Holding that the "district court is entitled to limit its analysis of the facts on summary judgment to evidence that is properly identified and supported in the parties' [Local Rule 56.1] statements"
Holding that because the non-movant's Local Rule 56.1(b)(B) response "contained several extremely long, argumentative paragraphs, and in those paragraphs [the non-movant] simultaneously denied the veracity of [the movant's] proposed material facts and presented additional facts of his own..., the district court did not err by refusing to consider the facts he proposed"
Holding that although the plaintiff's complaint "fail[ed] to explicitly specify the existence of an opportunity for [the officer] to have intervened, the facts demonstrate several opportunities during which [the officer] could have acted"
Holding "that summary judgment is 'not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events'" (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005))
Holding that, in a "failure-to-train" claim brought under § 1983, "a municipality may be directly liable for constitutional violations by its officers when the municipality evinces a deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiff by failing to train adequately its officers to prevent the violation ... ."
Fed. R. Evid. 602 Cited 3,515 times 13 Legal Analyses
Stating that " witness may testify only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter"