27 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 237,184 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 217,149 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,187 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 52,406 times 95 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 19,997 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams
534 U.S. 184 (2002) Cited 2,461 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding "substantially" and "major" "need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled," and therefore, to be disabled "an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives"
Evans v. City of Houston
246 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2001) Cited 851 times
Holding that a plaintiff had provided sufficient circumstantial evidence that an employer's reasons for demoting her were pretextual to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether she was wrongfully demoted and reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer
Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp.
220 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) Cited 672 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that "[t]he defendant's burden at this stage is one of production, not one of persuasion"
Strong v. Univ., L.L.C
482 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2007) Cited 518 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that "temporal proximity alone is insufficient"
Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc.
93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996) Cited 543 times
Holding that "the employee's initial request for an accommodation . . . triggers the employer's obligation to participate in the interactive process of determining one"
Section 12111 - Definitions
42 U.S.C. § 12111 Cited 8,054 times 60 Legal Analyses
Adopting the definition of "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e for purposes of Title I of the ADA
Section 1630.2 - Definitions
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 Cited 8,358 times 141 Legal Analyses
Holding that major life activity is substantially limited if plaintiff is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities"

Molina v. D.S.I. Renal, Inc.

27 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that "[t]he defendant's burden at this stage is one of production, not one of persuasion"

Holding that "temporal proximity alone is insufficient"

Holding that "the employee's initial request for an accommodation . . . triggers the employer's obligation to participate in the interactive process of determining one"

Adopting the definition of "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e for purposes of Title I of the ADA

Holding that major life activity is substantially limited if plaintiff is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities"