IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHEN LAROQUE,
ANTHONY CUOMO, JOHN NIX,
KLAY NORTHRUP, LEE RAYNOR,
and KINSTON CITIZENS FOR
NONPARTISAN VOTING,
Plaintiffs
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as
Attorney General Of The United States,
Defendant
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Civil Action No. 1:10-0561 (JDB)
Judge John D. Bates
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RONALD C. MACHEN, JR. THOMAS E. PEREZ
United States Attorney Assistant Attorney General
District of Columbia
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS
JULIE A. FERNANDES
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
T. CHRISTIAN HERREN, JR.
DIANA K. FLYNN
RICHARD DELLHEIM (lead counsel)
LINDA F. THOME
ERNEST A. MCFARLAND
JARED M. SLADE
JUSTIN WEINSTEIN-TULL
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
NWB- Room 7264
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 305-1734
Facsimile: (202) 307-3961
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 1 of 56
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Plaintiffs brought this action alleging a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, as reauthorized and amended in 2006. Plaintiffs allege that Congress
exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments when it reauthorized
Section 5 in 2006. And they allege that Section 5, as amended in 2006, violates the
nondiscrimination mandates of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Pursuant to
Rule 56(b), Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. (“Attorney General”) respectfully moves this Court for
an order granting summary judgment to him as to both of Plaintiffs’ claims.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where, as here, “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Local Civ. R. 7(h); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-
250 (1986); Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Because there is no
genuine triable issue as to any material fact before this Court, the Attorney General is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
In support of this motion, the Attorney General submits a Memorandum of Law and
attaches a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, with accompanying exhibits.
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 2 of 56
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Date: August 1, 2011
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. MACHEN, JR. THOMAS E. PEREZ
United States Attorney Assistant Attorney General
District of Columbia Civil Rights Division
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS
JULIE A. FERNANDES
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
/s/Richard Dellheim
T. CHRISTIAN HERREN, JR.
DIANA K. FLYNN
RICHARD DELLHEIM (lead counsel)
LINDA F. THOME
ERNEST A. MCFARLAND
JARED M. SLADE
JUSTIN WEINSTEIN-TULL
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
NWB- Room 7264
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 305-1734
Facsimile: (202) 307-3961
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 3 of 56
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHEN LAROQUE,
ANTHONY CUOMO, JOHN NIX,
KLAY NORTHRUP, LEE RAYNOR,
and KINSTON CITIZENS FOR
NONPARTISAN VOTING,
Plaintiffs
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States,
Defendant
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Civil Action No. 1:10-0561 (JDB)
Judge John D. Bates
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RONALD C. MACHEN, JR. THOMAS E. PEREZ
United States Attorney Assistant Attorney General
District of Columbia
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS
JULIE A. FERNANDES
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
T. CHRISTIAN HERREN, JR.
DIANA K. FLYNN
RICHARD DELLHEIM (lead counsel)
LINDA F. THOME
ERNEST A. MCFARLAND
JARED M. SLADE
JUSTIN WEINSTEIN-TULL
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
NWB-Room 7264
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 305-1734
Facsimile: (202) 307-3961
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 4 of 56
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................1
A. The Voting Rights Act ...........................................................................................1
B. Plaintiffs ..................................................................................................................8
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................9
I SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT REMAINS A VALID
EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE
FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS ...................................11
A. The 2006 Reauthorization Is Subject To Rational Basis Review ........11
B. Congress Rationally Concluded That Reauthorization Of
Section 5 Was Appropriate .....................................................................12
C. Congress’s Decision To Continue Covering The Jurisdictions
That Section 5 Had Previously Covered Was Rational In
Theory And Practice ................................................................................16
II PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGES TO THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO
SECTION 5 MUST FAIL ...................................................................................17
A. The 2006 Amendments ............................................................................17
B. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Challenge The Constitutionality
Of The 2006 Amendments .......................................................................21
1. The 2006 Amendments Did Not Cause Plaintiffs’
Alleged Injuries ............................................................................22
2. A Ruling Invalidating Section 5(b)-(d) Would Not
Redress Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries ............................................25
a. Subsections (b)-(d) Are Severable From Section
5(a) .....................................................................................26
b. Because Subsection (a) Is Severable From
Subsections (b)-(d), Plaintiffs Have No Avenue For
Relief ..................................................................................29
C. The Challenge To The 2006 Amendments Is Not Ripe For
Review .......................................................................................................31
D. The 2006 Amendments To Section 5 Do Not Violate The
Constitution On Their Face ....................................................................33
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued): PAGE
1. The Amendment To Section 5’s Purpose Prong Is Valid
Enforcement Legislation And Does Not Violate Equal
Protection ......................................................................................34
2. The Amendment To Section 5’s Retrogression Prong Is
Valid Enforcement Legislation And Does Not Violate
Equal Protection...........................................................................38
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................44
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)..............................................................................31
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).......................................................... 26-27, 29
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) .....................................................................15
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ............................................................................................21
America’s Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ..............................................30
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) .....................................26, 29
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) ........................................................................... passim
Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ..............................................................26, 28
Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ...............................................13
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985) ..............................................................26
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) ................................................................................................42
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210 (1932) .................... 26-27
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) ........................................................................11, 13
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) ...............................................................................35
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) ........................................................ 39-40
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) ............................................................. passim
Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ..................................................................................... 26-27
County Council of Sumter Cnty. v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983) ..............31, 38
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006)..................................................................21
Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) ....................26
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) ......................................................................... 17-18, 42
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 7 of 56
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CASES (continued): PAGE
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) ...............................................................................5
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (1984), rev’d in part on different grounds,
Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) ......................................................................15
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .............................................................................................26
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) ....................................................................13
LaRoque v. Holder, No. 10-5433,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011) .............................................. 21-22
Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999) .........................................................................5, 11
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .............................................................. 21-22
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) .................................................................................... 41-42
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) ........................................................................................36
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) ..................................29
Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977).......................................................................... 23, 30-31
New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ........................................................27
Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) ..........................2, 9
Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey,
573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008) ...............................................................................9, 13
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) ..............................................................................15, 29
Randall v. Sorrell, 538 U.S. 230 (2006) ........................................................................................28
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) ............................................................13, 18
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) .......................................................... passim
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) ...............................................................................................36
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)....................................................22
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) ............................................................ passim
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 8 of 56
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CASES (continued): PAGE
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) .................................................................................35, 38
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998) ........................................................................... 31-32
Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) ..................................................................................38
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) ....................................................................................37
United States Ecology, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Interior,
231 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) .............................................................................................21
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) .........................................................................26, 29
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) .............................................................................35
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) ............................................................................22, 25
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) ...........................................................................38, 43
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) ........................................................................ 33-34
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) ...................................................................................................21
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) ...............................................................................................19, 34, 36
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442 (2008) ......................................................................................... 33-34, 38, 43
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) ...................................................................................35
STATUTES:
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq. .........................................................................1
42 U.S.C. 1973a(c).............................................................................................................16
42 U.S.C. 1973b(a) ..............................................................................................................5
42 U.S.C. 1973b(f) .............................................................................................................27
42 U.S.C. 1973c ...............................................................................................................3, 8
42 U.S.C. 1973c(a)..................................................................................................... passim
42 U.S.C. 1973c(b) & (d)...................................................................................................28
42 U.S.C. 1973c(b) ............................................................................................................42
42 U.S.C. 1973c(c).......................................................................................................28, 34
42 U.S.C. 1973p .................................................................................................................26
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STATUTES (continued): PAGE
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 .........................................................2
§ 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 ...............................................................................................................4
§ 4(b), 79 Stat. 438 ...............................................................................................................3
79 Stat. 439 ........................................................................................................................18
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315 ..................................4
Tit. I, 84 Stat. 315 ................................................................................................................4
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 ....................................4
Tit. II, 89 Stat. 401 ...............................................................................................................5
Tit. II, 89 Stat. 401-402 ........................................................................................................5
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 ..................................4
§ 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 131 ..........................................................................................................5
§ 2(b)(4), 96 Stat. 131-133 ...................................................................................................5
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577
§ 2(b), 120 Stat. 577-578 .........................................................................................7
§ 2(b)(6), 120 Stat. 578 ..........................................................................................19
§ 2(b)(9), 120 Stat. 578 ............................................................................................9
§§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 580-581 .........................................................................................3
§ 5, 120 Stat. 580-581 ........................................................................................8, 20
REGULATIONS:
28 C.F.R. 51.23 ..............................................................................................................................29
28 C.F.R. 51.45(a)..........................................................................................................................30
Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 5412 (Jan. 18, 2001).............................................................36, 40
Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987) ...............................................................................40
Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,239 (April 15, 2011) (28 C.F.R. 51.54, 51.57) ..............................37
40 Fed. Reg. 43,746 (Sept. 23, 1975) ..............................................................................................5
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: PAGE
H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ........................................................................ 3-4
H.R. Rep. No. 478, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006) ................................................................. passim
S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) ...............................................................................41
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 11 of 56
This is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as
reauthorized and amended in 2006.1 Plaintiffs allege that Congress exceeded its authority under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments when it reauthorized Section 5 in 2006. And they
allege that Section 5, as amended in 2006, violates the nondiscrimination mandates of the Fifth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
Both parties have moved for summary judgment. Because plaintiffs’ first claim is similar
to the claims of the plaintiff in Shelby County v. Holder, No. 1:10-cv-00651-JDB (D.D.C.), we
have attached as Attachments 1, 2, and 3 to this Memorandum the Attorney General’s
Memoranda Of Law In Opposition To Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment And In
Support Of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment in the Shelby County case. For the
reasons set forth therein and infra, Section 5 is constitutional and the Attorney General’s cross
motion for summary judgment should be granted.
BACKGROUND
A. The Voting Rights Act
1. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq., “to
banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which ha[d] infected the electoral process in
parts of our country for nearly a century.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966). The Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits racial discrimination in voting, was ratified
in 1870. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 310. “The first century of congressional enforcement of
1 Plaintiffs have unequivocally disavowed any intention to assert an as-applied
challenge, including any intention to challenge the Attorney General’s objection to the proposed
voting change in Kinston. See e.g., Motion Hearing Tr. Dec. 3, 2010, at 68 (“Because we are
bringing a facial challenge to the statute, we are not challenging the Attorney General’s
objection.”); id. at 87 (representing to the court that plaintiffs are “willing to be held” to their
statement that they “are bringing a facial and only a facial challenge”).
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the Amendment, however, can only be regarded as a failure.” Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009) (Northwest Austin II). Initial federal
enforcement of the Amendment was short-lived, and in 1894, most of the federal enforcement
provisions were repealed. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 310. Beginning in 1890, Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia began
systematically disenfranchising black citizens by adopting literacy tests applicable to black
citizens, while using alternate devices such as the grandfather clause, property qualifications, and
good character tests to enable illiterate whites to vote. Id. at 310-311.
Over the following decades, the Supreme Court struck down a variety of techniques
“designed to deprive Negroes of the right to vote,” including the grandfather clause, procedural
roadblocks, the white primary, improper voter challenges, racial gerrymandering, and
discriminatory application of tests. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 311-312 (citations omitted).
Congress enacted voting rights legislation in 1957, 1960, and 1964. Id. at 313. But “these new
laws,” the Court explained in South Carolina, did “little to cure the problem of voting
discrimination.” Id. at 314. Voting rights litigation was “unusually onerous” and “exceedingly
slow.” Ibid. And, even when litigation was successful, voting officials “merely switched to
discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees,” “enacted difficult new tests,” or
“defied and evaded court orders.” Ibid.
In 1965, Congress enacted the VRA to address the deficiencies in earlier legislation
designed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
79 Stat. 437 (1965 Act). The VRA includes both temporary provisions, applicable only to
certain “covered jurisdictions,” and other provisions applicable to the nation as a whole. This
case concerns one of the temporary provisions of the VRA – Section 5, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, as it
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was reauthorized and amended in 2006. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5,
120 Stat. 580-581; 42 U.S.C. 1973c (2006 Reauthorization).
Section 4(b) of the VRA contains the coverage formula that defines the jurisdictions
covered by Section 5 and the other temporary provisions. Congress designed this formula to
capture States for which the legislative record demonstrated “evidence of actual voting
discrimination,” and where “federal courts ha[d] repeatedly found substantial voting
discrimination.” South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 329-330. Evidence before Congress in 1965
revealed that the worst records of discrimination existed in certain southern States that “share[d]
two characteristics: * * * the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in
the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the national average.” South Carolina,
383 U.S. at 330; see H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1965) (1965 House
Report). Thus, as originally enacted, Section 4(b) included any jurisdiction that: (1) maintained
a test or device on November 1, 1964; and (2) had registration or turnout rates below 50% of the
voting age population in November 1964. 1965 Act, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 438. The original formula
covered e.g., Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, and 40
counties in North Carolina. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 51 App.
Section 5 provides that “[w]henever” a covered jurisdiction “enact[s] or seek[s] to
administer any * * * standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that
in force or effect” on its coverage date, it must first obtain administrative preclearance from the
Attorney General or judicial preclearance from a three-judge panel of this court. 42 U.S.C.
1973c. In either case, preclearance may be granted only if the jurisdiction demonstrates that the
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proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color” or membership in a language minority group. Ibid.
Covered jurisdictions may seek to terminate their coverage under the special provisions,
including the requirement to comply with Section 5, by bringing a declaratory judgment action in
this court. See 1965 Act, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438. As originally enacted, this “bailout” mechanism
was available only to covered States and to jurisdictions, such as counties, “with respect to which
such [coverage] determinations have been made as a separate unit.” Ibid. The purpose of the
provision was to remedy any overbreadth in the coverage formula by enabling jurisdictions that
had not discriminated to escape coverage. 1965 House Report 15; South Carolina, 383 U.S. at
331. To terminate coverage, such a jurisdiction originally was required to prove it had not used a
prohibited test or device “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color” during the previous five years. Ibid.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 4(b) and 5 of the 1965 Act in
South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 323-335, finding that these and other temporary provisions of the
Act were valid exercises of Congress’s authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
2. Congress reauthorized Section 5 in 1970 for five years, in 1975 for seven years, and in
1982 for 25 years. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315
(1970 Reauthorization); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat.
400 (1975 Reauthorization); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96
Stat. 131 (1982 Reauthorization).2 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of
2 The 1970 Reauthorization amended the coverage formula in Section 4(b) to include
jurisdictions that maintained a prohibited test or device on November 1, 1968, and had voter
registration or turnout of less than 50% of eligible residents in the Presidential election of 1968.
Tit. I, 84 Stat. 315. The 1975 Reauthorization amended the coverage formula to include
(continued…)
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Section 5 after each reauthorization. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-182 (1980); Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266,
282-285 (1999).
In 1982, Congress amended the bailout provision of the VRA, substantially expanding
the opportunity for covered jurisdictions to terminate coverage to include “any political
subdivision of [a covered] State” even if the coverage determination had not been made “with
respect to such subdivision as a separate unit.” 1982 Reauthorization, § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 131.
The 1982 Reauthorization also changed the substantive requirements for bailout. Under the
revised bailout provision, which is currently in effect, jurisdictions may terminate coverage by
demonstrating that they have fully complied with Section 5 and other voting rights provisions
during the previous ten years. 1982 Reauthorization, § 2(b)(4), 96 Stat. 131-133; see 42 U.S.C.
1973b(a). As of the date of this filing, bailout has been granted by the court, with the consent of
the Attorney General, in 18 cases since the current bailout provision went into effect in 1984,
including five cases in the two years since the decision in Northwest Austin significantly
expanded the jurisdictions eligible to bailout. See Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts (Def. SMF) ¶¶ 32, 34-35. Consent decrees providing for bailout in four additional cases
have been filed and are awaiting court approval. Def. SMF ¶ 36. The Attorney General is
(…continued)
jurisdictions that maintained a prohibited test or device on November 1, 1972, and had voter
registration or turnout of less than 50% of voting age residents in the Presidential election of
1972. Tit. II, 89 Stat. 401. The 1975 reauthorization also expanded the definition of “test or
device” to include a practice of providing voting materials only in English in jurisdictions in
which at least 5% of the voting age population were members of a single-language minority. Tit.
II, 89 Stat. 401-402; see 40 Fed. Reg. 43,746 (Sept. 23, 1975).
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currently reviewing the informal bailout requests of numerous additional jurisdictions. Def.
SMF ¶ 40.
3. In 2006, Congress again reauthorized Section 5 for 25 years, finding that although
progress had been made, Section 5 review is still necessary to overcome nearly 100 years of
voting discrimination perpetrated in defiance of the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress made the
following statutory findings:
(1) Significant progress has been made in eliminating first generation barriers
experienced by minority voters, including increased numbers of registered
minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress,
State legislatures, and local elected offices. This progress is the direct result of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
(2) However, vestiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as
demonstrated by second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters
from fully participating in the electoral process.
(3) The continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each of the jurisdictions
covered by the expiring provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 demonstrates
that racial and language minorities remain politically vulnerable, warranting the
continued protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
(4) Evidence of continued discrimination includes—
(A) the hundreds of objections interposed, requests for more information
submitted followed by voting changes withdrawn from consideration by
jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and section 5
enforcement actions undertaken by the Department of Justice in covered
jurisdictions since 1982 that prevented election practices, such as
annexation, at-large voting, and the use of multimember districts, from
being enacted to dilute minority voting strength;
(B) the number of requests for declaratory judgments denied by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia;
(C) the continued filing of section 2 cases that originated in covered
jurisdictions; and
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(D) the litigation pursued by the Department of Justice since 1982 to
enforce sections 4(e), (f)(4), and 203 of such Act to ensure that all
language minority citizens have full access to the political process.
(5) The evidence clearly shows the continued need for Federal oversight in
jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 since 1982, as
demonstrated in the counties certified by the Attorney General for Federal
examiner and observer coverage and the tens of thousands of Federal observers
that have been dispatched to observe elections in covered jurisdictions.
(6) The effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been significantly
weakened by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Reno v. Bossier
Parish II and Georgia v. Ashcroft, which have misconstrued Congress’ original
intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and narrowed the protections
afforded by section 5 of such Act.
(7) Despite the progress made by minorities under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
the evidence before Congress reveals that 40 years has not been a sufficient
amount of time to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100
years of disregard for the dictates of the 15th amendment and to ensure that the
right of all citizens to vote is protected as guaranteed by the Constitution.
(8) Present day discrimination experienced by racial and language minority voters
is contained in evidence, including the objections interposed by the Department of
Justice in covered jurisdictions; the section 2 litigation filed to prevent dilutive
techniques from adversely affecting minority voters; the enforcement actions filed
to protect language minorities; and the tens of thousands of Federal observers
dispatched to monitor polls in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of
1965.
(9) The record compiled by Congress demonstrates that, without the continuation
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority
citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will
have their votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in
the last 40 years.
2006 Reauthorization, § 2(b), 120 Stat. 577-578.
Congress also amended Section 5 by adding three new subsections:
(b) Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of or will
have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United
States on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
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forth in section 4(f)(2), to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies
or abridges the right to vote within the meaning of subsection (a) of this
section.
(c) The term ‘purpose’ in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall
include any discriminatory purpose.
(d) The purpose of subsection (b) of this section is to protect the ability of
such citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice.
2006 Reauthorization, § 5, 120 Stat. 580-581; see 42 U.S.C. 1973c (b)-(d) .
B. Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs are proponents of a 2008 referendum that would have changed the method of
electing the mayor and city council of the City of Kinston, North Carolina from partisan to
nonpartisan elections. Complaint ¶¶ 2-7, 14. The individual plaintiffs are registered voters and
residents of Kinston, one of whom is running as a candidate for elective office in the City.
Complaint ¶¶ 2-6. The organizational plaintiff, Kinston Citizens for Nonpartisan Voting,
consists of registered Kinston voters and prospective candidates who supported the referendum.
Complaint ¶ 7.
The City of Kinston, in Lenoir County, North Carolina, has been subject to Section 5
since 1965, when Lenoir County was designated for coverage. Def. SMF ¶ 1-2. In February
2009, Kinston submitted to the Department of Justice for Section 5 review a proposed change
from partisan to nonpartisan elections for municipal offices that had been adopted by the City’s
electorate by referendum in November 2008. Def. SMF ¶ 3. On August 17, 2009, the
Department interposed an objection to the proposed change to nonpartisan elections. Def. SMF ¶
2 & Exh. 2. The City of Kinston did not exercise its right to seek a de novo statutory declaratory
judgment from this court to overcome the Department’s objection, nor did it seek reconsideration
from the Attorney General. Def. SMF ¶ 5; see 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a).
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ARGUMENT
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) (Northwest Austin II), “[t]he Fifteenth
Amendment empowers ‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first instance what
legislation is needed to enforce it.” See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)
(“Congress [is] to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created by” the Fifteenth
Amendment). In 2006, Congress “amassed a sizable record in support of its decision to extend
the preclearance requirements.” Northwest Austin II, 129 S. Ct. at 2513. Based on that record,
Congress correctly concluded that, without the preclearance requirement for covered
jurisdictions, “racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to
exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the significant gains
made by minorities in the last 40 years.” 2006 Reauthorization, § 2(b)(9), 120 Stat. 578; see
Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 265-268 (D.D.C.
2008) (Northwest Austin I) (Congress rationally determined that reauthorization was
appropriate); id. at 268-278 (finding reauthorization congruent and proportional response to
evidence of continued voting discrimination).
When Congress reauthorized Section 5 in 2006, it chose to continue covering the
jurisdictions that it had already subjected to the preclearance requirement and that had not bailed
out. Congress acted based on findings that voting discrimination continued to exist in those
specific jurisdictions and that Section 5 preclearance remained necessary to protect minority
voting rights there. That determination alone was sufficient. Having lawfully covered a set of
jurisdictions in 1965, and having lawfully extended the preclearance requirement in those
jurisdictions in 1970, 1975, and 1982, Congress was entitled in 2006 to ask simply whether those
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jurisdictions, to the extent they had not bailed out, had sufficiently eliminated the pattern of
discrimination that justified their coverage in the first place. But Congress did more than simply
ask whether the covered jurisdictions had purged their violations. Congress also considered
comparative evidence establishing that voting discrimination was more prevalent in those
jurisdictions than in the non-covered jurisdictions. See Att. 1 at 5-6, 68-69; Att. 2 at 30-32.
Plaintiffs challenge not only Congress’s decision to extend Section 5 but also its decision
to amend the statute. But plaintiffs’ challenges to the 2006 Amendments are not properly
presented here. Because the Attorney General’s objection to the Kinston nonpartisan vote plan
did not rest on those Amendments, it did not cause the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. And because
the Amendments, which appear in Subsections 5(b) through (d), are severable from the basic
preclearance requirement, which appears in Subsection 5(a) and was applied in the Kinston
objection, a ruling invalidating the Amendments would not redress the plaintiffs’ alleged
injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2006 Amendments rests on speculations about
how the Attorney General will apply those Amendments in the future; it is not ripe for review.
In any event, the Amendments are constitutional, and plaintiffs have certainly not met their
burden to show that those Amendments are unconstitutional in all of their applications. The
change to Section 5’s purpose prong, the new Subsection 5(c), simply incorporates the Supreme
Court’s own standard for determining what discriminatory purpose violates equal protection.
Accordingly, it directly enforces the Constitution and cannot itself violate equal protection. The
change to Section 5’s retrogression prong, the new Subsections 5(b) and (d), simply resolves a
particular question regarding the definition of retrogression in the context of districting. It does
not purport to overturn the principle, long established in the Supreme Court’s cases, that even a
retrogressive change must be precleared if the alternative would violate the Constitution.
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I
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT REMAINS A VALID EXERCISE OF
CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
For the reasons set forth in Attachment 1 at 9-75, Attachment 2 at 1-35, and Attachment 3
at 1-15, the 2006 Reauthorization of Section 5 is well within Congress’s authority under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Attorney General is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on plaintiffs’ first claim for relief. Plaintiffs’ contentions to the contrary are unavailing.
A. The 2006 Reauthorization Is Subject To Rational Basis Review
Plaintiffs contend, first, that Section 5 must be subjected to the congruence and
proportionality test set forth in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). Pl. Mem. 8-
13.3 For the reasons set forth in Attachment 1 at 12-20, and Attachment 2 at 1-12, Section 5 is
subject to rational basis review. Section 5 enforces the core prohibition on race discrimination
found in both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and it protects a citizen’s most
fundamental right – the right to vote. 4 As the Court held in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
3 Citations to “Pl. Mem. __” refer to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Of Points And Authorities
In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment.
4 Plaintiffs contend that Congress’s authority for Section 5 must be found in the
Fourteenth as well as the Fifteenth Amendment. Pl. Mem. 11. But the Supreme Court has
squarely upheld Section 5 and the other temporary provisions of the Voting Rights Act as valid
Fifteenth Amendment legislation, and those holdings are binding on this court. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324-337 (1966); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 173 (1980 ) (“Congress passed the Act under the authority accorded it by the Fifteenth
Amendment. * * * We hold that, even if § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful
discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not,
pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.”); see id. at 174-175;
Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999) (“Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act
under its authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s proscription against voting
discrimination.”); see id. at 282-283. Notably, while plaintiffs contend that Congress’s authority
under the Fifteenth Amendment is limited to electoral practices affecting the right to cast a
(continued…)
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U.S. 301, 324 (1966), “As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”
Plaintiffs erroneously contend (Pl. Mem. 12-13) that rational basis review is no longer
applicable to Section 5 because the 2006 Amendments have transformed the statute so that it is
no longer race neutral. As explained below, pp. 34-43, infra, the Amendments will not have the
draconian effect that plaintiffs predict. In any event, it has been clear since at least 1976 – long
before the enactment of the 2006 Amendments and four years before the Court applied rational
basis review to uphold Section 5 in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-182 (1980),
that Section 5 is not race-neutral. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (the
“effect” prong of the preclearance standard precludes only changes that “would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise”). Thus, the 2006 Amendments provide no basis from departing from
Supreme Court precedent requiring the application of rational basis review to Section 5.
Moreover, even measured against the congruence and proportionality standard, the 2006
Reauthorization is appropriate legislation. See Att. 1 at 20.
B. Congress Rationally Concluded That Reauthorization Of Section 5 Was
Appropriate
The 2006 Reauthorization of Section 5 was appropriate legislation authorized by
Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In 2006, Congress
(…continued)
ballot, see Pl. Mem. 11, neither City of Rome and Lopez involved such practices, but rather
involved dilutive mechanisms. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 160; Lopez, 446 U.S. at 271-273.
