28 Cited authorities

  1. Brehm v. Eisner

    26 Del. 3 (Del. 2000)   Cited 1,165 times   18 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Delaware Supreme Court reviews de novo all demand futility rulings by the Delaware Court of Chancery
  2. Aronson v. Lewis

    473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)   Cited 1,607 times   64 Legal Analyses
    Holding that plaintiff must demonstrate that directors were beholden to controlling person
  3. Rales v. Blasband

    634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993)   Cited 907 times   37 Legal Analyses
    Holding that three of eight directors were interested parties and that the amended complaint raised a reasonable doubt as to the independence of two remaining directors, making demand futile
  4. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation

    906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)   Cited 554 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding bad faith to be a “category of fiduciary conduct, which falls in between the first two categories of conduct motivated by subjective bad intent and conduct resulting from gross negligence” and that bad faith could be found “where the fiduciary acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.”
  5. In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder

    964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009)   Cited 374 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding the Rales test applies "to show demand futility where the subject of the derivative suit is not a business decision of the board"
  6. Guttman v. Huang

    823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003)   Cited 355 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding the Rales test applied because the allegations "do not attack a specific business judgment of the board"
  7. In re Tyson Foods

    919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007)   Cited 262 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "no theory will toll the statute beyond the point where the plaintiff was objectively aware, or should have been aware, of facts giving rise to the wrong."
  8. White v. Panic

    783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001)   Cited 254 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the directors' prior agreement to settle eight "harassment lawsuits" lodged against the corporation and its president did not raise any reasonable inference "that the board knew that [the president] had actually engaged in in misconduct," and consequently did not excuse demand
  9. Marx v. Akers

    88 N.Y.2d 189 (N.Y. 1996)   Cited 262 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that demand requirement is excused when majority of board is interested in challenged transaction, board members did not inform themselves about transaction, and challenged transaction is "so egregious on its face that it could not have been the product of sound business judgment"
  10. In re InfoUSA

    953 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2007)   Cited 148 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that directors "violate the fiduciary duties that protect shareholders" "where it can be shown that the directors involved issued their communication with the knowledge that it was deceptive or incomplete."
  11. Section 102 - Contents of certificate of incorporation

    Del. Code tit. 8 § 102   Cited 600 times   57 Legal Analyses
    Authorizing such waivers
  12. Section 713 - Interested directors

    N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713   Cited 54 times
    Permitting transactions involving interested directors upon approval by a disinterested board, but only where the material facts regarding the interest at stake are disclosed to the board
  13. Section 712 - Executive committee and other committees

    N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 712   Cited 6 times

    (a) If the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws so provide, the board, by resolution adopted by a majority of the entire board, may designate from among its members an executive committee and other committees, each consisting of one or more directors, and each of which, to the extent provided in the resolution or in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, shall have all the authority of the board, except that no such committee shall have authority as to the following matters: (1) The