Martinez et al v. Viad Corp. et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction WITH SUPPORTING MEMO

D.R.I.November 23, 2016

{W5872218.4} UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND AURELIO MARTINEZ ) and SANDRA MARTINEZ, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) ) v. ) C.A. No.: 1:16-cv-00619 ) ALFA LAVAL, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) PACIFIC MARINE & SUPPLY COMPANY, LTD.’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION Defendant Pacific Marine & Supply Company, Ltd., by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of this motion, the Court is respectfully referred to the accompanying memorandum and affidavit. PACIFIC MARINE & SUPPLY COMPANY, LTD. By its Attorneys, /s/ Mark A. Pogue________ Mark A. Pogue (#3441) Stephen J. MacGillivray (#5416) Thomas J. Pagliarini (#9330) PIERCE ATWOOD LLP 72 Pine Street, 5th Floor Providence, RI 02903 Telephone (401) 490-3430 Fax (401) 588-5166 mpogue@PierceAtwood.com smacgillivray@PierceAtwood.com tpagliarini@PierceAtwood.com Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 1168 {W5872218.4} - 2 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 23, 2016, I e-filed and served this document through the electronic filing system on the following parties. The document electronically filed and served is available for viewing and/or downloading from the Court’s Electronic Filing System. /s/ Mark A. Pogue________ Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 1169 {W5872218.4} UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND AURELIO MARTINEZ ) and SANDRA MARTINEZ, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) ) v. ) C.A. No.: 1:16-cv-00619 ) ALFA LAVAL, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PACIFIC MARINE & SUPPLY COMPANY, LTD.’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION Defendant Pacific Marine & Supply Company, Ltd. (“Pacific Marine”) submits this memorandum in support of its motion dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. As shown below, neither specific nor general personal jurisdiction exists over Pacific Marine in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against Pacific Marine should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. I. Introduction The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Aurelio Martinez was injured due to the inhalation of asbestos fibers allegedly emitted from products that were designed, manufactured, distributed and/or sold by the various defendants, including Pacific Marine. Regardless of the merits of these claims, however, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to demonstrate a prima facie case for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Pacific Marine. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Pacific Marine is subject to specific personal Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 1170 {W5872218.4} - 2 - jurisdiction because their claims do not arise out of any activity of Pacific Marine within the State of Rhode Island; nor does Pacific Marine have the necessary “minimum contacts” with the State of Rhode Island for a lawful exercise of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Pacific Marine is subject to general personal jurisdiction in this case because Pacific Marine does not have sufficient contacts with the State of Rhode Island such that its affiliations render it “essentially at home” in this State. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014). Since personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained over Pacific Marine, Plaintiffs’ claims against it must be dismissed. II. Factual Background Plaintiffs Aurelio and Sandra Martinez (“Plaintiffs”) brought this action in Rhode Island Superior Court against a number of defendants, including Pacific Marine. Plaintiffs contend that Aurelio Martinez was injured because of exposure to asbestos. The case was removed to this Court. Pacific Marine is a corporation formed and organized under the laws of the State of Hawaii with its principal place of business in the State of Hawaii. See Exhibit A Affidavit of Susan Crain Matuura (“Matuura Aff.”) at ¶ 2. Pacific Marine provides administrative services for its affiliated companies which are located primarily in the State of Hawaii. Id. at ¶ 3. It does not maintain an office, principal place of business, residence, or telephone number in the State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 4. It has not expressly or implicitly consented to personal jurisdiction in the State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 5. Pacific Marine does not own, lease, or use and real property in the State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 6. It does not hold any mortgages or liens on any real property located in the Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 9 PageID #: 1171 {W5872218.4} - 3 - State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 7. It does not maintain any bank accounts in the State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 8. Pacific Marine does not maintain any employees, salesmen, or other retained personnel in the State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 9. Pacific Marine has never done any business in this State. It has never made sales to, or performed work in, the State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 10. It has never sold, distributed, or manufactured