221 Cited authorities

Apprendi v. New Jersey
530 U.S. 466 (2000) Cited 26,650 times 100 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”
Blakely v. Washington
542 U.S. 296 (2004) Cited 16,617 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority”
Cunningham v. California
549 U.S. 270 (2007) Cited 4,293 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that the "jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant"
Kyles v. Whitley
514 U.S. 419 (1995) Cited 7,263 times 36 Legal Analyses
Holding the State's disclosure obligation turns on the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the defense
Ring v. Arizona
536 U.S. 584 (2002) Cited 4,999 times 50 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”
Brady v. Maryland
373 U.S. 83 (1963) Cited 43,434 times 133 Legal Analyses
Holding that the prosecution violates due process when it suppresses material, favorable evidence
Chapman v. California
386 U.S. 18 (1967) Cited 23,491 times 28 Legal Analyses
Holding that error is harmless only if "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
United States v. Agurs
427 U.S. 97 (1976) Cited 7,515 times 18 Legal Analyses
Holding that materiality "must be evaluated in the context of the entire record"
Payne v. Tennessee
501 U.S. 808 (1991) Cited 2,612 times 21 Legal Analyses
Holding that admission of victim impact evidence at death penalty sentencing phase does not per se violate the Eighth Amendment
Francis v. Franklin
471 U.S. 307 (1985) Cited 2,057 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding a mandatory presumption, either conclusive or rebuttable, as to an element violates a defendant's due process rights because it conflicts with the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged

PEOPLE v. MORA

221 Cited authorities

Holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”

Holding that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority”

Holding that the "jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant"

Holding the State's disclosure obligation turns on the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the defense

Holding that “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”

Holding that the prosecution violates due process when it suppresses material, favorable evidence

Holding that error is harmless only if "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"

Holding that materiality "must be evaluated in the context of the entire record"

Holding that admission of victim impact evidence at death penalty sentencing phase does not per se violate the Eighth Amendment

Holding a mandatory presumption, either conclusive or rebuttable, as to an element violates a defendant's due process rights because it conflicts with the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged