Levy et al v. Charlotte School of Law, Llc et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

W.D.N.C.April 21, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION CASE NO. 3:17-cv-00026-GCM MS. RAISSA LEVY, MR. JAMES VILLANUEVA, MS. SHANNA RIVERA, MR. ANDRÉ MCCOY individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, LLC, INFILAW HOLDING, LLC, INFILAW CORPORATION, STERLING PARTNERS, L.P., and STERLING CAPITAL PARTNERS, GMBH & CO. KG, Defendants. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, LLC, INFILAW HOLDING, LLC, AND INFILAW CORPORATION Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants Charlotte School of Law (“CSL”), InfiLaw Holding, LLC (“Holding”), and InfiLaw Corporation (“InfiLaw”), respectfully move this Court for an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (the “Levy Second Amended Complaint” or “LSAC”) with prejudice. 1 The grounds for this Motion are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion and exhibits thereto. 1 InfiLaw Holding, LLC appears for the purpose of this Motion only and for no other purpose and reserves all defenses and rights available to it, including without limitation the right to challenge personal jurisdiction. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 3 2 This the 21st day of April, 2017. WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE A Limited Liability Partnership /s/ Sarah Motley Stone Debbie W. Harden, NCSB No. 10576 Sarah Motley Stone, NCSB No. 34117 One Wells Fargo Center, Suite 3500 301 South College Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202-6037 Telephone: (704) 331-4943 Facsimile: (704) 338-7813 E-mail dharden@wcsr.com; sstone@wcsr.com Johnny W. Loper, NCSB No. 15533 555 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1100 PO Box 831 Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 Telephone: (919) 755-2116 Facsimile: (919) 755-6056 E-mail jloper@wcsr.com Attorneys for Defendants Charlotte School of Law, InfiLaw Corporation, and InfiLaw Holding, LLC COOLEY LLP /s/ David E. Mills David Edward Mills (admitted Pro Hac Vice) Michael DeWayne Hays (admitted Pro Hac Vice) COOLEY LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004-2400 Telephone: (202) 842-7800 Facsimile: (202) 842-7899 Email: dmills@cooley.com Email: mhays@cooley.com Attorneys for Defendants Charlotte School of Law, InfiLaw Corporation, and InfiLaw Holding, LLC Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 21, 2017, I have electronically filed the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to the following: Amanda A. Mingo Rawls, Scheer, Foster, Mingo & Culp 1011 E. Morehead Street, Suite 300 Charlotte, NC 28204 amingo@rsfmlaw.com Brian Leighton Kinsley Daniel Ray Francis Crumley Roberts 2400 Freeman Mill Rd., Suite 200 Greensboro, NC 27406 blkinsley@crumleyroberts.com, drfrancis@CrumleyRoberts.com Philip Bohrer Bohrer Brady, LLC 8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809 phil@bohrerbrady.com Robert E. Harrington, N.C. Bar No. 26967 Adam K. Doerr, N.C. Bar No. 37087 101 North Tryon Street, Suite 1900 Charlotte, NC 28246 Telephone: (704) 377-2536 Facsimile: (704) 378-4000 rharrington@robinsonbradshaw.com adoerr@robinsonbradshaw.com Peter L. Welsh William L. Roberts Prudential Tower, 800 Boylston Street Boston, MA 02199-3600 (617) 951-7865 (617) 951-7313 peter.welsh@ropesgray.com william.roberts@ropesgray.com Nicholas M. Berg 191 North Wacker Drive, 32nd Floor Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 845-1322 nicholas.berg@ropesgray.com /s/ Sarah Motley Stone Sarah Motley Stone Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00026 RAISSA LEVY, JAMES VILLANUEVA, SHANNA RIVERA, and ANDRÉ MCCOY, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, vs. CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, LLC, INFILAW HOLDING, LLC, INFILAW CORPORATION, STERLING PARTNERS, L.P. and STERLING CAPITAL PARTNERS GMBH & CO. KG, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DEFENDANTS CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, LLC, INFILAW HOLDING, LLC, AND INFILAW CORPORATION’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM INTRODUCTION The Plaintiffs, a current student and three former students at Charlotte School of Law (“CSL”), assert on behalf of a purported class that CSL should have disclosed certain interim findings and conclusions of the American Bar Association, Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (“ABA” or “Council”), even as CSL was still working its way through a lengthy ABA confidential review process over the past year and a half. They claim, based on those internal ABA findings, that CSL has failed to provide a “rigorous curriculum,” has failed to implement adequate admissions standards, and should have told students that it had these issues and might lose its accreditation before the ABA had completed its confidential review process or had required any such disclosure under its own procedures. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 37 2 The Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint” or “LSAC”) lacks merit as a matter of law and should be dismissed. The determination of when disclosure of ABA findings must be made is squarely within the province of the ABA itself under a well-established federal system of divided responsibility for overseeing the provision of higher education. As shown below, the indisputable facts are that CSL has been and remains fully accredited by the ABA, that it is currently on a two-year period of probation working to satisfy certain ABA conditions, and that it made the ABA-required disclosures at the proper time under the ABA’s own rules. In fact, the ABA process is, by its nature and by rule, confidential to ensure the candid exchange of information, fair evaluations, and the opportunity to address deficiencies. The ABA Rules do not require a law school to make disclosures of matters raised during interim proceedings and, to the contrary, explicitly state that such interim proceedings “shall be confidential.” CSL still has time while on probation to demonstrate compliance and has no reason to suppose that the ABA will revoke its accreditation, a sanction the ABA has never previously imposed. Indeed, as detailed below, the pertinent ABA accreditation committee determined that, based on the findings of the distinguished ABA inspection site team (the only ABA group to have visited the CSL campus from 2011 through 2016), CSL offered rigorous, challenging, and intellectually stimulating assignments, exams, and classes—in stark contrast to the Plaintiffs’ vague and unsupported assertion that CSL’s academic standards are “suspicious.” To be sure, the U.S. Department of Education (“Department”) in December took the unprecedented step of declining to recertify CSL for federal student aid funding based on the ABA’s interim conclusions, an exceptional action to take in the midst of an ongoing ABA process. CSL could not reasonably have anticipated this extreme and politically charged action. It is indeed unfortunate that the Department took this unexpected action, particularly as CSL has Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 37 3 been true to its mission of educating underserved populations seeking to break into the legal profession. CSL takes the ABA’s concerns and probationary actions very seriously and continues to undertake substantial efforts to raise the requisite metrics to the levels sought by the ABA. At the same time, however, it was not the ABA’s findings and probationary status that materially impacted CSL’s students. What has impacted students—in a devastating way—was the Department’s unprecedented decision not to recertify CSL in the middle of a pending accreditation review, thereby cutting off its students’ access to federal aid. It is in this context that the LSAC asserts nine causes of action, each of which fails as a matter of law for multiple reasons. Fundamentally, the suit is ill-founded because it seeks to stretch various legal theories (e.g., breach of contract and unjust enrichment) to cover what is, in essence, an “educational malpractice” claim, which North Carolina and most other states do not recognize as a proper judicial claim. 1 The breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment claims fail because both overlap entirely with the contract claim. So too, the intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims fail because Plaintiffs have not alleged (and cannot allege) them with the required particularity and have omitted elements, including that they reasonably relied on false information from a party that owed them a duty of care. And without a predicate of misconduct, the unfair trade practices claim fails as well. Finally, North Carolina does not recognize claims for unconscionability, joint liability, and punitive damages as stand-alone claims. For these reasons and others, the LSAC must be dismissed with prejudice. 2 1 McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 982-83 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012). 2 Holding is contemporaneously with this motion filing a memorandum in support of its separate motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which is incorporated herein by reference, including without limitation the portion dealing with veil-piercing. Holding appears solely for the purpose of these motions, reserving all defenses and rights, including the right to challenge personal jurisdiction. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 37 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 I. Background Of Charlotte School Of Law. CSL was founded in 2006. It is one of three law schools owned by InfiLaw Corporation (“InfiLaw”), a private, non-tax exempt entity. (LSAC ¶ 22.) InfiLaw, in turn, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of InfiLaw Holding, LLC (“Holding”). 4 From its founding, CSL has envisioned a unique mission with respect to underrepresented populations, striving to advance “inclusive excellence” by “creat[ing] an environment for persons of all backgrounds and life experiences.” 5 CSL has been recognized by the National Jurist as “one of the nation’s most diverse law schools,” a recognition that “attests to the importance” CSL places on diversity and its “commitment to providing an experience and environment that aligns with the future rather than the past.” 6 CSL has succeeded in its goal of increasing the representation of minorities enrolled. For example, 57 percent of students enrolled at CSL at the beginning of the 2016-17 academic year were from minority populations. 7 3 This section is based on the LSAC’s allegations (accepted solely for purposes of this motion) and other documents the Court may consider on a motion to dismiss, which include: (i) federal filings, including documents attached to the complaint (In re Wachovia Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 3:09CV262, 2010 WL 3081359, at *2 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2010)); (ii) “matters of public record” (Sec’y of State For Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007)); (iii) “information publicly announced on a party’s website” and “factual information found on the world wide web” (Jeandron v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Md., 510 F. App’x 223, 227 (4th Cir. 2013)); and (iv) documents not “expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity” (Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016)). 4 As noted in Holding’s contemporaneous Rule 12(b)(2) motion, Plaintiffs incorrectly allege that InfiLaw and Holding “jointly own, operate, manage and control CSL.” (LSAC ¶ 18.) 5 CSL Website, “Why Charlotte School of Law: A Community You Are a Part Of,” available at http://www.charlottelaw.edu/why-charlotte-school-of-law.html. 6 Id. 7 See CSL’s ABA Standard 509 Information Reports (“509 Reports”), J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity Charts, “Total Minority” category. In accordance with its mission, CSL’s “Total Minority” population has grown substantially over the last five years, from 26.5% in 2011 to 57% in 2016. See CSL’s 509 Report for 2016, available at Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 37 5 The ABA has strongly encouraged schools to provide broader access to legal education to underrepresented groups, 8 although very few schools have undertaken the challenges this goal entails. Nonetheless, despite these challenges, since its full accreditation in 2011, CSL has complied with ABA Standard 316, which provides the objective, quantitative measure of sufficient bar passage rates. 9 II. ABA Accreditation Procedures. The ABA Council and its “Accreditation Committee” (“Committee”) constitute the only accrediting body that the Department recognizes to accredit J.D. programs. 10 Under the ABA Standards and Rules, after a law school has demonstrated to the Council that it is in full compliance with each of the Standards, the Council grants “full approval” to the institution. ABA Standard 103(a). A law school granted full approval “remains approved unless the Council withdraws that approval.” Id. 103(b). The ABA Council provisionally accredited CSL in 2008, and then (once the ABA’s mandatory two-year provisional accreditation period had passed) fully accredited CSL in 2011. (LSAC ¶ 16.) CSL remains fully accredited to this day. 11 http://www.charlottelaw.edu/userfiles/files/2016%20Charlotte%20Std509InfoReport_12.15.2016 .pdf and CSL’s 509 Reports for 2011 through 2015, each available at http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/ (together submitted as Ex. 1). 8 See ABA Standard 206(a), ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools (“ABA Standards and Rules”) (relevant excerpts submitted as Ex. 2) (“[A] law school shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by providing full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession by members of underrepresented groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities.”). The 2016-2017 ABA Standards and Rules cited herein are generally consistent with those in editions published since August 2014. 9 None of the ABA decisions alleged that CSL had violated Standard 316. 10 See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Website, “Specialized Accrediting Agencies,” available at https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg7.html#law. 11 See ABA Website, “ABA-Approved Law Schools by Year,” available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/by_y ear_approved.html (excerpt submitted as Ex. 3). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 5 of 37 6 The ABA Rules provide that (except for certain circumstances in which the ABA is obligated to disclose information, none of which is applicable here) “site evaluation and fact finding reports” and “decisions and recommendations of the Committee and Council shall be confidential” and not released to the public. 12 ABA Rules 51(a) and 52(a). Only under certain conditions (and after a decision by the Committee or the Council) may the ABA’s Managing Director provide public notice of the decision or recommendation. See ABA Rule 53. CSL had no reason to expect that the ABA’s limited findings of non-compliance would result in severe consequences for enrolled students, much less that the Department inexplicably would use interim ABA findings within an ongoing accreditation process to deny CSL recertification to participate in federal student loan programs. It is standard practice amongst accrediting agencies to engage in thorough confidential reviews of institutions. The purpose of such review is to identify concerns, to allow institutions to correct inaccuracies, and to permit schools to fix operational issues. In fact, the ABA accreditation review process, while often identifying noncompliance with one or more standards, has never resulted in the revocation of any law school’s accreditation 13 – belying Plaintiffs’ allegation that CSL “knew, or should have known, that [its] accreditation was in jeopardy” “as early as September, 2014.” (LSAC ¶ 2.) 12 To preserve the integrity and requisite candor within the confidential peer review process and to prevent premature disclosures, ABA Rules 51(b) and 52(b) establish procedures and conditions that become applicable in the unusual circumstance where a law school decides on its own accord to disclose a site evaluation report or decision or recommendation of the Committee or Council. There were no such circumstances here. To the contrary, the ABA Managing Director in July 2016 “stay[ed]” any requirement to make disclosures as described in the Committee’s July directive while the matter was pending before the Council. See ABA Directive from B. Currier to CSL dtd. July 24, 2016 (Ex. 4). 13 ABA Website, “Accreditation Archives,” available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/accreditation_archives.html (submitted as Ex. 5). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 6 of 37 7 Indeed, according to ABA representatives, the ABA has never “denied accreditation” to a school “for low [bar] pass rates alone,” 14 and, as far back as the public records go (at least five years), has never withdrawn accreditation from a law school for any reason. 15 Rather, the ABA’s review and probation processes are designed to improve law schools’ performance and bring them into compliance with ABA Standards, which is consistent with accrediting agencies’ fundamental goal of institutional improvement. 16 Thus, it is not surprising that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the Department has revoked any law school’s Title IV eligibility because the ABA placed the law school on probation. Furthermore, candid communications between accreditor and school are a necessary component of the accreditation process. To strip away the confidentiality of this peer review and continual improvement process and allow each interim step to become the basis of litigation would undermine the ABA’s ability to conduct confidential reviews and its authority to determine when to require public notice. Further, it would put every institution at risk for constant lawsuits each time an accreditor identifies a problem or an area for improvement. III. CSL’s Accreditation Review Proceedings. A. The Site Team’s 2014 Visit And Committee Review. ABA procedures require periodic review of the accreditation status of law schools. As part of this routine process, an ABA Site Team visited CSL in March 2014. (LSAC ¶ 24.) The Site Team met with “CSL staff, owners, administrators, faculty, and students, and also conducted an onsite inspection,” during which Site Team members conducted interviews, visited classes, 14 U.S. Dep’t of Ed., National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity, Transcript of Hearing on June 22, 2016 (“NACIQI Trans.”), at 182-83, available at https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/archive-of-meetings/ (excerpt submitted as Ex. 6). 15 See Accreditation Archives (Ex. 5). 16 See ABA Rule 18(c) (if a law school demonstrates compliance with the Standards, “then the Committee shall recommend to the Council that probationary status be removed”). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 7 of 37 8 and evaluated services and facilities. (Id.) The ABA advised CSL that the Site Team Inspection Report “is a step in the process of determining whether CSL continues to comply with ABA accreditation standards.” (LSAC ¶ 25.) The Site Team is the only ABA group to have evaluated CSL in person from 2011 through 2016. On February 24, 2015, in its first review of CSL after the Site Team visit, the Committee found (consistent with the Site Team’s evaluation) that CSL offered rigorous and challenging assignments, exams, and classes. Nonetheless, despite these findings, it requested that CSL provide further information demonstrating the rigor of its programs. (LSAC ¶¶ 25-27.) B. The Committee And Council’s 2016 Findings And CSL’s Appeal. Throughout 2015, the ABA made no finding that CSL failed to comply with any ABA Standard. However, as communicated to CSL by letter on February 3, 2016, despite CSL’s extensive submissions (and the Committee’s own factual findings), the Committee, for the first time, found that CSL was not in full compliance with a few ABA Standards and again requested that CSL submit additional information. (LSAC ¶ 28.) This decision did not place CSL on probation or include any directive to issue a notice to its students or the public. After a further attempt by CSL to satisfy the Committee’s inquiries, on July 21, 2016, the Committee advised CSL that it believed CSL was still not in compliance. (LSAC ¶ 29.) It ordered certain remedial action, including, for the first time, providing notice to CSL students of the Committee action, but it did not withdraw approval. (Id.) Under the ABA Standards and Rules: a law school granted full approval “remains approved unless the Council withdraws that approval” (ABA Standard 103(b)); the two-year period for CSL to demonstrate compliance with the Standards commenced on February 3, 2016, and (absent a permissible extension) expires on February 2, 2018 (ABA Rule 14(b)-(c)); and CSL had the right to appeal the decision within 30 days from the date of the Committee letter (ABA Rule 23(a)). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 8 of 37 9 In August 2016, CSL appealed the Committee decision to the Council, which suspended the remedial action that the Committee had ordered, including notice to the students. (LSAC ¶ 34.) 17 In a closed meeting in October 2016, the Council affirmed the Committee’s decision. On November 14, 2016, the Council advised CSL of this action, at which point it became final and binding on the school. Among other things, the Council ordered CSL to provide notice to students by November 21, 2016. (LSAC ¶¶ 34-35.) CSL complied with this requirement. (Id.) IV. Background Regarding Plaintiffs’ Admission And Attendance. Contrary to their allegations, Plaintiffs had access to information—prior to and during their enrollment at CSL—to make fully informed decisions as to whether to attend CSL. For example, CSL posts on its website the ABA-mandated Employment Summary template with detailed statistics regarding employment of recent graduates. 18 Moreover, since the ABA adopted new website disclosure requirements in 2012, CSL has published a document on its website called the Standard 509 Information Report (“509 Report”). (LSAC ¶ 33.) This 509 Report, presented in ABA-required templates and formulas, provides detailed data, including CSL’s first-time bar passage and attrition rates, matriculant undergraduate grade point averages (“UGPAs”), and Law School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) scores. See CSL 509 Reports (Ex. 1). The ABA publishes compilations of all accredited law schools’ 509 Report data in one place online, allowing for easy comparison among law schools. See ABA Required 17 See ABA Rule 13(c) (“The approval status of a law school is not affected while an appeal . . . of [] a decision or recommendation of the Committee . . . is pending.”). Thus, the Committee’s July 2016 Letter directing CSL to make various disclosures never became effective, and CSL was not required to advise the public of that information. Indeed, the ABA Managing Director “stay[ed] any requirement to disclose the non-compliance findings and remedial action while the appeal was pending. See ABA Directive from B. Currier to CSL dtd. July 24, 2016 (Ex. 4). 18 See CSL Employment Summary Reports, available at http://www.charlottelaw.edu/gainful- employment-aba-required-disclosures.html for years 2013, 2014, and 2015 and previously published for prior years since 2012 (Ex. 7) (allowing for easy comparison between schools). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 9 of 37 10 Disclosures, available at http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org. Prospective law students use this information to determine whether to attend an institution—not confidential technical documents exchanged between a school and the ABA that are part of an ongoing process designed to enhance school quality. Plaintiffs do not deny that CSL published accurate 509 Reports on its websites (and that the data was thus readily available), or that students and prospective students rely on this ABA-mandated information in making enrollment decisions. V. CSL’s Matriculation Procedures. CSL’s tuition is comparable to that of other private law schools. 