co No. 5198616
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re: CIPRO CASES I & II
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT NO. D056361
SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO, THE HONORABLE RICHARDE.L. STRAUSS,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING NOS.4154 & 4220
(Service Required on Attorney General and District Attorney,
Bus. & Prof. Code § 17209, Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.29)
ANSWERBRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BARR LABORATORIES,
INC., HOECHST MARION ROUSSEL, INC., THE RUGBY
GROUP, INC., AND WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS,INC.
Joann Rezzo
(Bar No. 185675)
EDLESON & REZZO
402 West Broadway, Suite 2700 —
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 230-0836
jrezzo@san.rr.com
Kathryn E, Karcher
(Bar No. 125078)
Jay P. Lefkowitz, P.C.*
Karen N. Walker, P.C.*
* SUPREME COURTEdwin John U
Gregory L. Skidmore* aa beDn
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, N.W. MAY 29 2012
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
edwin.u@kirkand.com
Fredenex K. Oninien Clerk
KARCHER HARMES LLP Counsel for Defendant Barr ~~~ Deputy
401 B Street, Suite 2450 Laboratories, Inc. :
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 565-4755 David E. Everson*
kathryn@karcherappeals.com Heather 8S. Woodson*
Victoria Smith*
. STINSON MORRISON HECKER LLP
Counsel for Defendants Barr 1201 Walnut Street, Suite 2900
Laboratories, Inc., Hoechst Marion Kansas City, MO 64106
Roussel, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc., (816) 842-8600
and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. hwoodson@stinson.com
* Admitted pro hac vice Counsel for Defendants Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., The Rugby
~ Group, Inc., and Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ‘
i
£
No. 8198616
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re: CIPRO CASES I & II
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT NO. D056361
SUPERIOR COURT OFSAN DIEGO, THE HONORABLE RICHARD E.L. STRAUSS,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING NOS.4154 & 4220
(Service Required on Attorney General and District Attorney,
Bus. & Prof. Code § 17209, Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.29)
ANSWER BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BARR LABORATORIES,
INC., HOECHST MARION ROUSSEL,INC., THE RUGBY
GROUP, INC., AND WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS,INC.
Joann Rezzo
(Bar No. 185675)
EDLESON & REZZO
402 West Broadway, Suite 2700
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 230-0836
jJrezzo@san.rr.com
Kathryn E. Karcher
(Bar No. 125073)
KARCHER HARMES LLP
401 B Street, Suite 2450
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 565-4755
kathryn@karcherappeals.com
Counsel for Defendants Barr
Laboratories, Inc., Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc.,
and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
* Admitted pro hac vice
Jay P. Lefkowitz, P.C.*
Karen N. Walker, P.C.*
Edwin John U*
Gregory L. Skidmore*
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
edwin.u@kirkand.com
Counselfor Defendant Barr
Laboratories, Inc.
David E. Everson*
Heather S. Woodson*
Victoria Smith*
STINSON MORRISON HECKER LLP
1201 Walnut Street, Suite 2900
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 842-8600
hwoodson@stinson.com
Counsel for Defendants Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., The Rugby
Group, Inc., and Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 00... ccccccccccceccceeeeeecceeeeeeeeseeceeeestsanaeeeseseseenieeeeesenias 1
BACKGROUND 2... ceccccccccceeecee cece ceenneeeeeeeteneaeeessessaeeseeseeseesnaseseeeerags 3
A. The Hatch-WaxmanAct...........eeseceeccsnerteceeeeeseneeenesaes 3
B. Factual Background..............cecesesssceccceteeeeeteeeeerereeeeeseees6
C. Cipro Litigation............ceeeceeeeeseeeeseeeeeeeeenenseeeneeseesseeeens 9
STANDARD OF REVIEW..........:cccceecccceeeeeeeeeeneeeeseneceseeneeeeeeeueenees 14
ARGUMENT1.0... cccccccccceecssererennceeeeeeiceecessseeeeeeeeeseteserrensseseeseeeneneas 15
I. The Lower Courts—Consistent With California And
Federal Law—Correctly Applied The Rule Of Reason
In Holding That The Cipro Settlement Does Not
Violate The Cartwright Act. 0.0... ccceeesessesseesnneeeeeeeeeereeeees 15
A. The Lower Courts Correctly Held The Cipro
Settlement Does Not Violate The Cartwright
Act Because It Does Not Exceed The Scope Of
The Cipro Patent. ........ccccccccccccesecceeeeeeeeerereecenneeeaneaenees 16
California Courts Have Long Held That No
Antitrust Liability Attaches For Conduct
Within The Scope Of The Patent. .......ceeeeeeeeeeee 19
1. California Courts Have Long Embraced
The Scope Of The Patent Test...eee 19
2. Importation Of Patent Misuse Into
California Law Is Inappropriate. ...............006 24
Federal Courts Have Uniformly Applied The
Scope Of The Patent Test—Including Three
Courts That Have Upheld This Very
Settlement. .........ccccccccceecccccecccceccescecsecevauseesececteeseaess 29
i
D. There Is No Basis For Applying A Per Se Rule. ...... 35
II. The Scope Of The Patent Test Is Consistent With
Sound California Policy. .........0cccccecccccccceceeeseeescsesuseeseaeaaaneees 42
A. The Scope Of The Patent Test Furthers The
Long-Standing Policy Favoring Settlement Of
Litigation. 00.0...cc cece cccccceeeeecesseeneceeseseseeeseeeeseeeneeees 43
B. The Undisputed Record Evidence Shows That
Settlements Like The Cipro Settlement
Increase Competition And Benefit Consumers........ 50
III. Assessing Liability For Conduct Within The Scope Of
A Patent, As Plaintiffs Advocate, Would Create A
Conflict With Federal Patent Law And Would Be
Precempted........cccccccccccccccsceccecceesececeeessseeuseeecseeeeetseesenesseeeaea 59
IV. The Superior Court Properly Granted Summary
JUAMEN. 0... cece eeeseeeeeceesecceeeceeceeeaaeeeeesaeesesseetssersessesessnseeees 63
V. Summary Judgment For Defendant Watson Should
Be Affirmed For Additional Reasons. ............:cccccccccseeseeneeee 68
CONCLUSIONWo...ee eeencececeneeeceeneneseeeeseeeseaeaeeeeeneaeeseseeetnareseaas 71
u
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Abouabv. City and County of San Francisco
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 648 ..cccccccccccscscssssessessessseesseeseeeseee 43
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Superior Court
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 320 ...ccccccscsescsesessecsseecsesssessseseesesseeens 20
Aguilar v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826.00... eeecceeceeeeeeeeeeevee 14, 15, 18, 41
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Internat.
(D.C. Cir. 2001) 256 F.3d 799 0... cccsesesscceceeeeessessttseeeeees 30
Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG
(2d Cir. 2010) 604 F.3d 98,
rehg. en banc den.
(2010) 625 F.3d 779,
cert. den. sub nom.
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Bayer AG
(2011) 131 S.Ct. 1606 v.eeceecescescsecsesscsesessesetestesvsseesees 11, 12, 29
Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(N.D.II1. 2003) 289 F.Supp.2d 986....28-29, 45, 47-48, 53, 58
B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories
(Fed.Cir. 1997) 124 F.8d 1419.0... ccececeeeeeeeeeeesnteeeees 25
Bayer AG v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1996, No. 92 Civ. 0381-WK)
1996 WL 804544 wiceccccccccceccceccenessnnsnneeeeseeeeesensssnteeseeaaes 6
Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Technology, Inc.
(S.D.Cal. June 7, 2002 and Aug. 7, 2002,
No. OLCVO867-B) ...ccccccccccccccccesccecececeenaeeseessnaeeaeeesesneeeerteneeeuaes 8
id
Bayer AG v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(D.N.J. Oct. 29, 1999, No. 98-4464)eeeeee eeeeeeeeeeeees 8
Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceutical, Inc.
(D.N.J. 2001) 129 F.Supp.2d 705,
affd. (Fed.Cir. 2002) 301 F.3d 1806 0.0... eceeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 8
Bert G. Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co.
(1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1020,
disapproved on other grounds in
Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384.0... ccccecccececeeeneenteeeeeeeeseeeeseeeaes 16, 17
Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of
Columbia
(Fed.Cir. 2007) 496 F.3d 1362 ..........ccececceecceceeesentenerees 60, 63
Blank v. Coffin
(1942) 20 Cal.2d 457 vecccecccssscscsecssesscssssrsessssussessecscinssssnsseees 65
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.
(1989) 489 U.S. 141 ecccccceececcscssvsssessecseessesssecsseesuvessucanesevesecens 60
Brulotte v. Thys Co.
(1964) 879 U.S. 29... ceccccccceeteeeeeeeeasenseeeeeteeeceeseeeccaauaaeeerenea 56
Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers
(Qd Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 917 ccccccccccssscsesscscesseesseeesesereseeseeees 56
Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular
Telephone Co.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163 ....cccccecsssccsescscscssesssseeessesssssesssessssesssees 19
Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp.
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363 200... eeessssseneecerseeeeerseeeeees 16, 19
Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc.
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 842 o..cccccccccsecssessessecseessesssessesstessssestseseeseesees 18
iv
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States
(1940) 809 U.S. 486...eecceee cece eeneceeeaeseeeeneeeeeeeeeeea 23
Exxon Corp. v. Superior Court
(1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1672 0... ccccceeeesceesetteesreesteeeees 17
Federal Trade Com. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(lith Cir. Apr. 25, 2012, No. 10-12729)
2012 WL 1427789 ........ 29, 32, 33, 41, 42, 48, 50, 61, 67
Fisherman’s WharfBay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court
(2008) 114 Cal.App.4th 309 0.0... cccceeeeccesscceseesseeeeeeeeeeesenees 34
Forbes v. County of San Bernardino
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 48.0... eeecsecsssceeeeeeecssaeeteeeetteeeeees 67
Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors
(1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 171...ccccnsscceneeeseeeeeeeseeeeeserers 20
Fruit Machinery Co. v. F. M. Ball & Co.
(19538) 118 Cal.App.2d 748 oo.eeeeee 2, 14, 20-28, 34, 38
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Superior Court
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95 ......cccccccccceesseeeeeeessesesssteneeees 64
Hines v. Davidowttz
(1941) 312 U.S. BQicccccccccseecsssesesssseeeseeeeeesseneeeeeeees 60
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
(6th Cir. 2003) 382 F.3d 896.0... ceseeseseeeeeeeeees 30, 31, 32
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
(E.D.N.Y. 2003)
261 F.Supp.2d 188 ........eee 6, 9, 39, 45, 46, 53, 65, 69
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
(E.D.N-Y. 2005) 363 F.Supp.2d 514........ 9, 29, 39, 49, 61, 67
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
(Fed.Cir. 2008) 544 F.3d 1323,
rehg. en banc den.(Dec. 23, 2008),
cert. den. sub nom. Arkansas Carpenters Health and
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG
(2009) 129 8.Ct. 2828......... 10, 11, 21, 29, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39,
44, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Litigation
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) 166 F.Supp.2d 740.0000... eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 66
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation
(2d Cir. 2006) 466 F.3d 187...12, 29-30, 39, 45-46, 54, 61, 67
King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.
(E.D.Pa. 2010) 702 F.Supp.2d 514.0...eee eeeeceeeteeeeeteeee 29
Lockwood v. Shephard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 675 vccccccccceccssssssessessessessitssseeeseessee 65
Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson
(1976) 16 Cal.8d 920 ......eeeeeeneeeeeeetees 16, 17, 38, 35, 36
Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 480.0... cececeeceenaeeeeeeeneteeeeenee 17
McClure v. McClure
(1893) 100 Cal. 339 oo. ieecccccccccsecesceeeeeeeseneeeeeeeteneeteesetensees 48
Morrison v. Viacom, Inc.
(1998) 66 CalApp.4th 534 ..ccccccsccecccseseeeeesseeeees 16, 35, 69
Neary v. Regents of the University of California
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 278... ..cccccccccccscccsssceceesseeeeeeeeeeesennseseteneees 43
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States
(1958) 856 US. Lineccccccccsececeeeeeceeseeaneceseceeseeeeeetntteners 36
v1
O.K. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Technologies,
Inc.
(7th Cir. 1994) 36 F.3d 565.00... eeeeecee cece eens reeeeeeeeneaneeees 69
Princo Corp. v. Internat. Trade Com.
(Fed.Cir. 2010) 616 F.8d 1318.00... cceeeeececceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 26
Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc.
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 687 -ccccccccsceccseccsssssstsseseseseesvesesseeseees AT
Reid v. Google, Inc.
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 512.0...ceececeecceeae teen eneeenenaeeeeees 67, 68
Rusheen v. Cohen
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048.0... ceeesccceeeceeeeeeeeeeeeesseeeeneeeeeeeess 19
Schering-Plough Cartwright Act Cases
(Ala.Cty.Super.Ct. Dec. 17, 2009) JCCP No. 4559............. 21
Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Com.
(11th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3d 1056.......... 5, 29, 30, 33, 42, 47, 54
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.
(2d Cir. 1981) 645 F.2d 1195 weececcceececeanenneeeeaenanaaenens 60
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.
(1964) 376 U.S. 225 oe cccccccceecceesssseeeeeereseeseneeeeeceeneneeerees 20
Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v.
Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik
Aktiengesellschaft
(Fed.Cir. 1987) 829 F.2d 1075 ........cccceccescececeeeesseeeeteeenereeeees 56
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
(1911) 221 U.S. Linccccccccceseeceeaeeeeeeeeeecseeeereeeeeeereeesaa 16
Standard Oil Co., Inc. v. United States
(1981) 283 U.S. 168...ccececccceeseneeteceeeaeeesseeteresees 21, 43
vu
Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States
(1912) 226 U.S. 20... eeccceccccccesecccececeeceeeeeeaaauceeecseeeeeteeanaeeees 23
State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc.
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147 ccccceccscccseccsesccsssesseesssesessessstesssessestessees 34
TransCore, LP v. Electric Transaction Consultants Corp.
(Fed.Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d L271... ccccccccececceeeeeeeetenteeeeees 56
Transitron Electric Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
(D.Mass 1980) 487 F.Supp. 885 oo... eeeeneeeees 25, 26, 27
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Internat. Trade Com.
(Fed.Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 1179 ccccccccsssscssssssscsscsssssssesssessseees 25
United States v. Masonite Corp.
(1942) 316 U.S. 265 ccccccccccscsscessessecsssesssecssecssesstesseessevessessses 27
United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.
(1968) 374 U.S. 174.ccececceeeteesetteeeereeeececeeeeteeeeeees 27, 28
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(11th Cir. 2008) 344 F.3d 1294... 29, 39, 44, 53, 62, 66
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP
(2004) 540 U.S. 898 oo... ece cece eeceeecceeeeceeececensecteeeeeeeeeeeenaaes 56
Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co.
(1892) 96 Cal. 510 veccccccccssesessecsvssestsssessesnsesestesssssees 23, 24, 34
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine &
Chemical Corp.
(1965) 882 U.S. 172... cecccececccccccecesseeceeensacececeeensneeetensueneees 39
Rules and Statutes
QL ULS.C. § 855 cicceccccccccccesccesseecseeeceeccesseececsneeseceeseesneaseteessneseees 3, 6
21 U.S.C. § B55) ceececccecseseceesessesesecsvsesecsetsessssesevsesevessessetseeeeseees 4, 70
vill
21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A) (Vii) coeecccsccescsesseessecessesssecssvessessssecssesesneesseven 4
21 U.S.C. § 355G)(2)(A)(WI)LV) oo. eeeecccecenteeeecenecerneeesnaeeessaneenenas 5
QV U.S.C. § S55a ccceccecseccsecsessesseessessessessessusssseesevsressucsseesesseessecsseeneen 8
28 U.S.C. § L295(a)L) oo. ceccceecneceeeeneeeeeseeeeeeeneeeesnneeeenneesseneesas 65
35 U.S.C. § 154 ccccceccseessvecssecssssseesssessseeserssecsssessesesutssesssiessasessevessess 60
BB U.S.C. § 154(al) woe ceeeseccesseecessseeeeeseeeeesesneeeesteeeseneeeesteesenes 38
BB U.S.C. § 2710)... ccecccccccccecccscseceeeneeeceseecesscaneeeeceeceenaeeeneeeennaeeseeas 5
35 U.S.C. § 282 ccccceccescssecssecssesseessuesssvsssectevesevesecssesssvssatesseveneesnseees 37
Bus. and Prof. Code, § 16720, et Seq. 00.0... eeccecccceeeesseeeeseeeeteeeesenes 19
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(e)(8)....... cece ccccccessssessesseeeeceeeeeeeeeeees 3
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(1) ........cceeeccccceeenseeeceeeneueeesenee 19
Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (0)(2) ...cccccccccccceceeseesesneeeeeeereessenneees 14
Other Authorities
Areeda & Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law (8d ed. 2008) .......cccccccecccssessessessesseceeeeeeeees 20
B. Dickey, J. Orszag & R. Willig,
A Preliminary Economic Analysis of the Budgetary
Effects of Proposed Restrictions on “Reverse Payment”
Settlements
(August 10, 2010) 0... ecccececeeaaeseeeeaeeenneeesaaaesanaaes 52, 57
Bernard & Tom,
Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to
First Principles
(2006) 15 Fed. Cir.B.J. 617 cccccccccssesesssssesessessessvesecssessesseeseeae: 40
1X
Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kroger Co.
(U.S. filed July 9, 2004) No. 03-779, 2004 WL
DDG2075 ooo cccccecccecccneeceenscneccaseeeececsesnenseaeeeeeeaeseeaaesaesenetsanes bl
Davisetal.,
FTC Call for Settlement Ban Is ... Full of Sound and
Fury, Signifying Nothing (Jan. 14, 2010)... eeeeeeeeeeeeee 57
H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009) ....... cc ccccccecceccseeeeeeeeecceeneeeeeeeeeeserens 58
RBC Capital Markets,
Pharmaceuticals: Analyzing Litigation Success Rates
(January 15, 2010) wcccccccesesscceeeeeceeecceeeceeeeeaeenaaeeeeeeees 52
Reply Br. of Appellants,
In re Cipro Cases I & II (Nov. 15, 2010)
2010 WL 5079984 oo... cccccccsceseeecceceeeseeceeeeeeeseeereeeeaeeeeeeseaes 64
S. 27, L1Qth Corng. (2011)... ccccccccceecccceeececeeecenseeeseeeeetenseneeeaeeees 58
§. 3677 (amend.), 111th Cong. (2010)...eeeeeceeceeceeeeeeneeeeeees 58
S, 369, 111th Cong. (2009)...ccccecseccsessssessessseecseeseresevessesssesssnssseeen 58
Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse
Payment Fallacy
(2004) 71 Antitrust L.Jd. 1033oeeee e ee eeees 45, 51
INTRODUCTION
This case presents the question whether a patent means
less in California than anywhere else in the Nation. The answer
to that question is no: California law, like federal law, recognizes
that a patent confers a lawful monopoly that entitles the patent
holder to exclude competition within the patent’s scope. It
follows, as a matter of law and logic, that the patent holder is
entitled to settle litigation involving the patent, as long as that
settlement does not restrain competition beyond the patent’s
scope. Any restraint on competition within the patent’s scope
flows not from the settlement, but from the patent itself.
That straightforward point is the beginning and the end of
this case. After years of litigation, Bayer and Barrsettled their
dispute over the validity of Bayer’s patent on the antibiotic drug
Cipro. That settlement did not restrain any competition beyond
the patent’s scope—and indeed allowed Barr to launch a
competing drug a full year before the end of the patent’s
exclusivity period. Nothing in the settlement limited the ability
of other generic drug makers to challenge the validity of the
Cipro patent—and several other companies in fact pursued such
a challenge andlost.
Nonetheless, a numberof lawsuits werefiled in federal and
state court challenging the Cipro settlement under the antitrust
laws. Not one of those lawsuits has prevailed for the simple
reason that the antitrust laws do not protect competition within a
patent’s scope, and the settlement here did not restrain any
competition beyond the patent’s scope. Thus, both the US.
Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Federal Circuit
specifically rejected antitrust challenges to the very settlement
agreement challenged here, and in both cases the U.S. Supreme
Court declined review.
Plaintiffs’ effort to impose per se antitrust liability on the
Cipro settlement would take California antitrust law far beyond
federal antitrust law, and bring it squarely into conflict with
federal patent law. This Court need not, and should not, create
any such conflict, which would simply result in the preemption of
state law. As both the Second and Federal Circuits have
recognized, it is entirely possible to harmonize antitrust and
patent law by declining to extend antitrust liability to conduct
within a patent’s scope. That harmonizing approach also has the
virtue of comporting with settled California law. (See Fruit
Machinery Co. v. F. M. Ball & Co. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 748
2
(Fruit Machinery).) Accordingly, this Court should affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeal, and end this twelve-year-old
litigation for once andforall.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the settlement of patent litigation
between Bayer—which held the patent on the active ingredient in
the prescription antibiotic ciprofloxacin hydrochloride, commonly
known as Cipro—and the Generic Defendants.!
A, The Hatch-Waxman Act
Because the process for introducing generic drugs to
market is relevant to understanding how the Cipro patent
litigation unfolded, the Generic Defendants briefly explain that
process here.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of
1984 (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”) established a new procedure for
obtaining FDA approval to market generic drugs. (21 U.S.C.
1 Barr Laboratories, Inc., Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., and
the Rugby Group, Inc. (collectively “the Generic Defendants”),
along with Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., collectively referred to
in this brief as “defendants,” join in and incorporate by reference
the brief filed by defendant Bayer. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.504(e)(3).)
§ 355 (2000) [text of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended
by Hatch-Waxman Act].) The Hatch-Waxman Actis a carefully-
drafted statute that balances two primary interests:
(1) encouraging the development of generic drugs, and
(2) protecting the patent rights of brand-name drug
manufacturers to reward their research and developmentefforts.
The Hatch-Waxman Act made it easier for generic drug
companies to introduce competing versions of a brand-name drug
by allowing the generic company to rely on the FDA’s
determination that the brand-name drugis safe and effective. To
gain approval, the generic company must file what is known as
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”). (See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355G).) In the ANDA, the applicant must demonstrate that its
generic version of the drug is “bioequivalent” to the branded
drug, meaning that it works in the same way and provides the
same benefits. (See ibid.) To protect the patent rights of the
branded manufacturer, however, the Hatch-Waxman Act
requires the generic challenger to file one of four certifications
concerning any patent that claims the branded product. (See id.,
§ 355G)(2)(A)wii).) The certification relevant here is an ANDA
[V—acertification either that the generic drug does not infringe
4
the patent, or that the patent is invalid or unenforceable (see id.,
§ 355(9)(2)(A)wi)IV).)
Because an ANDA IV amounts to an assertion by the
generic company that the patent on a brand-name drug should
not be enforced, filing an ANDAIV is considered a technical act
of patent infringement (see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)), which allows the
branded manufacturer to sue immediately rather than waiting
until the generic company introduces its drug into the market.
Through the resulting litigation, a generic company can obtain a
judicial determination of whether the patent is valid before
producing and selling its competing product. So long as the
generic company waits for the ruling before coming to market,it
does not risk paying damagesif it loses the patent case, because
it will not have made any infringing sales. By contrast, the
branded manufacturer stands to lose a great deal in the
litigation: if the generic company’s challenge to the patent is
upheld, the generic company can enter the market immediately
and the branded manufacturer will lose its patent monopoly.
(See generally Schering-Plough Corp. vu. Federal Trade Com.
(11th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (Schering-Plough); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
5
261 F.Supp.2d 188, 251 (Cipro D.)
B. Factual Background
Defendant Barr Laboratories, a generic drug manufacturer,
sought FDA approval to introduce a competing generic version of
Cipro pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, and
filed an ANDA IV. In response, Bayer brought a patent
infringement action. Because Bayer’s patent covered the active
ingredient in Cipro, Barr conceded from the start that its generic
version would infringe the patent and argued only that the
patent was invalid and unenforceable. (2 RA 356-357.)
