Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative et al v. Hogan et al

MOTION to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

D. Md.July 8, 2016

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MARYLAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INITIATIVE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN, et al., Defendants. * * * * * No. 1:16-cv-01021-ELH * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants Governor of Maryland Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr.; Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services Stephen T. Moyer; Chairman of the Maryland Parole Commission David R. Blumberg; and Commissioner of Corrections Dayena M. Corcoran, all sued in their official capacities, through counsel, move to dismiss the complaint (ECF No. 1) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c) and 12(b)(1), (6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For reasons more fully stated in the accompanying memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the claims are barred by the rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and applicable statute of limitations; the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted; and the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their claims against Commissioner Corcoran as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23 Filed 07/08/16 Page 1 of 3 2 Alternatively, the defendants move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on all counts of the complaint for the reasons stated more fully in the accompanying supporting memorandum. A supporting memorandum and proposed order are attached. CONCLUSION The complaint should be dismissed and, in the alternative, summary judgment should be entered for defendants. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Steven M. Sullivan ______________________ STEVEN M. SULLIVAN Federal Bar No. 24930 JULIA DOYLE BERNHARDT Federal Bar No. 25300 Assistant Attorneys General 200 Saint Paul Place, 20th Floor Baltimore, Maryland 21202 ssullivan@oag.state.md.us jbernhardt@oag.state.md.us (410) 576-6325 (410) 576-6955 (facsimile) MICHAEL O. DOYLE Federal Bar No. 11291 Assistant Attorney General Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 300 East Joppa Road, Suite 1000 Towson, Maryland 21286 michaelo.doyle@maryland.gov (410) 339-7567 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23 Filed 07/08/16 Page 2 of 3 3 (410) 764-5366 (facsimile) Attorneys for Defendants Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23 Filed 07/08/16 Page 3 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MARYLAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INITIATIVE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN, et al., Defendants. * * * * * No. 1:16-cv-01021-ELH * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIAN E. FROSH Attorney General of Maryland STEVEN M. SULLIVAN Federal Bar No. 24930 JULIA DOYLE BERNHARDT Federal Bar No. 25300 Assistant Attorneys General 200 Saint Paul Place, 20th Floor Baltimore, Maryland 21202 ssullivan@oag.state.md.us (410) 576-6325 MICHAEL O. DOYLE Federal Bar No. 11291 Assistant Attorney General 300 East Joppa Road, Suite 1000 Towson, Maryland 21286 michaelo.doyle@maryland.gov (410) 339-7567 July 8, 2016 Attorneys for Defendants Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 1 of 65 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 4 Maryland’s System for Early Prisoner Release ........................................................ 4 Parole ............................................................................................................. 4 Mandatory Supervision ................................................................................. 8 Executive Clemency .................................................................................... 10 Early Releases of Division Inmates Serving Life Sentences for Crimes Committed as Juveniles .......................................................................................... 10 Parole of John Alexander Jones (17 Years of Age at Time of Offense) ......................................................... 11 Parole of Mark Farley Grant (14 Years of Age at Time of Offense) ......................................................... 12 Parole of Mary Washington Brown (16 Years of Age at Time of Offense) ......................................................... 13 Parole of Karen Lynn Fried (17 Years of Age at Time of Offense) ......................................................... 14 Parole of Milton Humphrey (17 Years of Age at Time of Offense) ......................................................... 15 ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 15 I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................... 15 II. THE PLAINTIFFS’ § 1983 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN HECK V. HUMPHREY BECAUSE A JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR WOULD NECESSARILY IMPLY THE INVALIDITY OF THEIR ALLEGED DE FACTO LIFE- WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES. ............................................................................. 17 III. ALL CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. ............................. 20 A. Principles Governing Statute of Limitations for § 1983 Claims .......................................................................................................... 20 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 2 of 65 ii B. Principles Governing Statute of Limitations for Claims Under Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....................................... 21 C. The Same Statute of Limitations and Accrual Rules Apply to the Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Declaratory Relief. .............................................. 22 D. The Plaintiffs’ Allegations Confirm That All of Their Claims Are Untimely Under the Applicable Three-Year Statute of Limitations. .................................................................................................. 23 E. The Statute of Limitations Is Not Tolled Due to the Existence of Adverse Precedent That Might Have Prevented the Plaintiffs from Prevailing. ........................................................................... 25 F. The Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy the Requirements for the Continuing Violation Exception. ................................................................. 28 IV. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. ............................................................................................................... 32 A. The Plaintiffs’ Allegations Fail to State a Plausible Claim Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments or Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ....................................................... 32 B. The Plaintiffs’ Allegations Demonstrate That They Are Being Provided Meaningful Opportunities for Release. ........................................ 41 1. Calvin McNeil .................................................................................. 42 2. Kenneth Tucker ................................................................................ 45 3. Nathaniel Foster ............................................................................... 48 V. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES FOR CRIMES COMMITTED AS JUVENILES RECEIVE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PAROLE PROCESS AND TO DEMONSTRATE MATURITY AND REHABILITATION, AND HAVE BEEN GRANTED PAROLE. ................................ 50 A. Maryland’s Parole Process Affords Inmates Serving Life Sentences with Proper Parole Consideration. ............................................. 51 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 3 of 65 iii B. Maryland’s Parole Process Has Resulted in the Parole of Inmates Serving Life Sentences for Crimes Committed as Juveniles. ..................................................................................................... 52 VI. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS IS BARRED BY THE MANDATORY EXHAUSTION PROVISION OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT. ...................................................................................... 54 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 54 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 4 of 65 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2011) ............. 21, 24, 28, 29 Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Ltd. P’ship, 126 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997) ......................................................................................... 23 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ..................................................... 16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................. 15, 16, 42 Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................................................... 50 Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606 (2012) ................................................................... 23, 29 Barnhill v. Strong, Civil No. JFM 07-1678, 2008 WL 544835 (D. Md. 2008) .......... 21, 22 Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013) ................................................................. 34 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).................................................. 15, 47, 50 Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697 (Iowa 2010) ................................................................. 33 Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) ................................................................. 26 Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2009) ........................................................... 31 Brown v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................. 29, 30 Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 38, 48 Cathcart v. State, 397 Md. 320 (2007) ................................................................................ 8 CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 664 F.3d 46 (4th Cir. 2011) ...................... 22, 23 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 116 Md. App. 605 (1997)............................................................................................. 23 Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001) ....................................................... 29 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 5 of 65 v Davidson v. Koerber, 454 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Md. 1978) .................................................. 21 District Att’y’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) ....................................................................................................... 20 Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005) ..................................................................... 27 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) ................................................ 17 Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) ................................................................... 17, 18 Electro-Nucleonics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 315 Md. 361 (1989) ..................................................................................................... 21 Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256 (2006) .................................................................................. 32 Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1991) ................................................................ 37 Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2008) ....................................................... 16 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) ....................................................................... passim Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2012) ............................................................ 38 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) ......................................................................................................... 37 Hanson v. Hughes, 52 Md. App. 246 (1982)....................................................................... 5 Hayden v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000 (W.D.N.C. 2015) .............................................. 51 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) ........................................................ 17, 18, 19, 20 Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011) ................................................................ 16 Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258 (2000) ........................................................................ 22, 24 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) .......................................................................... 26 International Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................. 22, 23 Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................. 20, 28 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 6 of 65 vi Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2011) .............................................. 17 Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013) ....................................... 16 Liverman v. Johnson, No. 3:07-cv-344, 2008 WL 2397544 (E.D. Va. 2008) .................. 30 Lomax v. Warden, 356 Md. 569 (1999) ............................................................................. 24 Lovett v. Ray, 327 F. 3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003) ................................................................. 30 Ly v. Beard, No. 15-70939, __ F. App’x __, 2016 WL 331881 (9th Cir. June 15, 2016) .................................................................. 27 Miller v. Alabama, __U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) ................................................ passim Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2000).................................................................... 26 Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) ...................................... passim Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d 279 (7th Cir. 1993)............................................................................................ 29 Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) .......................... 21, 24 National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1991) ............................................................................... 28, 29 Pantry Pride Enterprises, Inc. v. Glenlo Corp., 729 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1984) ................. 20 People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245 (Cal. 2014) ................................................................. 36 People v. Holman, __ N.E.3d __, 2016 WL 868413 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) ....................................................................................................... 36 Poole v. Coakley & Williams Const., Inc., 423 Md. 91 (2011) ................................... 22, 24 Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2006)............................................................ 31, 54 Ross v. Blake, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) ............................................................ 54 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) .............................................. 22 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) ........................................................................... 32, 33 State ex rel. Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222 (1950) ................................................ 32, 33 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 7 of 65 vii State v. Castaneda, 842 N.W.2d 740 (Neb. 2014) ............................................................ 33 State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114 (1976) .................................................................................. 8 Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992) .............................................................. 22 Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) ................................................................... 37, 40 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) ................................................................. 21 United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2012) ..................................................... 27 Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................................ 16 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) ............................................................................... 21 Wershe v. Combs, No. 1:12-CV-1375, 2016 WL 1253036 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2016) ........................................................................................ 44 Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2011) ................................................. 26 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) .............................................................. 17, 18, 19 Witherspoon v. Maryland Parole Comm’n, 149 Md. App. 101 (2002) .............................. 9 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2008) ............................................................................... 54 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) ....................................................... 16 Wright v. United States Postal Serv., 305 F. Supp. 2d 562 (D. Md. 2004) ....................... 20 Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const. amend. VIII .............................................................................................. passim Md. Const. art. II, § 20 ...................................................................................................... 10 Md. Declaration of Rights art. 25 ............................................................................... passim Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 8 of 65 viii Statutes 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) ...................................................................................................... 28 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) ................................................................................................. 27 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ..................................................................................................... 2, 20, 27 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) ....................................................................................................... 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ..................................................................................................... 3, 54 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-502(2) ..................................................................... 43, 44 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-502(3) ........................................................................... 43 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-701(2) ......................................................................... 8, 9 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-101(i) .............................................................................. 4 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-101(m) ............................................................................ 4 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(a) ............................................................................. 4 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(c) ............................................................................. 4 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(1) ........................................................................ 5 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(2) ........................................................................ 5 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) ............................... 7 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) ............................... 8 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-305 ............................................................................ 6, 47 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-401(c) ............................................................................. 9 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-401(d) ............................................................................. 9 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-501 .................................................................................. 9 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-502(b)(1) ........................................................................ 9 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 9 of 65 ix Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-502(b)(2) ........................................................................ 9 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-601 ................................................................................ 10 Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-303 (LexisNexis 2012) ..................................................... 5 Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-304 .................................................................................... 5 Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101........................................................................ 20 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2013) .............................................................................. 39 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 56............................................................................................................... 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) .......................................................................................................... 16 Regulations COMAR § 12.08.01.15 (1995) .......................................................................................... 10 COMAR § 12.08.01.15.A (1995) ...................................................................................... 10 COMAR § 12.08.01.15B (1995) ....................................................................................... 10 COMAR § 12.08.01.18 (Pending) ....................................................................................... 6 COMAR § 12.08.01.18.A(2)(a) ........................................................................................ 47 COMAR § 12.08.01.18.A(3)(f) ......................................................................................... 48 COMAR § 12.08.01.18.A(3)(g) ........................................................................................ 47 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 10 of 65 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MARYLAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INITIATIVE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN, et al., Defendants. * * * * * No. 1:16-cv-01021-ELH * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The plaintiffs, three prisoners confined in the Maryland Division of Correction (“Division”) and the Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative (“MRJI”), a “grassroots membership organization” that advocates “for individuals serving long-term prison sentences,” Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 16, bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four Maryland officials: Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr.; Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services Stephen T. Moyer; Chairman of the Maryland Parole Commission David R. Blumberg; and Commissioner of Corrections Dayena M. Corcoran. All defendants are sued in their official capacities. The plaintiffs allege that the individual plaintiffs’ sentences of life, with the possibility of parole after fifteen years less diminution of confinement credits (“diminution credits”), are de facto sentences of life without parole and, as such, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 11 of 65 2 All three of the plaintiffs are serving parolable life sentences for murders committed when they were under the age of eighteen. Compl. ¶¶ 122, 136, 147. Each has repeatedly been considered for parole - and in the case of Mr. McNeill, even recommended for release, Compl. ¶¶ 127-129. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs seek relief under a series of cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of sentences of life without the possibility of parole imposed on juvenile offenders. See Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory sentences of life in prison without parole for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (holding that sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses violate the Eighth Amendment); and Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (applying Miller retroactively). These cases require that a juvenile offender be afforded a “meaningful” opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation to parole authorities through the “means and mechanisms” made available by the State. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 82; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the defendants’ “illegal” and “unconstitutional” conduct, the individual plaintiffs’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole “have been converted into de facto [life without the possibility of parole] sentences . . . .” and, as such, are unconstitutional. Compl. ¶ 11; Compl. 59 (emphasis added). This Court should decline to consider the merits of plaintiffs’ claims in this § 1983 action because an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the exclusive remedy for state prisoners who, like plaintiffs, challenge the fact or duration of their Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 12 of 65 3 confinement and seek an immediate or speedier release from prison. If properly brought as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs’ challenges to parole policies and decisions dating back more than 20 years are barred by plaintiffs’ failure to bring this action within the applicable three-year limitations period. The plaintiffs’ claims against Commissioner Corcoran are also barred by their failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Even if the merits of plaintiffs’ claims were to be considered by the Court, the allegations of the complaint make clear that they have had multiple opportunities to demonstrate that they merit early release, and continue to have such opportunities, as required by the Supreme Court’s cases. Moreover, the undisputed facts make clear that, contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, procedures put into place by Maryland authorities to determine inmate suitability for early release from prison, while also considering whether such release is consistent with public safety, have resulted in the parole releases of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, including prisoners who committed crimes as juveniles. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s determination that juveniles “are constitutionally different from adults,” Montgomery, 136 U.S. at 733 (quotation omitted), the defendants have promulgated new policies that expressly provide for the Maryland Parole Commission to consider the “three primary ways,” Montgomery, 136 U.S. at 733, in which juveniles differ, as well as other factors relevant to juvenile offenders, when the Parole Commission considers a parole application of an inmate sentenced for a crime committed as a juvenile. The defendants have also amended their parole policies to ensure Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 13 of 65 4 that all prisoners have access to the information to be considered by parole authorities when considering a parole application, to the full extent permitted by law, and their revised prison classification policies, which have already been implemented, remove restrictions on juvenile offenders’ progressing to lower security levels, including work-release. Accordingly, as explained more fully below, this Court should grant judgment to the defendants, because there is no merit to plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims. STATEMENT OF FACTS Maryland’s System for Early Prisoner Release There are three statutory mechanisms that result in early release for inmates in the Division: parole, mandatory supervision, and the exercise of executive clemency, which includes pardon and commutation. Over the 20-year time period encompassed by the complaint, all three types of release, sometimes employed in combination in individual cases, have been used to release inmates serving life sentences from prison, including those serving life sentences for crimes committed as juveniles. Parole Parole is a discretionary, conditional release ordered by the Parole Commission. Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-101(i). In general, inmates are eligible for parole after serving one-quarter of their sentences. Corr. Servs. § 7-301(a). However, inmates serving sentences for violent crimes as defined in Correctional Services § 7-101(m) must serve half of their sentences before they can be paroled. Corr. Servs. § 7-301(c). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 14 of 65 5 The law governing parole eligibility for inmates serving parolable life sentences typically entitles them to earlier parole consideration than that available to inmates serving a term of years for a violent crime. An inmate serving a life sentence ordinarily is eligible for parole after serving 15 years of the sentence, less diminution credits. Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(1). If the case is one in which the State’s Attorney sought a sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole, under former Criminal Law § 2-303 or Criminal Law § 2-304, the inmate is eligible for parole after serving 25 years, less diminution credits. Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(2). Although an inmate serving a parolable life sentence cannot be released through the application of diminution credits, application of credits will result in parole eligibility after approximately 11½ years, or approximately 20 years if a sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole was initially sought but not imposed.1 In all cases, the applicable statute and regulation require the Parole Commission to consider the following factors in determining whether to grant parole: 1. the circumstances surrounding the crime; 2. the physical, mental, and moral qualifications of the inmate; 1 The following hypothetical illustrates why an inmate serving a life sentence will typically be eligible for parole before an inmate serving a term-of-years sentence for a violent crime. If an inmate receives a 50-year term for a violent crime or crimes, the inmate must serve 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. However, if the inmate receives a life sentence for such crimes, the inmate will be parole-eligible after serving approximately 11½ years (or approximately 20 years if sentenced under Criminal Law § 2-303 or 2-304). This rule also applies to an inmate serving a life sentence, with all but a term of years suspended, followed by probation upon release. See Hanson v. Hughes, 52 Md. App. 246, 248, aff’d, 294 Md. 599 (1982). Thus, an inmate serving a life sentence, with all but 50 years suspended, will also be eligible for parole after serving approximately 11 ½ years, or 20 years, if sentenced under Criminal Law § 2-303 or 2-304. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 15 of 65 6 3. the progress of the inmate during confinement; 4. a report on a drug or alcohol evaluation that has been conducted on the inmate; 5. whether there is a reasonable probability that the inmate, if released on parole, will remain at liberty without violating the law; 6. whether release of the inmate on parole is compatible with the welfare of society; 7. an updated victim impact statement; 8. any recommendation made by the sentencing judge at the time of sentencing; 9. any information that is presented to a commissioner at a meeting with the victim; and 10. any testimony presented to the Commission by the victim or the victim’s designated representative. Corr. Servs § 7-305. See also Md. Code Regs. (“COMAR”) § 12.08.01.18 (1995) (also listing criteria to be considered). Additionally, in response to the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding juvenile offenders, the Parole Commission has adopted a policy to provide expressly that it will consider the following factors in determining whether a prisoner who committed a crime as a juvenile is suitable for release on parole: (a) Age at the time the crime was committed; (b) The individual’s level of maturity and sense of responsibility at the time of the crime was committed; (c) Whether influence or pressure from other individuals contributed to the commission of the crime; (d) Whether the prisoner’s character developed since the time of the crime in a manner that indicates the prisoner will comply with the conditions of release; Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 16 of 65 7 (e) The home environment and family relationships at the time the crime was committed; (f) The individual’s educational background and achievement at the time the crime was committed; and (g) Other factors or circumstances unique to prisoners who committed crimes at the time the individual was a juvenile that the Commissioner determines to be relevant. Exhibit 1 (Decl. of David Blumberg) ¶ 27, Attachment V. In accordance with the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10-101 − 10-118, the Parole Commission has proposed to amend its regulations to reflect the new policy. Exhibit 1 ¶ 27. The Division also recently revised its policies regarding prisoners serving life sentences for crimes committed as juveniles. The Division’s Case Management Manual now allows such an inmate to be classified to minimum or pre-release security if the Parole Commission recommends that the inmate participate in “outside testing and/or work release.” Exhibit 2 (OPS.100.0004.5.D.).2 See Alison Knezevich, “Md. Juvenile Lifers Could be Considered for Minimum Security, Work Release Programs in Policy Shift,” Baltimore Sun (June 27, 2016). Maryland law requires the Governor’s approval of a Parole Commission decision to grant parole to an inmate who has served fewer than 25 years of a life sentence, without application of diminution credits. Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). 2 “Outside testing” refers to an inmate’s supervised participation in a work assignment outside the confines of the prison. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 17 of 65 8 Such approval is not required, however, if the Parole Commission elects to parole an inmate who has served 25 years or more of a life sentence. Instead, the law allows the Governor to disapprove a parole decision made by the Parole Commission with regard to such an inmate. Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). However, if the Parole Commission elects to parole an inmate who has served 25 years, and the Governor does not disapprove the Parole Commission’s decision within 180 days of receiving it, the parole decision becomes effective. Id. These laws addressing Governor-approval also apply to inmates serving sentences of life, with or without a term of years suspended.3 Mandatory Supervision Under Correctional Services §§ 3-701 - 3-711, and with exceptions not relevant here, an inmate serving “a term of confinement” in the Division may earn diminution credits, which are applied to the inmate’s term to reduce the length of the inmate’s incarceration. A “term of confinement” is “the length of the sentence” for an inmate serving a single sentence. Corr. Servs. § 3-701(2). For an inmate serving multiple concurrent or consecutive sentences, the term of confinement is the “[t]he period from the first day of the sentence that begins first through the last day of the sentence that ends last.” 3 As was true when the individual plaintiffs were sentenced and remains true today, in Maryland a sentencing judge has the discretion to suspend all or part of a parolable life sentence. Cathcart v. State, 397 Md. 320, 328 (2007) (requiring imposition of period of probation upon suspension of execution of all or part of a life sentence); State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 115 (1976) (finding “nothing improper in the trial court’s suspension of all but the first eight years of the life sentence it imposed in this case”). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 18 of 65 9 Id. The last day of the term of confinement is the “maximum expiration date.” It is from this date that diminution credits are subtracted. Upon earning a sufficient number of diminution credits, the inmate is released on “mandatory supervision.” Corr. Servs. § 7-501. While on mandatory supervision, the releasee “is subject to . . . all laws, rules, regulations, and conditions that apply to parolees” and “any special conditions established by a [parole] commissioner.” Corr. Servs. § 7-502(b)(1), (2). If the supervisee fails to abide by the terms and conditions of release, the Parole Commission may revoke the mandatory supervision and require the supervisee to serve the balance of the term less any credit allowed by the presiding commissioner for the period between release and revocation. Corr. Servs. § 7-401(c), (d). An inmate serving a life sentence with all but a portion of that sentence suspended is eligible to earn diminution credits because the inmate is serving a “term of confinement” as defined under Correctional Services § 3-701(2). Thus, if, for example, the inmate is serving life, with all but 20 years suspended, the inmate will be released after serving the 20 years, less diminution credits. An inmate serving a life sentence with no portion suspended is not serving a “term of confinement” because there is no “last day of the sentence.” Thus, an inmate serving such a sentence, even if it is imposed with the possibility for parole, “cannot obtain early release based on diminution of confinement credits.” Witherspoon v. Maryland Parole Comm’n, 149 Md. App. 101, 103 (2002). As noted above, however, earned diminution credits will advance the inmate’s parole eligibility date. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 19 of 65 10 Executive Clemency The Governor’s power to grant commutations and pardons is derived from Article II, § 20 of the Maryland Constitution. That authority is currently codified at Correctional Services § 7-601, which permits the Governor, as relevant here, to “pardon an individual convicted of a crime subject to any conditions the Governor requires,” or “remit any part of a sentence of imprisonment subject to any conditions the Governor requires, without the remission operating as a full pardon.” The Parole Commission’s regulations addressing its role in the commutation process have specific applicability to inmates serving life sentences. See COMAR § 12.08.01.15 (1995). For “[l]ife [c]ases, . . . [t]he [Parole] Commission will recommend to the Governor a commutation of a life sentence where the case warrants special consideration or where the facts and circumstances of the crime justify special consideration, or both.” Id. § 12.08.01.15.B.4 Early Releases of Division Inmates Serving Life Sentences for Crimes Committed as Juveniles As demonstrated in Parole Commission Chairman Blumberg’s attached declaration, Maryland’s early release system has resulted in the release of inmates serving life sentences, 4 For inmates serving non-life sentences, the regulations permit the Parole Commission, in “unusual” circumstances, to recommend that the Governor commute an inmate’s sentence “to time served,” resulting in the inmate’s immediate release, or “to a number of years.” COMAR § 12.08.01.15.A (1995). “Once [the sentence is] commuted, the [Parole] Commission, in its discretion, may release the inmate on parole.” Id. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 20 of 65 11 including parole releases of inmates sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes committed as juveniles. Chairman Blumberg’s declaration describes the parole of the following juvenile offenders.5 Parole of John Alexander Jones (17 Years of Age at Time of Offense) On November 5, 2012, upon recommendation of the Parole Commission, Governor Martin O’Malley conditionally commuted the life sentence of John Alexander Jones, Division identification number 168832, to life, with all but 47 years suspended. See Attachment A (Executive Order 01.01.2012.27). Mr. Jones was convicted by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on August 25, 1983 of felony murder, and received a life sentence. Mr. Jones was also convicted of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, and a handgun violation, for which he received a concurrent five-year sentence. In conditionally commuting Mr. Jones’s life sentence, the Governor noted that Mr. Jones “was seventeen years old at the time of the offense and has compiled, while incarcerated, a strong record of work experience and institutional progress, including the attainment of a GED and then an undergraduate degree from Coppin State University.” Attachment A, p. 1. The Governor also noted that “[t]he jury convicted [Mr. Jones] of [f]elony [m]urder for participation in an attempted robbery that led to the murder, but the State . . . did not allege that [Mr. Jones] was the shooter;” that the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City “does not oppose clemency” for Mr. Jones; and that the Parole Commission “has concluded that [Mr. Jones] presently appears to constitute no threat to public safety and recommends the granting of [e]xecutive [c]lemency.” Attachment A, p. 1. The Governor conditioned the commutation of Mr. Jones’s sentence on Mr. Jones’s participation in “a period of community testing and/or . . . work release” and a re-entry plan, to include a home plan, an “employment plan that includes as necessary, job placement, job training, and/or 5 Since 2004, in addition to these juvenile offenders, five inmates who were originally sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes committed as adults, that is, at age 18 or older, have been paroled from the Division or released from the Division on mandatory supervision following a commutation of sentence granted by the Governor. Exhibit 1 ¶¶ 4, 19-23. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 21 of 65 12 educational programs,” a counseling plan, and if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, a substance abuse evaluation and treatment program. Attachment A, p. 2. The Governor authorized the Parole Commission to grant parole to Mr. Jones, if merited, and also directed that upon release, Mr. Jones participate in counseling, and mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment, as directed by the Parole Commission and his supervising agent. Attachment A at pp. 2-3. The Governor’s order also provided for supervision by the Parole Commission following the expiration of the 47- year term, if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, and included procedures for revocation of the release if Mr. Jones failed to abide by its terms. Attachment A, pp. 4-5. Following the conditional commutation of Mr. Jones’s sentence, the Parole Commission granted parole to Mr. Jones on February 20, 2013. See Attachment B (Order for Release on Parole). Parole of Mark Farley Grant (14 years of Age at Time of Offense) On March 29, 2012, Governor O’Malley, upon recommendation of the Parole Commission, conditionally commuted the life sentence of Mark Farley Grant, Division identification number 171372, to a term of life, with all but 45 years suspended. See Attachment C (Executive Order 01.01.2012.06). Mr. Grant was sentenced by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on January 31, 1984 to life imprisonment, and a consecutive 15-year term, after a jury found him guilty of felony murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and attempted robbery with a deadly weapon. In 2003, the sentencing court merged the sentences for use of a handgun and attempted robbery into the life sentence. Attachment C, p. 1. The Governor noted that Mr. Grant “was fourteen years old at the time of the offense and has compiled, while incarcerated, a strong record of work experience and institutional progress.” Attachment C, p. 1. He also noted that the jury had acquitted Mr. Grant of first-degree murder; that the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City “does not oppose clemency for [Mr. Grant];” and that the Parole Commission “has concluded that [Mr. Grant] presently appears to constitute no threat to public safety and recommends the granting of [e]xecutive [c]lemency.” Attachment C, p. 1. The commutation of Mr. Grant’s sentence was conditioned on Mr. Grant’s participation in “a period of community testing and/or . . . work release” and a re-entry plan, to include a home plan, an employment plan “that includes, as necessary, job placement, job training, and/or educational programs,” a counseling plan, and if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, a substance abuse evaluation and treatment program. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 22 of 65 13 Attachment C, p. 2. The Governor’s order authorized the Parole Commission to grant parole to Mr. Grant, if merited, and also directed that upon release, Mr. Grant participate in counseling and mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment, as directed by the Parole Commission and his supervising agent. Attachment C, pp. 2-3. The order also provided for supervision by the Parole Commission following the expiration of the 45- year term, if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, and procedures for revocation of the release if Mr. Grant failed to abide by its terms. Attachment C, pp. 4-5. Following the conditional commutation of Mr. Grant’s sentence, the Parole Commission paroled Mr. Grant on December 18, 2012. See Attachment D (Order for Release on Parole). Parole of Mary Washington Brown (16 years of Age at Time of Offense) On November 25, 2004, Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., on recommendation of the Parole Commission, conditionally commuted the life sentence of Mary Washington Brown, Division identification number 901457. See Attachment E (Executive Order 01.01.2004.67). Ms. Brown was sentenced to imprisonment for life by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on December 18, 1974, following her conviction for first degree murder. At the time of the offense, Ms. Brown was 16 years of age. In commuting Ms. Brown’s sentence, the Governor noted the following: that Ms. Brown was “an exemplary inmate,” and had “compiled an impressive record of practical instruction, work experience, and institutional progress;” that the Parole Commission “has concluded that [Ms. Brown] appears to constitute no threat to the safety of society;” and that the Parole Commission “recommends the granting of executive clemency.” Attachment E, p. 1. He therefore concluded that “[t]he interests of the State of Maryland and of [Ms. Brown] will be best served by the granting of” the conditional commutation. Attachment E, p. 1. The commutation of Ms. Brown’s sentence was conditioned on Ms. Brown’s participation in 12 months of work-release prior to reaching parole eligibility. Attachment E, p. 1. The Governor’s order further stated that in the event the Parole Commission “determines that [Ms. Brown] merits parole release,” Ms. Brown would be required to comply with a re-entry plan that included counseling and substance abuse treatment, as well as educational and vocational training. Attachment E, pp. 1-2. Following the commutation of Ms. Brown’s sentence, the Parole Commission granted parole to Ms. Brown on February 13, 2006. See Attachment F (Order for Release on Parole). Because Governor Ehrlich Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 23 of 65 14 commuted Ms. Brown’s sentence to a term of years, she was no longer serving a life sentence when the Parole Commission granted her parole, and approval by the Governor was thus not required. Ms. Brown remains under parole supervision until the 60-year term expires. Parole of Karen Lynn Fried (17 years of Age at Time of Offense) On November 14, 2003, Governor Ehrlich, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, commuted the life sentence of Karen Lynn Fried, Division identification no. 902530, to a term of 45 years. See Attachment G (Executive Order 01.01.2003.35). Ms. Fried had been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on September 15, 1978, following her conviction for murder. Ms. Fried also received a five-year concurrent sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. Attachment G, p. 1. In commuting Ms. Fried’s sentence, Governor Ehrlich noted that when Ms. Fried committed the offenses, she was seventeen years of age. Attachment G, p. 1. He also noted that in August 1988, the sentencing judge “wrote his belief that ‘[Ms.] Fried has achieved maximum rehabilitation and has reached the point where she should be paroled.’” Attachment G, p. 1. The Governor further noted that in September 1993, “a three-judge panel of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found that [Ms.] Fried’s progress during incarceration had been exemplary;” that “[h]er achievement in education and apparent rehabilitation had been noteworthy and highly commendable;” and that “[s]he appeared to have earned the opportunity to be considered for ultimate release from confinement[.]” Attachment G, p. 1. Additionally, Governor Ehrlich noted that while incarcerated, Ms. Fried “has earned her GED and engaged herself in a wide range of self-help programs,” and that she “has a comprehensive support network in place upon reentry.” Attachment G, p. 1. Finally, Governor Ehrlich noted that the “Parole Commission has concluded that [Ms. Fried] being contrite and remorseful, presently appears to constitute no threat to the safety of society, and recommends her sentence to be commuted to a term of forty-five years[.]” Attachment G, p. 1. He concluded that “the interests of the State of Maryland and [Ms. Fried] will best be served by commutation of the sentence.” Attachment G, p. 1. Following the commutation of Ms. Fried’s sentence to a term of 45 years, the Parole Commission granted parole to Ms. Fried on September 15, 2015. See Attachment H (Order for Release on Parole). As was the case with Ms. Brown, because Governor Ehrlich commuted Ms. Fried’s sentence Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 24 of 65 15 to a term of years, she was no longer serving a life sentence at the time the Parole Commission granted her parole, and approval by the Governor was not required. Ms. Fried will remain under parole supervision until the 45- year term expires on March 24, 2023. Parole of Milton Humphrey (17 years of Age at Time of Offense) On May 20, 1999, the Parole Commission, with the approval of Governor Parris Glendening, granted a “medical parole” to Milton Humphrey, Division identification no. 193624. See Attachment I (Order for Release on Parole). Prior to the enactment, in 2008, of § 7-309 of the Correctional Services Article (“CS”), which specifically authorizes the granting of medical parole, the Parole Commission granted medical paroles under its general parole authority set forth in CS § 7-205. Mr. Humphrey was paroled from a life sentence beginning on October 6, 1987, imposed by the Circuit for Baltimore City on August 10, 1988, for first degree murder, and a consecutive 13-year sentence for use of a handgun. When he committed these crimes, Mr. Humphrey was 17 years of age. See Attachment J (Parole Information System (“PARIS”) record, reflecting that Mr. Humphrey was born on September 13, 1969 and that his offenses occurred on August 28, 1987). Mr. Humphrey died on or about June 9, 1999. See Attachment K (Offender-Based State Corrections Information System) (“OBSCIS”) record, reflecting that Mr. Humphrey’s case was closed on June 9, 1999, due to his death). Exhibit 1 ¶¶ 5-18. ARGUMENT I. STANDARD OF REVIEW To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although the Court is required to “‘take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’” the Court “need Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 25 of 65 16 not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or ‘unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.’” Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court “shall grant summary judgment” if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to “view the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 312-13 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873 (4th Cir. 2013)). “For purposes of summary judgment consideration, the substantive law identifies which facts are material, and ‘[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 548 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “Under ‘well-established principles of equity,’ a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 26 of 65 17 defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). II. THE PLAINTIFFS’ § 1983 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN HECK V. HUMPHREY BECAUSE A JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR WOULD NECESSARILY IMPLY THE INVALIDITY OF THEIR ALLEGED DE FACTO LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court “held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). The Heck bar applies to a state prisoner’s § 1983 action “no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (parentheses and emphasis in original). The plaintiffs allege that Maryland’s statutory scheme governing parole violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland Constitution because it “imposes life sentences upon minors without appropriate consideration of their distinctive attributes as youth, and . . . fails to provide them a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release.” Compl. ¶ 7. As a result of this statutory Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 27 of 65 18 scheme, the plaintiffs contend, they are being confined subject to “de facto life-without- parole sentences” that impose “unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article 25.” Compl. ¶ 63. Thus, although the plaintiffs do not seek immediate release from confinement, their § 1983 claims for relief must be dismissed because a judgment in their favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity of . . . [their] sentence[s].” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81 (explaining that Heck bars prisoners’ suits that “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement - either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody”). The Heck bar applies to a state prisoner’s action challenging his conviction or sentence on procedural grounds where “the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity” of the conviction or sentence. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 645. In Edwards, for example, the Court held that Heck barred a prisoner’s § 1983 claim for damages and declaratory relief challenging the procedures employed in a disciplinary hearing, because the alleged procedural defect - bias by the decision maker - “would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits.” Id. at 646. The Court distinguished procedural claims that do “not call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement” from claims where the procedural challenge necessarily implies the invalidity of a judgment or sentence. Id. at 646 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (emphasis omitted in Edwards)). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 28 of 65 19 In accordance with this distinction, in Wilkinson, the Court held that Heck did not bar challenges brought by two prisoners alleging that certain procedures employed in their parole proceedings violated the Constitution. In that case, the prisoners asserted Ex Post Facto Clause and due process challenges to prison officials’ use of harsher parole guidelines that were adopted after the prisoners began to serve their sentences and other alleged procedural irregularities. Id. at 76-77. Both prisoners sought declaratory relief and injunctions ordering prison officials to grant them new parole hearings conducted under constitutionally proper procedures. Id. Their action was not barred by Heck, the Court explained, because the prisoners challenged the procedures employed by the State but did not challenge the resulting denial of parole, nor did their challenge to the procedures at issue necessarily imply the invalidity of their continued confinement subject to their parole- eligible sentences. Id. at 81-82. Here, in contrast, although the plaintiffs identify allegedly faulty parole procedures employed by the State as applied to them, they expressly allege that as a result of the State’s application of its “policies and practices” their parole-eligible sentences have been “convert[ed] . . . into de facto life-without-parole sentences” that “subjects them to unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article 25.” Compl. ¶ 63. Thus, they are not alleging merely that the State employed improper procedures, but rather that the State’s current procedures necessarily have rendered their underlying sentences unconstitutional. Because the plaintiffs seek a judicial determination that they are currently serving unconstitutional sentences, a judgment in their Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 29 of 65 20 favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of those sentences. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Rather than challenge the validity of their sentences through a § 1983 action, the plaintiffs “must file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . and thus must exhaust state remedies, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).” District Att’y’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 75 (2009) (Alito J., concurring); see, e.g., In re Wright, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 3409851, at *4 (4th Cir. June 21, 2016) (evaluating a challenge to the execution of a state prisoner’s sentence under 28 U.S. § 2254).6 III. ALL CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. “Statutes of limitations defenses are recognized as appropriate grounds for granting a motion to dismiss where,” as here, “the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint.” Wright v. United States Postal Serv., 305 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 (D. Md. 2004) (citing Pantry Pride Enterprises, Inc. v. Glenlo Corp., 729 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1984)). A. Principles Governing Statute of Limitations for § 1983 Claims For a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts borrow the State’s general personal injury limitations period, which in Maryland is three years. Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101). Determining when the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued, however, is a matter of federal law. Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 6 The State’s post-conviction procedure is set forth in Title 7 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 30 of 65 21 955 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). A claim under § 1983 “accrues when the plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action,’” A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); that is, “a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action,” Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955 (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1979)); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (applying to § 1983 claim ‘“the traditional rule of accrual” that “the tort cause of action accrues . . . when the wrongful act or omission results in damages. . . . even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable”). B. Principles Governing Statute of Limitations for Claims Under Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitation would also apply to the plaintiffs’ state law claims under Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, see Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 175−180 and 185. Barnhill v. Strong, Civil No. JFM 07-1678, 2008 WL 544835 at *2 (D. Md. 2008) (citing Davidson v. Koerber, 454 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D. Md. 1978)); id. at *3 (“Other than [the default limitations statute], there is no statute addressing limitations on actions alleging a violation of art. 24 of the Declaration of Rights or of the other federal and state constitutional provisions implicated in any inverse condemnation claim. Consequently, the general three year statute of limitations found in [the default statute] controls Plaintiff’s claim.” (quoting Electro-Nucleonics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 315 Md. 361, 374 (1989) (brackets in original)). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 31 of 65 22 To determine the accrual date for the state law claims, this Court will look to applicable Maryland law. See, e.g., Barnhill, 2008 WL 544835 at *2. Under Maryland law, a cause of action arises and the statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run “upon the occurrence of the alleged wrong,” Poole v. Coakley & Williams Const., Inc., 423 Md. 91, 131 (2011), that is, “when the legally operative facts permitting the filing of [a plaintiff’s] claims came into existence,” Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264 (2000). However, Maryland courts recognize an exception, known as the “discovery rule,” which effectively results in a formula for accrual that is equivalent to the federal accrual principle: Maryland’s discovery rule ‘“tolls the accrual date of the action until such time as the potential plaintiff either discovers his or her injury, or should have discovered it through the exercise of due diligence.”’ Poole, 423 Md. at 131 (citation omitted). C. The Same Statute of Limitations and Accrual Rules Apply to the Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Declaratory Relief. The plaintiffs also invoke the federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 − 2202, but that statute “is remedial only and neither extends federal courts’ jurisdiction nor creates any substantive rights.” CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 55 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing, inter alia, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950)). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief are time-barred ‘“if relief on a direct claim would also be barred”’ under the applicable statute of limitations. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992), Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 32 of 65 23 cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906 (1993)). That is, a ‘“request for declaratory relief is barred to the same extent that the claim for substantive relief on which it is based would be barred.’” CGM, LLC, 664 F.3d at 55-56 (quoting International Ass’n of Machinists, 108 F.3d at 668); accord Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Ltd. P’ship, 126 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997) (summarizing decisions from the First, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, all of which have “held that an action for declaratory relief will be barred to the same extent the applicable statute of limitations bars the concurrent legal remedy”). Maryland courts adhere to the same rule barring declaratory relief to the same extent substantive claims would be time-barred. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 116 Md. App. 605, 658-59 (1997) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606, 657-59 (2012) (affirming trial court’s dismissal for untimeliness of tort and constitutional claims, including claims for declaratory relief, based on application of the same three-year general statute of limitations and finding that the declaratory judgment claim and other prayers for relief on constitutional claims accrued simultaneously and the limitations period for each expired simultaneously). D. The Plaintiffs’ Allegations Confirm That All of Their Claims Are Untimely Under the Applicable Three-Year Statute of Limitations. Under the pertinent three-year statute of limitations and “discovery rule” for accrual, all of the plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims are time-barred because, according to the complaint, the plaintiffs knew the facts necessary to pursue their cause of action two decades ago. The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claims consists of their assertion that their Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 33 of 65 24 sentences to life with eligibility for parole were, in effect, converted to life without parole due to a former governor’s 1995 adoption of a policy against granting parole to prisoners serving a life sentence. As the complaint alleges, in 1995, then-Governor Glendening announced publicly that he did not intend to grant parole to anyone serving a life sentence unless the prisoner was very old or terminally ill. Compl. ¶¶ 105, 106. At the time of that 1995 announcement, the individual plaintiffs were prisoners serving life sentences, as was the founder of plaintiff MRJI, Walter Lomax. Compl. ¶¶ 16-19, 108. In fact, Mr. Lomax’s understanding that a cause of action had accrued at the time of Governor Glendening’s announcement was demonstrated by the filing of a court challenge to the policy, which was considered and rejected by the Maryland Court of Appeals in a 1999 decision that is cited repeatedly in the complaint. Lomax v. Warden, 356 Md. 569 (1999). Compl. ¶ 108. Therefore, as early as 1995, the plaintiffs’ claims accrued because they “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action,’” A Society Without a Name, 655 F.3d at 348; accord Poole, 423 Md. at 131; they “possesse[d] sufficient facts about the harm” caused to them by the policy so that “reasonable inquiry w[ould] reveal [their] cause of action,” Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955; and, as confirmed by the complaint, “the legally operative facts permitting the filing of [plaintiff’s] claims came into existence” by 1995, Heron, 361 Md. at 264. Even if the 1995 announcement that is the centerpiece of the complaint could somehow be deemed insufficient to alert the plaintiffs to their injury, they had ample opportunity in the ensuing years to comprehend and act upon their cause of action long before the three years that preceded the filing of this suit. Certainly, plaintiff Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 34 of 65 25 Calvin McNeill’s claim had accrued by 2011, when then-Governor O’Malley rejected without comment the 2008 recommendation of the Parole Commission that his sentence be commuted. Compl. ¶ 126. Similarly, plaintiff Kenneth Tucker has long been aware of his alleged injury, given that he declined his parole hearing in 1996 and declined to attend a parole hearing until 2014, because “he did not see much point to reinstating hearings when no lifers were being paroled.” Compl. ¶ 142. Plaintiff Nathaniel Foster also acknowledges that he was aware of his injury more than three years before the filing of this lawsuit; the complaint alleges that in 2005 “Mr. Foster was told ‘off the record’ that the Governor was not going to sign any lifer parole papers,” and his next hearing was set for three years later. Compl. ¶ 159. The complaint further alleges that, on Mr. Foster’s request for reconsideration, Chairman Blumberg informed him “on August 15, 2007” - some 8⅔ years before this suit was filed - that the Parole Commission saw “no basis to change its decision.” Compl. ¶ 160. For these reasons, the plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims are barred because the complaint was filed more than three years after the claims accrued. E. The Statute of Limitations Is Not Tolled Due to the Existence of Adverse Precedent That Might Have Prevented the Plaintiffs from Prevailing. Although the plaintiffs may contend that their claims are timely because the availability of the theory on which they rely was unclear prior to the Supreme Court’s 2016 Montgomery decision (holding that that the rights of juveniles recognized in Graham and Miller must be applied retroactively), the Fourth Circuit has rejected the notion that a Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 35 of 65 26 statute of limitations could be tolled due to “the unfavorable precedent that would have governed [plaintiffs’] claim had [they] sued prior to” the issuance of a new decision that is more favorable to their claim. Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2890 (2015) (holding prisoner’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence was time barred by applicable limitations and rejecting his equitable tolling argument that, prior to a new 4th Circuit decision, he had been “prevented from timely filing by the unfavorable precedent that would have governed his claim”). Whiteside held that the existence of prior adverse precedent, together with the lack of the necessary legal support for a prisoner’s claim until the new precedent was created, did not constitute an ‘“extraordinary circumstance [that] stood in [the prisoner’s] way and prevented timely filing”’ for purposes of equitable tolling. Id. at 184 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). Nor does new precedent cited by a prisoner constitute “a new ‘fact’” for purposes of determining the accrual date for the statute of limitations, id. at 183; rather, “[a] decision ‘establishing an abstract proposition of law arguably helpful to the petitioner’s claim does not constitute the ‘factual predicate’ for that claim,’” id. at 184 (citation omitted). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that “futility cannot constitute cause” for a procedural default. Id. at 185 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (other citation omitted)). Whiteside also relied on prior Fourth Circuit precedent that reached the same conclusion. 775 F.3d at 185 (citing Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 666 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting equitable tolling based on prisoner’s Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 36 of 65 27 argument that unfavorable precedent had previously barred his claim and stating that “futility . . . is not a valid justification for filing an untimely . . . petition”)). Even if Fourth Circuit precedent did not so clearly preclude the plaintiffs here from escaping the statute of limitations by relying on the recent issuance of Montgomery, Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent holds that, under the special exception Congress has created to allow a habeas petition to be based on a right established by new precedent, the meaningful date for accrual purposes would be ‘“the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court,’” not the date of any subsequent decision in which the right was “made retroactively applicable. . . .” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357-59 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)); followed in United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 2012); see id. at 403-04 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (explaining Dodd).7 Therefore, even if the plaintiffs had availed themselves of the habeas statute and filed a petition under § 2254 rather than a § 1983 complaint, their claims would 7 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) authorizes prisoners in federal custody to file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence based on new Supreme Court precedent within one year from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court,” id., but the Supreme Court has held that the one-year statute of limitations runs from the date the right was first recognized by Supreme Court, not the date of a subsequent Supreme Court decision making the right retroactive. Dodd, 545 U.S. at 357-59. A substantively identical provision governs habeas petitions by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (“The [one-year] limitation period shall run from the latest of . . . the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. . . .”). See, e.g., Ly v. Beard, No. 15-70939, __ F. App’x __, 2016 WL 331881, *2 (9th Cir. June 15, 2016) (applying Dodd to interpretation of § 2544(d)(1)(C)). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 37 of 65 28 be time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) because Montgomery merely “made retroactively applicable” a right recognized in the 2012 Miller decision, which was decided four years earlier. To the extent the plaintiffs’ claims also rely heavily on Graham, it was decided even earlier, in 2010, some six years before the commencement of this suit. F. The Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy the Requirements for the Continuing Violation Exception. Finally, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the “continuing violation” exception to accrual for limitations purposes because, according to their complaint, during more than three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit they did not experience new violations of law but, at most, experienced the continuing ill effects of known policies adopted much earlier. Under both Fourth Circuit precedent and decisions of Maryland state courts, a ‘“continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation.”’ Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 189 (quoting National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166 (4th Cir. 1991)). That is, “the continuing ill effects from an original violation . . . do not constitute a continuing violation.” 8 A Society Without a Name, 8 Thus, in Jersey Heights, the Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ continuing violation theory because their claims rested “on the alleged ongoing effects of the original decision to locate the highway in proximity to Jersey Heights” and they “cite[d] no discrete acts of discrimination . . . within the limitations period,” 174 F.3d at 189; in National Advertising, the continuing violation exception was held not to apply because the alleged unconstitutional taking “occurred at the time of the ordinance’s enactment” and “what continued was the ill effect of the ordinance’s enactment and the alleged taking,” 947 F.2d at 1166; and in A Society Without a Name, the continuing violation exception invoked as to certain claims was rejected because the plaintiff’s objection to the relocation of homeless services away from downtown Richmond “amount[ed] to the continuing effect of the original decision to locate” the service center where it continued to stand, 655 F.3d at 349. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 38 of 65 29 655 F.3d at 348; accord Bacon, 203 Md. App. at 662 (“Continuing violations that qualify under this theory are continuing unlawful acts, . . . not merely the continuing effects of a single earlier act” and the “continuing tort doctrine’ requires that a tortious act - not simply the continuing ill effects of prior tortious acts - fall within the limitation period. . . .” (citation omitted)). Although the continuing violation exception may apply “if the plaintiff can show that the illegal act did not occur just once, but rather ‘in a series of separate acts[,] and if the same alleged violation was committed at the time of each act,” A Society Without a Name, 655 F.3d at 348 (citation omitted), the Fourth Circuit has also cautioned that the continuing violation theory ‘“should not provide a means of relieving plaintiff from its duty of reasonable diligence in pursuing its claims,”’ National Advertising, 947 F.3d at 1168 (citation omitted). Accordingly, if a plaintiff “was in a position to challenge” a law or policy at the time of its adoption, then “statute of limitations policies militate against finding a continuing violation.” Id.; accord Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d 279, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1993). In prisoner cases analogous to this one, courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to assert a continuing violation as a way of overcoming the applicable statute of limitations. Thus, in two Eleventh Circuit decisions, the continuing violation theory was rejected where prisoners filed suit, in 2002 and 2001, respectively, to challenge a 1995 change in policy that diminished the frequency with which the prisoners would be considered for parole. Brown v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003); Lovett Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 39 of 65 30 v. Ray, 327 F. 3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003). These decisions concluded that the resetting of a parole hearing or the period of delay caused by a deferred parole hearing due to a policy change did not constitute either a “continuing violation of [the prisoner’s] constitutional rights against Ex Post Facto laws” or an injury “separate and distinct” from “the original decision” to establish the policy and apply it retroactively to the prisoner. Brown, 335 F.3d at 1260-61; Lovett, 327 F. 3d at 1183 (“[T]he defendants’ act (deciding not to consider Lovett for parole again until 2006) was a one time act with continued consequences, and the limitations period is not extended.” (parentheses in original)). As Brown explained, Each time Brown’s parole reconsideration hearing is set, it does not amount to a distinct and separate injury. . . . Rather, Brown’s injury, to the extent it ever existed, was when the Georgia Parole Board applied its new policy, eliminating the requirement of parole review every three years for Brown, retroactively. It is the decision in 1995 that forms a potential basis for Brown’s claim. It was also at this point that Brown could have discovered the factual predicate of his claim. The successive denials of parole do not involve separate factual predicates and therefore do not warrant separate statute-of-limitations calculations. 335 F.3d at 1261-62 (citation omitted). The holding in Brown has been applied in cases affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. See Liverman v. Johnson, No. 3:07-cv-344, 2008 WL 2397544, *2 (E.D. Va. 2008) (applying Brown), aff’d, 318 F. App’x 166 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per curiam); Downey v. Johnson, No. 3:08-cv-199, 2009 WL 150667, *2 (E.D. Va. 2009) (applying Brown), aff’d, 326 F. App’x 131 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per curiam). Similar conclusions have been reached in other belated prisoner challenges to changes in policies or statutes. For example, in Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 40 of 65 31 2006), the Court rejected a continuing violation argument raised by prisoners who brought suit in 2002 to challenge an alleged “de facto” policy regarding parole eligibility that had been applied to them, with their knowledge, as early as 1996. The Court found no merit in “the appellants’ argument that they suffer a continuing violation each day they are imprisoned beyond [the statutory minimum time for parole eligibility] or the [tentative parole month] dictated by the [Parole Board’s Parole Decision] Guidelines,” and the Court further found that their claims were untimely because “any injury that the [plaintiffs] suffered was a one-time injury that occurred in 1996 or 1998 when they learned that they would have to serve sentences longer than [the statutory minimum for parole eligibility] and greater than the Guidelines dictated.” Id. at 1324. In Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2009), the court dismissed as untimely a death row inmate’s suit challenging the State’s lethal injection protocol and rejected the prisoner’s continuing violation argument. As the court explained, “Broom has not alleged ‘continual unlawful acts,’ but rather challenges the effects from the adoption of the lethal-injection protocol. In essence, he has presented no continued wrongful conduct, only the continued risk of future harm.” Id. at 555-56. Just as those cases held that the complaint’s untimeliness could not be excused by resort to a continuing violation theory, here the plaintiffs, according to their own allegations, are complaining of the continuing effects of what they describe as longstanding policies that were first applied to them, with their knowledge, in the mid-1990s. Their Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 41 of 65 32 continued serving of sentences imposed years earlier does not provide a basis for treating the policy changes of the 1990s as continual or repeated unlawful acts. IV. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. A. The Plaintiffs’ Allegations Fail to State a Plausible Claim Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments or Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Court has not recognized a federal cause of action of the type that plaintiffs attempt to assert here: that a constitutional sentence of life with the possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile can be transformed by the alleged action or inaction of executive officials into an unconstitutional sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Nor does any Maryland authority support the plaintiffs’ purported claims under Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.9 Even if such a claim could be asserted, no such violation occurred in the plaintiffs’ cases. First, the holdings of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery do not apply to plaintiffs because those cases involved the imposition of criminal sentences, and plaintiffs make no argument that the sentences they actually received are unconstitutional. Second, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Maryland have insisted that there is a substantial difference between the exercise of the executive’s powers of clemency and the executive’s power to grant parole. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301 (1983); State ex rel. Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 229 (1950). 9 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has “consistently construed [Articles 16, 24, and 25 of the Declaration of Rights] as being in pari materia with their Federal counterparts.” Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 327 (2006). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 42 of 65 33 Under the jurisprudence of both courts, the plaintiffs received constitutional sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole under a system that grants them meaningful opportunity to prove that they are entitled to be released before the end of their natural lives. No more is required. The plaintiffs mistakenly equate the Governor’s role in the parole process with the Governor’s exercise of his power to exercise clemency to pardon an individual or remit part of a sentence of imprisonment without the remission operating as a full pardon. “As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different concepts, despite some surface similarities.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 300. “A parole is a conditional release from imprisonment which entitles the grantee to leave the institution in which he is imprisoned, and to serve the remainder of his term outside the confines thereof, if he shall satisfactorily comply with all the terms and conditions provided in the parole order.” State ex rel. Murray, 196 Md. at 229. “Generally, a pardon is an act of clemency, evidenced by an executive order signed by the Governor, absolving the convict from the guilt of his criminal acts and exempting him from any pains and penalties imposed upon him therefor by law.” Id. Unlike the systems in some States, including the Florida scheme at issue in Graham, Maryland’s parole process is available to plaintiffs who have been sentenced to life imprisonment with parole, without the necessity of prior exercise of the Governor’s power to pardon. See, e.g., State v. Castaneda, 842 N.W.2d 740, 758 (Neb. 2014) (“Nebraska’s parole system has absolutely no application to Castaneda unless and until executive clemency in the form of sentence commutation is granted.”); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Iowa 2010) Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 43 of 65 34 (“[A]n individual convicted of a class ‘A’ felony will be sentenced to life and ‘shall not be released on parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term of years.’”); id. (“Bonilla was sentenced to life in prison and does not have the possibility of parole other than commutation by the governor.”); Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 45 (Wyo. 2013) (“Thus, the only way that a person serving a life sentence according to law may become eligible for parole in Wyoming is if the governor commutes the life sentence to a term of years.”). In Graham, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses. Because Florida had abolished its parole system, the juvenile offender’s sentence was, in effect, a sentence of life without parole, and his only hope of obtaining release was by the exercise of executive clemency. Graham, 560 U.S. at 57. A sentence of life without parole, the Court observed, “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency, the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 69-70. Juvenile offenders, the Court held, must be afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” before the end of their lives. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. The Court cautioned, however, that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.” Id. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 44 of 65 35 In Miller, the Court held that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court did not, however, categorically preclude the imposition of life without parole on juvenile homicide offenders; it may be imposed on those juveniles whose crimes “reflect irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court required, however, that the sentencing authority, be it judge or jury, have the discretion “to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,” before imposing a sentence of life without parole. 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Supreme Court in Montgomery held that the sentencing proscription announced in Miller applied not just to defendants sentenced after the opinion in Miller was issued, but to any individual serving a mandatory life sentence without parole for a homicide committed as a juvenile. “A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” Id., 136 S. Ct. at 736. The Court contemplated that extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders would not “impose an onerous burden on the States” because “prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life sentences,” id., while the “opportunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central intuition that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.” Id. The three Supreme Court cases, taken together, prohibit the State from “making the judgment at the outset” - i.e., at sentencing - that juvenile offenders “never will be fit to Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 45 of 65 36 reenter society,” absent a finding by the sentencing court that the defendant’s crime “reflects irreparable corruption.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. See People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014) (upholding statute that confers discretion on a trial court to sentence a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to life without parole or to 25 years to life, and requiring sentencing judge to consider the “‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how those attributes ‘diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders’ before imposing life without parole on a juvenile offender”); id. at 262 (“Under Miller, a state may authorize its courts to impose life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender when the penalty is discretionary and when the sentencing court’s discretion is properly exercised in accordance with Miller.”); People v. Holman, __ N.E.3d __, 2016 WL 868413, at *9 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (explaining that “although the Miller Court did require sentencing courts to consider mitigating circumstances related to a juvenile defendant’s youth [before imposing a sentence of life without parole for a homicide offense], it did not require courts to consider any set list of factors”); State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890, 893 (Ohio 2014) (holding that a sentencing court is not required to consider any list of factors before sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole but must consider youth to be a mitigating factor when imposing sentence and that “when the court selects this most serious sanction, its reasoning for the choice ought to be clear on the record”). Thus, Montgomery, Miller, and Graham address the “sentencer’s ability” to make the judgment in a homicide case that a defendant should never be eligible for parole, and Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 46 of 65 37 they hold that a sentencer may impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile only after “tak[ing] into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (emphases added). The limitation of the holding in these cases to criminal sentencings, rather than parole proceedings, is consistent with well-settled precedent that the granting or denying of parole is an executive decision, the merits of which are not subject to review by the Court. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011). “There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979), and “[d]ecisions of the Executive Branch, however serious their impact, do not automatically invoke due process protection . . .,” id. at 7. “This is especially true with respect to the sensitive choices presented by the administrative decision to grant parole release,” which “differs from the traditional mold of judicial decision-making” because it “involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the decision maker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate and for the community.” Id. at 8. See also Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that the decision whether to grant parole is a discretionary one, and “a prisoner cannot claim entitlement and therefore a liberty interest in the parole release”). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 47 of 65 38 Thus, the Fourth Circuit and other federal courts have rejected constitutional claims, similar to those plaintiffs bring here, that challenge alleged “blanket” or “unwritten” policies to deny parole to offenders serving sentences for serious crimes. Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of due process and ex post facto claims brought against Virginia parole officials for adopting de facto policy of denying parole to persons incarcerated for violent offenses; noting that each of the inmates “was convicted of a very serious crime or crimes, that the lightest sentence given to any of the inmates was eighty years’ imprisonment, and that “it would be well within the [Parole] Board’s discretion to consider such a prisoner holistically and nevertheless to determine that he or she has not served a sufficiently lengthy sentence in light of the grave crime”); Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 115-17 (2nd Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of due process, equal protection, and ex post facto claims of inmates brought against Governor of New York and state parole officials for allegedly denying parole to violent felony offenders based on “unwritten policy” to focus on violent nature of their crimes without proper consideration of other mandated factors). The fact that the plaintiffs were juveniles at the time they committed their offenses does not render these principles of judicial deference inapplicable to their cases. Indeed, in its decisions addressing the need for juveniles to be afforded opportunities for early release, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” with the guidance provided by these decisions. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Even in cases where a juvenile defendant did receive Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 48 of 65 39 a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a homicide offense, a State “may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 718 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2013) (providing that juvenile homicide offenders are eligible for parole after serving 25 years in prison). Here, the plaintiffs have received consideration for parole, and that is all the Supreme Court decisions require. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ beliefs, the Eighth Amendment does not require the State to produce data demonstrating that a certain percentage or number of juvenile offenders has been paroled. The Eighth Amendment only “prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender,” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, or imposing such a sentence on a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense absent a finding of “irreparable corruption,” Miller, 132 S. Ct., at 2469; the Constitution “does not require the State to release that offender during his natural life,” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. In contrast to the juvenile offenders in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, none of the plaintiffs in this case received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole or even received a mandatory sentence. Instead, each plaintiff received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after serving 15 years less any diminution credits. Nor was the imposition of a fully-executed life sentence mandatory because, as with any criminal defendant convicted of first-degree murder, the judges who sentenced the plaintiffs had the discretion to conditionally suspend the execution of a life sentence or any portion of it in favor of a period of probation. Cathcart, 397 Md. at 328; Wooten, 277 Md. at 115. Indeed, Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 49 of 65 40 the plaintiffs acknowledge that their life sentences with the possibility of parole, when imposed, were constitutional. For this reason alone, they have failed to state an Eighth Amendment violation. The plaintiffs are also wrong to suggest that Maryland’s parole system is unconstitutional because it requires the Governor’s approval of the Parole Commission’s decision to parole an inmate serving a life sentence. In Swarthout, the Supreme Court rejected due process claims brought by two prisoners, one of whom was denied parole after the Governor reversed the Parole Board’s decision that the prisoner was suitable for parole. In doing so, the Court reiterated that, “[t]here is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, . . . the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners,” and that, even when state law creates a liberty interest in parole, the “procedures required are minimal.” Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220. Although California’s system differs from Maryland’s in that it permits, but does not require, Governor-approval of a parole board decision for an inmate serving a life sentence, the plaintiffs have failed to identify any authority for their apparent assertion that the chief executive of the State may not constitutionally participate in the executive function of parole consideration. Additionally, to the extent plaintiffs are concerned with apparent delays in the Governor’s review of parole recommendations, the General Assembly has already addressed those concerns by amending the parole statute to provide that a decision by the Parole Commission to parole a lifer who has served 25 years in prison is effective if Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 50 of 65 41 the Governor does not disapprove the decision within 180 days of receiving it. See Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d)(5). B. The Plaintiffs’ Allegations Demonstrate That They Are Being Provided Meaningful Opportunities for Release. Even if the holdings of the Supreme Court in its cases involving juvenile defendants sentenced to serve life without the possibility of parole were applicable to this conditions- of-confinement action involving prisoners serving parolable life sentences, the allegations contained in the complaint, as well as the evidence submitted with this motion, demonstrate that the plaintiffs have been provided meaningful opportunities for release from prison in compliance with the Eighth Amendment. In holding that the Constitution forbids the mandatory sentencing of a juvenile offender to a term of life without the possibility of parole for a homicide offense, the Supreme Court was careful to insist that the Eighth Amendment “‘does not require the State to release that offender during his natural life.’” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). Rather, State is required to provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. Moreover, “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Those “means and mechanisms” do not “require the State to release [the] offender during his natural life,” id., but to allow the prisoner to demonstrate that he has “atone[d] for his crimes and learn[ed] from his mistakes,” so that parole officials may determine if he is “fit to reenter society.” Id. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 51 of 65 42 The complaint does not contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief” against the defendants under the Eighth Amendment “that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citation omitted). That is, the allegations do not allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. On the contrary, the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs, even without resort to the evidentiary materials supplied by the defendants, demonstrate that the plaintiffs have had, and continue to have, meaningful and realistic opportunities to obtain release. 1. Calvin McNeil Mr. McNeil alleges that he was sentenced to imprisonment for life under Maryland’s felony murder statute “for his role in a fatal robbery of a dice game that occurred in 1981, the day he turned 17 years old.” Compl. ¶¶ 120, 122. He is now 51 years old. Compl. ¶ 121. During his incarceration, he “has taken advantage of every program available to him, earned positions of trust in employment, and taken leadership roles in programs to promote alternatives to violence within and outside [the Division].” Compl. ¶ 124. He has also “earned recognition from correctional officers and administrators who submitted letters of support on his behalf, including a commendation for helping to save someone’s life.” Compl. ¶ 124; see Compl. ¶ 132 (citing notation in Mr. McNeil’s case record that he had Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 52 of 65 43 received his G.E.D, worked for State Use Industries, and served as “a facilitator for [the prison’s] Alternatives to Violence program”).10 As a result, “[i]n recognition of this strong record, in 2008, the Maryland Parole Commission recommended Mr. McNeill for commutation” of sentence. Compl. ¶ 125. After Governor O’Malley disapproved the recommendation in 2011, the Parole Commission scheduled his next hearing for 2015. Compl. ¶ 127. At that time, the two commissioners who conducted the hearing “told him they would be recommending him for a risk assessment,” but “as of the filing of suit Mr. McNeill has not been transferred [to Patuxent Institution] for the assessment,” due to the “lengthy waiting list for assessment at Patuxent[.]” Compl. ¶ 128. Although Mr. McNeill contends that a Division policy precluding him from moving to a lower security level “where he would be able to participate in work release and family leave programs” has “denied [him] a meaningful opportunity for release,” Compl. ¶ 135, because he “is barred from developing skills that allow him to demonstrate his rehabilitation,” his own factual allegations refute that claim. As Mr. McNeil acknowledges, he has been afforded ample opportunities to attempt to demonstrate his rehabilitation. He has been placed in programs that allowed him to obtain his G.E.D., and 10 State Use Industries is the former name of Maryland Correctional Enterprises, a unit of the Division that provides work experience to inmates “for the purpose of improving [their] employability . . . on release,” in “an environment that resembles as closely as possible the environment of private sector business operations.” Corr. Servs. § 3-502(2) and (3). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 53 of 65 44 that gave him work experience to “improv[e] [his] employability . . . on release,” Corr. Servs. § 3-502(2), and he has been afforded the opportunity to participate in the prison’s alternatives to violence program. The State has thus fulfilled its constitutional duty to employ “means and mechanisms” to provide him with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Notably, Mr. McNeil does not allege any facts indicating that the Parole Commission has declined to recommend him for release because he has not participated in programming at lower security levels. On the contrary, the Parole Commission “recommend[ed] [him] for release” to commutation from his status as a medium security inmate, Compl. ¶ 129, and Mr. McNeil has thus failed to state any plausible claim that the Division’s security policies unconstitutionally hindered his ability to “demonstrate his rehabilitation.” Compl. ¶ 135. Governor O’Malley’s decision to decline the Parole Commission’s recommendation for release, without more, also does not state an Eighth Amendment violation, because constitutional compliance requires the State to provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” not to “guarantee eventual freedom.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; see Wershe v. Combs, No. 1:12-CV-1375, 2016 WL 1253036, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2016) (Graham “gives the State primary responsibility for determining how to provide” prisoners with “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that they are entitled to release based on maturity and rehabilitation,” and “does not allow courts to undertake a full review of the State’s parole procedures and substitute its own judgment for the State’s”). Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 54 of 65 45 2. Kenneth Tucker Mr. Tucker “was sentenced to life with parole in 1974 at age 17” after being convicted of felony murder. Compl. ¶ 136. Mr. Tucker “participat[ed] in a robbery-murder with another teenager,” who killed the victim during the robbery. Id. During his incarceration, Mr. Tucker “earn[ed] his high school equivalency in 1975, an associate’s degree in 1989, and a bachelor’s degree in psychology in 1994.” Compl. ¶ 139. He has also participated in prison programs that allowed him to obtain “certification or training in several professions, including metal and wood work apprenticeships, clerical work, and food service sanitation.” Compl. ¶ 139. He “is currently an observation aide in [the Jessup Correctional Institution’s] hospital, where he provides consolation and coping strategies to terminally ill and mentally distressed peers.” Compl. ¶ 139. He is also “a member of [the institution’s] Scholars program and volunteers weekly as a mentor for other men.” Compl. ¶ 139. During parole hearings conducted between 1987 and 1993, parole commissioners noted Mr. Tucker’s good institutional adjustment, and recommended that Mr. Tucker progress to minimum security and work release. Compl. ¶ 140. After “Governor Glendening announced that he would not parole any lifer,” Compl. ¶ 142, Mr. Tucker “declined his parole hearing in 1996, believing the process was futile,” id., and thereafter “did not have any parole hearing again for nearly 20 years, until 2014, as he did not see much point to reinstating hearings when no lifers were being paroled.” Compl. ¶ 142. He did not thereafter request a parole hearing until 2014, when he did so “at the urging of his Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 55 of 65 46 case manager.” Compl. ¶ 142. At that hearing, Mr. Tucker’s sixth, the commissioners who heard his case recommended that he receive a risk assessment at Patuxent Institution, Compl. ¶ 143, and based on the results of that assessment, they noted that a rehearing in January 2017 “would be more appropriate in [his] case.” Compl. ¶ 143. Mr. Tucker states that “[u]pon information and belief, the ‘primary [bases] for the commissioners’ refusal of parole’” were “static factors” that “do not take into account Mr. Tucker’s maturity, rehabilitation or institutional record,” but were instead based on “who he was as [sic] age 17, penalizing him for his youth, such as [his] being unmarried at the time of the offense.” Compl. ¶ 144. Like Mr. McNeil, Mr. Tucker has been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in programming in the Division that could demonstrate to the Parole Commission the sufficient maturity and rehabilitation to warrant parole. Contrary to his claim, the Parole Commission considered, and noted, his good institutional progress in his earlier parole hearings, and to the extent that a parole decision was affected by Division security policies that prevented him from progressing to lower security, those restrictions no longer exist, because an inmate serving a sentence for a crime committed as a juvenile is “eligible for a reduction below medium or minimum security status when recommended by the Maryland Parole Commission for outside testing or work release[.]” Exhibit 2, OPS.100.0004.5.D. Mr. Tucker elected not to be considered for parole for nearly 20 years, based upon his apparent belief that during that time, no inmate serving a life sentence for a crime committed as a juvenile would be paroled. That belief was incorrect because such Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 56 of 65 47 inmates were granted early release from prison by action of the Parole Commission and former governors. See Exhibit 1 ¶¶ 5-18. To the extent Mr. Tucker and the other plaintiffs allege that the defendants have violated the Eighth Amendment by relying on certain risk assessment tools or other psychological testing, that allegation fails to state a claim for relief. In determining whether “an inmate is suitable for parole,” Corr. Servs. § 7-305, the Parole Commission is required to consider “whether there is reasonable probability that the inmate, if released on parole, will remain at liberty without violating the law,” id. at § 7-305(5), and “whether there is a substantial risk the individual will not conform to the conditions of parole.” COMAR § 12.08.01.18.A(2)(a). In making this determination, the Parole Commission considers, among numerous other criteria, “[a]ny reports or recommendations made by the sentencing judge, the institutional staff, or by a professional consultant such as a physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist.” COMAR § 12.08.01.18.A(3)(g). Mr. Tucker has not alleged any facts rising “above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, to support his conclusory allegation that, in electing to re-hear him for parole consideration in 2017, the Parole Commission was “penalizing him for his youth” at the time he committed the crime, rather than merely determining from other information in the risk assessment that there was less than a reasonable probability that, if released on parole, he would conform his conduct to the law. Nor have Mr. Tucker or the other plaintiffs alleged any facts demonstrating that the parole commissioners failed to take into account age at the time of offense when they Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 57 of 65 48 considered the “circumstances surrounding the crime,” Corr. Servs. 7-305(1), or that the presiding commissioners did not assess “[w]hether the offender[s] . . . demonstrated emotional maturity and insight into [their] problems,” a consideration required by the Commission’s regulations since prior to 1995. COMAR § 12.08.01.18.A(3)(f). “In the absence of facts to the contrary, [the Court] cannot presume that the [Parole Commission] has failed to conform to constitutional requirements and its statutory mandate[.]” Burnette, 687 F.3d at 183. 3. Nathaniel Foster Mr. Foster alleges that “[i]n 1983, at 17 years old, [he] was involved in a botched robbery attempt along with his co-defendant, who was eight years his senior and is the father of his sister’s children,” and that “[d]uring the course of the robbery, the victim was killed.” Compl. ¶ 146. Mr. Foster was charged with first-degree murder and received a life sentence with the possibility of parole. Compl. ¶ 147. Mr. Foster contends that he “has an exemplary institutional record,” has pursued his education during his incarceration, “earning a place on the Dean’s List for his high grades while attending Coppin State University for Criminal Justice,” and has held a number of institutional jobs. Compl. ¶¶ 151, 152. Those jobs include working in the institutional canteen and the Officers’ Dining Room, and his current institutional assignment, which is lead office clerk in the Maryland Correctional Enterprises sheet metal shop, where he works “directly under the Plant Manager.” Compl. ¶ 152. He also serves as a volunteer at the prison hospital. Compl. ¶ 153. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 58 of 65 49 Mr. Foster acknowledges that he has received “six parole hearings in the last twenty years, in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2013,” Compl. ¶ 155, and alleges that parole commissioners considering his case in the past have noted his good institutional record, expressed the need for him to progress to lower security, and indicated, in 2000, that he “need[ed] to serve more time for the crime.” Compl. ¶¶ 156-158. He alleges that in 2008 and 2013, the decision of the presiding parole commissioners was to rehear his case at a future date because of the nature of the crime, and that at his parole hearing in 2011, “he was advised that he will be sent to Patuxent for a psychological evaluation.” Compl. ¶¶ 161, 164, 165. Mr. Foster alleges in summary fashion that he has been “barred from developing skills that allow him to demonstrate his rehabilitation,” Compl. ¶ 166, but as with Mr. Tucker and Mr. McNeil, his factual allegations demonstrate otherwise. Indeed, Mr. Foster acknowledges that the Division has “entrusted [him] with extraordinary responsibilities in [his] jobs.” Compl. ¶ 152. Nor has he alleged any facts indicating that, in the last 20 years, any parole decision has conditioned release on progression to minimum or work release security. Compl. ¶ 156. In any event, as noted above, the restriction on progression to lower security about which he complains has been removed for inmates serving life sentences for crimes committed as juveniles. Nor has Mr. Foster alleged any facts demonstrating that he has been denied parole due to the results of a risk assessment that “holds his youth at the time of offense against him.” Compl. ¶ 166. Rather, at his recent parole hearings, the presiding commissioners Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 59 of 65 50 expressed concern regarding the nature and circumstances of his crime. Notably, Mr. Foster does not contend that, in making the determination to rehear his case at a future date based on this concern, the presiding commissioners failed to consider his status as a juvenile at the time he committed the offense. Accordingly, he too has failed to “allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief ‘above the speculative level,’” Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), and this Court should therefore dismiss his claims. V. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES FOR CRIMES COMMITTED AS JUVENILES RECEIVE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PAROLE PROCESS AND TO DEMONSTRATE MATURITY AND REHABILITATION, AND HAVE BEEN GRANTED PAROLE. As demonstrated above, the complaint’s factual allegations demonstrate that they have not been denied meaningful opportunities for parole consideration in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Even if the Court determines that those allegations adequately state an Eighth Amendment claim, however, it is clear from evidence not subject to dispute that the plaintiffs’ claims lack merit, because Maryland’s “means and mechanisms” provide juvenile lifers with appropriate opportunities to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 82; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Undisputed evidence also confirms that, contrary to the plaintiffs’ allegations, juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment are released on parole. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 60 of 65 51 A. Maryland’s Parole Process Affords Inmates Serving Life Sentences with Proper Parole Consideration. Unlike a state in which “there is no advance notice or opportunity for juvenile offenders to be heard on the question of maturity and rehabilitation - either in writing or in person,” and “[t]he offender is an entirely passive participant in . . . [the] parole review process,” Hayden v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1011 (W.D.N.C. 2015), in Maryland, “prisoners receive individualized and personal parole consideration.” As explained by Chairman Blumberg, Pursuant to Correctional Services Article (“CS”), § 7-303(a) and Code of Maryland Regulation (“COMAR”) 12.08.01.17.C, the Commission provides to the inmate advance written notice of the date, time, and place of the parole hearing, as well as the factors that the Commission will consider in determining whether to parole the inmate. Prior to the hearing, the Commission also notifies the inmate that the inmate or a representative of the inmate has the right to examine any document to be reviewed by the Commission in considering the inmate for parole, subject to the exceptions listed in CS § 7-303(b). After reviewing the parole file in the presence of the institutional parole agent (“IPA”), the inmate or the inmate’s representative has the right to dispute information contained in the parole file or to request the placement of additional information in the parole file. If the IPA and the inmate or representative cannot resolve the issue, the IPA is required to notify the Commission immediately. The Commission then takes all necessary steps to investigate the matter and to determine whether any information should be removed from or added to the file before the parole hearing. All prisoners serving life sentences are considered for parole by two commissioners who meet with the prisoner either in person or by video- conference. Pursuant to COMAR 12.08.01.18, a parole hearing is actually an interview of the inmate, not a formal hearing. Pursuant to the same regulation, “[t]he hearings are private and shall be held in an informal manner, allowing the prisoner the opportunity to give free expression to his views and feelings related to his case;” furthermore, although attorneys and relatives are not permitted to make presentations during parole hearings, they are permitted to meet with a parole commissioner “to discuss the relative Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 61 of 65 52 merits or other factors of the case with the Commission at its executive offices, any time before or after a parole hearing.” If both commissioners believe that a prisoner serving a life sentence is a suitable candidate for parole or commutation, they hold the case and refer the prisoner for a psychological examination, also known as a risk assessment. If the results of the risk assessment are promising, the commissioners present the case to the Commission en banc, pursuant to COMAR 12.08.01.23.A. Prior to considering the case en banc, each parole commissioner personally reviews the prisoner’s entire parole file. After every commissioner has reviewed the parole file, the Commission meets to discuss the case in detail, giving careful consideration to all of the factors listed in CS § 7-305 and COMAR 12.08.01.18.A. The commissioners who present the case to the Commission explain the circumstances of the crime, the age of the prisoner at the time of the offense, the sentence imposed by the Court, the prisoner’s criminal history, the progress of the prisoner in the Division of Correction (including programming and discipline), family support, employment prospects, substance abuse issues, any medical or mental health issues, the results of the risk assessment, victim impact, and any other factor that may be relevant to the parole consideration. The commissioners then have the opportunity to ask questions of the two commissioners. After the discussion, one commissioner makes a motion to approve the prisoner for either parole or a commutation of sentence, the motion is seconded, and the commissioners vote. If the Commission votes to approve the prisoner for parole or a commutation of sentence, the decision is forwarded to the Governor for review. Exhibit 2 ¶¶ 24-26. It is thus clear that the procedures in place in Maryland for providing parole consideration to inmates serving life sentences for crimes committed as juveniles comport with the requirements of Miller and Graham. B. Maryland’s Parole Process Has Resulted in the Parole of Inmates Serving Life Sentences for Crimes Committed as Juveniles. The plaintiffs wrongly claim that former governors and parole officials denied parole to all inmates serving life sentences for crimes committed as juveniles who applied for early release. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 119 (alleging the “failure to parole any juvenile lifer Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 62 of 65 53 for more than 20 years”). In fact, under both of Governor Hogan’s most recent predecessors, Governor Martin O’Malley and Governor Robert Ehrlich, Jr., the Governor and the Parole Commission acted together to parole inmates serving life sentences for crimes as juveniles. See Exhibit 1 ¶¶ 5-17. First, the Governor, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, commuted the inmate’s sentence to a term of years, or to life, with all but a term of years suspended. Thereafter, the inmate was granted parole by the Parole Commission, subject to enumerated conditions of parole. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ claims that Maryland’s governors and public safety officials have denied youthful offenders “meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation,” Compl. ¶ 16, the Executive Orders and parole orders that resulted in the releases of these prisoners demonstrate the careful consideration given to the offenders’ cases, and the numerous opportunities for treatment, counseling, and educational and vocational training afforded to the parolees upon release. In each case, the Governor considered the Parole Commission’s recommendation for release, as well as other factors in individual cases, including the offender’s age at the time of the offense, and the views of the sentencing court. Exhibit 1 ¶¶ 5-17. A comprehensive post-release plan was also created for each offender to assist the offender in conforming his or her conduct to the law. Defendants have thus provided undisputed evidence that, in compliance with Graham and Miller, Maryland’s parole process has the proper “means and mechanisms” to afford inmates serving sentences for crimes committed as juveniles a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Miller, Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 63 of 65 54 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Accordingly, if the Court does not grant dismissal, it should grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. VI. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS IS BARRED BY THE MANDATORY EXHAUSTION PROVISION OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires an inmate to exhaust “proper[ly]” all available administrative remedies prior to filing an action challenging the conditions of the inmate’s confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2008). The PLRA’s “mandatory” exhaustion requirement applies to “all inmate suits about prison life,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), and thus plainly applies to the complaints against Commissioner Corcoran. The plaintiffs did not avail themselves of remedies available through the Inmate Grievance Office prior to filing suit against Commissioner Corcoran. Exhibit 3 (Decl. of Russell Neverdon). Therefore, their claims against Commissioner Corcoran, and any other claims addressed to the actions or inactions of Division of Correction officials, must be dismissed. CONCLUSION The complaint should be dismissed and, in the alternative, summary judgment should be entered for defendants. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 64 of 65 55 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Steven M. Sullivan ______________________ STEVEN M. SULLIVAN Federal Bar No. 24930 JULIA DOYLE BERNHARDT Federal Bar No. 25300 Assistant Attorneys General 200 Saint Paul Place, 20th Floor Baltimore, Maryland 21202 ssullivan@oag.state.md.us jbernhardt@oag.state.md.us (410) 576-6325 (410) 576-6955 (facsimile) MICHAEL O. DOYLE Federal Bar No. 11291 Assistant Attorney General Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 300 East Joppa Road, Suite 1000 Towson, Maryland 21286 michaelo.doyle@maryland.gov (410) 339-7567 (410) 764-5366 (facsimile) Attorneys for Defendants Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 65 of 65 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MARYLAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INITIATIVE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN, et al., Defendants. * * * * * No. 1:16-cv-01021-ELH * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT Upon consideration of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, it is this _____ day of ________________, 2016, ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ request for permanent injunction and all other relief is DENIED. ________________________ Ellen L. Hollander United States District Judge Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-2 Filed 07/08/16 Page 1 of 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MARYLAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INITIATIVE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN, et al., Defendants. * * * * * No. 1:16-cv-01021-ELH * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS Upon consideration of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, it is this _____ day of ________________, 2016, ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ request for permanent injunction and all other relief is DENIED. ________________________ Ellen L. Hollander United States District Judge Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-2 Filed 07/08/16 Page 2 of 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MARYLAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INITIATIVE, et al., Plaintiffs, * * v. * CaseNo.1:16-cv-01021-ELH GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN, et al., Defendants. * * * * * * * * * * * * DECLARATION OF DA YID R. BLUMBERG * * I, David R. Blumberg, am over eighteen years of age and am competent to testify. 1. I am the Chairman of the Maryland Parole Commission ("the Parole Commission"). I have served as Chairman since July 1, 2004. I served as a commissioner of the Parole Commission from October 1, 2003 until my appointment as Chairman. 2. As the Chairman of the Parole Commission, I am a custodian of the files and records of the Parole Commission. 3. The information contained m this declaration is based upon personal knowledge of my review of files and records of the Parole Commission. The documents attached to this declaration are true and accurate copies of records maintained in the ordinary course of business of the Parole Commission. 1 EXHIBIT I I Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 1 of 78 4. Between 1999 and 2012, five Division of Correction ("Division") inmates who were originally sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes committed as juveniles, that is, at an age under 18, were paroled from the Division. Between 2004 and the present, five inmates who were originally sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes committed as adults, that is, at age 18 or older, have been paroled from the Division or released from the Division on mandatory supervision following a commutation of sentence granted by the Governor. Parole of John Alexander Jones (17 Years of Age at Time of Offense) 5. On November 5, 2012, upon recommendation of the Parole Commission, Governor Martin O'Malley conditionally commuted the life sentence of John Alexander Jones, Division identification number 168832, to life, with all but 47 years suspended. See Attachment A (Executive Order 01.01.2012.27). Mr. Jones was convicted by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on August 25, 1983 of felony murder, and received a life sentence. Mr. Jones was also convicted of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, and a handgun violation, for which he received a concurrent five-year sentence. In conditionally commuting Mr. Jones's life sentence, the Governor noted that Mr. Jones "was seventeen years old at the time of the offense and has compiled, while incarcerated, a strong record of work experience and institutional progress, including the attainment of a GED and then an undergraduate degree from Coppin State University." Attachment A, p. I. The Governor also noted that "[t]he jury convicted [Mr. Jones] of[f]elony [m]urder for participation in an attempted robbery that led to the murder, but the State ... did not allege that [Mr. Jones] was the shooter;" that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City 2 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 2 of 78 "does not oppose clemency" for Mr. Jones; and that the Parole Commission "has concluded that [Mr. Jones] presently appears to constitute no threat to public safety and recommends the granting of[e]xecutive [c]lemency." Attachment A, p. 1. 6. The Governor conditioned the commutation of Mr. Jones's sentence on Mr. Jones's participation in "a period of community testing and/or ... work release" and a re- entry plan, to include a home plan, an "employment plan that includes as necessary, job placement, job training, and/or educational programs," a counseling plan, and if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, a substance abuse evaluation and treatment program. Attachment A, p. 2. The Governor authorized the Parole Commission to grant parole to Mr. Jones if merited, and also directed that upon release, Mr. Jones participate in counseling, and mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment, as directed by the Parole Commission and his supervising agent. Attachment A at pp. 2-3. The Governor's order also provided for supervision by the Parole Commission following the expiration of the 47-year term, if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, and included procedures for revocation of the release if Mr. Jones failed to abide by its terms. Attachment A, pp. 4-5. Following the conditional commutation of Mr. Jones's sentence, the Parole Commission granted parole to Mr. Jones on February 20, 2013. See Attachment B (Order for Release on Parole). Parole of Mark Farley Grant (14 years of Age at Time of Offense) 7. On March 29, 2012, Governor O'Malley, upon recommendation of the Parole Commission, conditionally commuted the life sentence of Mark Farley Grant, Division identification number 1713 72, to a term of life, with all but 45 years suspended. 3 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 3 of 78 See Attachment C (Executive Order 01.01.2012.06). Mr. Grant was sentenced by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on January 31, 1984 to life imprisonment, and a consecutive 15-year term, after a jury found him guilty of felony murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and attempted robbery with a deadly weapon. In 2003, the sentencing court merged the sentences for use of a handgun and attempted robbery into the life sentence. Attachment C, p. 1. 8. The Governor noted that Mr. Grant "was fourteen years old at the time of the offense and has compiled, while incarcerated, a strong record of work experience and institutional progress." Attachment C, p. 1. He also noted that the jury had acquitted Mr. Grant of first-degree murder; that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City "does not oppose clemency for [Mr. Grant];" and that the Parole Commission "has concluded that [Mr. Grant] presently appears to constitute no threat to public safety and recommends the granting of [ e ]xecutive [ c ]lemency ." Attachment C, p. 1. 9. The commutation of Mr. Grant's sentence was conditioned on Mr. Grant's participation in "a period of community testing and/or ... work release" and a re-entry plan, to include a home plan, an employment plan "that includes, as necessary, job placement, job training, and/or educational programs," a counseling plan, and if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, a substance abuse evaluation and treatment program. Attachment C, p. 2. The Governor's order authorized the Parole Commission to grant parole to Mr. Grant, if merited, and also directed that upon release, Mr. Grant participate in counseling and mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment, as directed by the Parole Commission and his supervising agent. Attachment C, pp. 2-3. 4 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 4 of 78 The order also provided for superv1s1on by the Parole Commission following the expiration of the 45-year term, if deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, and procedures for revocation of the release if Mr. Grant failed to abide by its terms. Attachment C, pp. 4-5. Following the conditional commutation of Mr. Grant's sentence, the Parole Commission paroled Mr. Grant on December 18, 2012. See Attachment D (Order for Release on Parole). Parole of Mary Washington Brown (16 years of Age at Time of Offense) 10. On November 25, 2004, Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., on recommendation of the Parole Commission, conditionally commuted the life sentence of Mary Washington Brown, Division identification number 901457, to a term of 60 years. See Attachment E (Executive Order 01.01.2004.67). Ms. Brown was sentenced to imprisonment for life by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on December 18, 1974, following her conviction for first degree murder. At the time of the offense, Ms. Brown was 16 years of age. 11. In commuting Ms. Brown's sentence, the Governor noted the following: that Ms. Brown was "an exemplary inmate," and had "compiled an impressive record of practical instruction, work experience, and institutional progress;" that the Parole Commission "has concluded that [Ms. Brown] appears to constitute no threat to the safety of society;" and that the Parole Commission "recommends the granting of executive clemency." Attachment E, p. I. He therefore concluded that "[t]he interests of the State of Maryland and of [Ms. Brown) will be best served by the granting of' the conditional commutation. Attachment E, p. I. 5 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 5 of 78 12. The commutation of Ms. Brown's sentence was conditioned on Ms. Brown's participation in 12 months of work-release prior to reaching parole eligibility. Attachment E, p. 1. The Governor's order further stated that in the event the Parole Commissi.on "determines that [Ms. Brown] merits parole release," Ms. Brown would be required to comply with a re-entry plan that included counseling and substance abuse treatment, as well as educational and vocational training. Attachment E, pp. 1-2. 13. Following the commutation of Ms. Brown's sentence, the Parole Commission granted parole to Ms. Brown on February 13, 2006. See Attachment F (Order for Release on Parole and Offender-Based State Corrections Information System ("OBSCIS") record, reflecting that Ms. Brown was released on parole). Because Governor Ehrlich commuted Ms. Brown's sentence to a term of years, she was no longer serving a life sentence when the Parole Commission granted her parole, and approval by the Governor was thus not required. Ms. Brown remains under parole supervision until the 60-year term expires. Parole of Karen Lynn Fried (17 years of Age at Time of Offense) 14. On November 14, 2003, Governor Ehrlich, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, commuted the life sentence of Karen Lynn Fried, Division identification no. 902530, to a term of 45 years. See Attachment G (Executive Order 01.01.2003.35). Ms. Fried had been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on September 15, 1978, following her conviction for murder. Ms. Fried also received a five-year concurrent sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. Attachment G, p. 1. 6 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 6 of 78 15. In commuting Ms. Fried's sentence, Governor Ehrlich noted that when Ms. Fried committed the offenses, she was seventeen years of age. Attachment G, p. I. He also noted that in August 1988, the sentencing judge "wrote his belief that '[Ms.) Fried has achieved maximum rehabilitation and has reached the point where she should be paroled."' Attachment G, p. I. The Governor further noted that in September 1993, "a three-judge panel of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found that [Ms.) Fried's progress during incarceration had been exemplary;" that "[h]er achievement in education and apparent rehabilitation had been noteworthy and highly commendable;" and that "[ s ]he appeared to have earned the opportunity to be considered for ultimate release from confinement[.)" Attachment G, p. I. Additionally, Governor Ehrlich noted that while incarcerated, Ms. Fried "has earned her GED and engaged herself in a wide range of self- help programs," and that she "has a comprehensive support network in place upon reentry." Attachment G, p. I. 16. Finally, Governor Ehrlich noted that the "Parole Commission has concluded that [Ms. Fried] being contrite and remorseful, presently appears to constitute no threat to the safety of society, and recommends her sentence to be commuted to a term of forty-five years[.]" Attachment G, p. I. He concluded that "the interests of the State of Maryland and [Ms. Fried] will best be served by commutation of the sentence." Attachment G, p. I. 17. Following the commutation of Ms. Fried's sentence to a term of 45 years, the Parole Commission granted parole to Ms. Fried on September 15, 2015. See Attachment H (Order for Release on Parole and OBSCIS record reflecting that Ms. Fried 7 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 7 of 78 was released on parole). As was the case with Ms. Brown, because Governor Ehrlich commuted Ms. Fried's sentence to a term of years, she was no longer serving a life sentence at the time the Parole Commission granted her parole, and approval by the Governor was not required. Ms. Fried will remain under parole supervision until the 45- year term expires on March 24, 2023. Parole of Milton Humphrey (17 years of Age at Time of Offense) 18. On May 20, 1999, the Parole Commission, with the approval of Governor Parris Glendening, granted a "medical parole" to Milton Humphrey, Division identification no. 193624. See Attachment I (Order for Release on Parole and OBSCIS record reflecting that Mr. Humphrey was released on medical parole). Prior to the enactment, in 2008, of § 7-309 of the Correctional Services Article ("CS"), which specifically authorizes the granting of medical parole, the Parole Commission granted medical paroles under its general parole authority set forth in CS § 7-205. Mr. Humphrey was paroled from a life sentence beginning on October 6, 1987, imposed by the Circuit for Baltimore City on August 10, 1988, for first degree murder, and a consecutive 13- year sentence for use of a handgun. When he committed these crimes, Mr. Humphrey was 17 years of age. See Attachment J (Parole Information System ("PARIS") record, reflecting that Mr. Humphrey was born on September 13, 1969 and that his offenses occurred on August 28, 1987). Mr. Humphrey died on or about June 9, 1999. See Attachment K (OBSCIS record, reflecting that Mr. Humphrey's case was closed on June 9, 1999, due to his death). 