556 U.S. 418 (2009) Cited 3,292 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that "courts must be mindful that the Government's role as the respondent in every removal proceeding does not make the public interest in each individual one negligible"
Holding that "our venerable standard for assessing a movant's probability of success on the merits remains valid [after the Supreme Court's decision in Winter]"
Holding that to establish irreparable harm the movant must "substantiate the claim that irreparable injury is 'likely' to occur. . . . Bare allegations of what is likely to occur are of no value."
Holding that, "[w]ithout such a substantial indication of probable success, there would be no justification for the court's intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review"
Holding that company's decision to hire employees and purchase materials without assurance that the project would go forward, and the resulting economic harm to the company if the activity was stayed, were "self-imposed costs are not properly the subject of inquiry on a motion for stay"
Holding that "the interpretation of an integrated contract is a question of law unless it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212)
Finding that an FDCPA plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded the causation element of constitutional standing with regard to a defendant debt collector by alleging that the debt collector and the plaintiff's credit union "worked in concert ... to convert [funds] from the Plaintiff's Account" (alteration in original) (quoting the plaintiff's complaint)
15 U.S.C. § 1691 Cited 1,693 times 55 Legal Analyses
Providing that it is unlawful "for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance program"
12 C.F.R. § 202.7 Cited 164 times 2 Legal Analyses
Confirming that with regard to "secured credit, a creditor may require the signature of the applicant's spouse ... on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary ... to make the property being offered as security available to satisfy the debt in the event of a default, for example, an instrument to create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights, or assign earnings"