Ma v. Uscis Director

MOTION for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

N.D. Cal.August 5, 2016

DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BENJAMIN C. MIZER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director TIMOTHY M. BELSAN Senior Litigation Counsel ANTHONY D. BIANCO Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Telephone: (202) 305-8014 Facsimile: (202) 305-7000 E-mail: anthony.d.bianco@usdoj.gov Attorneys for Defendant UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WENMIN MA, Plaintiff, v. USCIS DIRECTOR, Defendant. No. 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: September 22, 2016 Time: 10:00 a.m Location: Courtroom B, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California Hon. Maria-Elena James NOTICE OF MOTION PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 22, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Maria-Elena James, in Courtroom B, San Francisco Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California 94102, Defendant, by and through counsel, will move the Court for summary judgment in Defendant’s favor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendant’s motion is based on this notice, the points and authorities in support of this Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 1 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 motion, Defendant’s exhibits, the pleadings on file in this matter, and on such oral argument as the Court may permit. Dated: August 5, 2016 Respectfully submitted, BENJAMIN C. MIZER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director TIMOTHY M. BELSAN Senior Litigation Counsel /s/ Anthony D. Bianco ANTHONY D. BIANCO Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Telephone: (202) 305-8014 Facsimile: (202) 305-7000 E-mail: anthony.d.bianco@usdoj.gov Attorneys for Defendants Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 2 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 II. ISSUE PRESENTED ...................................................................................... 1 III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND .............................. 1 IV. RELEVANT FACTS ....................................................................................... 4 V. STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................. 5 A. Review of Agency Action under the Administrative Procedure Act ....... 5 B. Summary Judgement in an Administrative Procedure Act Case. ............. 6 VI. ARGUMENT..... .............................................................................................. 6 A. The Administrative Record Supports USCIS’s Decision to Automatically Revoke Li’s Petition Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 205.1 ........................................................ 6 B. USCIS’s Decision Was Fully Consistent with Its Statutory and Regulatory Authority. .................................................................................... 8 1. Section 205.1 is Based on a Permissible Construction of the INA ................... 9 2. Plaintiff's argument relies on inapposite caselaw ........................................... 11 VII. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................12 Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 3 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Ana Int’l v. Way, 393 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................................. 9 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) ............................................................................................................................... 4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ......................................................................................................................... 5,6,9 City & Cty. of S.F. v. United States, 130 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................................. 5 Desai v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. SACV 14-593 DSF (JPRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97084 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) ........... 10,11 Family Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 469 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................................... 8 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) ............................................................................................................................. 10 Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010) ......................................................................................................... 11, 12 Fence Creek Cattle Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 602 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................................... 5 Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................................. 11 Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402 (1993) ............................................................................................................................... 6 Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................................. 4, 5 Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................................... 11 Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493 (B.I.A. 1966) ......................................................................................................... 2 Montoya v. Holder, 744 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................................. 2, 3 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ........................................................................................................................ 5, 6,12 Neang Chea Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................................. 11 Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 4 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Occidental Eng’g Co. v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................................. 4, 6 Queen of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 65 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................................. 6 Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2006) ......................................................................................................... 6 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) ............................................................................................................................... 5 Tongatapu Woodcraft Haw., Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984) ............................................................................................................... 2 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) ............................................................................................................................... 9 Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 6 STATUTES 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) ............................................................................................................................ 9 5 U.S.C. § 568(d)(a) ............................................................................................................................ 11, 12 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) ................................................................................................................................. 4 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) .................................................................................................................... 5,8 8 U.S.C. § 205.1 (2012) .............................................................................................................................. 7 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) ...................................................................................................................... 3 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2012) ...................................................................................................................... 3 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012) ................................................................................................................... 2, 3, 4 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(B) ............................................................................................................................ 2 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e) (2012) ........................................................................................................................... 2 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012) ............................................................................................................. 7, 10, 11, 12 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) ............................................................................................................. 2 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k) (2012) .......................................................................................................................... 2 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l) (2012) ..................................................................................................................... 3, 10 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2012) .......................................................................................................................... 3 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2012) ................................................................................................................. 1, 3, 9, 10 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (2012) ...................................................................................................................... 1 8 U.S.C. § 1183a (2012) ............................................................................................................................. 7 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(i)(H) (2012) ............................................................................................................... 12 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(i)(H)(i) (2012) ...................................................................................................... 11, 12 Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 5 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012) ............................................................................................................................... 2 REGULATIONS 8 C.F.R. § 25.2 (1938) .............................................................................................................................. 10 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (2014) .......................................................................................................................... 2 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (2014) .......................................................................................................................... 2 8 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2014) .................................................................................................................... 3, 9, 11 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a) (2014) .................................................................................................................. 3, 7, 8 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(C) (2014) ........................................................................................................ 3, 8, 9 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C) (2014) .................................................................................................... 5, 6, 7 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2) (2014) .................................................................................................... 5, 6 8 C.F.R. pt. 213 (2014) ............................................................................................................................... 7 8 C.F.R. pt. 1154 (2014) ........................................................................................................................... 11 8 C.F.R. pt. 1154 (1938) ........................................................................................................................... 12 Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 6 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Wenmin Ma (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion for summary judgment on July 8, 2016, claiming that Defendant U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (“USCIS”) decision to revoke her classification as the beneficiary of an immediate relative immigrant petition was unlawful. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF Doc. 20. In 2009, USCIS approved the family-based petition filed by Plaintiff’s mother, Shuzhen Li (“Li”), on Plaintiff’s behalf, concluding that Plaintiff was the unmarried daughter of a permanent resident. Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 9. After discovering Li had died subsequent to its approval of the petition, USCIS revoked the petition pursuant to its statutory authority to do so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155. Plaintiff asks the Court to find USCIS’s actions to be unlawful pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) because she remains the unmarried daughter of Li and therefore should retain her immediate relative immigrant classification. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2-3. USCIS’s decision to revoke the petition is supported by “good and sufficient cause.” 