Montegna v. Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc. et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

S.D. Cal.June 30, 2017

TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 3:17-CV-00939-ABJ-BLM TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP Chad R. Fuller (CSB No. 190830) chad.fuller@troutmansanders.com Virginia Bell Flynn (pro hac vice to be filed) virginia.flynn@troutmansanders.com 11682 El Camino Real, Suite 400 San Diego, CA 92130 Telephone: 858.509.6000 Facsimile: 858.509.6040 Attorneys for Defendants Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc. and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA GREGORY MONTEGNA, Plaintiff, v. OCWEN MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., and OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-ABJ-BLM DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT [FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)] Date: September 21, 2017 Time: 2:00 p.m. Judge: Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia Dept: 4A (4 th Floor Schwartz) TO PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on September 21, 2017 at 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in Courtroom 4A of the above-entitled court located at 221 West Broadway, Suite 4135, San Diego, California 92101, Defendants Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc. and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (collectively “Ocwen”), by their attorneys and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint filed on May 8, 2017 (ECF 1) for failure to state a claim. Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.40 Page 1 of 3 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 3:17-CV-00939-ABJ-BLM MOTION Ocwen hereby moves this Court for an order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in its entirety and specifically as to Counts I-VI for alleged violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, negligence, and negligence per se. This motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, and all pleadings and papers on file in this action and upon such other matters and arguments as may be presented to the Court prior to and at the time of the hearing. Dated: June 30, 2017 Respectfully submitted, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP By:/s/ Chad R. Fuller Chad R. Fuller Virginia Bell Flynn (pro hac vice to be filed) Attorneys for Defendants OCWEN MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. and OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.41 Page 2 of 3 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 3:17-CV-00939-ABJ-BLM 31665069 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certified that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on June 30, 2017, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Civil Rule 5.4. Any counsel of record who have not consented to electronic service through the Court’s CM/ECF system will be served by electronic mail, first class mail, facsimile, and/or overnight delivery. /s/ Chad R. Fuller Chad R. Fuller Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.42 Page 3 of 3 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP Chad R. Fuller (CSB No. 190830) chad.fuller@troutmansanders.com Virginia Bell Flynn (pro hac vice to be filed) virginia.flynn@troutmansanders.com 11682 El Camino Real, Suite 400 San Diego, CA 92130 Telephone: 858.509.6000 Facsimile: 858.509.6040 Attorneys for Defendants Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc. and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA GREGORY MONTEGNA, Plaintiff, v. OCWEN MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC., and OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-ABJ-BLM DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Date: September 21, 2017 Time: 2:00 p.m. Judge: Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia Dept: 4A (4 th Floor Schwartz) Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.43 Page 1 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................... 1 III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 2 A. Legal Standard ...................................................................................... 2 B. Montegna Lacks Standing ..................................................................... 3 C. American Pipe Does Not Apply to Montegna’s State Law Claims ................................................................................................... 6 D. Montegna Fails to Plead Specific Facts Regarding Ocwen’s Conduct ................................................................................................. 8 E. Montegna Cannot State a Claim for Negligence or Negligence Per Se .................................................................................................... 9 F. Montegna Fails to Plead Facts Evidencing Oppression, Fraud, or Malice, Precluding an Award of Punitive Damages ........................... 11 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 13 Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.44 Page 2 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ii DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Am. Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) ............................................................................................. 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................................................................................... 2, 9, 12 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ................................................................................... 2, 8, 12 Bouncing Angels, Inc. v. Burlington Ins. Co., No. EDCV 17-0015 JGB (SPx) 2017 WL 1294004, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2017) ............................................................................................................. 12 Cal. Service Station & Auto. Repair Ass’n v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 1166 (1998) ............................................................................... 10 Centaur Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund, Ltd. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 878 F.Supp.2d 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011) .............................................................. 6, 7 Century Surety Co. v. Crosby Ins., Inc., 124 Cal.App.4th 116 (2004) ............................................................................... 10 Chaconas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 713 F.Supp.2d 1180 (S.D. Cal. 2010) ................................................................ 11 Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) ............................................................................................. 7 Clemens v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 6, 7 Crown v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) ............................................................................................. 6 Diaz v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., No. CV099286PSGMANX, 2011 WL 13046844 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) ................................................................................................................... 12 Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.45 Page 3 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 iii DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM Ewing v. SQM US, Inc., 211 F.Supp.3d 1289 .......................................................................................... 4, 5 Galvez v. Frields, 88 Cal.App.4th 1410 (2001) ............................................................................... 11 GBTI, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, No. CV F 09-1173 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 2365409 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) ................................................................................................................... 12 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 465 F.Supp.2d 687 (S.D. Tex. 2006) .................................................................... 6 In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F.Supp.2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012).................................................................. 2 In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.Supp.2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................ 2, 3 Katz v. Am. Express Co., No. 14-00084 JMS-RLP, 2014 WL 2738528 (D. Hawaii June 17, 2014) ........... 9 Kelley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 750 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ................................................................ 11 Lockhart v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 13-CV-1919-MMA (KSC), 2013 WL 12121260 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) ................................................................................................................... 11 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ......................................................................................... 4, 5 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................ 2 Prezzi v. Berzak, 57 F.R.D. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ............................................................................ 9 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) ............................................................................................. 4 Romero v. Dep’t Stores Nat’l Bank, 199 F.Supp.3d 1256 (S.D. Cal. 2016) .................................................................. 3 Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.46 Page 4 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 iv DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM Sailola v. Mun. Servs. Bureau, No. 13-00544 2014 WL 3389395, at *9 (D. Hawaii July 9, 2014) .................... 10 Sartin v. EKF Diagnostics, Inc., No. CV 16-1816, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86777, 2016 WL 3598297 (E.D. La. July 5, 2016) ................................................................................................... 3 Sewraz v. Guice, No. 3:08cv35, 2008 WL 3926443 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2008) .............................. 9 Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Superior Court, 227 Cal.App.3d 318 (1991) ................................................................................ 10 Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................ 5 Snyder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No. 1:14-cv-08461 ....................................................................................... 7 Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d 1153 (E.D. Cal. 2009) ................................................................ 10 Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016) .................................................................................. 3, 4, 5 Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137 (5th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................. 7 Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................ 6 STATUTES Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.4 ...................................................................................................... 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ......................................................................................................... 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) .................................................................................................... 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)............................................................................................ 2, 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ....................................................................................... 2, 11 Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.47 Page 5 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM Evidence Code § 669 ............................................................................................... 10 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) ................................................................................................. 8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 335.1 ............................................................................................. 8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.17 ......................................................................................... 8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.30(f) ..................................................................................... 8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) ....................................................................................... 11 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c) ....................................................................................... 12 OTHER AUTHORITIES BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009) ......................................................... 5 Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.48 Page 6 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Gregory Montegna (“Montegna”) alleges that Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“OMS”) and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“OLS”) (collectively “Ocwen”) violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) by calling his cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) after he orally revoked his consent for Ocwen to call his at that number. See ECF 1, Compl. ¶¶ 21-38, 43. In addition to claims arising under the TCPA, Montegna alleges a number of other state law claims, which all relate to the TCPA. Montegna’s pleading suffers from a number of deficiencies requiring dismissal:  Montegna does not have standing to bring a TCPA claim because he cannot demonstrate a concrete injury resulting from the alleged calls;  Montegna’s state and related common law claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations;  Montegna does not allege conduct by OLS or OMS sufficient to state a cognizable claim;  Montegna cannot, as a matter of law, couch his TCPA claim as separate claims grounded in negligence; and  Montegna fails to plead any facts supporting a finding of malice, oppression, or fraud, which precludes an award of punitive damages. Because of their numerous incurable defects, Montegna’s TCPA, Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”), negligence, and negligence per se claims against Ocwen should be dismissed with prejudice. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On May 11, 2017, Montegna filed a Complaint in this Court alleging violations of the TCPA, the FDCPA, the Rosenthal Act, as well as claims of negligence and negligence per se. Id. ¶¶ 74-97. According to Montegna, he has a “consumer debt” which “was due and owing” or was “alleged to be due and Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.49 Page 7 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 2 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM owing.” Compl. ¶21. The “debt” referred to throughout the Complaint is related to a mortgage loan secured by Montegna’s primary residence. ¶ 24. Montegna alleges that “Defendant” called his cellular telephone number with an ATDS between December 17, 2013 and June 18, 2016, without his consent. Id. ¶ 26. These calls form the basis of the allegations and each of the counts contained in his Complaint. III. ARGUMENT A. Legal Standard A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s claims. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To withstand dismissal, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Although a plaintiff need not establish a probability of success on the merits, he/he must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.50 Page 8 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 3 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM Litig., 996 F.Supp.2d 942, 959 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “it is not proper for the court to assume that the plaintiff can prove facts that he or he has not alleged or that defendants have violated laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). B. Montegna Lacks Standing. Montegna’s Complaint should be dismissed because he has not suffered a concrete injury from the phone calls referenced in the Complaint. As such, he lacks Article III standing to bring this action because he has not, and cannot, plead an “injury-in-fact” with respect to the allegation of Ocwen placing phone calls with an ATDS, or otherwise using a prerecorded message or artificial voice as alleged in the Complaint. According to the Supreme Court in Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016), for a plaintiff to maintain Article III standing he must have suffered a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. A plaintiff cannot simply allege a procedural violation without any connection to a concrete harm and satisfy the injury in fact requirement of Article III of the Constitution. As a court in this District recently noted, bare assertion of a procedural violation of the TCPA does not satisfy the fundamental requirement under Article III of the Constitution to plead a concrete injury in fact. Ewing v. SQM US, Inc., 211 F.Supp.3d 1289, 1292 (S.D. Cal. 2016); see Romero v. Dep’t Stores Nat’l Bank, 199 F.Supp.3d 1256 (S.D. Cal. 2016). In Ewing, the Court held that “Plaintiff does not, and cannot, allege that Defendants’ use of an ATDS to dial his number caused him to incur a charge that he would not have incurred had Defendants manually dialed his number, which would not have violated the TCPA.” Id. Like the instant case, the plaintiff in Ewing did not suffer an injury in fact traceable to the defendants’ alleged violation of the TCPA, and the plaintiff therefore lacked standing to make a claim for the TCPA violation. Although the TCPA provides call recipients with a private right of action Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.51 Page 9 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 4 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM for receiving certain calls on their cellular phones, a recipient lacks standing to bring a claim under the TCPA unless he can also allege a concrete and particularized harm caused by the TCPA violation. Montegna fails to do so and cannot do so. Montegna failure to plead facts sufficient to connect his claimed injuries with a specific TCPA violation eliminates any possibility for him to maintain Article III standing. Further, Montegna has not suffered a concrete injury caused by the alleged TCPA violation, and thus his claims cannot stand. See Sartin v. EKF Diagnostics, Inc., No. CV 16-1816, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86777, 2016 WL 3598297, at *3 (E.D. La. July 5, 2016) (“Although Dr. Sartin has plausibly alleged that defendants violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited fax advertisements, he fails to plead facts demonstrating how this statutory violation caused him concrete harm.”). The standing-to-sue doctrine is derived from Article III’s limitation of the judicial power of federal courts to “actual cases or controversies.” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). “The doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Id. “[T]he ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Requiring Montegna to have suffered an injury in fact “is a constitutional requirement, and ‘it is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.’” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547-48 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.52 Page 10 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 5 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). Meanwhile, “[a] ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.” Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009)). Therefore, a plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Ewing, 211 F.Supp.3d at 1292. “A ‘bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,’ does not satisfy the injury- in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id. In a challenge to Article III standing, “[t]he burden of showing that there is standing rests on the shoulders of the party asserting” that standing is proper. Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 682 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, Montegna makes only confusing, boilerplate statements referencing standing and harm in connection with his claims, and attempts to plead around the Spokeo requirements with conclusory allegations, which are insufficient to demonstrate standing. See Compl. ¶¶ 46-56. The only allegations in the Complaint relating to harm he allegedly suffered are bare and ambiguous; for example, he alleges that calls “disrupted [his] daily activities” and the “peaceful enjoyment of [his] personal and professional life.” Id. ¶ 42. He further alleges that “the calls . . . were extremely intrusive, including Plaintiff’s relationships with close family members.” Id. ¶ 43. In short, Montegna does not adequately allege standing because he does not, and cannot, connect his claims related to alleged TCPA violations-Ocwen’s use of an ATDS or artificial/pre-recorded voice, to dial his cellular telephone number. “Put differently, Plaintiff does not, and cannot, allege that Defendants’ use of an ATDS to dial his number caused him to incur a charge that he would not have incurred had Defendants manually dialed his number, which would not have Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.53 Page 11 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 6 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM violated the TCPA.” Ewing, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1293. Therefore, Montegna did not suffer an injury in fact traceable to Ocwen’s alleged violations of the TCPA and lacks standing to make a claim for the TCPA violation here. Montegna’s TCPA claims as stated in Counts II and III should be dismissed. C. American Pipe Does Not Apply to Montegna’s State Law Claims. Even if Montegna demonstrates the requisite standing for his TCPA claims, his state law claims against OLS and OMS should be dismissed pursuant to the applicable statutes of limitations because those claims were not asserted in the underlying class action (see Compl. ¶ 7). Filing a class action in federal court tolls the applicable statute of limitations only for federal claims asserted on behalf of the putative class until the court grants or denies class certification. See Am. Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974). In American Pipe, the Supreme Court permitted unnamed members of a class to intervene as plaintiffs in an individual action that continued after denial of class certification, even though the limitations period for their claims had expired. The Court held that “the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.” Id. In Crown v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), the Court clarified that the tolling of the limitations period applies to both intervenors and putative class members who wish to file entirely new actions. Tolling under American Pipe only applies within the federal court system in federal question class actions. Clemens v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). “The rule is not binding on state law claims, which are governed by state law statutes of limitation and state law tolling principles.” Centaur Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund, Ltd. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 878 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 2011), citing Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 290 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 465 Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.54 Page 12 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 7 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM F.Supp.2d 687, 719 (S.D. Tex. 2006). Whether the limitations period for a state law claim is tolled by a federal class action presents a question of state law. Id., citing Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 661 (1983); Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1144 (5th Cir. 1997). California law does not permit “cross-jurisdictional tolling”-that is, the filing of an out-of-state class action does not toll the limitations period for claims under California law. See Centaur Classic Convertible, 878 F.Supp.2d at 1017 (“Because California does not recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling, this Court has no authority to apply American Pipe to toll the state statutes of limitation here.”). In Clemens, the plaintiff filed a putative class action in December 2005 asserting California state law claims for fraud and unfair competition alleging that Dodge Neon automobiles were sold with defective head gaskets. Although the three-year statute of limitations had passed, the plaintiff argued that the limitations period had been tolled because: (a) a similar action concerning Dodge Neon head gaskets had been filed in Illinois in 2001; (b) he was a member of the nationwide class that the plaintiffs had attempted to certify in the Illinois action; and (c) he relied upon the Illinois action to vindicate his rights. Id. at 1025. In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit noted that the “rule of American Pipe-which allows tolling within