8 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 8 of 78 Early Releases Of Inmates Sentenced to Imprisonment for Life for Crimes Committed at 18 Years of Age or Older Under Governors Hogan, O'Malley, and Ehrlich 19. In addition to the parole releases set forth above, under Governors Hogan, O'Malley, and Ehrlich, five inmates who were sentenced to imprisonment for life for crimes committed at age 18 or older have been released on parole prior to the expiration of the life sentence or on mandatory supervision following commutation of sentence. On February 3, 1989, Howard Simms, Division identification number 197429, was sentenced by the Circuit Court for Howard County to imprisonment for life on February 3, 1989, upon conviction of a fourth crime of violence. See Attachment L (case record, Circuit Court for Howard County, case no. 13-K-87-017186). On October 8, 2014, the Parole Commission elected to grant parole to Mr. Simms. On October 10, 2014, the Parole Commission forwarded its parole decision to Governor O'Malley pursuant to § 7- 30l(d)(5)(i) of the Correctional Services Article, which provides that "[i]f the [Parole] Commission decides to 'grant parole to an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment who has served 25 years without application of diminution of confinement credits, the decision shall be transmitted to the Governor," who "may disapprove the decision by written transmittal to the [Parole Commission]." Under§ 7-30l(d)(5)(ii), "[i]fthe Governor does not disapprove the decision within 180 days after receipt, the decision becomes effective." During the 180-day period, neither Governor O'Malley nor Governor Hogan, who succeeded Governor O'Malley on January 21, 2015, disapproved the Parole Commission's decision. Mr. Simms was paroled on September 24, 2015. See 9 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 9 of 78 Attachment M (Order for Release on Parole). Mr. Simms was 43 years of age when he committed his offense. 20. On March 29, 2012, Governor O'Malley, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, commuted the life sentence of Tamara Settles, Division identification number 904563, which was imposed by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on April 11, 1985 upon her conviction for felony murder, to a sentence of life, with all but 40 years suspended. See Attachment N (Executive Order 01.01.2012.07). On July 26, 2012, the Parole Commission granted parole to Ms. Settles. See Attachment 0 (Order for Release on Parole). Ms. Settles was 26 years of age at the time of the offense. 21. On November 25, 2004, as amended on November 29, 2004, Governor Ehrlich, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, granted a conditional commutation of sentence to Walter Arvinger, Division identification number 11117 5. See Attachment P (Executive Order 01.01.2004.69). Mr. Arvinger was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of first-degree murder on December 4, 1969, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Governor Ehrlich conditionally commuted Mr. Arvinger's sentence to a sentence of life, with all but 45 years suspended, and directed that upon his release, he was to "be supervised by the Division of Parole and Probation as though on mandatory supervision." On the date of the issuance of the amended conditional commutation, Mr. Arvinger was released from the Division subject to the standard conditions of mandatory supervision. See Attachment Q (Conditions of Mandatory Supervision Release). Mr. Arvinger was 19 years of age at the time of the offense. 10 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 10 of 78 22. On November 25, 2005, Governor Ehrlich, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, granted a conditional commutation of sentence to Charles Davis, Division identification number 6762. See Attachment R (Executive Clemency order). Mr. Davis was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City of murder on December 6, 1960, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Governor Ehrlich conditionally commuted Mr. Davis's sentence to a term of 65 years. On June 9, 2006, the Parole Commission granted parole to Mr. Davis, who was 21 years of age at the time of his offense. See Attachment S (Order for Release on Parole). 23. On February 25, 2005, Governor Ehrlich, on recommendation of the Parole Commission, granted a conditional commutation of sentence to Charles Terrell Walters, Sr., Division identification number 133871. See Attachment T (Executive Order 01.01.2005.07). Mr. Walters was convicted by the Circuit Court for Garrett County of murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and on February 25, 1977, he received sentences of life beginning on March 16, 1975, ten years concurrent, five years concurrent, and five years consecutive. On September 23, 1975, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County imposed a ten-year consecutive sentence for armed robbery, and on August 12, 2002, Mr. Walters's Garrett County sentences were modified to an aggregate term of life, with all but 50 years suspended. Following the court's modification of the sentences, Governor Ehrlich conditionally commuted Mr. Walters's sentences to a total term of 50 years. Attachment T, p, 2. On November 2, 2006, the Parole Commission granted parole to Mr. 11 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 11 of 78 Walters, who was 28 at the time of his Garrett County offenses. See Attachment U (Order for Release on Parole). 24. Maryland prisoners receive individualized and personal parole consideration. Pursuant to Correctional Services Article ("CS"), § 7-303(a) and Code of Maryland Regulation ("COMAR") 12.08.01.17.C, the Commission provides to the inmate advance written notice of the date, time, and place of the parole hearing, as well as the factors that the Commission will consider in determining whether to parole the inmate. Prior to the hearing, the Commission also notifies the inmate that the inmate or a representative of the inmate has the right to examine any document to be reviewed by the Commission in considering the inmate for parole, subject to the exceptions listed in CS§ 7-303(b). After reviewing the parole file in the presence of the institutional parole agent ("IP A"), the inmate or the inmate's representative has the right to dispute information contained in the parole file or to request the placement of additional information in the parole file. If the IP A and the inmate or representative cannot resolve the issue, the IP A is required to notify the Commission immediately. The Commission then takes all necessary steps to investigate the matter and to determine whether any information should be removed from or added to the file before the parole hearing. 25. All prisoners serving life sentences are considered for parole by two commissioners who meet with the prisoner either in person or by video-conference. Pursuant to COMAR 12.08.01.18, a parole hearing is actually an interview of the inmate, not a formal hearing. Pursuant to the same regulation, "[t]he hearings are private and shall be held in an informal manner, allowing the prisoner the opportunity to give free 12 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 12 of 78 expression to his views and feelings related to his case;" furthermore, although attorneys and relatives are not permitted to make presentations during parole hearings, they are permitted to meet with a parole commissioner "to discuss the relative merits or other factors of the case with the Commission at its executive offices, any time before or after a parole hearing." 26. If both commissioners believe that a prisoner serving a life sentence is a suitable candidate for parole or commutation, they hold the case and refer the prisoner for a psychological examination, also known as a risk assessment. If the results of the risk assessment are promising, the commissioners present the case to the Commission en bane, pursuant to COMAR 12.08.01.23.A. Prior to considering the case en bane, each parole commissioner personally reviews the prisoner's entire parole file. After every commissioner has reviewed the parole file, the Commission meets to discuss the case in detail, giving careful consideration to all of the factors listed in CS § 7-305 and COMAR 12.08.01.18.A. The commissioners who present the case to the Commission explain the circumstances of the crime, the age of the prisoner at the time of the offense, the sentence imposed by the Court, the prisoner's criminal history, the progress of the prisoner in the Division of Correction (including programming and discipline), family support, employment prospects, substance abuse issues, any medical or mental health issues, the results of the risk assessment, victim impact, and any other factor that may be relevant to the parole consideration. The commissioners then have the opportunity to ask questions of the two commissioners. After the discussion, one commissioner makes a motion to approve the prisoner for either parole or a commutation of sentence, the motion is 13 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 13 of 78 seconded, and the commissioners vote. If the Commission votes to approve the prisoner for parole or a commutation of sentence, the decision is forwarded to the Governor for review. 27. The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services recently proposed to amend COMAR 12.08.01.17 and 12.08.01.18 (Attachment V) through the emergency process contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),§§ 10-101 - 10-118 of the State Government Article. The Joint Committee on Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review recently informed the Department that as a result of comments received by members of the public, the committee will not currently take action on the emergency regulations. Accordingly, pending further action by the Committee, the Department will promulgate the regulations through the non-emergency process set forth in the AP A. While that promulgation process is pending, the Commission will consider the factors listed in proposed COMAR 12.08.01.18.A(3) when considering for parole any prisoner who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, and will provide access to information to prisoners being considered for parole under proposed COMAR 12.08.01.17, which was drafted to ensure that the policies of the Parole Commission comply with Maryland Jaw, and in particular CS§ 7-303(b)(2). 28. Most prisoners serving a life sentence, or a life sentence with all but a number of years suspended, are eligible for parole after serving 15 years less diminution credits, which usually works out to parole eligibility in approximately 11 Y2 years. If the prisoner was sentenced to life, or to life with all but a number of years suspended, following the failed application of the death penalty or a sentence of life without parole, the prisoner is 14 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 14 of 78 eligible for parole after serving 25 years, less diminution credits, which usually works out to parole eligibility in approximately 20 years. CS § 7-301(d) (1) and (2). A prisoner convicted of a violent crime committed on or after October l , 1994, is not eligible for parole until the prisoner has served one-half of the sentence for the violent crime. CS § 7-30l(c). For example, a prisoner serving a life sentence (or a life sentence with all but 50 years suspended) in a case in which there is no failed application of the death penalty or a sentence of life without parole, is eligible for parole after serving approximately 11 Y2 years . By contrast, a prisoner serving 50 years for an attempted murder of other violent crime committed on or after October 1, 1994, is not eligible for parole until the prisoner has served 25 years. I solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury and upon personal knowledge that the contents of the foregoing declaration are true. DATE DA vm R. BLUMBt-o 15 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 15 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:33 AM p, 0 2 4 . " i~~~+ Olxctutibe ~tpm:tmcnt EXECUTIVE ORDER 01.01.2012.27 Conditional Commtttation of Sentence- Job]) Alexander Jones WB'EREAS, John Alexander Jones (Division pf Correction I:nnmte Number 168832), Conditional Grantee, was convicted of Felony Murder, Handgun Violation, '1lld Attempted Robbery with Deadly Weapon in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City on August 25, 1983 (Case No. 18305502) and W$S sentenced to lifo imprisonment p:tus five years concurrent; WHEREAS, John Alexander JonOarttnent of Public Safety and Conectional Services pursuant to Title 7, Snbtitles 3 and 4 of the Correctional Services Article of iho Annotatod Code of Maryland, subject to .11 of the standard C(l!lditions of parole arid the followiltg special conditions: 2 p, 0 2 5 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 17 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:34 AM (l) l'articipate in counseling programs es provided in fue . reentry plan established under Se<;tion J3 of thls Conditional Commutation unless the ParQJe Co1mnission determines !hat participation in the program is no longer: necessary; (2) lf deeined necessary by the Parole Commission, submit to a mental health evaluation ond participate Jn menW health treatment programming as directed by W. supervising agent; (3) Submit to random drug testing as directed by his supervising agent; (4) If deemotl necessary by the Parole Commission, p"l'licipate in stlhstance abuse treatment programming as directed by his supervising agent; and (5) Any other special conditioll.8 !hat~ Parole Commission considers proper. F, lf the Conditionol Grantee is roleased ou mandatory supervision, upon reka:m from custody, he shall be supervised by the Departinellt of Public Safsty and Coo:ectional Services pursUll.ilt to Title 7, Subtitle 5 ofthe Correctional Services Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, subject to all the standard conditions of mandatory supexvision and the following special conditiorul: (l) Participate ln CO'Ullscling progrnms as provided iA !he reentry·pl'ttl established unde< Section:S of this Conditiooal Corrnnutation unless the Parole Commission detemrines th.at participation in the program is no longer.i1ecessary; (2) If deemed necessary by the Parole ConnniBsion, submit to a mental health evaluation o.nd participate in mental health treatment pro gramrnlng as directed by his supervising agent; (3) Submit to rE1Ddom drug t.,.tiu.g as directed by his supervising agent; ( 4) If deemed necessary by the Parole Commission, participate in substance abuse treatment programming as directed by his supervising agent; and (5) Any other special cor1ditions tl:iat !he Parole Commission considew J?l'OP"" 3 P. 0 26 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 18 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:34 AM G. The Parole Commission shall not grant an abatemeot of supervision whik the Conditional Grantee is on parole or numdatory supervision. H. Revocation of Parat. or Mandatory Supervision and Re- imposition of Commuted Sentence: If the Parole CollllllissiQl) detemrine. that the Conditional Grantee violated a condition of parole or mandatory supervision und\11 Sectiops E or F of th.is Conditional Commutatiou, but the Conditional Commutation has not been revoked under Section J, the Parole Commission may revoke parole or·mandatory suporvision pursuant to the procedures outlilled in Title 7 of the Correctional Services Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland and the Code of Maryland Regulatiops. The Parole Commission may, withia its .discretion, d0J1y the Conditional Grantee credit for time served on parole or mandatory supervision. Notwithstanding any other provision of!aw, the Parole Commission may also, within its discretion, revoke a11y o;r all offue Conditional Grantee's diminution credits whether the Conditional Grantee was released on parole or mandatory supervision. I. Following completion ofbls unsuspended tenn of 47 years: (1) The Conditional Grantee must submit to contillued supervision by the Parole Commission for the remainder of his suspended lifetime term unless !he Parole Commission detorn:rines that the abatement of such .supervision is in the best mterests of 1he State and that further supervision is not necessary fur the protection of public safety. Except as otherwise provided in this Conditional Commutatlon, tlris supervision shall be conducted according to the standard policies mid procf;dures governing supervision of parolees onder the Code ofMatyla!ld Regulations. (2) The Conditional Granteo must, whefuer or not supervision ls abated, C\lntluue to abide by tlw following conciltions for the remainder of his suspe11ded lifetime torrn: (a) Report as directed to and follow his parole agent's instructionB unless the Parole Commission has granted an abatement of supervision: (b) Obey all laws; (c) Notify the Parole Conunission. before chsnging jobs, clumging his home, or leaving the State of Maryland. Tho hrolo Commission has the authority to waive these noti,Jication requ:ii:ements; 4 p, 02 J Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 19 of 78 --------. --------~-------------- APR-14-2016 THU 08:34 AM (d) Do not illegally use, possess, or sell any narcotic drug, "controlled d•ngerouSOiional facility INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PAROLEE No. AD13543 37174E SID# p, 004/031 p' 00 2 Upon release you shall be deame11 to rem~ln i;legal custody until the expiraioh of your full, undiminished lflllll of c:onflnemen\_ Upon me alleged vlolation ofany rondhion of pal1lleyou shall be remanded to the authorlly from which paroled, where• hearing shan be oonducted by the Parole Commi.sion. If your parole Is revoked, the Commission shall dsillrmins the amount oftime spent on parole, if any, which is to be Grndiilld toyourterm of confinement You are subject to the special conqitions of pamle as setfortl\ below, the standard conditions of parole on po~o 2 of this oroer and to such further condltions as the Commission may Impose at any time duong the telTTI of your parole, Special Conditions: 1. Submit to, successfi.J!ly nomplete, and pay miy reqtJ!rQ(l coots Wr artj and att eval~kms, treatment progratm:, iesi:ing, and aftsrcam as dirg(ftfld by tll~ Of Vie Jon of Parole and Probation. which may include substance abuse, manta! hea!th, anger mMagement parcntlng, domMtic violQOce1 and otriar lS!l\las, Take all medioation5 pteacsfoed by your tmatment pf'O\tld131·, MPG-54 (R"'"8ed 1110712007) Page1 ol 3 · Attachment B Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 22 of 78 p, 005/031 JUL-07-2016 THU 08: 15 AM FcB-20-2013 WED 03:01 AM p. 0 03 Namo: JONEs JOHN A Oodi:168832 3. Petmlls agents of the. Division of Parole and Probation ID visit your hotne: e~ any time. 34. Comply 1!S a1rected by your parole/probation a.gent with 1tla Division of Pam!El Eiriii Probation's sBXUal rrfrender management µrogram, which rnay include intensive reporting requll'Elm~1 speoi.ar!ZJ:!d sex offender treatment, elsclrorilt;: trlOt\~ring, medication, potyg~ph testing, and . oornputor monltonng. · '· 35, Gomplywifh any Gtjrfew or site restricllo~ !tl'lpooed Qj your ~m)gjprobation :;igent to liml\:ybur s~ to certain area<1 uf b oomn'IUfll\y and For ta require you to obtain tiefTTiission to leave your resldenoo during certron hours. Cooperate. with any program which ls es!Hblished to monlioryour cornpllancewttll these restricHoris, ~!ch m21y include p<1ymentfur costs assocl.W .wtth Global Positioning Systems (GPS) or other !racking teohnology. · 3B, Provide B.altimorn City on January 31, l984 (Case No. 18301906) and was sentenced to life unprisolUlient plus filteen ye at$; On Ma+ell ! 0, :Z003, the.Ci~cuit Cpm:tfor Balilmore City m~ged Mark Farley Grartt's tell )'~Iii" ~enie:l\Ce for Atte)llpted Robbery with a De\'ldly We~pon 11J1d.his 'five yeat sentence :J\lr Use of a Fl1U1dg\m in Conµnission ·oh Ctime· of Violence into hfo·.senfun;;e of life imprisonment for Felony MUrdet; .... Mw:k Farley· Grant was fourteen yej.µxy ocnvic;te(!Mark Farle.y Grant of Felony Murder fur participation m Jhe i:obbecy th;Jt led. to the wmtl~r, b11t ac~uitted him of First Degree Murde.r; The Baltitnorl: Cit¥ .State.'s Attoniei' doe$ not opposq. clemency for Mark Farl"Y Grant; lJlld Tue M&ryland )'aro1~ Commi~ion has oo)lolud.ed ;hat Mark Farley Gtant presently appears to 'C\Jnstitilte no threat to public safety attd 110conunends ihe grab.till fl ofExecutiVe Clemency, · NOW,"TFIEREFORE, I,.J'4AR.TIN b1MA;LLEY. GOVERNOR.OF UIB STATE Ol' . MARXLAND.1 HAVING THOUGHT PROPER TBE COl\UJITJONAL GRANTING OF CLEMENCY lN THIS CASE AND UNDER THE AUTIIORITYVESTED JN ME BY ARTICLE II, SECTION20 OF THE CONST!10TION OF MARYLAND AND SECTION 7·601 OF TBE CORJIBCTJO'NAL SBRVlCES ARTICLE OF TI:lE AN!\fOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND, ))O BBREIW ORDER 'J'HATTHE-OruO:!NALSBNTENCE TO Tiffi.GlJS'I:ODYOF THE: p 018 j I Attachment C Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 25 of 78 - -------~, -------~-------------- APR-14-2016 THU 08:33 AM liNIStON OF CORRECTION BE AND .l:lEREBY IS cONbJUONALL 'Y COMMUTEbAND CONDITIONALLY Jm!yJI'ITED TO LIFE Wl'Il!.ALL BUT 45 YEARS SUSPENDED SUBJECT TO TiiE FOLLOWXN'G; Pre:teleruie Conditio))s A. Prlot to parole ¢lease, the Conditional Qrantee sha!J c.omple_ti; aper-!od of.colnmunityU>liting and/or a period of work .release, as detenninedb:x the Department of Public Safely and ·Co11-ectibna1:8 ervfo.. 'fhe Parole C:onunission may irtl.pose an.y other pre-releaBe conditions thot it.cmn•lders proper. Post-release C9miltfons 13' rfthe Maryllllld l'm:ole .Qo.mmission a,etemxines :that !he Co.ndiliQnai !}i:apte.e merits ·pru:ol¢ rd~.ase, the Parole C'otun1iSsibh may ,grant par.Ole, -and the Conditional Grantee shall 2 p, 019 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 26 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:33 AM ------,-: ------------------ b.e superyised by 1he D~plll1nfent of'Public Safety and Corteclio!\lll Smii~ pursu!Ulito Title 7, Subtitles 3 aI1d 4 of the Gorrect!onaJ Se,rvices Aitiblo of the .Amotated Cod.e of Mazyllmd,.silbJ®t to all of the Standard conditiims ·of parole and the fo!loWing special conditions: (l). PllJ:tiqipate in counseling.programs i!ll pro'Vlded in the reen,b:y pl;m e;;t~bllshed under ~oction B oftl)is Gonditional Comniutatiofi unless the Parole Gommissiondeterml!ies that partfoipation in the program is ·no lon&•r necessary; (2) Ifdoemed.necess.ary byihe Pti;tole Commission, ~pmlt to a;tneatal health evaluation· and pa:rticipat\o Ui immtal health treatment .programming as directed by his SUpeh'islng .agent; (3) Subt)11J to rando)ll drug tesfuig as directed by !)is super-Vising agen.t; (4) lf deemed.necessary by the Parole Commission, particlp.aw in substauqe a~use .treatment programming as dfrecte!l by hi~ s11pervishi~ ~gent; Md \5) AnJI oib,er special condlii.P;os that the Parole j:ornrriission considers proper, F, If the Conditional Orautee is released on mondatory ,supergtarns as provided in .the reentry plan establi~hed U1Jder Section B ~f this Condition~! Con;mmtatlqn unless th1' J?a:role C!)Ullnisslon di:tetmines tliat pm:tioipation:i!l th" µrog+.am is M ]Qnger ;necessary\ · (2) If deemed necessaty by the Parole Cornmlsslon, .submit to a meyital bi;aith evaluation and patticlpate in ment.1 .health treatment programming ai> ~iresirio11.ofCommuted Sentence: If fue PIU"ole Commission deietmlpes tb..at the Con<)itiona) GJ;antee yi'olated a condition of pa:ro1e or m;mdatozy supervision nndor Sections E or!' of fuls Conditional Conunutation, but 'the Conditional Co:rrunutation has .not been t<>vokod 11nder Section J, the. Pa±a=~t of such supervision is i11 the best \nterests of the State and that l\irthet ·.supervlslo11 is not necessary for the protoo:ti:on of public ·safety. Except as b:lherWise provided fo tllls Conditional Commutation, this supervision.shall be conducted accordlng to the standard yolioies.and procodures govmrlng mipervfa!0n. of parolees up,de(IOode of Maryland Regu;l~tiono Sectian r2:os.OJ.2!. (ll) The C::ondH!onal Grant.ee. mwrt, whother gr not . supervision ls abated, cenfuuie to abide by the fO'llo"ldll!l ·cCOJlditions :fur the ~emainder .ofhlatement of supervi&ion: {!>) Obey.alllaws; (0) Notify the Parole Commission before cli®ging job$, changW.g_ hls home, ot teavlng the State of Maryliind, The Parole· Cemmission has the authority to waive these notificatfon requlrement:i; -(cj) Do not llle_gal)y use, .J'08Sess, or sell my J)'arcot.ic- dl:ug; "pontrolled dimgerous .su\lstimce, » or related :PE1111phema1ia; · .(e) .Do not OWQ, _possess, -use, sel~ or have c.ontral of any dangemus We(ltlon or firea:rm. of any descriptiou wi\houn4e '\J?Pro'Val of the Parole Conunisslon; (f) Notify the Pru:ole Commission inunediately if "1rested; and .(g) Any Special con\!Wons that t.lw llBrole Conunission·considers proper. Rev:ocation ).. Rei•ocation of/he CandittonaJ Commutation-and Re· f1J1J1ndititl11•l Grante.e po~es a. threat to. public saf~ty (Uld, $Ons:iderlng .the totality of the oircumstanoes,. that revocation .is war; ante& (1) TheClllldi\ionql·CJ:rantee.is 09nvicted of•a oriine; . (2) 'rhe Conditional Grantee owns, possesses, ·uses, sells or has under·his oontrnl a firearm; (3) The ·Conditional Or@tee, whlle inoarcerate(j, Is fo1ll;l4 .guilty of ;,n inmate rule violation listed in Code Qf Mru:ylOJ.id Regulations Sect!on.12.0Z.27.04B(l)c{4) ""(6) or ia {oUn.m one inmate i;ufo. yfolation listed ln Cocle of Maryl!lllc\ Regulation~ SoctioiJ(J2.0Z;z;i,04B-E; or · (5) the Conditional Grantee violates a condition unde)'. i;lection;i B, F, or I oftlill: Conditional Commumtion. K. Ttie. Parole Commission shall notify tho Governor in wrlting.of:a reoolnmendation to revoke this Con\1itional Con;ml,lfatiou under Sectfon J, and the Ooverll1lr may declde to accept Ol'. reject the Parole. Co111:1Uission's .i:ecomtnendation. GivenU:uder lYfy Hand and the GJ:eat Seal of the SWJ:e of 'Moryl an) uas SCl-CRJ.cT 11onmo1907 D:1te(s) sentenced: 1)0Jioolii64 2) ownaao lerm(s): from: 3) 03'\l511SS4 1l y Iii•!\\ 000 000 2J <005 M 00 o ooo 3)Y010 M 00 DOJl() 1) 01/1011~3 (o) oloff•rno(•) oommli\dy ~nUI !he explraUon of.your full, undiminished term of confintn1onl. Upon the allsged vlolcilon ofany cond~on of pamJ" you oholl to rernonded to tho oulhorl!yffilm which paroled, who"' o hcoring c:h::ill ho conduci\:l~ by ttlo P:iro!o C'ommit:£ion. If your pm!9 ie riVoked 1 thw Commk~!r;m cMll ®kirmino tho 1mount ot tlrrio •pant oh perole, If any, which is to bG crMlle~ to younerm of c:annnommil. You are subjecl ro !he special Cd !>y l''"" ""'lmont pr.,ldor • .:J. Pwmlts i'.l~~ of the: O'M!i!on dfl1Jm!i:i f.lnd Pl'bbil~tm t11 vbil your home: ;:if ol'>yilma. 34. CtJmpl~-:!l!I dlreacrl b~ your pa((lla/prob:.itloh agianl wlinVio Dll!lr:l\on o( Parole, srn:.f Prnb11.tlon1~ ~x.uAI p.lfliilTldor m1mll\IOITTM1 progn1tn4 whlch "1SY ~~udo lnlon, spocl•llzod '" al!ond•r IT""1rllOIJI. ~""1unlc monllOrfn!J. 111Qd~ro, polJllr;,pn 1"11ng. MIOonoo during oortsln !lour>. co~rotlryour OQ1jjpl~nce with lh"'' "'1ri<>loo" which m')'""'IJtli p,a)monl lor 00.lt! """'tiohld wilh GlobOl /'<>•IUcnlhg S)'lo!M (GPS) or o\~1'1 tocillno toohnokiav. 29.,AppO"arlnroudwbwn.notf~l:I to do :io. 40_ Wolvc oll '"""'ditlon r\lh~ snd P'O""""'• ond ogroo Jo MARYlANb, HAVINGTilO\IGHT PROPER TfjE CoNOlnONAL GFV\NTING OF CLEMENCl;Y IN 'J'HIS CASE 1\1'10 UNDER THEAUTflORtTY VE$TEO eY llf\TICLE II, SECTION 20 OF 1'1E CORRECTION/\!. 8i;RVICES ARTICU:: OF TI1E ANNOTATED OOPE Of MhR'l'U\ND, OROS'RtCT!ON B!;AND HEREBY CONDITIONALL v CQMMIJTEO AND GONDfTIONAL REMl'fmJ ro llFE wrrn All BlfT 4S l'EARS SUSPENDED :5\JBJEGT TQ 1HE F()LlOwii'IG: GuuN~t:!JN~ Aei u1ri~L:1t;0;HAN11uM UH.Uu 1~11N~ ;:iuu~ 1AN1.:1:!'.iu:uJ~-1K1:-..ITTMEr;'1'~Vin AS01ftt'i..liii:' /\1~t"V\iit:tt ~r't;l.i!rtk CONDITION Ao PMOLfO COMMISSION DEEMS AS NECE$W\RY •piEAsE REP~TO TllE EAE;C\JT\JIVE ORDER FOR l'Vlh PEF'INITION IX lilESP!;OAl CONDITIONS• Home Plan MARY GR.ANT Al/NT N:ilflQ itely Ir you am arrnslsd. · 6, You shall no! Illegal~ P°""""· µll(l, or aelf any rnm;otlc dnJg, 'oonlrolled dao9erous substJnca", or rafatod parapnernalla. 7. You •hall not ow~. P"'''"'""• use, ~ell, or have under your control any llangarous w;ii>on or~rearrns ofany desorlptlon wlttmutapproval of the Paro1e'eomm1Gsion, a. You ah;ill conduct yourself as not Ill presonta danger to yuursolror other... 9, Special oondftlaos: See p:ige 1 oflhls ~9mlllllem. NOTE: ConrtlUons 10 and 11 apply lo parolaWI whos• tlitm of confinerrnm!rasulled from a crime or odmes committed on or af!Br May 1. 19Sl. 10. You most pay a monlhly •upa~slon lee ~s roquJrod..hy l~l".11~ tiie P.am!~ C-!lmm~sl0n W:Q!n~tli you wholly or µaT11ytrom payment af lite fee. 1 t If u•uuiuu hy U1• l'>lrulo C<>111m1"•lon to Uhdlll'g<> dntg or alG\,11ul """"" 1,,.11ng, you must pay rorllte tesffng if l>'qUlred lo da oo by t)Je OIVlslon of Pero/a and ProbaJion, I have read, or have h~d read to ms, lha fomgolnE colldlllolls of parola •nd any spool Bl condldons. I lllTIY undarstand lhom and I ~grao, in conoldaratlllfl of gl'nnUng of parula to ob servo and ilblde by such condl0o!1' of pan;>le. Mer, I hereby waive axlr.E.Y \·JASl:lfNGTON BROWN #9(11457 OOR Commitment Name DOC/PARIS No. oon who w~ convicted of: ---------------------------------- BAUIN'.JRE CITY CIRCUIT mlmT - #17400351 Date{s) sentenced: 12/18/7•/ ferro; SO WARS 01/19/74 'l'REREFoRE; the ::iidd Commission does hereby oi:der the release on p~le of the s~id qff'endei: from: l$,'ME DITT'!!NTI.ON l~1IT 01/19/203/. (C<:tn.-ectional J.i'acility) ParOi.ent · Must °""Ply With All Components .;if '.!i\? Agreel1"Pt M'IL')Rfff-1 P.R~ .JOHFS(StSTER), 34.:tl M0l',~Dl\i<:1'H'N AW.Nf)Ey L;(l1.,1'!MC1f'J:~, MD. r Home and ~mploymen.t J>Jan; · ,· 21216, (410) 358-5700 OR (410) 233-1050 ;~) BALTI~URf. PR!WFN1TO~ (X)Al.ITI0N, 714 ?Ai~K .AVENUE, BALTIM:)RE, ND., 21101 Cbl"i'J.'ACT~ ~'E'._Ni1:.!.\. l!Jt:-i(kALL U1;1on rel~se1 yon shall report, in 1ters91\i_QR_!fier than 10:00 &Jn:-,.On the JJ~xt busj,ne~§. d:ay, tu the Division of Parole and 4101..J (::.ij_,_lJ!u,_,)_) AVENUE, BALrJ.f~ORE~ 11D., Ll'l. !..H Probation office located.at · 1 (443) 2~3 ... 3500 Telephone no.--------- Date WHITE· Parolrii: • l'INJ! P11roJe Commlssiott Copy • YE:W'.-OW. CQ,rnctional Fa.cUlty Copy •BLUE Ci:-rtificd Copy· GREEN. O..urt 0.>py MPC·14 (RcviK.d i/00) Attachment F Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 36 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 08: 17 AM p 011/031 CONDITIONS. OF PARO LE : 1. :Re:Port as ill;i;ected to and follow your Pa:role Agent's instructions. 2. Work regularly. 3. Get permission befon:i: a. Changing yow home;. b. Changing your job; or c. Leaving the State of Maryland. 4. Obey all laws. 5. Notify yow P<1role Agent immediately if you are mrested. 6. You shall. not illegally possess, use, or sell any narcotic drug, "controlled dangerous substance", or related paraphernalia. ·1. You shall not own, possess, ilse, sell, or have under your control any dangerous weapon or fueanns bf any description without approval of the Parole Commission. · 8. You shall so conduct yourself as not to present a danger to yourself or others. 9. Special conditions: See page 1 of this agreement. NOTE: Conditions 10 and 11 apply to parolees whose term of confinement resulted from a crime or crimes committed on or after May 1, 1991. 10. You must pay a monthly supervision fee as required by law unless the Parole Commission exempts you wholly or partly from payment of the fee. 11. Xf ordered by the Parole Commission to undergo dnig or alcohol abuse testing, you must pay for the testing if requi.i:-ed to do so by the :Division of Parole and Probation. l have read, or have had read to me, the foregoing conditions of parole and any special conditions imposed 01 page 1 of this agreement. I fully understand them and I agree, in consideration of granting of parole, to observe am abide by such conditions of parole. Flli-ther, I hereby waive extradition to the State of Maryland and expressly agre( that I will not contest any effort to return to the State of Maryland in consequence of my violating any of the term: and conditions of this parole. OOG #901457 Signature of Parolee. Date Witness Jv.IPC-15 (Revised 11/99) WBITE - Parolee • PINK - rarole Co!01'Jisoion Copy • YELLOW - Institution Copy • BLUE - Cortified Copy · GJUlm - Court Copy Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 37 of 78 JUL -0 J- 2016 THU 0 8 : 18 AM p, 013/031 P/N OBSCIS REPORTING FUNCTIONS PAGE: 001 OFFENDER TRAFFIC HISTORY DATE:. 07/07/16 TIME: 08:11 DOC #: 901457 BROWN MARY WASHINGTON DATE TIME LOCATION BLOCK TIER CELL BED REASON PER 02 13 2006 13 38 SEE REASON 84 PAROLE LAWRENCE D D 11 22 2005 13 44 HOME DETEl'il 01 ADMIN LAWRENCE D D 07 12 2005 12 20 BAlll'O PRER B 014 B 03 HOUSING MCCLENDON J 04 12 2005 12 30 BALTO PRER A 014 B 03 HOUSING MCCLENDON J 01 11 2005 14 00 BALTO PRER B 019 D 03 HOUSING YOUNG ELVA 12 21 2004 13 15 BALTO PRER B 015 B 01 ADMIN ALEXANDER M M 10 26 2004 12 50 WOMENS INS B 2 131 B 18 RET MED AP BOGUES C 10 26 2004 10 05 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT BOGUES C 10 13 2004 16 45 WOMENS INS B 2 131 B 18 RET MED AP WEST, R 10 13 2004 13 55 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT WEST, R 08 18 2004 15 28 WOMENS INS B 2 131 B 18 RET MED AP TAYLOR V 08 18 2004 12 45 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT QUEEN D 07 20 2004 14 00 WOMENS INS B 2 131 B 03 HOUSING QUEEN D 07 16 2004 11 45 WOMENS INS 192B 2 610 B 03 HOUSING QUEEN D 07 14 2004 14 00 WOMENS INS 192B 2 •. 601 B 03 HOUSING TAYLOR V 07 08 2004 12 10 WOMENS INS 192D 2 819 s 18 RET MED AP QUEEN D 07 08 2004 07 35 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT QUEEN D INQUIRY ONLY. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 38 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:32 AM P. 0 I 0 •11/15/2603 12:23 4169742077 GOV OFC LC RA PA~o 02 · '· .. NDV.15,~00.3 4!07AM I MD SEC Of $lAlt N0.619 p,i/(8 WHEREAS, ·~ntM~' ~~ ~~ ~........::;.... · iexccutibt :.IDtpartnttnt EXECU'rrvE ORDER OLOUoo;,3:; . Oo.Sepilllnbor )$, 1978, Ji;."111.\L)'®Jlrisd, ~. tl\Elo IOVlllll•ll!l yeor• Of ago, WU ¢On'9iotii)O•d ~y tho l~tli ludse J obn !l. Raine, . Ji. to llil:: lmpd.lolllll•ut, with a eoncw:rfllit tenn o!!l.vo years on the ·: ohargo of CollfPilAAY to Conunl1 Murclei1 On Augu;it 2$. 1~es, fuds• R~o -!chi.. boliofthat ".Karan l'r\od lw Mbfovoo maximum rebabilitillon and.ha. re-.mu.d till: : point wh .... •he Gnollld bi; patolod;" On September8, 199,1, a tltr~jUdge pmel of the Citcult Court of · llaltlmoro CDll!lt)' fuimcl tba1Mi9S l'l:l•d's ittogte•& dllrlng · iuooroemtlo11 hod becn ox""'!'l"'l', .Ker aohlOVll!llm oonfu:l !broat to th• ;>lf~ty Qf,ooiaty1 mdWCO)lll1l'1lds hO!f : •entenoo I<> be oommm~d to a tmn 0£ forly-f!•e Y"1ltR; lll)d ~: l))a lil!er•l!tll of the Stale ofMazyl!iJ!d mid of1lle Onmtee will host ' ~· '"""'\! ~y comm11iatioii of the ~O!ItO!lce. · Attachment G Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 39 of 78 . ····~, ------------,---- APR-14-2016 THU 08:32 AM p, 011 , 11/15/2M3 12: 23 41~974201'7 GOV OFC LC RA PAGE 03 · NOV .15. 2003 a; ~?AM ' MD i;;;:t OF" STATE: N0.618 P.2/1:3 '/ ~ . lfOW, '.l'HER.Ef'ORil. )'., R(>BJ>RT L, Eal!LJC!:l, Jl<., GOV!mNOR OF THE S'l'A'n! ~ · MARY'l.AND, BY VllU'lJE C)l T:flRA.tl'.raO!Urr VESTED lN ~ Mll E\Y Tttll CONSTITUTION mp LAWS OF MA.RYLAW, REl ~. Cll'\IEN Undor ll{y bond an,d th• l'.lr¢at Seal a.f'lho $tote of :M;ary!l\nd, fl) tho CJ1y of Amlaponi, Ibis 14~ D•r o~ N¢v0mber, ioo3. It. K'A"l Aumonn Sooromry of Stato Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 40 of 78 JUN-27-2015 MON 09: 29 AM p, 00 2 09/14/05 JCJ 44202 N<:>. _____ _ MARYLAND PAROLE COMMISSION ORDER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE WHE~, the Fa.tole Commission, by virtue of the authority t:0:t1ferred upi:n:.i lt by tbe laws of the State of M;icyland, \loes hereby grant parQle to; KAREN LYNN FRIED DOC #902530 DOB: 02/09/1961 Commitment Name DOCl?Af!.IS !lo. DOl! MURDER 1sr DEGREE who wall convicted of; ---------------------------------- Court: Baltimore County Circuit Court #f,1477 Date(s) sentenced: 09/15/1978 Tenn: 45 years From: 03/24/1978 TIIE:IU:~ORE, the said Commission does hereby order the :release 011, piirole of the s~id qffender from: llOME llEJ'ENITON UNIT (Correctional Facility) Farole Expiration Date: -~0~3~/2~4~/~2~0~2~3--- Date(s) of offense(s) committed on Qr after May lj 1991------------------------ INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PAROLEE VP-On r:de.aSe, you shall be deemed to l,'t!lll.ain in legal custody until the expiration of your tun, undiminished ten:n ·of continement Upon the alleged violation of any wndition of varole you shall be remanded to the authority from which paroled1 where a hearing shall be condm:ted . .Qy the Piu:ole Commission. If your 'parole is revoked, the Conn:u.itlsion shall determil:le the amount of thne spent Qn parole, j( any, which is to be credited to your term of confineme:ut.· Y0n. are subject to the special conditions of parole as s:et forth. below, the sta:udanl conditions of parole on page 2 of this order . and such further conditions as the Commissio:u may impose at any time during the term of your parol£. Special Condition{&): JOYCE WllLIAl'lSON (friend) 12005 Tarragon Road, Reisterstawn, MD 21136 llome and Employmmt Plan! -------------------------------- TEL: (410) 526-5280 Upo.:u i:elease, you shall report, in pei:3oo, 110 later than 10:00 s.m. on the next bmSl<'" • PINK-l'arole Commission Copy • YBILOW-Iret\tution C0py • :SLUB-Cmified Copy • OREEN--Onut CoJ?Y Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 42 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 08: 18 AM p 015/031 P/N OBSCIS REPORTING FUNCTIONS PAGE: 001 OFFENDER TRAFFlC HISTORY DATE: 07/07/16 TIME: 08:12 DOC #: 902530 FRIED KAREN LYNN DATE TIME t,OCATION BLOCK TIER CELL BED REASON PER 09 15 2005 15 21 SEE REASON 84 PAROLE JOHNSON D 07 13 2005 15 33 HOME DETEN 01 ADM IN LAwRENCE! D D 07 13 2005 10 45 BALTO PRER Ol .llDMIN CORCORAN, DAYENA 04 09 2005 )_O 00 BALTO PRER A 009 A 03 HOUSING ZOLLICOFFER 02 15 2005 )_)_ 39 BALTO PRER B 003 A 01 ADMlN ZOt,LICOFFER 10 21 2004 14 00 WOMENS INS A 1 023 A 03 HOUSING TAYLOR V 06 16 2004 18 55 WOMENS INS A 1 002 A 27 RET FR COU TAYLOR V 06 16 2004 11 42 SEE REASON 31 COURT APPR BOGUES C 03 26 2004 13 30 WOMENS INS A 1 002 A 27 RET FR COU QUEEN D 03 26 2004 08 15 SEE RE:l\SON 31 COURT Al?PR QUEEN D 10 03 2003 12 00 WOMENS INS A 1 002 A 27 RET FR COU TAYLOR V 10 03 2003 08 20 SEE REASON 31 COURT APPR BOGUES C 08 29 2003 14 00 WOMENS INS A 1 002 A 03 HOUSING DAVIS K K Ol 15 2003 14 00 WOMENS INS A 1 029 A 03 HOUSING BLANDING Z 06 25 2002 14 00 WOMENS INS A 2 130 B 03 HOUSING BLl\NDING Z 06 14 2002 14 00 WOMENS INS A 2 106 B 03 HOUSING BLANDING . Z 10 31 2001 14 00 WOMENS INS A 1 023 B .03 HOUSING TAYLOR V INQUIRY ONLY. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 43 of 78 JUN-22-2016 WED 09:04 AM p 008/013 ORDER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE The Patole Commission, by virtue of the authority conferred upon it by the laws of the State of Maryland, does hereby gi:ant parole to: (True Name) (Commitment Name/ s) Milton lillJJlphrey #193624 ls~ Degxee Murder; Use of R~ndgun n.o.n. 09/13/69 who was co(lvicted of: ___________________________________ _ Court: B.ilt:i,mo;r:e City Circuit Cou.rt - #18727514 ', Sentem:::ed: 08/10/88 Term: From: 10/06/87; Cons~cutive Therefore, the said Commission does hereby order the release on parole of the said prisoner from ~YW\ND HOUSE OF CORRECTlONS -(Correctional lnstitution ·or Jail) The Parolee, upon release, shall be deemed to remain in legal custody undl the expiration ofthe full, undiminished term and upon violation of any condition of his parole shall be remanded to the authority from which paroled, where a hea.1'ing shall be conducted by the Parole Commission. If parole is revoked, the Commission shall determine the amount of time spent on parole, :if any, which shall be credited to the parolee. Tbis order js subje<::t to the rules, regulaHons and conditions of tbis parole as set forth below and on page 2 of this agreement, and such further conditions as tbe Commission may impose at any time during the period of parole. Upon be.ing released, report to the Division of Parole and Probation office located at 2100 Guilford ~vl;!.nr.;piratlon Date: Ll'.FE Special Condition(s): ~~:Agent is to Slibmit Writteu Report on d Qudrterly B~sis t:o .the M.:tryl.,i.nd Pd.role Commi.s.s;ll)n. :?>V\.RYLAl"ID PAROLE COMMISSJ:Ol'l ;r:ra~ Commissioner Md.y 20, 1999 l:!.ome/Ernpioyment Plan.: (li) .Joseph Richey Hospi~e~ 820 North Eut:.dw Sr.., J3d.ltiraore. Mn 21201 Tele.(410)523-2150 contd.ct: Ctlt:he~i~e Rawtin Anyone" .serving a sentence for a crime coilllJ)..itted on or after May 1, 1991 must pay sµpervision and/or dnig testW,g fees as prescribed in Article 41, Sectiou 4,519 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Date(s) of.Offense(s) : ________________________________ _ MPC-14- (R,£V[S£!18/15/96) -1- WHITE- Pa((>].,, • PJNK - h.role Commisilon Copy • YBUOW - fosliruiion ¢opy • BLUE - Certified Co1>y • GREEN - C-0urt Copy i) Attachment I Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 44 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 08: 19 AM p, 017/031 P/N OBSCIS REPORTING FUNCTIONS PAGE: 001 OFFENDER TRAFFIC HISTORY DATE: 07/07/16 T!ME: 08:14 DOC #: 193624 HUMPHREY MILTON DATE TIME LOCATION BLOCK TIER CELL BED REASON PER 05 20 1999 14 30 SEE REASON 88 MED/PAROLE DENNARD, HATTIE 04 30 1999 22 16 *MHC NOT I HOSP 009 03 HOUSING JOHNSON V 04 30 1999 22 15 *MHC NOT I 0000 0 000 00 18 RET MED AP JOHNSON V 04 22 1999 23 44 SEE REASON 60 UNIV B'OSP JOHNSON V 04 17 1999 21 00 *MHC NOT I HOSP 009 04 MEDICAL JOHNSON V 04 17 1999 21 00 *MHC NOT I 0000 o 000 00 J_8 RET MED AP JOHNSON V 04 10 ;1999 22 30 SEE REASON 60 UNIV HOSP JOHNSON V 03 31 1999 21 00 *MHC NOT I HOSP 009 l8 RET MED AP MARKS, KIM 03 27 19$9 06 00 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT JOHNS, ZEN!A 03 16 1999 13 00 *MHC NOT I HOSP 009 18 RET MED AP JOHNS, ZENIA 03 16 1999 09 50 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT .JOHNS, ZENIA 02 10 1999 l4 00 *MHC NOT I HOSP 009 18 RET MED AP RICHARDSON, CHER 02 10 1999 07 30 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT JOHNS, ZENIA 01 07 1999 13 24 ~-MHC NOT I HOSP 009 18 RET MED AP JOHNS, ZENIA 01 07 1999 08 00 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT WILLIAMS, RHONDA 01 05 1999 15 SI *MHC NOT I HOSP 009 18 RET MED AP WILLIAMS, RHONDA 01 05 1999 12 35 SEE REASON 32 MED APPT W!LLIAMS, RHONDA INQUIRY ONLY. Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 45 of 78 JUL-07-1016 THU 08: 19 AM PARIS P/1 P.I. # 193624 CASE INFORMATJ:ON B D.O.C. # 193624 S.I.D. # 1029693 HUMPHREY MILTON LOCATJ:ON: MHC MV-RSN: 88 MED/PAROLE MV-DT: 05 20 1999 BIR'.l'H DATE: 09 13 1969 SEX: M RACE: B TOT SENT LENGTH: ACTION, SEQ# : 01 02 CS TO 01 . SENTENCE TYPE: 15 LIFE ORG OFFENSE CODE : 540 WEAPONS OFF OFFENSE DESC. : OFFENSE DATE : SENTENCE DATE: SENT START DT: SllNT LENG'.l'H COURT TRACKING # INDICTMENT # OBSI COMMENTS: WEAPONS OTHER 08 28 1987 08 10 1988 10 06 1987 y M 030 BCI-CIR-C 18727514 D 03.CS 536 WEAPONS OFF CARRY DEADLY WEAPON 08 10 1988 013 y M D 030 BCI·CIR-C 18727514 p, 018/031 PAGE: 01 DATE: 07/07/16 TIME: 07:47 MAX: y M D y M D RESTITUTION $ __ _ $ __ _ $ __ _ COMM COMMENTS: ACM DET DAT/.'.JURIS: LIFTED DATE NO MORE LEGAL-DETAINER SEGMENTS FOUND Attachment J Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 46 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 09:28 AM (810847) (INQ) OBSCIS II CLASSIFICATION DATA DATE: 07/07/16 TIME: 1025190 p, 00 2 P/P#: 2901760. CLIENT NAME: HUMPHREY, MILTON D.0.B.: 09/13/69 AGENT NAME: STEWART, S OFFICE: 23 PAROLE SUJ?ERVISI TERM: QO TY'PE OF CASE: PAROLE DATE CASE OPENED: 05/20/99 SUPERVISION LEVEL: LMD DATE SUPV ASSIGNED: 06/16/99 CASE STATUS: DATE STATUS EFFECT: EXPIRATION DATE: CLOSED 06/09/99 INDETERM SJ?ECIAL CONDITIONS: NONE ALCOH DRUG ORDERED: X OUTCOME: S PSYCH MAX OTHER FCR x x S D OUTCOME CODES: S=SATISFIED/PAID IN FULL P=PARTIALLY SATISFIED U=UNSATISFIED D=DEEMEP UNCOLLECTABLE T=UNCOLLECTABLE BY TERMINATION Y=STAYED C=SATISFIED BY COMM: SERVICE DATE CASE CLOSED: 06/09/99 TYPE OF CLOSE: DEATH R"REFERRED TO CCU SPECIAL PROGRAM: M ENI:ER=IDENT INQ PF2~LEGJ\L INQ PF3=SUBMENU PF4=MAIN MENU PF5=CASE SUMMARY PF6=PROBATION WAR/SUM INQ PF7~PAROLE WAR/SUM INQ J?F9=CASE RECORD INTAKE Attachment K Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 47 of 78 6/2412016 Case Information Go Back Now Case Information Court System: Case Number: Title: Case Type: Case Status: Circuit Court for Howard County - Criminal System 13K87017186 State Of Maryland vs Howard Earl Simms Indictment Filing Date: 12/17 /1987 Closed/Inactive Case Disposition: Guilty Disposition Date: 02/03/1989 District Case No: 609194TS Defendant Information (Each Alias, Address, and Attorney for the Defendant is displayed) Name: Simms, Howard Earl Race: African American Sex: M Height: 5'7" Weight: 150 DOB: 10/06/1944 Address: Division Of Correction City: Baltimore State: MD Zip Code: 21202 Address: JCI #197429 City: Jessup State: MD Zip Code: 20794 Attorney(s) for the Defendant Name: Hanson, Esq, Carol A Appearance Date: OS/22/2007 Practice Name: Address: District Public Defender City: Ellicott City State: MD Zip Code: 21043 Name: Shefferman, Esq, Brian D Appearance Date: 10/25/2006 Practice Name: Address: City: Office Of The Public Defender 100 W. Patrick Street Frederick State: MD Zip Code: 21701 Court Scheduling Information Event Type: Three Judge Panel Review Notice Date: 06/20/2007 Event Date: 08/06/2007 Event Time: 01:30 PM Resu It: Cancelled/Vacated Result Date: 07 /18/2007 Event Type: Three Judge Panel Review Notice Date: 07 /18/2007 Event Date: 09/06/2007 Event Time: 01:30 PM Result: Held/Concluded Result Date: 09/06/2007 Charge and Disposition Information (Each Charge is listed separately, The disposition is listed below the Charge) Charge No: 1 CJIS Code: 1 2299 Statute Code: 27.30 Charge Description: Burglary - Int/Steal/Day Offense Date From: 11/17 /1987 To: Arrest Tracking No: Citation: Charge Amend l\Jo: 0 Sentence Version: 1 Charge Class: F Disposition http://casesear ch.courts .state. m d.us/casesearch/i nqui ryD etai I .j is ?caseld= 13K87017186&1oc= 62&detai I Loe= K Attachment L 1/6 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 48 of 78 6/24/2016 Plea: Disposition: ail Life/Death: Not Guilty Plea Date: 02/01/1989 Guilty Disposition Date:02/03/1989 Jail Term: LIFE Yrs: 0 Suspended Term: Yrs: O Unsuspended Term: Yrs: 0 Probation Probation: Yrs: Mos: Supervised Yrs: 0 Mos: Unsupervised : Yrs: 0 Mos: Fine Mos: 0 Days: 0 Hours: Mos: 0 Days: 0 Hours: Mos: 0 Days: 0 Hours: Days: Hours: 0 Days: 0 Hours: 0 0 Days: o Hours: 0 Case Information 0 0 0 Fine Amt: 0 Fine Suspended Amt: 0 Fine Due: First Pmt Due: Community Work Service Hours: Complete By: Report To: Report Date: Charge No: 2 CJIS Code: 3 2400 Statute Code: 27.342 Charge Description: Theft: $300 Plus Value Offense Date From: 11/17 /1987 To: Arrest Tracking No: Citation; Charge Amend No: 0 Sentence Version: 0 Charge Class: F Disposition Plea: Not Guilty Plea Date: 02/01/1989 Disposition: Aquitted Disposition Date:02/03/1989 Charge No: 3 CJIS Code: Statute Code: 27.342 Charge Description: Theft:Less $300 Value Offense Date From: 11/17 /1987 To: Arrest Tracking No: Citation: Charge Amend No: 0 Sentence Version: 1 Charge Class: M Disposition Plea: Not Guilty Plea Date: 02/01/1989 Disposition: Guilty Disposition Date:02/03/1989 llail Life/Death: Jail Term: Yrs: 0 Mos: 18 Days: 0 Hours: 0 Suspended Term: Yrs: 0 Mos: 0 Days: 0 Hours: 0 Unsuspended Term: Yrs: 0 Mos: 18 Days: 0 Hours: 0 Fine Fine Amt: 0 Fine Suspended Amt: 0 Fine Due: First Pmt Due: Community Work Service Hours: Complete By: Report To: Report Date: Charge No: 4 CJIS Code: 3 2399 Statute Code: 27 .342 Charge Description: Theft: Less $300 Value Offense Date From: 11/17 /1987 To: Arrest Tracking No: Citation: Charge Amend No: 0 Sentence Version: 0 Charge Class: M Disposition Plea: Not Guilty Plea Date: 02/01/1989 Disposition: Aquitted Disposition Date:02/03/1989 Charge No: 5 CJIS Code: 1 2900 Statute Code: 27.111 http://casesearch. courts. state .m d. us/casesearch/i nqui ryD etai I .j is ?caseld= 13K87017186&1oc= 62&detai I Loe= K . -, ------------- 216 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 49 of 78 6/24/2016 Case Information Charge Description: Malicious Destruction Of Property/Value Less Than $300 Offense Date From: 11/17/1987 To: Arrest Tracking No: Citation: Charge Amend No: 0 Sentence Version: 0 Charge Class: M Disposition Plea: Not Guilty Plea Date: 02/01/1989 Disposition: Aquitted Disposition Date:02/03/1989 Sentencing Net Totals Life Sentence plus 0 Years, 18 Months, 0 Days, 0 Hours is Imposed. Serve Time: Yrs: 0 Mos: 18 Days: 0 Hours: 0 Probation : Yrs: 0 Mos: 0 Days: 0 Hours: 0 Fine Amount: 0 Fine Due Date: CWS Hours: 0 Credit Time Served: 6601 Related Person Information (Each Person related to the case other than the Defendant is shown) Name:State Of Maryland Party Type: Plaintiff City: State: Zip Code: Attorney(s) for the Related Person Name: Appearance Date: Address: City: Document Tracking Lank, Esq, David A 10/25/2006 The Carroll Building Ellicott City State: MD Zip Code: 21043 (Each Document listed. Documents are listed in Motion No,/Sequence No. order) Doc No./Seq No.: 1/0 File Date: 12/17 /1987 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Document Name: See Docket Sheet for Previous Entries Doc No./Seq No.: 2/0 File Date: 01/19/2007 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Document Name: Reopen/Modification Doc No./ Seq No.: 3/0 File Date: 10/25/2006 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Party Type: Plaintiff Party No.: 1 Document Name: Attorney Appearance David A Lank Doc No./Seq No.: 4/0 File Date: 10/25/2006 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Party Type: Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Defense Attorney Appearance Filed Brian D Shefferman Doc No./Seq No.: 5/0 File Date: 09/28/2006 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Party Type: Defendant Party No.: 1 http://casesear ch. courts .state .m d. us/casesearch/i nqui ryDetai I .j is ?caseld= 13K87017186&1oc=62&detai I Loe= K 316 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 50 of 78 -- ----, ------------------------ 6/24/2016 Case Information Document Name: Application for Review of Sentence Doc No./Seq No.: S/1 File Date: Party Type: 10/2S/2006 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Correction to Application for Review of Sentence Doc No./Seq No.: S/2 File Date: 01/11/2007 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Party Type: Plaintiff Party No.: 1 Document Name: State's Motion to Oppose Review of Sentence Doc No./Seq No.: 6/0 File Date: 10/10/2006 Entered Date: 01/19/2007 Party Type: Plaintiff Party No.: 1 Document Name: State's Motion to Extend Time Requirements for Filing a Response to Defendant's Petition for Review of Sentence Doc No./Seq No.: 9 /0 File Date: OS/11/2007 Entered Date: OS/11/2007 Document Name: Hearing Notice Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 10/0 File Date: OS/11/2007 Entered Date: OS/11/2007 Document Name: Writ of Habeas Corpus Issued Doc No./Seq No.: File Date: Party Type: Document Name: 11/0 OS/22/2007 Entered Date: OS/29/2007 Defendant Party No.: 1 Defense Attorney Appearance Filed Carol A Hanson Doc No./Seq No.: 12/0 File Date: OS/29/2007 Entered Date: OS/29/2007 Document Name: Hearing Notice Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 13/0 File Date: OS/22/2007 Entered Date: OS/29/2007 Party Type: Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Request for Speedy Trial Doc No./Seq No.: File Date: Party Type: 14/0 OS/22/2007 Ente1·ed Date: OS/29/2007 Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Request for Discovery,and motion to produce documents Doc No./Seq No.: lS/O File Date: OS/22/2007 Entered Date: OS/29/2007 Party Type: Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Motion Pursuant to MD rule 4-252 Doc No./Seq No.: 16/0 http://casesear ch.courts.state. m d. us/casesearc h/i nqui ry Detai I .j is ?caseld= 13K87017186&1oc::::62&detai I Loe= K 4/6 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 51 of 78 612412016 Case Information File Date: 06/20/2007 Entered Date: 06/20/2007 Document Name: Hearing Notice Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 17 /0 File Date: 06/20/2007 Entered Date: 06/20/2007 Document Name: Writ of Habeas Corpus Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 18/0 File Date: 07 /18/2007 Entered Date: 07 /18/2007 Document Name: Hearing Notice Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 19/0 File Date: 07 /18/2007 Entered Date: 07 /18/2007 Document Name: Writ of Habeas Corpus Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 20/0 File Date: 07 /18/2007 Entered Date: 07 /18/2007 Party Type: Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Writ of Habeas Corpus Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 21/0 File Date: 07 /18/2007 Entered Date: 07 /18/2007 Party Type: Plaintiff Party No.: 1 Document Name: Hearing Notice Issued Doc No./ Seq No.: 26/0 File Date: 09/18/2007 Entered Date: 09/18/2007 Document Name: Amended Commitment Record Issued Doc No./Seq No.: 27 /0 File Date: 10/11/2007 Entered Date: 10/15/2007 Document Name: Reopen/Modification Doc No./Seq No.: 28/0 File Date: 10/11/2007 Entered Date: 10/15/2007 Document Name: Motion to Reconsider Sentence Doc No./Seq No.: File Date: Party Type: 29/0 10/31/2007 Entered Date: 11/05/2007 Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence Doc No./Seq No.: 30/0 File Date: 11/06/2007 Entered Date: 11/06/2007 Document Name: Notification to Return Exhibits Doc No,/Seq No.: 31/0 File Date: 11/13/2007 Entered Date: 11/13/2007 Party Type: .Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Nan1e: Notice of Appeal http:/ /casesearch.courts .state. m d. us/casesearctv'i nqui ryDetai I .j i s ?case!d= 13K87017186&1oc=62&detai I Loe= K 516 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 52 of 78 6/24/2016 Case Information Filed by Attorney: Carol A Hanson Esq Doc No./Seq No.: 32/0 File Date: 12/04/2007 Entered Date: 12/04/2007 Document Name: Letter to Reporter Re: Transcripts Doc No./Seq No.: 33/0 File Date: 12/06/2007 Entered Date: 12/07 /2007 Party Type: Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Defense Attorney Appearance Filed Geraldine K Sweeney for purposes of appeal only Doc No./Seq No.: 34/0 File Date: 01/10/2008 Entered Date: 01/10/2008 Document Name: Record Sent to COSA - 1-folder & 1-transcript Doc No./Seq No.: 35/0 File Date: 01/15/2008 Entered Date: 02/05/2008 Document Name: Certified Mail Receipt Received from C05A Doc No./Seq No.: 36/0 File Date: 02/28/2008 Entered Date: 03/04/2008 Document Name: Receipt for Record from - COSA Doc No./Seq No.: 37 /0 File Date: 04/22/2008 Entered Date: 04/22/2008 Document Name: Mandate fd. and iss. - appeal is hereby dismissed as not allowed by law Doc No./Seq No.: File Date: Party Type: 39/0 09/09/2014 Entered Date: 09/09/2014 Defendant Party No.: 1 Document Name: Motion to Reconsider Sentence Doc No./Seq No.: 39 /1 File Date: 09/24/2014 Entered Date: 09/24/2014 Party Type: Plaintiff Party No.: 1 Document Name: State's Opposition To Defendant1s Motion For Reduction Of Sentence This is an electronic case record. Full case information cannot be made available either because of legal restrictions on access to case records found in Maryland rules 16-1001 through 16-1011, or because of the practical difficulties inherent in reducing a case record into an electronic format. http://casesear ch .courts .state. m d .us/casesear chJl nqui ryDetai I .j is ?caseld= 13K87017186&1oc=62&detai I Loe= K 6/6 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 53 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 08: 19 AM ~~qi,":tJ [ !VOV·· ,• DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAl SER.VICES 0 ! , ~- 1 MARYLAND PAROLE COMMISSION Order for Release on Parole No. Ao2102< WHEREAS, The Parole commission, by virtue of authority ronferred upon it by laws of the State of Maryland, does hereby grllnl parole to: SIMMS HOWARP EARL 197429 Commitmenl Name tli!St. fir5!, Middle) DOC No.!PARIS No. Who was convii;:ted of: 1) DAYTIMf HouS~aREAKING 2) BURGl-AR.Y INTENT/STJ'AJJDAYTIME . 