 27 Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498oe5 Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 oeeeeerereee 5 Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 oo. 5, 8, 9, 20 Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal4th 706... cecccccsceceseccneestecseessecessesaseseeesaeeseesssenaeenees 34 In re Alejandro G. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 472 ooo eecesessececeesecsseeneesseecssesssesnsenneesees 28 In re ChristopherF. | (2011) 194 CalApp.4th 462oececeseeneereeseessersseseeseasseeesseeeeses 28 In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527eeeetree 8 In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855 vo eccsccsecsneccnsceseceaeseetsneeceessessaeesaeeeseeseeeneeaees 26 In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal4th 40... cecesceceneecneeeeeneesseeeseessecssesesessasseeetreerness 27 In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413 ooeeescececseeseeeseessecsseceeecseesraeeneeaees 24 In re Marriage ofMehlmauer (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 104 veccecccesecssscteeessecteetaeceeesaeeeeesserenesates 23 In re Ricky S. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 232 oo.cceecssceseeereeestessessaessnersaessneeaeeaeens 8 ili TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Johnson v. Baker (1914) 167 Cal. 260... ceeeecscecsersteccseneceeeeieeesrseseeeensesseusssesesesseessaees 15 Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 oceans 16 Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 3530... 7, 8, 24 Miller v. Fenton (1985) 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 oo.eee 31 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 oo... 30, 31 Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th Looeecccenenececeeeesesssesesseessrerseseesssecensseeeneeseesaes 14 Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 LEd2d91132, 33 Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 woeeeeeeeteees 5 People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47ceeeseesceceseeccssesseecssersrsaeessecsesstessseeesaes 10 People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250...cccceceeeesescnessesseesseeeeenes 32, 33, 34, 35 People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261eeeecseeceecereeeeesceeseeerseessesssseseseesseesseenses 17 People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269 oo... ceescescesecsessneeseecseerssseesesssuesenseressseeeneees 25 People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889ereeeeetseeseeseseeseeereeeeens 30, 32, 33, 35 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390...eeesessseesceneceesaeteceeseseaeesssseessnsssesensees 27 People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333 voc ceesesccsesssssesnccsseccesessessseeesseesnteresesatenees 28, 29 People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861oeeeeereeereeereees seseseeeesseaseesenesesseseseneneness 27 People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal4th 4320.ceeseeessceneecneecsserssseesesessessesssessenseesseas 32 People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557oeceecscereeecseenneerteesseerseasesssesesseeseeeneas+28 People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617 oo. cesccesecsecesersseeesessceecrneeeseseeesesssserseesenss 18 People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197 ooo cccecsecsrectseeseecsecnesseesseeessereesereeaereenenas 27 People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th Looeeeccseessecssecenneesecerssecereressesssssseseseseseassnes 27 People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870 oo... ceccsceseesscesseceseeesnssseseseseeesseseeeesatereesnaes 6, 21 People v. Morton (2003) 114 CalApp.4th 1039ooeesceseeeersseerreeeseseeeseesseresrseeaes 28 People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136...ice cesecsccesesssceeecssectessecsseessseseecsseesrersasenss 17 People v. Nguyen (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1612... eccecssecsreeseescsseeeseesseesseereeerseesaee 12 Peoplev. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860 oo... eccescteeceecsnerenererserseesssseseessesersenseteegs 13 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page. People v. Romero (1996) 43 CalApp.4th 440oeeeeesecseeesceesseerseeeseesseevassenuseeseenees 15 People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489... eccccccccsesseesseeteeesecesacesseesseessetseeesneeasenaees 27 People v. Skeirik (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 444 oo. ceceesceesetseceneeesneeeeeeseeenseseeeeneeaes 23, 22 People v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.Ath 667 ....cccsssesesssessssseseeesssssseeeeeessneeeeeesessnen |...27, 28 People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal4th 690... eesecsceseeeseeereeennerseeseeresssesesseeseeeseneseees 31 People v. Zambia . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965oeeecceseeseeseeeeeceneecseceseecneessseneseeeseseesnee 11 RamonaR. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802...cescecccesnecesecesecseeeseeesseeseseeceeraeserseessessseenes 25 Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383.0... 27, 31, 32 Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847.0... ceccecesesesneeesreeesereeceseeseeeesntenes passim Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S, 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 oo. ee ceeeseeeseeeees 27 United States v. Oregon Medical Society (1952) 343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690, 96 L.Ed. 978 oveeeceeeteneeeees 33 STATUTES US.C., Title 20 § 1415, subd. (K) ooeec ceeceecteeeeseecteeeeeereeesseeseaeestesensatessesesseaseassags 36 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Evidence Code § S00 oo. ecccecessseecesseeesaaceesasesseeeesseaeesaesesauseseseevsrseeaeesneesseenaes passim § 550, SUD. (Db)... eececeetscssececeseeecectseeeeneeteessaeoreeesseessseesseessaeeseeneess 23 § 606 oe eeecescessstecesscesseessacceseceseseeeeeseesseecsaeceseceseeseseasceseecesageeaesoeeees 25 Penal Code § 26 voececsecesccsseccsstecessectsteceacesaeeesessecaseneeceaeeeeecsaeecessessnsaesseesseasesees 25,26 — § 417, subd. (A)C1) ooo.ee eececcceceeceeeeecseeeeteceeerteeesssesneesesseessessseseaeseaneegs 3 § 594, SUDA. (8) oo.seeeceeeeneeeeneecensceeseseesseesssessaessenssseeseseseseeesseeens 3 § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)...ec eecessecesecssceteeseeseesesesseseseescsssesessseseseesenenies 3 § 1368, SUD. (8) oo. eeceecceeectecteceseeceeceneeeeeaeseeeseesesaeesseeseeaesenseseenensees 5 § 1368, SUDA. (D) cee ees ecsscsseeeeseeteeteersecteeseseasenesessesessenseessteseessssss § 1368, SUDA. (C) oeceeeesesseeeeeseeceeetsecseeeseeseecseseseseeeseveessessesesseeseeens 6 § 1369 oo ceeccccecssnecceessrecssaseessecesaneeseseeeesaaeenneeesssesesseeerevesensesenee passim . § 1369, SUDA. (8) eeeeee cscsseeseceseeeceeeeseteseesecesescssserenseseuseesreseensasease 21 § 1369, Sub. (f)...... cc eeeeescececetseesecseeeenseesaeseseeeneesesseeesesaeeessane 6,11, 14 § 1372 vecesccssccsscesescecsceceseeneceeseaeceesteeeseseaecesesesesaseseseeeseeesensessesesasenes 13 Vil TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Welfare & Institutions Code § GO] ee ecccccssecessecsseseeceseseeesseccssecsseeessessesseesseecesseeeesssesesesenseseauesessaeers 4 § 602 ooo. eeeeeccecsssscesssssssccsseseeecesseecssssecesssseseseecesenseeeeecesseeeessaeeseseeesenes 3,4 § 604 oo eeccesssecsstecsscseecsssseceeseccessesnessesessseessaseesseecsenseresestaesenaes 12, 13 § 604, SUDA. (8)... eecsssseccssseesessccessnsesseseeccseneseessaeeesesneecesseeenenaes 13 § 635.1 eeeeecsssccsssscsssesssssseccssacceseeecseseseseecsecseeeceseeesesesaseseneseeeeenes 17 § 704 oc eeccscecessssccessscesessestscecessnessesseeeceeeeseessescsseaaeeccseseeeeeateseueeeseenaes 17 § TOT voeccecsssesssceessecessesseeesscecssaecenessssecesaessseceenesesaeeesseseesaeesseeseeseeeeees 25 § 707, SUDA. (D)......cececeessscceessseeesssecsesscecerseeceesstaeeesetseeeessaesleseseseseens 25 § 707, SUDA. (C) oe eeeeesseesseceeseeetatecssecesnecesacecesaeecsnesesaeerseeeeateneaness 25 § 709 oo. eecceessecsseccssessevesseccssueessssesesessuesensessaeseesaeeceseseesanessseeesees passim § 709, SUDA. (8)......ccecccessssssecsesssessseecesseeeesssseeeesseeneeseaaeecesnseesenaes passim § 709, SUDA. (D) oo eeeecessccsssecsssesstsecsssesseseessesecsseseseeensaes 9, 11, 12, 20 § 709, SUDA. (C) oo... eccecessscccsssseessseeceeeseseeaeeeesessaeeesseneeeees 9, 12, 13, 11 § 713 eccccccccesssccceesnscessessscuecccsseessnseeessseseeseeecseesseeeeeesaesessaeeensesessesaes 17 § 726, SUDA. (A) .....sceeeccsssscccesseceesseecessseeceeseteeseeseeeccssseeecesasecesnscseenass 17 S727 veccccssessscecesseesscseessneeecsseeeseeesnaeessaessseegeauecseeecessuessenseetsessnsessaees 17 S727 iecccccessstecessnseseesssssseeeesseeessaesecesstecsnatecssenaaeceeseeeecseaueesnaeesneeegs 17 § T7277 cccccccsccceseneccsessecssnnecssaeessseseseecenesssaecssnseseseesesaeeeseeessrsssseeseanees 17 § 729.3 ecsecccsssccsssccesscseccssrecssueeessecsusecssnsessesssenesessaeeeseeessseessneesteeseaness 17 § 729.8 vo ecccccecsecesssecessessessnnecesnecenseeseseeseseeeeecssneeeeueeesaeesseseesensesteesentees 17 § 729.9 coiicccsccccccssscesteceessscecsessecensnseccesseessnaeeccseeeasceeueesesenassesseesseneas 17 § T2910 ve ccccccssseccesseseessceesseecsssessseecesecsnecsneesesueeeeaeeeseaeesetesenseeesaees 17 § 730, SUDA. (8) ...eccececesssscccesssceesseceesesceceesteccsseseeeeessececesseeeesatenseaes 17 § 730.5 veeccsscccessseessseenseesscessssecssseveceeesssessceessaeecessueesseeessaeeserseeeessnees 17 § 730.6 oeccccscccesssccessessecsseeessnseessscssreesseeseseeceseeccenseesueessueeeensesseenengees 17 § 731 eececcccesecccscsceecessecsneceecesssecseseesseseecessesesseeeseeesssueseesessessneaeeesnanees 17 § 6550 oecessceeesceesserteteteeseeteeensSs eesseeees Vesccesseauececesseeeecssauseseeseeesseeeeeees 17 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS United States Constitution Fifth AMendMent.............ccccssccccsscecsssscesssseccsessceeecesseeeceeseeeessssensseees 31 Vili TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page OTHER AUTHORITIES Joseph B. Sanborn,Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading through the Rhetoric and the Evidence (2009) 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 135 wc.ccsecscsesseesessessccsessessecssssessseseens 16 Stats. 