The parties engaged in five years of litigation and
discovery. Althoughplaintiffs attempt to exaggerate the strength
of Barr’s patent challenge by stating that the judge presiding
over the patent litigation denied Bayer’s motion for partial
summary judgment (POB 10), plaintiffs fail to point out that the
judge also denied Barr’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
(See Bayer AG v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. (8.D.N.Y. June 5, 1996,
No. 92 Civ. 0381-WK) 1996 WL 304544.) In fact, the court had
previously granted partial summary judgment in Bayer’s favor at
the start of the case and accordingly dismissed one of Barr’s
threshold patent claims. (2 AA 260, 7 8.) As Barr’s CEOtestified
6
during his deposition, he “was troubled that some of these claims
were dismissed—one or more of the claims were dismissed on
summary judgment. That didn’t bode well [for Barr], in my
opinion.” (2 RA 359.)
As the case approached trial, the district judge expressed
concern about the complex scientific issues presented. (See 1 RA
27.) The magistrate judge, meanwhile, “inquired about the
parties’ willingness to settle the case and urged the parties to
meet for that purpose.” (2 RA 361.) At that point, Bayer and
Barr settled their litigation, as litigants routinely do.
Under the Cipro settlement, Barr and its litigation
partners received both monetary consideration and a license to
sell a competing ciprofloxacin product at least six months before
the Cipro patent expired. (4 AA 770-775, 788-790.) Barr’s CEO
testified that the settlement gave Barr more than if it had lost
the underlying patent case, but less than it would have earned
had its patent challenge succeeded. (3 RA 670.)
Nothing in the settlement purported to preclude other
parties from challenging the validity of the Cipro patent. Several
other generic drug companies did so, but none prevailed. (See
Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceutical, Inc. (D.N.J. 2001) 129
7
F.Supp.2d 705 [rejecting validity challenges by Mylan and Schein
on summary judgment], affd. (Fed.Cir. 2002) 301 F.3d 1306;
Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Technology, Inc. (8.D.Cal. June 7, 2002 and
Aug. 7, 2002, No. 01CV0867-B) [rejecting Carlsbad’s validity
challenge after bench trial; opinions available at 1 RA 181-193,
195-227]; Bayer AG v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (D.N.J.
Oct. 29, 1999, No. 98-4464) [dismissing Ranbaxy’s challenge as
moot; stipulation of dismissal available at 1 RA 229-231].) Bayer
also sought re-examination of the Cipro patent by the U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office (PTO), which reaffirmed its validity in 1999.
In June 2003, six months before the Cipro patent expired,
Bayer began to supply ciprofloxacin that Barr could sell as a
competing product. (2 RA 374-377 [deposition of Barr sales and
marketing executive].) Because the FDA had, in the interim,
granted Bayer a six-month extension of its exclusivity in light of
a study on Cipro’s effectiveness in children (see 21 U.S.C. § 355a;
2 AA 248, § 4), the Cipro settlement enabled Barr to enter the
market and sell a lower-priced ciprofloxacin product a full year
earlier than the law otherwise would have permitted.2 (2 RA
374-877.)
C. Cipro Litigation
In 2000, direct and indirect purchasers of Cipro sued
defendants in various state and federal courts (including this
litigation), alleging that the Cipro settlement violated antitrust
and consumerprotection laws. In 2005, the judge presiding over
the coordinated federal cases (Judge Trager) granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety. (In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 363
F.Supp.2d 514 [Cipro II].) Judge Trager had previously denied
plaintiffs’ motion for a finding that the settlement was per se
illegal. (Cipro I, supra, 261 F.Supp.2d 188.)
Plaintiffs appealed both rulings to the U.S. Court of
2 Plaintiffs therefore err by asserting that “[t]he Cipro
agreements ... did not license patented rights.” (POB 33.) (See
Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (2d
Cir. 2010) 604 F.3d 98, 102 [noting that the settlement
agreement “provide[d] the generic manufacturers a guaranteed
license to sell brand-name Cipro at a reduced rate for six months
prior to the patent’s expiration’”].)
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit transferred
the appeal of the indirect purchaser plaintiffs—which included an
additional claim for fraud on the PTO—to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The indirect purchasers’
complaint in the case before the Federal Circuit—like the
complaint in this case—included claims by California consumers
suing under California law.
In 2008, the Federal Circuit unanimously affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on the
indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ claims. dn re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (Fed.Cir. 2008) 544 F.3d 1323,
rehg. en banc den. (Dec. 23, 2008), cert. den. sub nom. Arkansas
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (2009) 129
S.Ct. 2828 [Cipro III].) The court held that the Cipro settlement
was not per se unlawful under the Sherman Act and did not
violate the Rule of Reason. (d. at p.1340.) In so holding, the
Federal Circuit emphasized that the Cipro settlement did not
have any anticompetitive effects because it did not restrain trade
in areas beyond the lawful monopoly created by Bayer’s patent:
e “[T]here was no evidence that the Agreements created a
bottleneck on challenges to the [Cipro] patent or
10
otherwise restrained competition outside the
‘exclusionary zone’ of the patent.” (Ud. at p.1332.)
e “{T]here is no evidence that the Agreements prevented
challenges by other generic drug manufacturers to the
validity of the [Cipro] patent. In fact, four other generic
manufacturers—Ranbaxy, Mylan, Schein, and
Carlsbad— ... initiated challenges of the validity of the
patent.” (Cd. at p.1334.)
e “{T]here is no legal basis for restricting the right of a
patentee to choose its preferred means of enforcement
and no support for the notion that the Hatch-Waxman
Act was intended to thwart settlements.” (Ud. at
p.1337.)
The Federal Circuit denied plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en
banc, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.
(129 S.Ct. 2828.)
In 2010, the Second Circuit, which had retained jurisdiction
over the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ appeal, issued its own
opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment. (Arkansas
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (2d Cir. 2010)
604 F.3d 98, rehg. en banc den. (2010) 625 F.3d 779, cert. den.
sub nom. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Bayer AG (2011)
131 S.Ct. 1606 [Cipro IV].) That court, too, held that the Cipro
settlement did not violate the antitrust laws because it did not
preclude competition outside of the exclusionary zone of the
11
patent: “Barr’s agreementto refrain from manufacturing generic
Cipro encompasses only conduct that would infringe Bayer’s
patent rights,” meaning that there is no antitrust violation.
(Cipro IV, at p.106.) Although the Second Circuit panel queried
whether en banc review of the scope of the patent standard
adopted in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation (2d Cir.
2006) 466 F.3d 187 (Tamoxifen), would be appropriate, the full
court denied plaintiffs’ petition for en banc review without even
asking for a response from the defendants. (625 F.3d 779.)
Again, the U.S. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ petition for
certiorari. (131 S.Ct. 1606.) The Federal Circuit, the Second
Circuit, and the U.S. District Court thus have rejected antitrust
challenges to the exact same settlement agreement at issue in this
case.
After the Federal Circuit’s decision, the superior court
(Strauss, J.) considered defendants’ motions for summary
judgment in this litigation. Following extensive briefing and oral
argument, the court granted defendants’ motions and dismissed
the case. (11 AA 2665-2677.) Like the three federal courts, the
trial court held that the Cipro settlement does not violate the
antitrust laws because “[t]he undisputed evidence establishes
12
that no triable issue of material fact exists that the agreement
did not fall outside the exclusionary scope of the patent; there is
no evidence that the patent suit by Bayer against Barr was
objectively baseless; and Plaintiff cannot establish that the
settlement was otherwise unlawful.” (11 AA 2671.)
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division One (Nares, Benke, Aaron, JJ.),
affirmed in a unanimous 53-page published opinion. The court
first rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Hatch-Waxman patent
settlements are illegal per se, recognizing that “[uJnder the
Cartwright Act, as under the Sherman Act, the ‘illegal per se’
designation is reserved for agreements or practices that have a
pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming virtue,” a
designation that is inappropriate for the settlement of litigation
and that no court has ever accepted for a settlement within the
scope of a patent. (Slip opinion 32.)
The court then “conclud[ed] that the Cipro agreements do
not violate the Cartwright Act under rule-of-reason analysis,”
including the approach taken by federal courts addressing Hatch-
Waxman patent settlements specifically. (Slip opinion 33.) In
conducting this analysis, the court considered the many cases
13
that have analyzed—and upheld—such settlements under the
federal Sherman Act. As the court stated: “We agree with the
reasoning of these cases and conclude that it applies equally to
antitrust claims under the Cartwright Act.” (Ud. at p.32) “The
principle that an agreement is not unlawful under California and
federal antitrust law if it restrains competition only within the
exclusionary scope of a patent is reflected in Fruit Machinef[ry]
Co. v. F. M. Ball & Co. (1958) 118 Cal.App.2d 748.” (Slip opinion
34.) The court thus concluded that “[b]ecause the Cipro
agreements undisputedly did not restrain competition beyond the
exclusionary scope of the [Cipro] patent, ... they do not violate the
Cartwright Act.” (Ud. at pp.3—4.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850
(Aguilar).) To obtain summary judgment, defendants need only
show “that ‘one or more elements of the ‘cause of action’ in
question ‘cannot be established’ or that ‘there is a complete
defense” to that cause of action. (/bid., quoting Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (0)(2).) A defendant may also make the requisite
showing by establishing that a plaintiff does not possess the
14
evidence necessary to prevail on an element of its claim.
(Aguilar, at pp.854-855.) Under California law, summary
judgment is decidedly available to defendants in antitrust cases,
as subjecting defendants “to undue costs in the judicial sphere”
would “effectively chill procompetitive conduct in the world at
large, the very thing that [antitrust law] is designed to protect.”
(Id. at p.852.)
ARGUMENT
I. The Lower Courts—Consistent With California And
Federal Law—Correctly Applied The Rule Of Reason
In Holding That The Cipro Settlement Does Not
Violate The Cartwright Act.
The lower courts properly applied the well-established Rule
of Reason test in holding that the Cipro settlement does not
violate the Cartwright Act. Contrary to plaintiffs’ claim that the
lower courts “refused to apply California’s traditional antitrust
analysis” (POB 3), both courts followed well-established
California law in holding that plaintiffs could not establish the
first step of the Rule of Reason—showing an actual adverseeffect
on competition—because the settlement restrained no more
competition than the exclusionary potential of the Cipro patent
itself. (Slip opinion 33-34; see also 11 AA 2691.) This analysis is
15
entirely consistent with established precedent—including three
other decisions upholding the exact same settlement agreement
at issue in this case.
A. The Lower Courts Correctly Held The Cipro
Settlement Does Not Violate The Cartwright
Act Because It Does Not Exceed The Scope Of
The Cipro Patent.
As the superior court recognized, “[t]he Cartwright Act and
the federal antitrust laws are interpreted to permit restraints of
trade as long as those restraints are reasonable under the
circumstances.” (11 AA 2672; accord Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp.
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363, 375; Marin County Bd. of Realtors,
Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 930, citing Standard Oil Co.
of New Jersey v. United States (1911) 221 U.S. 1; Morrison v.
Viacom, Inc. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 534, 540.) The Rule of Reason
requires that (1) an alleged restraint on trade has
anticompetitive effects, and (2) the anticompetitive effects
outweigh any pro-competitive benefits. (11 AA 2690; accord Bert
G. Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d
1020, 1048, disapproved on other grounds in Dore v. Arnold
Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 394, fn.2; Marin County,
at pp.934-35.) The first element of this analysis requires a
16
plaintiff to show that the challenged agreement had a
“substantially adverse effect on competition in the relevant
market.” (Exxon Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th
1672, 1681; see also Bert G. Gianelli, at p.1048; Marin County, at
p.9387; Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 480, 494.)
Applying well-established California law, the lower courts
correctly held that plaintiffs could not demonstrate this actual
adverse effect on competition because the Cipro settlement
limited no more competition than the patent already limited.
(Slip opinion 33~34; 11 AA 2684.) In other words, because the
only restraints on competition were those “inherent in the
patent” itself, plaintiffs’ claims could not proceed as a matter of
law underthe first step of the Rule of Reason. (Slip opinion 33;
11 AA 2691,)
Under these circumstances, the grant of summary
judgment was entirely appropriate—especially when plaintiffs’
opening brief does not challenge the Court of Appeal’s
observation that “the Cipro Agreements undisputedly did not
restrain competition beyond the scope of the [Cipro] patent.”
