27 Cited authorities

Perdue v. Kenny A.
559 U.S. 542 (2010) Cited 2,494 times 13 Legal Analyses
Holding that enhancement is permitted only in "rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered"
Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr.
664 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2011) Cited 364 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the attorney's substantial evidence pointed to a rate lower than the one requested, but observing that if defendant had submitted no evidence on this issue, then the district court would be required to award fees at plaintiff's proposed rate
Cook v. Niedert
142 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1998) Cited 423 times
Holding that, because a case had been pending before the district court for five years and the district court had seen the parties throughout the case, the district court was "'far better suited than an appellate court to assess a reasonable fee'" (quoting Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1991)(alterations omitted))
In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation
264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001) Cited 235 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts should award class counsel market-rate litigation expenses and that "[i]f counsel submit bills with the level of detail that paying clients find satisfactory, a federal court should not require more"
Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.
463 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006) Cited 177 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding a settlement inadequate because the vouchers "share some characteristics of coupons, including forced future business with the defendant and . . . the likelihood that the full amount of [Defendant's] gains will not be disgorged."
Ciolino v. Frank
716 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2013) Cited 146 times 10 Legal Analyses
Holding that "in a case where the class receives only coupon relief," attorney's fees must "be calculated using the redemption value of the coupons"
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc.
473 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2007) Cited 146 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that when “we find an abuse of discretion in our review of the allocation of funds derived from class settlements, the scheme adopted by the District Court will not be upheld”
Florin v. Nationsbank of Georgia, N.A.
34 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 1994) Cited 144 times
Holding a fee-shifting statute "do[es] not purport to control fee awards in cases settled with the creation of a common fund"
Waters v. Intern. Precious Metals Corp.
190 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) Cited 123 times
Holding that award based on total common fund, rather than on value of claims made, was not an abuse of discretion where the "total fund amount . . . was not illusory or meaningless"
Williams v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.
129 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 1997) Cited 110 times
Holding that the lower court had “abused its discretion by basing the fee on the class members' claims against the fund rather than on a percentage of the entire fund or on the lodestar”
Rule 23 - Class Actions
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Cited 35,144 times 1237 Legal Analyses
Holding that, to certify a class, the court must find that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members"
Section 1712 - Coupon settlements
28 U.S.C. § 1712 Cited 147 times 18 Legal Analyses
Providing that "the portion of any attorney's fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed"

Redman v. Radioshack Corporation

27 Cited authorities

Holding that enhancement is permitted only in "rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered"

Holding that the attorney's substantial evidence pointed to a rate lower than the one requested, but observing that if defendant had submitted no evidence on this issue, then the district court would be required to award fees at plaintiff's proposed rate

Holding that courts should award class counsel market-rate litigation expenses and that "[i]f counsel submit bills with the level of detail that paying clients find satisfactory, a federal court should not require more"

Finding a settlement inadequate because the vouchers "share some characteristics of coupons, including forced future business with the defendant and . . . the likelihood that the full amount of [Defendant's] gains will not be disgorged."

Holding that "in a case where the class receives only coupon relief," attorney's fees must "be calculated using the redemption value of the coupons"

Holding that when “we find an abuse of discretion in our review of the allocation of funds derived from class settlements, the scheme adopted by the District Court will not be upheld”

Holding a fee-shifting statute "do[es] not purport to control fee awards in cases settled with the creation of a common fund"

Holding that award based on total common fund, rather than on value of claims made, was not an abuse of discretion where the "total fund amount . . . was not illusory or meaningless"

Holding that the lower court had “abused its discretion by basing the fee on the class members' claims against the fund rather than on a percentage of the entire fund or on the lodestar”

Holding that, to certify a class, the court must find that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members"

Providing that "the portion of any attorney's fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed"