Patel v. Sure Hands Transportation, Llc et al

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support

N.D. Ga.November 14, 2016

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA KETAN PATEL, Plaintiff, v. SURE HANDS TRANSPORTATION, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company; SURE HANDS CONSULTING, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company; HARVEY WILSON, an individual; and LAWANDA WILSON, an individual, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-cv-04154-AT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COME NOW defendants Sure Hands Transportation, LLC, Sure Hands Consulting, LLC, Harvey Wilson, and Lawanda Wilson (collectively "Defendants"), by and through their undersigned counsel, and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint against Defendants upon the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted. In support of the motion, Defendants rely on the following: (1) Defendants' memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss and all exhibits thereto, filed concurrently herewith; and Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 3 2 (2) All other pleadings and evidence properly before the Court. SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP /s/ Marvis L. Jenkins Marvis L. Jenkins Georgia Bar No. 910827 Attorney for Defendants 1180 W. Peachtree Street NW, Suite 2300 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Telephone: (404) 962-1000 Facsimile: (404) 962-1200 Email: marvis.jenkins@smithmoorelaw.com Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 3 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this date served the within and foregoing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send electronic mail notification of such filing to counsel of record who are CM/ECF participants and mailed by United States Postal Service, first-class, postage prepaid, a paper copy of the same document to counsel of record who are non-CM/ECF participants. Counsel of record is: Justin Oliverio, Esq. Attorney Justin Oliverio, LLC 150 E. Ponce de Leon Avenue Suite 200 Decatur, GA 30030 This 14 th day of November, 2016. SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP /s/ Marvis L. Jenkins Marvis L. Jenkins Georgia Bar No. 910827 Regions Plaza, Suite 2300 1180 W. Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3482 (404) 962-1000 (telephone) (404) 962-1200 (facsimile) ATLANTA 1515914 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA KETAN PATEL, Plaintiff, v. SURE HANDS TRANSPORTATION, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company; SURE HANDS CONSULTING, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company; HARVEY WILSON, an individual; and LAWANDA WILSON, an individual, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-cv-04154-AT MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants Sure Hands Transportation, LLC ("Sure Hands Transportation"), Sure Hands Consulting, LLC, Harvey Wilson, and Lawanda Wilson (collectively "Defendants"), submit this Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully requests the Court grant its Motion and dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 11 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that on or about March 30, 2015, Sure Hands Transportation transported Plaintiff's vehicle from Massachusetts to Locust Grove, Henry County, Georgia. (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶¶ 11, 14). The Bill of Lading for the shipment of Plaintiff's goods confirms that it was indeed shipped by Sure Hands Transportation from Massachusetts to Georgia. (Exhibit B, Bill of Lading). Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was damaged during this interstate transportation as a result of, among other things, negligent conduct, and seeks to recover actual damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and related costs from Defendants. (Complaint, Prayer for Relief). It is clear that all alleged damages Plaintiff seeks to recover arise from the alleged damage to Plaintiff's goods during interstate transport. Plaintiff has cited no independent source of his damages. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud, and seeks to recover punitive damages and attorney's fees. Because Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud seek damages arising from the alleged damage in delivering goods—and not from an independent source—these claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment and must be dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 11 3 ARGUMENT Federal law preempts common law remedies when Congress expressly provides that federal law supplants state authority in any particular field, or when its intent to do so may be inferred from a pervasive system of regulation which does not leave sufficient vacancy within which any state can act. Louisiana Public Service Commission vs. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986); Rice vs. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Preemption may also be inferred where state legislation would impede the purposes and objectives of legislation enacted by Congress. Hines vs. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Hillsboro County vs. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (stating "[e]ven where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when…state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963))). Congress enacted the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") in 1906 in response to the chaotic disparity which resulted from the application of varying state laws to interstate shipping. The Carmack Amendment defined the parameters of carrier liability for loss and damage to goods transported Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 11 4 under interstate bills of lading, bringing uniform treatment to the carrier-shipper relationship. The Carmack Amendment now set forth at 49 U.S.C. § 14706, states in relevant part: A carrier providing transportation or service … shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under this part. That carrier … [is] liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property… 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (emphasis added). Within a few years of the Carmack Amendment's passage, the United States Supreme Court addressed its dual goals of uniformity and preemptive scope. In the seminal case of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913), the Supreme Court defined Carmack preemption in the broadest terms: Almost every detail of the subject [interstate common carriers] is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject, and supersede all state regulations with reference to it … Adams Express, at 505-06. Adams Express held that claims arising out of loss or damage to property transported in interstate commerce are governed by the Carmack Amendment and that all state law claims are preempted. Id. The Court explained the primary objective of the statute is the establishment of a uniform national policy governing liability of interstate carriers: Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 11 5 [T]his branch of interstate commerce was being subjected to such a diversity of legislative and judicial holding that it was practically impossible for a shipper engaged in a business that extended beyond the confines of his own state, or a carrier whose lines were extensive, to know, without considerable investigation and trouble, and even then oftentimes with but little certainty, what would be the carrier's actual responsibility as to the goods delivered to it for transportation from one state to another. The congressional action has made an end to the diversity …. Id. at 505. Three years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Adams Express in Georgia, Florida and Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916). Blish Milling held that the Carmack Amendment is "comprehensive enough to embrace responsibility for all losses resulting from any failure to discharge a carrier's duty as to any part of the agreed transportation …" Id. at 196. (emphasis added). Each succeeding Supreme Court decision interpreting the scope of the Carmack Amendment has repeated the principles enunciated in Adams Express and Blish Milling – the comprehensiveness of application and uniformity of treatment regardless of state laws. See, e.g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) ("'As to interstate shipments, … the parties are held to the responsibilities imposed by the federal law, to the exclusion of all other rules of obligation.'" (quoting Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 203 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 5 of 11 6 (1918))); New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 131 (1953); Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 603-604 (1915) (holding that preemption applies not only to state law claims which directly contradict the procedures or remedies set out in the Carmack Amendment, but also encompasses state causes of action which would otherwise supplement relief under the Carmack Amendment); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371, 378 (1916). The federal Courts of Appeals, including the Eleventh Circuit, have also unanimously and repeatedly held that the Carmack Amendment's broad scope preempts all state law claims, regardless of whether they contradict or supplement Carmack remedies. Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d 1244, 1249 (11 th Cir. 2002) (holding the Carmack Amendment preempted claims for negligence, fraud, wantonness, or willfulness, and outrage based upon alleged failures in the transportation and delivery of goods); Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 383 (5 th Cir. 1998) (holding the Carmack Amendment preempted plaintiff's claims for compensatory, emotional, and punitive damages based on the carrier's alleged "...egregious conduct in the course of discharging its duties under the shipping contract."); Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 306-07 (5 th Cir. 1993) (holding the Carmack Amendment preempted claims of Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 6 of 11 7 misrepresentation, fraud, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 506 (1 st Cir. 1997) (holding state law claims of negligence, misrepresentation, and violation of state Consumer Protection Act are preempted by the Carmack Amendment); Cleveland v. Beltman North Am. Van Lines Co., Inc., 30 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1994) (the Carmack Amendment preempted federal common law claim for punitive damages based upon bad faith claim handling); Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Limited, 986 F2d 700, 706-707 (4 th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f the Interstate Commerce Commission had jurisdiction over the shipment in this case, Shao's common law claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment."); W.D. Lawson & Co., 456 F.2d 419 421 (6 th Cir. 1972) ("As to the …issue … [of] whether or not the Carmack Amendment preempted common law suits … we hold that it did."); see also, Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F3d 282, 289-90 (7 th Cir. 1997) (Carmack Amendment preempted state law claims against the carrier for alleged fraudulent procurement of the transportation agreement and bad faith claim handling); Hughes v. United Van Lines, 829 F.2d 1407, 1415 (7 th Cir. 1987) ("[We] hold that the remedy provision of the Carmack Amendment preempts all state and common law remedies inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act …"); Hughes Aircraft v. North American Van Lines, 970 F.2d 609, 613 (9 th Cir. 1992) ("Hughes [the Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 7 of 11 8 shipper] wisely concede[d] that federal law preempts any state common law action against … a common carrier."); Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. North American Van Lines, 890 F.2d 1112, 1120 (10 th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Carmack Amendment preempts state common law remedies against a carrier for negligent damage to goods shipped under a proper bill of lading."). Finally, federal district courts in the State of Georgia have recognized that the Carmack Amendment preempts state law claims such as those asserted by the Plaintiff here. See, e.g., Andrews v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 1 ; see also, Rykard v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 4:08-CV-74 (CDL), 2008 WL 4003629, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2008). As described above, Plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud stem from an interstate movement of freight by an interstate motor carrier. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that its freight was damaged during transport from Massachusetts to Georgia. This is confirmed by reference to the Bill of Lading for this shipment, showing transport of the freight from Massachusetts to Locust Grove, Henry County, Georgia. Although Plaintiff asserts separate causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud, he asserts 1 To the extent Plaintiff claims rights to recover attorney's fees and punitive damages, these claims are also preempted by the Carmack Amendment, which does not permit recovery of attorney's fees and/or punitive damages. Andrews v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 8 of 11 9 no claims other than those arising from damage to the freight during interstate transport. As the Eleventh Circuit has clearly held, "[t]o accomplish the goal of uniformity, the Carmack Amendment preempts state law claims arising from failures in the transportation and delivery of goods." Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d at 1246. "Almost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject, and supersede all state regulation with reference to it." Id. (quoting Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. at 505-06, 33 S.Ct. at 152. As such, Plaintiff's state law claims are within the class preempted by and governed by the Carmack Amendment and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice, all state law claims enumerated in Counts I - V of Plaintiff's Complaint. This the 14 th day of November, 2016. Respectfully submitted, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP /s/ Marvis L. Jenkins Marvis L. Jenkins Georgia Bar No. 910827 Regions Plaza, Suite 2300 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 9 of 11 10 1180 W. Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3482 (404) 962-1000 (telephone) (404) 962-1200 (facsimile) Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 10 of 11 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this date served the within and foregoing Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send electronic mail notification of such filing to counsel of record who are CM/ECF participants and mailed by United States Postal Service, first-class, postage prepaid, a paper copy of the same document to counsel of record who are non-CM/ECF participants. Counsel of record is: Justin Oliverio, Esq. Attorney Justin Oliverio, LLC 150 E. Ponce de Leon Avenue Suite 200 Decatur, GA 30030 This 14 th day of November, 2016. SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP /s/ Marvis L. Jenkins Marvis L. Jenkins Georgia Bar No. 910827 Regions Plaza, Suite 2300 1180 W. Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3482 (404) 962-1000 (telephone) (404) 962-1200 (facsimile) ATLANTA 1515910 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 11 of 11 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 5 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 6 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 7 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 8 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 9 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 10 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 11 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 12 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 13 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 14 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 15 of 15 Case 1:16-cv-04154-AT Document 2-3 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 1