In any event, the Attorney General’s argument that Section 5 is subject to rational basis review
does not depend solely on Congress’s authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. As explained
in Attachment 1 at 11-20, rational basis review applies to legislation enacted to enforce the
prohibition on race discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment as well as in the Fifteenth
Amendment.
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went to extraordinary lengths to carefully consider the various conflicting considerations
associated with reauthorizing Section 5. In so doing, Congress appropriately enforced core
constitutional protections against racial discrimination in voting. Congress looked in 2006 to the
same evidentiary sources relied upon by previous Congresses and found to be adequate by the
Supreme Court. The 2006 Congress found that the same types and patterns of discriminatory
behavior found by previous Congresses continue today. This extensive record of voting
discrimination, including intentional discrimination, stands in stark contrast to the very minimal
records of discrimination that the Court found inadequate to support legislation in other cases.
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000); Board of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). Thus, the 2006
Reauthorization not only satisfies the rational basis test, but also meets the congruence and
proportionality test. See Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d
221, 268-279 (D.D.C. 2008) (Northwest Austin I); Att. 1 at 20-65; Att. 2 at 12-29; Att. 3.
Plaintiffs contend that the sole justification for the preclearance requirement in Section 5
is to prevent retrogressive voting changes that cannot be remedied through litigation under
Section 2 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. 1973. See Pl. Mem. 14-17. The passages plaintiffs cite in
support of this proposition explain the differences between the two provisions. See e.g., Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 335 (2000) (Bossier Parish II) (“in vote-dilution cases § 5
prevents nothing but backsliding”); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 479 (1997)
(Bossier Parish I) (“Section 2, on the other hand, was designed as a means of eradicating voting
practices that ‘minimize or cancel out the voting strength and political effectiveness of minority
groups.’”) (citation omitted). But plaintiffs cite no authority that supports their bald assertion
that the sole function of Section 5 is to “supplement and protect the nondiscrimination gains
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14
achieved by Section 2.” Pl. Mem. 16. Indeed, while the Court has made it clear that the effects
prong of the Section 5 preclearance standard was designed to prevent “a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise,”
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141, the Court has never limited the application of Section 5 to protect only
those gains achieved through litigation. See, e.g., City of Rome 446 U.S. at 183-187 (affirming
denial of preclearance to voting changes adopted in 1966 that would have reduced the ability of
black voters to elect their candidates of choice when compared to pre-1966 voting procedures).
In any event, the legislative record documents specific instances in which Section 5 was essential
to preserve the gains achieved through litigation. Att. 1 at 33-34, 41-42. That record also
establishes that Section 2 alone is inadequate to protect minority voting rights, Att. 1 at 55-57,
and that the mere existence of the preclearance requirement deters election officials in covered
jurisdictions from taking discriminatory actions, Att. 1 at 53-55.
Plaintiffs next contend that Section 5 is not justified by current needs. Pl. Mem. 17-21.
As set forth in Attachment 1 at 23-57, and Attachment 3 at 9-13, the legislative record compiled
by Congress when it reauthorized Section 5 in 2006 includes abundant evidence of the continued
need for preclearance, including evidence of intentional voting discrimination by the covered
jurisdictions, and intimidation and harassment by election officials during the 1982 to 2006
period, see Att. 1 at 27-31, 37, 39-40, 44-49. Congress relied on the same types of evidence and
the same patterns of discrimination in 2006 as it did when it reauthorized Section 5 in 1970,
1975, and 1982. And the Supreme Court relied on the same types of evidence and patterns of
discrimination when it upheld those reauthorizations. See Att. 1 at 20-23.
Plaintiffs point to improvements in the registration and turnout of minority voters as
evidence that Section 5 is no longer needed. Pl. Mem. 19-20. But the Supreme Court long ago
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rejected the contention that the sole purpose of Section 5 was to prohibit barriers to registration
and turnout, holding that Section 5 was intended to prevent all manner of voting procedures that
have the purpose or effect of restricting minority voting rights, including dilutive techniques and
other means of minimizing the effectiveness of minority voters. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 563-571 (1969); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387-395 (1971). Indeed,
some of the jurisdictions now covered by Section 5 have a history of using dilutive techniques
beginning long before enactment of the VRA. See Att. 1 at 57-60; see also Gingles v. Edmisten,
590 F. Supp. 345, 360 (1984) (describing “voting mechanisms designed to minimize or cancel
the potential voting strength of black citizens” employed by North Carolina, including the 1955
enactment of an anti-single shot voting law that had “the intended effect of fragmenting a black
minority’s total vote between two or more candidates in a multi-seat election and preventing its
concentration on one candidate”), rev’d in part on different grounds, Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986).
Nor does the increase in numbers of minority elected officials indicate that Section 5 is
no longer needed. See Pl. Mem. 20. As explained in Attachment 1 at 49-53, Congress heard
evidence that most minority legislators, at both the state and federal level, were elected from
majority-minority districts, and that, because of racial bloc voting, such districts – largely created
as a result of the VRA – remain necessary to enable minority voters to elect candidates of their
choice. Finally, while there has been a reduction in the rate of Section 5 objections in recent
years (see Pl. Mem. 20), those figures do not reflect the complete picture. Many discriminatory
voting changes were withdrawn during the preclearance process after the Department of Justice
requested more information or were blocked by declaratory judgment actions. See Att. 1 at 35-
38 (more than 1100 voting changes were denied either judicial or administrative preclearance;
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200 submissions were withdrawn; and more than 855 submissions were affected by requests for
more information). Moreover, many more discriminatory changes were prevented by Section 5’s
deterrent effect. Att. 1 at 53-55.
C. Congress’s Decision To Continue Covering The Jurisdictions That Section 5 Had
Previously Covered Was Rational In Theory And Practice
Plaintiffs next contend that the coverage formula in Section 4(b) is irrational. Pl. Mem.
21-25. As explained in Attachment 1 at 65-75, and Attachment 3, Congress’s decision to
reauthorize the application of Section 5 to the covered jurisdictions was appropriate Fifteenth
Amendment legislation, “rational in both practice and theory.” South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 330.
In crafting the coverage formula in 1965, Congress defined the geographic reach of Section 5 by
using objective criteria that it knew would capture the jurisdictions it had found to be the most
egregious discriminators. In 2006, Congress found that voting discrimination was still occurring
in the covered jurisdictions. See pp. 6-7, supra. And evidence before Congress demonstrated
that voting discrimination was more prevalent in the covered than in the non-covered
jurisdictions. See Att. 1 at 5-6, 68-69; Att. 2 at 30-32; Att. 3 at 9-13; see Def. SMF ¶¶ 44-51 &
Exh. 3. Moreover, the bailout provision provides ample opportunity for jurisdictions to
terminate coverage when they are able to demonstrate that the need for Section 5 review no
longer exists. See Att. 1 at 69-74; Att. 2 at 33-34; Att. 3 at 14-15; see Def. SMF ¶¶ 17-40. And
the “bail-in” provision in Section 3(c) enables courts to subject jurisdictions found to have
violated the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment to the same
preclearance requirements required by Section 5. 42 U.S.C. 1973a(c); see Att. 2 at 32. The
coverage formula therefore remains valid.
Plaintiffs’ contention that there is no meaningful difference between jurisdictions covered
by Section 5 and the rest of the country, Pl. Mem. 21-25, is contradicted by the legislative record.
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As measured by outcomes in Section 2 cases, voting discrimination was much more common in
the covered than in the non-covered States. See Att. 1 at 40-41, 68-69; Att. 2 at 30-32; Att. 3 at
12-13; Def. SMF ¶¶ 44-51 & Exh. 3. Because the Section 5 preclearance process blocks many
discriminatory voting changes in the covered jurisdictions, one would expect there to be
proportionally fewer Section 2 cases in the covered than in the non-covered jurisdictions.
Instead, even when only reported decisions are considered, covered jurisdictions were subject to
more than twice their proportional share of successful plaintiffs’ Section 2 lawsuits. As plaintiffs
acknowledge, Pl. Mem. 31, the standard for proving a violation of Section 2 is designed to
“identify facially neutral practices that are likely to be intentionally discriminatory.” Thus, these
judicial findings of Section 2 violations are reliable evidence that intentional voting
discrimination is much more common in the covered jurisdictions. And, when unreported cases
involving settlements are included, the differential between covered and non-covered
jurisdictions is even more pronounced: 81% of the successful Section 2 actions nationwide were
in covered jurisdictions. Att. 1 at 68; see also Att. 2 at 31-32; Att. 3 at 12-13; Def. SMF ¶¶ 51.
II
PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGES TO THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 5 MUST
FAIL
A. The 2006 Amendments
Because Congress enacted the 2006 Amendments in response to two Supreme Court
decisions, Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (Bossier Parish II); and
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), we begin with a review of those decisions and their
impact on the preclearance standard. As enacted in 1965, Section 5 bars the implementation of a
change in “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting” by a covered jurisdiction unless the jurisdiction demonstrates that the
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change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color.” 1965 Act, 79 Stat. 439.
The Supreme Court long ago established that the “effect” prong of the preclearance
standard precludes only changes that “would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). In Bossier Parish II, the Court held for the first time5 that, in
the context of a claim of intentional vote dilution, the “purpose” prong of the preclearance
standard is similarly limited to voting changes with a retrogressive purpose. 528 U.S. at 328.
“[N]o matter how unconstitutional it may be,” the Court later explained, “a plan that is not
retrogressive should be precleared under § 5.” Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 477 (quoting Bossier Parish
II, 528 U.S. at 336) (emphasis in the original).
In Ashcroft, the Court examined the meaning of the term “effective exercise of the
electoral franchise,” used in Beer. 539 U.S. at 479; see Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. While the Court
recognized that “the comparative ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of its choice” is
an “important” factor in determining whether a plan is retrogressive, “it cannot be dispositive or
exclusive.” Id. at 480. Thus, the Court held, a State may choose to create districts in which a
minority group constitutes a sufficient majority that its ability to elect its candidates of choice is
“virtually guarantee[d].” Id. at 480-481 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or the State may
choose to create a larger number of districts in which minority voters have a substantial, but
smaller representation, and thus will have only the possibility of electing the candidates of their
choice, or perhaps only of influencing the outcome of the election, with or without a coalition
5 The Court had explicitly left the question open in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,
520 U.S. 471, 486 (1997) (Bossier Parish I).
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with other groups. Id. at 481-482. “Section 5,” the Court held, “gives States the flexibility to
choose one theory of effective representation over the other.” Id. at 482.
Congress concluded that the decisions in Bossier Parish II and Ashcroft “misconstrued
Congress’ original intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965,” “narrowed the protections
afforded by section 5,” and “significantly weakened” the Act’s effectiveness. 2006
Reauthorization, § 2(b)(6), 120 Stat. 578. With regard to the Court’s holding in Bossier Parish
II, the House Report explained that “[t]hrough the ‘purpose’ requirement, Congress sought to
prevent covered jurisdictions from enacting and enforcing voting changes made with a clear
racial animus, regardless of the measurable impact of such discriminatory changes.” H.R. Rep.
No. 478, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (2006) (2006 House Report). “Voting changes that
‘purposefully’ keep minority groups ‘in their place,’” the House Report declared, “have no role
in our electoral process and are precisely the types of changes Section 5 is intended to bar. To
allow otherwise would be contrary to the protections afforded by the 14th and 15th
amendment[s] and the VRA.” 2006 House Report 68. Thus, Congress amended Section 5 to
clarify “that any voting change motivated by any discriminatory purpose is prohibited under
Section 5.” Ibid. The Report went on to state that the existence of discriminatory intent should
be determined based upon the familiar factors set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 266-268 (1977). 2006 House
Report 68.
The House Report also concluded that the Court’s decision in Ashcroft “turns Section 5
on its head” by directing courts to “defer to the political decisions of States rather than the
genuine choice of minority voters regarding who is or is not their candidate of choice.” 2006
House Report 69. The Court’s “‘new’ analysis,” the House Report stated, “would allow the
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minority community’s own choice of preferred candidates to be trumped by political deals struck
by State legislators purporting to give ‘influence’ to the minority community while removing
that community’s ability to elect candidates. Permitting these trade-offs is inconsistent with the
original and current purpose of Section 5.” 2006 House Report 69. The retrogression standard
applied before the Ashcroft ruling, the House Report explained, was responsible for the electoral
gains made by minority communities since enactment of the VRA, and the Ashcroft standard put
those gains at risk:
[L]eaving the Georgia [v. Ashcroft] standard in place would encourage States to
spread minority voters under the guise of ‘influence’ and would effectively shut
minority voters out of the political process. In essence, the Committee heard that
Section 5, if left uncorrected, would now allow States to turn black and other
minority voters into second class voters who can influence elections of white
candidates, but who cannot elect their preferred candidates, including candidates
of their own race. This is clearly not the outcome that Congress intended the
Voting Rights Act and Section 5 to have on minority voters.
2006 House Report 70 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
Congress responded to the decisions in Bossier Parish II and Ashcroft by adding three
provisions to Section 5:
(b) Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of or will have the effect of
diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this
title, to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to
vote within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The term “purpose” in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall include any
discriminatory purpose.
(d) The purpose of subsection (b) of this section is to protect the ability of such
citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice.