3) THEFT-LESS l:lOO VALUE , l eAL T co-cmcu1r COURT 111J•CR.ooos 2) HOWARD COUNTY CIRCUIT-COURT #13k87017186 Court(s): 3) HOWARD COUNTY-CIRCUIT COURT#13Kll7017186 Date(s) Sen"'ncL'lting ~uiramsnts. speciafized sex offender treatment, elaatmnlc mon~orlng, ma.U\t:a6ofl, polygrapn l.estlng, and romputer monilorlfl9. 35. Comply with 3ny oorfew or sile ret>tnction~ imposed by J'-OllT parole/probation agenl to limit your~& ~o cenaln aieas of !he community arid/or 10 reQuire you IC obtain patmissio11 ta leave your residence during cerii:lln hows. Coope.iata wi\h an~ prcgrarn which is established lo rncnUll'.lr your compHance with these res1ric1ions, whici\ may incfu~e payment !or costs a$S.ocialed wilh Global Podtioning Systems {GPS} or other tracking. technology, · 38. Provide a DNA sample as tequireCI bY I~. 39. A.ppeo(ln courl when notified lo do so. 40. Waive .an ~lradilion lights ·~lhd proeas.ses, and agree to ret~rn to thB State- of Maryland when instrucled. 41. Do rtot phys\c:~ly 01 vatbally thfeatt1n or lnJlmklate- any employ.ea of the Departmenl of Public: Safety and Com~ional Services. Ollier: AGENT TO SUBh; or c. Leaving the Stale of Marylahd. 4. Obey all laws. 5. Notify your Parole Agent imrnetli~taly if you are a~ested .. '6. You shall not ill1l9ally posses, use, or sell any narcotic drug, 'controlled dangerous substance". or related paraphernalia. · 7. You shell nof own, possess, use. sell, or have under your control any dangerous weapon or firearms of any description withoul approval of the Parole Commission. 8. You sholl "'lnduct yourself as not to present a danger to yourself or others. 9. Special conditions; See page 1 of this agreement NOTE; Conditions 10 and 11 apply to parolees Whose tenn qt confinement resulted from a crime or crimes committed on or aftor May 1, 1991. 10. You mu$t pay a monthly supervision lee as requhw by law unless the Parole Commission exempts you wholly or pa~ly !i'om payment of \he fee_ 11. If ornered by tlie .Perole Commission to u1lO'll\JO drug or alcoMI abuse testing, you musl pay for the resting If required to do oo by the Division of Parole and Proba\ion. ~ -have hl!dition to the slate of Maryland and expressly agree that I wrn not contest any effort to return to tho State of Maryland in consequence of my violating and of lhe tmrns and conditions of this parole_ Witness >.1Pc;;4(Rev~ed1110712007) Date O~\e P~3of 3 p 021/031 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 56 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:32 AM WHEREAS, WHEREAS, WHEREAS, WHEREAS, EXEC1JTIVE ORDER Ot01.20t2.07 Conditional Commutation of Sentenc.e - Tamara Se.ttles Tamara Bottles (D!vislo:ll ofConwtlon Inm~te Number 904563), CoX\ditlona! Grantee, was convitte.d.ofFelony Murder on Aprill l, 1985, in the·Circuit·Coutt of Maryland.for J'l'.ince George's Coimty (Ci:tse No. CTS4-n&9A) 1111d w~~ seoterwed to life im)l!isonrnent; 'I]lete ls .no ·evidence fuat T;in1ara Settle~· was the shooter m:. possessed a wetjpon, ilnd. Settles has. served 27 years in pr.l£on while the shooter served only nine years andJrns been in the commuuit;t for 19 years; Ta.mirra Seffies h'!S rimtle s'1lttlficant p~ogross 'Whll~ jnca;roorated - overoowjng dJ.11& addiction, c<'lropleting 12 years of therapy at P atuxent Xt>.stitution, tecefvlrtg ill\ A:ssociate'.s Degree, wo*ing toward a Bachelor's Degj'ee "1Morgan State Univ.ersity, working· for Maryl811d Comootionitl Enterprises withpositi"~ rt;Yi<>ws, and serving as a voiw1teer we:ntor fur qtber w.orti~n at.th<' Matyland Correctional lnstitut.e for Women; The Prinoe Gmrge's County State 1 s Attorney's Oftfoe does not oppose clemency for T.amar~ $~ttles; and . The Mory.Jand Pa;oh; Collll)lissi.on has Cn, wllli;h rtlu~, at a minimum, include: (1) .. One ye~1!lfresid~)lcy and.services through 1he Tum About)lroilfam with Alternative Directions, !nc. If Altprnl)tlve Dir.eoiions cannot provide or !Ilental heolfu treal!nfmJ ¢va.Juation,an.d/qr program. 'B. The conditional gnmtee shall sub:mit to. tandoro drug testing as di•ecled by the P1µ..,Je Comroission. c.. '.l')le P1'l'ole 09.mmis~ionmay fu)pose flll.Y o1;herpte-ri::Jease .cpnditlqns th.at it uonsiders J)rqper. 'Post,release Conditions JJ, Iftl!o MBJ:yl.!md P!Uole Cornnrlssion'detl:mrines ful11 tho Conditi0nal Grantee merits plll'qle t.<;lease, \be Parole C.omm.ission may ,11rant parale, and the conditional grantee sM.11 k supem~od b,- die Depart;m.ent.ofl;'v.b)ic Safety and Oop:ectiou"1 S.ervleas pursuant to Title 7, Subtitles 3 and 4 of tile Cor,r~otional.Servio<:ll Mi.de of the Annotated Co<;le of ¥;,rylond, subjectto all bf the standard conditions of parole and lbe followfug· special conditions: (l) ·Com11letion 0fone year ofresjd¢noy 1µ1Q. servllll's ilrroush th~ Turn A.bout Program with Altema:tive Directio!l$, :rn,., or ()(lmpleripn of· a sµb~.tituw,plan; p 013 i. ! Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 58 of 78 APR-14-2016 THO Oi:32 AM (2) If d.oomed. nec<0ssocy by tho. Parole ·Coirunission, submitto a meJ:1ta1 health evalnatlon and participate in roen(H] hea11h 1reatment·pro!lianuning ~s di@cted by her supe~vislng ag~nt; · (S} Submit to drug testing.as directed by her supervising a~ent: (4) If 4eei:n¢ necessary by the Parole Commission, peytioipate in subJrtruice abuse lt:'lision anll !h\l'follbwing special conditions: · .(})' C0mpletio.n ofone year-ofresldeni;y imd services thro!lgb 1he Turn AbOut.Progrnm with Altell);iitive Directions, luc., or completion of a substitute plan; (i)· I{ deemed }lecessary by !he Parole Commission, sµbmi! IX> a.;n\lJltallrealth evah.l.ation a,n;! pa.rticipate b;t montal health J:reati:nent prOgrl11\1ming as .directed by ber supm:vi.si,ng agent; (3). 'Submit to d>iig testing ll8 directod by her snpetvising agent; · (4) !£ deemed necessary by the Faro le· Commission, p.arlicipate il! substance·abuse treatment prognmmting M directed h¥ bet supervisin~. agent;.1l!Id .(5) Any other special conditi~ns that the Parole ·Qomtniss\on .coll'lidets p~op.er . . F. 'The 1'!!role .Commissien·shaTl fiot;g!''lll.l an.abatement of supervision imder C0do ofMaryland Regulations Section i2.08,0l.21B y1h(le tho Oon(\)tional Grl'\Ilt•e is on· parole or mandal<)ry Anpervis.i.on. 3. p, 014 I· I Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 59 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:32 AM 0. Revocation of Parole Qr.Mandatory Supervlsion·cmd Re· impo~itipn of Qottimuteii S;pervisi.an. H. Fol!oWlug coropllllion of her unSll~pendedterm of 40 years: (1) The eonditlonal Grantee mull\ sub.rnit to continued superylslon by the Parole Co!IlII\lsslqn for \)le remaindei of her 5usp!l1l,<;led li:fctil)'.)e tey!1l upl~ss the Parole Coni.mA~•ia11 ·oet=ines,-that the abate.merit of suc'.b: SUpe1vlsion is Jn th!' best interest. of 1he State l!l)d !hat further supervision is not necessary for the protection .ofpublfo safe1y. Exwpt as otherwise provided in tliis Conditional Cllmmutation,-tbis supmisiol). shall be <;>m;iciwited acco1·ctlng \o 'the stood~ra·poli.oi.,,, aud prari0dures goY~ng slJPervisian of par6lees Jlllder .COde of M'.myland 'Regufo!ionsSertion 12.08.el.21. (2)· The Cont'\ition.al Grantee mU.";t, wh<;ther or. not sµpervision is abated> contln\le lo al.>itle ,by tb.e following condi\iops for '\he. temaindm: of her suspe>nded lifetime term: (~) · R..;pmt as directed to filld follow her parole agent"s ins(ructj011s.µp.less the P!!role ()9mmJssi@ has granted mt aba}e)llent ofalljl~!\lislon; · (b) Obey.all laws; (c) .Notlfy't11e'Parole Commission before ohang\ngjobs,. cbw.gil)g h\>I' homo, or leaviµgtho State of Mi>rylilll.d. The ))•!'Ole Commission has the autkority to.waive ~ese. nelifioo!i'.on requkem.ents; . 4 p 015 I' '• ;i ' Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 60 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08:32 AM ( d) Do not illegally use, ,possess, or sell any narcotic dl1il!. ~;C6ntmlled dangerous substance," or related paraphernalia; '(o) Do not own, posses>,' IJ!i<>. sell, or hive Mnj:rpl .of any d~erous weapon Qr fuefJflll of any ilescri.ption witho11\ the '\pproval of the Parole Con:unission; (f) if arr~sted; and Notify the P;uole Com.mission im:ooedlately (g) filly special conditions th!l! the Parole Co=lsslon oonside.rs proper. Reyboatfon l. .Rev9cail.on Qfthe Conditional Commuiation and Re· imposittrm,of'Original Life Sontenqe:. Under the following circumstances, the Plm>le Coromissi0:t1m:ay, folloW!ng.ahearill.g, reoommend .to the Gowomor that the Conditiqnal Co=utatlon be revo)ced and "the Cqnditi<1nal Gnintee's orlglna:I life.sentence be re- n;npose4..if.a majori,fy of.the co.mmissiopers C\eterrrrine th!l! the Oondili®•l Grantee po®S a 1hreat tppublio·safety and, ~pl)sid,erlng the to.tality af'lhe .circumstances, that revocation is wananted: {l) The; Conditional Grantee is convicted (}fa crime; .(2) T.he Conditional Grantee owns, possesses, 1JSOS, sells or-has 1J)lder her control a firearm; {3) The Co11ditio11al Grantee, while incarceroted, is found guilty .of.an innmte rule violation listed ln :Code of Maryland Regµlatiinm Section JZ,02.27.04B{1)i(4). or (6) or idonnd,guilty of:i:norethm one:imn•te ntle violation Ii*~ in Code of Maryland RegulatLons ~ct,i\ln 12.Q2,~7.04B"E; or {4) The· Conditional Grantee vicrlates a o.ondltlo.n under Se.ctions :0, E, or.Hof.this Conditional ColWliliitation; r.. Th~ '.Paro)e Cm:i;illlis!llon Sll"Oll notify tile Oovemqr in wn'ting of!\ ,rwolnll\en®tion \o revo )\e this Conditloual Coniintita;ion under 'S01;tion I, and !tre Govemvr may ded\ie to accept or·rejectthe 'I'aro.'le Gom:mission'·s reooIDJ1lC-CIR CT iie'r841289A Da!e(s) Seotenced; 1) 05/~1Me5 2) 06121/1985 lerm(s): 1)YOllOMOODOOD 2)Y012M0obOOO F'rom: 1) 0311311965 :i) conc.~rrerrt1i'om 03/13/1985 Tracl set forth below, 1he standard cbndition'? of p;irole on page 2 of this order and to such further wnditions ~s the Commiosion may impose al any time during the term of your P,,role. · Specla! Conditions: 1 _Submit to, suocessfully complete, and pay any reqLiiraO. costs for any and al! evaluations, treatmarrt programs, testing, ~nd afteroare es directed by the DMsion of Parole filld Probation, which me.y inclucle .F;iubst:incs abuse1 mental heall:h1 anger management p~nUng, Qom~tlt: vloJeni:e, ~nd other issues. TakQ all mBdications prescribed by your treatment provider. MPC--04[Revised11/07/2007) Page 1 of 3 Attachment 0 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 63 of 78 ---, --------~--------------- JUL-07-2016 THU 08:20 AM JUL-25-2012 WED 03:27 PM Mr 0AROLE COMMISSION l"l!hone Upon release you shall report, in person, no la!Br than 10:00 A.M., on ff//27/2012 to the Division of Parole and Pmbaflon office located at2100 GuilfordAvenw~ BaltJrimlll, MD 21218. l ~- ~ ·-lv.~1 07/2612012 Pag•2of 3 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 64 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 08:20 AM JUL-25-2012 WED 03:28 PM Mr 0 AROLE COMMISSION FAX No. 4rn·1535504 '~"'"'"'·'-''-! il.o...v ''""'""',.. CONDITIONS OF PAROLE. 1. Report as directed 1o and follow your Parole Agenfs lnstr\ictions. 2. Work rEJJularly. 3. Get permission befora: a. Changing your home: b. Changing your job; or c. Leaving the Stale of Maryland. 4, Obey all laws. 5, NoUfy your Ptitule Agent immediately if you arsarrested. 6. You shall not illegally posses, use, or $Bil any narcotic drug, ~controlled dangerou$ substance', or related paraphernalia. 7. You shall not own, possess, use, sell, or have uhderyour control any dangerous w~apon orftreanns of any desoriptan \\llimut approval of the Parole Commission. 8. You shall conduct yuurself as not to prBSeni a dangvr lo yourself or ofhers. 9, Speolal cond!Born;; See page 1 oflhis agreement .. NOTE: Conditions 10 and 11 apply io paroleeli whose term of confinement resulted from a crime or crimes committed on or~j\erMay 1, 19~1. 1 Q, You m~st pay a monlhly supervision fee iis requir6'1 by law unless tlie Parol9 Commission exempis you whQlly or par11y from payment of fhe fee. 11. Jfordered'by the Parole Commission to undergo drug oralcohol abuse testing, you must pay fOrthe testing if mquirad b the Division of Parole lnlo~b! of the Still~ cfMazyland &id i>fthe Conditloll.81 Clnmtee will best be srirvod by tlMi gi:aniing oh condition•! commuti;t!on ofienl0!lee Ill Wo!tot '.acnry Mi~ 111W . · lt i& llPJlrOprlate to iWl'""d &'.eoutlve Otdor a LO J ..2004.66 to emJUl'I> that conditional ~ will be sup11rvi$1•d UJIOn re!eaae. ' NOW 1\ID!a.EroRE, !, ROBERT L, llBRLlCR, JR., OOV.EilNOR OF TJm STATE OF . . . '.MAA'ILAND, HA VlNG ni:oumr.r PROPER Tlffi BXTilNSlON Oll • · i' ; OLEM!NCY~:Bli. THE AlJ'Jll'OlllTY VESTI\D IN ME BY Tm> . ' CONSTITll'rrON Afl)) 'l'.ai UWS OF MA:R111.ANJ:>, PO HErulllY I 1, i I. '.1' I ··!' :: OROiR TliA'.l' THE ORIGINAJ:. SEN'.!'lIN'Cll OF W ;U,TS lGNRY AI<.VJNGER. TO Ta:B CUSTOPY OF Tall Dtv!SION OF COAAECT10N BE ANn XS HEtREBY CONDITIONALI.. Y COMMU1l!P TO LIFE WITH ALL BUT FORTY-FM! YEARS SUSPllNPEP, SUBJECT TO THE FOU.OWlNG: UPON P.ELW!l F~OM CiJSTOPY, THli CONDITIONAL GMNTBE SHALL :Sli $0l'm<. V!SED B1" '1'Im lJIVISION OF l' AR.OLE ANP PROBATION Af:J THOUGH ON MANDA TORY STJPERV!$!0?-...__...... -.. -- R.. Kllrl Awnann\ Secretary of State TOTAL P,32 I ,. i I ' I , I I I ' ! I 'i • I' '.i • i I ., I I· i , I ,,. I Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 67 of 78 JUL-Ol-2016 THU 08:21 AM P.026/031 Nov,~30-04 07:42A P.02 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. _, CONDITIONS Or-MANDATORY SUPERVl&JN RE;:LEASE w &\ r-f e,,- A/ 2 ;/) 9 c,,,-. 4f l {I { 7 s- ' Report as directed to and. foll.6w your P\lrole Agent's ins uc1tions. /*10-1 e /ltJt""7 · fJ / 7 fC 1-· · Work Regularly. -~" I . · tJ , ~ - <'1 c/,:1/1 < /Pff:j7 '> I"'; tA "40. I ,·//; /) ') ( ') / , a. Changing your home; I t I_. ;,< / ,J /) _1_ / . , . "' """ 6 b. Changing your job; o;* L/!O- S l/)..- 711/ 1 i' /o- 3 3 3 - 0;(? O c_ Leaving the state_of M~a Ian~. · -~7:1 f'-•cd-c t_, ld j,, Xu/.4.!IJU· .. ~ 1e.;J!Yr-f 01 /OrJ;,-t'/o,:-. Obey a111awsy f /u~ '[it4-1fJt 1 {- :; o-. 0 Lf h 1 t, ,. dl ~&·r- Notify your Parole Agent 1ffi8diately if you are arrested. c!,li:/t <'ff, You shall not illegally possess, use .or sell or have under your control any narcotic drug, "controlled dangerous suqstance", or related paraphernalia. You shall not own, possess, use, sell, or have under your control any dangerous weapon or firearms of any description without approval of the Maryland Parole Commission. · You shall so condl.lCI yourself as not to present a danger to yourself or others. 9. Special conditions: See front of this cettificate NOTE: ·conditions 10 and 11 apply to mandatory SL1pervision releasees Whose term of confinement resulted from a crime or crimes committed on or after May 1, 1991. 10. You must pay a monthly supervision fee as required by law unless the Maryland Parole Commission exempts you ·either wholly or partly from payment of the fee. 11, If ordered by the Maryland Parole Commission to undergo drug or alcohol abuse testing, you must pay for the testing if required to do so by ~he Division of Parole and Probation. Page2 of 2 Attachment Q Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 68 of 78 APR-14-2016 THU 08 31 AM ' ' . ' ' ' ~ ' ' . . '•,,: .. ,.. ~nrrt~M~Jar_ra+ ---- ~t'- aid drug, alcohol, and/or mental health treatment services a.s required upon release and the service providers must be able to treat the Conditional Grantee immediately; p, 00 8 Attachment R Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 69 of 78 -~-------~------------------------ APR-14-2016 THU 08:31 AM C. Prior to any parole release, the Conditional Grantee must obtain a written offer of, at minimum, part-time employment and an affidavit from the employer must be Bubmitted to the Maryland Parole Commission promising to employ the Conditional Grantee once he is releaood from the Division of Correction; · D. If the Maryland Parole Conunission d<:>temilnes that the Conditional Grantee merits parole rnleai:e, and the other conditions set forth above are satisfied, the .petitioner must complete one h11ndred hours of community service with the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services and/or an organization approved by the Maryland Parole Commission in the five years inunediately following bis release from the Division of Correction; E. If tho Maxyhmd Parole Commission detennines that the Conditional Grantee nierits parole release, the Conditional Grantee must obey all laws while on parole; if the Conditional Grantee is convicted of a crime aft<:>r November 25, 2005, the new conviction is a violation of this conditional connnutationof sentence and the Governor will revoke this conditional conunutation of sentence after a hearing to be conducted by a commissioner of the Maryland Parole Commission; and F. Xfre!eased by mandatory supervision, upon release from custody, the Conditional Grantee shall be supervised by the Divisiou of Parole and Probation as tho11gh on mandatory supervision pursuant to Title 7, Subsection 5 of the Correctional Services Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, subject to all the standard conditions of mandatory supervision. · GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND TB:E GREAT SEAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, in-the City of Annapolis, this 2s01 Day of November, 2005. ~&~l;c~ Gov em or ATTEST: -.l!i~~D~.~~~~~- etary of State p, 009 Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 70 of 78 JUL-OJ-2016 THU 08: 21 AM 1uN~oo-212r0i; 1s~se P,04 MSJ:< 06/08/06 46162 ~No·--~- MARYLAND PAROLE COMMISSION t>RDE;R fOR RELJ':AS£ O:N PAROLE WHERE4S1 the Parole. C(ln.~rnh1ion1 b}' \.'"irlu~ at ~e'3ulb1'.irity 1.'.ll-D:kfftd urou it by tlii: b1WJ 1;1rthc Stde ofM:i.ry1:lt1d,. lloi::i bt:.{l::by gr.1111H paroJ~ t\l.! OlA\ndi.ifoll. oFr:u:olc ,Y(IU ~hllll ~ ~m~ndr:d tu th~ i;s.i;iU.o~tyfro)ll which pnh;)lo:d, wlu:.ri:'l bqrJng SM.ii 00 (:Onduclal by tbe Pnn.tl!!. C(lmmi~ian. If fotll"' tJ*ro)_t: LI Tl:''l'olu:d1 lfi~ t:'.mn:n,fs;sl:on Sh;'I}) di:krmin-c lht: ntn~l DF timr. tpcn1 ~" Jl.'.5-~lt; i(11,~y, i.t>hich ls to be ..:.ttrlited ~ y1,1ul" b::rm ar con(in~l"l"tl!Al- You ~ 5:llb:i1?.d tu thl:" :!'peCJJ1.I c.ondition~ ot r;ia.role A$ stl fllo.h bdtn•r1 tne 11J1.nlhrd co:o.iliti.Dn.:r or p~cvk ~n page :1 'Of dti.! oriltt &!"!~ .s~~fir.thertO)iditiuil.s iJ.S thi: O>mmi!;!jiom i:G»}' ~mpos~ -.t nn1 timi: dtiring tln:: h:nn. 11~ )(l)lf"pllroJt- 'JD aJMPORT WI1ll 1\lE GOVERNOR'S 00!1MUNTATION ORDER AND SUBSJQUENl' A.D-A-11.. EYAWA'.tXON, WE: WillJ 'IO APO 1HE FOll.OIJING ffil:IDITIOOS: 1) MUST NOT C:ONSIJME /\LCOHOL 2) SUBMI'f 11) llAN1lW BREATH REPORT liOR llLO'.JOOL ABUSE 3) A'lUl'ill ALCO!lOLIC' S ~S .MEEI'mGS AT LEAST ONCE EVERY Dl0(2) tJEEKS AND PROVlDE PROOt OF A1TINllAllGE 11J ms PAl\OLE AGEN.r _ ROSA l!M'\LIN(SLSTER) 4001 W- ROGERS AVN:JtiE, BAL~JffiRJ;;, MD., 21<15 l!Qm~~a.d Empi(lyr:;n~t l'"llin: ~---------------~===~===~~~~~ (410) 357-l.4"5 E) HlJ,IELL & HOIJELL, 2502 wroIA s6iJTiJWAY, BAL'fiMJRE,MD., 21215 (t)NfACT: lC"RL Hcm:u_. (443) 527-5632 Upon rt:lf:ll.ft:1 .JO" OU1~l ttpD-rf. ll.1 pt-r.s.on, .11,0 lnU~r th:l.n 10;1.ll) B.m, llJl th!! next bu!jn.~5" Wiy, ta th.I! Oivjslnn Of ,l'llrok .1.Ddi P , __ . ffi 1 · ._, 1 2100 j;DILWRD A\lll1\JE, liALTIIDRE, MD., 21218 · NlJ.llltoAO ~ l,le).u:u~ -----"-''------'-~----'--'-~---~--~~--- (443) 263--3500 Tdqihuac nv. -------- cJ(. ~ /(._ ~·. ~ C~mm~l~l'li:r o--= JUNE "9, 2006 . ..... ,:. WHITE. :r.i:o.t(dM • PINX- lr';iiro!,; C"r.m'"li1•ioi:i C~n. YELLOW ¥Corh1'"f. tll-l.1£.- C~r'lir'n.d ~,-Git.ED'!- Cv~r1 C'-un ?-ll'0-14 (Rn"~il 2/0D) p 027/031 ... , Attachment S Case :16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 71 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 08:21 AM p, 028/031 JUN-08-2005 15:SB MARYLAND PAROLE COMM P.05 -2- OJNTU'IUA'D:ON TO ADDENDUM; 4) MUST CilMPl.E):E 100 HOURS OF CXJMMUNI'IY SERVICE WITH THI.<; MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF JlJVfl'II)'.,E SERVXGES AND/OR AN ORGANIZATION APPROVED BY THE MARYLA.i\/D PARD1E 0Jl1MISSION IN 1HE FJVE(S) YEARS 1Mt1EDIATELY fOLLOWING HIS RELEASE F'ROM MARYLAND OOC (MAY FULFlU. THROUG!J: PRESENTATION TO AU,XIHOlJDRUG RECOVERY GROUPS SUCH: AS TilE GAlJDFNZIA PROGRAM IN HIS NEIGHBORliOOD). Case :16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 72 of 78 JUL-07-2016 THU 08 21 AM p, 029/031 .,,: /' i ~ . 1.- , "'Report as'!iir~cted to and follow yqilr Parole Agent's iust:ructions .. · 2. Work-regularly. , 3. · Get pcrmission before: a. .Changin.g your home; b. Changing your jOb; OJ.' -c. Leaving the State of Maryland .. 4. Obey all laws. 5. Notify your Parole Agent iimuediately if yoa are arrested. 6. You shall not illegally possess, use, or sell any narcotic diug, "controlled dangerous substance",.or related paraphernalia. 7. You shall not own, possess, use, sell, or have under your control any dangerous weapon or firearms of any description withoutapproval oftheParole Conll:il.ission. 8. You shall so conduct yourself as not to present a danger to yourself or others. 9. Special conditions: See page 1 ofthis agreement. ' ' ' ~ ' NOTE: Conditions 10 and 11 apply to parolees whose term of confinement resulted from a crime or crimes committed on or after May 1, 1991. 10. You must pay a monthly superviBion fee as required by law unless the Parole Conun:ission exempts you wholly · or partly from payment of the fee. 11. ff ordered by the Parole Commission t0 undel.'go drug or ivision of Commtion, while observing gQod behavior; B, Lt tho Maryland Paro lo Ca=issioo· dotlll'lninea that the c;~cliti1ma1. Qrontee merits parole release aftor tho cow:tition soi forth ntg~">'}' County Chari.t CoUrlo 1160l3 (1) 06/11/1975 (2) 09/22/1975 (1) 45 years; 05 years (2) 05 y-s . (1) 03/16/1975; Consecuti'l'e (2) Consecutive frcm 03/16/2020 · {Corru.tiomtl Faci) · l'•role E"Pit>li.,, ll>l r~a~. In legal t;w;i:Ddy unta tM cxpirntion of y()'l)r f~ undiminished ~.-ui (I( confinement.. U{Wll tb1; 1.'1.llEged vfolaiion of any 4!11ndhion or pawl~ YQU sb~JJ b(! rtmati.ded;t.o the ~1Jthority fro~ which paroled., whel:l}:p bllllring iilmJ.1 h1;1 conducted by- tbe POH'QI~ Coro11;1ilssion. If Yf i;onfi,Mtn~t ~You art mih,ici::t to th!:! !ipeciS.l conUiiiQ'"' oCpal'OJe as set forth bdmv, lbf: stnndurd ccn;iditi(1JJ.5 of I;llUVle ot:i page 2 of this ordi::r - and 1;1nch 1.\1.rtbel' condJt:i.On$ as the Commission .may bnpDs€! .nt any time dµMng U..e (em of YQUl" ~wli::. llomeornlEmploymen!Plnn: JJ!NNIFER WAI.mS (,n""') 11416 lloodview Pr., llagerstW • C:Orroct~l ~b' C!JP1 • BL~ • L1'rtiriM Copy • GREEN • Ci>uft Qipy :w'0.14 (R~~!!d UOOJ p, 030/031 TITTot Attachment U Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 76 of 78 JUL-01-2016 THU 08:22 AM p, 031/031 !' CONDITIONS OF PAROLE I / I. Report as directed to and follow your Parole Agent's instructions. 2. Work regularly. 3. ·Get permission before; a. Changing you, home; b. Changing your job; or c_ Leaving the State of Maryland. 4. Obey all laws. 5. Notify your Parole Agent inu.ilediately if you· are arrested. 6. You shall not illegally possess, use, w sell any narcotic drug, "controlled dangerous substance," o:r related paraphernalia. 7. You shall not own, possess, use, sell, or have un:der your contrOl any dangerolis weapcin or firearms of any description without approval of the Parole Commission. 8. You shall so conduct yourself as not to present a danger to yourself oi:: others. 9. Special conditions: See page 1 of this agreement. · NOTE: Conditiom; 10 and 11 apply to parolees whose t= of confinement resulted from a crime or crimes committed on or after May 1, 1991. 10. · You must pay a monthly supe:rvision fee as required by law unless the Parole Commission exempts you wholly or piu:tly from payment of the fee . . 11. ll' ord=d by· the Parole Colllmission to undergo drug or alcohol abuse testing, you must pay for the testing if required to do so by the Division of Parole and Probation. ~·-- . ~~or have had read to me, the fo\u_.t.-~··)~ ._, Witness MPC-15 (Revised 11/99) · WHITE-Parolee • l'JNK-Parole Co""1Jission Copy ; Ylll.-LOWJnsrltntion C0py • JlLUE-Certified Copy • GREEN·Court Coi>Y Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-3 Filed 07/08/16 Page 77 of 78 12.08.01.17 & .18 Parole Cornn1ission Proposal Draft Dated: June 14, 2016 Page I of I Title 12 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Subtitle 08 PARO LE COMMISSION Chapter 01 General Regulations Authority: Concctional Services Article, §7-207, Annotated Code of Maryland .17 Preparation for Parole Consideration. A. - B. (text unchanged) C. Notice to Inmate and Access to Files. (I) ~ ( 4) (text unchanged) (5) Review of Parole Co1111nission file. (a) The institutional parole agent and the inmate or fhisJ the inmate's representative shall review the file at the appointed tin1e. [Psychological reports, psychiatric reports, and other infonnation which is considered privileged shall be re1noved from the file and the institutional parole agent shall orally give a short sun1mary of the contents where appropriate.) (b) [Recommendations of classification counsellors, work sheets, and other work products of Con1missioncrs and hearing exan1iners are hereby declared privileged.] Except as provided in Correctional Services Article, _1:;'7- 303(b)(1 )(ii), Annotated Code o.f Maryland, the in1nate or the in111ate 's representative may, on request, exantine a docu1nent that the Conunission or flearing Exan1iner uses in detennining whether the inmate is suitable/Or parole. (c) Suhject to the provisions <~/'Correctional Service Article, § 7-303(b)(2}, Annotated Code <~(Maryland. any documents submitted by a Fictin1 or the victi1n 's designated representative shall be availablefOr review by the inmate or the inn1ate 's representative except when prohibited by Correctional Services Article, §7-303(b)( I )(ii), Annotated Code OfMiriyldi1d. (d) {f'a risk assessntent prepared }Or the Con1nJfssion contains diagnostic opinions, that assessment ntay not he avaifablefOr examination, on~v a sumrnary that does not contain the diagnostic opinions may be prepared and rnade available, upon request, to the inmate or the inmate's representative. (6) (text unchanged) .18 Consideration for Parole. A. General. (I)~ (2) (text unchanged) (3) In addition to the factors contained under §'§A(l) ~ (2) o,/'this regulation, the Cotnn1ission conside!'S the jOllowingfGctors in determining whether a prisoner who committed a crime as a juvenile is suitable for release on parole: (a) Age at the time the crime was comn1irred; (h) The individual's level of'maturi(v and sense <~( responsihili(v at the tin1e