Nikbakhsh-Tali v. Long, et alMOTION for Attorney FeesD. Ariz.July 4, 2008 -1- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Bernadette Connolly, Cal. Bar No. 194633 (Admitted Pro Hac Vice ) LAW OFFICES OF BERNADETTE W. CONNOLLY 1671 The Alameda, Suite 200 San Jose, CA 95126 Tel.: (408) 287-0383 Fax: (408) 287-4260 Attorneys for Petitioner Esfandiar Nikbakhsh-Tali UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA PHOENIX DIVISION In Re: Esfandiar Nikbakhsh-Tali Petitioner, v. Thomas Long, Officer in Charge, Eloy Detention Center; Phillip Crawford, Field Officer Director; Patricia A. Vroom, District Counsel; Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States; Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security Respondents. ) Case No. CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW ) ) Immigration File No.: A20 039 482 ) ) ) PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR AWARD ) OF ATTORNEY’S FEES, COSTS AND ) EXPENSES PURSUANT TO ) 28 U.S.C. §2412: ) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN ) SUPPORT OF THIS MOTION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NOT DETAINED ) Petitioner, through counsel, hereby applies for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 United States Code (“USC”) section 2412(d). Petitioner seeks recovery of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses for the time reasonably spent and incurred for his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and resulting litigation before this Court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C section 2412(d)(1)(A), this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate this application. Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 1 of 21 -2- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iran. On June 16, 1972, Petitioner’s immigration status was adjusted to that of a legal permanent resident pursuant to section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255. On February 3, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty in the Santa Clara County Superior Court to one count of Inflicting Corporal Injury on Spouse, in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5(a). For this offense, Petitioner was sentenced to four months imprisonment in the country jail. On December 3, 2003, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment after violating his probation. Petitioner was thereafter referred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). On October 4, 2004, the Government served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as one convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission, as well as pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as one convicted of a crime of domestic violence at any time after admission. Additionally, Petitioner was served a Notice of Custody Determination on this date, informing him that he was to be detained pending a final determination by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in his case, pursuant to section 236 of the INA and 8 C.F.R. § 236. On January 20, 2005, the IJ denied Petitioner’s applications for relief and ordered him removed to Iran. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on April 26, 2005. On May 4, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner a temporary stay of removal after he filed a Petition for Review and Request Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 2 of 21 -3- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 for Stay of Removal. On January 17, 2007, the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss his Stay of Removal. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 8, 2007.1 He also filed a Motion for Emergency Adjudication of the Writ which was denied on September 9, 2007. On December 13, 2007, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation finding that Petitioner had entered the “removal period” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) as of January 17, 2007, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted his stay of removal. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the Petition, finding that while Petitioner had been detained for a period of time longer than the six months the United States Supreme Court found presumptively reasonable in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), he had not met his burden of demonstrating good reason to believe that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Ten days later, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Magistrate’s Recommendation, with evidence showing that Iran would not issue travel documents to Petitioner, specifically a fax from the Interest Section at the Embassy of Pakistan indicating that Iran had rejected his request for travel documents. Subsequently, the Court ordered the Government to responded to the Petitioner’s Objection. The Government responded on January 29, 2008, still maintaining that the Petitioner had not met his burden of proof. The Court then ordered oral argument on this case on February 14, 2008. Both parties appeared and after completion of the oral argument, the Court ordered further briefings. During oral argument, the Government maintained that the December 13, 2007 letter was insufficient Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 3 of 21 -4- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 for the Petitioner to show that there was no significant likelihood of his removal to Iran in the foreseeable future. In addition, after the oral argument, a second letter dated February 4, 2008 was sent by the Iranian Interest Section at the Embassy of Pakistan to the ICE detention facility in Eloy, Arizona stating that the authenticity of Petitioner’s birth certificate could not be established and, therefore, no travel document would be issued. The Government maintained in their February 29, 2008 Supplemental Brief that these letters were not sufficient for Petitioner to meet his burden in showing that there was good reason to believe that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. It maintained that the letters were “cryptic,” while at the same time admitting that the letters were in a format the same as other final decisions received from the Iranian Interests Section. The Government instead urged the Court to give more weight to alleged personal verbal representations of an official of the Iranian Interest Section that the adjudication of Petitioner’s application for travel papers was continuing. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Brief on March 7, 2008 . The Petitioner maintained that he had established that there is no substantial likelihood of Petitioner’s removal from the United States in the foreseeable future and that he should be either released or at the very least afforded a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. On April 2, 2008, this Court rejected the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, referring the matter back to the Magistrate to consider Petitioner’s evidence. On May 14, 2008, 1 On September 6, 2006, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; however, the petition was denied as being premature because at the time of the petition, less than 180 days had passed since the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s request to withdraw his request for a stay of removal. Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 4 of 21 -5- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the Magistrate issued a new Report and Recommendation, finding that Petitioner had met his burden in showing that his removal was not reasonably foreseeable, and recommending that the Court grant Petitioner’s Petition for Writ Habeas Corpus. On May 30, 2008, the Government filed a Suggestion of Mootness with the Court, requesting that the petition be deemed moot because the Respondents “decided to release petitioner on conditions.” This Court denied the Respondents’ motion, accepted the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, and granted Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on June 4, 2008. ARGUMENT I. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT REQUIRES RESPONDENTS PAY FOR PETITIONER’S ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES. A. EAJA Applies to Petitioner’s Application. Petitioner requests attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2412. EAJA provides that [A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action ... including proceedings for judicial review of agency action ... unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied EAJA to immigration matters involving custody. See, e.g., Ratnam v. INS, 177 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1999). B. Petitioner Meets the Requirements of EAJA to Receive Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. 1. Petitioner’s motion is timely EAJA requires fee applications to be filed within 30 days of “final judgment in the action.” 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(B). “Final judgment” is defined as one “that is final and not Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 5 of 21 -6- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 appealable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (1988). Applications for fees under EAJA can thus be “filed and considered any time after final judgment is entered by the district court, but no later than 30 days following the entry of a final, non-appealable judgment from the appellate court.” Poole v. Rourke, 779 F. Supp. 1546, 1561 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Al-Harbi v. INS, 284 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002). This Court issued its final order on June 4, 2008. Since this application is being submitted before the expiration of the 60-day time period for filing an appeal, it is timely. 2. Petitioner is a “prevailing party” As a preliminary matter, Petitioner is properly a “party” under EAJA in that he is an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the action was filed. See Declaration of Petitioner. In addition, Petitioner is a “prevailing party” under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). EAJA does not define what the term “prevailing party” means. However the Supreme Court in Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), cites to the historical requirement of a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” as a condition precedent of a “prevailing party” fee award, holding that “enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create” the requisite material alteration. Id. at 604; see also Ali v. Gonzales, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has also clarified that a petitioner is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes if he “succeed[s] on [a] significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing suit.” Carbonell v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 429 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2005). Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 6 of 21 -7- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 It is not necessary that a party who seeks to avoid removal actually succeed in that goal in order to achieve “prevailing party” status for EAJA purposes. See Ali, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. In Ali v. Gonzales the Ninth Circuit found that four individuals from Somalia were prevailing parties because they secured their release from custody, even though the Supreme Court later ruled that the Government had the authority to remove individuals to Somalia without the necessity of obtaining the acceptance of the removal country’s government. Id. at 1202-1203. The Court reasoned that in being ordered to release the petitioners from custody pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Government was required to do something directly benefitting the petitioners that they otherwise would not have had to do. Id. at 1203-1204. See also Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005) (conferring “prevailing party” status upon a petitioner who obtained his release via a habeas petition from detention pending a determination of his immigration status). In the case at bar, Petitioner similarly sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Zadvydas. He was successful in obtaining release from custody and therefore is a “prevailing party” under Ninth Circuit law for EAJA purposes.2 C. Respondents’ Position Was Not Substantially Justified, Nor is an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Unjust. Once a petitioning party establishes prevailing party states, the Government can avoid payment of fees only if it can show that is pre-litigation conduct and litigation position were “substantially justified.” In order to meet this heavy burden of proof, the Government must show that its position has a reasonable basis both in law and in fact. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 2 The Government cannot claim that their “Suggestion of Mootness” negates Petitioner’s prevailing party status. While Respondents asserted in their motion that they “decided to release petitioner on conditions,” this Court clarified in its June 4, 2008 Order that “Respondents’ voluntary compliance with an adverse judicial decision does not moot the case.” Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 7 of 21 -8- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The Supreme Court has clarified that the “single finding that the Government’s position lacks substantial justification, like the determination that a claimant is a ‘prevailing party,’ thus operates as a one-time threshold for fee eligibility.” Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160 (1990). See also Roanoke River Basin Ass’n. v. Hudson, 991 F. 2d 132, 138 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Jean instructs that a single finding of governmental misconduct compelling a party to resort to litigation or to prolong litigation can open the door to recovery under EAJA.”)(emphasis added). Once the court determines that the government’s position lacks substantial justification, the prevailing party is presumptively eligible for fees for all phases of the federal case, unless the prevailing party has “unreasonably protracted” a portion of the litigation, which would warrant exempting fees for that portion of the litigation from the award. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D); Commissioner, INS, 496 U.S. at 161 (“Thus, absent unreasonably dilatory conduct by the prevailing party in ‘any portion’ of the litigation which would justify denying fees for that portion, a fee award presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action.”). 1. The Government’s position that Petitioner did not provide good reason to believe that there was no significant likelihood of removal to Iran in the reasonably foreseeable future was substantially unjustified. The authority of the Department of Homeland Security to detain an alien subject to removal charges is found in 8 U.S.C. sections 1226 and 1231. Once removal proceedings have been completed, detention and release of the alien are governed by section 1231. When a final order of removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures the alien’s removal during a subsequent 90-day statutory removal period. Where, as here, the removal is not accomplished within the 90-day period, the Government may detain the alien past the removal Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 8 of 21 -9- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 period. However, the Supreme Court has held that section 1231(a)(6) does not authorize the indefinite detention of removable aliens. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. Rather, the Court found that the statute limits “an alien’s post-removal period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s removal from the United States.” Id. at 689. To guide lower courts, the Court held that a six-month detention is presumed reasonable. Id. at 700. After six months, the Government’s authority to continue to detain an alien depends on whether there is “a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, it is the Government’s burden to provide sufficient evidence to rebut that showing. Id. As of January 17, 2007, Petitioner entered the removal period. Petitioner submitted two letters from the Iranian Interest Section stating that Iran would not issue travel documents to Petitioner. Respondents first argued that the December letter was “cryptic” because it did not show that the Iranian government has stated that it “declined to issue a travel document at all.” See Response to Petitioner’s Objection to Notice of Intent to Deny, Doc. No. 23 at 2. Petitioner’s second letter from the Iranian Interest Section clearly stated that the authenticity of Petitioner’s birth certificate could not be established and, therefore, no travel document will be issued. Nonetheless, the Government maintained that the letter should not be given much evidentiary weigh even though it admitted that the letter was in a format that ICE currently considers as a final decision. See Respondents’ Supplemental Brief, Doc. No. 26 at 2. Rather, the Government urged the Court to consider the alleged telephone conversation between Mr. Jahansoozan at the Iranian Interests Section and Mr. Alfaro at ICE. Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 9 of 21 -10- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 As the Magistrate pointed out, while Mr. Alfaro was confident that a final decision had not been made, that confidence was based solely on conversations with Mr. Jahansoozan, who admit[ted] that he [was] confused as to why a denial letter issued from the Iranian Interests Section, [did] not know when the original travel document request, original passport and original birth certificate were submitted to Tehran, could not explain why the verification was still ongoing, and refused to give any timeline for completion. Report and Recommendation, Doc. 31 at 12. The Magistrate also added that Mr. Alfaro did not provide any reason for placing “such confidence in one with such an apparent complete lack of knowledge,” nor did he explain why he believed that the review was ongoing. Id. at 13. The Government’s position was substantially unreasonable because alleged telephone conversations, which were vague and unfounded, took precedent over letters in a format recognized as a final decision. The Government unduly increased Petitioner’s standard of proof, namely, the Government essentially argued that Petitioner show that he would never be removed to Iran rather than show good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. By maintaining so, the Government needlessly prolonged litigation in Petitioner’s case and detained Petitioner for more than ten months beyond the period found to be presumptively reasonable in Zadvydas. 