Richardson v. District of Columbia et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Under Rooker-Feldman

D.D.C.November 21, 2006

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., Defendants ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:06CV01665 (RJL) MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, Wallace Eugene Shipp, Jr.1 Leonard H. Becker, Catherine Kello, Lalla Shishkevish,2 and Elizabeth J. Branda (collectively referred to herein as “Moving Defendants”) respectfully move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (6). The grounds for this motion are as follows: 1) Count #2 is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Any of Plaintiff’s claims that have not already been litigated could have been in one of his numerous prior cases. See, e.g., Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., No. 95-CV-1272 (August 1, 1995) , aff’d, 83 F.3d 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of App., 962 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. Mar 27, 1997), aff’d, No. 97-7085, 1997 WL 811754 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Richardson v. D.C. Bar, No. 96- CV-2286 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d, No. 97-7051, 1997 WL 404321 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 2) In Count #1, Plaintiff may not reinstate his previously dismissed habeas petition on the grounds that he has discovered “new” evidence relating to his prior claims, in the 1 Plaintiff incorrectly referred to Wallace Eugene Shipp, Jr. by his father’s name in the complaint. 2 Plaintiff incorrectly spelled the name of Ms. Shishkevish in his complaint. Ms. Shishkevish has not yet received service of process in this matter. See, e.g., Return of Service (Docket No. 5). While the time for proper service has not yet expired, Ms. Shishkevish provisionally raises this defense so as not to waive it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), (g), and (h)(1). Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 30 guise of a Rule 60(b) motion. Because Plaintiff attacks the resolution of his habeas petition rather than the integrity of the habeas proceedings, this is in reality a successive petition. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2647 (2005). The claims in the previous petition are barred by the prohibition against second or successive petitions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and no new claims may be heard by this Court without an order from the Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Additionally, the Moving Defendants were not parties in the previous habeas petition, nor is there any allegation that Moving Defendants have custody over Plaintiff. 3) This Court has no jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint regarding the conduct of his disciplinary proceedings before the D.C. Court of Appeals under the Supreme Court’s decision in Dist. of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 4) All Moving Defendants except for Lalla Shishkevish are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their actions in administering the attorney discipline process of the D.C. Court of Appeals under D.C. Bar Rule XI § 19(a), including investigations. Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Bar Defendant Lalla Shishkevish is entitled to absolute immunity as a non-complaining witness who provided information in this process. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983). 5) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Bar Defendant Lalla Shishkevish as Plaintiff has alleged no breach of law or duty when she forwarded the check he gave to her office, a division of the D.C. Bar, to Bar Counsel. 6) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that any of the Moving Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deny him his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), specifically complaining of (a) selective discipline, (b) denial of due process, (c) unreasonable 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 30 search and seizure of his bank records, and (d) disproportionate penalty, because Moving Defendants do not exercise any discretion in initiating reciprocal disciplinary proceedings and a conspiracy to inflict the other injuries is not a conspiracy to deny a person equal protection under the law. 7) Plaintiff’s attack on the constitutionality of the disciplinary Bar Rules is either barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or Plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring this attack since he is not a bar member subject to imminent application of these rules. Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., 83 F.3d 1513, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 8) The Complaint should be dismissed with regard to the Moving Defendants as Plaintiff has admitted that “the District of Columbia is de jure the only defendant.” (Docket No. 7, Opp’n to Mot. to Exceed Resp. Deadline at 1.) 9) Plaintiff is barred from bringing the claims in Count #2 by the statute of limitations. In support of this motion, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities is attached. November 21, 2006 Respectfully submitted, _/s/ Timothy K. Webster Timothy K. Webster (D.C. Bar No. 441297) SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 736-8000 (202) 736-8711 (fax) Counsel for Defendants D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, Wallace Eugene Shipp, Jr., Leonard H. Becker, Elizabeth J. Branda, Catherine Kello, and Lalla Shishkevish 3 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 3 of 30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., Defendants ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:06CV01665 (RJL) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOVING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY Defendants D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, Wallace Eugene Shipp, Jr.1 Leonard H. Becker, Catherine Kello, Lalla Shishkevish,2 and Elizabeth J. Branda (collectively referred to herein as “Moving Defendants”) respectfully submit this memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (6). The Moving Defendants respectfully request that this Court dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. In this action, Plaintiff T. Carlton Richardson (“Richardson”) filed a complaint accusing Moving Defendants and others of various constitutional violations related to reciprocal disciplinary proceedings prosecuted against him after he charged excessive attorney’s fees and refused to abide by disciplinary rules. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Richardson, 574 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1 Plaintiff incorrectly referred to Wallace Eugene Shipp, Jr. by his father’s name in the complaint. 2 Plaintiff incorrectly spelled the name of Ms. Shishkevish in his complaint. Ms. Shishkevish has not yet received service of process in this matter. See, e.g., Return of Service (Docket No. 5). While the time for proper service has not yet expired, Ms. Shishkevish provisionally raises this defense so as not to waive it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), (g), and (h)(1). Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 4 of 30 1990) (suspending Richardson for charging an elderly couple of modest means $10,551 to settle a $22,000 probate estate, guiding them to mortgage their home to pay his fee); In re Richardson, 759 A.2d 649 (D.C. 2000) (convicting Richardson of criminal contempt for practicing law while under a disciplinary suspension). This suit is the latest in a long series of collateral attacks on Richardson’s disciplinary suspensions, including eight in this Court alone. As in his previous federal suits, Richardson wants the Court to overturn a judicial action by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Yet Richardson fails to diligently pursue relief in that court; in his recent reinstatement petition, Richardson failed to file an exception to the Board on Professional Responsibility recommendation that he not be reinstated, despite two deadline extensions. In re Richardson, 874 A.2d 361, 362 (D.C. 2005). Except for his purported Rule 60(b) motion in the first count, Richardson’s suit is barred by res judicata. In addition to the issues of subject matter jurisdiction, the constitutionality of the Bar Rules under the Equal Protection clause, and expiration of the statute of limitations for damages claims on alleged constitutional violations, which have all been fully litigated, Richardson is precluded from bringing any new claims arising out of the same proceedings for which he has already sued. In his first count, Richardson attempts to “reinstate” his previously dismissed habeas petition pursuant to Rule 60(b) on the grounds that he supposedly has discovered new evidence and that a fraud somehow was committed on the courts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Because Richardson’s complaint seeks redetermination of the merits, this is in reality an attempt to present a successive habeas petition barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2647 (2005). Nor does Richardson claim that the Moving Defendants have ever held him in custody. 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 5 of 30 In his second count, Richardson presents claims for alleged violations of civil rights violations “arising out of investigatory and adjudicatory activities by the [D.C. Court of Appeals].” (Compl. ¶ 75.) The Court has in the past, on multiple occasions, correctly concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the claims in this suit under Dist. of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Thus, even if this suit was not barred by res judicata, the Court should reach the same conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of Richardson’s complaint. Moreover, Richardson has failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The Moving Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their actions in administering the attorney discipline process of the D.C. Court of Appeals, including investigations. D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a); Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Nace, 490 A.2d 1120, 1124 (D.C. 1985). Richardson attempts to defeat this absolute immunity by joining Moving Defendant Lalla Shishkevish, an employee of the District of Columbia Bar (D.C. Bar) who is in charge of the Continuing Legal Education (CLE) program, and who sent a copy of Richardson’s check used to pay for a CLE course in “Billing Ethics” to defendant Bar Counsel. (Compl. ¶ 27.) However, Ms. Shishkevish is entitled to immunity as a non-complaining witness participating in the disciplinary process. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983). Even if Defendant Shishkevish were not entitled to immunity, Richardson fails to state a claim against her in that there is no allegation that she obtained the check illegally or breached any duty in sending a copy to the Bar Counsel. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980). Richardson fails to state a claim that the Moving Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to obstruct justice with the intent to deny him his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) because he fails to make a prima facie case of discrimination, and 3 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 6 of 30 constitutional violations other than equal protection are not actionable under § 1985. Gager v. “Bob Seidel”, 300 F.2d 727, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Lastly, Richardson’s attack on the constitutionality of the disciplinary Bar Rules is barred either by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or by Richardson’s lack of standing to bring this attack since he is not a bar member subject to imminent application of these rules. Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., 83 F.3d 1513, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Moving Defendants should be dismissed as parties because Richardson’s primary complaint is the suspension and termination of his license to practice law, and the primary relief that Richardson seeks is reinstatement of his license to practice law in the District of Columbia. The Moving Defendants are powerless to grant him that relief, which rests solely in the hands of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Indeed, Richardson has admitted that the Moving Defendants are not the proper parties in his Opposition to Motion to Exceed Response Deadline, stating that “the District of Columbia is de jure the only defendant.” (Docket No. 7, Opp’n to Mot. to Exceed Resp. Deadline at 1.) And as this Court decided just last year, even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not divest the Court of jurisdiction, the statute of limitations would do so. Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia, 05-0210 (ESH) slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2005) (Ex. 13). BACKGROUND For more than fifteen years, Richardson has repeatedly filed meritless collateral challenges to state bar disciplinary proceedings. For the Court’s convenience, Moving Defendants have provided a chart listing the cases discussed below at Exhibit 1. 4 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 7 of 30 1. Jones Matter: Original Florida Discipline and D.C. Reciprocal Discipline. In 1990, Richardson was suspended from the practice of law in Florida for 91 days for charging an excessive fee. See Florida Bar, 574 So.2d at 60 (revised opinion of February 14, 1991). He attempted to bring a collateral attack against that Florida suspension in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, “challeng[ing] the procedures and results of the Florida disciplinary proceedings on federal antitrust and constitutional grounds.” Richardson v. Florida Bar, No. 90-984, 1990 WL 116727, at *2 (D.D.C. May 15,1990) (“Richardson I-A”) (see Exhibit 1 for an explanation of the numbering methodology). That complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id.; see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (holding that federal district courts cannot sit in appeal of the highest court of a state) and Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1980) (holding that federal district courts have no jurisdiction over challenges to state bar disciplinary proceedings). As a result of the Florida suspension, and in accordance with the recommendation of its Board on Professional Responsibility (“the Board”), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals imposed reciprocal discipline on Richardson in the form of a 91-day suspension. See In re Richardson, 602 A.2d 179 (D.C. 1992) (“Richardson I-B”). The court was unpersuaded by his collateral attacks on the Florida disciplinary actions, which included: (a) a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection in the makeup and deliberation of the Florida grievance committee; (b) an attack on the subject matter jurisdiction of the Florida probate court that originally found he had charged excessive fees; and (c) an allegation that the Florida Supreme Court denied due process by considering improper evidence. See id. at 180. 5 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 8 of 30 2. Overton Trust Matter: Florida Resignation and D.C. Interim Suspension. While a separate complaint for charging excessive fees was pending before the Florida Bar, Richardson filed a petition for resignation to the Supreme Court of Florida. See Florida Bar v. Richardson, 604 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1992). See also In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427 (D.C. 1997) (“Richardson IV-A”). The Florida court granted his request, with leave to seek reinstatement upon demonstration of fitness to practice law after three years. On June 27, 1995, over Richardson’s objection, the D. C. Court of Appeals imposed a temporary interim suspension so that the Board could consider whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed in D.C. by virtue of his resignation in Florida while disciplinary charges were pending there. In the Matter of Richardson, No. 95-BG-639 (D.C. June 27, 1995) (“Richardson II-A”) (Ex. 2). See also Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Richardson II-D”) (Ex. 5). Richardson then filed his second suit in this Court, arguing that the interim suspension violated his right to due process. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., No. 95-CV-1272 (Aug. 1, 1995) (“Richardson II-B”) (Ex. 3). That case was dismissed under Rooker-Feldman. Richardson unsuccessfully petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus. See In re Richardson, No. 95-5241 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1995) (“Richardson II-C”) (Ex. 4). The Circuit Court later affirmed the dismissal in Richardson II-D, 83 F.3d at 1514 (Ex. 5). On December 29, 1995, the D.C. Circuit disbarred Richardson based on the Florida resignation. See In re Richardson, No. 95-8519 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 29, 1995) His D.C. disciplinary matter (“Richardson II-A”) was still pending, and the D.C. Court of Appeals imposed a second temporary suspension to consider whether additional reciprocal discipline 6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 9 of 30 should be imposed based on the Circuit Court’s action. See Order, Richardson II-C (Mar. 12, 1996) (Ex. 15). Undeterred by the outcome in Richardson II-B, Richardson filed another District Court action (his third overall) challenging the second interim suspension order. See Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of App., 962 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 1997) (“Richardson II-F”) (Ex. 6). In that case, this Court recognized that Richardson was “trying to get, at the very least, a second bite at the apple. Having previously been rebuffed by Judge Hogan [in Richardson II-B] and the D.C. Circuit [in Richardson II-D], Plaintiff has attempted to bring the same action again.” 962 F. Supp. at 2. The Court warned Richardson that frivolous and repetitive litigation would subject him to sanctions. Id. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed the dismissal under Rooker-Feldman because Richardson’s allegations were “inextricably intertwined” with the previous D. C. Court of Appeals decisions. See Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of App., No. 97-7085, 1997 WL 811754 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 1997) (“Richardson II-G”) (Ex. 7). 3. Investigation and Conviction of Unauthorized Practice of Law. In May 1996, the D.C. Office of Bar Counsel (“Bar Counsel”) began investigating allegations that Richardson had continued to practice law despite the D.C. Court of Appeals’s interim suspension orders. During the investigation, Bar Counsel obtained a copy of a check Richardson had written from his trust account for a C.L.E. class in “Billing Ethics”. Richardson sued the D.C. Bar, two employees of the Office of Bar Counsel, and the Clerk of the D. C. Court of Appeals in District Court for “invasion of privacy and injunctive relief.” See Complaint, Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Bar, No. 96-CV-2286 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 2, 1996) (“Richardson III-A”) (Ex. 16). The suit alleged that the Defendants mishandled or improperly disclosed that check. That case was dismissed, and on appeal the Circuit Court summarily affirmed the dismissal. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Bar, No. 97-7051, 1997 WL 404321 (D.C. Cir. 7 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 10 of 30 June 30, 1997) (“Richardson III-B”) (Ex. 9). Unhappy with the dismissal, Richardson filed a substantially similar suit in D.C. Superior Court, naming several bar employees as defendants. See Richardson v. George Washington Univ., No. CA98-7961 (D.C. Super. Ct.) (“Richardson III-C”) (pending). During the contempt proceeding, Richardson returned to this Court to sue the D.C. Court of Appeals. See Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of App., No. 97-CV-1594 (D.D.C. July 17, 1997) (“Richardson III-D”) (Ex. 10). This Court dismissed the case, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed under Rooker-Feldman. See Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of App., No. 97-7242 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 1998) (“Richardson III-E”) (Ex. 11). In that same matter, the D.C. Circuit granted sanctions against Richardson, stating: “Appellant’s repeated attempts to litigate claims concerning his disbarment proceedings in the federal courts even though the federal courts lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . warrant sanctions.” Order, Richardson III-E (Mar. 25, 1999) (Ex. 17). On March 6, 1998, Richardson was convicted of criminal contempt for violating the interim suspension order. See In re Richardson, 759 A.2d 649, 651 (D.C. 2000) (“Richardson III-F”) (affirming conviction). Contesting his conviction before the D.C. Court of Appeals, Richardson again raised procedural and due process objections to the underlying interim suspension orders. However, the D. C. Court of Appeals treated those issues as res judicata. Id. at 654. Richardson also complained that disclosures of his bank records violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, but the court found those arguments meritless. Id. at 654-55. Richardson challenged that conviction in a habeas corpus action in this Court. See Richardson v. Ct. Servs. & Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., No. 99-657 (D.D.C. Jul. 8 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 11 of 30 11, 2001) (“Richardson III-G”) (Compl. Ex. A), aff’d, Richardson v. D.C. Ct. Servs. & Offender Supervision Agency, No. 01-7135 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 10, 2002) (“Richardson III-H”). In that action, again, Richardson tried to attack the underlying interim suspension orders and the related contempt investigation. See Memorandum Order, Richardson III-G (filed Jul. 31, 2001) (denying Richardson’s motion to reconsider) (Compl. App. B). Again, Richardson was instructed that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review those matters. Id. 4. Final Disciplinary Suspension. After determining that the Florida resignation was discipline, the Board recommended that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose final reciprocal discipline. See In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427, 428-29 (D.C. 1997) (“Richardson IV-A”). After hearing Richardson’s arguments to the contrary, the D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with the Board and suspended Richardson from the practice of law for three years, with the added condition that he must demonstrate his fitness to practice before being readmitted. Id. at 436. The United States Supreme Court denied Richardson’s petition for certiorari. See In re Richardson, 522 U.S. 118 (Feb. 23, 1998) (petition denied), 522 U.S. 1103 (April 27, 1998) (petition for rehearing denied). In 2004, Richardson filed yet another suit in this Court challenging his suspensions. The Court sua sponte ordered him to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On March 31, the Court dismissed his action with prejudice. See Memorandum and Opinion, Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., No. 04-101 (D.D.C. March 31, 2004) (“Richardson IV-B”) (Ex. 12). Richardson filed a “Motion for Reconsideration and Vacate Order of Dismissal” (June 24, 2004; denied June 25, 2004) but never appealed the adverse decision. 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 12 of 30 Six months later, Richardson filed an action “for fraudulent misrepresentation and the wrongful and conspiratorial suspension of the plaintiff’s license to practice law.” See Complaint, Richardson v. District of Columbia, No. 05-210 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 28, 2005) (“Richardson IV-C”). The Court again ordered Richardson, sua sponte, to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court dismissed his complaint on March 29, 2005 (Mot. for Recons. denied Apr. 18, 2005) (Ex. 13). After Richardson appealed every order in that case, the D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed. Richardson v. District of Columbia, No. 05-7078 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 2005) (“Richardson IV-D”) (Ex. 14). Richardson filed the instant case on September 28, 2006, adding several current and former employees of the D.C. Bar as defendants. Richardson’s complaint is divided into two counts: in the first, he seeks post-judgment relief in the form of a Rule 60(b) motion to reinstate his habeas petition dismissed in 2001 (see Richardson III-G); and in the second, he seeks damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for various alleged civil rights violations related to his prior disciplinary suspensions. ARGUMENT I. RICHARDSON’S SUIT IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. With the exception of the Rule 60(b) motion in Count One, Richardson’s latest suit should be barred by res judicata. Even the issue of whether res judicata applies to these claims has itself been fully litigated in this Court. See Richardson IV-C slip op. at 6 n.3 (Ex. 13). Res judicata applies both to the subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, and to the merits of Richardson’s claims. Federal jurisprudence is strongly opposed to piecemeal litigation. This opposition finds expression in several doctrines and laws, including: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1, Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments (district court has “affirmative duty” to “ensure that civil 10 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 13 of 30 litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or delay”) (emphasis added); the “final judgment rule,” which limits parties to a single appeal. See Franklin v. Dist. of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Linder v. Dep’t of Def., 133 F.3d 17, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1998); abstention based on pending state actions; see Handy v. Shaw, Bransford, Veilleux & Roth, 325 F.3d 346, 352-53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation” is a factor to be weighed in deciding whether to abstain); and res judicata; see Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“In brief, the doctrine is designed to conserve judicial resources . . . and to prevent serial forum-shopping and piecemeal litigation.”) (emphasis added). This case is a textbook example of the sort of piecemeal litigation these doctrines are intended to prevent. As a preliminary matter, Richardson is precluded from disputing the application of Rooker-Feldman to this case. An issue is precluded if: (1) the issue was previously litigated by the parties and (2) a court of competent jurisdiction actually and necessarily resolved the issue, unless (3) preclusion would work a basic unfairness to the party bound. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992). “[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as well as for other grounds.” Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Applying that standard to the present facts, it is clear that Richardson is precluded from contesting subject matter jurisdiction over any claim in his second count (alleged civil rights violations). First, the issue was litigated previously (in Richardson II-B, II-C, II-D, II-F, II-G, III-A, III-B, III-D, III-E, IV-B, and IV-C - attached as Exhibits 3-13 respectively). The fact that Richardson has joined different defendants in each of his many suits does not affect the outcome; the old mutuality requirement is long dead in defensive collateral estoppel. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324-25 (1971); Consol. Edison Co. v. Bodman, 449 F.3d 1254, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2006). See also Stanton v. D.C. Ct. of App., 127 11 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 14 of 30 F.3d 72, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing both “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion,” or collateral estoppel, aspects of res judicata). Furthermore, Richardson has admitted that “the District of Columbia is de jure the only defendant.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Exceed Resp. Deadline at 1.) Second, each of Richardson’s federal cases was finally decided against him on Rooker- Feldman grounds. Third, applying preclusion in this case causes no unfairness to Richardson: the stakes have not changed, and Richardson has repeatedly been instructed that the District Court has no jurisdiction to hear a challenge to his disciplinary suspensions. See Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 254. Res judicata also applies substantively to the merits of Richardson’s claims. Generally, res judicata requires a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Stanton, 127 F.3d at 77-78. Under that principle, the previous federal suits dismissed on the basis of Rooker-Feldman might only have preclusive effect as to jurisdiction (as discussed above). However, in this case, the underlying principle (avoiding duplicative and piecemeal litigation) should control. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 (“By failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal court.”). All of these suits arose out of the same transactions. “Courts today are having difficulty giving a litigant one day in court. To allow that litigant a second day is a luxury that cannot be afforded.” Stanton, 127 F.3d at 77 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. I.R.S., 765 F.2d 1174, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 678 (4th ed. 1983). There is no legitimate reason why the present claims were not raised in the previous suits. As this Court said in Hardison: Under [res judicata], the parties to a suit and their privies are bound by a final judgment and may not relitigate any ground for relief which they already have had an opportunity 12 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 15 of 30 to litigate even if they chose not to exploit that opportunity whether the initial judgment was erroneous or not. 655 F.2d at 1288. Richardson claims to have “discovered” some relevant information as late as 2003. Even assuming arguendo that those facts gave rise to a federal cause of action, he had an opportunity to litigate that claim in Richardson IV-B and IV-C and chose not to do so. (Ex. 12, 13.) His constant efforts to refashion the same tired old claims in order to avoid Rooker- Feldman should not be tolerated. Most (if not all) of Richardson’s claims have been finally decided against him on the merits by courts of competent jurisdiction, and all could have been brought in earlier proceedings. The propriety of his various suspensions under D.C. and federal constitutional law was necessarily decided by the D.C. Court of Appeals. See Richardson II-A (temporary suspension) (Ex. 2) and IV-A (final suspension) (Ex. 11). His claims associated with the investigation for contempt and unauthorized practice of law were litigated at length, and necessarily decided against him, in Richardson III-F, 759 A.2d 649 (D.C. 2000). Specifically, the Circuit Court held that no constitutional violation occurred with respect to the check and bank records subpoena (see Richardson III-B, Ex. 9), even though the District Court had originally dismissed the case under Rooker-Feldman (see Richardson III-A, Ex. 8). Finally, although Richardson did raise a challenge to the constitutionality of having different disciplinary rules for reciprocal and original proceedings in his criminal contempt case, the D.C. Court of Appeals did not find the need to reach the constitutional question because Richardson had complied with neither rule. Richardson III-F, 759 A.2d at 653. Cf. Richardson II-D, 83 F.3d 1513, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that Richardson’s attack on the constitutionality of the disciplinary Bar Rules is either barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or by Richardson’s lack 13 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 16 of 30 of standing to bring this attack since he is not a bar member subject to imminent application of these rules). Res judicata applies to all of these claims. II. RICHARDSON’S REQUEST TO REINSTATE HIS DISMISSED PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS UNDER RULE 60(B) IS IN REALITY A SUCCESSIVE PETITION BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 2244(B). In Count One of Richardson’s Complaint, he seeks to reinstate his previously dismissed habeas petition pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 on the grounds that he allegedly has discovered new evidence, and on the grounds that a fraud somehow was committed on the courts. (Compl. ¶ 6.) However, Richardson’s allegations are only that “the D.C. courts lacked jurisdiction and rendered void judgments” and that these courts denied him his due process rights. (Id.) These claims relate to the validity of D.C. Court of Appeals proceedings, not this Court’s review of those proceedings in the prior habeas case. Therefore, Richardson in reality presents second or successive claims which must be presented in conformance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2647 (2005). Richardson’s claims do not do so. In Gonzalez v. Crosby, the Supreme Court recently explained the difference between those allegations for which a Rule 60(b) motion might be entertained, and those that are in reality claims presented in second or successive applications for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. The Court distinguished between determinations of whether there were grounds to grant habeas 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states in relevant part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party 14 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 17 of 30 relief, those on the merits, and rulings that preclude a court from hearing habeas claims. Id. at 2648 n.4. The Court reasoned that “alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.” Id. at 2648. A Rule 60(b) motion that challenges the integrity of the habeas proceeding itself, however, might be heard because it does not attack the resolution of the habeas proceeding but its conduct. Id. Richardson claims to have discovered new evidence in 2003 that litigation documents in the Florida case against him were sent to the Office of Bar Counsel in 1992 and that Defendant Elizabeth J. Branda made a decision not to investigate Richardson further at that time. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.) Richardson complains that he was not notified that these pleadings were sent to the Office of Bar Counsel. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Richardson also complains that fraud was committed in his criminal contempt proceedings before the D.C. Court of Appeals. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Neither of these allegations concerns the conduct of the habeas proceedings themselves, rather they are relevant, if at all, only to the question of whether the criminal contempt conviction should be overturned. These claims are barred by the prohibition against second or successive petitions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and no new claims may be heard by this Court without an order from the Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Furthermore, it is difficult to see what Richardson seeks in reopening review of his habeas petition. The Moving Defendants were not parties in the previous habeas petition and they should not be parties to this complaint, whether presented as a Rule 60(b) motion or as a second or successive habeas petition. Nor is there any allegation that Moving Defendants have ever had custody over Richardson. Indeed, Richardson’s contempt sentence has long since 15 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 18 of 30 expired. (See Compl. ¶ 9.) See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) (reiterating that a habeas petition is moot after the sentence expires unless there are collateral consequences). III. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER RICHARDSON’S COLLATERAL ATTACK ON HIS D.C. BAR SUSPENSION. Federal District Courts do not have jurisdiction over collateral attacks brought by those who lost in state court. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). Congress has vested appellate review of state court decisions solely in the United States Supreme Court. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Richardson’s complaint should be dismissed; it is nothing more than a complaint by the losing party in state court “seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp, 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). A. The D. C. Court of Appeals’s Decisions to Suspend Richardson Were Judicial Actions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all federal suits seeking to have an adverse state court judgment overturned, and all suits raising federal claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court judgment. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 417; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87; Richardson II-C (Ex. 4). This case is remarkably similar to Feldman. In that case, two plaintiffs sued the D.C. Court of Appeals claiming that they had been improperly denied permission to take the D.C. Bar exam. 460 U.S. at 465-69. The Court first held that the D.C. Court of Appeals’s decisions were judicial actions, because the D.C. judges considered policy and equitable arguments in deciding whether to apply a bar admission rule. Id. at 480-81. The Court then decided that the Plaintiffs’ claims that the D.C. Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying their petitions were inextricably intertwined with the judicial decisions. Id. The District Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over those allegations. 16 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 19 of 30 It is obvious that the D.C. Court of Appeals’s decisions to suspend Richardson (first on an interim basis, Richardson II-C (Ex. 4), then as final reciprocal discipline, Richardson IV-A, 692 A.2d 427 (D.C. 1997)) and its decision to hold him in criminal contempt, Richardson III-F, 759 A.2d 649 (D.C. 2000), like its earlier decisions at issue in Feldman, were judicial actions. The court heard legal arguments from Richardson and the Bar, considered “liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist,” and rendered a decision. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 477 (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)). As such, Richardson cannot seek review of those decisions in federal district court. But that is exactly what Richardson is attempting to do: he seeks to “[e]njoin the [D.C. Court of Appeals] from denying Richardson’s reinstatement.” (Compl. ¶ 94(a).) As in each of his previous suits, Richardson filed this action attempting to circumvent the D.C. Court of Appeals’s disciplinary authority over the D.C. Bar. Despite unambiguous direction from this Court (e.g. Richardson III-E, Ex. 11), Richardson continues to file repetitive and frivolous litigation demanding “a second bite at the apple.” Richardson II-F (Ex. 6). Because the District Court has no jurisdiction to review the disciplinary decisions (which were judicial actions) of the D.C. Court of Appeals, the suit was properly dismissed. B. Richardson’s Claims are Inextricably Intertwined With Those Judicial Decisions With the exception of Richardson’s allegation that the Bar Rules are unconstitutional as they discriminate against members of the D.C. Bar “accused of foreign disciplinary misconduct instead of domestic disciplinary misconduct,” (Compl. ¶ 73(a)), the remainder of Richardson’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with his disciplinary actions. Richardson characterizes his suit as merely “seeking the reinstatement of [his] dismissed habeas corpus petition . . . and . . . related civil rights violations,” with no mention of what that petition 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 20 of 30 sought. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Richardson does not allege that he remains under the criminal contempt sentence, (see Compl. ¶ 9), but he requests a determination of whether he “received a full, fair and adequate hearing before the [D.C. Court of Appeals] in reciprocal disciplinary and contempt proceedings, both civil and criminal.” (Compl. ¶ 69.) This is clearly a demand for reversal, which this Court cannot hear. Richardson also seeks damages for claims that “arise out of investigatory and adjudicatory activities by the [D.C. Court of Appeals]” and the Moving Defendants and that “occurred in or arose out of reciprocal disciplinary, civil and criminal contempt matters.” (Compl. ¶ 75.) Because these allegations can “succeed only to the extent that the [D.C. Court of Appeals] wrongly decided the issues before it,” Richardson’s suit is nothing more than “a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). Rooker-Feldman bars not only those suits actually seeking reversal (in the form of injunction or otherwise) of the state court proceeding, but also any claims “inextricably intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87. In Feldman, the Supreme Court held that the lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction over claims that the D.C. Court of Appeals had “acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying [plaintiffs’] petitions for waiver and that the court acted unreasonably and discriminatorily in denying their petitions.” Id. at 486. These allegations impermissibly “required the District Court to review a final judicial decision” of the D.C. Court of Appeals, because the “allegations [were] inextricably intertwined” with those decisions. Id. at 486 (finding jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ general challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying bar rule). 18 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 21 of 30 While the contours of “inextricably intertwined” are not sharply defined, this uncertainty does not benefit Richardson; his claims are clearly barred. The “paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from proceeding” arises when the losing party in state court “repair[s] to federal court to undo the [state] judgment.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. In previous Richardson cases, this Court has stated that claims are inextricably intertwined if holding in the Plaintiff’s favor would require the District Court to conclude that the D.C. Court of Appeals got it wrong. For example, in Richardson II-D, the Circuit Court affirmed dismissal of Richardson’s attack on D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(d) (allowing temporary suspension of an attorney without a hearing to consider whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed). 83 F.3d at 1515-16. The constitutional attack was distinguishable from that in Feldman, because in that case the judicial action at issue was the D.C. Court of Appeals’s refusal to waive a bar admission rule requiring graduation from an A.B.A. approved law school. See Feldman. The judicial action in Feldman was not application of the bar admission rule, so the constitutional challenge to that rule was not inextricably intertwined with the judicial action. But in Richardson II-D, the judicial action was a decision applying Rule XI, § 11(d) to Richardson’s case. See Richardson II-D. “Richardson’s attacks on § 11(d)’s constitutionality, however, are not merely intertwined with his attack on the decision to suspend him but are one and the same . . . His attack on the rule cannot be contemplated without his attack on his suspension.” 83 F.3d at 1515-16 (emphasis added). Each and every allegation succeeds only to the extent that the D.C. Court of Appeals wrongly decided the disciplinary cases. His current allegations are no different than the previous suits. All of the claims, without exception, are based on Richardson’s conviction that the D.C. Court of Appeals’ judicial acts were wrong. His claims based on the denial of evidentiary hearings, (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 11, 16, 19 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 22 of 30 36, 41), are explicit challenges to judicial actions. To the extent that he renews his attack on the underlying rules used to discipline him, that attack is inseparable from the D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision to apply the rules to his case. His claims that previously collected materials were improperly included in his case file in Richardson II-A would make sense, if at all, only to the extent that that case was improperly decided. His “disproportionate sentence” claims involve the D.C. Court of Appeals’s application of D.C. Bar rules to his case, (e.g. Compl. ¶¶ 59-60), or the decision to impose reciprocal discipline itself, or the denial of reinstatement. All are judicial actions. He makes no challenge to the procedures employed by the D.C. Court of Appeals that can be contemplated without questioning the result with that court. These allegations require this Court to sit in review of the D.C. Court of Appeals. But under Rooker-Feldman, that is exactly what “the district court may not do.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16. IV. RICHARDSON HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. A. The Moving Defendants Are Entitled To Absolute Immunity. In his second count, Richardson seeks monetary damages for various alleged constitutional violations committed in the course of his disciplinary proceedings. All of the Moving Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity except Lalla Shishkevish, an employee of the D.C. Bar’s Continuing Legal Education (CLE) program, who is entitled to immunity for her role as a non-complaining witness. The D.C. Court of Appeals created the D.C. Bar “as an official arm of the Court” and promulgated Rules pursuant to its statutory authority. Preamble, Rules Governing the District of Columbia Bar. Congress empowered the D.C. Court of Appeals to adopt rules concerning the “censure, suspension, and expulsion” of bar members. D.C. Court Reform Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, §§ 11-2502 & 11-2504, 84 Stat. 473, 521 (July 29, 1970). The D.C. Court of Appeals created the Board on Professional 20 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 23 of 30 Responsibility and appoints its members, which in turn has the power to appoint Bar Counsel. D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 4. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a) provides immunity for those involved in the disciplinary process by stating that “[m]embers of the Board, its employees, members of Hearing Committees, Bar Counsel, and all assistants and employees of Bar Counsel shall be immune from disciplinary complaint under this rule and from suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties.” Both this Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have recognized that those involved in D.C. Bar disciplinary proceedings and investigations are absolutely immune from suits involving these activities, because these functions are judicial. Simons, 643 F.2d at 785; Thomas v. Knight, 257 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d, No. 03- 7041, 2003 WL 22239653 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 2003). Even though generally prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for actions committed during their general investigations, absolute immunity extends to disciplinary investigations because disciplinary investigations are focused on both a specific defendant and a specific wrong; these investigations are focused on the decision to begin disciplinary proceedings. Simons, 643 F.2d at 784-85. As the court in Simons recognized, those involved in Bar disciplinary proceedings are “even more probable targets for harassment” through litigation than either judges or prosecutors. Simons, 643 F.2d at 782. Richardson’s many suits are a shining example. All of the Moving Defendants except for Lalla Shishkevish are entitled to absolute immunity under the settled rule because they are current or former employees of the Board on Professional Responsibility or Office of Bar Counsel. Ms. Shishkevish does not work in the Bar Counsel’s office, but in the CLE office. Richardson’s inclusion of Ms. Shishkevish is a transparent attempt to defeat absolute immunity. However, she is entitled to immunity as a non-complaining witness participating in the 21 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 24 of 30 disciplinary process. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983) (holding that even officers committing perjury are entitled to immunity). The D.C. Circuit has held that judicial immunity stems not from the forum in which witness statements are given but from the fact that the statements will take the form of testimony. Gray v. Poole, 243 F.3d 572, 576-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Although the disciplinary process may not be as formal as traditional court proceedings, those who provide information to this process should be given the same immunity as traditional witnesses, for the same reason that the other participants in the disciplinary process are: they might otherwise be harassed by litigious losers in the process. D.C. law has recognized this need and holds that those who provide information during disciplinary process are immune from suit. Nace, 490 A.2d at 1124. B. Richardson Fails To State A Claim Against Bar Defendant Shishkevish Because He Alleges No Breach of Law or Duty. Richardson’s only complaint against Ms. Shishkevish is that she “surreptitiously and conspiratorially” sent a copy of the check Richardson used to pay for a CLE course in “Billing Ethics” to defendant Bar Counsel. (Compl. ¶ 27) The bank account information from this check was then allegedley used to subpoena Richardson’s bank records. In addition to being clearly barred by res judicata as described above, this allegation fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Ms. Shishkevish was required to send any information to Bar Counsel “surreptitiously” because Bar Rule XI, § 17(a) requires that investigations during disciplinary proceedings be kept confidential. Furthermore, there is no constitutional injury in issuing a subpoena for bank records; the Supreme Court has held that there is no privacy interest in bank account information. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Richardson does not allege that Ms. Shishkevish’s actions breach any law 22 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 25 of 30 or duty to him. As Richardson does not allege any other action by Ms. Shishkevish or involvement in his disciplinary process; she should be dismissed from this suit. C. Richardson’s § 1985(2) Claim Fails Because The Moving Defendants Do Not Exercise Discretion In Imposing Reciprocal Discipline And A Conspiracy To Inflict The Other Injuries Is Not A Conspiracy To Deny A Person Equal Protection Under The Law. Plaintiff claims that Moving Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deny him his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), specifically complaining of (a) selective discipline, (b) denial of due process, (c) unreasonable search and seizure of his bank records, and (d) disproportionate penalty. Although all of these allegations were made in previous cases (see res judicata, discussion supra), in this suit, Richardson recasts the allegations as a § 1985(2) conspiracy claim. In order to state a claim for selective discipline (or prosecution), Richardson must make a prima facie showing that (1) others similarly situated were not selected for discipline and (2) the discriminatory selection was based on impermissible grounds such as race or religion. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 605 (1985). This prima facie showing has to be a non-frivolous presentation backed by data. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Richardson claims that he was subjected to discipline because he “is a well- known Africanic person, a sole practitioner, and a [sic] openly devout Christian,” and that “non- Africanic persons, persons of other religious persuasions and in large law firms have never suffered for similar misconduct,” but he does not present any data to support this assertion. (Compl. ¶ 91.) Richardson further dilutes his claim by mixing a permitted ground of law practice size, subject to the more lenient rational basis review, with the unpermitted grounds of race and religion. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 609. Moreover, Richardson admits that proceedings were initiated “based solely upon the August 1992 Florida resignation order,” (Compl. ¶¶ 82, 23 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 26 of 30 78), and that the Moving Defendants exercised no discretion in initiating these proceedings. (Compl. ¶84.) Lastly, conspiracy to deprive a person of due process is not the same as a conspiracy to deprive a person of equal protection within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The same is true for claims of other constitutional violations. Gager v. “Bob Seidel”, 300 F.2d 727, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1962). D. Richardson Has No Standing To Challenge The Bar Disciplinary Rules. Richardson’s attack on the constitutionality of the disciplinary Bar Rules is either barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or by his lack of standing to bring this attack since he is not a bar member subject to imminent application of these rules. Richardson II-D, 83 F.3d at 1516. Richardson might have standing to challenge the rules surrounding reinstatement procedures should he seek reinstatement. Id. However, Richardson does not claim any injury from the reinstatement rules, just those providing for reciprocal disciplinary procedures, orders to disbarred and suspended attorneys, and subpoena procedures. (Compl. ¶ 93.) Indeed, Richardson has failed to diligently pursue that avenue of relief. In his recent reinstatement petition, Richardson failed to file an exception to the Board on Professional Responsibility recommendation that he not be reinstated, despite two deadline extensions. In re Richardson, 874 A.2d 361, 362 (D.C. 2005). E. The Moving Defendants Are Not Proper Parties And Should Be Dismissed. The Moving Defendants should be dismissed as parties because Richardson’s primary complaint is the suspension and termination of his license to practice law, and the primary relief that Richardson seeks is reinstatement of his license to practice law in the District 24 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 27 of 30 of Columbia. The Moving Defendants are not responsible for taking his license away and are powerless to give it back to him. The authority to reinstate Richardson rests solely with the D.C. Court of Appeals. Indeed, Richardson has admitted that the Moving Defendants are not the proper parties in his Opposition to Motion to Exceed Response Deadline, stating that “the District of Columbia is de jure the only defendant.” (Docket No. 7, Opp’n to Mot. to Exceed Resp. Deadline at 1.) F. Richardson Is Barred By The Statute of Limitations From Bringing The Claims In His Second Count. Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not divest the Court of jurisdiction over the claims in Richardson’s second count, the statute of limitations would do so. This is another issue that was fully litigated in Richardson IV-C, 05-0210 (ESH) slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2005) (Ex. 13). Because Congress has not specified a statute of limitations for constitutional claims, such as those brought under § 1983 or § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 instructs the courts to look to the local law’s personal injury statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249- 50 (1989). If there is more than one statute of limitations for personal injury, then courts are to look to the general, residual limitations period. Id. D.C.’s local law provides for a three-year statute of limitations in D.C. Code § 12-301(8). Richardson IV-C, slip op. at 3 (Ex. 13). The most current claim asserted by Richardson arose out of his alleged discovery, in February 2003, of the 1992 disciplinary complaint made to Bar Counsel. Therefore, the limitations period for claims arising out of this discovery expired no later than February 2006, seven months before this suit was filed, and perhaps even earlier. 25 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 28 of 30 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Moving Defendants respectfully request that this Court dismiss Richardson’s complaint against them. Moving Defendants also ask that this Court grant any additional relief it deems proper. November 21, 2006 Respectfully submitted, _/s/ Timothy K. Webster Timothy K. Webster (D.C. Bar No. 441297) SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 736-8000 (202) 736-8711 (fax) Counsel for Defendants D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, Wallace Eugene Shipp, Jr., Leonard H. Becker, Elizabeth J. Branda, Catherine Kello, and Lalla Shishkevish 26 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 29 of 30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., Defendants ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:06CV01665 (RJL) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the following parties were served via first class mail, postage prepaid, on November 21, 2006: T. Carlton Richardson Pro se 1505 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE Washington, D.C. 20003-3117 District of Columbia Honorable Anthony A. Williams, Mayor 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 6th Floor Washington, D.C. 20004 Honorable Robert J. Spagnoletti Attorney General 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 6th Floor Washington, D.C. 20004 D.C Court of Appeals 500 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Court Services & Supervision Agency for D.C. 1418 Good Hope Road, SE Washington, D.C. 20020 Donna M. DeSilva 2550 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 /s/ Timothy K. Webster Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 30 of 30 EXHIBIT 1 Original Florida Discipline Florida Bar v. Richardson 574 So.2d 60 (Fla.1990) Richardson v. Florida Bar 1990 WL 116727 No. 90-984 (D.D.C. May 15, 1990) Richardson I-A In re Richardson 602 A.2d 179 (D.C. 1992) Richardson I-B Second Florida Discipline and Interim Suspension Florida Bar v. Richardson 604 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1992) In the Matter of Richardson No. 95-BG-639 (D.C. June 27, 1995) Richardson II-A Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals No. 95-CV-1272 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1995) Richardson II-B In re Richardson No. 95-5241 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1995) Richardson II-C Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals 83 F.3d 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1996) No. 95-7211 Richardson II-D In re Richardson No. 95-8519 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 29, 1995) Richardson II-E Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals 962 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997) No. 96-2535 Richardson II-F Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals 1997 WL 811754 No. 97-7085 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 1997) Richardson II-G Investigation and Conviction of Unauthorized Practice of Law Richardson v. D.C. Bar No. 96-CV-2286 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1997) Richardson III-A Richardson v. D.C. Bar 1997 WL 404321 No. 97-7051 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1997) Richardson III-B Richardson v. George Washington Univ. No. CA-98-7961 (D.C. Super. Ct.) Richardson III-C Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals No. 97-CV-1594 (D.D.C. July 17, 1997) Richardson III-D Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals No. 97-7242 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 1998) Richardson III-E In re Richardson 759 A.2d 649 (D.C. 2000) Richardson III-F Richardson v. Court Servs. & Offend. Superv. Agency No. 99-657 (D.D.C. Jul. 11, 2001) Richardson III-G Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-2 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 2 Richardson v. D.C. Court Servs. & Offend. Superv. Agency No. 01-7135 Richardson III-H Final Discipline In re Richardson 692 A.2d 427 (D.C. 1997) No. 95-BG-639 Richardson IV-A Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals No. 04-101 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004) Richardson IV-B Richardson v. District of Columbia No. 05-210 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2005) Richardson IV-C Richardson v. District of Columbia No. 05-7078 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 2005) Richardson IV-D 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-2 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-3 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-3 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-4 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1 2 of 2 DOCUMENTS In re: T. Carlton Richardson No. 95-5241 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28667 August 10, 1995, FILED NOTICE: [*1] RULES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. PRIOR HISTORY: 94cv01272. JUDGES: BEFORE: Wald, Ginsburg, and Randolph, Circuit Judges OPINION: ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for writ of mandamus, it is ORDERED that the petition be denied. "The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations." Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289, 99 L. Ed. 2d 296, 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988). In order to obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner must establish that there is no other adequate remedy available. Council of and for the Blind of Del. County Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 228 U.S. App. D.C. 295, 709 F.2d 1521, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc). As Richardson can appeal the district court's order dismissing his action, he has failed to make such a showing. See In re GTE Service Corp., 246 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 762 F.2d 1024, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Per Curiam Page 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-5 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1 LEXSEE 83 F.3D 1513 T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, APPELLANT v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, APPELLEE No. 95-7211 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 317 U.S. App. D.C. 465; 83 F.3d 1513; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11836 May 7, 1996, Argued May 24, 1996, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (No. 95cv01272). DISPOSITION: Affirmed. CASE SUMMARY: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant lawyer sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed his claim against his suspension from the practice of law and abstained from hearing his claim against the D.C. Bar rule, D.C. App. Rule XI § 11(d). The lawyer alleged that his suspension by appellee, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, unconstitutionally deprived him of his liberty interest in practicing law. OVERVIEW: Faced with disbarment proceedings in Florida, the lawyer petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for permission to resign. His petition was granted. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals temporarily suspended him from the practice of law in the District. The lawyer filed suit. The district court dismissed his claim against his suspension for want of jurisdiction and abstained from hearing his claim against the D.C. Bar rule itself. On appeal, the court found that the lawyer's complaint about the D.C. Court of Appeals's order fell squarely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which federal district courts lacked jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts. Even if the suspension were not final for purposes of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1257, the district court would have lacked jurisdiction. The boundaries of § 1257's grant of Supreme Court jurisdiction did not prevent the application of Rooker-Feldman to the final decisions of lower state courts, or to state courts' interlocutory decisions. The lawyer's attacks on the constitutionality of the Bar rule were the same attack on the decision to suspend him. The district court lacked jurisdiction. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. LexisNexis(R) Headnotes Civil Procedure > Judgments > Preclusion & Effect of Judgments > Full Faith & Credit > Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Civil Procedure > U.S. Supreme Court Review > State Court Decisions [HN1] Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts. Congress has vested federal court review of such decisions in the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1257, and Rooker-Feldman makes clear that that jurisdiction is exclusive. Civil Procedure > U.S. Supreme Court Review > State Court Decisions [HN2] The boundaries of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1257's grant of Supreme Court jurisdiction do not prevent the application of Rooker-Feldman to the final decisions of lower state courts, or to state courts' interlocutory decisions. Page 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-6 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 4 Civil Procedure > Judgments > Preclusion & Effect of Judgments > Full Faith & Credit > Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Civil Procedure > U.S. Supreme Court Review > State Court Decisions [HN3] A United States Court of Appeals holds no warrant to review even final judgments of state courts, let alone those which may never take final effect because they remain subject to revision in the state appellate system. Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview Civil Procedure > Judgments > Preclusion & Effect of Judgments > Full Faith & Credit > Rooker-Feldman Doctrine [HN4] Despite Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court may sometimes have jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a general bar rule promulgated by a state or District of Columbia court in a nonjudicial capacity. Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Suspensions [HN5] See D.C. App. Rule XI § 11(d). Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview Civil Procedure > Judgments > Preclusion & Effect of Judgments > Full Faith & Credit > Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Civil Procedure > U.S. Supreme Court Review > State Court Decisions [HN6] The principle allowing federal district court adjudication of attacks on bar rules would thoroughly undermine Rooker-Feldman if it encompassed claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the judicial actions immunized under Rooker-Feldman. COUNSEL: T. Carlton Richardson, appearing pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Martin B. White, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Charles F. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, argued the cause for appellee. JUDGES: Before: WILLIAMS, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS. OPINION BY: WILLIAMS OPINION: [*1514] WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: Faced with disbarment proceedings in Florida, T. Carlton Richardson petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for permission to resign, with leave to reapply in three years. The court granted the petition and deemed Richardson to have resigned. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals thereupon temporarily suspended Richardson from the practice of law in the District, to enable the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility to conduct reciprocal disciplinary proceedings against him. See In the Matter of T. Carlton Richardson, No. 95-BG-639 (D.C. App. 1993). Richardson filed suit in federal district court alleging that [**2] his temporary suspension, and the D.C. Bar rule that permits it, see D.C. App. Rule XI § 11(d), unconstitutionally deprive him, without due process, of his liberty interest in practicing law. The district court dismissed Richardson's claim against his suspension for want of jurisdiction under District of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983), and abstained from hearing his claim against the D.C. Bar rule itself under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971). Richardson appealed. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear either of Richardson's claims, we affirm without reaching the issue of Younger abstention. Richardson's complaint to the district court about the D.C. Court of Appeals's order falls squarely within [HN1] the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts. See Feldman; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 68 L. Ed. 362, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923). Congress has vested federal court review of such decisions in the Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and Rooker-Feldman makes clear that that jurisdiction is exclusive. Richardson does not deny [**3] that the order effecting his suspension was a judicial decision. Rather, Page 2 317 U.S. App. D.C. 465; 83 F.3d 1513, *; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11836, **1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-6 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 4 he says that the order is merely interlocutory, and that Rooker-Feldman's bar against district court jurisdiction was meant to apply only coextensively with the set of "final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State" reviewable by the Supreme Court under § 1257. The District argues that the order of the D.C. Court of Appeals temporarily suspending Richardson is clearly a "final" decision for purposes of § 1257, much as the Georgia Supreme Court's reversal of the lower court's denial of a temporary injunction was final in Construction Laborers' v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548-552, 9 L. Ed. 2d 514, 83 S. Ct. 531 (1963). See also Nat'l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44, 53 L. Ed. 2d 96, 97 S. Ct. 2205 (1977) (reviewing as final a state supreme court's refusal to stay trial court's injunction pending appeal). Richardson's complaint is that his temporary suspension violates the Constitution, and its rejection by the D.C. Court of Appeals appears to be amenable to treatment as a final order: the issue is legally entirely separate from any claims to be resolved in the substantive [*1515] disciplinary proceedings that appear destined to follow; it has [**4] been finally resolved by the D.C. Court of Appeals; and it cannot be cured by any remedy given at the end of the substantive proceedings. See Curry, 371 U.S. at 549; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949) (setting out the elements of this test); cf. Board of Education v. Illinois State Board of Education, 79 F.3d 654, 656-59 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding an order appealable both as an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and as a "final" order under Cohen). Even if the suspension were not final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the district court would have lacked jurisdiction. We cannot imagine how one could reconcile Feldman's reasoning, based as it is on allowing state courts to arrive at decisions free from collateral federal attack, with the idea that the district court would be free to review Richardson's suspension so long as the decision was interlocutory. Indeed, other circuits have persuasively concluded that [HN2] the boundaries of § 1257's grant of Supreme Court jurisdiction do not prevent the application of Rooker-Feldman to the final decisions of lower state courts, or to state courts' interlocutory [**5] decisions. As the Fifth Circuit explained, discussing Feldman, [HN3] we hold no warrant to review even final judgments of state courts, let alone those which may never take final effect because they remain subject to revision in the state appellate system. Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1986) (refusing to entertain constitutional challenge to state court divorce decree). See also Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1990) (Feldman bars federal district court from hearing constitutional challenge to state court's discovery order); cf. Port Auth. PBA v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3rd Cir. 1992) (Rooker-Feldman's bar applies to decisions of lower state courts in addition to those of the highest one). [HN4] Despite Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court may sometimes have jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a general bar rule promulgated by a state or District of Columbia court in a nonjudicial capacity. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86 & n.16. We thus turn to consider the district court's possible jurisdiction over Richardson's purportedly independent claims as to the constitutionality of the rule that [**6] the D.C. Court of Appeals applied. D.C. App. Rule XI § 11(d) provides: [HN5] Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that an attorney ... has been suspended ... by a disciplining court outside the District of Columbia ..., the [D.C.] Court [of Appeals] shall forthwith enter an order suspending the attorney from the practice of law in the District of Columbia pending final disposition of any reciprocal disciplinary proceeding, and directing the attorney to show cause within thirty days from the date of the order why the identical discipline should not be imposed. [HN6] The principle allowing federal district court adjudication of attacks on bar rules would, of course, thoroughly undermine Rooker-Feldman if it encompassed claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the judicial actions immunized under Rooker-Feldman. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16. In Feldman itself, attorneys who had not graduated from ABA-accredited Page 3 317 U.S. App. D.C. 465; 83 F.3d 1513, *1514; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11836, **3 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-6 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 3 of 4 law schools challenged both the District's refusal to waive the accreditation requirement (when, it was claimed, the District had done so for similarly situated applicants) and the rule under which the District generally [**7] refused to admit such applicants. The plaintiffs' attacks on the District rule were found to be extricable from the District's refusal to grant a waiver, as the former did not even contemplate the granting of a waiver. Thus, the core of plaintiffs' generalized challenge was independent of the specific decision to deny a waiver and the unequal treatment that it was claimed to demonstrate. Id. at 487-88 & n.18. Richardson's attacks on § 11(d)'s constitutionality, however, are not merely intertwined with his attack on the decision to suspend him but are one and the same--namely, that application of § 11(d)'s procedures [*1516] (or lack of procedures) deprives him of his liberty interest in the practice of law without due process. His attack on the rule cannot be contemplated without his attack on his suspension. Absent any actual or imminent application to Richardson, it is doubtful that he would have standing to secure adjudication of his general due process claim. See Levin v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Ill., 74 F.3d 763, 766-68 (7th Cir. 1996) (after plaintiff was disbarred, he would lack the "personal stake" needed for an independent [**8] constitutional attack on state's rules concerning disbarment); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (plaintiff has no standing to seek injunctive relief against police chokehold practice without showing imminent application to himself); Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544-45 (10th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff lacks standing to challenge state rules on default judgments, under which he lost a case, independent of his attempt to have the judgment against him undone). The actual application of § 11(d) is obviously encompassed in the Court of Appeals's order and review barred under Feldman; imminent application is not in the cards, as Richardson has already been suspended. By contrast, if the Feldman plaintiffs lost their attack on the court's denial of waivers of the accreditation rule, they might still be positioned to attack the rule itself. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction over Richardson's claims. Richardson is entitled to have his claims heard through the course of proceedings in the District of Columbia courts and, if unsatisfied, through petition for certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The decision of the district court [**9] to dismiss his claims is therefore Affirmed. Page 4 317 U.S. App. D.C. 465; 83 F.3d 1513, *1515; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11836, **6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-6 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 4 of 4 LEXSEE 962 FSUPP 1 T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 96-02535 (SS) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 962 F. Supp. 1; 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4558 March 26, 1997, Decided March 27, 1997, FILED DISPOSITION: [**1] Defendants' motions for summary judgment GRANTED; and case DISMISSED. COUNSEL: T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, plaintiff, Pro se, Washington, DC. For DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, defendant: Charles W. Scarborough, ARNOLD & PORTER, Washington, DC. Lisa Annette Bell, OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C., Washington, DC. For BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DCCA, defendant: Charles W. Scarborough, (See above). For LEONARD H. BECKER, defendant: Charles W. Scarborough, (See above). For DONNA M. DESILVA, defendant: Charles W. Scarborough, (See above). JUDGES: Stanley Sporkin, United States District Judge OPINION BY: Stanley Sporkin OPINION: [*1] MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss and Plaintiff's opposition thereto. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on February 21, 1997. Plaintiff, pro se, challenges on Constitutional grounds his March 12, 1996 temporary suspension from the District of Columbia bar. Plaintiff was suspended following his resignation from the Florida bar, n1 pursuant to D.C. App. Rule XI § 11(d), which provides for temporary suspension in the District of Columbia upon notice to the D.C. Court of Appeals that an attorney [**2] has been suspended from another state's bar. Plaintiff contends that he should not have been suspended in the District of Columbia because he resigned in Florida. He claims he was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because the D.C. Court of Appeals did not give him a hearing on this issue before temporarily suspending him. He seeks injunctive and monetary relief. n1 Plaintiff voluntarily resigned from the Florida bar following allegations that he had engaged in misconduct. Plaintiff previously challenged the constitutionality of his temporary suspension before Judge Hogan in Case No. 95-CV-1272. Judge Hogan dismissed Plaintiff's claim because federal district courts lack jurisdiction to hear challenges to the attorney disciplinary proceedings of state courts. Judge Hogan's decision was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 317 U.S. App. D.C. 465, 83 F.3d 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not distinguished this case from the suit he brought [**3] before Judge Hogan. The D.C. Circuit was clear in that case: Richardson's attacks on § 11(d)'s constitutionality. . . are not merely intertwined with his attack on the decision Page 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-7 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 2 to suspend him but are one and the same -- namely, that application of § 11(d)'s procedures (or lack of procedures) deprives him of his liberty interest in the practice of law without due process. His attack on the rule cannot be contemplated without his attack on his suspension. 83 F.3d at 1515-16. The decision to temporarily suspend Plaintiff was a final judgment of the D.C. Court of Appeals. Id. at 1514-15. This Court cannot review the constitutionality of the underlying D.C. Bar rule if the net effect is to reverse that final judgment. Id. at 1514-16. Plaintiff can attack that decision [*2] by seeking certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1515. n2 n2 Even if this Court were to reach the substantive question of Plaintiff's due process rights, it is not apparent, based on Plaintiff's own representations, how his due process rights were violated. Although Plaintiff did not appear in person before the D.C. Court of Appeals before the temporary suspension was first initiated, he was given notice and did respond to that notice in writing. It was the opportunity to respond in writing that constituted Plaintiff's due process. He was granted further due process when he appeared before the D.C. Court of Appeals for a post-deprivation hearing. [**4] It is clear to the Court that Plaintiff is trying to get, at the very least, a second bite at the apple. Having previously been rebuffed by Judge Hogan and the D.C. Circuit, Plaintiff has attempted to bring the same action again. Plaintiff, like many pro se litigants, feels very passionate about his cause, as was demonstrated by his "vigorous" performance at oral argument. Nevertheless, this Court has broad powers under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11 to sanction an attorney or party who abuses the process by bringing frivolous or repetitive litigation. If Plaintiff's ultimate goal is to be reinstated as an attorney in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, he would do well to think hard before filing another suit such as this one. The Court will grant Defendants' motions for summary judgment. An appropriate order follows this opinion. 3/26/97 Date Stanley Sporkin United States District Judge ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss and Plaintiff's opposition thereto. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motions for summary judgment be GRANTED; and it is further [**5] ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED. 3/26/97 Date Stanley Sporkin United States District Judge Page 2 962 F. Supp. 1, *1; 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4558, **3 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-7 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 2 2 of 3 DOCUMENTS T. Carlton Richardson, Appellant v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, et al., Appellees No. 97-7085 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 37569 December 9, 1997, Filed NOTICE: [*1] RULES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. PRIOR HISTORY: 96cv02535. DISPOSITION: Motions for summary affirmance granted. COUNSEL: T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Pro se, Washington, DC. For DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS: Charles Wylie Scarborough, Arnold & Porter, Lutz A. Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Jo Anne Robinson, Interim Corporation Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, Washington, DC. For BOARD ON PROF. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE D.C. COURT OF APPEALS, LEONARD H. BECKER, DONNA M. DESILVA: Kenneth A. Letzler, Charles Wylie Scarborough, John A. Freedman, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC. JUDGES: BEFORE: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Henderson, Circuit Judges. OPINION: ORDER Upon consideration of the motions for summary affirmance, the response thereto, and the replies, it is ORDERED that the motions for summary affirmance be granted substantially for the reasons stated by the district court in its order filed March 27, 1997. Because appellant essentially seeks review of decisions of the District of Columbia [*2] Court of Appeals, and his general constitutional challenge to that court's rule is inextricably intertwined with those decisions, the district court correctly found jurisdiction lacking. See Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 317 U.S. App. D.C. 465, 83 F.3d 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 404, 127 F.3d 72, 1997 WL 637610 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Levin v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of the Supreme Court of Ill., 74 F.3d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1072, 116 S. Ct. 2553 (1996). The merits of the parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 260 U.S. App. D.C. 334, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Walker v. Washington, 201 U.S. App. D.C. 82, 627 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See [*3] D.C. Cir. Rule 41. Per Curiam Page 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-8 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-9 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1 2 of 2 DOCUMENTS T. Carlton Richardson, Appellant v. District of Columbia Bar Association, et al., Appellees No. 97-7051 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19078 June 30, 1997, FILED NOTICE: [*1] RULES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. PRIOR HISTORY: 96cv02286. DISPOSITION: Motion for leave to file a surreply denied. Motion for summary reversal denied. Motion for summary affirmance granted. LexisNexis(R) Headnotes Civil Procedure > Pretrial Matters > Subpoenas Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > State Application [HN1] The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia. Constitutional Law > Relations Among Governments > Privileges & Immunities Constitutional Law > Privileges & Immunities [HN2] The Privileges and Immunities Clause of U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 applies only to claims that a state illegally discriminates against nonresidents. COUNSEL: T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Pro se, Law Offices of Theodore Carlton Richardson, Washington, DC. For DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR ASSOCIATION: Elizabeth Sarah Gere, Erik Jorma Salovaara, Ross, Dixon & Masback, Washington, DC. For LEONARD H. BECKER: Hamilton Phillips Fox, III, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, DC. For DONNA M. DESILVA: Hamilton Phillips Fox, III, (See above). For GARLAND PINKSTON, JR.: Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Jo Anne Robinson, Acting Corporation Counsel, Corporation Counsel, (Appellate Division), Washington, DC. For SIGNET BANK NA: Robert Lawrence Ferguson, Jr., Ferguson, Schetelich, Hefferman & Murdock, Baltimore, MD. JUDGES: BEFORE: Wald, Rogers, and Tatel, Circuit Judges OPINION: ORDER Upon consideration of the motion for summary reversal, and the opposition thereto; the motion for leave to file a surreply; the motion [*2] for summary affirmance, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a surreply be denied. The Clerk is directed to return the lodged surreply. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary reversal be denied. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog. Inc. v. Stanley, 260 U.S. App. D.C. Page 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 2 334, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Walker v. Washington, 201 U.S. App. D.C. 82, 627 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). The district court's dismissal of appellant's complaint was proper because the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellees' alleged actions did not violate appellant's privacy rights under either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments because he neither owned nor possessed the check used to institute the investigation or the bank records which were subpoenaed. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 442-43, 445-46, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976); Donaldson v. United [*3] States, 400 U.S. 517, 522-24, 27 L. Ed. 2d 580, 91 S. Ct. 534 (1971); see also In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, because appellant had no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in the check or bank records at issue, appellees' actions did not violate his procedural due process rights. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 n.5 (bank customer not entitled to notice of bank's receipt of or intent to comply with subpoena for customer's bank records); United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 49 (1974) (same). The court notes that appellant's reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment is misplaced, as [HN1] the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 98 L. Ed. 884, 74 S. Ct. 693 (1954) (applying Fifth Amendment to District of Columbia because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states). Likewise, appellant's recent invocation of [HN2] the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution is of no help to him, as that provision applies only to claims that a state illegally discriminates against nonresidents, see Hague v. C.I.O., [*4] 307 U.S. 496, 511, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939), and Richardson did not allege either that he is a nonresident of the District of Columbia or that appellees treated him differently from how it treats District of Columbia residents in like cases. Finally, the allegations in the complaint provided no basis to impose common law tort liability upon appellees for wrongful disclosure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or wrongful interference with appellant's economic interests. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C. Cir. Rule 41. Per Curiam Page 2 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19078, *2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-10 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 2 District of Columbia live database - Docket Report https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?399508077931496-... 1 of 2 11/21/2006 4:56 PM CLOSED, JURY, TYPE-D U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:97-cv-01594-SS RICHARDSON v. DC COURT OF APPEALS Assigned to: Stanley Sporkin Demand: $0 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights Date Filed: 07/11/1997 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question Plaintiff T. CARLTON RICHARDSON represented by T. CARLTON RICHARDSON 1505 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20003 (202) 347-4466 Fax: AREA CODE (202) PRO SE V. Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS Date Filed # Docket Text 07/11/1997 1 COMPLAINT filed by plaintiff T. CARLTON RICHARDSON; jury demand (st) (Entered: 07/22/1997) 07/11/1997 SUMMONS issued for defendant DC COURT OF APPEALS (st) (Entered: 07/22/1997) 07/11/1997 2 MOTION filed by plaintiff T. CARLTON RICHARDSON for temporary restraining order (st) (Entered: 07/22/1997) 07/11/1997 MOTION HEARING before Judge Stanley Sporkin denied motion for temporary restraining order [2-1] by T. CARLTON RICHARDSON Reporter: B. Byrne (lin) (Entered: 07/22/1997) 07/17/1997 3 ORDER by Judge Stanley Sporkin : denying motion for temporary restraining order [2-1] by T. CARLTON RICHARDSON dismissing case(N) (lin) (Entered: 07/23/1997) 07/30/1997 4 MOTION filed by plaintiff T. CARLTON RICHARDSON for reconsideration of order [3-1] (st) (Entered: 07/31/1997) 11/26/1997 5 ORDER by Judge Stanley Sporkin : denying motion for reconsideration of order [3-1] [4-1] by T. CARLTON RICHARDSON (N) (lin) (Entered: Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 9 District of Columbia live database - Docket Report https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?399508077931496-... 2 of 2 11/21/2006 4:56 PM 12/02/1997) 12/24/1997 6 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff T. CARLTON RICHARDSON from order [5-1], order [3-1] , entered on: 7/23/97 dismissing complaint,12/2/97 denying motion for reconsideration. Fees paid, copies mailed. (st) (Entered: 12/29/1997) 12/29/1997 TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [6-1] by T. CARLTON RICHARDSON to U.S. Court of Appeals (st) (Entered: 12/29/1997) 12/30/1997 USCA # 97-7242 assigned for appeal [6-1] by T. CARLTON RICHARDSON (st) (Entered: 12/31/1997) 01/20/1999 7 CERTIFIED COPY of judgment filed in USCA dated 9/16/98, on appeal [6-1] , affirming the judgment of USDC . USCA # 97-7242 (cjp) (Entered: 01/20/1999) PACER Service Center Transaction Receipt 11/21/2006 16:56:30 PACER Login: bc0229 Client Code: wes-wrwr Description: Docket Report Search Criteria: 1:97-cv-01594-SS Billable Pages: 1 Cost: 0.08 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 3 of 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 4 of 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 5 of 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 6 of 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 7 of 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 8 of 9 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-11 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 9 of 9 2 of 3 DOCUMENTS T. Carlton Richardson, Appellant v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Appellee No. 97-7242 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26029 September 16, 1998, Filed NOTICE: [*1] RULES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported in Table Case Format at: 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 38370. PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 97cv01594. DISPOSITION: Affirmed. COUNSEL: T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, Pro se, Washington, DC. For DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant - Appellee: John M. Ferren, Corporation Counsel, Lutz A. Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, Washington, DC. JUDGES: BEFORE: Wald, Williams, and Garland, Circuit Judges. OPINION: JUDGMENT This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. The court has determined that the issues presented occasion no need for an opinion. See D.C. Cir. Rule 36(b). It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court's order filed July 17, 1997 be affirmed. Federal courts lack jurisdiction [*2] to review the judicial acts of state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416, 68 L. Ed. 362, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 317 U.S. App. D.C. 465, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Appellant sought relief on the basis of alleged judicial errors in his contempt proceeding in the D.C. Superior Court, and thus the complaint was properly dismissed. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C. Cir. Rule 41. Per Curiam Page 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-12 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1 The Court may consider sua sponte its own subject matter jurisdiction at any time. 1/ Murphy Exploration and Prod. Co. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 479-80 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds, 252 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). -1- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 04-101 (ESH) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT ) OF APPEALS, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff has now filed suit for the third time against the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Each of these suits involves a challenge to the constitutionality of his temporary suspension from the District of Columbia Bar. Since both of his prior suits were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, this Court issued an Order on March 10, 2004, requiring plaintiff to show cause on or before March 20, 2004, why this case should not also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Based on consideration of his response to that Order and a review of his complaint, the Court finds that this case is indistinguishable from the suits he brought before Judges Hogan and Sporkin, and, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s challenge.1/ In two prior suits, plaintiff attempted to challenge D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(d), which Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 8 Filed 03/31/2004 Page 1 of 5 Case 1:06-cv 01665-RJL Document 10-13 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 1 of 11 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which stands for the proposition that federal district2/ courts lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions of state and D.C. courts, takes its name from two Supreme Court decisions. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923), the Court found that only the Supreme Court has authority to reconsider a decision of the highest court of a state, and accordingly, a federal district court lacks such authority. The Feldman case considered facts remarkably similar to those at issue here. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). There, D.C. Bar applicants challenged the D.C. Court of Appeals’ refusal to waive its admission rule requiring applicants to have graduated from accredited law schools. The Supreme Court held that, to the extent that D.C. Bar applicants sought review of District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denials of their petitions for waiver, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the denials because they constituted judicial decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at 476-82. However, the Court found that the district court would have jurisdiction to hear their due process claims to the extent they were not intertwined with a challenge to a judicial decision. Id. at 482-87. -2- requires the D.C. Court of Appeals to temporarily suspend from the practice of law an attorney who has been suspended by a disciplining court outside the District of Columbia. In both cases, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Richardson I”); Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 962 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.) (“Richardson II”), aff’d, No. 97-7085, 1997 WL 811754 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 (1998). In Richardson I, the D.C. Circuit found that the D.C. Court of Appeals’ order temporarily suspending Mr. Richardson from practicing law fell “squarely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which federal2/ district courts lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts,” as well as those claims inextricably intertwined with such a judicial decision. 83 F.3d at 1514, 1515. The Circuit found Richardson's attacks on § 11(d)'s constitutionality . . . are not merely intertwined with his attack on the decision to suspend him but are one and the same--namely, that application of § 11(d)'s procedures (or lack of procedures) deprives him of his liberty interest in the practice of law without due process. His attack on the rule cannot be contemplated without his attack on his suspension. Absent any actual or imminent application to Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 8 Filed 03/31/2004 Page 2 of 5 Case 1:06-cv 01665-RJL Document 10-13 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 2 of 11 In this regard, this Court agrees wholeheartedly with the observations of Judge Sporkin:3/ “If Plaintiff’s ultimate goal is to be reinstated as an attorney in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, he would do well to think hard before filing another suit such as this one.” Id. at 2. -3- Richardson, it is doubtful that he would have standing to secure adjudication of his general due process claim. Id. at 1515-16. Likewise, in Richardson II, Judge Sporkin found that Mr. Richardson failed to distinguish his suit from Richardson I, and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the disciplinary rule. 962 F. Supp. at 1 (“The decision to temporarily suspend Plaintiff was a final judgment of the D.C. Court of Appeals. This Court cannot review the constitutionality of the underlying D.C. Bar rule if the net effect is to reverse that final judgment.” (internal citations omitted).) The D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed. 1997 WL3/ 811754, at *1. Here, Mr. Richardson challenges for the third time the constitutionality of D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(d), and he also asks the Court to declare unconstitutional D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(f) (now § 14(g)). Section 14(g) requires a suspended attorney to file, within ten days of suspension, an affidavit asserting, inter alia, compliance with the suspension order. D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g). Mr. Richardson claims a due process violation occurs when a suspended attorney, who fails to file this affidavit, is “sanctioned automatically through judicial notice procedures without notice and an evidentiary hearing with the imposition of the period in which the registration noncompliance existed . . . .” (Compl. ¶4.1(d).) In an attempt to avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Mr. Richardson now argues in his Response that this Court “is not being called upon to review a judicial decision of the D.C. Court Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 8 Filed 03/31/2004 Page 3 of 5 Case 1:06-cv 01665-RJL Document 10-13 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 3 of 11 As noted in Richardson I, plaintiff did not contest that the suspension order was a4/ judicial decision. 83 F.3d at 1514. -4- of Appeals, only non-judicial acts in the legislating, executing, and administering the bar disciplinary rules governing reciprocal discipline.” (Pls.’ Response at 4.) Plaintiff’s argument misinterprets Rooker-Feldman, for even if the bar rule is not a judicial decision, a challenge to it would be inextricably intertwined with the Court of Appeals’ ruling on Mr. Richardson’s suspension, which is a judicial decision. Specifically, if this Court were to review the4/ constitutionality of § 14(g), the net effect of any relief it could grant would be to reverse the Court of Appeals’ final judgment. As held in Richardson I, this is an impermissible challenge to the D.C. Court of Appeals’ ruling. 83 F.3d at 1515-16. The same is true with respect to plaintiff’s challenge to § 11, which he claims “violates the due process rights of attorneys.” (Compl. ¶ 4.1(b).) As has been held on two prior occasions, this rule cannot be challenged without challenging the Court of Appeals’ suspension ruling, and thus, suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Richardson I, 83 F.3d at 1515-16; Richardson II, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1. Mr. Richardson also appears to challenge the procedure this Court has invoked to determine whether jurisdiction is proper. In particular, he suggests that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. However, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing here as there are no contested facts. The question plaintiff seeks to have answered by an evidentiary hearing -- whether his complaint challenges a judicial decision, thus falling under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine -- is legal, not factual. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 n.13 (“it is a question of federal law whether a particular proceeding before another tribunal was Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 8 Filed 03/31/2004 Page 4 of 5 Case 1:06-cv 01665-RJL Document 10-13 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 4 of 11 On March 16, 2004, the Clerk of Court entered default against defendant. Defendant5/ has filed a meritorious motion to vacate default entry and to stay. Because plaintiff’s complaint is being dismissed with prejudice, the Court need not address defendant’s motion. -5- truly judicial for purposes of ascertaining the jurisdiction of a federal court” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff has been provided with an opportunity to respond, and as did the courts in Richardson I and II, this Court has considered his legal arguments. No further hearing or procedure is necessary in order to decide this legal question. In short, plaintiff is not entitled to yet a third bite at the apple by bringing another due process challenge to his suspension from the D.C. Bar. This Court lacks jurisdiction over his claim, and therefore, his complaint must be dismissed. 5/ A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: March 31, 2004 Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 8 Filed 03/31/2004 Page 5 of 5 Case 1:06-cv 01665-RJL Document 10-13 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 5 of 11 -1- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 04-101 (ESH) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT ) OF APPEALS, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION After this Court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for lack of jurisdiction on March 31, 2004, plaintiff filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to File a Motion to Reconsider Dismissal. He argues that, because the dismissal order was not mailed until April 8, 2004, the ten-day time period within which he could move to reconsider the Court’s judgment should be expanded. Because the Court lacks authority to extend the time for filing a motion to reconsider, plaintiff’s motion must be denied. Plaintiff seeks enlargement of the time allotted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to move for reconsideration of the Court’s judgment. Rule 59(e) requires any motion to alter or amend a court’s judgment to be filed “no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) permits a court to enlarge time limits imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except in certain circumstances. Specifically, a court “may not extend the time for taking any action under Rule[] . . . 59(e), except to the extent and under the conditions Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 13 Filed 05/06/2004 Page 1 of 4 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10- Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 6 of 11 Plaintiff notes that Good Friday -- a Christian holiday -- fell on April 9, 2004, the day1/ he received the Court’s judgment, and that he is a “devout observant and adherent (and currently a seminarian). (Pl.’s Mot. at 1 (emphasis in original).) Although it may be unfortunate, this timing does not alter Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)’s ten-day period, as Good Friday is not among the enumerated legal holidays excluded from the computation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Moreover, Mr. Richardson is incorrect in reading the statute to add a “3-day grace period” to the ten-day period. “[W]henever a party has a right or is required to do some act . . . within a prescribed period after the service of a notice . . . , 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (emphasis added). However, Rule 59(e)’s ten-day period commences from the date judgment is entered -- not from the date of service of any notice -- and thus, three days are not added to this period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 6(e); see also Derrington-Bey v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 39 F.3d 1224, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994). -2- stated” in that rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Rule 59(e) contains no provisions for extending its ten-day limit. Here, the Court’s judgment was entered on March 31, 2004, mailed on April 8, 2004, and received by plaintiff on April 9, 2004. Accordingly, excluding intermediate Saturdays and Sundays, the ten-day period expired and any Rule 59(e) motion was due on April 14, 2004. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 59(e). On that date, plaintiff moved for enlargement of time to file his1/ motion to reconsider. A recent D.C. Circuit ruling provides guidance regarding this Court’s ability to grant plaintiff’s motion. See Cooper v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 03-5172, 2004 WL 326220, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 4, 2004) (per curiam). There, the pro se plaintiff asked the Circuit to hold his appeal in abeyance pending the district court’s disposition of his Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider. Id. Plaintiff had received a copy of the district court’s judgment seven calendar days after it was docketed. Id. He then filed his Rule 59(e) motion three days late. Id. The Circuit declined to hold the appeal in abeyance pending the district court’s disposition of plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 13 Filed 05/06/2004 Page 2 of 4 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10- Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 7 of 11 -3- motion because that motion was untimely filed, and the district court simply “has no authority to extend the time for filing such a motion.” Id. To be sure, 10 days for preparing and serving a motion to alter or amend a judgment, even 10 working days, is not much time. Yet there is no doubt that strict compliance is required. District courts do not have even the customary discretion given by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) to enlarge the Rule 59(e) period. The period is to be kept short presumably because a timely Rule 59(e) motion deprives the judgment of finality. Derrington-Bey, 39 F.3d at 1225 (internal citations omitted). Because the Court lacks authority to enlarge the ten-day time period prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), plaintiff’s motion must be denied. Moreover, the Court notes that Mr. Richardson’s claims have been fully considered by this Court and two others, and each dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, No. 04-101, at 1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004); Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 962 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, No. 97-7085, 1997 WL 811754, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 1997) (per curiam), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 (1998). It is therefore clear that even if plaintiff had filed a timely motion, he would not be able to satisfy Rule 59(e)’s requirement as there has been no intervening change of law, there is no indication of new or previously unavailable evidence that would alter this Court’s conclusions, and there is no apparent need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 13 Filed 05/06/2004 Page 3 of 4 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10- Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 8 of 11 -4- A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: May 6, 2004 Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 13 Filed 05/06/2004 Page 4 of 4 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10- Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 9 of 11 By Order dated May 6, 2004, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion pursuant to Rule1/ 59(e). UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 04-0101 (ESH) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT ) OF APPEALS, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and his Motion for Show Cause and Sanctions. By this Order, the Court is ordering the Clerk’s Office to docket both motions. Therefore, the Motion to Show Cause will be dismissed as moot. The Court has also carefully reviewed plaintiff’s latest motion to reconsider, which was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), and it will be denied. 