McWILLIAMS v. CITY OF LONG BEACH

Respondent’s Reply Brief on the Merits

Cal.November 15, 2012

$202037 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JOHN W. MCWILLIAMS re | LED Plaintiff and Appellant, y NOV 15 2012 CITY OF LONG BEACH, Frank A. McGuire cen Defendant and Respondent. ——pepuy CITY OF LONG BEACH'S REPLYBRIEF Of an Unpublished Decision of the Second Appellate District of the Court ofAppeal Case No. B200831 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC361469 Honorable AnthonyJ. Mohr, Presiding CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE COLANTUONO & LEVIN, PC ROBERT E. SHANNON(43691) MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) J. CHARLES PARKIN (159162) SANDRAJ. LEVIN (130690) MONTEH. MACHIT(140692) TIANA J. MURILLO (255259) 333 West Ocean Blvd., 11 FI. 300 S. Grand Ave., Suite 2700 Long Beach, CA 90802-4664 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3137 (562) 570-2200 (213) 542-5700 (562) 436-1579 (fax) (213) 542-5710 (fax) 113603.4 $202037 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JOHN W. MCWILLIAMS Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant and Respondent. CITY OF LONG BEACH'S REPLY BRIEF Of an Unpublished Decision of the Second Appellate District of the Court ofAppeal Case No. B20083 | Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC361469 Honorable AnthonyJ. Mohr, Presiding CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE COLANTUONO& LEVIN, PC ROBERT E. SHANNON(43691) MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) J. CHARLES PARKIN (159162) SANDRAJ. LEVIN (130690) MONTEH. MACHIT(140692) — TIANA J. MURILLO (255259) 333 West Ocean Blvd., II" FI. 300 S. Grand Ave., Suite 2700 Long Beach, CA 90802-4664 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3137 (562) 570-2200 (213) 542-5700 (562) 436-1579 (fax) (213) 542-5710 (fax) 113603.4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTIONucccsccscssssssesessssessetscessssessssssssssssessseasesesessseessesssssenssessentensenss 1 LEGAL DISCUSSION...ssssssesssssssssssssssssssvenssssseseseecessssssnsnnseseseeeeeesesnssssnannseesseseee | I, Ardon Does Not Decide This Case......sssssssssssssssssesssessssssecssssssnsessneessees 1 Il. If the Government Claims ActWere Unambiguous,the Parties Would Not Be Before This Court.......cccscssssscssssersseessessssensessesseseseeess 3 A. Section 905’s Subdivisions Do Not Evidence Intent to Preempt Local Ordinance........ccecscssessseseeeeseseseseeeeeetseensenensenees 4 B. ObviousInconsistencies in the GovernmentClaims Act's Use of Defined Terms May Not Be Simply Ignored................. 8 III. Appellant Cannot Escape the Legislative History of the Government Claims Act...ccscsscesesessessesssssresscsseseseessssessssenseeeees 10 IV. Cities Across California, Large and Small, Have Long Understood the Use of “Statute” in Section 905, Subd.(a) to Include Local Ordinances......ccccscessecssssessessssecsssessesessseseesesssesesesseeeeaes 12 A. Major Cities Around California Adopted Claiming Procedures for Transient Occupancy and Utility Users TAXES wo.sssssscsssscssessssscecseseesssesscssrssscsseuseessesseseseessessseessegsseesesssesteses 14 B. Statutes Are Interpreted In Light of Their Contexts............... 17 V. The City’s Ordinances Impose a Local Claiming Requirement with Which McWilliams Did Not Comply ........scsessssseseesrereseereeees 18 VI. Public Policy Supports the Trial Court’s Reading of Section 905, SUDA.(A) ..ececcsscscsssceesececcnecsscssseesesssesseetsessssssssseessecssssesescesesensacasessseesees 20 A. Sister States Do Not Permit Class Actions of the Sort 113603.4 Advanced by Appellantsesvasseeeseessssesssesesssessssnseneneseseesssssaseeeeerees 23 The City is Enforcing its Laws, and There is No Evidence toB. the COMtrary....cccccccsscsssssscssssssessesessseseseeseesecsessessenesesecsessereasees 24 Vii. The AnswerBrief Raises Points That Are Not Disputed.................. 26 A. No Due ProcessIssue is Presented ........cssccsesssseesesesessseeseaes 26 B. The City Does Not Dispute the Languageof Article XI, Section 12 of the California Constitution .........ccceseseeeeees 27 C. The City Does Not Dispute the Language of Code of Civil Procedure Section 313 0... csesessssesesssecesesetssseesssessesseesensseneeees 28 D. The City Does Not Dispute That the Government Claims Act Occupies the Field to Which it Applies... 29 E. The City Concedes That the Contested Taxes Have Been Paid ooo eecscetscsessesstscessescssscscscssseseeessssssssessenseseeseeesssssesesseseesseeseres 31 VIII. The Merits of McWilliams’ Complaint Remain Untested................ 32 CONCLUSION...cecceccssssessscssesssscscssscesscscesessessnsnssssesssessessseseesceneeeseseenesssesesees 33 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCEWITH CAL.R.CT. 8.520(c)..... 34 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE... ceecssssssseessesssssssesscssesesesseeesesessessseseseseesenes 35 ii 113603.4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page STATE CASES AB Cellular LA, LLC v. City ofLos Angeles (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 747.0... ccsssssssssesesseseessessersessesesssesssssseeseesesseees21, 22 American Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Garamendi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1044.0... cccssssssssssesesssessesessseessseesseeaneseeseeeeeenes 18 Anaheim v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 825......cccsssesssresessreresesssssseseeeseseesseetssesesesensseenenees31 Ardonv. City ofLos Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241 oeceescscseescsecsserecsessssssssessserssesseasesenssesses passim Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal.App4th 65.0...cc ccsssseesseesesessesessesesssesresssessesensenenenees passim Boy Scouts ofAmerica Nat. Foundation v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 428.00... ccccscsstesssssseesssessesssssseeessesescsssenessssseesees17 Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp. (1975) 44 CalApp.3d 460.0...cecesotescsesessesssesessensssssssssuassssssseuseceeneeens5 Brumley v. Utah State Tax Comm’n (Utah 1993) 868 P.2d 796 oo... eccssssssssscescsssssssessssssceesesesensseesessesseseseseessssenteees24 Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914 wcccesssssssssessensssssscesseseesessssessessssrsesseeseseessessses 19 Chodosv. City of Los Angeles (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 675.....cccscssscsssscsccseecueesssscensesseseentesneentensesseesscasesesens31 City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447oececsecsststsesssssssssesseessesssessssesssssssssessssssesssteessseseesees25 Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803.0... eecesesesessessssssssscssssscessssesessssssssesesssssssssesesessseeessees4,5 iii 113603.4 County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Oronoz) (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 353 vcesesssecsssessseecessssessecsesssseseesssesesssnseesessens3, 13 Diamond View Limited v. Herz (1986) 180 CalApp.3d 612.0...ccceccsesesecenstssseseesessecesssesesnesecssseeseeerees17 Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty Sav. & Loan Assn. (1967) 254 CalApp.2d 585... cesesesssssstssessscssecssssssessscesssssesssesseseeesseesses5 Dunn v. Bd. ofProp. Assessment, Appeals and Row (Pa. Commw.Ct. 2005) 877 A.2d 504...eecsescescesrsesseseceseeenceseessesseserees23 Flying Dutchman Park, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 CalApp.4th 1129... scesscscsssessstsestsssessssescssssssssnessseseeeees12, 14 Georgia Dep’t ofRevenue v. Roof (Ga. App. 2010) 690 S.E. 2d 442 oicessssessssessecsessesesssssssscssssssssseonseenees23 Goldtree v. City of San Diego (1908) 8 Cal.App. 505 0...sssssssesessceessescscssscesessseseees seseseenssseseseseassseeseeeaes5 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City ofLos Angeles (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 242.0.cscsesssesssesssssessssstessessssssessessssssseess 12, 13, 14 IBM Personal Pension Plan v. City & County of San Francisco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1291...ssvecessasecssnscesasecucesacssseesusecsaseessieessess23 In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Litigation (C.D. Cal. 2010) 738 F.Supp.2d 1062.0...seesstseessacseecassesesesesssseoseess20 ].W. Theisen v. County ofLos Angeles (1960) 54 Cal.2d 170.00... ceccsssesssessesssscsescsssserssssssssscecessseseesssseestsnsenesseeses4,5 Javor v. State Bd. of Equalization (1974) 12 Cal.3d. 790.00... ccscsscessessssssssssssscscssssssssssesssssesssseensessssessersnessees20, 21 Jones v. Dep’t of Revenue (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) 377 N.E.2d 202 w..cecscssssssessssssscsessessessserssessesseassesssees24 Kern County Water Agency v. Watershed Enforcers (2010) 185 CalApp.4th 969.0... cesscssscsecesesessssssssssesssesssssessessestsnsssseeseans 18 iv 113603.4 Lacey Nursing Center, Inc. v. Dep’t ofRevenue (Wash. 1995) 905 P.2d 338 .....cccssssesssssssesssesesssssssssessesessssessesssssssesssessssseeseees24 Livengood v. Nebraska State Patrol Retirement System (Neb. 2007) 729 N.W.2d 55... ccssssssssssssssressssesssssssssessssssssssssssseeseesseseeseseeeees23 M’Cullochv. State (1819) 17 U.S. 316.eseesetsesnsessssssscsesassssssscesseesssesscssessseseacsneserseensensees25 McKesson v. Division ofAlcoholic Beverages & Tobacco (1990) 496 U.S. 18 ..eeececsscsesessenesseesssecseseenssecseesseeatsnesasensseneenesecnenecassesacens26 Neamav. Town of Babylon (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 18 A.D. 3d 836 .......ssssssesessescsesrssssssessssessenesseensees23 Orange County Employees Assn. v. County of Orange (1993) 14 CalApp.4th 575...cessscstcescseeeressessnsesssesssssesssesesseassseeeseeseeses30 Pasadena Hotel Development Venture v. City ofPasadena (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 412.0... cccescsesssssseescsssssesssesssstsessseseseees 3, 11, 13, 14 Pourier v. South Dakota Dept. ofRevenue and Regulations (S.D. 2010) 778 N.W.2d 602 ....ccceesssesssscsseessesessseessstesstsesesessesesssssaseees23, 24 Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co. | (1928) 205 Cal. 496 wc eccessseescsssssesssesssssssesssessssessscesssscesessesssesssssseeeeeseseeeseees5 Stansbury v. Frazier (1920) 46 Cal.App. 485 oo.cccscsssesesssssesscessssesesssssnssssssssssscsessessatassosssaseeseens5 State ex rel. Lohman v. Brown (Mo Ct. App. 1997) 936 S. W.2d 607 ....cccescsescectssscsssessssssssesssersseeesseeseesees23 Volkswagen Pacific v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 7 Cal.3d 48...ceccescsssstssseesssssessseesessssscsseseesssssesessscssnesenes 13, 17, 28 Wicker v. Comm’r | (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) 342 S.W.3d 35 wn .esesssssesssssssssssssstssesssrseesscesseees24 Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758 oo.csseceerssessesecessesssscsesesssssssssesssseasesessessesssessessones31 Vv 113603.4 Writers Guild ofAmerica, West, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 475... ccccssscesessssessesssscessssesssssssesssssessesssessssseecsseaes 13 Ziegler v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (Ind. T.C. 2003) 797 N.E.2d 881 .........se00sesesesessscssensssssscsssesasesecstensseseseseness24 RULES & STATUTES 72 Pa. Stat. ANN. § 5566D oeceessesessssecessesesesesseesssessesesssseseessaseacesesesesseonseatees23 California Constitution, Article XI, §.12 0...scssscssesseecessensereeesessseees27, 28 California Constitution, Article XTIDC, § 3.0... eescssssscsssscsresseceenesscesecessceees27 California Rules of Court, Rule 8.520, subd. (hh)...eeeeesseeeseeeeeceeesereeeseeees8 California Statutes 2008, Chapter 383, § 1 secsasssessusestnsesinesssessse seveneeseees6 Civil Code § 3264 oeeeecssssessesesesseeseceessecseesescsesceccscsscasaceessccesseaceesecsceasoesasies5,6 Codeof Civil Procedure § 313.0...eessesssseesssesseseessescssssssessseessessreseerseeeseas28 Codeof Civil Procedure § 1021.5...eeeeeseceseceeesecceeesecseeeccsessesscesesaeseeeeeaes27 Fresno Municipal Code § 7-603 .....csscsssssseessesssesessssesssesseessssnseessseeseeseneseeeees 16 Fresno Municipal Code § 7-613 .....csccccescsssesesesssessessescsesessenserseseesesesssessssneeeeess 16 Government Code § 810.0...cee seeeeseeeecereesscescesssseessssssesseseecseeseescecssseseseressoes20 GovernmentCode § 811.6... ccscssssssceseessesscesessescesceeecsceseessesssasessesseesssenees9,14 Government Code § 905.......ccsssccscssscceccssessssscsnesessececseesccecennessesaceneeeasseesesensaees28 GovernmentCode § 905 (a)... ceccsseseesssssessscssssssscsssesssensassesessecesassceaees passim Government Code § 905 (Db)... cesssesescssessescsseeseseecsesessseneeeeeeseeeeneees 4,5,6,7,8 Government Code § 905 (€)....essesssssececssseesscceceesseenessoesesseceaseeseeeneeseasensees 6, 7,8 Government Code § 935.......ccscssesseccssseescceceseseessseeseeeeteneeeseneeecseeasesseseeceasesseateas28 Government Code § 995.2... sesesssesessecessecceceseeessceceeseeseesasecseeeessssecceseaseneeeseeees9 Long Beach Municipal Code § 3.64.030 .....cscssssssseseresereteessessesesssesesenesssesseess 15 Long Beach Municipal Code§ 3.64.055 ......cecssesesssseeeesseetesssctsrstenseeseeeseees 15 vi 113603.4 Long Beach Municipal Code § 3.68.160.........sssseessessanssssosssnsasecnneennsenneenrenneceses 19 Los Angeles Municipal Code § 21.07 ...cecsesssssssesssssesssesesssssserereceeeereceseres15 Los Angeles Municipal Code § 21.1.3 .ucccccsssssssssssessssssssssssessssssscscessesseseeese15 Los Angeles Municipal Code § 21.1.12 oo. cccssssssssssssesesssssssssseeceseceneeserseeees 15 Los Angeles Municipal Code § 21.7.3 ocussssssesssescesessesssesseesssseseseeeseeesaseees 15 Los Angeles Municipal Code § 21.7.12 ....ccsscsccssesssssscscessessseessssesesseecessassesees 15 Oakland Code of Ordinances § 4.24.030.......ccscsscssssssssseccsscnsssssessssesseeneeesees15 Oakland Code of Ordinances § 4.24.120 0... sscsssssssssssetsecesseesscsseeseereseeneereees 15 Oakland Code of Ordinances § 4.28.030.........ccssssssssessssesesesessssesscssessesesseeseess16 Oakland Codeof Ordinances § 4.28.180.......cssssssssssssessesersssssessssseessesssscensens 16 San Diego Municipal Code § 35.0103ecrsesesnsesnseseee seeseseneseesceeseesesseseaees 16 San Diego Municipal Code § 35.0122... ccccsessessssssscssscsessseseseessnssscesesssssans16 San Francisco Business & Tax Regulations Code § 502.0... .ecsssesseeeeseesseees16 San Francisco Business & Tax Regulations Code § 6.15-1 oceeseeeseeeeees 16 San Jose Municipal Code § 4.70.500 ou. ssecsssssssessscesessessccesecsesessesessesescesssesens 15 San JoseMunicipal Code § 4.70.700 vceeccssceessesseececcseceseecsesceeseseseeseasssessveess 15 San Jose Municipal Code § 4.72.040 wo. ccesssesssssssesssssssesesssesessseeesesesensseececees 15 San Jose Municipal Code § 4.72.130..........seeseeseeseseeeeseseseeeseesnsssesseseseesseasessnses 15 San Jose Municipal Code Ch. 4.82 occcecsssscssesessscsssssssssssssssssesesseeeetesseaeseaeees 15 Ga. Code Ann.§ 48-2-35(C)(5) ..cscsssssessssssessscsceserscsssssssessesessecssseseseseseecacscasaeees23 Ind. Code § 6-8.1-9-7 .icccccssssccsssscsssessssesssssssesssessscssscsorssssssssesesseeeeeeenereseasseesesesets24 Mo.Rev.Stat. § 144.190... esssssessesssseeessssssssesssssesssssensesssssesseeesasasseseeseeeseeegs23 Neb.Rev. Stat. § 77-2798 ...cccccccsssscssscsssessssscsesesesssssesssesessessssssscseeesteeceseesesaeeeees23 S.D. Codified Laws § 10-59-17 oesessssssesesseecsceeceeesseeeeeseeseeerasseeseeseeaeeeseeens24 vii 113603.4 Sacramento City Code § 3.04.070........ecsssesesnessessssensseesesssseencsiseeseesesecenesees 15 Sacramento City Code § 3.28.030......cccssssssssssscscsssesssseesesssssssssssseessceeeseeseees15 Sacramento City Code § 3.28.150.....ssccssesssssssseeesesessensescsnesesresesseeestenesenes15 Sacramento City Code § 3.32.030......csssssecesssessesseeseseessessesesssesesesesseseneeseeaes15 Sacramento City Code § 3.32.160......ssssssssssssssssssssseesssssreteressssseseeessseetsees15 Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1802(a)(1) ...c.ccessssssssssssssesesssesessessesessseeeessssseeesssesessnees24 WashRev. Code § 82.32.180 .........ccssssssssssssseceessccsccencceseecsesecseeaserseesncerseseasesseres24 OTHER AUTHORITIES Recommendation and Study Relating to the Presentation of Claims Against Public Entities 2 Cal. Law Rev. Com.Rep.(1959)...........8, 10, 17 Vili 113603.4 INTRODUCTION The AnswerBrief on the Merits rings hollow. Specifically, McWilliams’ claim that Ardon v. City of Los Angeles disposesof this matter is simply untrue,as is his assertion that the relevant provisions of the Government Claims Act are clear and unambiguous. Despite McWilliams’ efforts to reduce the Court's task to rote application of defined terms read in isolation, the question of vital importance toall California cities, counties and special districts remains: did the Legislature intend to exclude local ordinances from the definition of “statute” in section 905, subd. (a)?! McWilliams’ proposed answer — which dismisses relevant legislative history and context — would drastically alter the legal landscape on which both the Legislature and local governments havelong relied. This case warrants a morestudied review that properly takes into account the legislative history of the GovernmentClaims Act and the policy considerations which animate the Act. LEGAL DISCUSSION I. Ardon Does Not Decide This Case Ardonv. City ofLos Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241 (“Ardon”) does not dispose of this appeal. Ardon itself says so and this Court's unanimousdecision to grant review of the unpublished Court of 1 All unspecified section references are to the Government Code. -1- 113603.4 Appeal decision underlying this case demonstrates that the Court maintains that view. Moreover, Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 65 (hereinafter, “Batt’) has not been overruled by Ardon implicitly or otherwise. (Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits (“AnswerBrief”), p. 3.) Rather, Ardon expressly distinguished Batt on the basis that it “considered statutes or municipal ordinances enacted to provide specific proceduresfor filing tax? claims against governmentalentities—proceduresthat are not applicable or required in this case[i.e., Ardon].” (Ardon, supra, 52 Cal.4th 241, 250.) Even Appellant acknowledgesthe point, as he must. (AnswerBrief at 22, n. 27 (“[T]his Court distinguished rather than rejected Batt in its Ardon decision, this Court did not address, because it did not need to, whether municipal ordinances can provide the applicable claims proceduresfor local tax refundsorif section 910 preempts them.”). * As in the Opening Brief, the City uses “tax” to refer to taxes, assessments and fees, as the differences among these revenue measuresis not significant for construction of section 905, subd. (a), although it is certainly true that particular revenue measures are subject to some specific statutes while others are governed by general statutes. (E.g., Revenue & Taxation Code.) -2- 113603.4 ll. If the Government Claims ActWere Unambiguous, the Parties Would Not Be Before This Court Asthe City’s Opening Brief on the Merits (“Opening Brief”) demonstrates, the Government Claims Act cannot be read to use “statute” and “enactment”as the Act's stated definitions suggest. (Opening Brief, pp. 31-34.) Indeed, every Court of Appeal but that here has read section 905, subd.(a) differently than what Appellant claimsto be its “plain meaning.” As but one example, County ofLos Angeles v. Superior Court (Oronoz) (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 353, 365 (hereinafter, “Oronoz”) construed Batt’s holding as dicta and declined to follow it. (Id. at n. 9.) That samedivision of the Court of Appeal recognized Batt’s language as a holdingin this case, but summarily rejected it and Pasadena Hotel Development Venture v. City ofPasadena (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 412 (hereinafter, “Pasadena Hotel”). (Opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Three, filed March 28, 2012 at 11.) 3 Two of the three justices who decided Oronoz decided Ardon. Justice Joan Dempsey Klein changed her position in Ardon to repudiate Oronoz. While Justice Dempsey Klein joined the decision below in this case (Opening Brief, p. 8, n.10), the DCA declined to publish its opinion even though it plainly involved important unresolved questions and despite Appellant’s request that it do so. (Id. at p. 11; see also City of Long Beach’s Petition for Review,p. 14.) -3- 113603.4 A. Section 905’s Subdivisions Do Not Evidence Intent to Preempt Local Ordinances Appellant contends the Legislature's revision of language provided by the Law Revision Commission for section 905, subd.(b) to delete “other provisions of law” is evidence of intent to exclude ordinances from subdivision (a). (AnswerBrief, p. 18.) However, the claim is ahistorical error. The Legislature excluded “other provisions of law” from whatis nowsection 905, subd.(a), while retaining “any provision of law”in section 905, subd. (b) because subdivision (b)is intended to include judge-madelaw while subdivision(a)is intended to exclude it. As with section 905, subd.(a) itself, the Legislature’s intent can be identified by resort to legislative history. In 1959, when the Government Claims Act wasfirst enacted, mechanicsliens and stop notice claims were governedby judge- made “equitable lien” remedies and by the Legislature. The long- standing law in California as of 1959 (and presently) was that mechanics’ liens cannot attach to public property. (E.g., ].W. Theisen v. County ofLos Angeles (1960) 54 Cal.2d 170, 176.) Thus, when a primary contractor on a public works projectfails to pay, a subcontractor can claim against public funds due the primary contractor via a stop paymentnotice. This Court surveyed the history of the mechanics’ lien and stop notice remedies in Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803. The Court explained that as mechanics liens were noteffective to protect subcontractors and material suppliers, “the courts and the -4- 113603.4 Legislature evolved alternative remedies — the equitable lien and the stop notice — which attach directly to the [construction] loan fund.”(Id. at p. 827; see also Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1928) 205 Cal. 496, 502; Doud Lumber Co. v. GuarantySav. & Loan Assn. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 585, 588-590[listing elements of judicially created equitable lien].) The stop notice remedy wasthe Legislature’s remedy creating a right in subcontractors to public fundsallocated to pay the contractor who had failed to pay the subcontractor as required.(J.W. Theisen, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 177 [discussing stop notice procedure available against public entities under former Code of Civil Procedure section 1192.1].) The judge-madeequitable lien remedy wasalso available against public entities. (Stansbury v. Frazier (1920) 46 Cal.App. 485, 488; Goldtree v. City of San Diego (1908) 8 Cal.App. 505, 508-510 [constitutional requirementof a remedyfor mechanics and materialmen authorized judicially created remedy for public works projects, where the Legislature had not, at that time, enacted such a remedy].) This created some confusing overlap between the remedies as discussed in Connolly Development. Although Civil Code section 3264 abolished the judge-made equitable lien remedy in 1969, that remedy wasstill available in 1959, when section 703, subd.(b) [the precursor of today’s section 905, subd. (b)] was enacted. (Connolly Development, Inc., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 826 n.24; see also Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western ‘Pac. Fin. Corp. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 460, 464-465 [discussing history 113603.4 of equitable lien remedy andits abolition by Civil Code section 3264].) Thus, the Legislature used “any provision of law” in subdivision (b) of former section 703 to include both judge-made and statutory remedies; it was meantto distinguish legislation from commonlaw, and notto distinguish state from local laws. Indeed,it is unlikely the Legislature used “any provision of law”to include municipal charters and ordinances, given that the sources of law governing mechanicsliens and stop notices were common law and state — not local — legislation. Thus, the Legislature’s use of the terms “statute” and “any provision of law” in formersection 703, subds.(a) and (b) (and present section 905, subds.(a) and (b)*) underminesrather than supports Appellant's position. This understanding of the history is not inconsistent with the Legislature’s use of “other provisions of law” in what is now section 905, subd.(e). By that reference, the Legislature intended to allow exceptions to the Government Claims Act to derive from a variety of legal sourcesas to welfare claims (which are heavily regulated by federal, state and County regulations and policies), and simultaneously implemented the Law Revision Commission’s advice to leave undisturbed local claiming requirements for tax and fee refunds. Again, like mechanics liens, welfare claims are not governed by local law, but by state and federal law, much ofits 4 Section 905, subd. (b) was amended to change “any provision of law” to “any law”in 2008. (Cal. Stats. 2008, Ch. 383, § 1.) -6- 113603.4 regulatory law from the social welfare bureaucracy. Moreover, as discussed in the Opening Brief, none of the terms by which the Legislature refers to the sources of law for claiming requirementsis used consistently and with precision throughoutthe Act. (Opening Brief at pp. 30-34.) Finally, the 1959 Law Revision Commission Report sharpens the point that the phrase “other provisions of law” used in subdivisions(b) and (e) are not intended to distinguish mechanics liens and welfare claims from tax refund claims. Indeed, the intent wasthe opposite — the Commission’s reasons for excludingall three sorts of claims from the Government Claims Act were the same: “Also excluded [from the unified claims statute] are ... claims required by the mechanics’ and materialmen’slien laws... [and] claims for aid under public assistance programs.... In mostof these instances, the basic objectives of early investigation to preventlitigation and discourage false claims which support a uniform procedure for tort and inverse condemnationclaims are not applicable; and orderly administration of the substantive policies governing the enumerated types of claims strongly suggests that claims procedure should be closely and directly integrated into such substantive policies. Obvious and compelling reasons appearfor gearing tax refund claimsto the assessment, levy and collection dates and procedures; establishing special 113603.4 modesfor protecting mechanics and material suppliers on public projects [and] providing an uncomplicated routine procedure for processing the tremendous volumeof...public assistance claims...” (2 Cal. Law Revision Com.Rep. (1959) p. A-117, attached to this Brief as an Appendix (emphasis supplied).)® Thus, there was no “deliberate” or “meaningful” reason for the Legislature to have used “statute” in section 905, subd. (a) and “other provisions of law” in subdivisions(b) and (e). Rather, the distinction is between positive law provided by one form of law-makeror another, and judge-made common law. McWilliams’ claim to the contrary is simply historical error. B. Obvious Inconsistencies in the Government Claims Act’s Use of Defined Terms May Not Be Simply Ignored Appellant “merely seeks a direct application of section 910 as written.” (AnswerBrief, p. 13.) In other words,if the Court would simply agree that the GovernmentClaims Act’s ambiguous and inconsistent terms are not in fact ambiguousor inconsistent, everyonecould avoid the inconvenientfact that direct application of those termsleadsto illogical results the Legislature plainly did not 5 Excerpts from 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) are appended to this brief pursuant to Rule of Court, rule 8.520, subd. (h) for the convenience of the Court. 113603.4 intend. Appellant's position fails to persuade. While Appellant attempts to dismiss the ambiguity of the Government Claims Act's definition of “regulation” by claiming that the term is notat issue here (AnswerBrief, p. 13), his position ignores the fact thatall portionsof the statute that adopted the modern ClaimsAct are relevant to its construction — a position both he and the Court of Appeal below acknowledge. (AnswerBrief, p. 12.) Appellant also asks this Court to construe section 995.2 so that conflicts of interest are identified by “rule or regulation ... of the public entity” because this phrase is separated from “statute” by an “or.” (AnswerBrief, pp. 13-14.) However, not only does this reading simply read “statute” out of the Act, but it merely reframes the question. “Regulation” is defined as a state or federal regulation and also has no meaningas applied to local governments. (See § 811.6.) The fact remains that the 1963 Legislature addeddefinitions to the 1959 statute without the care that such a task demanded,creating a cluster of interpretative puzzles of whichthis case is but one. (OpeningBrief, pp. 19-26.) Finally, Appellant claims the interpretative problemsof sections 811.6 and 995.2 can be ignored becausehe can construe section 905, subd. (a) without problem to reach the result he seeks. Therules of statutory construction, however, are not mere tools for an advocate to reach a preferred result. They are tools courts use to accomplish the legislative purpose, whichis as it must be ina ~143603.4 democracy. Courts do not play “gotcha” with the Legislature and achieve endsthe Legislature did not intend merely because the languageof onestatutory section, read in isolation, can reach those ends. The goalof all rules of statutory construction is the same: courts seek to discern the legislative intent and to effectuate it. As the Opening Brief demonstrates, that intent was not to impose a uniform state-wide process for claims under disparate local taxing ordinances when the Legislature demonstrated via section 905, subd.(a) that diversity, not uniformity, was appropriate for tax- claiming procedures. (OpeningBrief, pp. 27-30.) Nor wasthat the intent when the Law Revision Commission’s report which constitutes the legislative history of the Act makesplain that, like mechanics liens and welfare claims, claims for tax refunds are best integrated with the substantive statutes creating the liabilities to which the claimsrelate. (2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) p. A-117.) Ill. Appellant Cannot Escape the Legislative History of the Government Claims Act The issue before the Court is the meaning of the 1963 statute’s adoption of definitions of “statute,” “enactment,” “regulation” and related terms. Accordingly, the variety of formulations in the 1959 we Act (“statute,” “statutes or regulations,” “charter, ordinance or regulation adopted bythe local public entity”) reinforce the City’s argumentthat the one-size-fits-all definitions of the 1963 statute -10- 113603.4 were not well considered as they applied to 1959 language. (Opening Brief, pp. 19-26.) In the teeth of this language, McWilliams argues the Legislature never used “statute” alone whenit had local governments in mind. (AnswerBrief, p. 14, n. 19.) This statementis self-serving and conclusory; it assumes the result McWilliams seeks to prove — that the term “statute” as used in section 905, subd.(a) excludeslocallegislation. Still further, Appellant errs in claiming that Professor Van Alstyne’s studyis notlegislative history of the Government Claims Act. (AnswerBrief, p. 20.) To the contrary, Professor Van Alstyne’s study directly informed the Law Revision Commission’s positions and the Commission attached the studyto the draft statute it recommendedto the Legislature. (See Opening Brief, Appendix, p. A-1.) Indeed, this Court has already determined that the Studyis the legislative history of the Act: [T]he Law Revision Commissionhasstated thatit excluded from the scope of the unified claims statute then proposed by the Commissionall ‘claims for tax exemption, cancellation or refund.’ (See 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep.(1959) p. A-117.) ... the intent of the commission in regard to [the meaning of 905(a) and former 703(a)] may be deemedto be the intent of the Legislature. (Pasadena Hotel, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at 415, n.3.) -11- 113603.4 Finally, there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature’s change from “other provisions of law” to “statute” was meantto exclude local ordinances.In fact, the opposite is true. (See discussion at section IL.A., supra). Appellant's attempt to discredit these sources is therefore baseless. IV. Cities Across California, Large and Small, Have Long Understood the Use of “Statute” in Section 905, Subd.(a) to Include Local Ordinances In trying to avoid the force of the authorities the City cites in its Opening Brief, Appellant misses the point: as to whetherlocal claiming ordinances govern claims for refundsof local taxes, neither this Court nor either party writes on a blank slate. California has a long-standing practice of deferring to local charters and ordinances to provide refund claiming proceduresfor local taxes, and the ahistorical reading of section 905, subd.(a) that Appellant advances here would make a sea changein the law. Review of the extensive case law which the City discussed in its Opening Brief at pp. 35-41 reveals that the City is hardly alone in understanding “statute” in section 905, subd.(a) to include local ordinances. (See Batt, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 77-78 [relying on local ordinance governing tax refunds]; Flying Dutchman Park,Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1139 [“Flying Dutchman”] [relying on local ordinance imposing “payfirst, litigate later” rule]; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 79 -12- 113603.4 Cal.App.4th 242, 249 n. 5 [enforcing municipal code provision regarding tax refund claims]; Writers Guild ofAmerica, West, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 475, 483 [local business license tax subject to “payfirst, litigate later” rule]; Volkswagen Pacific v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 7 Cal.3d 48, 60-63 [“Volkswagen Pacific” | [enforced a municipal ordinance requiring pre-suit filing of a claim . for refund of local tax];6 Pasadena Hotel, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at 415, n. 3 [enforcing Pasadena’s local claiming requirements after careful review oflegislative history].”” Indeed, even this Court in Ardon implicitly recognized the 6 Although Appellant claims this Court did not enforce in Volkswagen Pacific a local tax refund claiming ordinance (Answer Brief, p. 15), he may be alone in that understanding. (See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 242, 249 n. 5 [“The California Supreme Court has observed that by [local ordinance and charter] provisions the City ‘prescribes that a claim be presented as a prerequisite to suit for tax refund.’].) ” Appellant makes muchof the fact that Pasadena Hotel was decided by the same court as Oronoz and Ardon. (Answer Brief, p. 16.) However, the cases were decided in 1981, 2008, and 2009, respectively. Although Justice Dempsey Klein’s remarkably long service places her on all three panels, the latter cases can hardly be said to be the considered reflection of the Pasadena Hotel panel, as is true of the Ardon panel’s rejection of Oronoz and that panel's decision not to publish its decision in this case. -13- 113603.4 validity of local ordinances addressing tax refunds. As noted above, this Court wascareful to distinguish rather than to overrule Batt. (Ardon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 250.) Moreover, unlike the case at bar, no local ordinance wasin issue in Ardon.(Id. at 246, n.2.) Nevertheless, the Ardon opinion twice references alternative claiming requirements undera local ordinance.(Id. at 250 (“[the foregoing] casesall considered statutes or municipal ordinances enacted to provide specific proceduresforfiling tax claims against governmental entities”) and at p. 251 (“the claim here did not involve any applicable municipal code or statute governing claims for refunds”).) Neither does Ardon cite or abrogate Pasadena Hotel, even thoughthe parties there cited the case to the Court. Appellant's efforts to distinguish Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 242, and Flying Dutchman, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1129, also fail. (Answer Brief, pp. 15-16.) That those cases did not cite and discusssection 811.8’s definition of “statute”is noterror;it reflects that the Batt and Flying Dutchman courts viewed section 905, subd.(a) as the City does:it uses “statute” differently than the term is defined in section 811.8, which wasadopted with liability and immunity in mind, not the establishmentof claiming requirementsfor local tax refund claims. A. Major Cities Around California Adopted Claiming Procedures for Transient Occupancy and Utility Users Taxes -14- 113603.4 There is further evidence that the Legislature left to local governments the task of providing refund claim proceduresspecific to local taxes: California’s largest cities have legislated local refund claiming proceduresfor transient occupancy or “bed taxes” and for utility taxes, or both. By contrast, even though state law authorizes, and partly regulates the substanceof, local bed and utility taxes (Opening Brief, pp. 29-30), the Legislature has provided no claiming procedures. Thus — in addition to the City of Long Beach — Los Angeles, San Jose, Sacramento, Oakland and San Francisco haveall adopted local claiming requirements for refunds of bed or utility taxes (or both).’ Likewise, San Diego and Fresnocollect bed taxes and have 8 See Long Beach Municipal Code §§ 3.64.030 and 3.64.055 (bed tax imposition and refund procedures); Los Angeles Municipal Code §§ 21.7.3 and 21.7.12 (bed tax imposition and refund procedures), §§ 21.1.3 and 21.1.12 (communications users tax imposition and refund procedures) and § 21.07 (general refund procedures); San Jose Municipal Code §§ 4.72.040 and 4.72.130 (bed tax imposition and refund procedures), §§ 4.70.500 and 4.70.700 (utility tax imposition and refund procedures) and chapter 4.82 (general refund procedures); Sacramento City Code §§ 3.28.030 and 3.28.150 (bed tax imposition and refund procedures), §§ 3.32.030 and 3.32.160 (communications users tax imposition and refund procedures) and § 3.04.070 (general tax refund procedures); Oakland Code of Ordinances §§ 4.24.030 and 4.24.120 (bed tax imposition and refund -15- 113603.4 legislated local refund claim proceduresspecific to that tax.? The existence of these ordinancesacross the most populouscities in California”reflects a broad understanding that the Legislatureleft to local governmentsthe task of establishing claiming procedures tailored to local needs. These are the same reasonsthat animated section 905, subd.(a)’s exception for taxes generally: one-size-fits-all solutions may work for ordinary tort and contract claims, but are not procedures) and §§ 4.28.030 and 4.28.180 (utility tax imposition and refund procedures); San Francisco Business & Tax Regulations Code § 502 (imposition of bed tax) and § 6.15-1 (general tax refund procedure); see also Batt, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 77 (applying San Francisco Business & Tax Regulation Codesection 6.15-1 to bed tax refund claim). These code sections are attached to the City’s Motion for Judicial Notice filed herewith (“MJN,”) at Exhs. B through G. 9 See San Diego Municipal Code §§ 35.0103 and 35.0122 (TOT imposition and refund procedure); Fresno Municipal Code §§ 7-603 and 7-613 (same). These codesections are attached at MJN, Exhs. H andI. 10 The City seeks notice of the ordinancesof State’s largest cities as a matter of convenience but believes that any random sample of municipal codes of California cities would prove the point — all local governments have understood their authority to legislate in this area and the Legislature has respected that authority by not duplicating or displacing these rules even as to taxes otherwise partly governed byState statute. -16- 113603.4 appropriate for local tax refund claims. Again, as the Law Revision Commission noted, such claiming proceduresare best integrated with the legislation that substantively governsthe taxes. (2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep.(1959) p. A-117.) B. Statutes Are Interpreted In Light of Their Contexts Appellant claims that the City provides no authority for its position that the context can require a court to look beyond a statutory definition to discern its meaning even when,ashere, a literal reading producesillogical results the Legislature could not have intended. (AnswerBrief, pp. 12-13.) However, Volkswagen Pacific itself demonstratesthatlegislative history can be consulted to confirm that context requires that a statutory definition not control — even thoughthe Court then had no needto delve into the legislative history for section 905, subd. (a) briefed here. (See Volkswagen Pacific, supra, 7 Cal.3d at 62-63.) Of course, many cases rely onlegislative history and other principles of statutory interpretation to conclude context requires a courtto disregard a definition contained elsewhere in a given code whenconstruing a particular statute. (E.g. Diamond View Limited v. Herz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 612, 618-619 [context andlegislative history required that the civil harassmentrestraining order rule of Code Civ. Proc. § 527.6 used “person” to exclude limited partnerships, despite general definition in Code Civ. Proc. § 17 to the contrary]; Boy Scouts of -17- 113603.4 America Nat. Foundation v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 428, 447-478 [context indicated that Legislature intended for “persons” in Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(a)(1) to mean only natural persons, despite general definition of Code Civ. Proc. § 17]; Kern County Water Agency v. Watershed Enforcers (2010) 185Cal.App.4th 969, 981-982 [legislative history and context required conclusion that public agency was within the definition of “person” under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA), despite no explicit reference to public agencies in the statutory definition, and despite explicit reference to public agencies in other CESAprovisions]; American Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Garamendi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1053-1054 [context and legislative history required “subject person” in Ins. Code § 1748.5 to include only natural persons despite Ins. Code § 19 to the contrary].) In short, statutory definitions are not talismans that produce winnersand losers. They are evidenceoflegislative intent that must be weighedin the balance with all other such indicia so a court may discern and implementthe Legislature’s actual intent. V. The City’s Ordinances Impose a Local Claiming Requirement with Which McWilliams Did Not Comply Asthe City established in its Opening Brief, Long Beach’s ordinances apply to bar McWilliams’ purported class claim. (Opening Brief, pp. 12-16.) McWilliams attempts to dismiss the Long Beach Municipal Code (“LBMC’”) by questioning the simplicity of -18- 113603.4 the City’s ordinance (AnswerBrief, p. 25) and arguing that LBMC section 3.68.160 “merely” provides that a service provider may request a refund, and no refund can be paid without a claim (id. at p. 23). However,that is all that the Government ClaimsActitself would do: require a claim and authorize a refund. What more would Appellant have the LBMC do? Whatlaw requires the LBMCto do more? In any event, Appellant himself concedes that LBMC section 3.48.070 can be read to establish a claiming requirement. (Answer Brief, p. 25) (“[S]ection 3.48.070 declaresthat it is the intent of the City Council to provide for making refunds, even if the procedures are not ‘expressly authorized,’ so long as they are not ‘expressly prohibited.”) Additionally, Appellant's argument regarding LBMC section 3.68.160, subsection (D) is misleading. (AnswerBrief, p. 24, n. 30.) The City added subsection (D)to section 3.68.160 by adopting an ordinance on September12, 2006, one month after Appellantfiled his administrative claim (MJN, Exh. A), before the claim was denied by operation of law and well before this suit wasfiled. In any event, the ordinance that added subsection (D) stated that it was “declaratory of existing law and expressfes] the intent of the City in the adoption of the utility users tax on telephones... in 1990.” (Id.) Thus, that subsection is properly applied to McWilliams’ claim. (See Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 [“A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is -19- 113603.4 properly applied to transactions predating its enactment”].) Appellant’s contention that the City has no history demonstrating that it has construed its claiming ordinancesasit now construes them is likewise unpersuasive. The City represents that it has never entertained a class claim for a tax refund, no published case law involving such claims exists despite the City’s large size andlitigation case load, and there is a complete dearth of evidencein this record to suggest otherwise. Moreover, Appellant has failed — in morethan 6 yearsof litigation— to identify any evidence to the contrary. Just as the silence of a dog trained to bark at intruders suggests the absence of intruders, this silence speaks loudly. (See In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Litigation (C.D. Cal. 2010) 738 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1075 [citing Arthur Conan Doyle short story Silver Blaze].) Vi. Public Policy Supports the Trial Court’s Reading of Section 905, Subd. (a) The City has demonstrated that the text of the Government Claims Act, understoodin light of the limited sweepofits definitions permitted by section 810 andin lightofits legislative history, requires the interpretation of section 905, subd.(a) followed by the trial court below. That construction is supported by public policy as well. | Telecommunications carriers do have an incentive to seek refundson behalf of their customers. Appellant's claim to the -20 - 113603.4 contrary (AnswerBrief, p. 25) is untrue for two reasons.First, Javor v. State Bd. of Equalization (1974) 12 Cal.3d 790 —on which Appellant relies to make his claim — involved a different tax (a sales tax) and reacheda limited holding “unique” to the “circumstancesof [that] case.” (Id. at 802-803.)" Second, as the City argued before the Court of Appeal, the telecommunications industry vigorously seeks to expandits market and,in particular, seeks to avoid taxes to lower the netcost of its services to consumers. Thus, the carriers are very assertive as to taxes on their services and understandtheir customers make decisions about competing carriers and technologies based onthetotal effective cost, including taxes. (See, e.g., AB Cellular LA, LLC v. City ofLos Angeles (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 747 (“AB Cellular’) [cell phone carriers sought mandate and declaratoryrelief, contending voter approval required for extension of utility tax to some wireless telephony charges]. To boot, all local telephone taxes are not created equal, and the single tax-claiming regime McWilliams seeks therefore does not “More specifically, Javor held that a “customer, who has erroneously paid an excessive sales tax reimbursementto his retailer who has in turn paid this money to the Board, may join the Board as a party to his suit for recovery againstthe retailer in order to require the Board in response to the refund application from the retailers to pay the refund owed the retailers into court or provide proof to the court that the retailer had already claimed and received a refund from the Board.”(Id. at p. 802.) -21- 113603.4 make good policy andis therefore notlikely to have been the legislative intent. (AnswerBrief, p. 26.) AB Cellular demonstrates the point. Different cities and counties tax someorall of landline services, cellular services, monthly base bill amounts, charges per call, new wireless and internet technologies, to nameonly a few. In addition, different carriers do businessin different communities, as the ubiquitous color-coded coverage maps in mobile phonestores attest. “Can you hear me now?”is a familiar slogan for a reason. The “chaotic” diversity resulting from local control of tax refundsthat Appellant fears (AnswerBrief, p. 5) is merely a reflection of the varied tools needed to address the diversity of taxes, tax collectors and tax payers that characterize our complex State and its energetic economy. The reverseis in fact the case: assumingstate legislative control of claiming requirements that have historically been established by local governments that the Legislature never intended creates a vacuumin the law, resulting ina need to apply general rules of the GovernmentClaims Act to tax cases for which they were neverintended, creating the very chaos McWilliamsfears. Still further, nothing in the Government Claims Act accounts for the problem of applying its basic rules for tort and contract claims to claims for refund of privately collected taxes, precisely because theLegislature understood such claims to be addressed by local charters and ordinances because they are excluded from the Act by section 905, subd.(a). Appellant's effort to distinguish IBM -22- 113603.4 Personal Pension Plan v. City & County of San Francisco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1291 (AnswerBrief, p. 26, n. 32) is unpersuasive. That case involved exactly the same administrative issues that concern us here: a claimant did not have tax paymentrecords anda risk of double recovery and unjust enrichmentof tax collectors arose if claims bytax collectors and customers were permitted.(Id. at 1305.) A. Sister States Do Not Permit Class Actions of the Sort Advanced by Appellant The City cited in its Opening Brief cases in otherstates stating the policy rationale for precluding class actions for tax refunds. (Opening Brief, pp. 44-46.) It bears noting that eight states — Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee and Washington! — prohibit class action claims ” Georgia prohibits such claims. (See Ga. Code Ann. § 48-2-35(c)(5); see also Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Roof (Ga. App. 2010) 690 S.E. 2d 442, 443.) For Missouri, see Mo. Rev.Stat. § 144.190; see also State ex rel. Lohman v. Brown (Mo Ct. App. 1997) 936 S. W.2d 607, 610. For Nebraska, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2798; see also Livengood v. Nebraska State Patrol Retirement System (Neb. 2007) 729 N.W.2d 55, 63. For NewYork, see Neama v. Town of Babylon (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 18 A.D. 3d 836, 838. For Pennsylvania, see 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5566b; see also Dunn v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals and Ruw (Pa. Commw.Ct. 2005) 877 A.2d 504, 512. For South Dakota, see S.D. Codified Laws § 10-59-17; see also Pourier v. South Dakota Dept. of -23- 113603.4 for tax refunds. In addition, Illinois, Indiana and Utah limit such classes to those who have exhausted administrative remedies by claiming, paying underprotest or otherwise. Thus, the result reached bythetrial court below puts California in good company. B. The City is Enforcing its Laws, and There is No Evidence to the Contrary McWilliams gratuitously claims the City should havesettled this case andthis justifies the class remedy he seeks. (AnswerBrief, pp. 35-36.) That the City has not acceded to Appellant's demandsin a case yetto betried is not evidence that the City is treatingits Revenue and Regulations (S.D. 2010) 778 N.W.2d 602, 605. For Tennessee, see Tenn. Code Ann.§ 67-1-1802(a)(1); see also Wicker v. Comm’r (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) 342 S.W.3d 35, 42-43. For Washington, see Wash Rev. Code § 82.32.180; see also Lacey Nursing Center, Inc. v. Dep’t ofRevenue (Wash. 1995) 905 P.2d 338, 343. 3 Illinois allows such actions by default as not expressly barred, but it is limited under the voluntary payment doctrine to taxpayers who protested the tax on payment. (See Jones v. Dep’t ofRevenue(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) 377 N.E.2d 202.) Indiana requires individual refund claims prior to class action suits. (See Ind. Code § 6-8.1-9-7; see also Ziegler v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue (Ind. T.C. 2003) 797 N.E.2d 881.) Utah allows such claims by statute, but requires exhaustion of administrative remedies. (See Brumley v. Utah State Tax. Comm’n (Utah 1993) 868 P.2d 796.) - 24 - 113603.4 taxpayers unfairly and incurring unnecessary legal fees. Rather,it is evidence the City is enforcing its laws as they are written and in light of the intentof the City’s elected legislators, not as Appellant — a single resident represented bya coterie of sophisticated class counsel from aroundthestate and the country —wouldprefer. Similarly, Appellant's claim the City could enforce arbitrary, unstated rules for claiming proceduresif it prevailed in this case is completely off the mark. (AnswerBrief, p. 4.) First, due process provides an outerlimit to the City’s ability to enforce rules that implicate its citizens’ property. Second, case law demonstrates the courts’ ability to save technically deficient but worthy claims under a substantial compliancerule. (E.g. Ardon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 248 [discussing the application of the substantial compliancerule in City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447].) Such a rule, however, cannot be stretched so far as to allow class relief where none is authorized bya legislative body. Finally, the fear that a powermight be abusedis not reason to bar the Legislature from conferring it, especially where the equitable powers of our Courts are equalto the needsof justice should the occasion require. While Appellant cites M’Culloch v. State (1819) 17 U.S. 316 (Reply Brief at p. 35, fn. 42) for