2010, Chapter 671 SL ieeeceseesteessecsaeceeseaceeesaecsaeesseeenecseaeseecsecsesatesaessesenesssseaeseesenss 8 ix ISSUES FOR REVIEW Minorput forth the following issues in his petition for review: (1) “Whether a minor is presumed competent and bears the burden to prove incompetencyin a juvenile delinquency proceeding”; and (2) ““Whether there wassufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt’ that [minor] was competent given that defense counsel told the court [minor] wasnotable to consult with her with a reasonable degreeofrational understanding, the appointed doctor opined that [minor] was not competent, and the prosecution presented no evidence of competency.” INTRODUCTION Minorthreatened three adults and destroyed property in his home because he did not want to go to school. Juvenile court proceedings began, and minor’s attorney expressed a doubt as to minor’s competency. Minor wasevaluated by a court-appointed psychologist but refused to submit to any testing. The psychologist subsequently opined minor wasnot competent. The court rejected that opinion, found minor hadfailed to meet his burden of proving incompetence,and reinstated proceedings. On appeal, the court held minor was presumedto be competent, that the juvenile court properly placed the burden on minor, and that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding. The Court of Appeal wascorrect on all points: minor was presumed competent; he bore the burden of proving incompetence by a preponderanceofthe evidence; and a juvenile court’s finding on this issue is reviewed for substantial evidence. First, Welfare and Institutions Code ' Although minorcites the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in his questions presented, in his argument, minor does not dispute Welfare and Institutions Code section 709’s use of the preponderanceof the evidence standard. Respondent assumesthis to be a typographicalerror in the questions presented and does not addressthis point further. section 709 contains an implied presumption of competence. Additionally, the burden rests with minor because, under the plain language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 and Evidence Codesection 500, minoris © the party seeking to establish the facts necessary forrelief, namely, incompetence. Requiring minor to prove incompetence also comports with the legislative history underlying section 709. Because minor and his attorney have better access to the relevant information pertaining to competency, the burden properly lies with minor. Finally, placing the burden on the People when a minoris claiming incompetence would wrongly incentivize minors and would, to a certain extent, conflict with existing presumptionsin juvenile law. Regarding the second point, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s competency determination. Competency determinations are factual findings subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. In cases where the prosecution does not adduce evidence of competence and the court’s determination rests on minor’s failure to meet his burden, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding so long as the court could reasonably reject the evidence of incompetence. Here, the juvenile court reasonably rejected the doctor’s opinion because it was not supported by any testing, including testing for malingering, and the court was satisfied by many of minor’s responses during his evaluation with the doctor. This court should affirm the judgment belowinits entirety. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE On March 9, 2012, 16-year old minor woke up angry and did not want to go to school. (CT 4.) When his mother’s boyfriendtried to tell him he was going to miss the bus, minor threw television to the floor and threatened to “fuck up” his mother’s boyfriend. (CT 4.) When the boyfriend tried to calm minor down, minorpulled out a small knife and told the boyfriend he would kill him if he called the police. (CT 4, 16.) When minor’s mother entered the room, minortold her, “Don’t come close to me I have a knife.” (CT 69.) Uponhearing the fight, the landlord, who had been working on the roof, came inside. (CT 4.) There, he saw minor kick a DVD player and threaten to stab the boyfriend. (CT 4.) When the landlord also tried to calm minor down, minorthreatened to kill him as well. (CT 4, 16.) Minor then stabbedhis bed three times with the knife. (CT 4.) Consequently, on March 12, 2012, the Orange County District Attorneyfiled a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code’ section 602 alleging the following: two counts of brandishing a deadly weapon,in violation of Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(1), and one count of vandalism,in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2)(A). (CT 1.) On April 2, 2012, defense counsel expressed a doubt as to minor’s competency pursuant to section 709, subdivision (a), and Dr. Haig J. Kojian was appointed to evaluate minor. (CT 18, 24; RT 11.) On April 20, 2012, during the scheduled competency hearing, minor’s counsel submitted on Dr. Kojian’s report, in which the doctor opined appellant was not competent. (RT 25.) The prosecutor requested a continuance in order to subpoena Dr. Kojian to testify. (RT 26.) At the April 27, 2012 competency hearing, Dr. Kojian testified as to his interview with minor, and again opined minor was not competentto standtrial, based on his opinion that minor “was struggling under the duress of some type of impaired cognitive process.” (RT 47.) The juvenile court stated that minor was presumed competent and had the burden to demonstrate incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. (RT 73.) * Future statutory references are to the Welfare andInstitutions Code unless otherwise indicated. After finding that minor had not met that burden, the court declared minor competent and reinstated the proceedings against minor. (CT 81; RT 29, 73.) Minor admitted the allegations, and the court foundtheallegationsto be true. (CT 82.) Minor was declared a ward and placed on probation. (CT 82; RT 80-81.) . On appeal, minor claimed the juvenile court improperly imposed upon him the burden of demonstrating incompetence rather than requiring the People to prove competence. Minoralso claimed that, regardless of whose burden it was, substantial evidence demonstrated he was incompetent. On June 19, 2013, Division Three of the Fourth District Court of Appealissued its published opinion affirming the juvenile court’s finding. On September 25, 2013, this court granted minor’s petition for review. | ARGUMENT I. A MINOR SUBJECT TO A WELFAREAND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 601 OR 602 PETITION IS PRESUMED COMPETENT AND BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING INCOMPETENCEBY A PREPONDERANCEOF THE EVIDENCE Minor contends the courts below erred by presuming his competence and by requiring him to prove incompetence by a preponderance ofthe evidence. (ABOM 9.) According to minor, under section 709, there is no | presumption of competence and neitherparty isallocated the burden the proof. (ABOM 19, 21.) Alternatively, minor argues the burden ofproofis on the People to prove competence. (ABOM 27.) Respondent disagrees. The juvenile court properly required minor to provehis alleged incompetence by a preponderanceofthe evidence. Section 709 contains an implied presumption of competence and requires proof of incompetence. As minor wasthe party alleging incompetence, under the plain language of section 709 and under Evidence Code section 500, minor bore the burden of proof. Placing the burden on minoralso comports with the legislative intent behind section 709. Moreover, as a matter of policy, placing the burden on minor wasproper because (1) minor wasthe party with accessto the type of information necessary to prove incompetence, (2) placing the burden on the People when the minoralleges incompetence would create improper incentives for minors, and (3) a contrary rule would be inconsistent with existing presumptionsin juvenile law. A. Background: Competency in the Adult Context Under the federal Constitution, a defendant may notbe putto trial unless he ‘“has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. . . [and] a rational as well as 399factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” (Cooperv. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354 [116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498], citing Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402 [80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824] (Dusky).) The conviction of a defendant wholacks the above abilities violates due process. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 [86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815].) In order to protect this right, the trial court must employ adequate procedures and safeguards. (/bid.; see Dropev. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 [95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103].) Penal Codesections 1368 and 1369 set forth the relevant statutory procedures for adult defendants. Section 1368, subdivision (a), provides that if “a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant,” the court shall inquire of defense counsel regarding the defendant’s competenceand, if counsel believes defendant may be incompetent, the court shall order a hearing on the matter. The section further provides that even if defense counsel believeshis clientis competent, the court may,in its discretion, order a competency hearing. (Pen. Code, § 1368, subd. (b).) Once the hearingis ordered, “all proceedingsin the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until the question of the present mental competence ofthe defendant has been determined.” (Pen. Code, § 1368, subd (c).) Penal Code section 1369 sets forth the procedures for a competency hearing. Subdivision (f) of that section provides, in pertinentpart, that “[i]t shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have found these proceduressatisfactorily protect the due processrights of adult defendants. In People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870 (Medina J), the defendant challenged Penal Code section 1369 as unconstitutional because it required him to prove incompetence even though“fitness to standtrial i fundamental to an adversary system ofjustice.” (/d. at p. 882.) This court rejected that challenge and foundthe allocation of the burden of proof constitutional. (/d. at p. 885.) In doing so, this court reasonedthat “a critical factor is the extent to whicheither party has accessto the relevant information.” (MedinaI, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 885.) This court concluded it was the defendant and his counsel whohadbetter accessto the facts relevant to the court’s competency inquiry while,“[t]he People, on the other hand, havelittle or no access to information regarding the defendant’s relationship with his counsel, or defendant’s actual comprehension of the nature of the criminal proceedings.” (bid.) This court also rejected the defendant’s argumentthatit was irrational to apply Penal Code section 1369’s presumption of competenceafter a doubtarises regarding the defendant’s competence. (Medina I, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 885.) In rejecting that argument, this court explained that the purposeofthe presumption wasto assign the party contesting it the burden of rebutting it. bid.) Because the presumption operatedto affect the burden ofproof, this court reasoned that it “remains in effect despite the introduction of some evidence of incompetence.” (bid.) The United States Supreme Court affirmed this court’s decision in Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437 [112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353] (Medina IT). In MedinaIT, the court held due process wassatisfied so long as a state “provides a defendant access to procedures for making a competency evaluation.” (Jd. at p. 449.) The court held there was “no basis for holding that due process further requires the State to assumethe burden of vindicating the defendant’s constitutional right by persuading the trier of fact that the defendant is competentto standtrial.” (/bid.) The court also agreed with this court’s reasoning as to the defendant being better suited to bear the burden of proof dueto his or her superior access to the relevant information,stating, “the defendant’s inability to assist counsel can, in andofitself, constitute probative evidence of incompetence, and defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense.” (/d. at p. 450.) Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, voiced a potential concern that could arise if the burden fell to the People rather than the defendant. She stated: “Ifthe burden of proving competencerests on the government, a defendant will have less incentive to cooperate in psychiatric investigations, because an inconclusive examination will benefit the defense, not the prosecution. A defendant mayalso be less cooperative in making available friends or family who might have information aboutthe defendant’s mental state.” (Medina II, supra, 505 U.S.at p. 455 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) Justice O’ Connor wenton to reason that requiring a defendant to prove incompetence could be a wayforstates to obtain “a more complete picture of a defendant’s competence”by giving the defense “the incentive to produceall the evidence in its possession.” ([bid.) The majority in Medina IT also addressed the presumption of competence in Penal Code section 1369. In so doing, the court cited approvingly to this court’s reasoning in Medina I regarding the presumption of competence. The court in Medina IT saw noreasonto disturb this court’s conclusion that the presumption was essentially “a restatement ofthe burden on proof,” and further held the presumption did not violate due. process. (Medina IT, supra, 505 U.S.at pp. 453-454.) | Thus,it is well-settled that in California an adult defendantis presumed competent and must prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence and that this frameworkis constitutional. The question now becomes whether these procedures — approved by this court and the United States Supreme Court — apply equally to juveniles. B. The Relevant Law and Statutory Framework for Juveniles Asthe “essentials of due process and fair treatment” apply to juvenile proceedings as well as to adult criminal proceedings, the Dusky competency standard applies to minors in delinquency proceedings. (/n re Ricky S. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 232, 234; Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 857 (Timothy J.); see also In re Gault (1967) 387 US. 1, 30 [87 S.Ct. 1428, 18L.Ed.2d 527].) Prior to 2010, the procedures governing competency determinations in the juvenile context derived from case law and the Rules of Court. (See Timothy J., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.) In 2010, the Legislature introduced section 709 in order to codify the competency processes for juveniles. (Stats. 2010, ch. 671, § 1.) Subdivision (a) of section 709 sets forth the initial procedures for declaring a doubt as to a minor’s competency. Under subdivision(a), either the minor’s attorney or the court may express a doubtas to the minor’s competency. (§ 709, subd. (a).) Once a doubt is expressed, the court must determineifthere is substantial evidence of incompetence, meaning substantial evidence that minor “lacks sufficient present ability to consult with counselandassist in preparing his or her defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or lacks a rational as well as factual understanding, of the nature of the charges or proceedings against him or her.” (§ 709, subd. (a).) If the court finds substantial evidence of incompetence, the court must suspend proceedings. (§ 709, subd.(a).) Subdivision (b) sets forth the procedures for a competency hearing. Undersubdivision (b), the court must appoint an expert “to evaluate whether the minor suffers from a mental disorder, developmental disability, developmental immaturity, or other condition and, if so, whether the condition or conditions impair the minor’s competency.” (§ 709, subd. (b).) The court-appointed expert must have training and expertise in juvenile developmentandin the forensic evaluation ofjuveniles and must be familiar with competency standards andcriteria used in evaluating competence. (§ 709, subd. (b).) Thus, under subdivision (b), while the Dusky standardstill applies, juvenile incompetencyis not defined solely in terms of mentalillness or disability, but also encompasses developmental immaturity, because minors’ brains arestill developing. (Timothy J., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) Finally, subdivision (c) provides that, following the competency hearing, “[i]f the minor is found to be incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence,” all proceedings remain suspended for a reasonable period of time in order to determine whetherthere is a substantial probability the minorwill attain competency. (§ 709, subd.(c).) C. Ina Juvenile Proceeding, the Minor is Presumed Competent and Bears the Burden of Proving Incompetence by a Preponderance of the Evidence The Court of Appeal correctly held that minor was presumedto be competent and bore the burden of proving incompetence. Section 709 contains an implied presumption of competence and assigns the burden of proving otherwiseto the party alleging incompetence. This construction is consistent with the legislative intent of section 709. Further, policy concerns dictate that minor should bear the burden ofproof because heis the party with better access to the relevant information and placing the burden on the People, or holding that neither party bears the burden, would lead to undesirable consequences where the minoris the party alleging incompetence. 1. Section 709 contains an implied presumption of competence; the party alleging incompetence bears the burdenof proof Whether a minor is presumed competent and has the burden of proving incompetence undersection 709 is a question of statutory construction. In construing statutes, the “goal is ‘to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that [a court] may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose ofthe law.’” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 54-55, citations omitted.) A reviewingcourt must ‘“first examine the wordsofthe statute, “giving them their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the statutory janguage is usually the mostreliable indicator of legislative intent.” (People v. Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 54-55.) Additionally, “[a] statute must be given a reasonable and commonsenseinterpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, which upon application will result 10 in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.” (People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 972, citation and quotations omitted.) Asappellant correctly notes, section 709 does not contain an express presumption of competencelike Penal Code section 1369, subdivision(f). (ABOM 17.) Nor does section 709 explicitly state which party bears the burden of proof. Nonetheless, the language of section 709 indicates that a minor is presumed to be competent and that the minor bore the burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance ofthe evidence.” Section 709, subdivision (a), states, “during the pendency of any juvenile proceeding, the minor’s counsel or the court may express a doubt as to the minor’s competency.” The fact that competency proceedings are triggered by the declaration of a doubt as‘to competency indicates an initial presumption of competence. If minor were not presumed competent, the Legislature would have required an affirmative showing of competence before any juvenile petition could proceed. Likewise, subdivision (c) provides for suspension ofproceedings “[i]f the minoris found to be incompetent by a preponderanceofthe evidence.” (§ 709, subd. (c), italics added.) This subdivision indicates that even after an initial doubtis raised, the fact to be established is incompetence, not competence. The sameis true in subsection (b), which charges the - appointed expert with evaluating “whether the minor suffers from a mental disorder, developmental disability, developmental immaturity, or other condition and, if so, whether the condition or conditions impair the minor’s 3 Respondentis not contending the minor must always bearthe burden. Rather, the burden ofprooffalls to the party whois alleging incompetence. Ordinarily, this will be the minor, as was the case here; however, in cases where the People allege incompetence, the People should properly bear the burden of proof. For simplicity’s sake, rather than repeatedly clarifying this point, respondentwill refer to minoras the party with the burden ofproof because he wasthe party alleging incompetence. 11 competency. (§ 709, subd. (b).) Thus, as the Court of Appeal properly noted: “the statute mandates suspension of proceedings only upon afinding that a minoris “incompetent,” rather than requiring suspension unless minoris found to be competent.” (Slip opn.at p. 11, italics in original.) Accordingly, subdivisions (a) through (c) of section 709 establishthat, like an adult defendant, a minor is presumed to be competent. Consequently,as with adult defendants, a minor has the burden of proving incompetency. This interpretation of section 709 is supported by Evidence Code section 500, which provides: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden ofproof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.” Undersubsections(b) and(c), the juvenile court is tasked with determining whether incompetence has been demonstrated by a preponderanceofthe evidence. Under Evidence Code section 500, the party alleging the existence of that incompetence bears the burden ofprovingit. Placing the burden on the minor based on the language of section 709 is consistent with case law from this court and various courts of appeal on analogousissues involving statutory construction. For example, in People v. Nguyen (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1612, the Court of Appeal had to determine whichparty bore the burden of proving the defendant’s age in order to determine whetherjurisdiction was proper undersection 604.4 (Id. * Section 604 provides, in relevant part: “(a) Whenevera case is before any court upon an accusatory pleading andit is suggested or appears to the judge before whom thepersonis brought that the person charged was,at the date the offense is alleged to have been committed, under the age of 18 years, the judge shall immediately suspendall proceedings against the person on the charge. The judge shall examineinto the age of the person, andif, from the examination, it appears to his or hersatisfaction that the person wasat the date the offenseis alleged to have been committed underthe age of 18 years, he or she shall immediately certify (continued...) 12 at p. 1618.) The court recognized that section 604 did not explicitly answer that question, but construed the section as imposing the burden of proof on the party seeking certification in the juvenile court. (/d. at pp. 1618-1619.) In so holding the court reasoned the language of section 604 sought proof that the person was “under the age of 18 years” and noted that if such evidence was not adduced,“the suspensionis lifted and the adult criminal proceedings go forward.” Based on the statutory languageas well as Evidence Code section 500, the court concluded “the burden ofproofis on the party seeking to establish the existence of the defendant’s minority.” (Ud. at p. 1619.) Similarly, here, section 709, subdivision (c), allows for proceedings to go forward unless the court is satisfied the minoris incompetent to proceed. As such, the burden should fall on the party seeking to establish the existence of the minor’s incompetence — in this case, minor. The merefact that unlike Penal Code section 1369, section 709 does not include an express presumption of competence does not suggest a different result in the juvenile context. For example, in People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, this court determined whether a defendantbore the burden of proving incompetenceby a preponderanceof the evidence under Penal Codesection 1372, which sets forth the procedures for establishing recovery of mental competence. This court noted that while Penal Code section 1369 expressly provides a presumption of competence and places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate incompetence, Penal Code section 1372 does not. Ultimately, this court held both the presumption and the burden were the same as under Penal Code section 1369. (/d.at p. (...continued) [various information] to the juvenile court of the county: ....” (§ 604, subd.(a).) 13 868.) In so holding, this court noted that “if mental incompetence were to be characterized aseither a ‘claim for relief’ on the part of a defendantor a ‘defense’ at his disposal, Evidence Code section 500, as a general matter at least, would impose the burden of proof on the defendant himself rather than the People.” (/d.at p. 868, fn. 4, citations omitted.) The court should apply the same reasoninghere to place the burden of demonstrating incompetence on minor. Minor, however, argues that section 709 should not be read to imply a presumption of competenceorto allocate the burden of proof. Minorfirst contends that because section 709 adopts some,butnotall, of the procedures from the adult competencystatutes, the omitted portions must have been left out intentionally. (See ABOM 18.) While reference to a particular subject in a statute can, at times, show a different intention where that provision is omitted from a similar statute (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 26), no such inference should be drawnhere. The express presumption of competency for adults is contained in a subdivision detailing how to instructthe jury in a jurytrial. (Pen. Code, § 1369, subd. (f).) Becauseall juvenile matters are handled by the court, rather than a jury, the Legislature may well have found the language pertaining to an express presumption to be unnecessary in the juvenile context. At the very least, a statutory provision regarding jury instructions would have been unnecessary. Further, despite the lack of an express presumption, as will be explained below,in enacting section 709, the Legislature intended to codify proceduressimilar to those afforded adults. A statutory construction inferring that the Legislature intended to reverse the presumption of competenceorreallocate the burden of proof would notlead to that intended result. 14 Additionally, with respect to the presumption of competence, minor asserts the “statutory trigger of expressing a doubt over a juvenile’s competency does not... imply a presumption of competency.” (ABOM 20.) According to minor’s reasoning, where no doubtis raised, “the parties and the court proceed because the juvenile’s competencyis sufficiently clear that no expert is required and no special proceeding must be held to make the competency determination.” (ABOM 20.) Rather than relying on this sort of tacit agreement as to competence, the better approachis to conclude that where no doubt as to competencyis declared, proceedings continue because the minor is presumed competent. Because such a presumptionis logically necessary in order for section 709 to operate effectively, contrary to minor’s position (ABOM 18), the fact thatit is not expressly included in the language ofthe statute is of no consequence. (See Johnson v. Baker (1914) 167 Cal. 260, 264 [whatever is necessarily implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed]; see also People v. Romero (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 440, 448-449 [statute that requires the defendant to demonstrate inability to pay impliedly presumes an ability to pay absent proofto the contrary].) Minoralso points to section 709’s use of the phrase “attain competency”(as opposed to “restore competence”) as evidence that there is no presumption of competence. (ABOM 19-20.) This word choice, however,is simply reflective of the Legislature’s expansion of the definition of competence to include developmental immaturity. Juveniles whose incompetence is based on developmental immaturity must attain competency rather than have competency restored. The fact that some juveniles might ultimately be found to be too immature to be deemed competent does not mean that they should not have been presumed competentat.the outset and required to demonstrate otherwise. Afterall, ‘“Tt]here is no precise age which determines the question of competency.’” 15 (Timothy J., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 861, quoting Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 741, fn. 11 [107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L-Ed.2d 631].) A minor’s young age, therefore, is not reason, in andofitself, to disregard the presumption of competence. Minor further contends that a presumption of competence would “ignore the developmentas well as the psychology and the research on adolescent brain development” that suggests many minorsare legally incompetent. (ABOM 21.) Accepting minor’s arguments regarding the cognitive differences between juveniles and adults as true,” as will be explained further below, the Legislature properly accounted for these differences by defining legal incompetence to include developmental immaturity and by requiring specialized training of the experts conducting the competency evaluations. These procedures adequately account for the differences between juveniles and adults; to further presumeall minors to be incompetent would be improper and unnecessary. Moreover, as the Court of Appeal emphasized below,due to the nature and goals of the juvenile justice system, a presumption of incompetenceor placing the burden ofproving competence on the People might not inure to the minor’s benefit. The reformative tools and services > There is conflicting evidence on this point. Studies have repeatedly shown older juveniles, age 16 and 17, consistently outperforming adults on tests designed to measure competency. (Joseph B. Sanborn,Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading through the Rhetoric and the Evidence (2009) 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 135 at p. 23.) Additionally, even in studies showing that juveniles performed poorer than adults in competency assessments, “the majority of all youths scored above the threshold level acknowledged as competent.” (/d. at p. 25.) That the juveniles may have scored lowerthan adults is not of great consequence, as competencyis a legal threshold that is either met or not met rather than a relative term subject to variations or degrees. (See /d. at p. 23.) 16 at the juvenile court’s disposal are many: mental health and medical diagnosis and treatment, substance abuse education andtesting, counseling, court orders to perform community serviceor to pay fines andrestitution, placementin the family homeor other appropriate setting, commitment to juvenile hall or the Juvenile Justice Department, and education and other services for the minor’s parent or guardian. (See, e.g. §§ 635.1; 704; 713 (in certain counties); 726, subd. (a); 727, 7272: 727.7; 729.3; 729.8; 729.9; 729.10; 730, subd. (a); 730.5; 730.6, 731; 6550.) Considering this “panoply”ofrehabilitative treatment options available to adjudicated minors in the juvenile court system, the Court of Appeal reasoned that minor’s argument for presuming minors incompetent could be “turned on its head.” (Slip opn. at pp. 9-10.) As the Court of Appeal reasoned, presuming a competent minor to be incompetent “deprives him or her of the full panoply of reformative options available underthe juvenile justice system and thereby diminishes the chancesfor true rehabilitation.” (Slip opn.at p. 10.) . Accordingly, the plain language of section 709, especially when read in light of Evidence Codesection 500, implies a presumption of competenceandallocates the burden of rebutting that presumptionto the party alleging incompetence; minor’s arguments to the contrary should be rejected. 2. The legislative history indicates that in enacting section 709, the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the presumption of competence and burdenof proof that is used in the adult context Asset forth above, the fundamental task in any case involving statutory interpretation is “‘to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265, citing People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) If, after examining the plain languageofthe statute, there exists any ambiguity, the 17 reviewing court may then turn to “various extrinsic aids, including the purposeofthe statute, the evils to be remedied,the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing thestatute.” (People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.) Even assuming section 709 were ambiguous, presuming competence and placing the burden ofproof on the minor also comports with the legislative history of section 709. Thelegislative history of section 709 demonstrates that the purpose of the statute wastofill the statutory void in the area ofjuvenile competency. Prior to the passage of section 709, there was no statutory framework available to the juvenile courts for dealing with competencyissues; thus,in enacting section 709, the Legislature sought to “codify competency processes for juveniles, similar to those afforded adults.” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, com. on AB 2212, as amended April 22, 2010, p. 2.°) While the Legislature intended for proceedings under section 709 to be similar to those afforded adults, it also recognized particular areas where different procedures were necessary. Specifically, the Legislature recognized that the type of “developmental immaturity” discussed in Timothy J., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 851, should be incorporated into the statutory definition for juvenile competency. (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, com. on AB 2212, as amended April 22, 2010,p.2.) Additionally, the Legislature recognized that experts charged with evaluating minors should have specialized training in the field of child development andin the use of “assessment instruments unique to evaluations of children in order to identify a mental disorder or developmental disability” in minors. (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, com. on AB 2212, as amended April 22, 2010,p. 2.) © See Exhibit A of Respondent’s Motion for Judicial Notice,filed concurrently with the AnswerBrief on the Merits. 18 The fact that the Legislature commentedon the specific ways in whichthe adult competencystatute needed to be modified in orderto fit the needs ofjuveniles and did not mention the presumption of competence or the requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proofas areas in need of modification strongly indicates an intent to maintain those procedures in the juvenile context, especially in light of the Legislature’s stated purpose to codify competency procedures “similar to those afforded adults.” Moreover, the specific modifications the Legislature did make, with respect to developmental immaturity and including evaluations by an expert specializing in juvenile development, show that the Legislature was well aware of the research on juvenile competency indicating potential differences in the cognitive abilities ofjuveniles and adults. As such, minor’s argument that applying the adult presumption and burden of proof in the juvenile context would “ignore” this research (ABOM 21) is incorrect. Rather, in light of this research, the Legislature identified discrete areas in which modification of the adult statute was appropriate and decided not to include the presumption or burden ofproof among those areas. This decision makes good sense. Cognitive differences between juveniles and adults should go to the type of expert called upon to evaluate the minor, the way the expert conducts that evaluation, and the information the expert called upon to evaluate. Section 709 allows for exactly that. The existence of cognitive differences, if any, should not affect the presumption of competence or the burden ofproof because, as will be explained below, regardless of any cognitive differences and regardless of whether some juveniles are more likely to be found incompetent, juvenilesstill remain the party with better access to competency-related informationandpolicy concernsstill direct that minors should bear the burden ofproving alleged incompetency. 19 3. Policy concerns support minor bearing the burden of proof | In addition to furthering the Legislature’s intent in passing section 709, placing the burden on the minor also comports with policy concerns because the minorandhis attorney have better access to the relevant information regarding competency and placing the burden on the People when the minoris claiming incompetence would create improperincentives and conflict with existing presumptions in juvenile law. a. The minor andhis attorney have superior access to information relevant to competency Just as this court found that adult defendants have better access to the relevant information regarding competency, so too do minorsin juvenile court. Underthe Dusky standard andsection 709, a juvenile competency determination focuses on whether the minor can consult with his attorney, assist in the preparation of his defense, and understand the proceedings against him. (Dusky, supra, 362 U.S.at p. 402; § 709, subd. (a).) Relevant to this determination is whether the minor suffers from a mental disorder, developmental disorder, developmental immaturity, or other condition. (§ 709, subd. (b).) The minorandhis attorney have superior access toall of the above information. It is the minor’s attorney, and not the prosecutor, who knows and can demonstrate whether the minoris able to consult with counsel and assist in his own defense. Andit is the minor, and perhaps his family members, whoare better able to call upon relevant witnesses — such as teachers, doctors, or friends — to attest to incompetence generally or to provide evidence of developmental disorders or immaturity. The People, on the other hand,as this court found in Medina I, “havelittle or no access to information regarding the defendant’s relationship with his counsel, or 20 defendant’s actual comprehension ofthe nature of the . . . proceedings.” (Medina I, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 885.) There is no reason whythis holds anyless true for a minorin juvenile court than for an adult defendant. Minor, in his opening brief, claimsit is the Peoplewho havethe better access in the juvenile context, but provides no satisfactory support for this claim. Minorstates, “In a juvenile proceeding, defense counsel may often bein the best position toinitially raise a doubtas to the minor’s competency, but once the court finds substantial evidence of incompetency and appoints an expert in juvenile development to examine the minor, the expert becomes the person having the best access to relevant information and the skill to assessit.” (ABOM 22.) In arguing that the burden should fall to the People, minor further argues both the prosecutor and defense counsel have access to the court appointed expert’s report and information uponwhichthe expert relies. (ABOM 28.) These arguments miss the point. While the court-appointed expert undoubtedly plays a role in a juvenile competency determination, an expert’s evaluation does not lessen or negate the superiority of the minor’s access as comparedto the People’s. Though both parties may have equal access to the expert andto his or her report, the minor and his attorney remain the parties with superior access to information concerning their ability to interact with one another and prepare a defense. Moreover,if the existence of the expert evaluation truly changed anything with regard to whichparty had better access to the relevant information, this court would not have relied upon that information as a “critical factor” in determining “the propriety of a particular proof allocation” in Medina I. (MedinaI, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 885.) After all, in the adult context, Penal Code section 1369 also provides for the appointment of an expert to examine the defendant and render an opinion as to competence. (Pen. Code, § 1369, 21 subd. (a).) Yet, despite the fact that an expert was involved in the process and that, presumably, both parties have equal access to the expert andto his report, this court still found it “critical” that the defendant, as compared to the People, was the party with better access to. the relevant information regarding competency. b. ~ A system that does not allocate the burden to either party or that places the burden on the People would provide the minor with the wrongincentives Minorargues that because section 709 does not explicitly allocate the burden of proof, “no single party has the burden to prove the minor incompetent.”” (ABOM 27.) Rather, minor contends, “all parties are tasked with the important obligation to make sure that the minoris not adjudicated while incompetent.” (ABOM 27.) ‘Alternatively, minor argues the burden falls to the People “to ensure fairness and accuracy ofthe adjudication.” (ABOM 28.) Essentially, minor posits that the goals of the juvenile justice system can only be metif the minor is competent and, because the prosecutoris the party bringing the initial charges, he or she should be required to prove the minor is competent before proceeding on those charges. (ABOM 28-29.) Initially, minor’s argumentthat neither party should bear the burden of proof should be rejected as unworkable in cases where the minoris alleging incompetence. Minor correctly notes that in cases where neither the prosecutor nor the defense seeks a finding of incompetence, neither party bears the burden andit is up to the court to adduce evidence of incompetence.’ (ABOM 24; Peoplev. Skeirik, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at 7 Thus, in the adult context, even in cases where both the prosecutor and the defendant seek a finding of competence, the prosecutoris not (continued...) 22 pp. 459-460.) Requiring the court to adduce evidence of incompetencein that unique situation is appropriate because the defendant should not be required to prove somethingthat heis not alleging to be true. Outsidethis narrow situation, however, the burden of proof should be assigned to the party alleging incompetence. Otherwise, if neither party is assigned the burden ofproof, neither party has the burden ofproducing evidence of either competence or incompetence. (See Evid. Code, § 550, subd. (b); see also In re Marriage ofMehlmauer (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 104, 108 [““We think it obvious that in a contested proceeding a burden of proofis necessary in order to get the proceeding off the ground”’].) Minor’s argumentfor assigning the burden of proofto the People (ABOM 27) mustalso be rejected, as it ignores the fact that the minoris the conduit through which evidence of competence or incompetence mustpass. The minor must converse with his attorney and with the appointed expert in order for there to be evidence from which to make a competency determination. The People cannot force the minorto either speak to his attorney or cooperate with the appointed expert. As such, if the People are charged with proving competence, the minor will have an incentive to remain silent and to refuse to submit to a full evaluation or to competency testing. Without such evidence, it will be difficult for the People to prove competence. This is the exact concern Justice O’Connorexpressed in Medina II whenshestated, “If the burden ofproving competencerests on the government, a defendantwill have less incentive to cooperate in psychiatric investigations, because an inconclusive examination will benefit the defense, not the prosecution. A defendant may also be less cooperative (...continued) required to prove competence. (See People v. Skeirik (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 444, 459-460.) 23 in making available friends or family who might have information about the defendant’s mental state.” (Medina IT, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 455 (conc. opn. of O’Connor,J.).) The facts of the instant case aptly illustrate this point. Minor here refused to participate in testing, therefore impeding Dr. Kojian’s ability to determine whether he was malingering. Placing the burden on the People in this scenario would likely lead to a number of competent minors being deemed incompetentfor lack of proof. On the other hand, a minor who bears the burden of proving incompetence would haveevery incentive to participate in testing, cooperate with the evaluation, and provide access to relevant witnesses because doing so would be the best way to adduce sufficient evidence of incompetence. The latter scenario best serves the goals of the juvenile justice system. The goal of the system is not simply treatment for treatment’s sake, but rather to provide an effective treatment program geared,as best as possible, to the specific needs of the individual minor. (In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413 [juvenile statutory framework is designed “to provide the juvenile court maximum flexibility to craft suitable orders aimedat rehabilitating the particular ward before it’’].) It is through full and frank conversations between the minor, the court, and the appointed expert that proper treatment and’ placement can be determined. As the Court of Appeal below pointed out, encouragingsilent or uncooperative minors by failing to place the burden on the minor would, in effect, obstruct the goals of the juvenile justice system because the minor whois deemed “incompetent” based on silence or lack of proof would not have the “full panoply of reformative options available underthe juvenile justice system ... thereby diminish{ing] the chancesfor true rehabilitation.” (Opn.at p. 10.) 24 c. Placing the burden on the People would be inconsistent with existing presumptionsin juvenile law In addition to creating an incentive for minorsto refuse full evaluations, placing the burden on the People would also be inconsistent with other presumptions applicable to minors; namely, the presumption of | capacity in Penal Codesection 26 and the presumptions regardingfitness and unfitness in section 707. Penal Codesection 26 provides that minors overthe age of 14 are “capable of committing crimes,” unless they fall under one of the enumerated excepted groups. (Pen. Code, § 26.) Section 707, subdivision (c), provides that minors charged with certain enumerated felonies are presumedto be unfit for juvenile court treatment and bear the burden of proving fitness.® (§ 707, subds.(b) & (c); Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 805.) Admittedly, it is theoretically possible for a minor to be capable of committing a crime and be unfit for treatment in juvenile court yet also be incompetent because the inquiries underlying these determinations are different. (See Timothy J., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.) Nonetheless, “some of the same factors may be relevant” to more than one type of inquiry. (See [bid.) As such, it would be to someextent logically inconsistent for the court to presume the same minor capable of committing a crime — meaning that he comprehends the wrongfulnessof the act — and presumehim to be unfit for juvenile court — meaning that he exhibited a certain level of criminal sophistication — yet, at the same time, presume him § Under both statutes, consistent with Evidence Codesections 500 and 606, the party rebutting the presumption bears the burden ofproof. (People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 303 [Penal Code section 26]; RamonaR. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 805 [section 707].) 25 to be unable to understandthe nature of the proceedings against and unable to communicate effectively with his attorney. Instead, at least with respect to those minors over the age of 14, it would be consistent for the court to presume— as it does with capacity — that the minor is competent to proceed absent proof from the minorto the contrary. As for minors under 14, the People would already be required to demonstrate capacity pursuant to Penal Code section 26. A capacity determination requires consideration and examination of the minor’s age, experience, and understanding in order to determine whether the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. (n re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 864.) Hence, the presumption of competence in section 709 would only apply to those minors under age 14 whose age, experience, and understanding demonstrates sufficient capacity to meet the requirements of Penal Code section 26. Accordingly, for the above reasons,this court should affirm the Court of Appeal’s holding that minor bore the burden of provinghis alleged ‘ incompetence by a preponderanceofthe evidence. II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUVENILE COURT’S FINDING THAT MINOR FAILED TO PROVE INCOMPETENCE BY A PREPONDERANCEOF THE EVIDENCE Minor contends this court should independently review the juvenile court’s competency finding, which he claims is a mixed question of law and fact. (ABOM 32, 28.) Minor further contends that, whether viewed independently or underthe substantial evidencetest, the juvenile court’s competency finding was not supported by substantial evidence. (ABOM 39.) Respondent disagrees. The Court of Appeal properly applied the substantial evidence standard of review and properly upheld the juvenile court’s finding. The substantial evidence standard is appropriate because 26 competency determinationsare factual findings. Under the substantial evidence standard of review,this court should affirm the juvenile court’s finding because the juvenile court could reasonably reject the evidence of incompetence based on thefact that the minor refused to submit to any testing. Moreover, the juvenile court was in the best position to determine the credibility of both the minor and the expert. A. Standard of Review Competency determinations are factual findings reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 215 [applying the substantial evidence standard of review to an adult defendant’s competency finding]; People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 493 [reviewing an adult defendant’s competency determination for substantial evidence and giving deferenceto the trier of fact]; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31 [same]; People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 885, disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 422, fn. 22.) The United States Supreme Court has defined issues offact as “basic, primary, or historical facts: facts ‘in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators ....’” (Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 309 at fin. 6 [83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770], quoting Brownv. Allen (1953) 344 U.S. 443, 506 [73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469].) In Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99 [116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383], the court reasoned that, in the context of habeas review, a competency determination is factual becauseits resolution “depends heavily on thetrial court’s appraisal ofwitness credibility and demeanor.” (/d. at p. 111.) This court has also found a variety of analogous issues to be factual findings. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680, 681, fn. 3 (Jones) [a court’s ruling on whether a minorisfit or unfit for treatment under juvenile court law is treated as a factual finding]; In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40, 49 [whether a 27 capital defendant is mentally retarded is a question of fact].) Additionally, while declining to decide the burden of proofissue, the courts of appeal have consistently applied the substantial evidence test when reviewing juvenile competency findings. (See, e.g., In re Alejandro G. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 472, 480; In re Christopher F. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 462, 472.) Findings of fact are reviewed underthe “substantial evidence” standard. (Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 681.) The standard is deferential: “Whena trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination....” (/bid.) This is because the powerto evaluate witnesses, resolve testimonial conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences reposes with the trial court alone and, on appeal, presumptions favorthe trial court’s proper exercise of its authority. (People v. Morton (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1047-1048.) With respect to competency determinations, where the court’s finding is based on affirmative evidence of competence, by way ofeither prosecution evidenceor expert opinion testimony that a minoris competent, a reviewing court should apply the well-settled test for substantial evidence and upholdthe findings if the evidence supporting it is “ofponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) The substantial evidence test is also the appropriate appellate test in cases — such as this one — where the court’s finding is based on the minor’s failure to meet his burden of demonstrating incompetence rather than on any affirmative evidence of competence. This court held as much under analogous circumstances in People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 351. 28 There, this court was tasked with determining whethersubstantial evidence supported the court’s finding that the defendant was sane. (ld.at p. 349.) Both of the court-appointed experts in Drew testified the defendant was unaware of the wrongfulnessofhis acts and the prosecution presented no evidenceat the sanity trial. (Id. at pp. 350-351.) This court held the trial court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. In so holding, the court reasoned: “Defendant . . . has the burden of proofon the issue of insanity; if neither party presents credible evidence on that issue the jury must find him sane.” (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 351.) The court then explained how the substantial evidencetest functioned under circumstances where the defense bears the burden of proof, stating: “the question on appeal is not so much the substantiality of _the evidence favoring the jury’s finding as whether the evidence contrary to that finding is of such weight and character that the jury could not reasonablyreject it.” (Jbid.) Applying that test to the facts of the case, the court determined that the jury could reasonably reject the opinionsthat the defendant was insane on the groundthat the experts failed to present sufficient material and reasoning to justify their opinions. (/bid.) As such, the court concluded that “the jury’s verdict cannot be overturned as lacking support in the trial record.” (/bid.) The same test should govern here. In applying the substantial evidencetest, the question for the Court of Appeal was whetherthe juvenile court could reasonably reject the expert’s opinion and therefore determine that minor failed to meet his burden to demonstrate incompetency. Although minordid not contest the application of the substantial evidence standard of review below, he now contends that competency determinations are mixed questions of law and fact subject to independent review. (ABOM 32-33.) Minor’s claim should be rejected because 29 competency determinations are not mixed questions of law and fact but, even if they were, the substantial evidencetestis still appropriate. First, minor’s argument that competency determinations involve mixed questions of law and fact is incorrect. In so arguing, minor reasons: “First, it is necessary for the juvenile court to review the expert’s findings and to establish a detailed account of the basis for the expert’s opinion on competency. Second, given those findings, the juvenile court must decide whetherthose findings established that the minor did not lack a sufficient present ability to consult with counsel andassist in preparing a defense with a reasonable degree ofrational understanding,or lack a rational as well as factual understanding of the nature of the charges or proceedings against him or her.” (ABOM 32-33.) According to minor, the second inquiry constitutes a “predominantly legal question.” (ABOM 33.) This reasoning fails to withstand scrutiny. Though minor attempts to liken competency determinations to established mixed law and fact questions, the attempt fails because, in the case of competency determinations, both inquiries are factual in nature. This is because both inquiries are purely subjective and specific to the minorat issue. This is in | stark contrast to other mixed law andfact inquiries such as determining due diligence, reasonablenessof a search, or issues pertaining to custodial interrogation under Miranda,’ where the court accepts the factual findings of the trial court but then applies those facts to a purely objective standard. (See, e.g. Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 895 [discussing the objective nature of in-custody determinations under Miranda andoffindings of reasonable suspicion and probable cause].) With competency determinations, the question is not whether, under the facts found by the ° Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda). 30 expert, a theoretical minor would understandthe nature of the proceedings against him; the question is always whetherthis minor is incompetent to proceed. However, even if competency determinations were mixed questions, the substantial evidence standardis still appropriate. Mixed questions of law and fact may be subject to either independent review orsubstantial evidence review. (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 893-894.) In deciding mixed law and fact questions, this court has found the substantial evidence test most appropriate where the issues presented are predominantly factual or credibility based. (See, e.g., People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730, [whether suspect in custody initiated new discussion after invoking Mirandaright to counsel].) Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have referenced competency determinations as issues appropriate for substantial evidence review. In Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. 99, the United States Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard of review for questions involving the Fifth Amendmentright against self-incrimination. While the court concluded independent review wasappropriate in that context, in reaching that conclusionit distinguished the situation before it from the competencyto standtrial context, noting that, for competency determinations, a deferential standard of review was appropriate both because (1) determinations of competency take place in open court on a full record with the trial court having a “first-person vantage” and (2) the court’s determination as to whether a defendant was competentto stand trial is an “individual-specific decision” unlikely to have precedential value. Cd. at pp. 113-114.); see also Miller v. Fenton (1985) 474 U.S. 104, 114 [106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405] [when an “issue involves the credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of 31 applying law to fact to the trial court”’].) Similarly, in People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 442, this court commented that a deferential standard of review is appropriate in cases where the “trial court makes an individual-specific decision, such as for juror bias or competency to stand trial.” In addition to its having been highlighted as a prime example of a predominantly factual inquiry, competency determinations are appropriately reviewed for substantial evidence underthe factors set forth in Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th 889, and People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1267. In Cromer, this court analyzed the proper standard of review when evaluatinga trial court’s due diligence determination. (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 893.) Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s guidance in Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. 99 and Ornelasv. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690 [116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911], this court found that independent review was most appropriate because (1) the due diligence determination required application of an objective, constitutionally based legal test to the historical facts; (2) the trial court does not havea first-person vantage on the prosecution’s out-of-court efforts to locate an absent witness; and (3) a due diligence determination is not “highly individualized” because it could potentially guide law enforcement officers by offering a defined set of rules. (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 900-901.) . Morerecently, in Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1250, this court examined the proper standard of review in analyzing the People’s appeal following a trial court’s grant of a new trial based on juror misconduct. Ultimately, this court determined that while the issue was a mixed question of law andfact, the trial court’s order should be deferentially reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ud. at p. 1255.) In so holding, the court relied upon the factors considered in Cromer as well as the following considerations: (1) the 32 importanceofthe legal rights or interests at stake; and (2) the consequences of an erroneous determination. (/d. at p. 1267.) While a minor’s competence is no doubt important and courts must employ adequate procedures to guard against erroneous determinations, the majority of the Cromer and Ault factors point to application of the substantial evidence standard