8 U.S.C. § 1155. USCIS’s revocation adhered to the regulatory scheme of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) which provides for the automatic revocation of approved immediate relative petitions upon the death of a petitioner. In addition, the record establishes that USCIS had good and sufficient cause to revoke and acted within the context of the INA’s statutory provisions on family-based immigrant petitions. As explained below, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, uphold USCIS’s revocation, and grant judgment in the Government’s favor. II. ISSUE PRESENTED Whether USCIS’s revocation of Li’s petition upon her death, in accordance with the regulation requiring automatic revocation, was lawful. III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND To be admitted and remain in the United States, Congress generally requires aliens to possess a visa conferring either immigrant or non-immigrant status. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). One such immigrant visa category established by Congress is the family-based immigrant visa. 8 Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 7 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Within the family-based immigrant visa category, the INA provides that lawful permanent residents of the United States, under certain conditions, may petition USCIS for classification of their alien son or daughter as an “immediate relative.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(2)(B), 1154(a)(1)(B)(i). The lawful permanent resident must file a Form I-130 petition seeking formal recognition by USCIS of the relationship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a).1 The filing date of a petition constitutes the “priority date” and establishes the beneficiary’s place in the queue for an immigrant visa. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(c). USCIS investigates filed petitions to determine whether the petitioner’s statements are true and whether the beneficiary listed on the petition qualifies for the intended benefit based on a valid relationship. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). If USCIS determines the facts of the petition are true and the listed beneficiary is an authorized immediate relative of the petitioner, then USCIS must approve the petition and notify the U.S. Department of State. Id. In visa petition proceedings, such as the adjudication of an I-130 petition by USCIS, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493, 493 (BIA 1966). An alien does not obtain a vested right for adjustment of status upon approval of a visa petition. See Montoya v. Holder, 744 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he mere filing and approval of a Form I–130 creates no vested right.”); Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[A visa petition] does not guarantee that a visa will be issued, nor does it grant the alien any right to remain in the United States.”). Rather, the approved petition “is merely a preliminary step in the visa application process.” Id. The U.S. Department of State makes the number of immigrant visas available annually and issues them in the order in which a petition is filed. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e). Until a visa is available and the alien is able to file for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident, the beneficiary of an approved petition is merely “a passive recipient 1 Petitions filed by lawful permanent residents for an unmarried son or daughter are converted to a petition for the unmarried son or daughter of a U.S. citizen if the parent-petitioner subsequently naturalizes. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k). Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 8 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 of the benefits of other parties’ actions” that “does not raise the alien’s expectations above the level of hope.” Montoya, 744 F.3d at 617 (citations omitted). Congress has expressly authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to revoke any approved immigrant visa petition “at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (emphasis added). Immigrant visa petitions like the one at issue in this case are no exception. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 1154(l), 1155. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has promulgated regulations identifying situations where the revocation of an approved petition is automatic.2 8 C.F.R. § 205.1. A petition may be automatically revoked upon one of an enumerated list of events, including upon the death of the petitioner if the death occurs prior to the beneficiary’s journey to the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C). Any such revocation is effective as of the date of the approval of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a). The regulation provides for relief from the automatic revocation of petitions upon the death of the petitioner where USCIS “determines, as a matter of discretion exercised for humanitarian reasons in light of the facts of a particular case, that it is inappropriate to revoke the approval of the petition.” 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2). USCIS may make this determination only where the petition’s beneficiary asks for reinstatement of the approval and provides the required affidavit of support. Id. 2 The Secretary’s authority to promulgate such regulations is codified within the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens . . . .”); id. § 1103(a)(3) (“He shall establish such regulations . . . issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.”) Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 9 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IV. RELEVANT FACTS3 Plaintiff was born in December 1952 in Tianjin, China, to Jiyun Ma (father) and Shuzhen Li (mother). CAR 27; see also CAR 46. Li, who was also born in Tianjin, China, CAR 22, became a U.S. permanent resident on January 31, 2007. CAR 17. Li completed a USCIS Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative (“I-130 petition”), on April 26, 2007, seeking to classify Plaintiff as her unmarried daughter. CAR 13-15. USCIS received the I-130 petition on May 22, 2007, and issued it a priority date of May 1, 2007. CAR 13. In the I-130 petition, Li stated that Plaintiff was single. Id. USCIS approved the I-130 petition on July 20, 2009, classifying Plaintiff as the unmarried daughter of a lawful permanent resident. Id; CAR 9. Li naturalized on February 26, 2013. CAR 12. Due to Li’s naturalization, the I-130 petition was automatically converted to a petition for the unmarried son or daughter of a U.S. citizen. CAR 11. Plaintiff completed two sets of U.S. Department of State Form DS-230, Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration (“DS-230 application”): the first on July 25, 2013, and the second on September 28, 2013. CAR 161-75; 176-85. Plaintiff filed each with the U.S. Department of State: the first on August 19, 2013, and the second on October 11, 2013. CAR 161, 176. The U.S. Department of State did not approve either DS-230 application. CAR 161-75; 176-85. Li died on October 30, 2014. CAR 6. The Department of State, National Visa Center, sent a memorandum to USCIS on July 9, 2015, regarding Li’s I-130 petition. CAR 4. In the memorandum, the National Visa Center stated that the I-130’s beneficiary appeared to not be 3 This case does not present any disputed issues of material fact because it is an action for review of an agency action under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”); Occidental Eng’g Co. v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[The district] court is not required to resolve any facts in a review of an administrative proceeding. . . . However, the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.”). The Court may direct summary judgment to either party based upon its review of the administrative record. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law” usually required pursuant to Local Rule 56-1 is inapplicable. Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 10 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 eligible for the benefit sought due to the death of the petitioner, and recommended that the petition be revoked. Id. USCIS issued a notice of decision to Li’s estate on August 24, 2015, stating that due to Li’s death and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C), the I-130 petition was automatically revoked as of the date of its approval. CAR 2. The notice included instruction on how to request that the I-130 petition’s approval be reinstated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2) for discretionary humanitarian reinstatement. Id. Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 11, 2015. Compl., ECF Doc. 1. Plaintiff seeks APA review of USCIS’s decision to revoke Li’s I-130 petition due to Li’s death. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff claims that because the INA authorizes USCIS to revoke an immigrant visa petition only if the evidence at the time the decision was issued warranted denial, id. at ¶ 11, Li’s revocation was unlawful because she continued to be Li’s daughter even after her mother’s death and did not warrant denial, id. at ¶ 12-13. V. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Review of Agency Action under the Administrative Procedure Act Under the APA, an informal agency action may only be disturbed if it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). This standard of review is narrow; a court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. The agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Fence Creek Cattle Co. v. Forest Serv., 602 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010). Federal courts give an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (citations omitted). To the extent review of agency action involves review of an agency’s interpretation of its organic statute, the Court applies the familiar Chevron two-step framework. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 11 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). If the court determines “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” and “the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” Id. at 842. If, however, “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court determines whether the agency’s action “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. An agency must be given ample latitude to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42; see generally Vasquez- Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 970 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[J]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.”). The court need not conclude that the agency’s interpretation of a statute is “the only reasonable one, or even the ‘best’ one.” Queen of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 65 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). The court must only find that it is a “permissible” one.” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 414, 113 (1993). B. Summary Judgment in an Administrative Procedure Act Case Summary judgment is the appropriate means for deciding the legal question of whether an agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S., 130 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1997). “[I]n a case involving review of a final agency action under the [APA] . . . the standard set forth in Rule 56[a] does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 (D.D.C. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1985). Summary judgment thus serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (citations omitted). VI. ARGUMENT A. The Administrative Record Supports USCIS’s Decision to Automatically Revoke Li’s Petition Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 205.1 USCIS’s decision to automatically revoke Li’s petition is indisputably supported by the record in this case. The record clearly establishes that Li’s death occurred prior to Plaintiff’s Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 12 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 journey to the United States and thus is sufficient for an automatic revocation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(C). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot establish that the record compels a contrary decision than the one USCIS reached or was based on an unreasonable interpretation of the regulation. The governing regulation sets forth USCIS’s requirement to automatically revoke an approved petition: Reasons for automatic revocation. The approval of a petition or self- petition made under [8 U.S.C. § 1154] and in accordance with part 204 of this chapter is revoked as of the date of approval: . . . (3) If any of the following circumstances occur before the beneficiary’s or self-petitioner’s journey to the United States commences or, if the beneficiary or self-petitioner is an applicant for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident, before the decision on his or her adjustment application becomes final: (i) Immediate relative and family-sponsored petitions, other than Amerasian petitions . . . (C) Upon the death of the petitioner, unless: . . . (2) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determines, as a matter of discretion exercised for humanitarian reasons in light of the facts of a particular case, that it is inappropriate to revoke the approval of the petition. USCIS may make this determination only if the principal beneficiary of the visa petition asks for reinstatement of the approval of the petition and establishes that a person related to the principal beneficiary in one of the ways described in [8 U.S.C. § 1183a] is willing and able to file an affidavit of support under 8 CFR part 213a as a substitute sponsor. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a). The regulation and its application in this case are straightforward. Here, USCIS’s determination that the evidence satisfied the regulatory requirements for automatic revocation is adequately supported by the evidence. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C), USCIS must automatically revoke a petition for an immediate relative upon the death of the petitioner if the death occurs before the beneficiary’s journey to the United States commences. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C). There is no dispute that the record establishes Li’s death on October 30, 2014, CAR 6, or Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 13 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 that USCIS relied on Li’s death to revoke her I-130 petition, CAR 2. There is also no dispute that the record establishes that Plaintiff had not yet journeyed to the United States at the time of Li’s death. While Plaintiff had filed two separate applications for an immigrant visa, neither application was approved. CAR 161-75, 176-85. The record contains no evidence that Plaintiff was admitted to the United States at any time, either pursuant to the applied-for immigrant visa or any other manner.4 USCIS’s decision to automatically revoke Li’s I-130 petition pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(C) is supported by substantial evidence in the record and must therefore be affirmed as lawful. Family Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 469 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 2006); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The record here provides substantial evidence for USCIS’s decision and does not compel the Court to reach a different decision. Family Inc., 469 F.3d at 1315. Thus, USCIS’s factual determination that Li’s I-130 petition warranted automatic revocation must be affirmed, and the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety and grant judgment in the Government’s favor. B. USCIS’s Decision Was Fully Consistent with Its Statutory and Regulatory Authority Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment challenges only USCIS’s decision to revoke Li’s I-130 petition upon her death.5 See generally Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. As discussed supra, USCIS’s decision was lawful as the agency applied the undisputed facts in the record to the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a). Plaintiff has not challenged the lawfulness of the regulation. Id. Thus, there is no further review in which the Court must engage. However, even if Plaintiff had challenged 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a), she cannot establish that the applicable regulation was unlawful. Automatic revocations pursuant to section 205.1(a) were established under the 4 Plaintiff’s filings in this matter confirm that she remained in China and did not journey to the United States at any time since Li filed her I-130 petition. See Compl. ¶ 2; Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 4 (“At the time [her mother died] Wenmin Ma was not a resident of the United States.”). 5 The only issue Plaintiff presented in his motion is “[w]hether the USCIS acted in accordance with law in revoking Shenyun Li’s immigrant visa petition upon behalf of Wenmin Ma as the unmarried daughter of a U.S. citizen solely because of the death of Shenyun Li.” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 2. Plaintiff did not cite to, let alone challenge, the applicable regulation in his motion. See generally Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 14 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 notice-and-comment procedures of the APA and have been codified under this regulation since January 1, 1977. See Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Status, 41 Fed. Reg. 55849 (Dec. 23, 1976) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 205.1); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). This regulation is based on a permissible construction of the relevant statute authorizing the revocation of approved petitions. 8 U.S.C. § 1155. To the extent the Court’s inquiry requires a review of the relevant regulation, the regulation is lawful and is based on a permissible construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1155, which permits revocations based on “good and sufficient cause.” Id. 1. Section 205.1 is Based on a Permissible Construction of the INA The automatic revocation provision of 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a) is a lawful construction of the relevant statute and Plaintiff cannot establish that it violates the APA. Under Chevron deference, USCIS’s interpretation of the relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1155, as provided in 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a),6 is controlling under a two-part test: (1) has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue; and (2) if not, is USCIS’s answer based on a permissible construction of the statute? Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, “there is an express delegation of authority to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.” Id. at 843-44. Such regulations are controlling unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Id. at 844. Congress has expressly authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to revoke any approved immigrant visa petition “at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (emphasis added). 8 U.S.C. § 1155. Section 1155’s requirement that “good and sufficient cause” exist is an explicit gap that Congress has left for the agency to fill. See ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the phrase “may, at any time, for what he deems to be” in section 1155 “plainly authorizes some measure of discretion” by the Secretary). Here, the issue is whether the death of a petitioner is “good and sufficient cause” for a petition’s automatic revocation. As 6 As a general rule, notice-and-comment rulemaking qualify for Chevron deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). Statutory provisions taken in the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking are usually a signal that the agency is entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 229-30. Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 15 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Congress has not specifically addressed the question, the Secretary’s construction of the statute is entitled to deference. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). The automatic revocation of family-based visa petitions where the petitioner has died is a permissible construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1155 entitled to deference. See Id. In fact, the lawfulness of the automatic revocation regulation to revoke family-based immigrant visa petitions upon the death of the petition is consistent with another section of the INA where Congress has recently directly spoken to the issue of granting such petitions where the petitioner has died. In 8 U.S.C. § 1154 – the INA section codifying the procedures for granting immigrant status – Congress has created a limited exception to the denial of family-based petitions upon the death of petitioners that only applies in cases where the beneficiaries reside in the United States at the time of the death. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l). By providing such an exception, section 1154(l) demonstrates a clear congressional acknowledgment of the longstanding practice of denying petitions upon the death of petitioners and congressional intent to allow for the continued processing of immigrant visas after the petitioner’s death only in cases where the beneficiary is in the United States. While Congress has not directly spoken to whether this exception applies to revoking already approved petitions, the exception Congress created in section 1154 establishes that USCIS’s interpretation to allow for automatic revocations where the alien is not present in the United States at the time of petitioner’s death is lawful. For years, the United States has revoked approved petitions based on the death of the petitioning relative. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 25.2 (1938); see also Desai v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., No. 14-593, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97084, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (finding the denial of petitions on behalf of relatives of citizens who die while the petition is pending to be a “long-standing practice”). In 2009, Congress amended section 1154 to modify this rule for those aliens “who resided in the United States at the time of the death of the qualifying relative and who continue to reside in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l); see also Dept. of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-83, Title V, § 568(d)(a), 123 Stat. 2142, 2187 (Oct. 28, 2009). Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 16 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Section 1154(l) did not alter pre-existing law and practice concerning aliens outside of the United States who had never been in the United States; Congress did not mandate the continued processing of their immigrant applications. Rather, the amendment makes clear that Congress sought to provide a remedy and the ability to continue the procedure for granting immigrant status for certain beneficiaries who had petitions filed on their behalf by deceased petitioners and who were already in the United States and otherwise faced the possibility of deportation.7 See Desai, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97084, at *4 (“The text of 1154(l) indicates that Congress intends that certain petitions be denied where the citizen sponsor has died unless the requirements of § 1154(l) are met.”). The amendment says nothing about aliens never admitted to the United States who would not be faced with the possibility of deportation. In the context of the Secretary’s interpretation of section 1155, it is clear that the applicable regulation providing for automatic revocations relies on the same factors that Congress specifically intended be considered in the initial adjudication of similar petitions. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 205.1. Thus, the automatic revocation of family-based petitions based on the death of a petitioner where the beneficiary has not arrived in the United States is a decision based on factors that Congress intended the agency to consider. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. 2. Plaintiff’s Argument Relies on Inapposite Caselaw Plaintiff’s argument that she should continue to be classified as the beneficiary of her mother’s petition – despite her mother’s death – relies on Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010). Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 7-8. However, while the Ninth Circuit in Federiso held that a son continued to be the son of a U.S. citizen even after his mother’s death, it did so in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(i)(H)(i). Federiso, 605 F.3d at 696. The Federiso court found that 7 Plaintiff cites to three cases – Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006); Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2009); Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2009) – in support of its argument that USCIS’s decision to revoke Li’s petition was not in accordance with applicable law. However, statutory analysis in each of these cases predated the amendment to section 1154(l) relevant here. Cf. Dept. of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-83, Title V, § 568(d)(a), 123 Stat. 2142, 2187 (Oct. 28, 2009) with Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1031; Lockhart, 573 F.3d at 251; Taing, 567 F.3d at 19. Thus, the analysis within these cases is superseded by Congress’s amendment and is unpersuasive. Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 17 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the “plain and unambiguous” text of the statute there at issue provided for the waiver of removal for the son of a U.S. citizen. Id. at 697-8; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(i)(H). The statutes governing the issue in this case, however, do not contain the same language as that relied on in Federiso. Compare Federiso, 605 F.3d at 696; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(i)(H)(i); with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1155. Congress has clearly sought to exclude beneficiaries of applications who have never resided in the United States when considering family-based immigrant petitions in a manner it has not when considering waivers of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1155. Because 8 C.F.R. § 205.1 evinces a reliance on factors Congress intended the agency to consider in the immigrant visa petition process that do not exist in the waiver statutes, USCIS’s automatic revocation regulations are lawful. VII. CONCLUSION As demonstrated, USCIS’s decision to revoke the petition is supported by good and sufficient cause to revoke and USCIS acted within the context of the INA’s statutory provisions on family-based immigrant petitions. Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, uphold USCIS’s revocation, and grant judgment in the Government’s favor. Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 18 of 19 DEF.’S OPP’N TO PL.’S MOT. FOR SUMM. J. & CROSS-MOT. FOR SUMM. J. NO. 3:15-CV-05672-MEJ 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dated: August 5, 2016 Respectfully submitted, BENJAMIN C. MIZER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director TIMOTHY M. BELSAN Senior Litigation Counsel /s/ Anthony D. Bianco ANTHONY D. BIANCO Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Telephone: (202) 305-8014 Facsimile: (202) 305-7000 E-mail: anthony.d.bianco@usdoj.gov Attorneys for Defendants Case 3:15-cv-05672-MEJ Document 21 Filed 08/05/16 Page 19 of 19