32 Cited authorities

Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (1989) Cited 25,243 times 26 Legal Analyses
Holding that the reasonableness of force deployed during an arrest is judged using the "facts and circumstances of each particular case" from the perspective of "a reasonable officer on the scene"
County of Sacramento v. Lewis
523 U.S. 833 (1998) Cited 8,699 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that "only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation"
Tennessee v. Garner
471 U.S. 1 (1985) Cited 4,973 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that where a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer or others, the use of deadly force is excessive
Zelig v. County of Los Angeles
27 Cal.4th 1112 (Cal. 2002) Cited 956 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding public entity could not be liable under respondeat superior because the plaintiff had failed to allege that the public employees were engaged in conduct within the scope of employment that would render the public employee liable to the plaintiff
Porter v. Osborn
546 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) Cited 446 times
Holding that "purpose to harm" standard applied when suspect drove car toward officer
Brown v. Ransweiler
171 Cal.App.4th 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) Cited 351 times
Holding that if an officer's "use of . . . force [was] objectively reasonable under the circumstances," then the officer "met his duty to use reasonable care . . . and, as a matter of law, cannot be found to have been negligent in this regard"
Bingue v. Prunchak
512 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) Cited 330 times
Holding that the Lewis intent to harm standard applies to all police officers involved in high-speed chases
Hernandez v. City of Pomona
46 Cal.4th 501 (Cal. 2009) Cited 269 times
Holding that the standard of reasonableness applicable in a section 1983 action based on excessive force is the same as the standard of reasonableness applicable in a state law negligence action
Yount v. City of Sacramento
43 Cal.4th 885 (Cal. 2008) Cited 259 times
Holding that plaintiff's unlimited no contest plea established his culpability for resisting an officer during the entire incident
Billington v. Smith
292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002) Cited 295 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over state-law tort claims on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity
Section 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Cited 486,625 times 688 Legal Analyses
Holding liable any state actor who "subjects, or causes [a person] to be subjected" to a constitutional violation
Section 1988 - Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
42 U.S.C. § 1988 Cited 21,783 times 43 Legal Analyses
Finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 defines the term "costs" as used in Rule 54(d) and enumerates the expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority granted in Rule 54(d)
Rule 8.520 - Briefs by parties and amici curiae; judicial notice
Cal. R. 8.520 Cited 3,160 times
(a)Parties' briefs; time to file (1) Within 30 days after the Supreme Court files the order of review, the petitioner must serve and file in that court either an opening brief on the merits or the brief it filed in the Court of Appeal. (2) Within 30 days after the petitioner files its brief or the time to do so expires, the opposing party must serve and file either an answer brief on the merits or the brief it filed in the Court of Appeal. (3) The petitioner may file a reply brief on the merits or

HAYES v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

32 Cited authorities

Holding that the reasonableness of force deployed during an arrest is judged using the "facts and circumstances of each particular case" from the perspective of "a reasonable officer on the scene"

Holding that "only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation"

Holding that where a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer or others, the use of deadly force is excessive

Finding public entity could not be liable under respondeat superior because the plaintiff had failed to allege that the public employees were engaged in conduct within the scope of employment that would render the public employee liable to the plaintiff

Holding that "purpose to harm" standard applied when suspect drove car toward officer

Holding that if an officer's "use of . . . force [was] objectively reasonable under the circumstances," then the officer "met his duty to use reasonable care . . . and, as a matter of law, cannot be found to have been negligent in this regard"

Holding that the Lewis intent to harm standard applies to all police officers involved in high-speed chases

Holding that the standard of reasonableness applicable in a section 1983 action based on excessive force is the same as the standard of reasonableness applicable in a state law negligence action

Holding that plaintiff's unlimited no contest plea established his culpability for resisting an officer during the entire incident

Holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over state-law tort claims on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity

Holding liable any state actor who "subjects, or causes [a person] to be subjected" to a constitutional violation

Finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 defines the term "costs" as used in Rule 54(d) and enumerates the expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority granted in Rule 54(d)