the federal court system in federal question class actions-does not mandate cross- jurisdictional tolling as a matter of state procedure.” Id. Because California, like most states, “has not adopted such cross-jurisdictional tolling,” the state law fraud claims were time-barred. Id. Montegna’s state law claims (Counts I, IV, V, and VI) do not receive the benefit of tolling under American Pipe because these claims arise under California state law. Although Montegna may have qualified as a member of the putative class in Snyder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No. 1:14-cv-08461 currently pending in the Northern District of Illinois, Snyder includes TCPA and FDCPA claims, but does not include any claims arising under California law, and thus has Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.55 Page 13 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 8 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM no bearing on Montegna’s state law claims. The applicable statutes of limitation bar the state law claims based on the scant facts plead in the Complaint. The statute of limitations for negligence as to an individual is two years from the date of injury. CAL. CIV. CODE § 335.1. The statute of limitations for claims brought under the Rosenthal Act is one year. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.30(f); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.17. In the Complaint, Montegna allegations relate to calls that allegedly occurred between December 17, 2013 through June 18, 2016, but he pleads no facts to demonstrate that any violation actually occurred within the relevant statutory period. See Compl. ¶ 26. Montegna’s failure to raise these claims within the applicable statute of limitations is fatal, and thus the state law claims must be dismissed. D. Montegna Fails to Plead Specific Facts Regarding Ocwen’s Conduct. Montegna has not complied with the requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) to give OLS and OMS fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Montegna’s conclusory allegations that OLS and OMS acted collectively as a single wrongdoer do not plausibly demonstrate how each defendant is liable for the claims stated herein. General allegations that fail to specifically identify any of the alleged conduct of the particular defendants, such as the allegations in the Complaint, are inadequate. See id. OLS and OMS individually are only mentioned twice in the Complaint, and no specific conduct by either is alleged. Montegna alleges that he “bring[s] this action to challenge the conduct of Ocwen Mortgage Servicing, Inc. … and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC … (collectively “Ocwen”), with regard to attempts by defendant to unlawfully and abusively collect a debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶6. The conduct of the individual entities is not discussed in the remaining voluminous allegations. See generally Compl. The Complaint generally alleges that: Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.56 Page 14 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 9 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM  “Plaintiff would answer the calls from Defendants” (Compl. ¶ 28);  “Sometimes, Plaintiff would receive calls from Defendants in which the caller was a recorded voice or message.” (Compl. ¶ 29);  “Plaintiff has received at least 234 calls from Defendant on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone.” (Compl. ¶ 30); Nowhere does the Complaint allege that Montegna received calls from either of the defendants, instead he groups them together one bad actor in the allegations relating to the allegedly unlawful phone calls. Montegna never specifies which defendant actually allegedly injured him. Rule 8 articulates a vision for “a system of simplified pleadings that give notice of the general claim asserted, allow for the preparation of a basic defense, narrow the issues to be litigated, and provide a means for quick dispositions of sham claims.” Sewraz v. Guice, No. 3:08cv35, 2008 WL 3926443, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2008) (quoting Prezzi v. Berzak, 57 F.R.D. 149, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). Here, even reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to Montegna cannot satisfy the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (2009) (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). The Court cannot plausibly infer any acts or omissions of either OLS or OMS that allegedly give rise to liability in the Complaint, and thus claims as to these defendants should be dismissed. See Katz v. Am. Express Co., No. 14-00084 JMS-RLP, 2014 WL 2738528 (D. Hawaii June 17, 2014) (dismissing claims against multiple creditors where the court was not able to draw the reasonable inference that multiple creditor defendants were liable for the misconduct alleged). Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.57 Page 15 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 10 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM E. Montegna Cannot State a Claim for Negligence or Negligence Per Se. In addition to being barred by the statute of limitations, Montegna’s negligence claims (Counts IV-VI) fail because the TCPA does not provide a duty of care sufficient for a negligence cause of action. Sailola v. Mun. Servs. Bureau, No. 13-00544 HG-RLP, 2014 WL 3389395, at *9 (D. Hawaii July 9, 2014). To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege (1) a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty by the defendant, (3) legal and proximate causation, and (4) damages resulting from the defendant’s breach. Century Surety Co. v. Crosby Ins., Inc., 124 Cal.App.4th 116, 127 (2004). In the Complaint, Montegna alleges that each of the defendants “had a duty to use care to not infringe on consumers’ privacy rights when collecting on alleged debts” and to “not [call] Plaintiff hundreds and/or thousands of times to harass and/or abuse Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶ 67. 1 He claims that the Ocwen defendants breached their respective duties of care by “calling Plaintiff on Plaintiff’[s] cellular telephones a voluminous number of times, as discussed above, and continued to call despite Plaintiff’s request that the calls stop.” Id. ¶ 68. Although Montegna attempts to couch his TCPA claim as a claim for negligence, he fails to identify a valid “duty” to support a common-law negligence claim. Further, Montegna states a separate claim for negligence per se relating to the alleged TCPA violations. The negligence per se doctrine does not, however, establish a cause of action distinct from negligence. Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2009). “‘[A]n underlying claim of ordinary negligence must be viable before the presumption of negligence of Evidence Code section 669 can be employed.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Service Station & Auto. Repair 1 Coincidently, the Complaint alleges 234 calls “in total” at issue to Montegna’s cellular telephone. Compl. ¶30. As such, there are not “thousands” of call at issue in this case. Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.58 Page 16 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 11 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM Ass’n v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1178 (1998)). By alleging negligence per se, a plaintiff “is not attempting to pursue a private cause of action for violation of the statute; rather, he is pursuing a negligence action and is relying upon the violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation to establish part of that cause of action.” Id. (quoting Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Superior Court, 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 333 (1991)). Therefore, Montegna’s cause of action for negligence per se cannot be sustained. Under California law, negligence per se is presumed where a plaintiff establishes “(1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” Galvez v. Frields, 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420 (2001). However, where a statute itself provides for civil remedies, a plaintiff’s recourse is under the statute, not under the negligence per se doctrine. Chaconas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 713 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1188-89 (S.D. Cal. 2010). The TCPA itself provides for a private right of action, and thus Montegna’s recourse is provided for in the statute. His claim cannot be restated in negligence, and the negligence claims should be dismissed with prejudice. F. Montegna Fails to Plead Facts Evidencing Oppression, Fraud, or Malice, Precluding an Award of Punitive Damages. Finally, the Complaint demonstrably fails to assert any facts permitting an award of punitive damages. 2 In California, punitive damages can be awarded 2 Although Montegna seeks punitive damages as a form of relief, Ocwen’s motion is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff fails to plead facts supporting such relief. See Lockhart v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 13-CV-1919- Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.59 Page 17 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 12 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a). Section 3294 elaborates on these prerequisites:  “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others;  “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights; and  “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c). Montegna’s demand for punitive damages must satisfy the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. See Diaz v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., No. CV099286PSGMANX, 2011 WL 13046844, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s demands for punitive damages for lack of sufficient factual detail); GBTI, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, No. CV F 09-1173 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 2365409, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) (striking punitive damages where the complaint contained only “platitudes and a conclusory paragraph which essentially summarizes section 3294 elements”). Instead, he provides no facts showing that either OLS’s or OMS’s actions were oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious, or that either entity acted “with a MMA (KSC), 2013 WL 12121260, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) (quoting Kelley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 750 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010)). Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.60 Page 18 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 13 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM willful and conscious disregard” of his rights. Montegna’s claims for punitive damages are predicated on the exact same “conclusory allegations” that Ocwen was negligent, without any support for punitive damages. See Bouncing Angels, Inc. v. Burlington Ins. Co., No. EDCV 17-0015 JGB (SPx), 2017 WL 1294004, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2017) (dismissing punitive damages claim where the allegations of a breach of contract claim remained undifferentiated from the defendant’s allegedly despicable conduct). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Montegna’s prayer for punitive damages. IV. CONCLUSION Montegna’s complete lack of damages connecting his alleged injury to a concrete injury in fact eliminates his ability to establish Article III standing to assert his TCPA claims. As a result, Defendants are entitled to a dismissal with prejudice of the Complaint. Further, the Court should dismiss Montegna’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dated: June 30, 2017 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP By: /s/ Chad R. Fuller Chad R. Fuller Virginia Bell Flynn (pro hac vice to be filed) Attorneys for Defendants OCWEN MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. AND OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.61 Page 19 of 20 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 11682 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 400 SAN DIEGO, CA 92130-2092 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 14 - DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 17-CV-00939-AJB-BLM 31665082 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certified that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on June 30, 2017, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Civil Rule 5.4. Any counsel of record who have not consented to electronic service through the Court’s CM/ECF system will be served by electronic mail, first class mail, facsimile, and/or overnight delivery. /s/ Chad R. Fuller Chad R. Fuller Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.62 Page 20 of 20