1/ Plaintiff’s claims have been fully considered by this Court and by two other courts, and all have dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff’s latest motion does not change this result. First, it does not satisfy the dictates of Rule 60(b), since the Court does not view the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s motion as “newly-discovered evidence.” Second, his legal argument on the merits is without support. He cannot escape the dictates of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by arguing that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court. Mr. Richardson cites Long v. Shorebank Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 19 Filed 06/25/2004 Page 1 of 2 Case 1:06-cv 01665-RJL Document 10- 3 il 11/ 1/ 6 0 of 11 -2- Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558-60 (7th Cir. 1999), which did not apply Rooker-Feldman because the state statute required that an eviction proceeding “should not be burdened by other matters,” and it thus precluded plaintiff from bringing her federal claims in such a proceeding. That is simply not the case here. D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(d), which Mr. Richardson contests, specifically allows an attorney subject to temporary suspension an opportunity to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. Moreover, this is not a case where there was no state proceeding in which Mr. Richardson could have brought his claim or of which he lacked notice. Cf. Wood v. Orange County, 715 F2d 1543,1547-58 (11th Cir. 1983). In sum, plaintiff has failed to raise any issue that would cause this Court to vacate its prior dismissal. As has been stated before, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter, and this case is dismissed with prejudice. s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: June 24, 2004 Case 1:04-cv-00101-ESH Document 19 Filed 06/25/2004 Page 2 of 2 Case 1:06-cv 01665-RJL Document 10- 3 il 11/ 1/ 6 11 of 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 05-0210 (ESH) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION This is the fourth lawsuit in which plaintiff attempts to challenge his suspension from the practice of law by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In this suit, he adds the District of Columbia, the Office of the D.C. Bar Counsel, the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, and Elizabeth J. Branda, formerly a prosecuting attorney for the Office of the D.C. Bar Counsel, as defendants and also seeks to enjoin the District of Columbia Court of Appeals from further prosecuting a disciplinary case against him. Recognizing that each prior lawsuit has been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause why this case should not also be dismissed. (Order, Feb. 2, 2005.) Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state or District of Columbia courts, as well as claims inextricably intertwined with such decisions. See Richarson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, No. 04-101, slip op. at 2 n.2 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004) (“Richardson III”) (explaining Rooker-Feldman doctrine in detail). Previous dismissals of plaintiff’s cases have held that, because plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to his suspension were inextricably intertwined with a challenge to the Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 16 Filed 03/29/2005 Page 1 of 6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-14 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 1 of 6 Plaintiff also argues in a separate section that his “claims that the state court violated due1/ process in the adjudication that resulted in the judgment” are excepted from Rooker-Feldman. This argument that is identical to number (2) above. - 2 - suspension itself, this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Richardson I”); Richardson v. Dist of Columbia Court of Appeals, 962 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C 1997), aff’d No. 97-7085, 1997 WL 811754 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 (1998) (“Richardson II”); Richardson III, No. 04-101, slip. op. (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that plaintiff has again failed to set forth any basis for attacking his suspension, and the Court therefore will dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ANALYSIS Plaintiff’s response to the February 2 Show Cause Order argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the instant suit’s claims because they (1) were “non-existent or unrelated” when the District of Columbia court’s decision was rendered, (2) are based on “improper procedures” leading up to the judgment and not the judgment itself, (3) arise out of the District of Columbia court’s nonjudicial functions (particularly “prosecutorial misconduct”), or (4) are based on the District of Columbia court’s “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” (Pl.’s1/ Resp. to Show Cause Order at 17-20 (emphasis in original).) None of these arguments is persuasive. I. Claims “Unrelated” To District of Columbia Court’s Judgment Plaintiff first argues that his claims of due process violations, an illegal search and seizure, and “disproportionality of suspension penalty” under the Eighth Amendment are unrelated to the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and thus may be heard by Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 16 Filed 03/29/2005 Page 2 of 6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-14 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 2 of 6 - 3 - this Court. The “unrelated” due process violations alleged by plaintiff all concern the actions of bar prosecutors and administrators, not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and will be dealt with in the Court’s discussion of the nonjudicial function exception below. Plaintiff’s “disproportionate penalty” claim appears to be based on the automatic extension of his license revocation for noncompliance with a D.C. Bar Rule. This is the exact argument-- and even the same rule-- that was addressed and rejected by this Court in Richardson III. No. 04-101, slip op. at 2-4 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004). The Court’s reasoning need not be repeated here. As for any other Eighth Amendment challenge to his suspension, as plaintiff has repeatedly been told, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court judgments even where a constitutional violation is alleged. Finally, plaintiff argues that the bar prosecutors’ subpoena of his bank records in 1996 was an illegal search and seizure which is unrelated to the D.C. Court of Appeals’ judgment and therefore exempted from Rooker-Feldman. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 17.) Nowhere does plaintiff’s Complaint allege this claim, and even if it did, the statute of limitations would divest the Court of jurisdiction. “Since Congress has not provided any federal statute of limitations for actions under [42 U.S.C. ] § 1983, federal law looks to state law.” Harley v. District of Columbia, 1985 WL 8794 at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 1985). The local law provides for a three-year statute of limitations. D.C. Code § 12-301(8). Thus, plaintiff’s claim of an illegal search is approximately six years too late. II. Procedural Due Process Claims Plaintiff’s next claim that he should be able to challenge the procedures leading to his suspension on due process grounds has already been rejected. See Richardson III, slip. op. at 4 Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 16 Filed 03/29/2005 Page 3 of 6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-14 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 3 of 6 - 4 - (where the “net effect of any relief it could grant would be to reverse the Court of Appeals’ final judgment,” the federal district court is not permitted to hear the case); Richardson I, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515-16 (plaintiff’s “attack on the rule [permitting temporary suspension without an evidentiary hearing] cannot be contemplated without his attack on his suspension”). As was the case in his previous lawsuits, the first four “due process violations” alleged by plaintiff are intertwined with, if not identical to, the suspension itself. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 18 (listing six due process violations including, for example, “license revocation based solely upon hearsay evidence”).) The final two “due process violations” listed by plaintiff in support of his argument are allegations of prosecutorial misconduct identical to those upon which plaintiff’s “nonjudicial function” argument is based. Nor is the Court persuaded by plaintiff’s suggestion that his failure to raise his federal constitutional claims in state court requires that they be heard now. See Dist. of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983) (“By failing to raise his [constitutional] claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state court decision in any federal court.”). III. Claims Regarding Nonjudicial Functions Plaintiff also attempts to recast the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ conduct as being executive, administrative, and prosecutorial and thereby not constituting judicial action. (See Compl. ¶¶ 4.1-4.7.) This attempt to refashion his suit is nothing short of frivolous. As in all his other lawsuits, plaintiff objects to the procedures that led up to his suspension from the D.C. Bar, and particularly to the practice of effectuating an interim suspension through an ex parte judicial notice procedure. He now additionally contends that in 2003, he discovered the Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 16 Filed 03/29/2005 Page 4 of 6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-14 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 4 of 6 Plaintiff alleges that Branda determined that the 1992 allegations against plaintiff did not2/ constitute probable cause for opening (“docketing”) a bar disciplinary investigation. (Compl. ¶ 4.2.) - 5 - existence of an “undocketed” 1992 investigation which was later merged with a 19942/ investigation file and formed the basis of his 1995 temporary suspension. Plaintiff claims that he had not been informed of the existence of the 1992 investigation prior to that time and that this fact gives rise to a fraudulent nondisclosure and even a civil conspiracy claim. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5.12, 5.14) But regardless of when plaintiff discovered the facts underlying his claims, it remains that these procedural challenges are inextricably intertwined with the suspension itself. Unlike Feldman, where the district court had jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges to a D.C. bar rule, here, plaintiff challenges only the procedures applied in his particular case. IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Claim Plaintiff’s final argument that a challenge to the District of Columbia Court of Appeal’s subject matter jurisdiction may be heard in this Court is completely without merit. The lower federal courts do not sit to review challenges to state court decisions, including challenges to the state court’s jurisdiction. See generally Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). CONCLUSION Judge Sporkin observed eight years ago that plaintiff was “trying to get, at the very least, a second bite at the apple.” Richardson II, 962 F. Supp. at 2. Plaintiff’s attempt to get yet another bite by recasting his claims as attacks on nonjudicial entities or independent constitutional violations will not be countenanced. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 16 Filed 03/29/2005 Page 5 of 6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-14 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 5 of 6 This action also faces the substantial obstacle of res judicata, which requires that all3/ claims against a party be brought in a single action, not in piece-meal fashion as plaintiff has repeatedly done in this Court. See generally U.S. Indus. v. Blake Construction Co., 765 F.2d 195, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985). - 6 - over plaintiff’s claims and therefore dismisses his complaint. A separate Order accompanies3/ this Memorandum Opinion. s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: March 29, 2005 Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 16 Filed 03/29/2005 Page 6 of 6 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-14 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 6 of 6 Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 22 Filed 02/01/2006 Page 1 of 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-15 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 1 of 2 Case 1:05-cv-00210-ESH Document 22 Filed 02/01/2006 Page 2 of 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-15 Filed 11/21/2 06 Page 2 of 2 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-16 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 2 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 3 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 4 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 5 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 6 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 7 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 8 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 9 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 10 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 11 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 12 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 13 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 14 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 15 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 16 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-17 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 17 of 17 Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-18 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., Defendants ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:06CV01665 (RJL) PROPOSED ORDER The Court has considered the Complaint filed by Plaintiff T. Carlton Richardson, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Defendants’ accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Based on these considerations, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That the Complaint in this action be dismissed with prejudice. Date: _______________ ____________________________________ The Honorable Richard J. Leon United States District Judge Case 1:06-cv-01665-RJL Document 10-19 Filed 11/21/2006 Page 1 of 1