Lincoln National Life Insurance Company v. Sussman

MOTION for summary judgment

M.D. Fla.December 1, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION THE LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Indiana corporation, Plaintiff, v. DOV SUSSMAN, an individual, Defendant. _______________________________________/ Case No.:8:16-cv-0052-RAL-AAS PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company (“Lincoln”), by and through its undersigned counsel, moves for final summary judgment in favor of Lincoln and against Defendant, Dov Sussman (“Sussman”). There are no material disputed issues of fact, and Lincoln is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. INTRODUCTION In 2013, Lincoln and Sussman entered into agreements pursuant to which Sussman became authorized to sell life insurance policies on behalf of Lincoln. Sussman sold one such policy. These agreements between Lincoln and Sussman dictated that, upon the surrender of certain life insurance policies within two years of the sale of the policy, the selling agent ‒ in this case, Sussman – would be obligated to return to Lincoln any commissions he received during the two-year period prior to surrender. In this case, because the policy was surrendered just over one year after issuance, Sussman became obligated to return the entirety of the commission he received. Nevertheless, Sussman Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 1 of 14 PageID 509 - 2 - refused to return the commission. Because the applicable documents are clear and unambiguous, and because there is no material disputed issues of fact, this matter is ripe for judicial determination upon summary judgment, and Lincoln is entitled to summary judgment in its favor in the full amount of the commission paid to Sussman. FACTS This Motion for Summary Judgment incorporates by reference Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed concurrently herewith, which has been reviewed and agreed upon by Sussman. The only fact not agreed upon is as follows: On or about June 19, 2013, Sussman presented a Life Insurance Illustration (the “Illustration”) of the Policy, prepared for William A. Brown. 1 A true and accurate copy of the Illustration is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference. The Illustration indicates that the Policy includes an Exec Rider. See Illustration, pp. 5-6, 12-13, 19; top right corner of each page 2-17. LEGAL STANDARDS I. Summary Judgment. The summary judgment standard is well settled in the Eleventh Circuit. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), “summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” SunTrust Bank v. Watts, No. 2:11–cv–198–FtM–UA–SPC, 2012 WL 1969945, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2012) (Lazzara, J.). 1 Sussman disagrees that this Illustration is binding, because it is unexecuted. Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 2 of 14 PageID 510 - 3 - The party asking for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issues exist. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (l986). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Moreover, the non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference, but only of every reasonable inference. See Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1988). When a party’s response “consists of nothing more than a repetition of his conclusory allegations,” summary judgment is not only proper, but required. Peppers v. Coates, 887 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1989). Based upon the undisputed facts before this Court, there is no material issue of fact that would preclude judgment in favor of Lincoln. II. Choice of Law. “Florida generally enforces choice-of-law provisions in contracts unless application of the chosen forum’s law would contravene a strong public policy of the State of Florida.” FusionStorm, Inc. v. Presidio Networked Sols., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De NeMours & Co., 761 So. 2d 306, 311 (Fla. 2000)); see also Focus Mgt. Grp. USA, Inc. v. King, Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 3 of 14 PageID 511 - 4 - 8:13-CV-1696-T-35-AEP, 2016 WL 1083938, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2016) (“Generally, Florida courts enforce choice-of-law provisions in a contract unless the law of the chosen forum contravenes strong public policy”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, both the Producer Agreement and the Marketing Agreement are governed by Indiana law. No public policy of the State of Florida is contravened or compromised by applying Indiana law in this case, because the issue at the heart of this matter is simple enforcement of unambiguous contractual terms. ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT I. The Documents Clearly Establish Sussman’s Liability. Lincoln and Sussman entered into agreements that unequivocally state that the Policy has a two-year commission chargeback provision. The Marketing Agreement directs policy sellers, such as Sussman, to refer to the Policy Guide for the chargeback policies on life insurance products with an Exec Rider, such as the Policy. The Product Guide then clearly and unambiguously delineates a two-year chargeback period for products such as the Policy. As noted in the Statement of Undisputed Facts, the Policy includes an “Alternate Cash Surrender Value Rider.” See Policy, p. 3. Pursuant to the Product Guide, an Exec Rider is also referred to as an Alternate Cash Surrender Value Rider. See Product Guide, pp. 9-10, 23. Further, the very application for life insurance policy that Sussman completed and signed, and the Illustration that Sussman prepared, state multiple times that an Exec Rider is included within the Policy. Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 4 of 14 PageID 512 - 5 - When a case turns on a written document, the construction of the contract in the context of a motion for summary judgment is a judicial function. Southbend Escan Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 962, 963 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (citing B & R Farm Serv. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 483 N.E.2d 1076 (Ind. 1985)); see also Bicknell Minerals, Inc. v. Tilly, 570 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (same); In re Yates Dev., Inc., 241 B.R. 247, 252 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“The well-established principle in the Eleventh Circuit is that contract interpretation is generally a question of law . . . . The interpretation or construction of a written contract is particularly suitable for summary judgment”) (internal citation omitted); C. Nat. Bank v. Palmer, 806 F. Supp. 253, 256 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (“construction of a contract is ordinarily a question of law and as such is suitable for summary judgment.”). Here, there is no question that the plain construction of the documents reflects that the chargeback period for the commission paid out to Sussman on the Policy was two years from the time of payment. Because the Policy was indeed surrendered less than two years after Sussman received the Commission, Sussman is liable to Lincoln for the full amount of the Commission he received during the entire life of the Policy. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Lincoln in the full amount of the Commission is appropriate. To the extent that Sussman argues that he did not read the entirety of the documents governing the relationship between Lincoln and himself and was therefore unaware of the Two-Year Chargeback Provision, or that he did not obtain the Product Guide, such argument fails as a matter of law. “Basic contract law establishes a duty to Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 5 of 14 PageID 513 - 6 - read the contract; it is no defense to say, ‘I did not read what I was signing.’ Under Indiana law, a person is presumed to understand the documents which he signs and cannot be released from the terms of a contract due to his failure to read it.” Palmer v. Menard, Inc., 3:12-CV-828, 2014 WL 835632, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 4, 2014) (citing Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989) and Clanton v. United Skates of Am., 686 N.E.2d 896, 899–900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)); Robert's Hair Designers, Inc. v. Pearson, 780 N.E.2d 858, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (same); see also Snelling & Snelling, Inc. v. Reynolds, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“A party who signs a contract is presumed to know and understand the contents of the terms and conditions of the contract”); Glob. Retail Enter., Inc. v. Personalized Prod., LLC, 206CV-463-FTM-34DNF, 2008 WL 879313, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2008) (same). Further, where a contract explicitly incorporates or references another document, such as the Product Guide, the signatory is presumed to have read and understood the terms of that contract, including the existence and incorporation of the other document, whether or not that document was provided. This axiomatic principle is widely accepted by courts throughout the country. For example, in the recent case of Sterling Const. Corp. v. SOS Const. and Roofing, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that where parties A and B signed a contract incorporating by reference a separate contract between parties A and C, party B was bound by the latter contract by force of this incorporation. No. 3:14–cv–1959, 2015 WL 2189588, at *1 (N.D. Ind. May 11, 2015). Further, in Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 6 of 14 PageID 514 - 7 - Obering v. Swain-Roach Lumber Co., 155 N.E. 712, 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 1927), an Indiana Court of Appeals held that a contract referencing a notice of sale, which notice gave the correct legal description of the tract of land sold, sufficiently binds the parties. Courts in Florida have also embraced this widely accepted rule. For example, in Avatar Prop., Inc. v. Greetham, the court explained: It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing. Incorporation by reference is a recognized method of making one document of any kind become a part of another separate document without actually copying it at length in the other. This court has routinely approved the enforcement of contractual provisions that were incorporated by reference into a contract that parties have signed, including arbitration provisions. 