Lebrun v. Baker Hughes Inc et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12

W.D. La.April 19, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE DIVISION JONATHAN LEBRUN * CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-cv-01828 VERSUS * JUDGE REBECCA F. DOHERTY BAKER HUGHES INC., ET AL * MAGISTRATE JUDGE C. MICHAEL HILL ***************************************************************************** MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED, who respectfully submits this Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Second Amended Complaint of Jonathan Lebrun, when read in conjunction with his “Petition [sic] for Damages” and “First Amended Petition [sic] of Jonathan Lebrun,” does not allege sufficient facts to support any of his legal theories of recovery against BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED, all as is more fully set forth in the Memorandum in Support of this Motion. Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63 Filed 04/19/17 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 676 Respectfully submitted, HILL & BEYER A Professional Law Corporation s/Bret C. Beyer, Sr. BRET C. BEYER, SR. (#18113) Post Office Box 53006 101 La Rue France, Suite 502 Lafayette, LA 70505-3006 (337) 232-9733 (337) 237-2566 (fax) bbeyer@hillandbeyer.com Counsel for defendant, BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 19, 2017, I presented the foregoing to the Clerk of Court for filing and uploading to the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record herein. I also certify that I have mailed by U.S. Postal Service this filing to the following non-CM/ECF participants: N/A. HILL & BEYER A Professional Law Corporation s/Bret C. Beyer, Sr. BRET C. BEYER, SR. (#18113) Post Office Box 53006 101 La Rue France, Suite 502 Lafayette, LA 70505-3006 (337) 232-9733 (337) 237-2566 (fax) bbeyer@hillandbeyer.com Counsel for defendant, BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63 Filed 04/19/17 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 677 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE DIVISION JONATHAN LEBRUN * CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-cv-01828 VERSUS * JUDGE REBECCA F. DOHERTY BAKER HUGHES INC., ET AL * MAGISTRATE JUDGE C. MICHAEL HILL ***************************************************************************** MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED (“BHI”) submits this Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6), seeking a dismissal of all claims against it. The Second Amended Complaint of Jonathan Lebrun, when read in conjunction with his “Petition [sic] for Damages” and “First Amended Petition [sic] of Jonathan Lebrun,” does not allege facts to support any of his theories of recovery against BHI. This deficiency in the plaintiff’s pleadings warrants a dismissal of this case against BHI under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 678 SYLLABUS The plaintiff avers that he is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages from BHI under several theories: (1) that BHI is liable for negligence and gross negligence under the general maritime law; (2) that BHI is liable for the alleged unseaworthiness of the DEEPWATER CHAMPION under the Sieracki doctrine; and (3) in the alternative, that BHI is somehow liable to him under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).1 However, the plaintiff pleads no facts to support the application of any of these theories. First, the plaintiff’s charge of negligence and gross negligence on the part of BHI is insufficiently pleaded because he does not allege any factual circumstances under which BHI owed him a duty of care. Second, even assuming that the plaintiff is found to be a Sieracki seaman as to the DEEPWATER CHAMPION, a proposition which BHI denies in the most ardent terms, he has not pleaded that BHI had any ownership interest in or control over the vessel, and Sieracki liability for unseaworthiness only attaches to vessel owners/operators. Finally, the plaintiff’s alternative claim that BHI is liable under the LHWCA, is also subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), because the plaintiff has made no allegation that BHI was his employer. Without an employment relationship, there is absolutely no cause for application of the LHWCA.2 1 Mistakenly referred to in the Plaintiff’s pleadings as the “LSHWA.” 2 BHI also notes that any claim for benefits under the LHWCA should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as LHWCA claims are properly administered through the Department of Labor. Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: 679 I. Facts & Procedural Context This case arises out of the plaintiff’s many spurious claims of injuries allegedly sustained in March or April of 2015, when he was aboard the DEEPWATER CHAMPION, a drillship owned/operated by Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (“Transocean”),3 while he was an employee of Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. (“BHOOI”). In his original Complaint4, alleging a low back injury, the plaintiff named “Baker Hughes, Inc.” as a defendant, alleging that “Baker Hughes, Inc.” was his Jones Act employer.5 BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED (“BHI”), mover herein, answered the plaintiff’s Complaint denying that it ever employed the plaintiff, and denying that he was ever employed by any party under circumstances that would qualify him for Jones Act status.6 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint,7 dismissing BHI and substituting BHOOI, the plaintiff’s actual employer and a wholly-owned subsidiary of BHI.8 BHOOI was dismissed from this lawsuit on summary judgment pursuant to this Court’s determination that the plaintiff is not, as he claimed, a Jones Act seaman.9 After the dismissal of BHOOI, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint10, again naming BHI as a defendant, adding a claim for an alleged 3 Answer, Doc. 15, ¶II. 4 For purposes of brevity, the plaintiff’s “Petition [sic] for Damages” (Rec. Doc. 1) and “First Amended Petition [sic] of Jonathan Lebrun” (Rec. Doc. 8) will be referred to as the plaintiff’s “Complaint” and “First Amended Complaint.” 5 Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶2. 6 BHI’s original Answer with Request for Jury Trial, Doc. 5, ¶2. 7 First Amended Complaint, Doc. 8. 8 BHOOI Corporate Disclosure Statement, Doc. 11. 9 Rec. Doc. 45. 10 Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 56. Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: 680 respiratory injury, and demanding punitive damages for alleged negligence and gross negligence related to the alleged new injury. As the plaintiff’s ever shifting claims and theories of recovery currently stand, he is alleging that while aboard the DEEPWATER CHAMPION he sustained an injury to his low back requiring surgery11 and “severe and debilitating respiratory disease” related to exposure to “noxious gases.”12 Though BHI has admittedly struggled to parse the logic of the plaintiff’s pleadings, upon information and belief, the plaintiff makes the following claims against BHI: (1) A claim for compensatory and punitive damages arising out of alleged negligence and gross negligence;13 (2) A claim for damages for the alleged unseaworthiness of the DEEPWATER CHAMPION by virtue his alleged status as a Sieracki Seaman;14 and (3) Alternatively, a claim for worker’s compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).15 II. Law Under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the two (2) seminal cases on 11 Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶11. 12 Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 56, ¶4. 13 Id., ¶4 14 Id., ¶3 15 Id. Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 4 of 10 PageID #: 681 dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the analysis on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must begin with an examination of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim under his chosen cause of action. The next step in the analysis involves considering the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint in light of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal: The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the – defendant – harmed - me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does the complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. 556 U.S. 662 at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted). There are two (2) principles underlying Twombly and Iqbal: “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id. “Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. While not equivalent to a probability requirement, this plausibility requirement is substantive: A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 5 of 10 PageID #: 682 with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted). III. Argument In the instant case, the plaintiff asserts claims for relief against BHI under three (3) separate causes of actions. Under the Twombly and Iqbal analysis, these claims must be considered individually. A. Negligence and Gross Negligence First, the plaintiff claims that BHI was generally negligent and grossly negligent in subjecting him to “noxious gases” while he worked aboard the DEEPWATER CHAMPION and that this gross negligence resulted in “severe and debilitating respiratory disease.”16 The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) damages; and (4) proximate cause.17 These are the elements of which a well-pleaded complaint must exhibit facial plausibility under Rule 8(a)(2) and the holdings of Twombly and Iqbal. The plaintiff’s Complaint and First and Second Amended Complaints, when read together, fall far short of this standard. Most importantly, the plaintiff has alleged no relationship between himself and BHI or between BHI and the DEEPWATER CHAMPION that would create a duty of care. This failing 16 Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 56, ¶4. 17 See, e.g., Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2000) and Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. V. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447 (5th Cir. 1989). Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 6 of 10 PageID #: 683 alone is dispositive as to the negligence causes of action, gross or otherwise. However, the plaintiff also failed to plead any factual circumstances related to a breach of duty by BHI beyond legal conclusions of negligence and gross negligence/willful and wonton misconduct, which are not properly considered in the Motion at bar. As to his claims against BHI for negligence and gross negligence, then, the plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standard required to survive BHI’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). B. Unseaworthiness Second, the plaintiff alleges that he is a Sieracki seaman entitled to pursue a claim for the alleged unseaworthiness of the DEEPWATER CHAMPION. The question of the plaintiff’s Sieracki status is a contentious one. BHI is vehemently opposed to any assertion that the plaintiff is entitled to such status.18 However, assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff qualifies as a Sieracki seaman, the duty of seaworthiness is owed to a seaman only by the owner/operator of a vessel.19 As such, a well-pleaded complaint alleging unseaworthiness would need to allege not only that the plaintiff is a seaman but also that the defendant is the owner/operator of the vessel in question. In this case, the plaintiff has made absolutely no allegation that BHI had any relationship whatsoever to the DEEPWATER CHAMPION. Without a relationship to the vessel, liability for unseaworthiness simply cannot 18 This subject is currently under consideration on Summary Judgment. See Rec., Docs. 59 and 60. 19 Hammett v. Sodexo, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51316, 2012 WL 1237742 (E.D. La. 2012); Olson v. E.H. Wachs, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4118, 2009 WL 152512 (E.D. La. 2009); and Watson v. Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., 387 F.Supp.2nd 385, 2005 AMC 2762 (D. De. 2005). Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 7 of 10 PageID #: 684 attach. The plaintiff’s claim against BHI for unseaworthiness does not meet the standard of Twombly and Iqbal as it fails to state any plausible grounds upon which liability could attach to BHI. C. LHWCA20 Finally, the plaintiff makes an alternative claim for compensation as a longshoreman under the LHWCA (33 U.S.C. §901, et seq.), which requires, among other things, an employer-employee relationship between the defendant and the injured party.21 The plaintiff has not alleged any such relationship between himself and BHI.22 Without an employer-employee relationship, no liability for compensation under the LHWCA can possibly attach to BHI. Thus, there is no facial plausibility that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under this cause of action. IV. Conclusion The law on sufficiency of pleadings is clear and well-established: where a plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to render his entitlement to relief plausible, his claims must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). As shown above, the plaintiff in this case has made absolutely no factual assertions that render his entitlement to damages from BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED plausible on any of his various 20 As noted supra, the plaintiff’s claim for LHWCA relief should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as LHWCA claims are properly administered through the Department of Labor’s administrative courts. 21 33 U.S.C. §904. 22 Of course, it has also been established in the case previously, in connection with the Court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s and BHOOI’s Cross-Motions for Summary on Seaman Status, that the plaintiff was an employee of BHOOI, not BHI. Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 8 of 10 PageID #: 685 causes of action. Therefore, BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED prays that this Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6) be granted and that the plaintiff’s claims against it be dismissed. Respectfully submitted, HILL & BEYER A Professional Law Corporation s/Bret C. Beyer, Sr. BRET C. BEYER, SR. (#18113) Post Office Box 53006 101 La Rue France, Suite 502 Lafayette, LA 70505-3006 (337) 232-9733 (337) 237-2566 (fax) bbeyer@hillandbeyer.com Counsel for defendant, BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 9 of 10 PageID #: 686 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 19, 2017, I presented the foregoing to the Clerk of Court for filing and uploading to the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record herein. I also certify that I have mailed by U.S. Postal Service this filing to the following non-CM/ECF participants: N/A. HILL & BEYER A Professional Law Corporation s/Bret C. Beyer, Sr. BRET C. BEYER, SR. (#18113) Post Office Box 53006 101 La Rue France, Suite 502 Lafayette, LA 70505-3006 (337) 232-9733 (337) 237-2566 (fax) bbeyer@hillandbeyer.com Counsel for defendant, BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED Case 6:15-cv-01828-RFD-CBW Document 63-1 Filed 04/19/17 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: 687