(Slip opinion 3, emphasis added; POB 36 [acknowledging “[t]hat
17
[defendants’] agreement was limited to the patent parameters”
before challenging the legal significance of that fact].) Although
plaintiffs assert that the question of reasonableness “in the
context of the Cartwright Act is a question of fact to be
determined at trial” (POB 42, quoting Corwin v. Los Angeles
Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842, 855), the
lower courts correctly concluded that, because there were no
material facts in dispute and no showing of anticompetitive
effects beyond the scope of the patent, plaintiffs could not
demonstrate an antitrust violation as a matter of law. (Slip
opinion 33; 11 AA 2688 [“The undisputed evidence establishes
that no triable issue of material fact exists that the agreement
did not fall outside the exclusionary scope of the patent; there is
no evidence that the patent suit by Bayer against Barr was
objectively baseless; and Plaintiff cannot establish that the
settlement was otherwise unlawful.”].) Summary judgment was
therefore warranted. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p.852
[affirming summary judgment in a Rule of Reason case].)3
3 The Generic Defendants and Watson adopt by reference the
argument by defendant Bayer that plaintiffs have waived review
(Continued...)
18
B. California Courts Have Long Held That No
Antitrust Liability Attaches For Conduct
Within The Scope Of The Patent.
Plaintiffs devote the balance of their brief to criticizing the
scope of the patent test. Contrary to what plaintiffs contend,
however, this test is consistent with both California and federal
antitrust law—as well as soundpolicy.
1. California Courts Have Long Embraced
The Scope Of The Patent Test.
California courts have long recognized the right of patent
of their claims under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus.
and Prof. Code, § 16720, et seq.) and for common law
monopolization by failing to provide any developed argument in
support of those claims in their opening brief. (See Rusheen v.
Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055, fn.2; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.516(b)(1).) In any event, as the lower courts held, any such
claims fail for the same reason as the Cartwright Act claims.
(Slip opinion 50-51; see also 11 AA 2687-2688; Chavez uv.
Whirlpool Corp., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p.375 [holding that
when “the same conduct is alleged to be both an antitrust
violation and an ‘unfair’ business act or practice for the same
reason... the determination that the conduct is not an
unreasonable restraint of trade necessarily implies that the
conduct is not ‘unfair’ towards consumers’]; Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 185 [emphasizing that the contrary
approach could “even lead to the enjoining of pro competitive
conduct and thereby undermine consumerprotection”].)
19
holders to exclude competition within the scope of a patent,
because “[t]he grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory
monopoly and is an express exception to laws prohibiting
monopolies.” (Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Superior Court
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 320, 328, citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co. (1964) 376 U.S. 225, 229.) After all, “[t]he very
purpose of the patent law is to encourage inventive effort by
according the inventor and his assigns control over the invention
and protection in the exercise of the rights accorded him as
patentee.” (Fruit Machinery, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p.762.)
Just as the Cartwright Act “has not been interpreted to
penalize natural monopolies.... [Citation]” (Freeman v. San Diego
Assn. of Realtors (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 171, 200), the statutory
monopoly conferred by a patent similarly entitles the owner to
exclude others from producing the patented invention, and to
settle patent litigation on flexible terms. (See Areeda &
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (8d ed. 2008) {| 658a, p.172 [equating
natural monopolies and patent monopolies—and emphasizing
“{tlo hold such monopolies unlawful would either be futile or
would undermine other principles that our society regards as
more important.”].) As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in
20
Standard Oil Co., Inc. v. United States (1931) 283 U.S. 1638, 171,
“[w]here there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened
interferences [with a patent], a settlement by agreement, rather
than litigation, is not precluded by the [antitrust laws].” All of
this underscores why the Cipro settlement had no actual adverse
effect on competition, as the Federal Circuit observed in
upholding this very settlement:
[P]atent law bestows the patent holder with “the
right to exclude others from profiting by the patented
invention.” [Citation.] A settlement is not unlawful
if it serves to protect that to which the patent holder
is legally entitled—a monopoly over the manufacture
and distribution of the patented invention.
[Citation.]
(Cipro I, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1337.)
California law is entirely consistent with this analytical
approach. As the Court of Appeal stated, “[t]he principle that an
agreement is not unlawful under California and federal antitrust
law if it restrains competition only within the exclusionary scope
of a patent is reflected in Fruit Machine[ry] Co. v. F.M. Ball &
Co. (1958) 118 Cal.App.2d 748.” (Slip opinion 34; see also
Schering-Plough Cartwright Act Cases (Ala.Cty.Super.Ct. Dec.
17, 2009) JCCP No. 4559 [adopting the scope of the patent
21
framework].) In Fruit Machinery, the court held that a patent
licensing regime did not “put the arrangement beyond the scope
of the patent rights and within the proscription of the antitrust
laws,” because the parties did not “exercise[] rights or powers not
accorded to them by the patent law or abuse[] any rights or
powers accorded to them by that law.” (Fruit Machinery, at
p.762; see also slip opinion 34.)
Plaintiffs seize on the final clause of this quotation and
argue that the Court of Appeal “misconstru[ed]” Fruit Machinery
by not recognizing that “abuse” of a patent can give rise to
antitrust liability. (POB 34.) What plaintiffs ignore, however, is
that the Fruit Machinery decision made clear that any such
violation of the antitrust laws would occur because the
arrangement would be “beyond the scope of the patent rights.”
(Fruit Machinery, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p.762, emphasis
added.) As the court stated in summarizing other cases in which
antitrust liability was found, “it appeared that the patentee or his
assignee [in the cited cases] went beyond that which was
necessary or incidental to the scope of his patent and brought
himself within the proscription of the antitrust laws.” (qd. at
p.763, citing, e.g., Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v.
22
United States (1912) 226 U.S. 20 [market allocation and price
fixing]; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States (1940) 309 U.S. 436
{resale price maintenance].) It is thus clear that the question in
Fruit Machinery was whether the arrangement exceeded the
scope of the patent. Because the patentee in Fruit Machinery did
not exceed the scope of the patent, there was no antitrust
violation, and the lower courts correctly applied the same
analysis here.
Plaintiffs have been unable to find any case—in California
or elsewhere—that contradicts the scope of the patent
framework. While plaintiffs claim that the lower courts
“ignore[d]” Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co. (1892) 96
Cal. 510 (POB 32-34), the superior court expressly observed that
Vulcan provides no support to plaintiffs. (11 AA 2672.) To the
contrary, Vulcan addressed a collaboration among industry
members(including some that did not even have patent rights) to
establish a committee to fix prices (imposing fines on companies
that disobeyed). (Vulcan Powder, at p.513; see also POB 32-33
[acknowledging this fact].) “The Court in Vulcan found an
antitrust violation because the agreement exceeded the scope of
the patent. The contract at issue in that case, unlike here, was
23
not confined to the product (dynamite) produced under the
patents, and involved a collaboration among many industry
members... to establish a commitment to fix prices.” (11 AA
2672.) Plaintiffs themselves concede that “[t]he [Vulcan]
Court’s... analysis focused on whether the patent holder was
receiving consideration for some right it had obtained through
the patent,” i.e., whether the agreement was within the scope of
the patent. (POB 33.)
Although plaintiffs argue that the scope of the patent
inquiry was only an “aggravating factor in the antitrust analysis”
(POB 383), they cite nothing in the text of Vulcan itself that
supports this assertion. As the superior court recognized, the
price-fixing agreement in Vulcan in no way resembles the Cipro
settlement, in which Bayer and Barr settled their patent
litigation Gust as countless other patent cases settle every year)
in a way that extended no further than the scope of the patent.
(11 AA 2672.)
2. Importation Of Patent Misuse Into
California Law Is Inappropriate.
Having found no California authority supporting their
argument, plaintiffs next try to import the doctrine of patent
24
misuse into California antitrust jurisprudence. Plaintiffs contend
that antitrust liability may attach for exclusionary conduct that
does not exceed the bounds of the patent grant because a
patentee “‘may commit patent misuse in improper exploitation of
the patent by violating the antitrust laws....” (POB 31, quoting
Transitron Electric Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (D.Mass 1980)
487 F.Supp. 885, 893 (Transitron).) According to plaintiffs, the
Court of Appeal’s “reasoning [on the scope of the patent test]
mistakenly treats what is normally a sufficient condition for
antitrust lability (restraints beyond the patent’s claims) as a
necessary condition.” (POB 31.) This argument fails for at least
two reasons.
First, the doctrine of patent misuse is wholly inapplicable
to an antitrust analysis. The doctrine of patent misuse is an
equitable defense to a patent infringement claim and is distinct
from an antitrust inquiry. (U.S. Philips Corp. v. Internat. Trade
Com. (Fed.Cir. 2005) 424 F.8d 1179, 1184; accord B. Braun
Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories (Fed.Cir. 1997) 124 F.3d
1419, 1426 [“The patent misuse doctrine, born from the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands, is a method of limiting abuse of patent
rights separate from the antitrust laws.”].) It thus does not apply
25
in this case. And even if the doctrine of patent misuse could
apply in the antitrust context, it is fully consistent with the scope
of the patent rule. (Princo Corp. v. Internat. Trade Com.
(Fed.Cir. 2010) 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 [en banc] [“Where the
patentee has not leveraged its patent beyond the scopeof rights
granted by the Patent Act, misuse has not been found.”].)
Second, the cases that plaintiffs cite actually applied the
scope of the patent test—thus confirming that there can be no
antitrust liability for restrictions within the exclusionary
potential of a patent. In Transitron, for example, the court
distinguished the equitable defense of patent misuse, which is
available to licensees, from a Sherman Act violation, noting that
“courts ... erect barriers which prevent the frustration of patent
law by antitrust law and its highly punitive treble damage
provisions,” but also provide the doctrine of patent misuse “to
relieve a licensee from paying royalties under a patent which is
unlawfully obtained or enforced.” (Transitron, supra, 487
F.Supp. at p.892—893, citations omitted.) The Transitron court’s
actual antitrust analysis supports the notion that, absent fraud
on the PTO or sham litigation, a patentee’s exclusionary conduct
within the scope of the patent is free from antitrust liability. Gee
26
id. at pp.891-892 [discussing antitrust theories of fraud on the
PTO and “attempt to enforce a patent knownto be invalid”].)
Nor can plaintiffs draw any support from United States v.
Masonite Corp. (1942) 316 U.S. 265 (Masonite), or United States
v. Singer Manufacturing Co. (1963) 374 U.S. 174 (Singer). (POB
81, 35.) In Masonite, the U.S. Supreme Courtheld that, although
a patent holder can set the price at which it sells its patented
product to purchasers, it cannot dictate the prices at which
downstream purchasers subsequently re-sell the product to
others. (Masonite, 316 U.S. at pp.277—78 [“[W]hen the patented
product passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer
within the limits of the monopoly.”].) Because Masonite’s
agreements did just that, they extended beyond the scope of the
patent. (Ud. at p.277 [“A patent affords no immunity for a
monopoly not fairly or plainly within the grant.”].)
In Singer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a series of
cross-license agreements between Singer and Italian and Swiss
sewing-machine manufacturers had the express purpose of
eliminating competition from rival Japanese manufacturers,
going “far beyond its claimed purpose of merely protecting its
own ... machine.” (Singer, supra, 374 U.S. at p.194.) Plaintiffs
27
seek to avoid this holding by citing Justice White’s concurring
opinion, in which he noted that Singer and the Swiss
manufacturer “agreed to settle an interference, at least in part,
to prevent an open fight over validity.” (POB 35,citing Singer,
at p.199 (conc. opn. of White, J.).) This statement similarly has
no bearing on this case. To begin with, the described scenario
formed only part of the concerted action that the Supreme Court
found to be unlawful after considering the “entire course of
dealings between the parties.” (Singer, at p.190, fn.7.) Moreover,
if the antitrust laws made it illegal to resolve patent cases in
order “to prevent an openfight over validity,” then parties could
never settle patent litigation at all. (See Asahi Glass Co., Lid. v.
Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (N.D.IIl. 2003) 289 F.Supp.2d 986,
993 (Posner, J., sitting by designation) (Asahi Glass) [“It is not
‘bad faith’ to assert patent rights that one is not certain will be
upheld in a suit for infringement pressed to judgment and to
settle the suit to avoid risking the loss of the rights.”].)
Plaintiffs are thus unable to cite even one case—from any
jurisdiction—that imposes antitrust liability for conduct within
the scope of a patent. The reason for this is simple: courts in and
out of California have long recognized that because a patent is
28
the statutory grant of a lawful monopoly, the antitrust laws do
not impose liability on an agreement that goes no further than
the scope of what the patent already protects.
C. Federal Courts Have Uniformly Applied The
Scope Of The Patent Test—Including Three
Courts That Have Upheld This Very Settlement.
The scope of the patent test also has been adopted by every
federal appellate court to have considered the issue under the
Sherman Act, including two appellate courts (and one federal
district court) that reviewed—and upheld—the very same
settlement agreement at issue here. Those cases include:
e Cipro IV, supra, 604 F.3d 98 [2d Cir.];
e Cipro IL, supra, 544 F.3d 1323 [Fed. Cir.];
e Cipro I, supra, 363 F.Supp.2d 514 [E.D.N.Y.];
e Federal Trade Com. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(llth Cir. Apr. 25, 2012, No. 10-12729) 2012 WL
1427789 (Watson);
e Tamoxifen, supra, 466 F.3d 187 [2d Cir.];
e Schering-Plough, supra, 402 F.3d 1056 [11th Cir.];
e Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (11th
Cir. 2008) 344 F.3d 1294 (Valley Drug);
e Asahi Glass, supra, 289 F.Supp.2d 986 [Posner,J.];
e King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.
(E.D.Pa. 2010) 702 F.Supp.2d 514.
29
Federal appellate courts have uniformly concluded that so long as
a patent litigation settlement goes no further than the
exclusionary scope of the patentitself, a plaintiff cannot establish
an antitrust violation under the Rule of Reason as a matter of
law. (E.g., Cipro IJ, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1336 [“The essence of
the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition
beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.”]; Tamoxifen, supra,
466 F.3d at p.213 n.27 [“[T]he question is whether the
exclusionary effects of the agreement exceed the scope of the
patent’s protection[]” (internal quotation marks omitted);
Schering-Plough, supra, 402 F.3d at p.1066 [“[T]he proper
analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of ... the
extent to which the [settlement] agreements exceed th[e] scope...
of the exclusionary potential of the patent....”].)
Plaintiffs’ assertion that “the federal authorities are not
monolithic” and that the federal courts have adopted varying
standards is demonstrably incorrect. (POB 37.) First, plaintiffs
argue, as they did below, that the courts in Andrx
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Internat. (D.C. Cir. 2001)
256 F.3d 799, and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation (6th
Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 896, applied a per se standard to a Hatch-
30
Waxman patent settlement. As the Court of Appeal correctly
noted, however, the agreement that triggered both of those cases
was distinguishable because “the reverse payment in Cardizem
restrained competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the
subject patent.” (Slip opinion 37, emphasis added [also noting
that, in any event, “the Cardizem court did not consider, much
less attempt to balance, the competing policies underlying
antitrust law and patent law or address the policy favoring
settlement of litigation”]; see also 11 AA 2673 [distinguishing
Cardizem on this ground].) Plaintiffs’ argument that the court’s
holding “did not depend on the fact that the agreement also
restrained trade beyond the patent’s scope” (POB 39) finds no
support in the opinion itself, which is why other courts and the
U.S. Department of Justice have concluded that the crux of
Cardizem’s holding is that the agreement exceeded the scope of
the patent. (See, e.g., Cipro III, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1335
[distinguishing Cardizem on this ground]; Br. for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kroger
Co. (U.S. filed July 9, 2004) No. 03-779, 2004 WL 1562075, at *13
[the restraints in Cardizem “extended beyond the legitimate
scope of the patent claims by reaching non-infringing products
31
and conduct by petitioner that the patent conferred no right to
exclude or demand”].) Plaintiffs’ argument that the Cardizem
“court rejected a defense based on the challenged patent’s
presumed exclusionary effects” (POB 40), is thus beside the point,
as the court found the agreement there (unlike the settlement
here) exceeded the scope of the patent.
Second, plaintiffs’ claim that the Eleventh Circuit applies a
different test is also incorrect. (POB 43-45.) As an initial
matter, plaintiffs observe that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit [a]pplies
the Rule of Reason.” (POB 43.) That is exactly what the lower
courts did here, consistent with California law. (Slip opinion 33
[“We further conclude that the Cipro agreements do not violate
the Cartwright Act under rule-of-reason analysis ....”].) Plaintiffs
go on to argue that the Eleventh Circuit's examination of the
999 es
“scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent” “incorporates
an analysis of the patent’s likely ability to exclude infringinguse,
i.e., its strength as tested through patent litigation.” (POB 43.)
As the Eleventh Circuit confirmed just last month, however,
plaintiffs’ characterization is incorrect. (Watson, supra, 2012 WL
1427789 at *10, fn.8.) In rejecting a similar assertion by the
FTC, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[w]hen read in the
32
context of the facts and reasoning of Schering-Plough, the phrase
‘strength of the patent’ refers to the potential exclusionary scope
of the patent—that is, the exclusionary rights appearing on the
patent’s face and not the underlying merits of the infringement
claim.” (Ibid.) The Watson decision thus reaffirmed that “so long
as [a reverse payment settlement’s] anticompetitive effects fall
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent,”
there is no antitrust violation. (Ud. at *11.)
The lower courts therefore correctly recognized that “every
reported decision to date addressing the legality of a reverse-
payment settlement of Hatch-Waxmanlitigation that does not
restrain competition beyond the exclusionary scope of the patent
has concluded that the settlement does not violate the antitrust
”
law.” (Slip opinion 37-38.) Nor is it surprising that the lower
courts considered these cases persuasive, especially when they
include decisions upholding the exact same settlement challenged
in this case. After all, California courts have long recognized the
value of examining Sherman Act jurisprudence when analyzing
Cartwright Act claims. (Marin County, supra, 16 Cal.3d at
p.925.) As the Court of Appeal noted, “[s]ince the Cartwright Act
and the federal Sherman Act share similar language and
33
objectives, California courts often look to federal precedents
under the Sherman Act for guidance.” (Slip opinion 16, quoting
Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2008) 114
Cal.App.4th 309, 334.)
Although California courts have observed that the
Cartwright Act may differ from the Sherman Act in certain
respects (see State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco,
Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1164), plaintiffs offer no authority to
suggest that the Cartwright Act differs from federal antitrust law
in evaluating the rights granted to a patent holder under the
federal Patent Act. (See POB 37.) To the contrary, as the Court
of Appeal recognized (slip opinion 34), California case law—as
reflected in Fruit Machinery and Vulcan—has consistently
mirrored federal law in recognizing the rights of patentees to
engage in exclusionary conduct within the scope their patent
grant. (See Vulcan, supra, 96 Cal. at pp.515-516; Fruit
Machinery, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p.763.)
This does not mean, as plaintiffs wrongly contend, that the
lower courts found federal authority “dispositive” (POB 16)
without performing their own analysis of the scope of the patent
test and simply “adopt[ed] this standard as the law of California”
34
(POB 5). To the contrary, the lower courts expressly recognized
that “federal decisional law is not binding on this Court” (11 AA
2690), and instead found the “reasoning” of the analogous federal
cases to be “sound and applicable” (slip opinion 32—33, emphasis
added.) The opinions below demonstrate that both courts
engaged in a detailed analysis of plaintiffs’ allegations before
holding that the Cipro settlement does not violate the Cartwright
Act under well-established California law. (Slip opinion 15—38;
11 AA 2672-2676.)
D. There Is No Basis For Applying A Per Se Rule.
Plaintiffs’ contention that the Cipro settlement should be
found per se illegal (POB 17-48) would therefore be
unprecedented. No court has ever adopted such a rule for a
settlement within the scope of a patent, and even plaintiffs’ amici
and commentators cannot agree on what standard should apply.
Under the Cartwright Act, “[c]ertain restraints which lack
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and illegal.” (Morrison v. Viacom, Inc., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at
p.540; accord Marin County, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp.930—931.)
But this category of restraints on trade is limited to activities
found to have a “pernicious effect on competition” and lack “any
35
redeeming virtue,” such as price-fixing, division of markets,
group boycotts and tying arrangements. (Marin County, at
pp.930-931, citing Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States (1958)
356 U.S.1, 5.)
As the lower courts held, Hatch-Waxman settlements
generally, and the Cipro settlement specifically, do not come close
to falling within the narrow and exceptional per se category. Far
from giving Hatch-Waxman settlements a “special privilege”
(POB 5), the lower courts simply applied the presumptive Rule of
Reason standard under the antitrust laws. As in the superior
court, “[plaintiffs] have cited no California case, nor is there one,
supporting that a per se illegal analysis is applicable to the
specific agreement at issue here, a reverse payment settlement
agreement under the Hatch Waxman Act concerning a patent.”
(11 AA 2689.)
This makes sense. There is nothing even remotely
anticompetitive about settling a Hatch-Waxman patent case.
Plaintiffs’ argument that the Cipro settlement was nothing more
than “a naked payoff... from one horizontal competitor to other
horizontal competitors to suppress competition” (POB 17),
completely ignores the presence of the patent. It is not
36
anticompetitive for a patent holder to keep would-be infringers
out of the market—both because patents are presumed valid by
operation of law (see Cipro III, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1337, citing
35 U.S.C. § 282) and because the Cipro patent itself has
repeatedly been upheld.
Plaintiffs take issue with the Court of Appeal’s discussion
of the statutory presumption of validity, arguing that a patent
“requires a court-approved injunction to be enforced.” (POB 26.)
But numerous courts, including the federal court that hears all
patent appeals, have recognized that patent litigation
settlements are themselves a viable and permissible form of
enforcement between the competing parties. As the Federal
Circuit stated in Cipro, “[s]ettlements in patent cases...
frequently provide that the alleged infringer will not challenge
the validity of the patent[]” and “the mere fact that the
Agreements insulated Bayer from patent validity challenges by
the generic defendants was not in itself an antitrust violation.”
(Cipro LI, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1334.)
[T]here is no legal basis for restricting the right of a
patentee to choose its preferred means of
enforcement and no support for the notion that the
Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to thwart
37
settlements.
(Id. at p.1338.) California courts agree: where, as here, a patent
holder could lawfully “restrain” competition through the
enforcement of its patent, any conduct that imposes a similar or
lesser restraint is presumptively lawful. (See Fruit Machinery,
supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p.763 [holding that when “the exercise
of patent rights was involved,” only an arrangement “beyond that
which was necessary or incidental to the scope of [the] patent”
falls “within the proscription of the antitrust laws”].)
Plaintiffs’ proposed rule would in fact create a presumption
of patent invalidity—requiring that a patent must first be upheld
in court to have any exclusionary effect at all. But such a rule,
which would impact all patents, not just pharmaceutical patents,
has no basis in the law. (See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) [“Every patent
shall... grant to the patentee ... the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States.”].) Such a rule also would run
afoul of the longstanding antitrust framework holding that—
absent fraud on the PTO orobjectively baseless sham litigation—
the good-faith exercise of patent rights is protected from antitrust
liability within the exclusionary scope of the patent. (See Walker
38
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine & Chemical Corp.
(1965) 382 U.S. 172, 177 [a patentee’s “good faith would furnish a
complete defense”]; Tamoxifen, supra, 466 F.3d at p.213, quoting
Cipro II, 363 F.Supp.2d at p.535 [“Unless and until the patent is
shown to have been procured by fraud, or a suit for its
enforcement is shownto be objectively baseless, there is no injury
to the market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as
competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent.”].)