the proposition that “the powerto tax is the powerto destroy” (while accusing the City of being “melodramatic”), the City respectfully submits that a class action refund coupled with a lucrative attorneys’ fee award has a -25- 113603.4 substantial destructive powerof its own. The essential government services fundedbycities across California are of no less moment than those of Alexander Hamilton’s National Bank. Vil. The AnswerBrief Raises Points That Are Not Disputed A. No Due Process Issue is Presented The City and McWilliams agree that McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco (1990) 496 U.S. 18 would require a remedy if none were provided. However, in the lower courts McWilliams contorted the City’s ordinancesto establish a violation so he could defendhisfifth and sixth causesof action. (Opening Brief, p. 14, n. 13.) Now, Appellant concedes those claims are baseless because the Government Claims Act would controlif the City’s claiming ordinances do not. (AnswerBrief, p. 26.) However, Appellant's position does not answerthe question presented by the City for which this Court granted review: what law applies? Appellantis not left without a remedyif no class action lies here; if need be, his individual claim can be adjudicated on its own merits. The case law is clear that there is no constitutional requirement that Appellant be allowed to serve as a generalat the head of an army. (OpeningBrief, p. 43.) Indeed, local governments are far more amenable to non-legal remediesthantheprivate parties for whom theclass action remedy wasdesigned: taxpayers are also - 26 - 113603.4 voters and remedieslie in elections of legislators and in the tools of direct democracy, including theinitiative, referendum andrecall. To boot, the number of signatures required to obtain an election on a measure to reduce or repeal a local tax is just 5% of the voters in a community whoparticipated in the last gubernatorialelection. (Cal. Const. art. XIII C, § 3; art. II, § 8, subd. (b).) As gubernatorial participation rates are commonlyin the vicinity of 40%,this is a very small number: 5% of 40% is just 2% of the City’s registered voters. More fundamentally, California law has not been impoverished by the lack of a lucrative class action fee award for counsel like the inter-state coalition at bar. The myriad cases in this Court's case reports alone under the names “Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association” and “California Taxpayers’ Association” demonstrate that individual refund claims, and claims for writ, declaratory and other prospective relief— coupled with fee awards under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 — have been more than sufficient to correct those errors which taxing authorities have been unwilling or unableto fix without judicial assistance. B. The City Does Not Dispute the Language of Article XI, Section 12 of the California Constitution The City does not deny the languageofarticle XI, section 12 of -27- 113603.4 our Constitution.'* However, that section leaves open the question wherethe Legislature’s powerto control claiming procedures leaves off and wherecharter cities’ home rule powerto define the legal duties of taxpayers and private tax collectors begins.It is not for nothing that the Law Revision Commission recommendedthat substantive tax requirements and claiming procedures be governed by the samelegislation. Even if Article XI, section 12 controls this case, that section speaks to what the Legislature may do, not whatthe Legislature did do. The parties and virtually every city in the statestill ask this Courtto find the meaning of section 905, subd.(a). That the Government Claims Act generally occupiesthefield, as Volkswagen Pacific determined,does not provide the Court much assistance becausethe Actitself expressly authorizes local claiming ordinances. (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905, 935.) Again, the question before this Courtis the legislative intent of section 905, subd.(a). C. The City Does Not Dispute the Language of Code of Civil Procedure Section 313 Appellantrelies on Code of Civil Procedure section 313 to argue the Government Claims Act governs tax refund claims against 4 All references in this brief to articles and sections are to the California Constitution. 15 See Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 7 Cal.3d 48, 62 n. 7. - 28 - 113603.4 public entities. (AnswerBrief, p. 29.) The City does not, of course, dispute the language of that section. However, the statute states only that:”[t]he general procedurefor the presentation of claims... is prescribed by [the Government Claims Act]” (emphasis supplied.) | That language doesnothelp resolve the specific questions presented to this Court: What does the Government Claims Act say aboutlocal tax claims? Is there any reason to believe the Legislature intended uniform treatmentof local tax refund claims and disparate treatmentof state tax refund claims? Deciding these issues as the legislative history persuasively showsthe Legislature intended avoidsdifficult questions as to wherethe state’s powerto prescribe claiming procedures ends and wherethe local powerto prescribe the substantive legal obligations of taxpayers and tax collectors begins. D. The City Does Not Dispute That the GovernmentClaims Act Occupies the Field to Whichit Applies Appellant conflates whether there is any preemption by the Government Claims Act — plainly there is and the City does not claim otherwise — with whether there is preemption here. In other words, that the Government Claims Act controls the claims to which it applies does not determineits application in thefirst instance. Appellant’s observation about the Government Claims Act's preemptiveeffect tells us nothing as to whether the Legislature -29 - 113603.4 intended by the use of the term “statute” in section 905, subd.(a) to impose onall local tax refund claims aone-size-fits-all rule, ill-suited to taxes collected by private parties even thoughthe Legislature plainly intended diverse rules for diverse state taxes. Neither doesit explain why the Legislature has partly regulated manylocal taxes, but has never provided claim proceduresfor those very sametaxes. Nor why the Legislature has not objected to the myriad local ordinances on point, just a few examples of which are identified above, and of which it is charged with notice because they existed whenit adopted the statutes governing the bed and utility taxes as to whichit has partially legislated. (Orange County Employees Assn.v. County of Orange (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 575, 582 [strong presumption that Legislature meansto preserve legal context which of whichit has notice, but does not change].) Additionally, Appellant's related argumentthat there is a conflict between the City’s claim procedure and the Government ClaimsAct, is off-point. Appellant overreachesin his characterization of the Government Claims Actas “eliminat[ing] the balkanization of claims,” suggesting that the Act would have been meaninglessif it did not preemptlocal procedures. (AnswerBrief, p. 30.) This position ignores the fact that section 905, subd.(a) already provides for a multiplicity of different tax refund procedures, even underhis interpretation of the term “statute.” (See Opening Brief, pp. 27-30.) Again, McWilliams argues from the - 30 - 113603.4 conclusion he seeks rather than toward it. E. The City Concedes That the Contested Taxes Have Been Paid The City’s reliance on article XIII, section 32 of our Constitution is not for its “pay first, litigate later” rule. The City concedes that the taxes that McWilliams contests have been paid.’ Rather, the City relies on article XIII, section 32 for the broader principle that Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 759 found there: class claims for tax refunds require express legislative authorization, a rationale that allows stable and predictable funding 16 However,that article XIII, section 32 establishes a pay-first- litigate-later rule for the protection of local governmentfinanceis of pressing concern, as evidenced by an outlying decision to the contrary and the speed with which another appellate court rejected it. (See Anaheim v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 825, 831 [allowing taxpayerto challenge assessment of underpaid bed tax withoutfirst paying tax]; Chodos v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [“Wedo not agree with that language [in Anaheim] to the extentit is inconsistent with the pronouncements in Writers Guild, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at page 481, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 603, - and Flying Dutchman, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pages 1135-1136, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 690, that the “payfirst” principle appliesto local governmental entities as a matter of public policy.”].) -31- 113603.4 of essential governmentservices. VIN. The Merits of McWilliams’ Complaint Remain Untested The AnswerBrief concludes dismissively, arguing the “IRS had conceded thatthe tax wasillegal,” as if only one tax were at issue here. In fact, there are two: the Federal Excise Tax (“FET”) and a local Long Beach tax that makes reference to the FET. The parties dispute, and no court has yet had occasion to decide, the meaning of a reference in the Long Beachtax to the FET. While this Court accepts the factual allegations of a complaint whena case arises on demurrer, the Court does not accept Appellant’s legal claimsorits would-be inevitable victory on the untested merits of this case. Moreover, the 1979 IRS ruling the City cites in construingits tax is no more a factual matter not suitable for judicial notice than the 2006 IRS ruling that Appellantcites (especially as that 2006 ruling is not cited in the complaint). (AnswerBrief, p. 6, n. 7; p. 7.) While the well pleaded allegations of the complaint control in this appeal from an ordersustaining a demurrer, a court need not accept facts which are contradicted by other information properly before the court, such as judicially noticeable materials. Finally, the legislative intent of Long Beach’s telephone tax ordinanceis a legal matter in any event. -32- 113603.4 CONCLUSION iAppellant's purported class claim for a refund of Long Beach’s telephonetax is contrary to the ordinances that control here — ordinances enacted by the City, consistent with the Legislature’s intent in section 905, subd. (a) to preserve cities’ power to establish proceduresto govern claims for refundof local taxes. Respectfully, the City asserts this Court should find that the trial court properly concluded that Appellant’s class action allegationsfail as a matter of law andaffirm that court's ruling thatthis litigation cannot proceed as a classaction. MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO SANDRAJ. LEVIN TIANA J. MURILLO COLANTUONO & LEVIN, PC javn 0,Mul TianaJ. MuriltoO 300 S. Grand Ave., Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3137 (213) 542-5700 (213) 542-5710 (fax) ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/ RESPONDENT - 33 - 113603.4 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CAL. R. CT. 8.520(c) Pursuantto California Rules of Court, Rule 8.520(c), the foregoing Reply Brief by Defendant / Respondentthe City of Long Beach contains 7,645 words(including footnotes, but excluding the tables and this Certificate) and is within the 8,400 wordlimit set by Rule 8.520, subd.(c), California Rules of Court. In preparing this certificate, I relied on the word count generated by Wordversion 14, included in Microsoft Office Professional Plus 2010. Executed on November14, 2012 at Los Angeles, California. COLANTUONO & LEVIN, PC TIANA J. MURILLO Aaanoewl Tiana J. MuHillo 113603.4 APPENDIX STATE OF CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION _ RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY relating to The Presentation of Claims Against Public Entities January 1959 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL To His EXcELLENcY Epmunp G. Brown Governor of California and to the Membersof the Legislature The California Law Revision Commission was authorized by Resolu- tion Chapter 35 of the Statutes of 1956 to make a study of the various provisions of law relating to the presentation of claims against public bodies and public employees to determine whether they should be made uniform and otherwise revised. The Commission herewith submits its recommendation relating to this subject and the study prepared by its research consultant, Professor Arvo VanAlstyne of the School of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. Tuomas E. Sranron, Jz., Chairman Joun D. Bappaar, Vice Chairman James A. Copsey, Member of the Senate Cuark L. Brapiey, Member of the Assembly Roy A, Gustarson Bert W. Levit CHarLes H. MATTHEWS Stanrorp C. SHaw Samuri D. THURMAN Raten N. Kuxps, Legislative Counsel, ex officio Joun R. McDonovan,Jz. Executive Secretary January 1959 At ire te e cm e en en ee ae e e e TABLE OF CONTENTS : RECOMMENDATION OF THE CALIFORNIA i LAW REVISION COMMISSION--_-------------- ------ A STUDY RELATING TO THE PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS AGAINST PUBLIC ENTITIES_------------- -- INTRODUCTION ..__-__-------------------------- --------~ Lrgat anp HisroricaL BACKGROUND_-_-.------------- ------- Survey or CLAmMs PROVISIONS - Coverage of Existing Claims Provisions__——-_-~---------- - Provisions Relating to Claims Against the State_.----_-- Provisions Relating to Claims Against Counties__—...--- Provisions Relatingto Claims Against Cities ----------- Provisions Relating to Claims Against Districts____---~— Cities Not Subject to Claims Statutes____~------------— Districts Not Subject to Claims Statutes___--~--------- Summary of Coverage of Existing Claims Provisions____ Comparison of Key Provisions _ of Claims Subject to Presentation Requirements__ Time Limits for Filing Claims -- Preliminary Considerations __-. __- Claims Against the State a Claims Against Counties Claims Against Cities and Districts ~_--------------- Summary of Filing Times___- _ Special Types of Time Requirements____------------ Special Exceptions to Time Requirements__..-------- Person to Whom Claim Is To Be Presented_-~-------- - Contents of Claims - = - Statutory Requirements Amendment of Defective Claims__—_~--------------- Formal Requisites --- Time for Consideration of Claims__---~-------------- - Time for Commencing Action on Claim_-~---—~-~---- --- JUDICIAL JNTERPRETATIONS __ General Principles -—----- -- aa. Objectives of Claims Presentation Requirements_- —-—---~- Consequences of Failure to Comply with Claims Pr ocedure Excuse, Waiver and Estoppel - - _ A3 Page A-7 A-17 A-17 A-18 A-21 A-21 A-22 A-23 A-24 A-29 A-33 A-34 AA40 TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued Page Interpretation of Typical Provisions_--~--~--~-~-----~--- A-82 Applicability of Claims Statute in Particular Fact Situations __________-_--_--------------------- A-82 Conflicting Provisions—Basis for Choice_--_-~-~------- A-84 Time Allowed for Presentation of Claim__-_----~---~-- A-90 Recipient of Claims -- - A-92 Required Contents of Claims___---------------~------- A-94 Verification — - _ A-96 Time Allowed for Official Consideration__.-----~------- A-96 Time Within Which Action Must Be Commenced_____-- A-100 Ciams Acanst Pusiic EMPLOYEES.._------~~------------- A-102 Survey of Existing Provisions_-—----------------------- A-102 Relationship to Other Law _-- ---~ _ A-105 Theory and Purpose of Employee Claim Statutes__..__--- A-106 Judicial Interpretations of Employee Claim Statutes__---- A-108 Claims Subject to Section 1981_~---------------------- A-108 Section 1981 and the Substantial Compliance Doctrine__- A-113 Pouicy CoNsERATIONS AND RECOMMENDA'IONS_————-------- A-113 Unified Statutory Treatment -- ------- A-116 Limitation on Entities Covered__-~-------~------------ A-116 Limitation on Claims Covered..____------------------- A-117 Need for Constitutional Amendment A-117 Relationship to Existing Claims Provisions__-——-_--~--- A-118 Retroactive Application . . A-119 Consequences of Noncompliance ---_-------------------- A-119 Requirement of Prior Rejection _.. A-119 Relief for Persons Under Disability_..--.---------~--- A-120 Relief From Defective Manner of Service_--------~-—-- A-122 Relief From Defects and Omissions in Contenis of Claim A-122 Estoppel A-124 Specific Requirements -_- A-124 Time for Presentation of Claim A-124 Time for Official Consideration and for Commencing Action on Claim —- __. A-125 Person Designated as Recipient_-~--------~----------- A-126 Contents of Claim.__-------------~-----------------~-- A-127 Formal Requisites - -- _-. A-127 Claims Against Employees a ane _. A-127 A-4 Li ne a p n rene et n m e n e i t n e e n e e a i n e e e Po ms F a e ne e & TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued Page TABLES I—Statutes Governing Claims Against the State__..--__ A-22 I1—Statutes Governing Claims Against Counties____----- A-23 I1I—Statutory and Charter Provisions Governing Claims Against Cities_____.__._.------------------ A-24 IV—Ordinances Governing Claims Against Cities__--~---- A-27 V—Statutory Provisions Governing Claims Against Districts ____.__._----------------------- A-29 VI—Charter Cities With No Provision in Charter for Filing Claims_____.-__--..------------ A-33 VII—Cities Reporting No Claims Ordinance in Effect__--~- A-34 VIlI—Special Districts as to Which No Provision for Filing of Claims Is Made_--_---------------------- A-35 IX—tTypes of Claims Covered by City Charters and Ordinances - we eee A-43 X—Types of Claims Covered by District Claims Statutes A-45 XI—Distribution of Filing Time Requirements Applicable to Cities and Districts___.___-___---_--------------- A-51 XII—Time Limits Governing Personal Injury, Property Dam- age and Contract Claims Against Cities and Districts A-51 XI1J—Person Designated as Recipient to Claim-_-_--------- A-58 A-5 A-116 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION apply to claims against public officers and employees or only to claims against public entities.5 20. Existing statutes which expressly purport to apply to claims against public officers and employees are in many respects ambiguous, uncertain and overlapping. Although such statutes are fewer innumber than provisions governing claims against public entities, they share,most of the difficulties attributed above to the entity claims provisions." While the present law of this State governing..the presentation of claims against public entities and their.officers and employees is subject to criticism, the large number of. claims. statutesevidences a wide- spread aceeptance ‘of the basic policy, underlying such procedural-pre- requisites. This policypostulates claims presentation as a means. of giving prompt notice in order to allow for earlyinvestigation ofthe facts and not merely ;as a.statute of: limitations. The values to .be secured:from the procedure include early-negotiated settlements in. lieu of expensive and annoying litigation disruptive.of. governmental -effi- ciency and the discouragementof.stale and ill-founded claims, It.is believed, that-thesebasie objectives can beachieved. Withopt the present :*bramble bush’’of claims statutes. by unifying.and reyising: our.clai procedures. My recommendations as to..the. legislation, neopamary.'¥0 accomplish this purposefollow. a Unified StatutoryTreatiientee Ttis recommended that the procedure applicable.to: sims,— all forms of governmental. agencies: below the, State;level b h in. single statutory enagtmenttobeincorporatedintothe L, Progedure. The,proceduresoprovided should, . uniformly. appl to. all elaims for money.or. damages upon:whicha= legal.action migl ' be brought against the‘public entity involved. - Limitation on Entities Covered oo: : Practically all, of the. important. litigationcon; visions isrelatedto:claims, against, pyblieentitiesnen.naytheneBe In part, ‘this is duetothefact that theclaims.provisionsre State areconsiderably.more liberal; in thefilingtimes. allgwed:edeanya‘do. notpartake of.the ambiguitieswhich arjse from the mere,onenren existence of many different. governmental sub: visions. with v: powers.andadministrative structures. Thereiisonly.one.State.but are, many. counties,. gities and, distrie he. Atate, iaunique,- alsa,- in thesizeof both.its geographicalal cual programs andf be.“eae dispersionof those aetivities. whi.ch imi htgive riseierotay types. Unlikelocal entities,the State Legislatu periodic session,where claims may.be considere eae authorized. From nearly every viewpoint,clain itevarious departmentsare. gubjegt. te. quite"aecamaicrratipns andshould be goyernedby,ditferent.proceduresfrom oeSrapply ‘to claims against local agencies. Accordingly, sincethe majorlegal problems relating to claims procedure appear to be eonfined-to‘claims against’ local agencies only, it is recommended that ‘lainhaagainst the State or any State agency beexcluded from the seope of the Proposed 4 See pp. A-103-105 supra. 