asbestos or asbestos-containing products in the State of Rhode Island. Id. at ¶ 11. III. Argument In Rhode Island, courts can only exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the exercise of jurisdiction (1) is authorized by the Rhode Island long-arm statute and (2) does not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Russell v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of Rhode Island, 160 F. Supp. 2d 239, 249 (D.R.I. 2001). The Rhode Island long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction “in every case not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted the long-arm statute to permit jurisdiction over foreign defendants so long as jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See Rose v. Firstar Bank, 819 A.2d 1247, 1250 (R.I. 2003); see also Russell, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 250. Once a defendant raises an objection to personal jurisdiction, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002). “To meet its burden, the plaintiff must establish sufficient facts to support a prima facie case authorizing personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Microfibres, Inc. v. McDevitt-Askew, 20 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (D.R.I. 1998) (quoting U.S.S. Yachts, Inc. v. Ocean Yachts, Inc., 894 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 3 of 9 PageID #: 1172 {W5872218.4} - 4 - Cir. 1990)). “[P]laintiff may not merely rely on its pleadings; it must make its case based on facts set forth in the record.” Id. There are two types of personal jurisdiction—specific and general. Specific jurisdiction may exist when the plaintiff’s “suit arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” Barry v. Mortg. Servicing Acquisition Corp., 909 F. Supp. 65, 72 (D.R.I. 1995). If the plaintiff’s claim does not arise from the defendant’s contacts with the forum, then the plaintiff must establish general jurisdiction over the defendant. See id. General jurisdiction is only proper where a “corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). Here, Pacific Marine is subject to neither specific nor general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ claims against it should therefore be dismissed. A. Pacific Marine Is Not Subject To Specific Personal Jurisdiction In This Case In order for specific jurisdiction to exist, “a plaintiff must make a showing in each of three separate categories: relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness.” Calabrese v. Argus Grp. Holdings Ltd., No. CA 14-463-ML, 2015 WL 3952724, at *3 (D.R.I. June 29, 2015), appeal dismissed (Sept. 15, 2015). “[T]he plaintiff must establish that (1) the claim underlying the litigation directly arises out of, or relates to, the defendant’s forum-state activities; (2) the defendant’s in-state contacts represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and making the defendant's involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in light of the Gestalt factors.” Id. at *3-4. Further, “[i]t is Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 4 of 9 PageID #: 1173 {W5872218.4} - 5 - well established law that the plaintiff must demonstrate that each of these three requirements is satisfied . . . and that the Gestalt factors come into play only if the first two segments of the test for specific jurisdiction have been fulfilled.” Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Put differently, to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists, the court focuses on whether the suit “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s [specific] contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n. 8 (1984). “Specific jurisdiction . . . depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851. In short, “the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State” in order for a state to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). In Walden, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on two of the requirements needed to show personal jurisdiction. “First, the relationship [of the defendant to the host-state] must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’’ creates with the forum State.” Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (emphasis in original)). In other words, “however significant the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum may be, those contacts cannot be ‘decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated.’” Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122 (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)). Second, the Walden court stressed that the trial court must look to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, “not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122. The Supreme Court warned that “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 5 of 9 PageID #: 1174 {W5872218.4} - 6 - defendant and the forum.” “Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.” Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1123. Importantly, a plaintiff may not establish specific personal jurisdiction merely by alleging that a defendant placed goods into the stream of commerce with the knowledge that they might be purchased by consumers in the forum state. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)). In keeping with this holding, this Court has held repeatedly that “mere foreseeability of harm is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction.” Emissive Energy Corp. v. SPA-Simrad, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 40, 49 (D.R.I. 2011); see Daniels Agrosciences, LLC v. Ball DPF, LLC, No. CA 13-268 ML, 2013 WL 5310208, at *12 (D.R.I. Sept. 20, 2013); accord, J. McIntyre Machinery, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (finding no personal urisdiction where a company had no contacts with the forum state other than the fact that one of its products ended up there through the actions of an independent seller); Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (opinion of O’Connor, J., for four members of the Court) (holding that “placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state”); Anderson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, 694 A.2d 701, 703 (R.I. 1997) (finding no personal jurisdiction over a company that shipped raw asbestos to a manufacturer outside Rhode Island whose products were then sent into Rhode Island). Application of these principles makes clear that this Court may not lawfully exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Pacific Marine. The reason is simple: Plaintiff’s claims Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 6 of 9 PageID #: 1175 {W5872218.4} - 7 - against Pacific Marine do not “arise[ ] out of or relate[ ] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” Barry, 909 F. Supp. at 72. Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not even allege that Aurelio Martinez’s injuries are the result of any conduct by Pacific Marine within the State of Rhode Island. Such an allegation – even if Plaintiffs had made it – would be groundless, because it is undisputed that Pacific Marine is not a Rhode Island corporation; has not conducted business here; and has not directed any action toward Rhode Island such that it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business here. Matuura Aff. at ¶¶ 4-11. For these reasons, Plaintiffs cannot establish specific personal jurisdiction over Pacific Marine. B. Pacific Marine Is Not Subject To General Personal Jurisdiction In Rhode Island In Daimler, the United States Supreme Court clarified that, under the Due Process Clause, general jurisdiction is constitutionally proper only where a corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive as to render it “essentially at home” in the forum State. 134 S.Ct. at 760. The Court explained that, except perhaps in an exceptional case, a corporation is “at home,” and hence subject to general jurisdiction, in only two states: its state of incorporation and the state of its principal place of business. Id. at 760. The Court specifically rejected the argument that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it engages in “a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business,” or other “continuous and systematic” contacts. Id. at 761. Similarly, the Court expressly rejected the contention that companies are subject to general jurisdiction in “every . . . state in which [their] sales are sizeable.” Id. Daimler makes clear that Pacific Marine is not subject to general jurisdiction in this case. Pacific Marine is incorporated in Hawaii and has its principal place of business in Hawaii. It is therefore “at home” in Hawaii, not Rhode Island. Thus, “the ‘paradigm forums’ of general Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 7 of 9 PageID #: 1176 {W5872218.4} - 8 - personal jurisdiction do not exist in the case[s] at bar.” Korsak v. Honey Dew Associates, Inc., 2015 R.I. Super. LEXIS 120, *22 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2015) (citing Daimler). Nor is this an “exceptional case” in which Pacific Marine might be subject to general jurisdiction in Rhode Island on the ground that its “operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business” are “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760, n.19. To the contrary: Pacific Marine does no business in Rhode Island; it does not maintain any offices here; or employ any employees here; or own any property, engage in any conduct, or derive any revenue from Rhode Island. Matuura Aff. at ¶¶ 4-11. This utter lack of contacts proves that Pacific Marine is not “at home” in Rhode Island, and is therefore not subject to general personal jurisdiction here. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Pacific Marine’s motion to dismiss should be granted. PACIFIC MARINE & SUPPLY COMPANY, LTD., By its Attorneys, /s/ Mark A. Pogue________ Mark A. Pogue (#3441) Stephen J. MacGillivray (#5416) Thomas J. Pagliarini (#9330) PIERCE ATWOOD LLP 72 Pine Street, 5th Floor Providence, RI 02903 Telephone (401) 490-3430 Fax (401) 588-5166 mpogue@PierceAtwood.com smacgillivray@PierceAtwood.com mpogue@PierceAtwood.com Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 8 of 9 PageID #: 1177 {W5872218.4} - 9 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 23, 2016, I e-filed and served this document through the electronic filing system on the following parties. The document electronically filed and served is available for viewing and/or downloading from the Court’s Electronic Filing System. /s/ Mark A. Pogue________ Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 1178 Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 1179 Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 1180 Case 1:16-cv-00619-M-LDA Document 12-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 1181