For these reasons, courts have repeatedly recognized the
lawfulness of Hatch-Waxman settlements within the scope of a
patent, even when they include monetary consideration from the
branded patent holder to the generic patent challenger. (E.g.,
Tamoxifen, supra, 466 F.3d at p.206 {holding that Hatch-
Waxman settlements with reverse payments are not per se
illegal]; Valley Drug, supra, 344 F.3d at pp.1309-—1311 [same].)
That includes the courts that have upheld this very settlement.
(E.g., Cipro IIT, supra, 544 F.8d at p.1332; Cipro I, supra, 261
F.Supp.2d at p.252.) It would be anomalous indeedto find that
the Cipro settlement was a per se antitrust violation after five
other courts (two California courts and three federal courts) not
only rejected the per se argument, but also found the settlement
39
lawful.
Given this, it is no surprise that plaintiffs can find no
support for their proposed per se rule. Even the commentators
and agencies that plaintiffs cite with approval are on record as
disagreeing with the per se standard. Neither the Department of
Justice, nor the Federal Trade Commission, nor the academic
commentators that plaintiffs cite (such as Professor Hovenkamp)
argue for a per se standard. (See POB 40-42 [describing the
DOJ-FTC-Hovenkamp proposal]j.)}4¢ As the current General
Counsel of the FTC has stated, “[T]he notion that it is per se
unlawful ... for a patent owner to pay cash or other value to an
alleged infringer ... ignores thefirst principle that enforcing valid
patents makes a major contribution to consumer welfare.”
(Bernard & Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First Principles
(2006) 15 Fed.Cir.B.J. 617, 617-618.)
4 Plaintiffs claim that the California Attorney General
advocated a per se standard in its rule 8.500(g) letter, but they
cite to a general proposition of law noted in the Attorney
General’s letter, not to the Attorney General’s proposed analysis
of Hatch-Waxman settlements. (POB 23.)
40
Perhaps recognizing the novelty of a per se approach,
plaintiffs also mention in passing the “presumptive illegality”
standard advocated by certain agencies and commentators. (POB
40-43.) But this standard similarly has no basis in antitrust law,
which is why it has been rejected by every court to considerit.
Although plaintiffs attempt to argue that the presumptive
illegality standard would be a “modified Rule of Reason” (POB
42), they concede that this standard is “only slightly less
stringent than the per se rule’ (POB 387) because it would
eliminate the first step of the Rule of Reason, assume that every
Hatch-Waxman settlement has actual adverse effects on
competition, and shift the burden to defendants to demonstrate
that a settlement had pro-competitive benefits. (POB 42; 11 AA
2581-2582.) Such a burden-shifting rule would create an entirely
new approach to antitrust claims arising from patent litigation
settlements, and create serious due process problems by
impermissibly shifting the burden of proof. (Compare POB 42
(“Defendants bear the initial burden.”] with Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p.861 [holding that a Cartwright Act plaintiff has the
burden of proof].) Plaintiffs do not and cannot cite any legal
authority that would support this new framework. (See Watson,
41
supra, 2012 WL 1427789, at *2, *11; Schering-Plough, supra, 402
F.3d at pp.1075—1076.)
As the Eleventh Circuit observed in rejecting that approach
or a per se approach,“[d]ue to the ‘asymmetrics of risk and large
profits at stake, even a patentee confident in the validity of its
patent might pay a potential infringer a substantial sum in
settlement.” (Schering-Plough, supra, 402 F.8d at p.1075; see
also Watson, supra, 2012 WL 1427789, at *12.) The parties to a
patent case are free to settle disputed claims, and a settlement
that extends no further than what the patent already protects
has no actual adverse effect on competition under the antitrust
law.
II. The Scope Of The Patent Test Is Consistent With
Sound California Policy.
Public policy fully supports the scope of the patent test—
especially given the policies in favor of the settlement of
litigation. As a threshold matter, plaintiffs’ approach ignores the
fact that consumers benefit from innovation, which the law
promotes by recognizing that patent holders should enjoy a
statutory monopoly within the scope of the patent grant.
Moreover, the undisputed record demonstrates that, far from
42
hurting competition, permitting Hatch-Waxman patent
settlements can actually increase the number of patent
challenges, and thus encourage the amountof overall competition
in the pharmaceutical industry.
A. The Scope Of The Patent Test Furthers The
Long-Standing Policy Favoring Settlement Of
Litigation.
California courts have long recognized the benefits to both
the parties and the courts of settling litigation. (See Abouab v.
City and County of San Francisco (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 643,
673 [recognizing that there has “long been a strong public policy
favoring settlements” in California, citing McClure v. McClure
(1893) 100 Cal. 339, 343].) As this court has stated: “The need for
settlements is greater than ever before. ‘Without them our
system of civil adjudication would quickly break down.’
[Citation].”. (Neary v. Regents of the University of California
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 277.) This policy applies with equal effect
to settlements of patent litigation: “it is well settled that the law
favors settlements and this would extend to patent infringement
suits as well.” (11 AA 2689; see also Standard Oil, supra, 283
U.S. at p.171 [“[w]here there are legitimately conflicting claims or
threatened interferences [with a patent], a settlement by
43
agreement, rather than litigation, is not precluded by the
[antitrust laws].”]; Cipro II, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1333 [“[T]here
is a long-standing policy in the law in favor of settlements, and
this policy extends to patent infringementlitigation.”].)
Hatch-Waxmansettlements are no different from any other
patent settlement on this score. Plaintiffs argue that Hatch-
Waxman settlements are distinct because monetary
consideration flows to the alleged infringer rather than to the
patent holder. (POB 2.) As numerous courts have explained,
however, there is nothing inherently unusual about a settlement
that provides consideration from the patent holder to the alleged
infringer as part of the resolution of a lawsuit. (E.g., Valley Drug,
supra, 344 F.3d at p.1309 [“We cannot conclude that the
exclusionary effect of the Agreements not to enter the market
were necessarily greater than the exclusionary effects of the []
patent merely because [the patent holder] paid [the generic
challengers] in return for their respective agreements.”].)
After all, in every patent settlement (even outside the
Hatch-Waxman context), the alleged infringer typically receives
consideration from the deal:
44
1. The patent owner sues the alleged infringer for selling
its infringing product.
2. A loss for the potential infringer could result in
potentially crippling damages.
3. To avoid this litigation risk, the alleged infringer
typically will pay some amount to the patent holder in
exchange for endingthelitigation.
4. But the settlement does not require the alleged infringer
to give back all of its profits. The alleged infringer will
also typically keep some amount of profit from its
allegedly infringing sales. (Tamoxifen, supra, 466 F.3d
at p.207, fn.20.)
5. The profits that the alleged infringer retains constitute
the value it receives from the settlement.
For this reason, “any settlement agreement can be characterized
as involving ‘compensation’ to the defendant, who would not
settle unless he had something to show for the settlement.”
(Asahi Glass, supra, 289 F.Supp.2d at p.994; accord Cipro I,
supra, 261 F.Supp.2d at p.252 [“[E]ven in the traditional context,
implicit consideration flows from the patent holder to the alleged
infringer.”]; Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the
Reverse Payment Fallacy (2004) 71 Antitrust L.J. 1038, 1033
[“[C]onsideration is moving from the patent holder to the alleged
infringer in most settlements of patent disputes.”].)
A settlement payment from a patent holder to a generic
challenger is even more logical in the Hatch-Waxman context.
45
Litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act reverses the traditional
risks associated with patent litigation. A generic manufacturer
can challenge the patent on a branded drugbyfiling an ANDA IV
without actually entering the market and risking infringement
damages. (Tamoxifen, supra, 466 F.3d at pp.206-207.) As a
result, even if the generic manufacturer is unsuccessful in its
challenge, it will be liable for few, if any, monetary damages
because it has not yet sold an infringing product. By contrast, a
loss for the branded manufacturer would invalidate its patent,
quickly costing it potentially billions of dollars in sales. (Ud. at
p.210 [describing the generic challenger as having “the whip
hand”].)
Just as the “typical” patent challenger would settle in
return for keeping a portion of the profits it derived, a Hatch-
Waxman challenger would logically settle for a portion of the
profits to be derived from its generic product. This explains why
settlement payments in Hatch-Waxman cases naturally flow
from the patent holder to the generic challenger: the generic
challenger has the claim of value in the litigation. (Cipro J,
supra, 261 F.Supp.2d at pp.250—251; see also Redwood Theatres,
Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 687, 705—
46
706 [noting the importance of considering the unique aspects of a
particular industry in analyzing a Cartwright Act claim].)
Nor does the amount of monetary consideration alter the
analysis. Although plaintiffs make much of the size of the
payment from Bayer to Barr (a number which in any event was
only a single-digit percentage of Bayer’s Cipro revenue during
that time period), courts have uniformly held that the size of the
paymentis irrelevant to the antitrust analysis. (K.g., Schering-
Plough, supra, 402 F.3d at p.1075 [“[T]he size of the payment, or
the mere presence of a payment, should not dictate the
availability of a settlement remedy.”].) The reason for this, as
courts have explained, is that no matter the consideration given,
“liJn a yreverse-payment case, the settlement leaves the
competitive situation unchanged from before the defendant tried
to enter the market.” (Asahi Glass, supra, 289 F.Supp.2d at
p.994.)
Plaintiffs also grossly mischaracterize why litigants settle
as a general matter, as reflected in their statement that
“Ir]jespondents ... do not dispute that they entered into the Cipro
47
agreements for the purpose of eliminating competition.” (POB
20.)5 Defendants most certainly do dispute this, because—as
numerous courts have recognized—the primary purpose of
settling litigation, including Hatch-Waxman patentlitigation, is
to eliminate the risk and uncertainty oflitigation. Parties cannot
know in advance if they will prevail—‘[n]o one can be certain
that he will prevail in a patent suit.” (Asahi Glass, supra, 289
F.Supp.2d 986 at p.993.) Indeed, even plaintiffs’ own expert has
recognized that there is “inherent uncertainty” in the outcome of
a patent case. (POB 6.) Given this uncertainty,it is only natural
that parties settle litigation some of the time, and the mere
existence of a settlement does not violate the antitrust laws.
(Watson, supra, 2012 WL 1427789, at *12.)
5 Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that defendants’ Joint Response
to Plaintiffs’ Evidence in the superior court (11 AA 2507-25138)
did “not dispute the evidence Petitioners submitted, save to
contend that the law makes it immaterial.” (POB 8.) What the
Joint Response actually stated, however, is that while plaintiffs’
“evidence” consisted of points of argument rather than
statements of fact—with citations to the record that did not even
support many of those assertions—noneof this created a genuine
dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment, because none of
plaintiffs’ points were material to the legal issues before the
superior court. (11 AA 2511-2512.)
48
Plaintiffs’ argument that such settlements improperly “halt
adversarial testing” is also baseless. (POB 25.) As an initial
matter, settling a patent case involving one generic company does
not prevent other generic companies from bringing their own
challenges. That is exactly what happened here. Three
subsequent companies challenged the Cipro patent in court, and
in each case the patent was upheld. (See Cipro IT, supra, 363
F.Supp.2d at p.547 [“Bayer’s success in its litigations against
Schein, Mylan and Carlsbad forecloses any argument that its
lawsuits were shams.”].) And, in any event, a party has no
obligation to continue litigation for someone else’s benefit. Ud. at
p.532 [“Requiring parties to a lawsuit either to litigate or
negotiate a settlement in the public interest, at the risk of treble
damages is, as a practical matter, tantamount to establishing a
rule requiring litigants ... ‘to act as unwilling private attorneys
general and to bear the various costs and risksof litigation.”].)
Parties, including parties in Hatch-Waxmancases, settle for any
number of reasons despite strong confidence in the strength of
their case. As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted:
Rational parties settle to cap the cost of litigation and
to avoid the chance of losing. Those motives exist not
49
only for the side that is likely to lose but also for the
side that is likely, but only likely, to win. A party
likely to win might not want to play the odds for the
same reason that one likely to survive a game of
Russian roulette might not want to take a turn. With
four chambers of a seven-chamber revolver unloaded,
a party pulling the trigger is likely (67% to 43%) to
survive, but the undertakingis still one that can lead
to undertaking.
(Watson, 2012 WL 1427789, at *12.) There is no basis to preclude
such settlements.
B. The Undisputed Record Evidence Shows That
Settlements Like The Cipro Settlement
Increase Competition And Benefit Consumers.
Although plaintiffs’ policy arguments about settlements do
not raise a material issue of fact because they do not bear on the
relevant question—whether the settlement was within the scope
of Bayer’s patent—the undisputed record also demonstrates that
Hatch-Waxman patent settlements, including settlements with
monetary consideration, increase competition and_ benefit
consumers.
As an initial matter, monetary consideration is often
needed for a patent holder and an alleged infringer to reach a
settlement. Plaintiffs make the conclusory argument that there
is no need for monetary consideration in Hatch-Waxman patent
50
settlements because “patent settlements can be negotiated for
early entry alone.” (POB 29; see also id. at pp.6—7.) But while
some settlements might occur in this manner, plaintiffs have no
support for the proposition that most or all pharmaceutical
patent suits would settle without some form of payment.
To the contrary, it has long been recognized that, given
litigants’ differing views about the litigation as well as the
parties’ different valuations of the case, it often is not possible to
settle litigation other than through monetary consideration.
(E.g., Schildkraut, supra, 71 Antitrust L.J. at p.1034.) This is
especially true in the Hatch-Waxman context because the two
parties place such vastly different values on the introduction of a
competing drug product. For the generic company, an extra day
of sales is worth only as much as it would gain at generic prices.
For the branded company, however, each lost day of sales is
calculated at the higher price of its branded drug. (2 RA 387-
389.) Each extra day will thus cost the branded manufacturer
more than the generic competitor will gain. The use of monetary
consideration allows the two companies to make up this
difference and meet in the middle. (/bid.) Independent economic
analysis confirms this conclusion: “[W]ithout a payment from the
51
branded manufacturer to the generic manufacturer, the parties
may be unable to reach agreement on a settlement—even if a
settlement would lower prescription drug costs by bringing a
generic version to market sooner than would occur if the case
were resolved by a court decision.” (B. Dickey, J. Orszag & R.
Willig, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of the Budgetary Effects
of Proposed Restrictions on “Reverse Payment” Settlements
(August 10, 2010), p.4.)
The very statistics that plaintiffs cite in their brief prove
the point. Plaintiffs claim that “[d]uring the period when reverse
payments were considered to be illegal, drug companies...
continued to settle patent disputes at approximately the same
rate.” (POB 6-7.) Butplaintiffs’ statistics show that the number
of Hatch-Waxman settlements has increased from 14 in 2007 to
28 in 2011. (POB 29-30) Equally important, the number of
patent challenges has increased dramatically during the same
time period, “with a record 65 new first-to-file lawsuits in 2009,
up from 51 in the prior year and more than double the number
just three years ago.” (RBC Capital Markets, Pharmaceuticals:
Analyzing Litigation Success Rates (January 15, 2010) at p.1.)
This demonstrable increase in patent challenges shows that
52
Hatch-Waxman patent settlements, including those with
monetary consideration, can increase competition by reducing the
potential costs and risks of bringing a patent challenge. As
numerous courts have held, it is vital that generic companies
bringing Hatch-Waxman challenges have the full range of
litigation options—including settlement—available to them,
because their incentive to bring such challenges in the first place
depends in significant measure upon having the flexibility to
decide when, and on what terms, to resolve the litigation rather
than fighting “to the death” in every case. (Valley Drug, supra,
344 F.3d at pp.1299, 1308; Asahi Glass, supra, 289 F.Supp.2d at
p.994.) As the judge presiding over the federal Cipro litigation
recognized in upholding the Cipro settlement:
The incentives created by the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments have led to generic investment in
product development, patent review and product
challenges through litigation. Indeed, Barr has
admitted that it has over ten ANDA challenges in
litigation today and more than twice that number
under review. To maximize these incentives, a
generic company should be permitted to choose not
only when to commence patent litigation, but also
when to terminate it. Otherwise, the incentives to
mount an ANDA IV challenge could be reduced.
(Cipro I, supra, 261 F.Supp.2d at p.256.)
53
As this and other decisions recognize, a generic company
like Barr can have multiple patent challenges going at any one
time. Those challenges can result in any number of outcomes,
ranging from a victory to a loss to settlements involvinglicenses,
payments, or both. (2 RA 344 [declaration of Barr CEO Bruce
Downey, §14].) A rule overly restricting settlement options, as
plaintiffs propose, decreases the likelihood that a generic
company will be able to reach a settlement and increases the
likelihood that the generic company will haveto litigate a patent
challenge through trial and all appeals. Given the enormous
expense of mounting a successful patent challenge through
appealif settlement is not available, such a rule could discourage
generic companies from bringing as many challenges in thefirst
place, even if those challenges could lead to pro-competitive
results. (2 RA 350-351 [declaration of Barr CEO Bruce Downey,
436]; see also Schering-Plough, supra, 402 F.3d at p.1075
[“Hatch-Waxmansettlements, like[] the ones at issue here ... may
benefit the public by introducing a new rival into the market,
facilitating competitive production, and encouraging further
innovation.”]; Tamoxifen, supra, 466 F.3d at pp.203, 212 [same].)
Needless to say, if the number of challenges to drug patents
54
decreases, there will be fewer opportunities to invalidate such
patents and the number of cheaper, generic alternatives on the
market will go down.
Moreover, plaintiffs wholly ignore the fact that many
settlements that include monetary consideration also provide for
early generic entry well before the date of patent expiration.
That is precisely the situation here. Because of the Cipro
settlement, Barr entered the market with a lower-priced
competing product in June 20038, six months before the expiration
of the Cipro patent and one year before Bayer’s exclusivity ended
under the FDA regulatory regime. (2 RA 374-376, 378-380; 5 AA
996 [deposition of Barr sales and marketing executive, noting an
eight percent discount from Bayer’s wholesale acquisition cost].)
During that period, Barr achieved significant market
penetration, resulting in increased competition and lower drug
prices. (2 RA 374-375, 378-380.)
It is no answer for plaintiffs to complain that the
settlement was not “good enough”—for example, by arguing that
the license should have been longer or that the price of the
license should have been lower. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
made clear, an agreement does not violate the antitrust laws
55
simply because plaintiffs can imagine a more competitive
settlement; after all, the antitrust laws do not require “that a
monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other
approach might yield greater competition.” (Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP
(2004) 540 U.S. 398, 415-416 (Trinko); accord Buffalo
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (2d Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 917, 933 [“[T]he antitrust
laws do not permit courts to ban all practices that some
economists consider undesirable.”].)
Patent law supports this reasoning as well, because it has
long been established that a patentee has the right to grant or
refuse a license, and to decide the license terms. (TransCore, LP
v. Electric Transaction Consultants Corp. (Fed.Cir. 2009) 563
F.3d 1271, 1275-1276, quoting Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr,
Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik
Aktiengesellschaft (Fed.Cir. 1987) 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 [*[A]
patent license agreement is in essence nothing more than a
promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee ... [and] patent
license agreements can be written to convey different scopes of
promises not to sue.”]; Brulotie v. Thys Co. (1964) 379 USS. 29, 33
56
[“A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he
can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.”].)
For these reasons, abandoning the traditional Rule of
Reason approach in favor of plaintiffs’ per se standard would
restrict the parties’ ability to settle Hatch-Waxmanlitigation and
dramatically increase its costs, which in turn could lead to fewer
Hatch-Waxman challenges, fewer settlements, and fewer early-
entry licenses, all in direct contravention of the public policies in
favor of settlement, reward for patent innovation, and increased
Hatch-Waxmanchallenges.* Plaintiffs’ proposed standard, then,
would undermine not only the policy in favor of settlement, but
6 Although irrelevant to the question of whether this
settlement exceeded the scope of the Cipro patent, plaintiffs’
claim that Hatch-Waxman settlements cost consumers $3.5
billion is based on an FTC study that has been criticized,
including by a former economic advisor to President Clinton, as
“unreliable.” (B. Dickey, J. Orszag & R. Willig, A Preliminary
Economic Analysis of the Budgetary Effects of Proposed
Restrictions on “Reverse Payment” Settlements (August 10, 2010),
at p.3; see also Davis et al., FTC Call for Settlement Ban Is ...
Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing (Jan. 14, 2010), at
pp.1—5 [concluding that the FTC study on whichthis statistic was
based was “exceedingly flawed” because it “presume[d] patent
invalidity across the board” and assumed that settlement is
achievable without monetary payments].)
57
also the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Actitself. (See Asahi Glass,
supra, 289 F.Supp.2d at p.994 [“A ban on reverse-payment
settlements would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by
reducing the challenger’s settlement options should he be sued
for infringement, and so might well be thought
anticompetitive.”].)
Given the sound legal basis for the lower courts’ holdings,
plaintiffs’ policy arguments reflect an improper effort to achieve
judicial legislation. Although plaintiffs claim that such
settlements “have been almost universally condemned by
prosecutors, legislators, and leading policy makers” (POB 2), the
U.S. Congress has considered multiple bills, including a bill
currently pending, that would alter the legal treatment of Hatch-
Waxman patent settlements and outlaw MHatch-Waxman
settlements that include monetary consideration, but has yet to
pass any one of them. (E.g., S. 27, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 3677
(amend.), 111th Cong. (2010); S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.
1706, 111th Cong. (2009).)
58
III. Assessing Liability For Conduct Within The Scope Of
A Patent, As Plaintiffs Advocate, Would Create A
Conflict With Federal Patent Law And Would Be
Preeempted.
Aside from having no support in law or policy, plaintiffs’
proposed per se approach also would create an impermissible
conflict with federal law, and thus be preempted. By assessing
antitrust liability for conduct within the scope of a patent,
plaintiffs’ approach would upset the policy balance struck by
Congress through the federal patent laws, by undermining what
it means to have a patent under the Patent Act. By contrast, the
scope of the patent test reflects the balance that Congress that
struck between the patent laws, on one hand, and the antitrust
laws, on the other. As the Federal Circuit recognized in
upholding the validity of the Cipro settlement, “the outcome is
the same” whether the analysis starts with the Sherman Act or
starts with the Patent Act, because the two meet in the middle.
(Cipro II, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1336.)
It is well established that “state law must yield to
congressional enactments if it ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.” (Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of
59
Columbia (Fed.Cir. 2007) 496 F.3d 13862, 1372 (Biotechnology
Industry), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67.)
This is particularly true in the context of federal patent rights:
“state regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent
that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent
laws.” (Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (1989) 489
U.S. 141, 152 (Bonito Boats).) Federal patent law determines the
scope and duration of a patent, granting patentees “the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States,’ for a [set] period.” (Cd. at p.150,
quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154; see also Biotechnology Industry, supra,
496 F.3d at p.1372 [“This court has repeatedly recognized as
important the pecuniary rewards stemming from the patent
right.”]; SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp. (2d Cir. 1981) 645 F.2d 1195,
1206 [“[W]here a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent
conduct permissible under the patents laws cannot trigger any
liability under the antitrust laws.”].) “The federal patent system
thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the
creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances
in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to
practice the invention for a period of years.” (Bonito Boats, at
60
pp.150—151, emphasis added.) This congressional bargain is no
different for pharmaceutical patents challenged under the Hatch-
WaxmanAct.
The ability to settle patent litigation is a critical elementof
a patentee’s exclusionary rights. (Cipro III, supra, 544 F.3d at
p.1338 [“there is no legal basis for restricting the right of a
patentee to choose its preferred means of enforcement and no
support for the notion that the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended
to thwart settlements.”].) Rather than be forced to litigate “to the
death,” a patentee may therefore choose to seek peace with a
patent challenger and protect its patent in exchange for
consideration. As numerous courts have recognized, so long as
the patent was not procured by fraud and the enforcement
litigation was not an objectively baseless sham, settling such
litigation amounts to no more than the permissible exercise of the
patent right. (Watson, supra, 2012 WL 1427789, at *8 [Our
decision [gives] full effect to the patent’s terms....”]; Tamoxifen,
supra, 466 F.3d at p.213; Cipro II, supra, 363 F.Supp.2d at
p.535.)
