Holding that destruction of evidence was "grossly negligent, if not reckless" where the defendant "failed to include [evidence from a key employee] in its preservation directive"
Holding it within district court's discretion to resolve ineffective assistance claim on basis of submitted papers, including trial counsel's detailed affidavit contradicting defendant's assertions
Holding that the district court erred in denying leave to amend because plaintiffs "were entitled to amend their complaint as a matter of right without leave of the district court"
Holding that collateral order doctrine afforded Argentina immediate review of order requiring foreign bank to disclose Argentina's worldwide assets because subsequent appellate review was unavailable and Argentina, as judgment debtor rather than party to whom disclosure order was directed, could not obtain review through disobedience and contempt
Holding that employer liability could arise under the principles of Restatement 219 if: the employer was negligent or reckless; or the employee relied on the supervisor's apparent authority; or the supervisor was aided in his harassment by the existence of the agency relationship
Holding individual liable where “the evidence clearly demonstrates that [individual] was the ‘top man’ ... and the corporation functioned for his profit”
Holding that the ADEA does not make it "unlawful . . . for an employer to discharge an employee based on reasonable factors other than age" (citing the RFOA) and noting that cost and administrative convenience may provide two such reasons
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 Cited 13,513 times 153 Legal Analyses
Finding that the rules related to electronic discovery were "not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system, although such access may be justified in some circumstances."