5 See pp. A-105-118 supra. oe ne e e n e p e e e e e e N E e e PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS A-117 statute. All other forms of governmental subdivisions, however, should be included; and in order to avoid any doubts and to ensure proper notice that State claims are separately treated, an express cross. reference to the State claims statutes should be made. Limitation on Claims Covered The scope of the proposed unified claims statute is limited to claims for money ‘or damages thereby excluding demands for injunctive or other forms of specific relief. ‘This limitation is consistent with the scope of nearlyall of the claimsprovisions presently found in California law. Also excluded are (1) claims for tax exemption, cancellation or refund; (2) claims required by thé mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien laws; (3)claims for wages, salaries, fees and reimbursement of expenses of public employees ; (4) claimsarising under the workmen’s compensa- tion laws; (5) claims for aid under pybli¢ assistance programs; (6) claims for money due under pension andretirement systems and (7) claims for interest ‘dnd priricipal upon bonded indebtedness. In most of these instances,thebasi¢ objectivesof early.investigation‘toprevent litigation and discourage, false claims which supporta uniform pro- cedurefortort and inverse contdetnnation claims arenot applicable ; and ordetly administration. ‘of the‘substantivepolicies |governingthe enumerated types of. claims ‘strongly suggests that-“dlaims procedure should beclosely anddirectly integrated into,guch substantive policies, Obviousand conipellingreasonsappear forgéaring tax refund dlaims to bksessiuent, levy and ddlléction dates andprotedures; establishing gpetial inodes for protéctizig iiechanieshd material ‘suppliers on‘public projects;providing an uncomplicatedroutitie procedute for processing the tremendous voltineof salary,pension, workmen’s, compensation andpublic assistance clainis; arid g flexible, simple and auts. matic procedures for niseting’obligationsto bondholders: ‘ ‘Contract claims pose a somewhat intermediate problem. |Insofar as the claim ig one for breach of contract, the. need‘for early’investigation arid negotidtionis’‘frequently as importantas in'the¢ase of tort.claims. Ordinaryroutine eldims for méneydueons contract,however,avein a different éategory dni for. purpdsesof ‘a itive conveniencé shouldriot be shackled with auelaborate formalclaiinsprocedure. Other types ofnon-routine conttact elaizhs stich. a8 claimsfor. tla‘value of goodsorserviceson’ati’ implied contractthdory lie801 tewhere between thefirst,twotlasseaIt isrecdtimbndédthat the new’‘claimsstatutepér, mit public! entitics t6 waive bycontract compliance ‘withthe cl statutésasto‘causes ‘of ‘action founded’‘pon! ex reds contract other = ties ee Needfer+ Constitute aa : ‘In ordér to’ provide ‘ter a ‘uniform claims.‘procedure applisdtle to charter cities as well asother. local entities, it is recommended that a!‘eonstitutional‘amendmentbe adopted. As. pointed ont. previously, there.is some doubt’ asto. whether @ statute of the typehere proposed could be validly applied to some types of claims against charter cities, since such: cities are vested by the constitution with legislative autonomy with respect to ‘‘municipal affairs.’’ With some modifications the proposed amendment along these lines adopted by the Assembly A-118 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION in 1953 5° would serve to safeguard the statute adequately from sue- cessful attack. Relationship to Existing Claims Provisions _One of the observable defects in present claims law is the tendency of claimants, not to mention lawyers and judges, to become confused as to which of several claims provisions applies in a particular case. To adopt a new uniform claims procedureas here recommended presents @ problem as to what should be done with the existing statutes, charter provisions and ordinances. Unless the existing, provisions are concur- rently repealed, some unwitting claimants will in all likelihood‘attempt to comply with the specific. claims,procedure of a district law, city charteror city ordinance which proceduremay not be in compliance with the new uniformclaims statute,Th proposed,uniform claims procedure would not necessarily. preclude the existing provisions from ress: repeal of existing provisions would, of course, be. the desirable solution.Under the proposed“eons tational, amendment,this could clearly be accomplished in| contemplation, But.as.a practical matter, those claimaprovisions whigh ar¢ not fonndin statutory formstich as city charfera and ordinances would. remain phygieelly un;changed except by. voluntary act of thecity qquneiland, in. thecase of ‘charters, voters. Thus, althoughclaims provisions. in. the. special district laws could and would be removed: byamendment,future editions ofsuch statute law, theehartdrand. ordingy formed reader. Even to repeal the purely,statutory.provisions. .weyk require an exhaustivesearchof present. Btatnte,Jawto sya) _ overk ing some provision ;-and although such9 search.was, pursued in, ing the present report, theanthor' isfar from cosiident relevant provision was discloged, for such. avaiable indexes toour statute ntid be dedigied, Se Any solution tothisdilemma should be designed. to eliminate the “trap” possibilities.‘It is accordingly recommended (1). that thenew yniform claimsprocedure bemade ezclusinely applicable only where no other claims procedure is présentlyprovided byJaw. ai new statute provide ;thgt substantial oi claims procedure applicable ‘to the type 0: lenon the effective date of the new.statu ) WOUlL be a tocompliance withthenew statute. Thus limitingthe alternativePllance clausé would ‘preclade. valid enactment offurther @necialclaims provisions by charterorordinanceand would provi repeal of pre-existing provisions in an orderly fashion. would be desirable to repeal expreasly allexisting procgdural stetates relating to claims against counties, cities and districts conqurrentlywith adoption of the new statute. fyIMany existing claims pfovisions, ‘yarticilarfy in charterasindopdi-nances, contain detailed ‘procedures for auditing. cldims andtos processing them: through appropriate‘channels of authority. These ™Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 23 (Reg. Seas. 1953) quoted in Comment,Califoruta Claims Statutes“ ‘or the 1 vu, . ’$e Wee). § Trape f wary U. L. Rav, 201 + e e e p a m p e r n e : PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS A-119 matters are primarily of local administrative concern. They do not affect the claimant except incidentally insofar as the internal procedures may delay approval or rejection of the claim; and they do not create any danger of being a ‘‘trap.’’ Accordingly, it is recommended that such auditing, accounting and internal processing procedures as may presently pertain to claims be left unchanged where they are not incon- sistent with the express provisions of the new statute. Retreactive Application Upon adoption of the proposed uniform claims procedure, the prob- lem ofits applicability to claims whichaecruedpriorto its effective date will undoubtedly arise.**7 As previously observed, in the absence of explicit provisions as to retroactivity of:elaims statutes, the California courts have disagreed as to the solution of the problem.**Litigation on the point‘should' be prevented by express rale. If the newstatute were made fullyretroactiveto allow all claima notbarred by the statute of limitationsto. be‘ presentéd within’a fixed peried afteritseffective date, many’staleclaims woulllundoubtedly be revived and additional bur- debeinypoadd‘onpublie) foniis. Limited rétroactivitywouldhave the ¢rebuilt, only ‘to'slesterdegree; andit woltld be difficultto fairly drawthe Bie. Htfs réediniiendedthat the newlaw bemade:applicable only8cuteeofctionwhich seuras aftet liteoffeetivedate and that Previenilysderdingcensen| of aetion“begovernedbythelaw,if any, spplieable:’ theteto‘prior 1"‘adoptionathe new ‘procedure. _ Conigedoce2Noneompata neqeicemeet ofPooroecion . "Txtsmestates, bg;Conneetieut,*compliance withthe claims statute five.peri eeecareth taleap ‘ob eaCali-|0.9: adhe: appéarsto obtain in fornia’whore ‘prior‘rejection isnot‘ekpresilyrequiredas8condition preesdent' to suit."If the claint statutes’areregatdedas a mére-skort statdte ‘ofUniitigtioné, ithia viewhas merit’ Ingeneral, however; the Catifordia Tegi ‘and courts: have!rdgarded ' suck-procedinre - mruélioretinh ‘a‘tinte linieation, Coimictioanentofa timély action’ on a claim before any demand lias beewtindds:forpaymentdefeatsthe basic. poliey of discouraging litigation. It may be true that service of theete gives adequate notice. andof nit teeinwedti: gation opportamity: ‘negotiation: aetilemant pric?to eurring theexpense ‘of: Utigationis completely precluded! Institution ofa:slaw. suit‘notolyobligates theelaimantfor atteriéy’é feosandcosts will probably increase his minimitimyabttlement figure;butfrequently ¢ wbardenofneedieasannvyapee:and inopuvenianes tothe public — pinvolved: andtocounselfortheloealentity im preparing and’ fling en:miswer withintiterelatively ahort‘timeallowed.‘Much.‘expense . ». 1955). . ge Hotioe, 101LAIR, 126 (1086). ™ See Porter v. Bakersheld, .&Kern Miec. R ie | 682, 225 P.3d 223 (1956),. diacuseed: ewpra at A-9fat notes 447-60.Under view, it is service of the complaint rather than commencementof the’action which constitutes oom- pliance with the claim statute. Usually these two events occur closely together. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Kimberly Nielsen, the undersigned, declare: 1. That declarantis and was,at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, over the age of 18 years, and nota party to or interested in the within action; that declarant’s business addressis 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2700, Los Angeles, California 90071. 2. . Thaton November 14, 2012, declarant served the CITY OF LONG BEACH’SREPLY BRIEFvia U.S. Mail in a sealed envelope fully prepaid and addressedto the parties listed on the attached Service List. 3. That there is regular communication between the parties. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoingis true and correct. Executed this 14'* day of November, 2012, at Los Angeles, California. COLANTUONO& LEVIN, PC 113603.4 McWilliamsv. City of Long Beach,etal. Case No. 5202037 Service List COUNSELFOR PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION: Francis M. Gregorek Rachele R. Rickert WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP 750 B Street, Suite 2770 San Diego, CA 92101 (619) 239-4599 (619) 234-4599 (fax) Nicholas E. Chimicles Timothy N. Mathews Benjamin F. Johns CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP One Haverford Centre 361 West Lancaster Avenue Haverford, PA 19041 (610) 641-8500 ~ (610) 649-3633 (fax) timothymathews@chimicles.com Jon A. Tostrud 9254 Thrush Way West Hollywood, CA 90069 (310) 276-9179 113603.4 McWilliamsv. City of Long Beach,etal. Case No. 5202037 Service List Sandra W. Cuneo CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA 330 South Barrington Ave., #109 Los Angeles, CA 90049 (424) 832-3450 (424) 832-3452 (fax) COURTESY COPIES TO: Honorable Anthony J. Mohr Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles 600 S. Commonwealth Ave. Los Angeles, CA 90005 Clerk of the Court California Court of Appeal Second Appellate Division 300 S. Spring Street, 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90013 113603.4