Plaintiffs’ proposed standard would impermissibly alter the
balance struck by Congress by curbing a patentee’s federal right
61
to settle patent litigation, even if the resulting settlement
restrains no more competition than the patent itself. (See Valley
Drug, supra, 344 F.3d at p.1309 [a per se rule against “any
payment by the patentee would obviously chill such settlements,
thereby increasingthe cost of patent enforcement and decreasing
the value of patent protection generally.”].) As the Federal
Circuit—the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent
appeals—has emphasized in upholding the validity of this very
settlement:
We conclude that in cases such as this, wherein all
anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement
are within the exclusionary powerof the patent, the
outcome is the same whether the court begins its
analysis under antitrust law by applying a rule of
reason approach to evaluate the anti-competitive
effects, or under patent law by analyzing the right to
exclude afforded by the patent. The essence of the
inquiry is whether the agreements restrict
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the
patent.
(Cipro III, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1336.) Plaintiffs are thus
incorrect in stating that the Federal Circuit did not consider the
Patent Act in its decision (POB 52, fn.29)—the Federal Circuit
expressly recognized that the scope of the patent test reflects
where the rights granted by the Patent Act end and the
62
obligations imposed by the Sherman Act begin. If California
were to impose liability in these circumstances, then having a
patent would mean something different in this State than in any
other—and California law will have underminedthe federal right
to exclude granted to a patent holder under the Patent Act. All
of this underscores why plaintiffs’ expansive interpretation of the
Cartwright Act is ultimately self-defeating, because it would be
preempted by federal law. (See Biotechnology Industry, supra,
496 F.3d at p.1373.)
IV. The Superior Court Properly Granted Summary
Judgment.
Plaintiffs finally resort to arguing that fact disputes
preclude the entry of summary judgment even underthe scope of
the patent test. Although plaintiffs make a numberof misleading
factual assertions, none of those assertions creates a genuine
issue of material fact because none of them rebuts the threshold
point that the Cipro settlement did not exceed the scope of a
patent that already foreclosed all generic competition. And, in
any event, appellants’ arguments find no support in the
undisputed factual record or the law.
First, plaintiffs contend that factual issues existed in the
63
underlying patent case between Bayer and Barr. (POB 57-59.)
The problem for plaintiffs, however, is that they cannot argue
that the underlying patent case was a “sham” (POB 57) because
they failed to make such an allegation in the trial court. (Slip
opinion 38-41; 11 AA 2692; Government Employees Insurance Co.
v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98, fn.4 [noting that a
“plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her
opposing papers” to defeat summary judgment].) Indeed,
plaintiffs stated in their reply brief in the Court of Appeal that
they “do not contend that Bayer is liable for its conduct in
procuring or enforcing the Cipro patent.” (Reply Br. of
Appellants, In re Cipro Cases I & II (Nov. 15, 2010) 2010 WL
5079934, at *35.)
Moreover,plaintiffs’ contention that the underlying patent
lawsuit was objectively baseless is wrong as a matter of law.
(POB 57.) The Federal Circuit’s decision upholding the
lawfulness of the Cipro Settlement held that “no fraud occurred”
in Bayer’s procurementof the Cipro patent (544 F.3d at p.1341)—
and Federal Circuit law governs on questions of federal patent
law, including whether there was fraud on the PTO. (See
Lockwood v. Shephard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2009) 173
64
Cal.App.4th 675, 684 [noting that the Federal Circuit has
exclusive final jurisdiction over patent cases, citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1)].) In any event, the record conclusively shows that
Bayer’s underlying patent claims—-which were meritorious
enough to survive Barr’s motion for summary judgment in the
2
patent case—were not a “sham.” That is especially true where,
as here, the patent holder defeated subsequent challengesto its
patent: far from constituting “post-hoc rationalizations” (POB 60),
Bayer’s subsequent victories constitute an objective fact that
contradicts the notion that its patent case against Barr was
objectively baseless. (Cipro II, supra, 363 F.Supp.2d at p.547
[“Bayer’s success in its litigations against Schein, Mylan and
Carlsbad forecloses any argument that its lawsuits were
shams.”]; see also Blank v. Coffin (1942) 20 Cal.2d 457, 463
[“Evidence of the existence of a particular condition, relationship,
or status... before and after an act in question is admissible to
indicate the existence of the same status, condition or
relationship at the timeof the act.”].)
Nor can plaintiffs avoid summary judgment by arguing
that Barr “would have won” the underlying litigation and
invalidated the Cipro patent. (See, e.g., POB 45, fn.23 [arguing
65
that “the original Cipro patent would almost certainly have been
nullified”].) Again, plaintiffs did not raise this argument in the
trial court. As plaintiffs represented to the federal district court
when arguing for remand to the California superior court, “their
state law antitrust claims... do not depend upon a finding that
Bayer’s patent is invalid.” (Un re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Litigation (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 166 F.Supp.2d 740, 749.) As with the
sham claim, then, plaintiffs are precluded from arguing this point
on appeal to defeat summary judgment.
Moreover, as courts have uniformly held, arguments about
who “would have won” the patent litigation cannot properly be
part of the antitrust analysis, because there is no reliable way for
a jury to determine what might have happened if the Bayer-Barr
patent litigation had proceeded to trial and through all appeals
more than ten years ago. “Patent litigation is too complex and
the results too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast
whether enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will
expose them to treble damages....” (Valley Drug, supra, 344 F.3d
at p.1308.) As a federal appellate court recently held in
upholding another Hatch-Waxman patent settlement,
“attempt[ing] to decide how some other court in some other case
66
at some other time waslikely to have resolved some otherclaim if
it had been pursued to judgment... would be deciding a patent
case within an antitrust case about the settlement of the patent
case, a turducken task.” (Watson, supra, 2012 WL 1427789, at
*14.) Moreover, such an approach would “undo much of the
benefits of settling patent litigation, and discourage settlements.”
(Ud. at *18; accord Cipro II, 363 F.Supp.2d at p.530 [“Such an
inquiry would undermine any certainty for patent litigants
seeking to settle.”].) For this reason, courts addressing the
antitrust implications of Hatch-Waxman settlements have
universally declined to engage in such speculative analysis. (E.g.,
Cipro III, supra, 544 F.3d at p.1336; Tamoxifen, supra, 466 F.3d
at p.204; see also Forbes v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 48, 59 [holding that the outcome of a potential
appeal and retrial was a matter of “pure speculation” that cannot
be a basis for liability].)
Second, plaintiffs take issue with the lower courts’
treatment of their evidentiary objections, contending that the
court “failed to hold the trial court to the directive in Reid v.
Google, Inc., (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, that each evidentiary
objection must be separately addressed.” (POB 60.) Plaintiffs’
67
argument fails, because it ignores the central holding of Reid that
is relevant here: “[I]f the trial court fails to rule expressly on
specific evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections
have been overruled, the trial court considered the evidence in
ruling on the merits of the summary judgment motion, and the
objections are preserved on appeal.” (Reid, at p.534.) As the
Court of Appeal correctly noted, the superior court considered
plaintiffs’ objections (and defendants’ responses) before holding
that those objections should be overruled. (Slip opinion 51-52.)
And while the “objections were preserved on appeal and
[plaintiffs] were free to challenge thetrial court’s consideration of
specific items of objected-to evidence on appeal,” plaintiffs waived
consideration of any objections by failing to “argue that the
admission of any specific evidence constituted prejudicial error.”
(Slip opinion 51-52.) Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections therefore
provide no basis upon which to disturb the lower court’s proper
grant of summary judgment.
V. Summary Judgment For Defendant Watson Should
Be Affirmed For Additional Reasons.
Summary judgment was proper as to Watson for the same
reason as for all defendants—because plaintiffs cannot
68
demonstrate any unreasonable restraint of trade. But as to
Watson, there is an additional reason to affirm: Watson was not
a party to the Cipro settlement. To state a Cartwright Act claim
against Watson,plaintiffs must establish that some agreement or
concerted conduct of Watson constituted an unlawful restraint of
trade that resulted in “antitrust injury’—‘“the type of injury the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent” and that would not have
occurred but for the violation. (WVWorrison v. Viacom, Inc., supra,
66 Cal.App.4th at p.548; O.K. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Martin
Marietta Technologies, Inc. (7th Cir. 1994) 36 F.3d 565, 573.)
It is undisputed that Watson was not a party to the 1996
litigation funding agreement between Rugby and Barr or any of
the 1997 settlement agreements with Bayer. (2 AA 248, 18.)
Thus, no act of Watson caused injury to plaintiffs. As the
superior court held, “Watson was not involved in the Cipro
settlement agreement and had no relationship to [its alleged
affiliates] HMR or Rugby when those agreements were made.”
(11 AA 2711; Cipro J, supra, 261 F.Supp.2d at pp.213, 218.) In
1998, Watson purchased Rugby from HMR. (2 AA 273, § 9.)
Watson expressed an interest in sharing in the proceeds from the
Settlement Agreements, but HMRrefused. (3 AA 552; 3 RA 600—
69
601.) As a result, Watson never did anything that changed the
obligations of the parties to the agreements as they existed when
Watson acquired Rugby, or that had any impact on when a
competing ciprofloxacin product was introduced. It is undisputed
that the only funds Watson received were from the sale of Barr’s
competing ciprofloxacin product, which was undeniably pro-
competitive. (2 AA 277, 4 14; 4 AA 652.)
Any argument that Watson could be liable ignores the
requirement of antitrust injury and the undisputed factual
record. Both before and after its purchase of Rugby, Watson
could not legally sell a generic ciprofloxacin product because it
did not have an ANDAor approval by the FDA. (See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355G).) It would have taken Watson years to obtain the
necessary FDA approval of a ciprofloxacin ANDA (see, e.g., 3 RA
647, 658-659 [more than three years passed before approval of
Schein’s ANDA]), and Watson may still have lost the patent
challenge to Bayer, as did three other companies which
challenged Bayer's patent. Nothing Watson did kept generic
ciprofloxacin from the market or caused any injury to plaintiffs.
In any event, as plaintiffs’ opening brief failed to make any
argument about these alternative grounds for affirmance—
70
grounds which Watsonraised in both the superior court and the
Court of Appeal—plaintiffs’ argument is waived. (tusheen v.
Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p.1055, fn.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.516(b)(1).) The grant of summary judgment to Watson should
be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those in the brief of
defendant Bayer, this court should affirm.
71
May 29, 2012 Respectfully submitted,
Joann Rezzo
EDLESON & REZZO
402 West Broadway, Suite 2700
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 230-0836
Kathryn E. Karcher
KARCHER HARMES LLP
401 B Street, Suite 2450
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 565-4755
Counsel for Defendants Barr
Laboratories, Inc., Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., The
Rugby Group, Inc., and Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Jay P. Lefkowitz, P.C.*
Karen N. Walker, P.C.*
Edwin John U*
Gregory L. Skidmore*
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
Counsel for Defendant Barr
Laboratories, Inc.
David E. Everson*
Heather S. Woodson*
Victoria Smith*
STINSON MORRISON HECKER LLP
1201 Walnut Street, Suite 2900
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 842-8600
Counsel for Defendants Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., The
Rugby Group, Inc., and Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
* Admitted pro hac vice
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1), the
undersigned certifies that the foregoing brief contains 13,996
words, exclusive of tables, certificates and attachments, as
counted by the Word Count feature of Microsoft Word.
Light——
7
Counsel
In re Cipro Cases I & II, Case No. S198616
PROOF OF SERVICE
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this
action. My business address is 655 15th Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20005. On May 29, 2012, I served the following
document(s):
ANSWER BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BARR
LABORATORIES, INC., HOECHST MARION ROUSSEL,
INC., THE RUGBY GROUP, INC., AND WATSON
PHARMACEUTICALS,INC.
X by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed
envelope with postage fully prepaid, in the United
States mail at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, 655 15th Street,
NW, Washington, DC 20005 addressed as set forth
below. I am familiar with Kirkland & Ellis’ practice
for collecting and processing correspondence for
mailing. On the same day that the correspondenceis
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the
ordinary course of business with the United States
Postal Service.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
United States that the above is true and correct. Dated May 29,
2012.
LopfA
VA t
Gregory L. Skidmore
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