40 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 237,112 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 217,084 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,178 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
548 U.S. 53 (2006) Cited 11,308 times 104 Legal Analyses
Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar
570 U.S. 338 (2013) Cited 5,248 times 78 Legal Analyses
Holding that application of the " ‘because’ of" requirement of Title VII's antiretaliation provision requires proof of "but-for" causation
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 52,385 times 95 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
557 U.S. 167 (2009) Cited 4,501 times 83 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's language "because of such individual's age," required plaintiff show "age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's adverse decision"
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 19,991 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
497 U.S. 871 (1990) Cited 9,577 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit affidavits in support of standing when filed after summary judgment briefing and hearing were complete
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden
532 U.S. 268 (2001) Cited 5,396 times 12 Legal Analyses
Holding that the temporal proximity requirement to establish a prima facie case "between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence" must be "very close"
Rule 56 - Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Cited 330,026 times 158 Legal Analyses
Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
Section 633a - Nondiscrimination on account of age in Federal Government employment
29 U.S.C. § 633a Cited 1,274 times 18 Legal Analyses
Extending antidiscrimination provisions to federal employees, but providing such employees a different remedy for violations

Meyer, M.D. v. Mcdonald

40 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"

Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"

Holding that application of the " ‘because’ of" requirement of Title VII's antiretaliation provision requires proof of "but-for" causation

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's language "because of such individual's age," required plaintiff show "age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's adverse decision"

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit affidavits in support of standing when filed after summary judgment briefing and hearing were complete

Holding that the temporal proximity requirement to establish a prima facie case "between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence" must be "very close"

Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

Extending antidiscrimination provisions to federal employees, but providing such employees a different remedy for violations