19 If CSL accepts a student, it so notifies the student, and, upon payment of tuition, the student enrolls. (LSAC ¶ 33.) CSL has no contractual obligation with its students committing the school to remaining compliant at all times with the hundreds of ABA Standards, and the Complaint cites none. VI. Plaintiffs’ Claims. Notwithstanding the indisputable fact that CSL is and has been fully ABA-accredited at all times since 2011, Plaintiffs assert, as the crux of their Complaint, Defendants’ “misrepresentation of [CSL’s] accreditation status” and Defendants’ failure to provide the “rigorous curriculum” and education Defendants allegedly promised them. (LSAC ¶¶ 1, 81.) Plaintiffs’ claims are nine variations of these factual themes, and each must be dismissed. ARGUMENT I. Applicable Standard. To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and to show that the claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 19 See ABA Website, “Statistics,” Law School Tuition spreadsheet, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html (showing the average tuition and fees of private law schools in 2013 (the most recent year for which data is available) was $41,985, and the median was $42,241); see also CSL’s 509 Report for 2013 (showing CSL’s tuition and fees were $40,146 for 2013) (Ex. 1). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 10 of 37 11 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”—a standard that requires more than facts “that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept as true a plaintiff’s “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). II. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Breach Of Contract (Count III). As shown below, Plaintiffs fail to state a breach of contract claim for multiple reasons, including: (1) their claim, in reality, merely asserts educational malpractice, a cause of action North Carolina does not recognize; (2) their vague and conclusory allegations fail to allege a cognizable breach of contract claim; and (3) the voluntary payment doctrine bars their claim. A. Plaintiffs’ Breach Of Contract Claim Merely Alleges Educational Malpractice, A Claim That North Carolina Does Not Recognize. As established below, North Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice. Plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent this well-established law by disguising their educational malpractice claim as a breach of contract claim should be rejected. North Carolina courts have repeatedly rejected claims for educational malpractice. As the Court in McFadyen stated: [T]he [breach of contract] claim must not involve “inquiry into the nuances of educational processes and theories.” . . . [T]he Court will not . . . open up any type of “educational malpractice” claim. McFadyen, 703 F.3d at 982-83 (quoting Ryan v. Univ. of N.C. Hosps., 128 N.C. App. 300, 301, 494 S.E. 2d 789, 791 (1998)); see Rouse v. Duke Univ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (M.D.N.C. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 11 of 37 12 2012) (rejecting claims based on vague assurances of educational quality and experience as “too general to be enforceable as a matter of contract”); Thomas v. Olshausen, No. 3:07CV130-MU, 2008 WL 2468738, at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 16, 2008) (claims that “Defendants denied [Plaintiff] or his son access to more challenging educational programs . . . should be dismissed as there is no cognizable claim for educational malpractice under North Carolina law”), aff’d, 305 F. App’x 55 (4th Cir. 2008). Indeed, only one week ago, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed that “educational malpractice claims . . . are not recognized under North Carolina law.” Arnold v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, No. COA16-573, 2017 WL 1382212, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017) (unpublished table decision). Thus, a breach of contract claim requires more than an allegation that “the education was not good enough.” Ryan, 128 N.C. App. at 302, 494 S.E.2d at 791. Courts applying North Carolina law have repeatedly rejected inquiries “into the nuances of educational processes,” id., recognizing that “not all aspects of the student/university relationship are subject to a contract remedy.” McFadyen, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 982. 20 Here, Plaintiffs’ breach of contract allegations would require exactly this forbidden inquiry. Plaintiffs allege that CSL offered to provide Plaintiffs with “a rigorous curriculum that was created to insure that students were equipped with practical skills that would allow them to thrive in a professional setting” and “that those students admitted to CSL possessed the capabilities of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education.” (LSAC ¶¶ 81-82.) These allegations are the quintessence of vague “nuances of the educational processes.” Ryan, 128 N.C. App. at 302, 494 S.E. 2d at 791. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’ invitation to 20 Courts do not recognize educational malpractice claims for many reasons, including that an alleged educational deficiency can be caused by complex and myriad factors other than the conduct of the school or teacher, the “sheer number of claims that could arise” if the cause of action were recognized, and the courts’ reluctance to “oversee[] the day-to-day operations of schools.” Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 12 of 37 13 ignore the case law and make a judgment regarding the quality of its education and admission practices. This is exactly the type of educational malpractice claim that North Carolina courts and others throughout the country 21 routinely refuse to hear. B. Plaintiffs Do Not Allege A Cognizable Breach of Contract Claim. To state a cognizable claim for breach of contract, the allegations must satisfy the pleading requirements, including “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Further, for breach of contract claims, the allegations regarding the terms of a contract must be “‘definite and certain or capable of being made so’ such that the parties ‘assent to the same thing, in the same sense.’” McFadyen, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (citation omitted). Failure to allege the “specific contract terms which were breached by Defendants” “obviously fall[s] far short of the line of ‘plausibility of entitle[ment] to relief.’” 22 In the higher education setting, a student must point to a “specific promise” about which a court can make an “objective assessment” without evaluating the “nuances of educational processes” to state a claim for breach of contract. Ryan, 128 N.C. App. at 302, 494 S.E.2d at 791. 21 See, e.g., Cavaliere v. Duff’s Bus. Inst., 413 Pa. Super. 357, 368, 605 A.2d 397, 403 (1992) (affirming dismissal of contract claim alleging that school provided inadequate instruction because such claims “for educational malpractice, whether framed in terms of tort or breach of contract” are not recognized); Lawrence v. Lorain Cty. Cmty. Coll., 127 Ohio App. 3d 546, 713 N.E.2d 478 (1998) (affirming dismissal of claims, including violation of state consumer practices act and breach of contract, by former student alleging that school provided a substandard education); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 89 A.D.2d 85, 94, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 874 (App. Div. 1982) (dismissing fraud claims where students could not show that school made any “statements of fact capable of proof” about the quality of the education). 22 Page v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 1:12CV900, 2013 WL 4679428, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12CV900, 2013 WL 5462282 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see also Houck v. Lifestore Bank, No. 5:13-CV-66-DSC, 2014 WL 197902, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2014) (“[b]ald assertions” about “improper” conduct were “insufficient” to allege breach of contract). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 13 of 37 14 Plaintiffs’ allegations flunk this pleading test for at least three reasons. First, Plaintiffs do not identify any written contract (let alone attach it to the Complaint) and provide no meaningful substance (or even the date) of any such alleged agreement. (LSAC ¶¶ 81-84.) The reason for such obfuscation is that the contractual promises Plaintiffs allege do not exist. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations contain no factual content of any “specific promises” about the quality of education, ABA accreditation, or a “rigorous curriculum.” Because none of the alleged promises upon which Plaintiffs rely appear in any material Plaintiffs cite, their breach of contract claims must fail. See, e.g., Rouse, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 682-83 (rejecting breach of contract allegation because it relied on a provision that was not incorporated into any specific agreement with Plaintiff). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ vague references to CSL’s “public statements” and “publications” (LSAC ¶¶ 81-82) are wholly ineffectual to state a contract claim. Not only do they fail to recite any promises of future conduct, North Carolina courts have repeatedly rejected nearly identical contract claims based on such materials. 23 Second, the impossibly broad contractual provision Plaintiffs allege was contained in the “contract”— i.e., that the Defendants agreed to provide Plaintiffs “with an education at and a degree from an accredited law school that complied with all [of the literally hundreds of] ABA Standards”— is implausible. (LSAC ¶ 81 (emphasis added); see LSAC ¶ 41 (inaccurately alleging that CSL represented that it “would remain in full compliance with each and every standard required by the ABA”).) See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (claim must be 23 See, e.g., McFadyen, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (“A general policy . . . does not provide any indication of any mutual agreement between [the school] and the students”); Giuliani v. Duke Univ., 1:08CV502, 2010 WL 1292321, at *7-8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2010) (dismissing contract claims based on student handbook); Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. Of Bus., No. 10-234, 2010 WL 3419568, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2010) (“Vague or aspirational statements cannot form the basis for an enforceable agreement” and “school publications are not generally a valid source of contract.”); Love v. Duke Univ., 776 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (“academic bulletin is not a binding contract.”), aff’d, 959 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 14 of 37 15 “plausible on its face”). CSL goes to great lengths to comply with hundreds of ABA Standards, including highly technical ones like Standard 311(b) requiring the school to place a particular signed statement in a student’s file if the student does not complete the program within 84 months. But it is simply not plausible that CSL intended to assume a contractual obligation to each student to conform at all times to each of these hundreds of obligations, many of which are far too vague for contract enforcement (e.g., “rigorous curriculum”). 24 Third, all the contract claims against Sterling Partners L.P., Sterling Capital Partners GMBH & Co. KG, Holding, and InfiLaw must be dismissed because there is no allegation that any Defendant (other than CSL) entered into any contract with Plaintiffs. (LSAC ¶¶ 81-84.) C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Arising Prior To November 14, 2016 Are Barred Because No Alleged Breach Occurred Prior To That Date. Even if Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims stated a cognizable cause of action (which they do not), Rivera and McCoy’s claims fail because they were not CSL students when the alleged breach accrued. Although (consistent with Plaintiffs’ vague pleading) they do not specify when the alleged breach occurred, the Complaint suggests that the breach could have occurred no earlier than November 14, 2016, when the Council issued its final decision that CSL was “‘not in compliance’” with certain ABA Standards. (LSAC ¶ 30.) Rivera graduated in May 2015 and McCoy graduated in May 2016, after CSL completed its performance of any alleged obligations but before any alleged breach occurred. (LSAC ¶¶ 53, 60.) D. The Voluntary Payment Doctrine Bars Plaintiffs’ Claims. North Carolina recognizes that “‘voluntary payment of money by a person who has full knowledge of all the facts cannot be recovered.’” Johnson v. Sprint Sols., Inc., No. 3:08-CV- 24 Also, it is highly implausible that, if a contract did exist, it imposed an obligation for CSL to grant a degree without a reciprocal promise of student performance, such as attending class or earning passing grades. Yet, Plaintiffs nowhere allege counter performance in the Complaint. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 15 of 37 16 00054, 2008 WL 2949253, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 29, 2008) (quoting Guerry v. American Trust Co., 234 N.C. 644, 647, 68 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1951)), aff’d on other grounds, 357 F. App’x 561 (4th Cir. 2009). Importantly, “where the means of knowledge or information is in reach of the [plaintiff] but the [plaintiff] neglects to obtain it,” the plaintiff is charged with knowledge. Johnson, 2008 WL 2949253, at *2. Here, Plaintiffs either knew or had access to all the information necessary to have paid their tuition “with full knowledge of the facts,” thus barring their claims under the voluntary payment doctrine. Plaintiffs’ core breach of contract allegations fall into two categories. First, Plaintiffs complain that CSL did not provide to them “a rigorous curriculum” that would enable them to succeed professionally. (LSAC ¶¶ 81, 84.) However, Plaintiffs, who had matriculated well prior to the ABA’s findings (LSAC ¶¶ 53, 60), knew about the quality of the curriculum first-hand because they had attended the classes, and, moreover, had access to the 509 Reports on CSL graduates’ bar passage rates as well as to CSL’s Employment Summary reports on post- graduation jobs. Second, Plaintiffs complain that CSL’s admission standards were not “in accordance with ABA standards” because admitted applicants did not possess the “capabilities of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education and being admitted to the bar.” (LSAC ¶¶ 82, 84.) However, statistics regarding CSL’s entering classes, such as for UGPAs and LSAT scores, were likewise publicly available through 509 Reports. Since Plaintiffs could easily have viewed this information themselves, they are charged with “full knowledge” of CSL’s admissions standards when they applied and agreed to attend CSL. 25 See Johnson, 2008 WL 25 See, e.g., CSL’s 509 Report for 2016, available at http://www.charlottelaw.edu/userfiles/files/2016%20Charlotte%20Std509InfoReport_12.15.2016 .pdf (disclosing admissions information); ABA Required Disclosures website, available at http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org (online repository of 509 Reports). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 16 of 37 17 2949253, at *2 (charging plaintiff with knowledge “where the means of knowledge or information is in reach of the paying party but the party neglects to obtain it”). 26 III. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing (Count IV). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “only arises where a party to a contract performs its contractual obligations in bad faith.” Devlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:12-CV-000388-MR, 2014 WL 1155415, at *10 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2014), aff'd, 585 F. App’x 171 (4th Cir. 2014); see Suntrust Mortg., Inc. v. Busby, 651 F. Supp. 2d 472, 487 (W.D.N.C. 2009). “In the absence of an enforceable contract, the parties cannot have an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Giuliani, 2010 WL 1292321, at *9. A plaintiff may assert a claim for breach of the implied covenant independently from a breach of contract claim only if the implied covenant claim is supported by allegations unique to that claim. 27 If “the same factual allegations support both claims,” then “the stand-alone breach of the covenant claim” must be dismissed. City Grill, 2014 WL 1429552, at *5; see Ada Liss Grp. v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 06CV610, 2010 WL 3910433, at *14 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2010) (same). To state an implied covenant claim independent of a contract claim, North Carolina 26 To the extent Plaintiffs’ minimal allegations may be deemed to suggest an implied contract claim (LSAC ¶ 83), that claim fails for all the reasons set forth above with respect to its express contract claim. See Marlen C. Robb & Son Boatyard & Marina, Inc. v. Vessel Bristol, 893 F. Supp. 526, 538 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (requiring the “same elements” for an implied contract as an express one). The implied contract claim further fails because Plaintiffs allege the “same representations” to support both the express and implied contract claims. Mancuso v. Burton Farm Dev. Co. LLC, 229 N.C. App. 531, 536-37, 748 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2013) (the existence of an express contract precludes “an implied contract for the same thing existing at the same time”). 27 See City Grill Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:12-CV-610-F, 2014 WL 1429552, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2014); Meineke Car Care Ctrs., Inc. v. RLB Holdings, LLC, No. 3:08cv240-RJC, 2009 WL 2461953, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 2009) (dismissing good faith and fair dealing claims because they were duplicative of breach of contract claims), rev’d on other grounds, 423 F. App’x 274 (4th Cir. 2011). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 17 of 37 18 courts also require a “special relationship” between the plaintiff and defendant that establishes a unique duty that defendant owes plaintiff. Meineke, 2009 WL 2461953, at *10. Plaintiffs’ implied covenant claim fails for four reasons. First, it must be dismissed for all the reasons that the breach of contract claim fails. As established above, Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of a valid promise under which any duty of good faith or fair dealing could arise. See supra, Argument, Section II; Giuliani, 2010 WL 1292321, at *9. 28 Second, Plaintiffs’ “threadbare” and “conclusory” claim (Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) that Defendants deliberately and in bad faith indulged in a self-inflicted violation of its accreditor’s standards subjecting it to probation is completely implausible. Such baseless recitals do not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Third, where the implied covenant claim is based on allegations duplicative of the breach of contract claim, it must be dismissed. See City Grill Hosp. Grp., 2014 WL 1429552, at *5 (dismissing duplicative allegations); Ada Liss Grp., 2010 WL 3910433, at *14. Plaintiffs’ minimal allegations fail to allege any facts supporting a breach of an implied covenant independent from their allegations of breach of contract. Indeed, the only harm alleged is that they “suffer[ed] damages for breach of contract.” (LSAC ¶ 88.) Fourth, Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege any kind of “special relationship” that would support an independent claim for breaching an implied covenant. See Meineke, 2009 WL 2461953, at *10 (listing categories of special relationships). Indeed, North Carolina courts have explicitly rejected any fiduciary relationship between a school and its students. 29 28 See also Bethel v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 1:09CV613, 2010 WL 3242651, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (dismissing claim based on non-contractual employee handbook); Devlin, 2014 WL 1155415, at *11 (implied covenant does not exist without “contractual duty”). 29 See, e.g, Ryan v. Univ. of N.C. Hosps., 168 N.C. App. 729, *4, 609 S.E.2d 498, *4 (2005) (rejecting the imposition of a fiduciary duty in the “academic setting”); McCants v. Nat’l Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 18 of 37 19 IV. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Intentional Misrepresentation (Count VI). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “intentionally misrepresented its ABA compliance status” causing damages to Plaintiffs. (LSAC ¶¶ 92-94.) To plead a fraud claim under North Carolina law, Plaintiffs must allege a false representation of material fact, made with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to deceive, which the Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon, causing them injury. Caper Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 578 F. App’x. 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2014); Fernandez Cmty. Ctr., LLC v. Toshiba Bus. Sols. (USA), No. 5:14-Civ.-692-F, 2015 WL 5054463, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2015). Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for multiple reasons. A. Plaintiffs’ Conclusory Allegations Violate Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs’ fraud claim is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. The required particularity obligates Plaintiffs to “at a minimum, describe the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Fernandez Cmty. Ctr., 2015 WL 5054463, at *3 (quoting United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2008)); Holland v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 5:14-cv-00176-MOC, 2015 WL 1432458, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2015) (dismissing fraud claim because “plaintiffs do not allege the time or place of the concealment or omission, or specifically allege which party concealed the fact that their loan would be securitized”). Plaintiffs fail to meet the particularity standard for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ vague allegations are insufficient to state a claim against any Defendant because they fail to allege—much less plead with particularity—any of the specifics regarding the purported Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732, 749 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (finding no fiduciary relationship exists because “North Carolina courts have been reluctant to extend the concept of fiduciary relationships to the academic setting”); J.W. v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:11- CV-707-D, 2012 WL 4425439, at *14 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2012) (same). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 19 of 37 20 misstatements, including the contents of the misstatements, the speaker, and the time and place in which the misstatements were made. See Fernandez Cmty. Ctr., 2015 WL 5054463, at *3 (plaintiff must state the “who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud”). Plaintiffs fail to allege the most basic factual information regarding their claim. 30 Indeed, unlike Count VI (unconscionability), the fraud count does not incorporate any of the preceding allegations in the Complaint. Thus, the only operative allegation is the wholly threadbare assertion that “CSL intentionally misrepresented its ABA compliance status” in various unspecified materials. (LSAC ¶ 92.) See Zuzul v. McDonald, 98 F. Supp. 3d 852, 869 n.15 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for retaliation because court refused to consider “allegations [that] arise in [plaintiff’s] defamation count and are not incorporated into her [retaliation] counts”). 31 This allegation is woefully insufficient to meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements. 32 Second, “where multiple defendants are asked to respond to allegations of fraud, the complaint should inform each defendant of the nature of his alleged participation in the fraud.” 30 Defendants may wish to challenge, for example, the content or alleged falsity of the purported misstatements. Without the specifics regarding each representation, Defendants are unable to formulate an appropriate response to Plaintiffs’ allegations. See Nixon v. Alan Vester Auto Group, Inc., No. 1:07CV839, 2008 WL 4544369, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2008) (“‘The primary purpose of Rule 9(b) is to afford defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the factual ground upon which it is based.’”) (quoting Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1990)). 31 See also Hinton v. Trans Union, LLC, 654 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“incorporation by reference under Rule 10(c) ‘must be direct and explicit, in order to enable the responding party to ascertain the nature and extent of the incorporation.’”) (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1326 (3d ed. 2004)), aff’d, 382 F. App’x 256 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-Wide Auto. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412, 425 (D.N.J. 1960) (“In view of plaintiff’s specific incorporation by reference of certain allegations in the complaint, the non-incorporation of other allegations demonstrates an intent not to make the latter a part thereof.”). 32 The remainder of the Complaint, even though not incorporated by reference, is equally devoid of the required specificity. See LSAC ¶¶ 2, 17, 23, 32. In a single averment, Plaintiffs allege that CSL misrepresented its accreditation and ABA compliance status on its “website,” in its “advertising,” and in “public statements.” (LSAC ¶ 37.) This allegation is far too general to sustain a fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim. See Fernandez Cmty. Ctr., 2015 WL 5054463, at *3. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 20 of 37 21 Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 197 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (quoting Andrews v. Fitzgerald, 823 F. Supp. 356, 373 (M.D.N.C. 1993)). 33 Although Plaintiffs’ conclusory fraud claim against all Defendants must be dismissed for the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ fraud count against Holding and InfiLaw (as well as the Sterling entities) must also be dismissed for the additional reason that Plaintiffs’ (patently insufficient) fraud allegations are directed solely against CSL. 34 Plaintiffs make no substantive allegations of fraud with regard to any of the other Defendants; instead they conclusorily allege that “[t]he defendants . . . were, at all relevant times, joint active participants[] in the illegal conduct.” (LSAC ¶¶ 96-100.) Lumping all the Defendants together and hoping that allegations against one will carry the rest is insufficient to allege fraud and violates Rule 9(b). B. The Economic Loss Rule Bars Plaintiffs’ Fraud Claim. The economic loss rule also bars Plaintiffs’ fraud claim. Under this rule, the same conduct allegedly breaching a contract cannot also serve as the basis for a fraud claim. Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-275-D, 2011 WL 1134453, at *4-5 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 25, 2011) (economic loss rule provides that “breach of contract claim will not support the assertion of tort claims as well”); Riggs v. Orkin, Inc., No. 7:11-CV-5-D, 2011 WL 2417016, at *2 (E.D.N.C. June 13, 2011) (breach of contract does not give rise to tort claim). 35 33 See Superior Performers, Inc. v. Meaike, No. 1:13CV1149, 2015 WL 3823818, at *5 (M.D.N.C. June 19, 2015) (“The requirement that the identity of each person making the misrepresentation be pled with particularity is especially important in a multi-defendant, or multi-counterclaim defendant case.”). 34 See, e.g., LSAC ¶ 17 (“CSL has aggressively marketed itself as fully accredited.”); ¶ 23 (“CSL marketed itself . . . as fully accredited.”); ¶ 37 (“CSL [advertised] that it was” ABA accredited); and ¶ 92 (“CSL intentionally misrepresented its ABA compliance status.”). 35 See also Strum v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 15 F.3d 327, 329–30 (4th Cir. 1994) (an “attempt to turn a contract dispute into a tort action with an accompanying punitive dimension is inconsistent both with North Carolina law and sound commercial practice”); Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 671 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (same). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 21 of 37 22 Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to misrepresentation (although not incorporated in the fraud claim itself) come squarely within this rule. 36 Plaintiffs allege that:  “[d]espite actual knowledge . . . that its ABA accreditation was in jeopardy, CSL promoted and maintained on its website, in its advertising, and in numerous public statements that it was, in all respects, ABA accredited and compliant” (LSAC ¶ 37); and  CSL “[falsely] claimed that students who were admitted to CSL appeared capable of satisfactorily completing its program and being admitted to the bar” (id.). However, these alleged misrepresentations are at the core of Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants breached a contract with Plaintiffs:  “CSL, through its admissions and public statements and publications, represented that its admission standards were in accordance with ABA standards and that those students admitted to CSL possessed the capabilities of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education and being admitted to the bar” (LSAC ¶ 82); and  “CSL’s actions in failing to fulfill its obligations to maintain its ABA accreditation and operate its school in accordance with the standards set forth by the ABA materially breached the terms of its contract with Plaintiffs and the Class” (LSAC ¶ 84). Under the economic loss rule, the purported breach cannot also serve as the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a separate cause of action for fraud. C. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Reliance Was Neither Plausible Nor Reasonable. Plaintiffs must allege plausible and reasonable reliance, with particularity. Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 198. It is not enough to allege simply that in taking certain actions, a plaintiff relied upon misrepresentations, because a “pleading that only avers the technical elements of fraud does not have sufficient informational context to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b).” Id. 36 Defendants can use these allegations, although not incorporated into the fraud claim, for purposes of attacking Plaintiffs’ claims because they are judicial admissions. See Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir. 1994) (“‘admissions in the pleadings are binding on the parties”) (citation omitted); Yates v. Ford Motor Co., 5:12-CV-752-FL, 2015 WL 3932687, at *3 (E.D.N.C. June 26, 2015) (“[D]efendants may rely upon factual allegations in the complaint as judicial admissions.”). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 22 of 37 23 In the Complaint, Plaintiffs merely allege—in the most conclusory way—that they relied upon CSL’s material false representations. (LSAC ¶ 93.) Plaintiffs offer no facts describing the content of the purported misstatements, where the misstatements were published, when and where the Plaintiffs reviewed them, and how they relied upon the misstatements to their detriment. Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 198 (“Dismissal of a fraud claim is proper where reasonable reliance has not been pleaded with particularity.”) (citing Learning Works, Inc. v. Learning Annex, Inc., 830 F.2d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 1987)). In addition, “the recipient of a representation must use reasonable care to ascertain the truth of that representation in order to reasonably rely on the same.” Caper Corp., 578 F. App’x at 281; see Vigus v. Milton A. Latta & Sons Dairy Farms, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 233, 676 S.E.2d 669 (2009) (reliance was “unreasonable” where plaintiffs “had notice” and “failed to further investigate”). Here, Plaintiffs’ fraud claim fails because they also have not alleged the requisite diligence. The Complaint makes no mention of any inquiry into the truth of CSL’s alleged misstatements. For example, Plaintiffs allege that CSL misinformed them about its accreditation and compliance status. (LSAC ¶¶ 92-93.) But they also allege that the school disclosed to students that the ABA “noted a few areas that ‘could be strengthened.’” (LSAC ¶ 35.) Wholly lacking in the fraud count are allegations that Plaintiffs made any effort to obtain further detail on the ABA’s findings, what areas needed “strengthening,” or that such efforts necessarily would have been unsuccessful. Further, with respect to Plaintiffs’ allegations that CSL misrepresented its compliance with ABA Standards (LSAC ¶ 92), such as maintaining a rigorous curriculum and admitting students capable of completing school and being admitted to the bar, Plaintiffs had ample ability to evaluate the alleged failures. They had experienced first-hand CSL’s curriculum, and Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 23 of 37 24 information regarding entering student UGPAs and LSAT scores for CSL and every other law school in the country is available in the publicly available 509 Reports (Ex. 1). Thus, their alleged reliance was neither plausible nor reasonable as a matter of law. D. Plaintiffs’ Causation Allegations Fail. Plaintiffs also must allege with particularity that the fraudulent misrepresentations proximately caused their injuries. See Cananwill, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 250 B.R. 533, 558 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (“loss causation requires a showing ‘that [such] misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic harm.’”) (quoting Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 360 (4th Cir. 1996)). 37 Plaintiffs fail to allege a direct causal link between CSL’s purported misrepresentations and omissions and Plaintiffs’ injuries. Indeed, despite the ABA’s finding of noncompliance, CSL has maintained full ABA accreditation, and no students were forced to transfer schools, delay their education, retake classes, or take on more loans than necessary as a result of the ABA’s findings. Rather, it was the Department’s decision not to recertify CSL’s participation in the federal student aid programs that actually caused Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. See LSAC ¶ 31 (students “previously eligible for federal student loans to pay all or some of the cost of attending CSL are no longer eligible”). 38 V. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Negligent Misrepresentation (Count V). To plead a claim for negligent misrepresentation, Plaintiffs would have to allege, with particularity, that they reasonably relied on false information prepared without reasonable care, 37 See also Zutel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-CV-3656 RRM VMS, 2014 WL 4700022, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014) (“Rule 9(b) ‘applies to . . . causation.’”) (citation omitted); Pa. Emp., Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478 (D. Del. 2010) (same). 38 Furthermore, the Department’s action was unprecedented and unforeseeable. As noted above, the Department had never previously declined to recertify a law school based on an ABA probation action and, indeed, here the ABA’s probationary period, designed to allow CSL to come into compliance, had not expired before the Department took the denial action. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 24 of 37 25 by a party that owed them a duty of care. Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin, 147 N.C. App. 52, 60, 554 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2001); Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 202 (Rule 9(b) applies to negligent misrepresentation). Plaintiffs’ cursory negligent misrepresentation claim merely alleges that “CSL misrepresented its ABA accreditation compliance status . . . .” (LSAC ¶ 90.) Thus, as with their intentional fraud claim, Plaintiffs fail to allege with particularity (i) negligent misrepresentations; (ii) reasonable reliance (including due diligence); and (iii) causation. They also fail to plead that Defendants lacked care in preparing statements for Plaintiffs. See Oberlin Capital, L.P., 147 N.C. App. at 58, 554 S.E.2d at 846 (negligent misrepresentation requires reliance on a representation prepared without reasonable care) (citing Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 206, 367 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1988)). VI. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Unjust Enrichment (Count II). To plead unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) one party conferred a benefit upon the other party; (2) the benefit was not ‘conferred officiously . . .’; (3) the benefit was not gratuitous; (4) the benefit was measureable; and (5) the defendant consciously accepted the benefit.” Law Offices of John L. Juliano, P.C., v. Jensen, --- Fed. Appx. ---, 2016 WL 7240176, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 15, 2016) (applying North Carolina law). A conclusory or “vague” claim fails to satisfy this standard. Pres. Prof’l Servs., LLC, No. 3:14-cv-589-RJC-DCK, 2015 WL 3657463, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 12, 2015); see McManus v. GMRI, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-009-DCK, 2012 WL 2577420, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 3, 2012) (same). In this case, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed for at least five reasons. First, under North Carolina law, an unjust enrichment claim fails where a Plaintiff pleads that an express contract exists. See Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 436, 446 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because counterclaimant “allege[d] there [was] an express contract between the parties” so it “cannot Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 25 of 37 26 now claim the existence of an implied contract”). 39 Here, Plaintiffs cannot maintain an action for unjust enrichment because they claim an express contract exists. (LSAC ¶¶ 81-85.) Second, the unjust enrichment claim is actually an educational malpractice claim, which courts in North Carolina and around the country do not recognize, as shown above. See supra, Argument, Section II(A). Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment allegation that CSL did not “adequately and fully disclose[] its ABA accreditation status” (LSAC ¶ 79) concerns whether Defendants satisfied the ABA Standards, such as whether it maintained a “rigorous curriculum,” thus requiring an impermissible inquiry into the “nuances of [CSL’s] educational processes.” Ryan, 128 N.C. App. at 302, 494 S.E.2d at 791. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ attempt to cast their educational malpractice claim as one for unjust enrichment must be rejected. 40 Third, Plaintiffs base this claim on their conclusory allegation that “Defendants derived a financial benefit in the form of students choosing to enroll and/or stay enrolled at CSL” as a result of Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations. (LSAC ¶ 79.) However, Plaintiffs again merely lump all Defendants together. There is no plausible allegation regarding how the parent and grandparent Defendants (InfiLaw and Holding, respectively) received any benefit. 41 Fourth, there is no unjust enrichment where a benefit is given officiously, that is to say, without “solicit[ation] or induce[ment].” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:07-CV-86, 2007 WL 4233317, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2007) (dismissing unjust enrichment 39 North Carolina courts apply this rule because an unjust enrichment claim is “not based on a promise,” so where a contract is alleged to exist, “the contract governs the claim and the law will not imply a contract.” Se. Shelter Corp. v. BTU, Inc., 154 N.C. App. 321, 330, 572 S.E.2d 200, 206 (2002). 40 See, e.g., Brodsky v. Mead Sch. For Human Dev., No. DNX05CV970156788S, 1999 WL 391580, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 4, 1999) (striking unjust enrichment claim requiring court to examine “the quality and value of services [the school] provided in return” for tuition); see also Bittle v. Okla. City Univ., 6 P.3d 509, 514-15 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000). 41 See, e.g., N.C. Joint Underwriting Ass’n v. Long, No. 7:06-CV-28-WW, 2008 WL 320150, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2008) (indirect benefit did not constitute unjust enrichment). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 26 of 37 27 claim because “[a]bsent such inducement or solicitation, Defendants are simply not liable for unjust enrichment, even if they did benefit from [plaintiff]’s actions”); see Homeq v. Watkins, 154 N.C. App. 731, 733, 572 S.E.2d 871, 873 (2002) (same); Krawiec v. Manly, No. 15 CVS 1927, 2016 WL 374734, at *18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2016) (same). Since Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants actively recruited them to attend CSL, this claim must be dismissed. 42 Fifth, Plaintiffs must allege that the benefit conferred gave rise to “a legal or equitable obligation on the part of the defendant to account for the benefits received.” Homeq, 154 N.C. App. at 733, 572 S.E.2d at 873 (quoting Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 390, 417, 537 S.E.2d 248, 266 (2000)). Here, CSL did account for the tuition (i.e., the benefit) it received. 43 CSL’s obligation was to provide an education to Plaintiffs, and it did so in exchange for Plaintiffs’ tuition. (LSAC ¶¶ 39, 44, 51, 60.) Thus, Plaintiffs “received the benefit of what [they] paid for,” and Defendants’ acceptance of Plaintiffs’ tuition cannot be unjust. VII. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Violation Of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (Count I). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 codifies North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”). To establish a violation of the UDTPA, “a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting 42 Plaintiffs’ voluntary payment of tuition also defeats the element that the benefit must not be provided “officiously.” It evinces that Plaintiffs acted affirmatively. See, e.g., Estate of Johnson v. Johnsonów, 796 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (unjust enrichment judgment for defendant affirmed because plaintiff’s donation “was made voluntarily”); Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. Yerby, 215 N.C. App. 124, 133, 715 S.E.2d 513, 520 (2011) (same). 43 See Gerboc v. ContextLogic, Inc., No. 1:16 CV 928, 2016 WL 6563684, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2016) (appeal filed Dec. 20, 2016) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim where Plaintiff paid the listed purchase price for speakers and received them even though defendant’s “Website, which made it appear as though [plaintiff] was getting a great deal, was fictitious” because plaintiff “received the benefit of what he paid for”); Augustson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 864 F. Supp. 2d 422, 439 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim where complaint did not “plausibly allege circumstances creating a legal or equitable obligation for [defendant] to account for a benefit” because “plaintiffs received the loan at the interest rate that each agreed to pay”). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 27 of 37 28 commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656-57, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001). The UDTPA claim fails for several reasons. A. The UDTPA Claim Fails Because It Falls With The Intentional Misrepresentation Claim. Where an independent fraud claim is asserted (like Plaintiffs’ intentional misrepresentation claim), a UDTPA claim based on that fraud rises and falls with the fraud claim. See Silverdeer, LLC v. Berton, No. 11 CVS 3539, 2013 WL 1792524, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2013) (“On its face, Plaintiffs’ Chapter 75 claim is derivative of their other Claims, specifically the fraud claims, and therefore rises and falls with those Claims.”); Atkinson v. Omtron USA, LLC, No. 1:11CV910, 2012 WL 12887700, at *4 (M.D.N.C. May 30, 2012) (“Because the fraud claim was found inadequate, it cannot serve as the basis of a Chapter 75-1.1 claim.”). Here, Plaintiffs base their UDTPA claim solely on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by Defendants. (LSAC ¶¶ 73-74.) As previously discussed, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a claim for fraud. See supra, Argument, Section IV. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ “derivative” UDTPA claim must fail. Silverdeer, 2013 WL 1792524, at *10. B. This Court Should Apply The Rule 9(b) Particularity Requirements To Plaintiffs’ UDTPA Claim. Additionally, the UDTPA claim fails because its allegations are insufficient. Defendants acknowledge there is a split of authority over whether Rule 9(b) applies to UDTPA claims based upon fraud. Compare Topshelf Mgmt., Inc. v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 722, 727-32 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (applying Rule 9(b) to fraud-based UDTPA claims) with CBP Res., Inc. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 733, 739 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (determining Rule 9(b) does not apply to fraud-based UDTPA claims). However, this Court should adopt the better-reasoned analysis of the more recent Topshelf Management, likewise the rule in many other states. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 28 of 37 29 In Topshelf Management, the court applied the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) to the plaintiff’s UDTPA claim because the claim was predicated on “precisely the same alleged misrepresentations” as the plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Topshelf Management, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 731. In explaining its decision, the court stated: To treat the two claims with two different pleading standards would permit [plaintiff] to bring a disguised fraud claim without putting [defendant] on notice of the “particular circumstances” of its claim and without having to show “substantial prediscovery evidence” of these circumstances. Id. The rationale articulated in Topshelf Management is equally applicable here. Thus, the Court should evaluate Plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim under Rule 9(b). C. Plaintiffs’ Claim Fails To Meet Rule 9(b)’s Particularity Requirements. As shown above, Rule 9(b) requires that the plaintiff plead with particularity “the time, place, and contents of the false representations,” “the identity of the person making the representation[,] and what such person obtained thereby.” Bishop v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. CIV 106CV355, 2007 WL 959524, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2007); see supra, Argument, Section IV(A). Like the misrepresentation allegations, the UDTPA allegations do not meet this standard. Plaintiffs fail to identify what Defendants did individually, instead defining them collectively as “Defendants” (LSAC ¶ 74), and fail to identify the specific contents of any alleged false statement, referring generally to “communications and publications” (LSAC ¶ 73). Further, Plaintiffs bare-boned causation allegation fail to provide the requisite particularity. D. Plaintiffs Cannot Predicate Their UDTPA Claim On A Breach. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ UDTPA count is premised on the alleged contractual breach rather than the alleged fraud, the claim also must fail. In North Carolina, “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 29 of 37 30 N.C. Gen .Stat. § 75–1.1.” Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Thompson, 107 N.C. App. 53, 62, 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (1992). 44 Here, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation of deception and misrepresentation does not convert their contract claim into a UDTPA claim. US LEC Commc’ns, Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., No. 3:05-CV-00011, 2006 WL 1367383, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 15, 2006) (UDTPA claim requires that “‘substantial aggravating circumstances’ must be present” beyond contractual breach) (quoting United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir. 1981)). Consequently, the UDTPA claim must be dismissed. VIII. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Unconscionability (Count VII). Plaintiffs purport to state a claim for unconscionability, alleging the amount Plaintiffs paid in tuition and fees was unconscionable as a matter of law because of Defendants’ alleged conduct. (LSAC ¶ 95.) However, under North Carolina law, “unconscionability is an affirmative defense,” not an independent cause of action. Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 102, 655 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2008); Raper v. Oliver House, LLC, 180 N.C. App. 414, 419, 637 S.E.2d 551, 554-55 (2006) (same); Goldstein v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:09cv329, 2010 WL 1252641, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 19, 2010) (J. Mullen) (“[N]o federal or state court has recognized such a claim [for unconscionability] under North Carolina law.”), aff’d, No. 1:09cv329, 2010 WL 1252629 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 24, 2010). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ unconscionability claim must be dismissed. 45 44 The rationale is that it is “unlikely that an independent tort could arise in the course of contractual performance, since those sorts of claims are most appropriately addressed by asking simply whether a party adequately fulfilled its contractual obligations.” Se. Shelter Corp, 154 N.C. App. at 330, 572 S.E.2d at 206 (citations and quotations omitted); see Bob Timberlake Collection, Inc. v. Edwards, 176 N.C. App. 33, 42, 626 S.E.2d 315, 323 (2006). 45 See Goldstein, 2010 WL 1252641, at *8 (recommending dismissal of cause of action for “‘[u]nconscionability’ [which] has never been recognized as [a] free-standing claim under North Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 30 of 37 31 IX. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Joint Tortfeasor Liability (Count VIII). Plaintiffs’ joint tortfeasor claim must be dismissed for at least three reasons. First, North Carolina does not recognize liability theories as independent causes of action. Bond v. Rexel, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-122, 2011 WL 1578502, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 26, 2011) (dismissing vicarious liability claim with prejudice because it is “a derivative method of assigning liability to a party,” “not a stand-alone cause of action”); Kargarian v. AutoZoners, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-144- MOC-DSC, 2012 WL 4753301, at *10 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2012) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12cv144, 2012 WL 4753300 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 4, 2012). Here, Plaintiffs assert joint tortfeasor liability against Defendants as a stand-alone claim. (LSAC ¶¶ 96-100.) Plaintiffs cannot do so as a matter of law. Second, because as established above, all the “underlying torts fail as a matter of law,” a claim of joint tortfeasor liability is of “no worth.” Bond, 2011 WL 1578502, at *9 (vicarious liability is “of no worth” when underlying torts fail). 46 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ joint tortfeasor claim should be dismissed with prejudice. Third, Plaintiffs are essentially asking the Court to pierce the corporate veil of CSL’s parent (InfiLaw) and grandparent (Holding) (collectively defined in the Complaint as “InfiLaw” (LSAC ¶ 18)), but have failed to allege the necessary elements. 47 North Carolina permits the Carolina common law”); Skeels v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:09CV335-MU, 2010 WL 143679, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2010) (J. Mullen) (summarily dismissing claim for “unconscionability” because “such a claim is not viable under North Carolina law”). 46 See also Henderson v. Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (finding a claim for joint and several liability “fails as a matter of law” when all “substantive tort claims” are dismissed); Dost v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-00270-ST, 2011 WL 6794028, at *9 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 2011) (“If there is no independent tort, then joint liability under an aiding and abetting or civil conspiracy theory will not lie.”). 47 Sterling Partners L.P. and Sterling Capital Partners GMBH & Co. KG, as well as Holding, are submitting separate briefs demonstrating that Plaintiffs’ veil piercing allegations are meritless, which are incorporated herein by reference. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 31 of 37 32 corporate veil to be pierced only when a plaintiff shows that: (1) the corporate parent exercised complete domination “so that the corporate entity . . . had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own”; (2) this control was used to commit legal harm; and (3) this control proximately caused the injury complained of. Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 455, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330 (1985); see Richmond v. Indalex Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (M.D.N.C. 2004). Here, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to allege (and could not plausibly allege) that either InfiLaw or Holding exercised complete domination over CSL or that CSL is a “mere instrumentality” of InfiLaw or Holding. Rather, Plaintiffs’ only allegation is that InfiLaw “jointly own[s], operate[s], manage[s] and control[s] CSL” and is “responsible for the Career Counseling and Career Development departments at the CSL and employed CSL students and faculty to work on behalf of CSL.” (LSAC ¶ 18.) This one conclusory allegation is legally insufficient to state a basis for veil piercing. See, e.g., Richmond, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (holding plaintiff failed to allege corporate defendant exercised complete domination and control where plaintiff alleged only that defendant “owned, controlled and operated” subsidiary defendant and “shared joint ownership, possession, management and control over the facilities, equipment and operation”); Synovus Bank v. Coleman, 887 F. Supp. 2d 659, 676 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (finding “mere ownership” is not enough to “render a parent corporation liable for the acts of its subsidiary”); Blue Ridge Pediatric & Adolescent Med., Inc. v. First Colony Healthcare, LLC, No. 11 CVS 127, 2012 WL 4714497, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012) (holding plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the corporate veil should be pierced where plaintiffs merely alleged that affiliates occupied the same office, shared employees, and were insolvent). InfiLaw and Holding’s alleged participation in CSL’s Career Counseling is not enough to provide a basis for concluding that it has exercised “complete domination” over CSL. Plaintiffs Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 32 of 37 33 have offered no facts to support that CSL, InfiLaw, and Holding had “no separate mind, will, or existence”; indeed, Plaintiffs cannot offer facts to support this because CSL, InfiLaw and Holding are three separate entities. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil, and the Court should dismiss this count. 48 X. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Punitive Damages (Count IX). Plaintiffs’ stand-alone claim for punitive damages also must be dismissed with prejudice. First, “punitive damages do not and cannot exist as an independent cause of action.” Iadanza v. Harper, 169 N.C. App. 776, 783, 611 S.E.2d 217, 223 (2005); see Funderburk v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 775 S.E.2d 1, 8 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (same). Second, as shown above, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for an underlying “independent tort,” as required under North Carolina law. See Strum v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 15 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing North Carolina courts require (1) an “identifiable” tort and (2) “an aggravating element such as malice or recklessness” to award punitive damages). 49 Third, even if the Complaint plausibly pled an independent tort (which it does not), it fails to make any well-pleaded factual allegations of aggravating circumstances. See Taha v. Thompson, 120 N.C. App. 697, 705, 463 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1995) (punitive damages may be awarded only when the tortious conduct has “some element of aggravation,” which “includes fraud, malice, such a degree of negligence as indicates a reckless indifference to consequences, oppression, insult, rudeness, caprice, and willfulness”) (internal quotations omitted). 48 Defendants reserve the right to argue that Delaware law applies to any attempt to pierce the veil of InfiLaw Corporation, a Delaware corporation, but the Court need not address that issue at this time because Plaintiffs’ claims fail under the law of both North Carolina and Delaware. 49 It is well-settled that punitive damages are not available in North Carolina for breach of contract. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 33 of 37 34 Here, Plaintiffs’ claim consists only of the following bare-bones allegations: that Defendants acted “intentionally, recklessly, willfully, wantonly and in disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs” and that the “acts and omissions of Defendants justify” punitive damages. (LSAC ¶¶ 101-02.) These conclusory allegations merely recite the pleading requirements for punitive damages and require dismissal of that claim. See Shugar v. Guill, 51 N.C. App. 466, 470, 277 S.E.2d 126, 130 (1981), modified, 304 N.C. 332, 283 S.E.2d 507 (1981) (a “mere conclusory statement that the wrongful act was advanced in a malicious, wanton, or willful manner is insufficient”); M-Tek Kiosk, Inc. v. Clayton, No. 1:15CV886, 2016 WL 2997505, at *20 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 2016), appeal dismissed (July 19, 2016) (dismissing punitive damages claim for failure to allege both “an underlying [tort] claim” and “egregiously wrongful acts”). Moreover, as established above, there are no aggravating circumstances here because CSL complied with ABA Rules in disclosing the ABA actions. The ABA Rules provide that (except for certain circumstances not relevant here) “site evaluation and fact finding reports” and “decisions and recommendations of the Committee and Council shall be confidential” and not released to the public. ABA Rules 51(a) and 52(a). Further, the ABA Managing Director “stay[ed]” any requirement to disclose any non-compliance findings or remedial action while the appeal was pending. See ABA Directive from B. Currier to CSL dtd. July 24, 2016 (Ex. 4). Fourth, under North Carolina law, punitive damages shall not be awarded against “a corporation” unless “the officers, directors, or managers of the corporation participated in or condoned the conduct constituting the aggravating factor giving rise to punitive damages.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-15(c); see Estrada v. Consol. Util. Servs., Inc., No. 5:10-CV-161-RLV, 2011 WL 2174467, at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 2, 2011). Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege that the officers, directors, or managers of any of the corporate Defendants participated in or condoned the alleged Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 34 of 37 35 wrongful conduct. In fact, the Complaint does not contain a single reference to a specific officer, director or manager of any Defendant. Thus, this claim cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. CONCLUSION For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety with prejudice. This the 21st day of April, 2017. Respectfully submitted, Cooley LLP s/ David E. Mills David E. Mills (admitted pro hac vice) Michael D. Hays (admitted pro hac vice) 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20004 Tel: (202) 776-2865 Fax: (202) 842-7899 Email: dmills@cooley.com mhays@cooley.com Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP s/ Sarah Motley Stone Debbie W. Harden, NCSB No. 10576 Sarah M. Stone, NCSB No. 34117 One Wells Fargo Center, Suite 3500 301 South College Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Tel: (704) 331-4943 Fax: (704) 338-7813 E-mail: dharden@wcsr.com sstone@wcsr.com Johnny M. Loper, NCSB No. 15533 555 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1100 P.O. Box 831 Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 Tel: (919) 755-2116 Fax: (919) 755-6056 E-mail: jloper@wcsr.com Attorneys for Defendants Charlotte School of Law, LLC InfiLaw Corporation, and InfiLaw Holding, LLC Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 35 of 37 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Defendants Charlotte School of Law, LLC, InfiLaw Holding, LLC, and InfiLaw Corporation’s Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim and Exhibits thereto were filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice of case activity to be generated and sent electronically by the Clerk of Court to the following parties registered to receive such service: Amanda A. Mingo Rawls, Scheer, Clary and Mingo, PLLC 1011 E. Morehead Street Suite 300 Charlotte, NC 28204 Tel: 704-376-3200 Fax: 704-332-2716 Email: amingo@rsfmlaw.com Brian Leighton Kinsley Daniel Ray Francis Crumley Roberts 2400 Freeman Mill Road, Ste. 200 Greensboro, NC 27406 Tel: 336-333-9899 Fax: 336-333-9894 Email: blkinsley@crumleyroberts.com Email: drfrancis@crumleyroberts.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs Adam Karl Doerr Robert Evans Harrington Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson 101 N. Tryon St., Ste. 1900 Charlotte, NC 28246 Tel: 704-377-8114 Email: adoerr@rbh.com Nicholas M. Berg Ropes & Gray LLP 191 North Wacker Drive, 32 nd Floor Chicago, IL 60606 Tel: 312-845-1322 Email: Nicholas.Berg@ropesgray.com Peter L. Welsh Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 36 of 37 ii William L. Roberts Ropes & Gray LLP 800 Boylston Street Boston, MA 02199-3600 Tel: 617-854-2283 Email: peter.welsh@ropesgray.com Attorneys for Sterling Partners L.P. and Sterling Capital Partners GMBH & Co. KG This the 21st day of April, 2017. WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE A Limited Liability Partnership /s/ Sarah Motley Stone Attorney for Defendants Charlotte School of Law, LLC, InfiLaw Corporation, and InfiLaw Holding, LLC Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 37 of 37 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00026 RAISSA LEVY, JAMES VILLANUEVA, SHANNA RIVERA, and ANDRÉ MCCOY, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, vs. CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, LLC, INFILAW HOLDING, LLC, INFILAW CORPORATION, STERLING PARTNERS, L.P. and STERLING CAPITAL PARTNERS GMBH & CO. KG, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) APPENDIX INDEX OF EXHIBITS THAT ARE JUDICIALLY NOTICEABLE, INTEGRAL TO THE COMPLAINT, OR OTHERWISE MAY BE CONSIDERED ON A MOTION TO DISMISS Exhibit Page Reference in Motion to Dismiss Document Basis for Court Consideration 1 p. 5, 9, 10, 24 Charlotte School of Law (“CSL”)’s American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standard 509 Information Reports (“509 Reports”) for 2011-2016 (available at http://www.charlottelaw.edu/userfiles/files/20 16%20Charlotte%20Std509InfoReport_12 and http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/) Judicial notice; referenced in Levy Second Amended Complaint (“LSAC”) ¶ 33 and integral to LSAC Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-2 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 2 ii Exhibit Page Reference in Motion to Dismiss Document Basis for Court Consideration 2 p. 5 Excerpts from ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools published in August 2016 (available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba /publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/ 2016_2017_aba_standards_and_rules_of_pro cedure.authcheckdam.pdf) Judicial notice; referenced in and integral to LSAC; see, e.g., LSAC ¶¶ 17, 25- 30, 33-34, 41, 69, 73, 81-82, 84, 87, 92 3 p. 5 Excerpt from “ABA-Approved Law Schools by Year” webpage (available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_ed ucation/resources/aba_approved_law_schools /by_year_approved.html) Judicial notice; referenced in and integral to LSAC, see, e.g., LSAC ¶ 16 4 p. 6, 9, 34 ABA Directive from ABA Managing Director Barry Currier dated July 24, 2016 Referenced in and integral to LSAC; see, e.g., LSAC ¶¶ 1-2, 32, 36, 79, 90 5 p. 6, 7 “Accreditation Archives” webpage (available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_ed ucation/accreditation/accreditation_archives) Judicial notice 6 p. 7 Excerpt from a transcript from a June 22, 2016 hearing of the United States Department of Education, National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (“NACIQI”) (available at https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/archive-of- meetings/) Judicial notice 7 p. 9 CSL Employment Summary Reports, available at http://www.charlottelaw.edu/gainful- employment-aba-required-disclosures.html for years 2013, 2014, and 2015 and previously published for prior years since 2012 Judicial notice; referenced in and integral to LSAC; see, e.g., LSAC ¶¶ 17, 37, 40-41, 45, 52-53, 59- 60, 69 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-2 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 2 Exhibit 1 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 13 The Basics Type of school PRIVATE Term Semester Application deadline 1/25/2012 8/15/201 2 Application fee $ 0 Financial aid deadline Can first year start other than fall? Yes Student faculty ratio 20.12 to 1 # of housing spaces available Restricted to law students 0 Graduate housing for which Law students are eligible 0 Faculty and Administrators Total Men Women Minorities Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Full-Time 36 41 15 18 21 23 12 14 Other Full- Time 3 1 2 1 Deans, librarians & others who teach 6 4 2 3 4 1 3 2 Part-Time 31 42 19 22 12 20 4 6 76 87 37 43 39 44 20 22 CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW 2145 Suttle Avenue Charlotte, NC 28208 Phone : 704-971-8500 Fax : 704-971-8599 Website : charlottelaw.edu 1231231212312312 ABA Approved Since 2008 Curriculum Full-Time Part-Time Typical first-year section size 75 60 Is there typically a "small section" of the first-year class, other than Legal writing, taught by full-time faculty No No If yes,typical size offered last year 0 0 # of class room course titles beyond 1st year curriculum 96 Number of upper division classroom course sections Under 25 72 25 - 49 32 50 - 74 10 75 - 99 11 100+ 2 # of seminars 19 # of seminar positions available 375 # of seminar positions filled 195 63 # of positions available in simulation courses 92 # of simulation position filled 63 21 # of positions available in faculty supervised clinical courses 204 # of faculty supervised clinical positions filled 63 17 # involved in field placements 43 13 # involved in law journals 38 5 # involved in moot court or trial competitions 18 5 # of credit hours required to graduate 90 1 J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity Men Women Full-Time Part-Time First - Year Total J.D. Deg # % # % # % # % # % # % Awrd Hispanics of any race 19 3.5 31 5.1 38 4 12 6.1 24 4.3 50 4.3 4 American Indian or Alaska Native 8 1.5 12 2 18 1.9 2 1 15 2.7 20 1.7 3 Asian 19 3.5 14 2.3 27 2.8 6 3 22 3.9 33 2.9 3 Black or African American 68 12.6 125 20.4 147 15.4 46 23.2 117 20.9 193 16.8 1 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 1 0.2 0 0 1 0.1 0 0 1 0.2 1 0.1 0 Two or more races 2 0.4 6 1 6 0.6 2 1 7 1.2 8 0.7 0 Total Minority 117 21.7 188 30.7 237 24.9 68 34.3 186 33.2 305 26.5 11 White 418 77.7 419 68.4 707 74.2 130 65.7 369 65.9 837 72.7 87 Nonresident Alien 3 0.6 6 1 9 0.9 0 0 5 0.9 9 0.8 0 Race and Ethnicity Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 538 46.7 613 53.3 953 82.8 198 17.2 560 48.7 1,151 100 98 Transfers Transfers In 10 Transfers Out 22 Tuition and Fees Resident Non- Resident Full-Time $ 36,916 $ 36,916 Part-Time $ 29,850 $ 29,850 Tuition Guarantee Program No Living Expenses Estimated Living Expenses for singles Living on Campus Living Off Campus Living at Home $ $ 21,305 $ 21,305 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 13 ABA Approved Since 2008 GPA and LSAT Scores Total Full-Time Part-Time # of apps 3,955 3,605 350 # of offers 2,728 2,512 216 # of matrics 529 446 83 75% GPA 3.31 3.33 3.16 Median GPA 3 3.01 2.92 25% GPA 2.6 2.61 2.53 75% LSAT 151 151 150 Median LSAT 148 149 147 25% LSAT 145 146 143 Grants and Scholarships (from prior year) Total Full-Time Part-Time # % # % # % Total # of students 812 100 669 82.4 143 17.6 Total # receiving grants 598 73.6 547 81.8 51 35.7 Less than 1/2 tuition 562 69.2 512 76.5 50 35 Half to full tuition 35 4.3 34 5.1 1 0.7 Full tuition 1 0.1 1 0.1 0 0 More than full tuition 0 0 0 0 0 0 Median grant amount $ 9,500 $ 7,500 Bar Passage Rates First Time Takers: 77 Avg. Pass Diff: 6.66 Reporting %: 90.91 Avg. School %: 84.28 Avg.State%: 77.62 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff % North Carolina 66 55 83.33 77.50 5.83 South Carolina 4 4 100.00 79.69 20.31 Informational and Library Resources Total amount spent on library materials $ 834,758 Study seating capacity inside the library 435 Study FTE professional librarians 9.34 Hours per week library is open 105 # of open wired connections available to students 0 # of networked computers available for use by students 56 Has wireless network Yes Require computer? Yes J.D. Attrition (from prior year) Academic Other Total # # # % 1st year 47 48 95 19.3 2nd year 4 3 7 3.1 3rd year 0 0 0 0 4th year 0 0 0 0 2 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 13 The Basics Type of school PRIVATE Term Semester Application deadline 1/15/2013 5/8/2013 8/19/201 3 Application fee $ 0 Financial aid deadline Can first year start other than fall? Yes Student faculty ratio 19.33 to 1 Faculty and Administrators Total Men Women Minorities Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Full-Time 42 62 19 25 23 37 15 19 Other Full- Time 8 2 6 3 Deans, librarians & others who teach 6 9 3 5 3 4 3 3 Part-Time 40 46 25 34 15 12 3 4 96 117 49 64 47 53 24 26 CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW 2145 Suttle Avenue Charlotte, NC 28208 Phone: 704-971-8500 Fax: 704-971-8599 Website: charlottelaw.edu 1231231212312312 ABA Approved Since 2008 Curriculum Full-Time Part-Time Typical first-year section size 70 60 Number of classroom course titles beyond first-year curriculum 117 Number of upper division classroom course sections Under 25 78 25 - 49 38 50 - 74 9 75 - 99 8 100+ 5 Number of positions available in simulation courses 410 Number of simulation positions filled 310 76 Number of positions available in faculty supervised clinical courses 137 Number of faculty supervised clinical positions filled 101 7 Number of field placement positions filled 128 0 Number of students who enrolled in independent study 12 4 Number of students who participated in law journals 40 6 Number of students who participated in interschool skills competitions 35 3 Number of credit hours required to graduate 90 1 J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity Men Women Full-Time Part-Time First - Year Total J.D. Deg # % # % # % # % # % # % Awrd Hispanics of any race 16 2.6 47 6.1 50 4.3 13 5.8 36 5.5 63 4.5 14 American Indian or Alaska Native 16 2.6 14 1.8 24 2.1 6 2.7 14 2.1 30 2.2 0 Asian 21 3.4 20 2.6 35 3 6 2.7 19 2.9 41 2.9 2 Black or African American 108 17.3 200 26.1 242 20.7 66 29.5 193 29.3 308 22.1 27 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 1 0.2 1 0.1 2 0.2 0 0 1 0.2 2 0.1 0 Two or more races 2 0.3 2 0.3 3 0.3 1 0.4 0 0 4 0.3 0 Total Minority 164 26.2 284 37 356 30.5 92 41.1 263 39.9 448 32.2 43 White 442 70.7 457 59.6 772 66.1 127 56.7 366 55.5 899 64.6 190 Nonresident Alien 6 1 12 1.6 18 1.5 0 0 13 2 18 1.3 0 Race and Ethnicity Unknown 13 2.1 14 1.8 22 1.9 5 2.2 17 2.6 27 1.9 1 Total 625 44.9 767 55.1 1,168 83.9 224 16.1 659 47.3 1,392 100 234 Transfers Transfers In 5 Transfers Out 43 Tuition and Fees Resident Non- Resident Full-Time $ 38,606 $ 38,606 Part-Time $ 31,232 $ 31,232 Tuition Guarantee Program No Living Expenses Estimated Living Expenses for singles Living on Campus Living Off Campus Living at Home $ $ 21,650 $ Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 13 ABA Approved Since 2008 GPA and LSAT Scores Total Full-Time Part-Time Number of apps 4,040 3,645 395 Number of offers 3,062 2,808 254 Number of matrics 626 529 97 75% GPA 3.32 3.35 3.12 Median GPA 2.97 3 2.9 25% GPA 2.65 2.67 2.57 75% LSAT 150 150 147 Median LSAT 146 147 144 25% LSAT 142 143 141 Grants and Scholarships (from prior year) Total Full-Time Part-Time # % # % # % Total number of students 1,151 100 953 82.8 198 17.2 Total number receiving grants 550 47.8 473 49.6 77 38.9 Less than 1/2 tuition 476 41.4 407 42.7 69 34.8 Half to full tuition 74 6.4 66 6.9 8 4 Full tuition 0 0 0 0 0 0 More than full tuition 0 0 0 0 0 0 75% grant amount 0 0 $ 18,000 0 $ 12,000 0 Median grant amount 10,000 7,000 25% grant amount 0 0 5,000 0 3,600 0 Bar Passage Rates First Time Takers: 98 Avg. Pass Diff: -1.00 Reporting %: 92.86 Avg. School %: 79.12 Avg.State%: 80.12 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff % North Carolina 86 67 77.91 80.32 -2.41 South Carolina 5 5 100.00 76.66 23.34 Informational and Library Resources Total amount spent on library materials $ 874,090 Study seating capacity inside the library 435 Number of FTE professional librarians 7.68 Hours per week library is open 105 Require computer? Yes J.D. Attrition (from prior year) Academic Other Total # # # % 1st year 76 72 148 26.4 2nd year 5 6 11 2.9 3rd year 0 5 5 2.5 4th year 0 0 0 0 2 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 5 of 13 The Basics Type of school PRIVATE Term Semester Application deadline 1/1/2014 5/1/2014 8/1/2014 Application fee $ 0 Financial aid deadline Can first year start other than fall? Yes Tuition and Fees (academic year*) Resident Non-Resident Full-Time $ 40,146 $ 40,146 Part-Time $ 32,476 $ 32,476 Tuition Guarantee Program No Living Expenses (academic year*) Estimated Living Expenses for singles Living on Campus $ Living Off Campus $ 21,650 Living at Home $ 21,650 - 2013 Standard 509 Information Report 201 South College Street Suite 400 Charlotte, NC 28244 Phone: 704-971-8500 Website: charlottelaw.edu 1231231212312312 ABA Approved Since 2008 GPA and LSAT Scores (calendar year**) Total Full-Time Part-Time Number of apps 3,340 2,878 462 Number of offers 2,446 2,152 294 Number of matrics 522 428 94 75% GPA 3.25 3.31 3.00 Median GPA 2.91 2.96 2.75 25% GPA 2.59 2.63 2.48 75% LSAT 149 149 144 Median LSAT 144 145 141 25% LSAT 141 142 139 Grants and Scholarships (prior academic year*) Total Full-Time Part-Time # % # % # % Total number of students 1,392 100 1,168 83.9 224 16.1 Total number receiving grants 700 50.3 583 49.9 117 52.2 Less than 1/2 tuition 469 33.7 382 32.7 87 38.8 Half to full tuition 231 16.6 201 17.2 30 13.4 Full tuition 0 0 0 0 0 0 More than full tuition 0 0 0 0 0 0 75% grant amount $ 29,000 $ 12,500 Median grant amount $ 12,500 $ 5,040 25% grant amount $ 5,000 $ 2,500 J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity (academic year*) Men Women Full-Time Part-Time First - Year Total J.D. Deg Awd # % # % # % # % # % # % Hispanics of any race 24 4.1 45 5.5 57 5 12 4.5 27 5 69 4.9 13 American Indian or Alaska Native 16 2.7 20 2.4 28 2.5 8 3 17 3.2 36 2.6 5 Asian 22 3.7 22 2.7 36 3.2 8 3 17 3.2 44 3.1 10 Black or African American 130 22 275 33.6 294 25.8 111 41.3 201 37.6 405 28.7 47 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 1 0.2 2 0.2 2 0.2 1 0.4 2 0.4 3 0.2 0 Two or more races 1 0.2 2 0.2 2 0.2 1 0.4 0 0 3 0.2 0 Total Minority 194 32.8 366 44.7 419 36.7 141 52.4 264 49.3 560 39.7 75 White 384 65 425 51.9 688 60.3 121 45 252 47.1 809 57.4 278 Nonresident Alien 1 0.2 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.4 0 0 2 0.1 0 Race and Ethnicity Unknown 12 2 27 3.3 33 2.9 6 2.2 19 3.6 39 2.8 1 Total 591 41.9 819 58.1 1,141 80.9 269 19.1 535 37.9 1,410 100 354 1 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 6 of 13 ABA Approved Since 2008 Curriculum (prior academic year*) Full-Time Part-Time Typical first-year section size 56 60 Number of classroom course titles beyond first-year curriculum 152 Number of upper division classroom course sections Under 25 131 25 - 49 63 50 - 74 34 75 - 99 24 100+ 0 Number of positions available in simulation courses 1,596 Number of simulation positions filled 930 309 Number of positions available in faculty supervised clinical courses 225 Number of faculty supervised clinical positions filled 102 33 Number of field placement positions filled 128 42 Number of students who enrolled in independent study 30 10 Number of students who participated in law journals 80 26 Number of students who participated in interschool skills competitions 44 14 Number of credit hours required to graduate 90 Faculty and Administrators (calendar year**) Total Men Women Minorities Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Full-Time 61 64 25 26 36 38 15 16 Other Full-Time 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 Deans, librarians & others who teach 9 8 3 3 6 5 3 4 Part-Time 48 45 31 29 17 16 6 4 119 119 59 59 60 60 25 25 Student faculty ratio 17.31 to 1 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2012) First Time Takers: 222 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 162 106 65.43 79.03 -13.60 South Carolina 18 14 77.78 72.79 4.99 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 81.08 66.67 78.41 -11.74 J.D. Attrition (prior academic year*) Academic Other Total # # # % 1st year 55 94 149 22.6 2nd year 3 7 10 2.4 3rd year 1 14 15 4.9 4th year 0 0 0 0 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2011) First Time Takers: 98 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 86 67 77.91 80.32 -2.41 South Carolina 5 5 100.00 76.66 23.34 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 92.86 79.12 80.12 -1.00 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2010) First Time Takers: 77 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 66 55 83.33 77.50 5.83 South Carolina 4 4 100.00 79.69 20.31 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 90.91 84.28 77.62 6.66 Transfers (prior academic year*) Transfers In 5 Transfers Out 66 2 * "Academic year" refers to the 2013 - 2014 academic year. ** "Calendar year" refers to the 2013 calendar year. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 7 of 13 The Basics Type of school PRIVATE Term Semester Application deadline Application fee $ 50 Financial aid deadline Can first year start other than fall? Yes Tuition and Fees (academic year*) Resident Non-Resident Full-Time $ 41,348 $ 41,348 Part-Time $ 33,448 $ 33,448 Tuition Guarantee Program No Living Expenses (academic year*) Estimated Living Expenses for singles Living on Campus $ Living Off Campus $ 22,620 Living at Home $ Students Matriculating in # Entering with # Reduced or Eliminated 2013-2014 Academic Year 307 178 2012-2013 Academic Year 341 181 2011-2012 Academic Year 307 177 Conditional Scholarships - 2014 Standard 509 Information Report 201 South College Street Suite 400 Charlotte, NC 28244 Phone: 704-971-8500 Last Site Visit: 2012-2013 Website: charlottelaw.edu Next Site Visit: 2019-2020 12312312 ABA Approved Since 2008 GPA and LSAT Scores (calendar year**) Total Full-Time Part-Time # of apps 2,472 2,110 362 # of offers 1,853 1,574 279 # of matriculants 446 319 127 75th Percentile GPA 3.18 3.21 3.00 50th Percentile GPA 2.83 2.91 2.66 25th Percentile GPA 2.53 2.59 2.37 # not incl. in GPA percentile calc. 4.00 1.00 3.00 75th Percentile LSAT 146 147 142 50th Percentile LSAT 142 143 138 25 Percentile LSAT 138 140 136 # not incl. in LSAT percentile calc. 0 0 0 Grants and Scholarships (prior academic year*) Total Full-Time Part-Time # % # % # % Total # of students 1,410 100 1,141 80.9 269 19.1 Total # receiving grants 644 45.7 571 50 73 27.1 Less than 1/2 tuition 382 27.1 335 29.4 47 17.5 Half to full tuition 228 16.2 204 17.9 24 8.9 Full tuition 34 2.4 32 2.8 2 0.7 More than full tuition 0 0 0 0 0 0 75th Percentile grant amount $ 27,000 $ 17,200 50th Percentile grant amount $ 15,000 $ 10,000 25th Percentile grant amount $ 8,000 $ 6,400 J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity (academic year*) Men Women Other Full-Time Part-Time First - Year Total J.D. Deg Awd # % # % # % # % # % # % # % Hispanics of any race 26 5.1 43 5.7 0 0 44 4.6 25 8.1 30 6.6 69 5.4 15 American Indian or Alaska Native 10 2 13 1.7 0 0 20 2.1 3 1 7 1.5 23 1.8 11 Asian 23 4.5 21 2.8 0 0 36 3.8 8 2.6 21 4.6 44 3.5 11 Black or African American 135 26.4 326 43.1 0 0 302 31.6 159 51.3 204 44.8 461 36.4 77 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 1 0.2 2 0.3 0 0 3 0.3 0 0 1 0.2 3 0.2 1 Two or more races 3 0.6 9 1.2 0 0 10 1 2 0.6 5 1.1 12 0.9 4 Total Minority 198 38.7 414 54.8 0 0 415 43.4 197 63.5 268 58.9 612 48.3 119 White 299 58.5 324 42.9 0 0 517 54 106 34.2 175 38.5 623 49.2 285 Nonresident Alien 1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.3 0 0 1 0.1 1 Race and Ethnicity Unknown 13 2.5 18 2.4 0 0 25 2.6 6 1.9 12 2.6 31 2.4 10 Total 511 40.3 756 59.7 0 0 957 75.5 310 24.5 455 35.9 1,267 100 415 1 2014.1Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 8 of 13 ABA Approved Since 2008 Curriculum (prior academic year*) Full-Time Part-Time Typical first-year section size 57 60 # of classroom course titles beyond first-year curriculum 161 # of upper division classroom course sections Under 25 167 25 - 49 76 50 - 74 39 75 - 99 21 100+ 0 # of positions available in simulation courses 1,625 # of simulation positions filled 1,133 492 # of seminar positions filled 589 104 # of positions available in faculty supervised law clinic courses 256 # of faculty supervised law clinic positions filled 163 42 # of field placement positions filled 158 57 # of students who enrolled in independent study 26 10 # of students who participated in law journals 110 29 # of students who participated in interschool skills competitions 62 17 # of credit hours required to graduate 90 Faculty and Administrators (calendar year**) Total Men Women Other Minorities Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Full-Time 57 64 23 25 34 39 0 0 16 18 Deans, librarians & others who teach 13 8 5 3 8 5 0 0 5 4 Part-Time 39 50 25 30 14 20 0 0 5 4 109 122 53 58 56 64 26 26 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2013) First Time Takers: 316 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 222 134 60.36 69.22 -8.86 South Carolina 34 24 70.59 79.49 -8.90 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 81.01 61.72 70.59 -8.87 J.D. Attrition (prior academic year*) Academic Transfer Other Total # # # # % 1st year 98 47 27 172 32.1 2nd year 11 5 14 30 6.7 3rd year 1 0 6 7 1.9 4th year 0 0 0 0 0 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2012) First Time Takers: 222 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 162 106 65.43 79.03 -13.60 South Carolina 18 14 77.78 72.79 4.99 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 81.08 66.67 78.41 -11.74 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2011) First Time Takers: 98 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 86 67 77.91 80.32 -2.41 South Carolina 5 5 100.00 76.66 23.34 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 92.86 79.12 80.12 -1.00 Transfers (prior academic year*) Transfers In # See Appendix for list of schools from which students transferred Transfers Out 52 2 * "Academic year" refers to the 2014 - 2015 academic year. ** "Calendar year" refers to the 2014 calendar year. 2014.1 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 9 of 13 The Basics Type of school PRIVATE Term Semester Application deadline Application fee $ 50 Financial aid deadline Can first year start other than fall? Yes Tuition and Fees (academic year*) Resident Non-Resident Full-Time $ 41,348 $ 41,348 Part-Time $ 33,448 $ 33,448 Tuition Guarantee Program No Living Expenses (academic year*) Estimated Living Expenses for singles Living on Campus $ 22,620 Living Off Campus $ 22,620 Living at Home $ 22,620 Students Matriculating in # Entering with # Reduced or Eliminated 2014-2015 Academic Year 337 202 2013-2014 Academic Year 307 178 2012-2013 Academic Year 341 181 Conditional Scholarships - 2015 Standard 509 Information Report 201 South College Street Suite 400 Charlotte, NC 28244 Phone: 704-971-8500 Last Site Visit: 2012-2013 Website: charlottelaw.edu Next Site Visit: 2019-2020 12312312 ABA Approved Since 2008 GPA and LSAT Scores (calendar year**) Total Full-Time Part-Time # of apps 2,260 2,007 253 # of offers 1,470 1,343 127 # of matriculants 309 251 58 75th Percentile GPA 3.17 3.16 3.23 50th Percentile GPA 2.82 2.82 2.82 25th Percentile GPA 2.51 2.49 2.59 # not incl. in GPA percentile calc. 2.00 1.00 1.00 75th Percentile LSAT 145 145 144 50th Percentile LSAT 142 143 141 25 Percentile LSAT 140 140 135 # not incl. in LSAT percentile calc. 0 0 0 Grants and Scholarships (prior academic year*) Total Full-Time Part-Time # % # % # % Total # of students 1,267 100 957 75.5 310 24.5 Total # receiving grants 778 61.4 597 62.4 181 58.4 Less than 1/2 tuition 553 43.6 410 42.8 143 46.1 Half to full tuition 188 14.8 154 16.1 34 11 Full tuition 25 2 24 2.5 1 0.3 More than full tuition 12 0.9 9 0.9 3 1 75th Percentile grant amount $ 3,042 $ 2,000 50th Percentile grant amount $ 11,000 $ 4,500 25th Percentile grant amount $ 25,000 $ 13,200 J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity (academic year*) Men Women Other Full-Time Part-Time First - Year Total J.D. Deg Awd # % # % # % # % # % # % # % Hispanics of any race 13 4 26 4.4 0 0 26 4 13 5 19 5.4 39 4.2 27 American Indian or Alaska Native 6 1.9 10 1.7 0 0 13 2 3 1.2 4 1.1 16 1.7 9 Asian 12 3.7 20 3.4 0 0 26 4 6 2.3 15 4.2 32 3.5 15 Black or African American 107 33.3 275 46.1 0 0 252 38.3 130 50 174 49.2 382 41.6 122 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 1 0.3 1 0.2 0 0 2 0.3 0 0 0 0 2 0.2 1 Two or more races 2 0.6 9 1.5 0 0 8 1.2 3 1.2 1 0.3 11 1.2 0 Total Minority 141 43.9 341 57.1 0 0 327 49.7 155 59.6 213 60.2 482 52.5 174 White 173 53.9 236 39.5 0 0 317 48.2 92 35.4 128 36.2 409 44.6 266 Nonresident Alien 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Race and Ethnicity Unknown 7 2.2 20 3.4 0 0 14 2.1 13 5 13 3.7 27 2.9 9 Total 321 35 597 65 0 0 658 71.7 260 28.3 354 38.6 918 100 450 1 2015.1Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 10 of 13 ABA Approved Since 2008 Curriculum (prior academic year*) Typical first-year section size 48 # of classroom course titles beyond first-year curriculum 167 # of upper division classroom course sections Under 25 222 25 - 49 83 50 - 74 30 75 - 99 14 100+ 0 # of positions available in simulation courses 2,481 # of simulation positions filled 1,941 # of seminar positions filled 556 # of law clinics 12 # of seats available in the law clinics identified in sub-part (i) above 253 # of seats filled in the law clinics identified in sub-part (i) above 167 # of field placement positions filled 351 # of students who enrolled in independent study 20 # of students who participated in law journals 109 # of students who participated in interschool skills competitions 49 Faculty and Administrators (calendar year**) Total Men Women Other Minorities Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Full-Time 43 48 23 24 20 24 0 0 14 16 Deans, librarians & others who teach 11 10 3 4 8 6 0 0 2 2 Part-Time 54 50 31 29 23 21 0 0 6 5 108 108 57 57 51 51 22 23 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2014) First Time Takers: 368 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 237 135 56.96 69.12 -12.16 South Carolina 34 22 64.71 73.41 -8.70 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 73.64 57.93 69.66 -11.73 J.D. Attrition (prior academic year*) Academic Transfer Other Total # # # # % 1st year 121 33 49 203 44.6 2nd year 16 5 4 25 5.7 3rd year 0 0 9 9 2.9 4th year 0 0 1 1 1.6 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2013) First Time Takers: 316 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 222 134 60.36 69.22 -8.86 South Carolina 34 24 70.59 79.49 -8.90 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 81.01 61.72 70.59 -8.87 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2012) First Time Takers: 222 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 162 106 65.43 79.03 -13.60 South Carolina 18 14 77.78 72.79 4.99 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 81.08 66.67 78.41 -11.74 Transfers (prior academic year*) Transfers In # See Appendix for list of schools from which students transferred Transfers Out 38 2 * "Academic year" refers to the 2015 - 2016 academic year. ** "Calendar year" refers to the 2015 calendar year. 2015.1 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 11 of 13 The Basics Type of school PRIVATE Term Semester Application deadline Application fee $ 50 Financial aid deadline 5/22/2016 Can first year start other than fall? Yes Tuition and Fees (academic year*) Resident Non-Resident Full-Time $ 44,284 $ 44,284 Part-Time $ 35,822 $ 35,822 Tuition Guarantee Program No Living Expenses (academic year*) Estimated Living Expenses for singles Living on Campus $ Living Off Campus $ 22,534 Living at Home $ 22,534 Students Matriculating in # Entering with # Reduced or Eliminated 2015-2016 Academic Year 264 155 2014-2015 Academic Year 337 202 2013-2014 Academic Year 307 178 Conditional Scholarships - 2016 Standard 509 Information Report 201 South College Street Suite 400 Charlotte, NC 28244 Phone: 704-971-8500 Last Site Visit: 2012-2013 Website: charlottelaw.edu Next Site Visit: 2019-2020 12312312 ABA Approved Since 2008 GPA and LSAT Scores (calendar year**) Total Full-Time Part-Time # of apps 2,189 1,981 208 # of offers 1,416 1,322 94 # of matriculants 343 303 40 75th Percentile GPA 3.07 3.06 3.22 50th Percentile GPA 2.80 2.81 2.75 25th Percentile GPA 2.48 2.46 2.55 # not incl. in GPA percentile calc. 13.00 11.00 2.00 75th Percentile LSAT 148 148 148 50th Percentile LSAT 144 144 144 25 Percentile LSAT 141 141 141 # not incl. in LSAT percentile calc. 7 7 0 Grants and Scholarships (prior academic year*) Total Full-Time Part-Time # % # % # % Total # of students 918 100 658 71.7 260 28.3 Total # receiving grants 566 61.7 452 68.7 114 43.8 Less than 1/2 tuition 397 43.2 319 48.5 78 30 Half to full tuition 154 16.8 123 18.7 31 11.9 Full tuition 14 1.5 10 1.5 4 1.5 More than full tuition 1 0.1 0 0 1 0.4 75th Percentile grant amount $ 20,000 $ 11,237 50th Percentile grant amount $ 8,000 $ 4,746 25th Percentile grant amount $ 4,500 $ 2,000 J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity (academic year*) Men Women Other Full-Time Part-Time First - Year Total J.D. Deg Awd # % # % # % # % # % # % # % Hispanics of any race 16 6.2 33 7.3 0 0 34 6.9 15 6.8 25 6.4 49 6.9 16 American Indian or Alaska Native 2 0.8 2 0.4 0 0 3 0.6 1 0.5 3 0.8 4 0.6 5 Asian 15 5.8 23 5.1 0 0 28 5.7 10 4.5 26 6.6 38 5.3 10 Black or African American 91 35 214 47.3 0 0 199 40.6 106 47.7 163 41.7 305 42.8 119 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 0 0 1 0.2 0 0 1 0.2 0 0 1 0.3 1 0.1 2 Two or more races 2 0.8 7 1.5 0 0 4 0.8 5 2.3 4 1 9 1.3 6 Total Minority 126 48.5 280 61.9 0 0 269 54.9 137 61.7 222 56.8 406 57 158 White 126 48.5 160 35.4 0 0 210 42.9 76 34.2 156 39.9 286 40.2 177 Nonresident Alien 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Race and Ethnicity Unknown 8 3.1 12 2.7 0 0 11 2.2 9 4.1 13 3.3 20 2.8 7 Total 260 36.5 452 63.5 0 0 490 68.8 222 31.2 391 54.9 712 100 342 1 2016.1Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 12 of 13 ABA Approved Since 2008 Curriculum (prior academic year*) Typical first-year section size 43 # of classroom course titles beyond first-year curriculum 126 # of upper division classroom course sections Under 25 140 25 - 49 82 50 - 74 19 75 - 99 5 100+ 0 # of positions available in simulation courses 935 # of simulation positions filled 756 # of seminar positions filled 147 # of law clinics 16 # of seats available in the law clinics identified in sub-part (i) above 196 # of seats filled in the law clinics identified in sub-part (i) above 190 # of field placement positions filled 237 # of students who enrolled in independent study 10 # of students who participated in law journals 109 # of students who participated in interschool skills competitions 51 Faculty and Administrators (calendar year**) Total Men Women Other Minorities Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Spr Fall Full-Time 34 36 17 18 17 18 0 0 12 14 Deans, librarians & others who teach 11 12 3 4 8 8 0 0 2 2 Part-Time 38 31 23 20 15 11 0 0 4 4 83 79 43 42 40 37 18 20 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2015) First Time Takers: 369 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 241 110 45.64 64.67 -19.03 South Carolina 27 14 51.85 72.78 -20.93 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 72.63 46.26 65.48 -19.22 J.D. Attrition (prior academic year*) Academic Transfer Other Total # # # # % 1st year 130 17 27 174 49.2 2nd year 12 0 5 17 7.3 3rd year 4 0 1 5 1.9 4th year 0 0 0 0 0 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2014) First Time Takers: 368 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 237 135 56.96 69.12 -12.16 South Carolina 34 22 64.71 73.41 -8.70 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 73.64 57.93 69.66 -11.73 Bar Passage Rates (February and July 2013) First Time Takers: 316 Jurisdiction Takers Passers Pass % State % Diff. % North Carolina 222 134 60.36 69.22 -8.86 South Carolina 34 24 70.59 79.49 -8.90 Reporting % Avg. School Pass % Avg. State Pass % Avg. Pass Diff. % 81.01 61.72 70.59 -8.87 Transfers (prior academic year*) Transfers In # See Appendix for list of schools from which students transferred Transfers Out 17 2 * "Academic year" refers to the 2016 - 2017 academic year. ** "Calendar year" refers to the 2016 calendar year. 2016.1 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-3 Filed 04/21/17 Page 13 of 13 Exhibit 2 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 16 ABA STANDARDS and RULES OF PROCEDURE for APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2 0 1 6 – 2 0 1 7 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 16 The 2016-2017 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools were adopted by the Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar and concurred in by the ABA House of Delegates in August 2016. © 2016 American Bar Association. Permission is granted to reprint, but not for profit, all or part of this publication, provided reference is made to this publication. All other rights reserved. To order copies of this publication contact the ABA Service Center at 800.285.2221 or order online at www.ShopABA.org. The ABA product code number for this publication is 5290116ED. The price for this publication is $15.00. This publication is also available in its entirety at the Section’s Web page: www.americanbar.org/legaled. Printed in the United States of America. Cataloging-in-Publication Data is on file with the Library of Congress ISBN: 978-1-63425-654-4 Discounts are available for books ordered in bulk. Special consideration is given to state bars, CLE programs, and other bar-related organizations. Inquire at Book Publishing, ABA Publishing, American Bar Association, 321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois 60654-7598. www.ShopABA.org Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 16 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 4 plans to take to bring the school into full compliance and demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that such actions will be successful. A provisionally approved law school may apply for full approval no earlier than two years after receiving provisional approval and must obtain full approval within five years after receiving provisional approval. (b) The Council may withdraw provisional approval if the Council determines that the law school is no longer in substantial compliance with the Standards, is not making adequate progress toward achieving full compliance with each of the Standards, or is no longer able to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the school will achieve full compliance with each of the Standards within the allotted time frame. (c) If five years have elapsed since the law school was provisionally approved and the Council has not granted full approval, provisional approval shall terminate. Before the end of the five-year period in an extraordinary case and for good cause shown, the Council may extend the time within which the law school must obtain full approval. (d) A provisionally approved law school shall not offer a post-J.D. degree program or other non-J.D. degree program, offer a program in a country outside the United States, or seek to establish a separate location. (e) A provisionally approved law school shall state that it is provisionally approved in all of its printed and electronic materials describing the law school and its program and in any other publication that references the law school’s approval by the Council. (f) Alaw school seeking provisional approval shall make its status clear in any printed and electronic materials describing the law school and its program and in any other publication that references the law school’s approval status. At a minimum, the law school shall state the following in all such communications: The law school is not currently approved by the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association and makes no representation to any applicant that it will receive approval from the Council before the graduation of any matriculating student. (g) A law school seeking provisional approval shall not delay conferring a J.D. upon a student in anticipation of obtaining approval. An approved law school may not retroactively grant a J.D. degree as an approved school to a student who graduated from the law school before its approval. Interpretation 102-1 Plans to achieve substantial compliance with any of the Standards are not sufficient to demonstrate substantial compliance. Standard 103. FULL APPROVAL (a) The Council shall grant full approval to a provisionally approved law school if at the time the school seeks such approval it demonstrates that it is in full compliance with each of the Standards. Plans to achieve full compliance with any Standard are not sufficient to demonstrate full compliance. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 16 5 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 (b) A law school granted approval under this Standard remains approved unless the Council withdraws that approval. Standard 104. PROVISION OF INFORMATION BY LAW SCHOOLS TO ACCREDITATION COMMITTEE AND COUNCIL A law school shall furnish a completed annual questionnaire, self-study, site evaluation questionnaire, and such other information as the Accreditation Committee or Council may require. This information must be complete, accurate, and not misleading, and must be submitted in the form, manner, and time frame specified by the Council. Standard 105. ACQUIESCENCE FOR MAJOR CHANGE IN PROGRAM OR STRUCTURE (a) Before a law school makes a major change in its program of legal education or organizational structure, it shall obtain the acquiescence of the Council for the change. A major change in program or structure that requires application for acquiescence includes: (1) Acquiring another law school, program, or educational institution; (2) Acquiring or merging with another university by the parent university where it appears that there may be substantial impact on the operation of the law school; (3) Transferring all, or substantially all, of the program of legal education or assets of the approved law school to another law school or university; (4) Merging or affiliating with one or more approved or unapproved law schools; (5) Merging or affiliating with one or more universities; (6) Materially modifying the law school’s legal status or institutional relationship with a parent institution; (7) A change in control of the school resulting from a change in ownership of the school or a contractual arrangement; (8) A change in the location of the school that could result in substantial changes in the faculty, administration, student body, or management of the school; (9) Establishing a branch campus; (10) Establishing a separate location; (11) A significant change in the mission or objectives of the law school; (12) The addition of courses or programs that represent a significant departure from existing offerings or method of delivery since the latest site evaluation including instituting a new full-time or part-time division; Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 5 of 16 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 12 the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, and disability in regard to hiring, promotion, retention and conditions of employment. Interpretation 205-1 A law school may not require applicants, students, faculty or employees to disclose their sexual orientation, although they may provide opportunities for them to do so voluntarily. Interpretation 205-2 So long as a school complies with Standard 205(c), the prohibition concerning sexual orientation does not require a religiously affiliated school to act inconsistently with the essential elements of its religious values and beliefs. For example, Standard 205(c) does not require a school to recognize or support organizations whose purposes or objectives with respect to sexual orientation conflict with the essential elements of the religious values and beliefs held by the school. Interpretation 205-3 Standard 205(d) applies to all employers, including government agencies, to which a school furnishes assistance and facilities for interviewing and other placement services. However, this Standard does not require a law school to implement its terms by excluding any employer unless that employer discriminates unlawfully. Interpretation 205-4 The denial by a law school of admission to a qualified applicant is treated as made upon the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability if the basis of denial relied upon is an admission qualification of the school that is intended to prevent the admission of applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability though not purporting to do so. Interpretation 205-5 The denial by a law school of employment to a qualified individual is treated as made upon the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability if the basis of denial relied upon is an employment policy of the school that is intended to prevent the employment of individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability though not purporting to do so. Standard 206. DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION (a) Consistent with sound legal education policy and the Standards, a law school shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by providing full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession by members of underrepresented groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities, and a commitment to having a student body that is diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity. (b) Consistent with sound educational policy and the Standards, a law school shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by having a faculty and staff that are diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 6 of 16 13 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 Interpretation 206-1 The requirement of a constitutional provision or statute that purports to prohibit consideration of gender, race, ethnicity, or national origin in admissions or employment decisions is not a justification for a school’s non-compliance with Standard 206. A law school that is subject to such constitutional or statutory provisions would have to demonstrate the commitment required by Standard 206 by means other than those prohibited by the applicable constitutional or statutory provisions. Interpretation 206-2 In addition to providing full opportunities for the study of law and the entry into the legal profession by members of underrepresented groups, the enrollment of a diverse student body promotes cross- cultural understanding, helps break down racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons of different backgrounds. The forms of concrete action required by a law school to satisfy the obligations of this Standard are not specified. If consistent with applicable law, a law school may use race and ethnicity in its admissions process to promote diversity and inclusion. The determination of a law school’s satisfaction of such obligations is based on the totality of the law school’s actions and the results achieved. The commitment to providing full educational opportunities for members of underrepresented groups typically includes a special concern for determining the potential of these applicants through the admission process, special recruitment efforts, and programs that assist in meeting the academic and financial needs of many of these students and that create a favorable environment for students from underrepresented groups. Standard 207. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES (a) Assuring equality of opportunity for qualified individuals with disabilities, as required by Standard 205, requires a law school to provide such students, faculty and staff with reasonable accommodations consistent with applicable law. (b) A law school shall adopt, publish, and adhere to written policies and procedures for assessing and handling requests for reasonable accommodations made by qualified individuals with disabilities. Interpretation 207-1 Applicants and students shall be individually evaluated to determine whether they meet the academic standards requisite to admission and participation in the law school program. The use of the term “qualified” in the Standard requires a careful and thorough consideration of each applicant and each student’s qualifications in light of reasonable accommodations. Reasonable accommodations are those that are consistent with the fundamental nature of the school’s program of legal education, that can be provided without undue financial or administrative burden, and that can be provided while maintaining academic and other essential performance standards. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 7 of 16 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 24 Interpretation 315-1 Examples of methods that may be used to measure the degree to which students have attained competency in the school’s student learning outcomes include review of the records the law school maintains to measure individual student achievement pursuant to Standard 314; evaluation of student learning portfolios; student evaluation of the sufficiency of their education; student performance in capstone courses or other courses that appropriately assess a variety of skills and knowledge; bar exam passage rates; placement rates; surveys of attorneys, judges, and alumni; and assessment of student performance by judges, attorneys, or law professors from other schools. The methods used to measure the degree of student achievement of learning outcomes are likely to differ from school to school and law schools are not required by this standard to use any particular methods. Standard 316. BAR PASSAGE (a) A law school’s bar passage rate shall be sufficient, for purposes of Standard 301(a), if the school demonstrates that it meets any one of the following tests: (1) That for students who graduated from the law school within the five most recently completed calendar years: (i) 75 percent or more of these graduates who sat for the bar passed a bar examination; or (ii) in at least three of these calendar years, 75 percent of the students graduating in those years and sitting for the bar have passed a bar examination. In demonstrating compliance under sections (1)(i) and (ii), the school must report bar passage results from as many jurisdictions as necessary to account for at least 70 percent of its graduates each year, starting with the jurisdiction in which the highest number of graduates took the bar exam and proceeding in descending order of frequency. (2) That in three or more of the five most recently completed calendar years, the school’s annual first-time bar passage rate in the jurisdictions reported by the school is no more than 15 points below the average first-time bar passage rates for graduates of ABA-approved law schools taking the bar examination in these same jurisdictions. In demonstrating compliance under section (2), the school must report first-time bar passage data from as many jurisdictions as necessary to account for at least 70 percent of its graduates each year, starting with the jurisdiction in which the highest number of graduates took the bar exam and proceeding in descending order of frequency. When more than one jurisdiction is reported, the weighted average of the results in each of the reported jurisdictions shall be used to determine compliance. (b) A school shall be out of compliance with this Standard if it is unable to demonstrate that it meets the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) or (2). (c) A school found out of compliance under paragraph (b) and that has not been able to come into compliance within the two-year period specified in Rule 14(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, may seek to demonstrate good cause for extending the period the law school has to demonstrate compliance by submitting evidence of: Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 8 of 16 25 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 (1) The law school’s trend in bar passage rates for both first-time and subsequent takers: a clear trend of improvement will be considered in the school’s favor, a declining or flat trend against it. (2) The length of time the law school’s bar passage rates have been below the first-time and ultimate rates established in paragraph A: a shorter time period will be considered in the school’s favor, a longer period against it. (3) Actions by the law school to address bar passage, particularly the law school’s academic rigor and the demonstrated value and effectiveness of its academic support and bar preparation programs: value-added, effective, sustained and pervasive actions to address bar passage problems will be considered in the law school’s favor; ineffective or only marginally effective programs or limited action by the law school against it. (4) Efforts by the law school to facilitate bar passage for its graduates who did not pass the bar on prior attempts: effective and sustained efforts by the law school will be considered in the school’s favor; ineffective or limited efforts by the law school against it. (5) Efforts by the law school to provide broader access to legal education while maintaining academic rigor: sustained meaningful efforts will be viewed in the law school’s favor; intermittent or limited efforts by the law school against it. (6) The demonstrated likelihood that the law school’s students who transfer to other ABA-approved schools will pass the bar examination: transfers by students with a strong likelihood of passing the bar will be considered in the school’s favor, providing the law school has undertaken counseling and other appropriate efforts to retain its well-performing students. (7) Temporary circumstances beyond the control of the law school, but which the law school is addressing: for example, a natural disaster that disrupts operations or a significant increase in the standard for passing the relevant bar examination(s). (8) Other factors, consistent with a law school’s demonstrated and sustained mission, which the school considers relevant in explaining its deficient bar passage results and in explaining the school’s efforts to improve them. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 9 of 16 57 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 Rule 13: Determinations of Compliance (a) A determination that the law school is in compliance with all of the Standards means that the law school remains an approved law school. (b) In finding a law school in compliance with a Standard, the Committee may couple the finding with a statement calling the law school’s attention to the requirements of that Standard when the Committee has reason to believe that the law school might, at some time before the next scheduled site evaluation, no longer be in compliance with the Standard in question. (c) The approval status of a law school is not affected while an appeal from, or review of, a decision or recommendation of the Committee or Council is pending. Rule 14: Actions on Determinations of Noncompliance with a Standard (a) Following a determination by the Committee of non-compliance with a Standard in accord with Rule12(a)(4), the Committee shall: (1) Require the law school to bring itself into compliance and submit information by a specific date to demonstrate that it has come into compliance with the Standard; and (2) Direct that representatives of the law school, including any person specifically designated by the Committee, appear at a hearing to determine whether to impose sanctions in connection with the law school’s non-compliance with the Standard. (b) The period of time by which a law school is required to demonstrate compliance with a Standard shall not exceed two years from the date of determination of noncompliance, except as provided for in subsection (c). (c) Upon request of the law school and for good cause shown, the Committee may extend the date of compliance or may recommend that the Council extend the date of compliance. Rule 15: Reconsideration; Right to Appeal (a) A law school does not have the right to request reconsideration of a decision or recommendation made by the Accreditation Committee or to request reconsideration of a decision made by the Council. (b) A law school has a right to appeal a decision of the Accreditation Committee as provided in Rule 23. (c) A law school has a right to appeal a decision of the Council as provided in Rule 36. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 10 of 16 59 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 (v) a pattern of misconduct; (vi) bad faith obstruction of an investigation or sanction proceeding by failing to comply with requests of the Managing Director’s Office, a Fact Finder, or rules of a sanction proceeding; (vii) submission of false or misleading evidence, false or misleading statements, or other deceptive practices during the investigation process or sanction proceeding; (viii) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (ix) injury to former, current, or prospective law students; (x) apparent amount of monetary, strategic, or reputational gain; (xi) failure to have sufficient systems in place to ensure compliance, including the law school dean’s lack of oversight; (xii) institutional incentive structures that may contribute to noncompliance; and (xiii) failure to enquire or investigate when circumstances warrant enquiry or investigation. (2) Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify withholding or reducing a sanction and include, without limitation: (i) absence of a prior history of violations; (ii) degree of negligence, recklessness, or knowledge; (iii) apparent lack of monetary, strategic, or reputational gain; (iv) self-reporting of violation; (v) timely good faith effort to rectify consequences of violation; (vi) full and free disclosure to and cooperation with Managing Director’s Office, cooperation with fact finder, or cooperative attitude toward sanction proceedings; and (vii) imposition of other sanctions. Rule 17: Sanctions for Failure to Cure Noncompliance with a Standard If, following a determination by the Committee that a law school is not in compliance with a Standard, the law school fails to bring itself into compliance within the time specified by the Committee, including any extension for good cause, or fails to complete remedial action directed under 21(c) or fails to comply with sanctions imposed by the Committee or Council under 16(b), the Committee shall impose or recommend that the Council impose further remedial action or sanctions as provided for in 16(c) and 16(d) or recommend that the Council extend the period for the law school to bring itself into compliance. Rule 18: Monitoring and Enforcing Compliance with Sanctions (a) The Committee shall monitor the law school’s compliance with any requirements for remedial action, any sanctions, or any requirements of probation imposed under these Rules. If the Committee concludes that the law school is not complying with the sanctions that have been imposed, or not making adequate progress toward bringing itself into compliance with the Standards, or not fulfilling the requirements of its probation, the Committee may impose or recommend that the Council impose additional sanctions referred to in 16(b). The Committee may itself impose any sanction under 16(b), except for sanctions under (7) or (8). Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 11 of 16 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 60 (b) If a law school has been placed on probation, the law school shall demonstrate compliance with the Standards by the end of the period fixed for probation. If the law school fails to demonstrate compliance, then the Committee shall: (1) Recommend that the Council withdraw approval; or (2) Recommend that, for good cause shown, the Council extend the period for the law school to bring itself into compliance. (c) If a law school has been placed on probation, and the law school demonstrates compliance with the Standards by the end of the period fixed for probation, then the Committee shall recommend to the Council that probationary status be removed. V. Hearings and Meetings of the Accreditation Committee Rule 19: Accreditation Committee Consideration (a) The Accreditation Committee shall consider the status of a law school under Part III or an application from a law school under Part VII based on a record consisting of the following, as appropriate: (1) Any fact finder’s report relating to the subject matter under consideration and any response from the law school; (2) The most recent site evaluation report and any response from the law school; (3) The most recent site evaluation questionnaire; (4) The most recent annual questionnaire; (5) Any letters reporting Committee or Council decisions written subsequent to the most recent site evaluation report, and any responses of the law school; (6) The application for provisional or full approval; (7) The application for acquiescence in a major change; (8) The application for a variance of a standard; and (9) Any other information that the Managing Director and the Chair determine relevant to the matter under consideration. (b) The Committee shall make findings of fact and state conclusions with respect to the matter under consideration. If the matter falls within the provisions of Rule 3(a), the Committee shall make recommendations to the Council. Rule 20: Attendance at Accreditation Committee Meetings and Hearings (a) A law school has a right to have representatives of the law school, including legal counsel, appear before the Committee at a hearing regarding (i) the law school’s application for provisional approval, (ii) the law school’s application for full approval, (iii) the law school’s application for Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 12 of 16 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 62 (b) The Managing Director in consultation with the Chair of the Council may set reasonable limitations on the number of law school representatives that may appear at a meeting and on the amount of time allotted for the appearance. (c) Except as permitted in subsection (a), a law school does not have a right to appear at a Council meeting, hearing or proceeding on any matter related to the accreditation of a law school. (d) The Chair of the Council may invite the Chair of the Accreditation Committee to appear at the hearing, if the Chair determines that such person could reasonably be expected to provide information helpful to the Committee. The Chair of the Accreditation Committee may not present new evidence unless the law school has the opportunity to respond to that new evidence. (e) The Managing Director or designee and any additional staff designated by the Managing Director shall be present at Accreditation Committee meetings and hearings. Legal Counsel for the Section may also be present at Accreditation Committee meetings and hearings. Rule 23: Council Consideration of Appeal from Accreditation Committee Decision (a) A law school may appeal a decision of the Committee by filing with the Managing Director a written appeal within 30 days after the date of the letter reporting the Committee’s decision. (b) The Council shall consider the appeal promptly and, when feasible, at its next regularly scheduled meeting. (c) A law school shall not have a right to appear before the Council in connection with the appeal. Rule 24: Evidence and Record for Decision (a) In any action on a recommendation of the Committee or in any appeal from a Committee decision, the Council shall adopt the Committee’s findings of fact unless the Council determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. (b) In any action on a recommendation of the Committee or in any appeal from a Committee decision, the record on which the Council shall make its decision shall be the following: (1) The record before the Committee on which the Committee based its decision or recommendation; (2) The letter setting forth the Committee’s decision or recommendation; (3) The written appeal by the law school, if applicable; (4) Any written submission by the Committee in response to an appeal, if applicable; (5) Any testimony of the law school in a hearing or an appearance before the Council. (c) Except as specifically provided otherwise in these Rules, the law school shall not present any evidence to the Council that was not before the Committee at the time of the Committee’s decision or recommendation. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 13 of 16 75 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 (c) If the law school’s response to a complaint does not establish that it is in compliance with the Standards on the matters raised by the complaint, then the Managing Director shall refer the complaint, along with the law school’s response, the fact-finder’s report, if any, and any other relevant information, to the Committee for further action in accordance with these Rules. Rule 45: Notice of Disposition of Complaint The Managing Director will promptly notify the person submitting a complaint of the final disposition of the complaint. The notification shall not include a copy of the law school’s response, if any, and shall not include a copy of any written decision of the Committee. Rule 46: Appeal of Managing Director’s Disposition of Complaint There is no appeal to any body of a conclusion by the Managing Director that a complaint does not raise issues under the Standards. Rule 47: Review of Complaint Process To ensure the proper administration of this complaint process, the Committee shall periodically review the written complaints received in the Managing Director’s Office and their disposition. Rule 48: Records of Complaints The Managing Director’s Office shall keep a record of the complaints under Part VIII of these Rules for a period of ten years. X. Transparency and Confidentiality Rule 49: Confidentiality of Accreditation Matters Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, all matters relating to the accreditation of a law school, including any proceedings, hearings or meetings of the Committee or Council, shall be confidential. Rule 50: Communication of Decisions and Recommendations When a law school is the subject of a decision or recommendation in accordance with these Rules, the Managing Director shall promptly inform the dean and the president of the decision or recommendation, in writing. Rule 51: Communication and Distribution of Site Evaluation Reports (a) Except as provided in Part X of these Rules, site evaluation and fact finding reports shall be confidential. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 14 of 16 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 76 (b) The law school may release an entire site evaluation report or fact finding report or portions of a report. (1) If the law school makes public the site evaluation report or any portion of it, the law school must notify the Managing Director at or before the time of the disclosure. In the event the law school discloses only a portion of the site evaluation report, the Managing Director, in consultation with the Chair of the Council, may subsequently disclose any other portions of the site evaluation report or the entire report. (2) Discussion of the contents of a site evaluation report with, or release of the report to, the faculty, the university administration, or the governing board of the university or law school, does not constitute release of the report to the public within the meaning of this Rule. (c) If the dean determines that a site evaluation report for the dean’s law school contains criticism of the professional performance, competence, or behavior of a member of the law school’s faculty or professional staff: (1) The dean shall make available to the person affected the relevant portions of the report and shall send the Managing Director a copy of those relevant portions and any accompanying memorandum or letter to the affected person. (2) The affected person shall have the right to file with the Managing Director a document responding to the criticism contained in the site evaluation report. (3) Any such response to the criticism shall become part of the law school’s official file. Rule 52: Disclosure of Decision Letters (a) Except as provided in Rule 53, decisions and recommendations of the Committee and Council shall be confidential. (b) If the law school makes public a decision or recommendation of the Committee or Council, the law school must make public the entire decision or recommendation. (1) If the law school makes public a decision or recommendation of the Committee or Council, the law school must notify the Managing Director at or before the time of the disclosure. (i) The Managing Director, in consultation with the Chair of the Council, may subsequently correct any inaccurate or misleading information released or published by the law school in connection with the disclosure or the decision or recommendation. (ii) A corrective communication by the Managing Director may include the disclosure of portions of the site evaluation report or the entire site evaluation report. (2) Discussion of the contents of a decision or recommendation with, or release of the report to, the faculty, the university, or the governing board of the university or law school, does not constitute release of the decision or recommendation to the public within the meaning of this Rule. Rule 53: Applications, Decisions and Recommendations Made Public (a) When a law school has applied for provisional or full approval, acquiescence in a major change, or a variance, the Council or the Managing Director shall provide public notice: (1) That the law school has submitted an application; and (2) Of the procedural steps for consideration of the application. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 15 of 16 77 ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017 (b) After a law school has been notified of the Committee’s decision or recommendation, the Managing Director may state publicly the conclusions of the Committee and its decision or recommendation, with an explanation of the procedural steps in further consideration of the matter, concerning: (1) The law school’s application for provisional or full approval; (2) The law school’s application for acquiescence in a major change; (3) The law school’s application for a variance; (4) The imposition of sanctions or specific remedial action on the law school; (5) The placing of the law school on probation; or (6) The withdrawal of the law school’s approval; (c) After a law school has been notified of the Council’s decision, the Managing Director shall provide public notification of the Council’s conclusions and decision (except as to a sanction that is explicitly not public), with an explanation of any procedural steps for further consideration of the matter, concerning: (1) The law school’s application for provisional or full approval; (2) The law school’s application for acquiescence in a major change; (3) The law school’s application for a variance; (4) The imposition of sanctions or specific remedial action on the law school; (5) The placing of the law school on probation; or (6) The withdrawal of the law school’s approval; (d) After a matter concerning a law school has been acted upon by an Appeals Panel, the Council or the Managing Director shall provide public notification of the conclusions and decision of the Appeals Panel. Rule 54: Statistical Reports (a) School specific information and statistical reports derived from data contained in all questionnaires are for the use of the Council, the Committee, the Managing Director, and deans of ABA-approved law schools, and are not for public release. (b) Information contained in statistical reports prepared from data contained in annual questionnaires is for exclusive and official use by those persons authorized by the Council to receive such statistical reports, except as public disclosure of information about specific law schools is authorized under Standard 509 or has been made public by the law school. (c) The Managing Director may release general data from the statistical reports and questionnaires that are not school-specific. Rule 55: Publication of List of Approved Law Schools The Council shall publish annually a complete list of all approved law schools. The list shall be published in one or more venues designated by the Council pursuant to Standard 509. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-4 Filed 04/21/17 Page 16 of 16 Exhibit 3 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-5 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 2 By Year Approved | Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/by_year_approved.html[4/5/2017 6:06:46 PM] | myABA | Log In ABA GROUPS ABA-Approved Law Schools By Year Approved Official Guide to ABA- Approved Law Schools By Year Approved ABA-Approved Law Schools by Year +denotes provisional approval 2016 Indiana Tech Law School+ 2015 Concordia University College of Law+ Mitchell | Hamline School of Law (formerly William Mitchell College of Law and Hamline University School of Law) 2014 Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law+ 2013 Belmont University College of Law 2012 University of La Verne College of Law (previously provisionally approved 2006-2011) University of Massachusetts School of Law-Dartmouth 2011 University of California-Irvine School of Law 2008 Charlotte School of Law Drexel University School of Law Elon University School of Law 2007 Arizona Summit Law School (formerly Phoenix School of Law) 2006 Charleston School of Law Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law Liberty University School of Law 2005 Atlanta's John Marshall Law School Law Schools Alphabetically Public Law Schools Private Law Schools Law Schools By Year Approved ABA-Approved Law Schools Accreditation Bar Admissions Distance Education Foreign Study Post J.D. / Non J.D. Pre Law Pro Bono Questionnaire Standards Statistics Legal Education Links The online Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools allows you to download Standard 509 Information and Employment Summary data charts. The Guide also contains links to other legal education statistics and resources. 0 Home > ABA Groups > Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar > Resources > ABA-Approved Law Schools > By Year Approved Official Guide JOIN THE ABA SHOP ABA CALENDAR MEMBER DIRECTORY Membership ABA Groups Diversity Advocacy Resources for Lawyers Publishing CLE Insurance News About Us Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-5 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 2 Exhibit 4 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-6 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 3 From: Barry Currier Date: Sunday, July 24, 2016 at 6:50 PM To: Jay Conison Cc: Chidi Ogene , "Adams, William" Subject: RE: ABA Letter to Charlotte Jay, This confirms receipt of your email. As we discussed, your note and my reply here stay any requirements for you to make the disclosures that the Decision Letter requires you to make within five business days of the date of the letter and means that we will not publish notice of the committee’s action on our website within that timeframe. Please address the appeal Greg Murphy, who will be chair by the time you file: Gregory Murphy, Esq. Council Chair c/o Managing Director’s Office ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar 321 North Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 You can send the appeal to me by attachment to an email, if you wish. There is no need to follow up with a hard copy. We will see you on Wednesday. Barry __________________ Barry A. Currier I Managing Director, Accreditation and Legal Education ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar 321 N. Clark St., 21st Floor I Chicago, IL 60654 312.988.6744 (office) I 310.400.2702 (mobile) barry.currier@americanbar.org From: Jay Conison Sent: Sunday, July 24, 2016 5:18 PM To: Currier, Barry Cc: Chidi Ogene; Adams, William Subject: ABA Letter to Charlotte Barry— Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-6 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 3 Thank you for taking time for a preliminary conversation today. As we discussed, Charlotte is very likely to appeal all or part of the Accreditation Committee decision. So would you please stay any action or requirements regarding public disclosure. We look forward to our discussion Wednesday. Regards, Jay Conison 201 S. College Street │ Charlotte, NC 28244 Telephone 704.808.8022 │ Mobile 704.575.1869 CSL-Disclaimer: This email transmission, and any documents, files or previous e-mail messages attached to it, may contain confidential, privileged and/or proprietary information for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). If you are not an intended recipient or a person responsible for delivering it to an intended recipient, any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this transmission is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please: (1) immediately notify me by reply e-mail; and (2) destroy the original (and any copies of) this transmission and its attachments without reading or saving in any manner. Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-6 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 3 Exhibit 5 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-7 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 5 Accreditation Archives http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/accreditation_archives.html[4/5/2017 6:08:02 PM] | myABA | Log In ABA GROUPS Accreditation Accreditation Archives DPCC Archives Appeals Panel Schedule of Law School Fees Schools Seeking ABA Approval Law School Site Visits Accreditation Archives December 2016 Council Grants Full Approval to University of Massachusetts School of Law-Dartmouth November 2016 Public Notice of Council Decision to Place Charlotte School of Law on Probation (November 15, 2016) Public Notice of Council Decision to Censure Valparaiso University School of Law (November 15,2016) Statement on Accreditation Actions Regarding the University of North Texas at Dallas College of Law August 2016 Public Notice of Council Decision to Direct Ave Maria School of Law to Take Specific Remedial Action June 2016 Council Grants Full Approval to Belmont University College of Law Council Acquiesces in Application of Willamette University College of Law to Operate a Separate Location in Portland, Oregon March 2016 Summary of Council Actions Regarding the Standards at March 2016 Meeting Council Grants Full ABA Approval to University of La Verne College of Law Council Grants Provisional ABA Approval to Indiana Tech Law School Council Acquiesces in Application of Albany Law School to Affiliate with University at Albany-SUNY December 2015 The Council acquiesced in the application of Hamline University School of Law and William Mitchell College of Law to combine the two schools into Mitchell | Hamline School of Law. The Council acquiesced in the application of the University of New Hampshire School of Law to establish a part-time Patent Track Program. The Council acquiesced in the application of Western State Coillege of Law at Argosy University for a change in the location of its campus from Fullerton, California, to Irvine, California. August 2015 Public Notice of Council Decision to Deny Provisional Approval to Indiana Tech Law School Council acquiesces in application of Rutgers University School of Law-Camden and Rutgers University School of Law-Newark to merge into one fully approved law school: Rutgers University School of Law June 2015 Concordia University School of Law Granted Provisional Approval 2012 Task Force on the Accreditation of Foreign Law Schools Task Force Report Executive Summary and Reports Supplemental Report 1: June 2010 Report on the Special Committee on Foreign Law Schools Supplemental Report 2: 2010 Report by Chair Christine Durham to the Council CCJ Resolution 2007 Accreditation Policy Task Force Accreditation Policy Task Force Report (May 2007) 2007 Accreditation Task Force Charge Open Forum Transcript (January 2007) Open Forum Transcript (February 2007)Comments 2003 Task Force on Foreign Programs Final Report Semester Abroad Criteria Foreign Summer Program Criteria Student Study at a Foreign Institution Criteria 2002 Task Force on Accreditation Processes Cover Memo Final Report 1995 Wahl Commission (Commission to Review the Substance & Process of the ABA's Accreditation of American Law Schools) Final Report Supplementary Report ABA Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education Issues Its Final Report (2015) 20 Years After the MacCrate Report: 2013 Report of the Special Committee on the Professional Educational Continuum 2010 Report of the Special Committee on Foreign Law Schools Seeking Approval Under ABA Standards (Kane Report) 2009 Report of the Special Committee on International Issues 2008 Reports of the Special Committees on Outcome Measures, Security of Position and Transparency Law School Consumer Data Available in New Easy-to-Use Format (February 2015) 0 Home > ABA Groups > Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar > Accreditation > Accreditation Archives Accreditation Decisions Task Force Reports Special Committee Reports Data Collection JOIN THE ABA SHOP ABA CALENDAR MEMBER DIRECTORY Membership ABA Groups Diversity Advocacy Resources for Lawyers Publishing CLE Insurance News About Us Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-7 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 5 Accreditation Archives http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/accreditation_archives.html[4/5/2017 6:08:02 PM] University of Oregon School of Law granted acquiescence in establishment of a separate location in Portland, Oregon Council Denies Application of Indiana Tech Law School for ABA Approval March 2015 Council Acquiesces in Widener University School of Law's Application to Separate Campuses into Two Separate ABA- Approved Law Schools Council acquiesces in application of Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center to realign with Louisiana State University December 2014 Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law Granted Provisional Approval August 2014 Council granted provisional approval to the Tampa Bay branch campus of the fully approved Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School June 2014 Penn State University Receives Approval to Operate Two Independent and Fully Approved Law Schools University of California-Irvine, School of Law Granted Full Approval Council approved Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School Teach-out Plan for its Ann Arbor campus. Council granted acquiescence in application of Seattle University School of Law to establish a separate location in Anchorage, Alaska. Council recognized Savannah Law School as an approved branch campus of the fully approved Atlanta's John Marshall Law School. December 2013 University of Kansas School of Law Public Censure ABA News Release Regarding University of Kansas Public Censure _____________________________ Rutgers University-Camden School of Law Public Censure ABA News Release Regarding Rutgers-Camden Public Censure Council granted acquiescence in application of the University of New Hampshire School of Law to be integrated into the university. Council approved application of William Mitchell College of Law to offer a part-time hybrid J.D. option. August 2013 Council Acquiesces in Texas Wesleyan School of Law/Texas A&M University Merger June 2013 Belmont University College of Law Granted Provisional Approval October 2012 Statement Regarding Dismissal of LMU Appeal and Lawsuit July 2012 Council Affirms Its Decision to Deny Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law Provisional Approval Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law has appealed the Council's denial of its application for provisional approval on remand from the Appeals Panel. The Council's decision on remand is stayed pending the Appeals Panel's decision on the second appeal under Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Compliance with Revised Standard 509 (August 2013) ABA Releases Class of 2012 Law Graduate Data March 2012 Statement on Collection of Employment Class of 2012 Law Graduate Employment Data Updated Announcement Regarding Collection of Employment Data (March 2012) Council Approves Changes in Collection & Publication of Law Graduate Employment Data (December 2011) Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-7 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 5 Accreditation Archives http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/accreditation_archives.html[4/5/2017 6:08:02 PM] Schools. June 2012 University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth School of Law Granted Provisional Approval Thomas M. Cooley Law School's Ann Arbor Branch Campus Granted Full Approval University of Illinois College of Law Public Censure March 2012 University of La Verne College of Law Granted Provisional Approval December 2011 Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law Denial of Provisional Approval Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law has appealed the Council's denial of its application for provisional approval. The Council's decision is stayed pending the decision of the Appeals Panel under Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools. August 2011 Villanova University School of Law Public Censure Charleston School of Law Granted Full Approval Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law Granted Full Approval June 2011 University of LaVerne College of Law Denied Full Approval Final Council Decision Regarding the University of La Verne College of Law The University of La Verne College of Law Response Regarding Submission of Comments Charlotte School of Law Granted Full Approval Elon University School of Law Granted Full Approval University of California-Irvine, School of Law Granted Provisional Approval March 2011 Changes Approved for Statement of Ethical Practices in the Process of Law School Accreditation 2016 Summary of September 2016 Standards Review Committee Actions Standards and Rules Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-7 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 5 Accreditation Archives http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/accreditation_archives.html[4/5/2017 6:08:02 PM] ___________________________________ 2016-2017 Review of ABA Standards, Interpretations, and Rules of Procedure ________________________ Adoption and Implementation of Revised Standards and Criteria Related to Foreign Study 2015 Adoption & Implementation of Revised Standards and Rules 2014 Revised Standards and Rules Concurred in by ABA House of Delegates ___________________________________ Implementation of New Standards and Rules for Approval of Law Schools ________________________________ Revised Memo on Compliance with Standard 509: July 2014 _________________________________ 2013 Compliance with Revised Standard 509 2012 Standard 509 (Consumer Information), Rule 16 (Sanctions) and Foreign Program Criteria (August 2012) Information on New Standard 509 2011 Standards 105, 306, 512 and Rules 20, 24 (August 2011) Standard 509, Rules 10, 22, 24 (February 2011) 2010 Revisions to Criteria for Approval of Study Abroad Programs Approved (August 2010) Council Adopts Resolution on Tracking Bar Exam Passage (December 2013) 2011 Resolution on Interference with Clinics 2010 Resolution on the Accreditation of Foreign Law Schools Resolutions Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-7 Filed 04/21/17 Page 5 of 5 Exhibit 6 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-8 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 4 1 U.S. Department of Education 1 Office of Postsecondary Education 2 3 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 4 INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND INTEGRITY 5 (NACIQI) 6 June 22, 2016 7 8:30 a.m. - 5:30 p.m. 8 9 Double Tree by Hilton Hotel 10 Washington Ballroom 11 Washington, DC - Crystal City 12 300 Army Navy Drive 13 Arlington, VA 22202 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-8 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 4 182 So it’s a combination -- there’s a group called the National Conference of 1 Bar Examiners which is the national group that works with bar examining offices and 2 they are doing a lot of good work and one of the things they are willing to do is be the 3 collector of all of that information if the states would provide it to them the bar 4 examining offices are very thinly staffed and have tight budgets and the notion that they 5 would send out letters to you know 60 or 70 different law schools you know twice a year 6 with name and bar pass/fail information is just a task that for the most part they have 7 been unwilling to assume. 8 But we do have a national organization that is developing a national bar 9 exam number so that a student who takes first in California and then takes again in 10 Oregon could easily be tracked. So we are on our way to actually getting very good 11 comprehensive data but bar admission is a matter for each state to determine under the 12 authority and control of the state and so it requires the cooperation and buy-in of the 13 Supreme Court of the state and the bar admissions professionals in that state. 14 MS. DERLIN: Thank you I will pass this back to you Sue. 15 MS. PHILLIPS: Art? 16 MR. KEISER: A couple of questions. I would like to get back to the 17 student achievement issues and the issue of pass rates. How many institutions have you 18 denied accreditation to for low pass rates? 19 MS. BERCH: For low pass rates alone none. We have several things 20 going on the bar pass rate 316 is something that can trigger a further inquiry by us that 21 will get more monitoring. As Mr. Currier just noted the time of enforcement under our 22 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-8 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 4 183 existing rule stretches out for almost five years it’s why we are trying to do away with 1 our existing rule and update to a rule that would allow us to enforce more quickly. 2 Bar pass rate is an item that we will look at to help us determine under 501 3 and schools can be disciplined under Standard 501 if it is determine that they are not 4 admitting students that appear capable of not only going through the program of study but 5 passing the bar so it is something that we can consider there and we have. 6 MR. KEISER: Over the past five years how many institutions have you 7 withdrawn your accreditation from? 8 MR. CURRIER: Zero, zero. 9 MR. KEISER: Yet in Florida I read about institutions with very low pass 10 rates. Is it a kind of a that moveable standard that the pass rates I mean some of the rates 11 I saw in the 30 percentile now I don’t know if that is true or not I don’t believe the press 12 most of the time. But those seem to be published rates of a number of institutions with 13 fairly low pass rates. 14 MR. CURRIER: And I don’t want to seem defensive at all about this and 15 my wife always says watch your tongue so signal when I’m -- what you see in the press is 16 usually first time pass rates so what you don’t know is if the school has 30% or 50% or 17 70% first-time pass rate, you don’t really know a year later what that pass rate is so that’s 18 one point the reports are a first-time pass rate information because that is what the bar 19 examiners make public. 20 Secondly a lot of those reports relate to the mid-year exam, bar exam that 21 is given in February, the bar exam is given in February and July -- I would say 75 - 85% 22 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-8 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 4 Exhibit 7 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 9 EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2012 GRADUATES 201 South College Street Suite 400 Phone : 704-971-8500 Charlotte, NC 28244 Website : charlottelaw.edu EMPLOYMENT STATUS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 90 17 2 14 123 Employed - J.D. Advantage 22 14 4 23 63 Employed - Professional Position 10 0 2 0 12 Employed - Non-Professional Position 0 1 5 1 7 Employed - Undeterminable 1 0 1 1 3 Pursuing Graduate Degree Full Time 3 Unemployed - Start Date Deferred 0 Unemployed - Not Seeking 3 Unemployed - Seeking 20 Employment Status Unknown 0 Total Graduates 234 EMPLOYMENT LOCATION STATE NUMBER State - Largest Employment North Carolina 154 State - 2nd Largest Employment South Carolina 14 State - 3rd Largest Employment Virginia 7 Employed in Foreign Countries 0 LAW SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY FUNDED POSITIONS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 2 3 0 12 17 Employed - J.D. Advantage 0 1 0 22 23 Employed - Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Employed - Non-Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Total Employed by Law School/University 2 4 0 34 40 EMPLOYMENT TYPE FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Law Firms Solo 8 0 0 0 8 2 - 10 46 0 4 0 50 11 - 25 2 1 0 0 3 26 - 50 4 0 0 0 4 51 - 100 2 0 0 0 2 101 - 250 1 0 0 0 1 251 - 500 1 0 0 0 1 501 + 1 1 0 0 2 Unknown Size 2 0 0 0 2 Business & Industry 38 26 9 3 76 Government 9 0 0 0 9 Pub. Int. (inc. Pub. Def.) 7 2 0 27 36 Clerkships - Federal 0 0 0 0 0 Clerkships - State & Local 0 0 0 0 0 Clerkships - Other 0 0 0 0 0 Education 2 2 0 8 12 Employer Type Unknown 0 0 1 1 2 Total 123 32 14 39 208 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 9 Employed Bar Passage Required. A position in this category requires the graduate to pass a bar exam and to be licensed to practice law in one or more jurisdictions. The positions that have such a requirement are varied and include, for example, positions in law firms, business, or government. However, not all positions in law firms, business, or government require bar passage; for example, a paralegal position would not. Positions that require the graduate to pass a bar exam and be licensed after beginning employment in order to retain the position are included in this category. Judicial clerkships are also included in this category. Employed J.D. Advantage. A position in this category is one for which the employer sought an individual with a J.D., and perhaps even required a J.D., or for which the J.D. provided a demonstrable advantage in obtaining or performing the job, but which does not itself require bar passage or an active law license or involve practicing law. Examples of positions for which a J.D. is an advantage include a corporate contracts administrator, alternative dispute resolution specialist, government regulatory analyst, FBI agent, and accountant. Also included might be jobs in personnel or human resources, jobs with investment banks, jobs with consulting firms, jobs doing compliance work in business and industry, jobs in law firm professional development, and jobs in law school career services offices, admissions offices, or other law school administrative offices. Doctors or nurses who plan to work in a litigation, insurance, or risk management setting, or as expert witnesses, would fall into this category, as would journalists and teachers (in a higher education setting) of law and law related topics. It is an indicator that a position does not fall into this category if a J.D. is uncommon among persons holding such a position. Employed Professional Position. A position in this category is one that requires professional skills or training but for which a J.D. is neither required nor a demonstrable advantage. Examples of persons in this category include a math or science teacher, business manager, or performing arts specialist. Other examples include professions such as doctors, nurses, engineers, or architects, if a J.D. was not demonstrably advantageous in obtaining the position or in performing the duties of the position. Employed Non-Professional Position. A position in this category is one that does not require any special professional skills or training. Short-term. A short-term position is one that has a definite term of less than one year. Thus, a clerkship that has a definite term of one year or more is not a short- term position. It also includes a position that is of an indefinite length if that position is not reasonably expected to last for one year or more. A position that is envisioned by the graduate and the employer to extend for one year or more is not a short-term position even though it is conditioned on bar passage and licensure. Thus, a long-term position that is conditioned on passing the bar exam by a certain date does not become a short-term position because of the condition. Long-term. A long-term position is one that does not have a definite or indefinite term of less than one year. It may have a definite length of time as long as the time is one year or longer. It may also have an indefinite length as long as it is expected to last one year or more. The possibility that a short-term position may evolve into a long-term position does not make the position a long- term position. Full-time. A full-time position is one in which the graduate works a minimum of 35 hours per week. A full-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Part-time. A part-time position is one in which the graduate works less than 35 hours per week. A part-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Submitted On 3/15/2013 3:58:32 PM Last Updated 3/15/2013 1:16:38 PM Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 9 EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2013 GRADUATES 201 South College Street Suite 400 Phone : 704-971-8500 Charlotte, NC 28244 Website : charlottelaw.edu EMPLOYMENT STATUS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 129 18 2 4 153 Employed - J.D. Advantage 61 21 3 20 105 Employed - Professional Position 18 0 2 1 21 Employed - Non-Professional Position 2 0 4 2 8 Employed - Undeterminable 0 0 0 0 0 Pursuing Graduate Degree Full Time 7 Unemployed - Start Date Deferred 4 Unemployed - Not Seeking 3 Unemployed - Seeking 46 Employment Status Unknown 3 Total Graduates 350 EMPLOYMENT LOCATION STATE NUMBER State - Largest Employment North Carolina 191 State - 2nd Largest Employment South Carolina 29 State - 3rd Largest Employment Colorado 6 Employed in Foreign Countries 1 LAW SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY FUNDED POSITIONS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 8 6 0 3 17 Employed - J.D. Advantage 1 8 0 19 28 Employed - Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Employed - Non-Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Total Employed by Law School/University 9 14 0 22 45 EMPLOYMENT TYPE FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Law Firms Solo 23 0 1 0 24 2 - 10 68 1 2 0 71 11 - 25 7 0 1 0 8 26 - 50 2 0 0 0 2 51 - 100 1 0 0 0 1 101 - 250 1 0 0 0 1 251 - 500 1 1 0 0 2 501 + 2 1 0 0 3 Unknown Size 1 0 0 0 1 Business & Industry 62 22 6 4 94 Government 21 0 0 0 21 Pub. Int. 13 10 0 6 29 Clerkships - Federal 1 0 0 0 1 Clerkships - State & Local 5 0 0 0 5 Clerkships - Other 0 0 0 0 0 Education 2 4 1 17 24 Employer Type Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 Total 210 39 11 27 287 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 9 Employed Bar Passage Required. A position in this category requires the graduate to pass a bar exam and to be licensed to practice law in one or more jurisdictions. The positions that have such a requirement are varied and include, for example, positions in law firms, business, or government. However, not all positions in law firms, business, or government require bar passage; for example, a paralegal position would not. Positions that require the graduate to pass a bar exam and be licensed after beginning employment in order to retain the position are included in this category. Judicial clerkships are also included in this category. Employed J.D. Advantage. A position in this category is one for which the employer sought an individual with a J.D., and perhaps even required a J.D., or for which the J.D. provided a demonstrable advantage in obtaining or performing the job, but which does not itself require bar passage or an active law license or involve practicing law. Examples of positions for which a J.D. is an advantage include a corporate contracts administrator, alternative dispute resolution specialist, government regulatory analyst, FBI agent, and accountant. Also included might be jobs in personnel or human resources, jobs with investment banks, jobs with consulting firms, jobs doing compliance work in business and industry, jobs in law firm professional development, and jobs in law school career services offices, admissions offices, or other law school administrative offices. Doctors or nurses who plan to work in a litigation, insurance, or risk management setting, or as expert witnesses, would fall into this category, as would journalists and teachers (in a higher education setting) of law and law related topics. It is an indicator that a position does not fall into this category if a J.D. is uncommon among persons holding such a position. Employed Professional Position. A position in this category is one that requires professional skills or training but for which a J.D. is neither required nor a demonstrable advantage. Examples of persons in this category include a math or science teacher, business manager, or performing arts specialist. Other examples include professions such as doctors, nurses, engineers, or architects, if a J.D. was not demonstrably advantageous in obtaining the position or in performing the duties of the position. Employed Non-Professional Position. A position in this category is one that does not require any special professional skills or training. Short-term. A short-term position is one that has a definite term of less than one year. Thus, a clerkship that has a definite term of one year or more is not a short- term position. It also includes a position that is of an indefinite length if that position is not reasonably expected to last for one year or more. A position that is envisioned by the graduate and the employer to extend for one year or more is not a short-term position even though it is conditioned on bar passage and licensure. Thus, a long-term position that is conditioned on passing the bar exam by a certain date does not become a short-term position because of the condition. Long-term. A long-term position is one that does not have a definite or indefinite term of less than one year. It may have a definite length of time as long as the time is one year or longer. It may also have an indefinite length as long as it is expected to last one year or more. The possibility that a short-term position may evolve into a long-term position does not make the position a long- term position. Full-time. A full-time position is one in which the graduate works a minimum of 35 hours per week. A full-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Part-time. A part-time position is one in which the graduate works less than 35 hours per week. A part-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Submitted On 3/14/2014 2:17:27 PM Last Updated 3/14/2014 11:07:28 AM Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 5 of 9 EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2014 GRADUATES 201 South College Street Suite 400 Phone : 704-971-8500 Charlotte, NC 28244 Website : charlottelaw.edu EMPLOYMENT STATUS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 141 47 3 3 194 Employed - J.D. Advantage 71 3 3 2 79 Employed - Professional Position 23 3 2 1 29 Employed - Non-Professional Position 2 0 4 5 11 Employed - Undeterminable 0 0 0 0 0 Pursuing Graduate Degree Full Time 7 Unemployed - Start Date Deferred 1 Unemployed - Not Seeking 2 Unemployed - Seeking 75 Employment Status Unknown 15 Total Graduates 413 EMPLOYMENT LOCATION STATE NUMBER State - Largest Employment North Carolina 183 State - 2nd Largest Employment South Carolina 37 State - 3rd Largest Employment New York 10 Employed in Foreign Countries 2 LAW SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY FUNDED POSITIONS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 0 33 0 0 33 Employed - J.D. Advantage 0 0 0 0 0 Employed - Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Employed - Non-Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Total Employed by Law School/University 0 33 0 0 33 EMPLOYMENT TYPE FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Law Firms Solo 22 0 0 0 22 2 - 10 71 6 4 3 84 11 - 25 13 0 0 0 13 26 - 50 1 0 0 0 1 51 - 100 1 0 0 0 1 101 - 250 0 0 0 0 0 251 - 500 1 0 0 0 1 501 + 0 1 0 0 1 Unknown Size 4 0 0 0 4 Business & Industry 88 17 7 8 120 Government 15 2 0 0 17 Pub. Int. 9 27 0 0 36 Clerkships - Federal 1 0 0 0 1 Clerkships - State & Local 8 0 0 0 8 Clerkships - Other 0 0 0 0 0 Education 3 0 1 0 4 Employer Type Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 Total 237 53 12 11 313 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 6 of 9 Employed Bar Passage Required. A position in this category requires the graduate to pass a bar exam and to be licensed to practice law in one or more jurisdictions. The positions that have such a requirement are varied and include, for example, positions in law firms, business, or government. However, not all positions in law firms, business, or government require bar passage; for example, a paralegal position would not. Positions that require the graduate to pass a bar exam and be licensed after beginning employment in order to retain the position are included in this category. Judicial clerkships are also included in this category. Employed J.D. Advantage. A position in this category is one for which the employer sought an individual with a J.D., and perhaps even required a J.D., or for which the J.D. provided a demonstrable advantage in obtaining or performing the job, but which does not itself require bar passage or an active law license or involve practicing law. Examples of positions for which a J.D. is an advantage include a corporate contracts administrator, alternative dispute resolution specialist, government regulatory analyst, FBI agent, and accountant. Also included might be jobs in personnel or human resources, jobs with investment banks, jobs with consulting firms, jobs doing compliance work in business and industry, jobs in law firm professional development, and jobs in law school career services offices, admissions offices, or other law school administrative offices. Doctors or nurses who plan to work in a litigation, insurance, or risk management setting, or as expert witnesses, would fall into this category, as would journalists and teachers (in a higher education setting) of law and law related topics. It is an indicator that a position does not fall into this category if a J.D. is uncommon among persons holding such a position. Employed Professional Position. A position in this category is one that requires professional skills or training but for which a J.D. is neither required nor a demonstrable advantage. Examples of persons in this category include a math or science teacher, business manager, or performing arts specialist. Other examples include professions such as doctors, nurses, engineers, or architects, if a J.D. was not demonstrably advantageous in obtaining the position or in performing the duties of the position. Employed Non-Professional Position. A position in this category is one that does not require any special professional skills or training. Short-term. A short-term position is one that has a definite term of less than one year. Thus, a clerkship that has a definite term of one year or more is not a short- term position. It also includes a position that is of an indefinite length if that position is not reasonably expected to last for one year or more. A position that is envisioned by the graduate and the employer to extend for one year or more is not a short-term position even though it is conditioned on bar passage and licensure. Thus, a long-term position that is conditioned on passing the bar exam by a certain date does not become a short-term position because of the condition. Long-term. A long-term position is one that does not have a definite or indefinite term of less than one year. It may have a definite length of time as long as the time is one year or longer. It may also have an indefinite length as long as it is expected to last one year or more. The possibility that a short-term position may evolve into a long-term position does not make the position a long- term position. Full-time. A full-time position is one in which the graduate works a minimum of 35 hours per week. A full-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Part-time. A part-time position is one in which the graduate works less than 35 hours per week. A part-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Submitted On 3/30/2015 5:16:03 PM Last Updated 3/30/2015 3:31:04 PM Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 7 of 9 EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2015 GRADUATES 201 South College Street Suite 400 Phone : 704-971-8500 Charlotte, NC 28244 Website : charlottelaw.edu EMPLOYMENT STATUS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 120 16 3 3 142 Employed - J.D. Advantage 48 65 8 1 122 Employed - Professional Position 35 10 3 6 54 Employed - Non-Professional Position 2 1 4 3 10 Employed - Law School/University Funded 0 7 0 0 7 Employed - Undeterminable 0 0 0 0 0 Pursuing Graduate Degree Full Time 7 Unemployed - Start Date Deferred 2 Unemployed - Not Seeking 7 Unemployed - Seeking 102 Employment Status Unknown 3 Total Graduates 456 EMPLOYMENT LOCATION STATE NUMBER State - Largest Employment North Carolina 194 State - 2nd Largest Employment South Carolina 26 State - 3rd Largest Employment Virginia 22 Employed in Foreign Countries 2 EMPLOYMENT TYPE FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Law Firms Solo 13 0 0 0 13 2 - 10 76 2 7 4 89 11 - 25 8 0 0 0 8 26 - 50 2 0 0 0 2 51 - 100 2 0 0 0 2 101 - 250 2 0 0 0 2 251 - 500 2 0 0 0 2 501 + 1 0 0 0 1 Unknown Size 5 0 2 0 7 Business & Industry 58 86 6 5 155 Government 21 4 2 0 27 Pub. Int. 5 3 1 0 9 Clerkships - Federal 0 0 0 0 0 Clerkships - State & Local 4 0 0 0 4 Clerkships - Other 0 0 0 0 0 Education 6 4 0 4 14 Employer Type Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 Total 205 99 18 13 335 LAW SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY FUNDED POSITIONS FULL TIME LONG TERM FULL TIME SHORT TERM PART TIME LONG TERM PART TIME SHORT TERM NUMBER Employed - Bar Passage Required 0 7 0 0 7 Employed - J.D. Advantage 0 0 0 0 0 Employed - Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Employed - Non-Professional Position 0 0 0 0 0 Total Employed by Law School/University 0 7 0 0 7 Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 8 of 9 Employed Bar Passage Required. A position in this category requires the graduate to pass a bar exam and to be licensed to practice law in one or more jurisdictions. The positions that have such a requirement are varied and include, for example, positions in law firms, business, or government. However, not all positions in law firms, business, or government require bar passage; for example, a paralegal position would not. Positions that require the graduate to pass a bar exam and be licensed after beginning employment in order to retain the position are included in this category. Judicial clerkships are also included in this category. Employed J.D. Advantage. A position in this category is one for which the employer sought an individual with a J.D., and perhaps even required a J.D., or for which the J.D. provided a demonstrable advantage in obtaining or performing the job, but which does not itself require bar passage or an active law license or involve practicing law. Examples of positions for which a J.D. is an advantage include a corporate contracts administrator, alternative dispute resolution specialist, government regulatory analyst, FBI agent, and accountant. Also included might be jobs in personnel or human resources, jobs with investment banks, jobs with consulting firms, jobs doing compliance work in business and industry, jobs in law firm professional development, and jobs in law school career services offices, admissions offices, or other law school administrative offices. Doctors or nurses who plan to work in a litigation, insurance, or risk management setting, or as expert witnesses, would fall into this category, as would journalists and teachers (in a higher education setting) of law and law related topics. It is an indicator that a position does not fall into this category if a J.D. is uncommon among persons holding such a position. Employed Professional Position. A position in this category is one that requires professional skills or training but for which a J.D. is neither required nor a demonstrable advantage. Examples of persons in this category include a math or science teacher, business manager, or performing arts specialist. Other examples include professions such as doctors, nurses, engineers, or architects, if a J.D. was not demonstrably advantageous in obtaining the position or in performing the duties of the position. Employed Non-Professional Position. A position in this category is one that does not require any special professional skills or training. Short-term. A short-term position is one that has a definite term of less than one year. Thus, a clerkship that has a definite term of one year or more is not a short- term position. It also includes a position that is of an indefinite length if that position is not reasonably expected to last for one year or more. A position that is envisioned by the graduate and the employer to extend for one year or more is not a short-term position even though it is conditioned on bar passage and licensure. Thus, a long-term position that is conditioned on passing the bar exam by a certain date does not become a short-term position because of the condition. Long-term. A long-term position is one that the employer expects to last one year or more. A law school/university funded position that the law school expects to last one year or more may be considered long-term for purposes of this definition only if the graduate is paid at least $40,000 per year. The possibility that a short-term position may evolve into a long-term position does not make the position a long-term position. Full-time. A full-time position is one in which the graduate works a minimum of 35 hours per week. A full-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Part-time. A part-time position is one in which the graduate works less than 35 hours per week. A part-time position may be either short-term or long-term. Submitted On 4/7/2016 12:27:21 PM Last Updated 4/7/2016 12:00:45 PM Case 3:17-cv-00026-GCM Document 48-9 Filed 04/21/17 Page 9 of 9