as the appropriate standard of review. First, _ as explained above,in contrast to mixed questions of law and fact that require independent review, competency determinations do not require application of an objective legal test to the historical facts. In reviewing a competencyfinding, the reviewing court is not analyzing the facts to see if they meet the level at which a typical minor would be considered | competent or incompetent — rather, the focus is on the specific, subjective competence of the minor. Second, competency determinationsare, in part, dependent upon the juvenile court’s first-person vantage. Minor argues competency determinations do not “really” depend on witness credibility because the expert’s evaluation of the minor takes place outside of the courtroom. (ABOM 35-36.) This court stated in Cromer that competencyto standtrial entails a “first-person vantage”for the trial court. (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 901.) Moreover, minor’s argumentignoresthe fact that in cases where the experttestifies as to his conclusions from that out-of-court evaluation, the juvenile court must evaluate the credibility of the expert (as well as the credibility of any other witness including, perhaps, the minor himself) from a first-person vantage. Becausethe ultimate questionis whetherthe minor is incompetent to proceed, the court’s ability to view and evaluate the minor’s demeanor, behavior, and interactionswith counsel are also critical components of a competency determination that are unavailable to a reviewing court. As the United States Supreme Court aptly stated in United States v. Oregon Medical Society (1952) 343 U.S. 326, 339 [72 33 S.Ct. 690, 698, 96 L.Ed. 978], “Face to face with living witnesses the originaltrier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth ... how can we saythe judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses... .” Even in cases where the expert does nottestify before the court and the court bases its opinion entirely upon the written reports, the juvenile court’s findingsare still entitled to deference. (See Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711, fn. 3 [“that the trial court’s findings [in denying motion to recuse prosecutor] were based on declarations and other written evidence does not lessen the deference due those findings”’].) Third, the substantial evidence test is appropriate because competency determinations are highly individualized and unlikely to have wide-spread precedential value. As set forth above with respect to the subjective versus objective nature of competency determinations, the goal of a competency determination is to determine whetherthe specific minor before the court is incompetent. That any one minoris found to be incompetent under a certain set of particular facts does not have any effect on a separate competency determination of another minor. In other words, if Minor No. 1 is of a certain age, has a certain I.Q., and gives certain responses during an evaluation and is found to be incompetent, Minor No. 2, whoshares the same characteristics and gives the similar responses, may or may not be incompetent to proceed. Competency determinations are fact specific to the individual minorand, as such, they are unlikely to hold much precedential- value. This court stated in Au/t that where a mixed question of law and fact “depend[s] heavily on the unique circumstancesofthe particular case” and is “so factually idiosyncratic and highly individualized as to lack any [significant] precedential value,” independent review is not required. (Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1267.) 34 Accordingly, under the Cromer and Ault factors, even if a competency determination constitutes a mixed question of law and fact, the substantial evidence standard of review is appropriate. B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding Underthe substantial evidence standard of review, this court should affirm the juvenile court’s finding because the juvenile court could reasonably reject the evidence of incompetence. The primary evidence of incompetence was Dr. Kojian’s opinion. That opinion, however, was based on the doctor’s interviewwith minor, during which minorrefused to participate in any sort oftesting, stating, “I decline tests.” (Conf. RT 42.) Dueto this refusal, Dr. Kojian was unable to determine whether minor was malingering and was unable to determine the cause of minor’s apparent “disruption in cognition.” (Conf. RT 43.) Dr. Kojian’s admitted there were “a plethora” of tests designedtotest cognitive functioning, yet claimed his opinion was not affected by minor’s refusal to submit to testing because there was no test he could have administered that would have changed his opinion. (RT 41, 46-47.) The doctor also based his opinion on the fact that minor was housedin a special unit in juvenile hall, minor’s teachers and the officers who arrested him “thought that he was impaired,” and minor’s mother provided information that “there is some type of mental process going on.” (RT 47.) But there was no evidencein the record as to why minor may have been housedin a “special unit,” and the documentation from minor’s schoo!did not clearly indicate any developmentaldisability. (See RT 76.) In fact, the 350 manifestation determination’? from minor’s school indicated that minor’s testing was not complete because the observed cognitive and adaptive delays “may have been drug induced,” andtesting from 2009 did not show any such delays. (RT 76.) Additionally, even if the court accepts Dr. Kojian’s opinion that minor suffered from somesort of cognitive impairment, minorfailed to demonstrate that any impairment rendered him legally incompetent. Admittedly, some of minor’s statements during his evaluation may have suggested confusion: appellant said that he did not know his mother, that he wasarrested for “not understanding,” and that he did not know the duties of his defense counsel or the prosecutor. (Conf. RT 41-42.) However, when Dr. Kojian attempted to administer a test to “rule out malingering,” minor flatly declined the test. (Conf. RT 42.) Accordingly, there is no way of knowing how truthful minor was being during the interview. It simply cannot be that a minor can meet his burden to demonstrate incompetence by a preponderanceofthe evidence by making outlandish statements and then refusing to participate in any sort of testing in order to determine the validity of those statements. Moreover, as the juvenile court noted, many of minor’s responses to Dr. Kojian were “appropriate.” (RT 75.) Minorindicated the court “makes a decision,” a guilty verdict meansheis “responsible,” and a notguilty verdict means “he could be released home.” (Conf. RT 42.) Moreover, although minor believed he was charged with “disturbing the peace,”it is understandable that minor could think ofhis actions offighting with and threatening his family membersas disturbingthe peace. Minor wasalso '0 A manifestation determination seeks to determine whether a student’s violation of a code of student conduct was a manifestation of the student’s disability. (See 20 U.S.C. 1415, subd.(k).) 36 able to clarify that he wasin trouble for “messing up [his] house,” and “playing with mom and dad.” (Conf. RT 42.) Minoralso stated that the court determines guilty versus innocence based on whether appellant attends school or not (Conf. RT 42), whichis incorrect, but school attendance is often an important factor considered by juvenile courts in determining the proper placement for a minor pendingtrial and during adjudication. For these reasons, the juvenile court’s finding that minorfailed to ‘meethis burden of demonstrating incompetence was supported by substantial evidence, as the Court of Appeal properly found. This court should affirm. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, respondent respectfully asks this court to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appealin its entirety. Dated: May 8, 2014 Respectfully submitted, KAMALAD.HARRIS Attorney General of California DANE R.GILLETTE ChiefAssistant Attorney General JULIE L. GARLAND Senior Assistant Attorney General STEVE OETTING Deputy Solicitor General LISE S. JACOBSON Deputy Attorney General (incaur KATHRYN KIRSCHBAUM Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent $D2013807045 70869856.doc 37 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached RESPONDENT’S ANSWERBRIEF ON THE MERITSusesa 13 point Times New Romanfont and contains 10,639 words. Dated: May 8, 2014 KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California Codtrn Kuwcltbown KATHRYN KIRSCHBAUM Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent DECLARATIONOF SERVICE BYU.S. MAIL & ELECTRONIC SERVICE Case Name: People v. Rosario V. Case No.: S$212346 I declare: I am employedin the Office of the Attorney General, whichis the office of a memberofthe California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondencefor mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. On May9, 2014, I served the attached RESPONDENT’S ANSWERBRIEF ON THE. MERITSbyplacing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 110 West A Street, Suite 1100, P.O. Box 85266, San Diego, CA 92186-5266, addressed as follows: The Honorable Judge Deborah Chuang Clerk of the Court - Orange County Superior Court Court of Appeal of the State of California Lamoreaux Justice Center Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 341 City Drive South 601 W. Santa Ana Blvd. Department L34 Santa Ana, CA 92701 Orange, CA 92868-3205 The Honorable Tony J. Rackauckas Orange County District Attorney's Office 401 Civic Center Drive West Santa Ana, CA 92701 and, furthermoreI declare, in compliance with California Rules of Court, rules 2.25(i)(1)(A)-(D) and 8.71 (f)(1)(A)-(D),I electronically served a copy of the above document from Office of the Attorney General's electronic service address ADIEService@doj.ca.gov on May9, 2014, to Appellate Defenders, Inc.'s electronic service address eservice-criminal@adi-sandiego.com and to Appellant's attorney's electronic service address by 5:00 p.m. on the close of businessdayat cindybrines@sbcglobal.net. I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsof the State of California the foregoingis true and correct and that this declaration was executed on May9, 2014, at San Diego, California. A. Brooks Declarant “Signature $D2013807045 70870599. doc