27 So. 3d 764, 766–67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing, inter alia, OBS Co. v. Pace Constr. Corp., 558 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1990)); see also Dellacasa, LLC v. John Moriarty & Assoc. of Fla., Inc., No. 07-21659-CIV, 2008 WL 299024, at *13–14 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008) (adopting the holding of a Rhode Island federal case that an “[e]xplicit reference in the contract to [other] documents puts reasonable people on notice that they should read it and know the terms.... [A] reasonable person would know without a doubt that he was agreeing to abide by the [incorporated document], and if [the defendant] signed the contract without examining the incorporated documents, then he did so at his own risk”); Oliver Wine Co., Inc. v. Ball Metal Bev. Container Corp., 1:13-CV-00062-RLY, 2013 WL 5603937, *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2013) (under Colorado law, a signatory is presumed “to have read and understood the terms of the Agreement, including the existence and incorporation of the [additional document] into the Agreement”); Omega Healthcare Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 7 of 14 PageID 515 - 8 - Investors, Inc. v. Res-Care, Inc., 475 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2007) (under Kentucky law, “when a signature is placed after clear language has expressed the incorporation of other terms and conditions by reference, it is a logical inference that the signer agrees to be bound by everything incorporated”). 2 The documents governing the contractual relationship between Lincoln and Sussman unambiguously support summary judgment in favor of Lincoln. No claim of ignorance by Sussman, a licensed attorney with approximately 30 years of experience and the long-time president and CEO of a wealth management company, 3 can overcome 2 See also Elite Precision Fabricators, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., NO. H-14-2086, 2015 WL 9302843, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2015) (“[T]he law presumes that a party knows and accepts the terms of the contract he signs, and the law does not excuse a party's failure to read the contract when he had an opportunity to do so. That presumption includes documents specifically incorporated by reference into the contract . . . . [Plaintiff] is presumed to have known about, and accepted, the express language of incorporation on the face of the contract and the terms of the incorporated [document], even if the incorporated document was not attached and “[Plaintiff] failed to obtain and read it”); Schofield v. French, 36 F.Supp.2d 481, 486 (D.R.I. 1999) (even assuming the referenced documents were not attached when the contract was signed, “a reasonable person would certainly have suspected that he was agreeing to abide by them. In fact, a reasonable person would know without a doubt that he was agreeing to abide by the [incorporated documents], and if [the signatory] signed the contract without examining the incorporated documents, then he did so at his own risk. Only two such agreements existed, so [signatory] could have identified them easily and sought them from [other party] before signing if they were not attached”); Budner v. Murnighan, No. 03 C 2100, 2003 WL 21544236, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2003) (The signatories are bound by the incorporated document regardless of whether they read them, because “[i]f a party signs a contract that incorporates another document, then he is presumed to know the incorporation terms of the contract as well as the terms of the referenced document.”); Norman Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Monitor Dynamics, Inc., 740 F.Supp. 1364, 1368 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (although signatory contends it never saw the incorporated document, “it is an established principle of contract law that parties may incorporate other writings by reference into a written contract. An explicit incorporation of another document into a signed contract binds the signing parties, according to the clear import of the agreement, even where they have not seen the incorporated document”) (internal quotation marks omitted; citing, inter alia, Guerini Stone Co. v. P.J. Carlin Construction Co., 240 U.S. 264, 278, 36 S.Ct. 300, 306, 60 L.Ed. 636 (1916)); Am. Registry of Radiologic Technologists v. Bennett, 939 F.Supp.2d 695, 708–09 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (defendant’s argument that she was not aware of any contractual obligations other than those on the face of the document she signed are meritless because “a party who signs a document is presumed to know its contents, including documents specifically incorporated by reference”). 3 See Sussman Depo, 9:5-6, 19:20-20:4, 23:18-20, attached as Exhibit E to the Statement of Undisputed Facts filed concurrently herewith. Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 8 of 14 PageID 516 - 9 - his clearly-established duty to read and understand the terms of the agreements, including terms incorporated by reference. II. Sussman’s Affirmative Defenses Do Not Preclude Summary Judgment. 1. Sussman has waived arbitration. Sussman’s first affirmative defense argues that this matter requires arbitration. However, Sussman has waived any right to arbitration because he has failed to move this Court to compel arbitration, and because he has actively and extensively participated in this litigation. Indiana courts have consistently held that “conduct inconsistent with an intent to enforce an arbitration provision waives compliance with a contract's arbitration provision.” Safety Nat. Cas. Co. v. Cinergy Corp., 829 N.E.2d 986, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); see also St. Mary's Med. Ct. v. Disco Alum. Prod., 969 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1992) (arbitration waived where the defendant seeking arbitration waited ten months after the claim was made to seek arbitration and participated in litigation); JKL Components Corp. v. Insul-Reps, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (arbitration waived where party made no effort to specifically request arbitration at any time before appeal); Garcia v. Wachovia Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) (refusing to compel arbitration and explaining that the right to arbitration is waived where a party “acts inconsistently with the arbitration right when the party substantially invokes the litigation machinery prior to demanding arbitration,” and where the other party has been prejudiced through a lengthy delay in demanding arbitration and expenses incurred during the litigation process). Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 9 of 14 PageID 517 - 10 - Sussman answered Lincoln’s complaint but never asked this Court to compel arbitration, nor did he mention arbitration in any further filing with the Court. Sussman participated in a Rule 26 conference and the filing of a case management report [ECF 12], submitted his Rule 26 disclosures, and filed a motion seeking affirmative relief. Further, Sussman responded to Lincoln’s Requests for Admissions, Requests for Production and Interrogatories, made two rounds of document production, and sat for a deposition. He then participated in mediation, and two good-faith phone conferences concerning the Statement of Undisputed Facts. Any argument that arbitration was appropriate has long ago been waived through Sussman’s consistent engagement in this litigation. 2. The documents support a two-year chargeback. Sussman’s second affirmative defense appears to argue that the schedules attached to the Marketing Agreement serves as a defense to this action. However, as noted above, that schedule specifically states: “Fixed Life Products with Exec Rider - Commission Chargeback for this rider is unique. Please consult the Lincoln LifeReserve UL and/or Indexed UL Product Guide(s) for full details.” The Product Guide then specifies that policies with an Exec Rider, such as the Policy, have a two-year chargeback period. By Sussman’s own admission, the Policy is a fixed life product. Therefore, Sussman’s second affirmative defense fails. Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 10 of 14 PageID 518 - 11 - 3. The Producer Agreement is enforceable because it is executed by Sussman, against whom it is to be enforced. Sussman’s third affirmative defense argues that the Producer Agreement is unenforceable as to Sussman because it is “unexecuted.” However, as is clear on page 7 of the Producer Agreement, it is executed by Sussman himself. See also Answer, ¶ 7. An agreement is enforceable as to a party that signed it, even if the counterparty did not sign it. “The critical signature is that of the party against whom the contract is being enforced.” Hess v. Bresney, 784 F.3d 1154, 1158 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Hager v. Venice Hosp., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1530, 1536-37 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (statute of frauds requires a writing and the signature of the party “against whom enforcement is sought”). Because Sussman is the party against whom enforcement of the Producer Agreement is being sought, his signature is the only one necessary. Because, by Sussman’s own admission, he executed the Producer Agreement, it is enforceable as against him, and therefore this affirmative defense fails. 4. Sussman waived arguments regarding indispensable parties. Failure to raise the issue of non-joinder of otherwise indispensable parties “in a meaningful and timely manner generally results in waiver of that issue.” City of Terre Haute v. Simpson, 746 N.E.2d 359, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Coak v. Rebber, 425 N.E.2d 197, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that party who waited to seek joinder of party until after judgment waived the issue); Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 442, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (same); Ligon Specialized Hauler, Inc. v. Hott, 384 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (1979) (“[w]e will not allow a party to sit idly by until appellate review before presenting appropriate motions for the joinder of additional parties.”). Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 11 of 14 PageID 519 - 12 - Sussman has not moved to join any allegedly indispensable party. Further, the Case Management and Scheduling Order designates July 1, 2016 as the deadline for “Third Party Joinder,” yet Sussman failed to take any action by that deadline to join any parties. Aside from this affirmative defense, Sussman has failed to raise this issue at any point during this nearly year-long litigation. Therefore, the issue of joinder has been waived, and this affirmative defense fails. 5. Lincoln returned all premiums paid on the Policy. Sussman’s fifth and sixth affirmative defenses both argue that Lincoln received premiums and earned interest on the Policy. However, as noted above, all premiums paid to Lincoln on the Policy, except for a $25 processing fee, were returned following the surrender of the Policy. See Lincoln Aff., ¶ 5. Nothing in the governing documents suggests that interest earned by Lincoln, if any, on the premiums paid prior to a policy’s surrender affects Lincoln’s right to a full chargeback. Therefore, Sussman’s fifth and sixth affirmative defenses fail because any issue of fact that may exist as to these affirmative defenses, to the extent these affirmative defenses are even cognizable or legally sufficient, is neither genuine nor material. CONCLUSION The agreements entered into between Lincoln and Sussman are clear, unambiguous, and binding. Taken together, those agreements dictate that upon surrender of the Policy, which is a fixed life product with an Exec Rider, Sussman, as the selling agent, must return all commissions that he received during the preceding two years. Because the Policy was surrendered barely a year after it became effective, the Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 12 of 14 PageID 520 - 13 - commission must be returned in full. Sussman’s affirmative defenses do not preclude entry of summary judgment, and because there is no material disputed issue of fact, Lincoln is entitled to summary judgment. WHEREFORE, Lincoln respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order (i) granting summary judgment in Lincoln’s favor; (ii) finding that Sussman is liable to Lincoln in the full amount of the Commission, $234,405.12, plus pre- and post-judgment interest; (iii) awarding Lincoln its attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Section 7(a) of the Marketing Agreement and Section 21(e) of the Producer Agreement; and (iv) granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 13 of 14 PageID 521 - 14 - TPADOCS 21133468 5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 1, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was electronically filed with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system, and also served via e-mail to the following: Dov Sussman, dovsussman91@gmail.com and via First Class U.S. Postage Prepaid to: Dov Sussman, c/o Overstreet Wealth Management, Inc., 1311 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 101, Tampa, FL 33607. /s/ Ella A. Shenhav MICHAEL P. SILVER Florida Bar No. 868701 msilver@shutts.com ELLA A. SHENHAV Florida Bar No. 81996 eshenhav@shutts.com SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP 4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33607 Telephone: (813) 229-8900 Facsimile: (813) 229-8901 Attorneys for Plaintiff Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24 Filed 12/01/16 Page 14 of 14 PageID 522 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 1 of 20 PageID 523 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 2 of 20 PageID 524 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 3 of 20 PageID 525 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 4 of 20 PageID 526 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 5 of 20 PageID 527 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 6 of 20 PageID 528 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 7 of 20 PageID 529 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 8 of 20 PageID 530 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 9 of 20 PageID 531 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 10 of 20 PageID 532 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 11 of 20 PageID 533 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 12 of 20 PageID 534 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 13 of 20 PageID 535 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 14 of 20 PageID 536 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 15 of 20 PageID 537 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 16 of 20 PageID 538 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 17 of 20 PageID 539 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 18 of 20 PageID 540 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 19 of 20 PageID 541 Case 8:16-cv-00052-RAL-AAS Document 24-1 Filed 12/01/16 Page 20 of 20 PageID 542