119 Cited authorities

Apprendi v. New Jersey
530 U.S. 466 (2000) Cited 26,650 times 100 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”
Blakely v. Washington
542 U.S. 296 (2004) Cited 16,617 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority”
Ring v. Arizona
536 U.S. 584 (2002) Cited 4,999 times 50 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”
Chapman v. California
386 U.S. 18 (1967) Cited 23,491 times 28 Legal Analyses
Holding that error is harmless only if "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
Atkins v. Virginia
536 U.S. 304 (2002) Cited 3,124 times 54 Legal Analyses
Holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute intellectually disabled defendants
Jones v. United States
526 U.S. 227 (1999) Cited 1,900 times 19 Legal Analyses
Holding that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt"
Wainwright v. Witt
469 U.S. 412 (1985) Cited 3,274 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding that juror bias determination is a question of fact, even though "[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears"
Boyde v. California
494 U.S. 370 (1990) Cited 2,325 times 24 Legal Analyses
Holding that Boyde's strength of character in the face of adversity was considered evidence that "excused" the gravity of the crime under factor (k)
Witherspoon v. Illinois
391 U.S. 510 (1968) Cited 3,563 times 10 Legal Analyses
Holding that a juror's views on the death penalty do not establish bias in the juror's determination of guilt
Simmons v. South Carolina
512 U.S. 154 (1994) Cited 1,000 times 27 Legal Analyses
Holding that when the state raised the specter of a defendant's future dangerousness, the court violated his due process rights by refusing to instruct the jury that, as an alternative to a capital sentence, the sentence of life imprisonment included absolutely no possibility of parole

PEOPLE v. DUENAS (ENRIQUE P.)

119 Cited authorities

Holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”

Holding that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority”

Holding that “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”

Holding that error is harmless only if "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"

Holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute intellectually disabled defendants

Holding that juror bias determination is a question of fact, even though "[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears"

Holding that Boyde's strength of character in the face of adversity was considered evidence that "excused" the gravity of the crime under factor (k)

Holding that a juror's views on the death penalty do not establish bias in the juror's determination of guilt

Holding that when the state raised the specter of a defendant's future dangerousness, the court violated his due process rights by refusing to instruct the jury that, as an alternative to a capital sentence, the sentence of life imprisonment included absolutely no possibility of parole