2. There are no special factors which would make an award to Petitioner unjust The “special circumstances” provision of EAJA allows a court to deny an award for equitable considerations, such as unclean hands, or when there are close and novel questions. See Taylor v. U.S., 815 F. 2d 249, 252-54 (3d Cir. 1987); National Truck Equip. Ass’n. v. NHTSA, 972 F.2d 669, 671 (6th 1991). It is the Government’s burden to assert any “special circumstances” which would make an award unjust. See INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160 (1990). Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that there are no such special circumstances in his case. Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 10 of 21 -11- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. ATTORNEYS’ FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED IN EXCESS OF THE STANDARD RATE OF $125 PER HOUR AND SHOULD INCLUDE TRAVEL EXPENSES A. Petitioner’s Attorneys’ Fees Can Be Adjusted to Reflect Cost in Living Increases The EAJA provides that “attorneys’ fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii). The Ninth Circuit accounts for an increase in the cost of living by multiplying the $125 statutory rate by the annual average Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for the years in which counsel’s work was performed and then dividing by the CPI-U figure for March 1996, the effective date of EAJA’s $125 statutory rate. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 877 (9th Cir. 2005); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2001). According to this calculation, Petitioner should be awarded at a minimum fees at the hourly rate of $177.70 for work performed in 2007 and $180.54 for work performed in 2008.3 B. The “Special Factor” of Attorney Bernadette Connolly’s Qualifications Justifies a Higher Rate of $250 per Hour Attorney rates may also be increased if a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). The Supreme Court has addressed the term “special factor” for EAJA purposes: We think it refers to attorneys having some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question—as opposed to an extraordinary level of general 3 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, see www.bls.gov, the March 1996 CPI-U for the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, California area was 152.9. The annual average for 2007 was 217.361, and the average for 2008, to date, is 220.84. Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 11 of 21 -12- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 lawyerly knowledge and ability useful in litigation. An example of the former would be an identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or language. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a specialized knowledge of immigration law could warrant enhanced attorney rates. See Rueda- Menicucci v. INS, 132 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] specialty in immigration law could be a special factor warranting an enhancement of the statutory rate if that specialty is ‘needful for the litigation in question’.”); Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876 (finding that an enhanced hourly rate is warranted if counsel possesses some “distinctive knowledge” or “specialized skill” necessary to litigate the case). Petitioner’s counsel, Bernadette Connolly, possesses the specialized skill and knowledge in immigration law meriting an award above the statutory rate. She practices exclusively in immigration and nationality law and has been doing so since 1998. Such specialized skill and knowledge was necessary for the case in that it presented several complicated immigration issues, including detention pursuant to the INA, due process and stays of removal. In addition, as explained in the attached declaration, the skills and knowledge required for this case are not available elsewhere at the statutory rate in the Bay Area. C. Petitioner’s Costs Include Travel Expenses Section 2412(a) states that “a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title . . . may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action by or against the United States . . . .” The Ninth Circuit has upheld an award of costs under EAJA for telephone calls, postage, air courier, and attorney travel expenses. See, e.g., International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986). The court stated that these costs, which are ordinarily billed to a client, are routine under all other fee statutes. Id.; Poole Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 12 of 21 -13- Motion for Attorney’s Fees CIV-07-01526-PHX-NVW2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v. Rourke, 779 F. Supp. 1546 (E.D. Cal. 1991). See also Local 3-98, Int'l Woodworkers v. Donovan, 580 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that an award pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) may compensate a prevailing party for attorneys’ fees incurred for work performed before the effective date of the statute, for counsel’s out-of-pocket travel and telephone costs, and for work connected to the motion for attorneys’ fees); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Res., 512 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Haw. 1981) (“In addition, [under the Endangered Species Act] plaintiffs are awarded, as part of reasonable attorneys’ fees, $ 621.50 as reimbursement for travel costs from San Francisco to Honolulu for oral argument.”) (emphasis in original). Petitioner’s counsel had to travel from her office in San Jose, California to this Court in Arizona to litigate Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner therefore requests reimbursement for travel costs in the amount of $336 as well as other costs for filing fees, copying and telephone calls in the amount of $224.17. CONCLUSION Because Petitioner is the prevailing party against Respondents, whose position was not substantially justified, Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under EAJA. Respectfully submitted this 4th day of July 2008 s/Bernadette Willeke Connolly Bernadette Willeke Connolly Attorney of the Petitioner Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 13 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 14 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 15 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 16 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 17 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 18 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 19 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 20 of 21 Case 2:07-cv-01526-NVW Document 38 Filed 07/04/08 Page 21 of 21