2006 Reauthorization, § 5, 120 Stat. 580-581.
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B. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Challenge The Constitutionality Of The 2006
Amendments
Plaintiffs must establish this Court’s jurisdiction to hear their claims. See United States
Ecology, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Because each
element of standing – injury, causation, and redressibility – is “indispensable” to the plaintiffs’
case, each “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive
stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Standing
requirements must be “strictly construed” in constitutional challenges to federal laws. Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
473-475 (1982). Furthermore, plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing for each claim [they] seek
to press.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (citing Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). Thus, standing to assert one claim does not confer standing to assert
a second, and the absence of any one element is fatal to that second claim. See Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560-561.
The D.C. Circuit raised a number of questions about plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the
2006 Amendments to Section 5, which added new Subsections 5(b) through (d). That court, for
example, questioned plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy the causation and redressability prongs of the
Supreme Court’s standing analysis. It observed that
Section 5’s preemptive provision appears in subsection (a), not subsections (b)-
(d), thus presenting the following questions: even were we to declare subsections
(b)-(d) unconstitutional, would we sever and strike down only those subsections,
leaving subsection (a) untouched? And if so, what would happen to the Kinston
referendum and the Attorney General’s decision to refuse preclearance, given that
the preemption and the preclearance decision both occurred under a statutory
scheme that included the allegedly defective subsections (b)-(d)?”
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LaRoque v. Holder (LaRoque II), No. 10-5433, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907, at *45 (D.C. Cir.
July 8, 2011). The Court also questioned whether plaintiffs, who “are bringing only a facial
challenge,” “have * * * met the requirement that litigants claiming injury from a racial
classification establish that they ‘personally [have been] denied equal treatment by the
challenged discriminatory conduct.’” Id. at *47 (quoting United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,
743-744 (1995)). As we explain below, plaintiffs lack standing to bring their Equal Protection
challenge because the 2006 Amendments on their face caused no harm and, in any event,
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries would not be redressed by striking the Amendments down.
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim.6
1. The 2006 Amendments Did Not Cause Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries
Even if plaintiffs established sufficient injury to assert their Equal Protection claim, the
2006 Amendments did not cause the harms alleged. To satisfy the causation requirement,
plaintiffs must establish “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of
-- the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560-561 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
Significantly, plaintiffs do not challenge on Equal Protection grounds the
constitutionality of the pre-2006 preclearance standards articulated in Georgia v. Ashcroft and
Bossier Parish II. LaRoque II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907, at *44. To have standing to
challenge the 2006 Amendments, plaintiffs must show that those Amendments themselves, and
6 The United States incorporates and reiterates the standing arguments it asserted with
respect to Plaintiffs’ Claim Two in earlier briefing. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. To
Dismiss 9-10, June 14, 2011, ECF No. 11; Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n To Mot. To Dismiss 11-
13, July 12, 2010, ECF No. 14.
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not the preclearance requirement as it existed before 2006, specifically caused their alleged
injuries. Plaintiffs cannot do so.
Plaintiffs say their “nondiscrimination rights were violated when Section 5 ‘postpon[ed]
the implementation of [the] validly enacted [referendum]’ in furtherance of Congress’ minority-
preferring regime, regardless of why the Attorney General subsequently declined to ‘end’ that
suspension.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 30, Laroque v. Holder, No. 10-5433 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17,
2011) (Appellants’ Reply Br.). Thus, they tie their alleged injury solely to the postponement of
the implementation of the referendum. Moreover, to conclude that the Attorney General
objected to the referendum because he determined that it violated the 2006 Amendments
“requires review of the Attorney General’s objection – something plaintiffs disclaim any
intention of seeking.” Laroque II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907, at 47; cf. Morris v. Gressette,
432 U.S. 491, 501-07 & n.24 (1977) (holding that “Congress intended to preclude all judicial
review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion or failure to act” under Section 5).
In any event, it simply cannot be true that an individual injured by Section 5’s prohibition
on implementing a new, unprecleared election law has standing to challenge the 2006
Amendments “regardless of why the Attorney General subsequently decided to ‘end’ that
suspension.” See Appellants’ Reply Br. 30. If it were, then individuals could challenge the 2006
Amendments even when those Amendments had absolutely no impact on them. For example,
such a plaintiff could challenge the 2006 Amendments even if the voting change at issue drew an
objection because it violated Section 5 under the pre-2006 standards (such as a change that was
adopted with the purpose to cause retrogression, see Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 328). Indeed,
such a plaintiff could challenge the 2006 Amendments even if the jurisdiction in which she lived
never submitted the voting change at issue for preclearance. Just as here, Section 5 will have
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“postpone[ed] the implementation of [the] validly enacted [voting change]” in each of these
cases. Appellants’ Reply Br. 30. But the 2006 Amendments will have had absolutely nothing to
do with it. It is the operation of Subsection 5(a) – which contains Section 5’s “preemptive
provision” – that has caused the injury in these cases, not the operation of Subsections 5(b)
through (d) – which contain the Amendments. See Laroque II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907, at
*45 (“[S]ection 5’s preemptive provision appears in subsection (a), not subsections (b)-(d)”).
Because plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, on plaintiffs’ own argument, flow directly from Section 5’s
“preemptive provision,” and not from the Attorney General’s objection or the standards he
applied, plaintiffs fail to establish injuries “fairly traceable” to the 2006 Amendments.
Turning to the facts of this case, plaintiffs cannot establish that the 2006 Amendments
played any role in the Attorney General’s objection to the proposed voting change in Kinston.
There is no plausible argument that the 2006 Amendment to the purpose standard, incorporated
in Section 5(c), caused plaintiffs’ injury. The Attorney General’s objection to the City’s
proposed change to nonpartisan elections was based solely on a finding of discriminatory effect,
not discriminatory purpose. See Def. SMF ¶ 4; Exh. 2 (“I cannot conclude that the city has
sustained its burden of showing that the proposed changes do not have a retrogressive effect.”).
Plaintiffs similarly fail to establish causation with respect to Sections 5(b) and (d). Congress
adopted those sections to overturn the Ashcroft test for determining whether voting changes are
retrogressive in the redistricting context. In particular, Congress sought to preclude covered
jurisdictions from eliminating existing gains achieved by minority voters by reducing the number
of districts from which those voters have the ability to elect their candidates of choice, and
replacing them with districts in which those voters can only influence the election’s outcome.
See pp. 19-20, supra. But the Kinston objection did not involve a districting plan at all.
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Accordingly, the requirement that States maintain opportunity-to-elect districts instead of
creating influence districts – the sole focus of Section 5(b) and (d) – did not cause plaintiffs’
injury.
Plaintiffs cannot establish that the 2006 Amendments to Section 5 on their face caused
the harms they allege. To the extent that plaintiffs contend that those Amendments are
themselves discriminatory (Pl. Mem. 37-42, 44-45), they have not been personally denied equal
treatment by those Amendments and thus lack standing. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 743-744 (“[E]ven
if a governmental actor is discriminating on the basis of race, the resulting injury accords a basis
for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged
discriminatory conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs’ argument is nothing
more than “a generalized grievance against government conduct of which [they do] not
approve.” Id. at 745.
2. A Ruling Invalidating Section 5(b)-(d) Would Not Redress Plaintiffs’ Alleged
Injuries
Even an order striking the 2006 Amendments as unconstitutional would not provide the
relief the plaintiffs seek, i.e., implementation of the Kinston referendum. That is because the
2006 Amendments (Subsections (b)-(d)) are severable from Section 5. And invalidating the
Amendments would leave intact Section 5(a) – the statutory vehicle through which the
referendum was preempted. Any finding that Subsections (b)-(d) are unconstitutional would
neither obviate the Attorney General’s objection nor resurrect the discriminatory voting change.
That change would remain preempted by virtue of Section 5(a) and the objection interposed
pursuant to it under the pre-2006 standards. Moreover, plaintiffs have no other recourse as they
may not seek reconsideration of the Attorney General’s objection or de novo review in this
Court.
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a. Subsections (b)-(d) Are Severable From Section 5(a)
Courts are hesitant to strike down an entire statute when one provision is
unconstitutional. See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3161 (2010) (citing Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234,
(1932)). The “normal rule is that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course.”
Ibid. (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Thus, when statutes contain a constitutional defect, courts generally “try to
limit the solution to the problem, [by] severing any problematic portions while leaving the
remainder intact.” Ibid. (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320,
328-329 (2006)).
Unconstitutional provisions of a statute may be severed when what remains is: (1)
constitutionally valid, (2) capable of functioning independently, and (3) “consistent with
Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-
259 (2005). See also Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2009). An explicit
severability clause strongly favors severing unconstitutional provisions while preserving the
remainder. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987); Consumer Energy
Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The Amendments to Section 5 are severable. First, the statute’s severability clause is
decisive evidence of Congress’s intent to preserve the Act even if segments are found to be
unconstitutional: “If any provision of [this Act] or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of [the Act] and the application of the provision to
other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.” 42
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U.S.C. 1973p. Such provisions erect a strong presumption of severability. See Alaska Airlines,
480 U.S. at 686 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983); Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corporation Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. at 235). That presumption cannot be overcome
absent “strong evidence that Congress intended otherwise.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.7
No such evidence exists.
Second, as explained above, pp. 11-17, supra, Section 5, including Subsection (a), is
constitutional and, importantly, plaintiffs do not allege that Section 5(a) violates their Equal
Protection rights. Their Equal Protection claim targets the 2006 Amendments only. See
Laroque II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907, at *44 (“Significantly, plaintiffs do not contest the
constitutionality of the pre-2006 preclearance standards articulated in Georgia v. Ashcroft and
Bossier Parish.”).
Third, Subsection 5(a) is fully capable of operating independently of Subsections (b)-(d),
as it has done since the Voting Rights Act’s inception. Subsection (a) itself is the core
mechanism by which all voting changes are automatically and indefinitely suspended pending
administrative review by the Attorney General or until this Court’s de novo review. See 42
U.S.C. 1973c(a); see also Laroque II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907, at *45 (“[S]ection 5’s
preemptive provision appears in subsection (a).”). In addition to the automatic prophylactic
mechanism, Subsection 5(a) also contains the general standard for determining whether voting
changes should be precleared, i.e., when it “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or [membership of a language
7 See also New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating
that severability clauses are “ordinarily given great weight”); Consumer Energy Council v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d at 441(noting that severability clause “makes it
extremely difficult for a party to demonstrate inseverability”).
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minority group].” 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a); 42 U.S.C. 1973b(f). While the 2006 Amendments seek
to guide the manner in which Subsection (a)’s general standard is applied, they do not alter that
subsection. For instance, Subsection (c) defines how Subsection (a)’s general standard should be
applied in situations involving intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C. 1973c(c). Subsections (b)
and (d) define how the general standard in Subsection (a) should be applied in situations
involving the ability to elect a candidate of choice. 42 U.S.C. 1973c(b) & (d). Striking down
Subsections (b)-(d) would leave in place Subsection (a)’s preemptive mechanism, as well as the
preclearance standard that applied prior to the 2006 Amendments. Indeed, Subsection (a)
virtually mirrors pre-amendment Section 5, which contained no subsections.8 Plaintiffs’ second
claim does not challenge the constitutionality of Section 5’s pre-amendment standards.9 See
Laroque II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13907, at *44. These standards have operated independently
since the statute’s inception; they may continue to do so absent Subsections (b)-(d).
Finally, Section 5(a) is not merely consistent with Congress’s basic objectives in enacting
the statute, it manifests Congress’s determination to “banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting[.]” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). The presumption in favor
of severability, therefore, can be overcome only if “Congress would not still have passed the
8 The only change to the language from the pre-2006 Section 5 to amended Subsection
(a) is a change from “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect” to “neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect.” This change is not relevant to the standards contained in
Subsections (b)-(d).
9 This is not a case where severing Subsections (b)-(d) would require the court to “write
words into the statute, * * * or to leave gaping loopholes, * * * or to foresee which of many
different possible ways the legislature might respond to the constitutional objections [of the
amendments].” Randall v. Sorrell, 538 U.S. 230, 508 (2006) (plurality). Rather, the Court has
already previously filled in those gaps and interpreted the statute prior to the amendments being
enacted. Thus if the amendments were struck down, the District Court and the Attorney General
would be able to apply the pre-2006 standard repeatedly approved by the Supreme Court.
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valid sections had it known about the constitutional invalidity of the other portion of the statute.”
Bismullah, 551 F.3d at 1071-1072 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 246) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-330 (“Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its
statute to no statute at all?”).10 The existence of the severability clause precludes any assumption
that Congress would not have reauthorized Section 5 in 2006 without the Amendments.
b. Because Subsection (a) Is Severable From Subsections (b)-(d), Plaintiffs
Have No Avenue For Relief
Because Subsection (a) (the pre-2006 provision) is severable from Subsections (b)-(d)
(the Amendments), no mechanism exists to remedy the harms plaintiffs allege were caused by
the 2006 Amendments. If Subsection (a) remains intact, all voting changes in covered
jurisdictions would still be subject to Subsection (a)’s preemption and preclearance mechanism.
In other words, striking Subsections (b) and (d) will not result in the implementation of the pre-
empted Kinston referendum. These private plaintiffs would not be able to seek administrative
reconsideration from the Attorney General, nor seek de novo review of the voting change from
this Court.
Subsection 5(a) provides two avenues to obtain a determination that a voting change does
not abridge or deny the right to vote – administrative review of the voting change by the
Attorney General or de novo review of the voting change in this Court at the instance of the
covered jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a); see also Perkins, 400 U.S. at 385. Subsection (a)
applies to covered jurisdictions only. 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a); 28 C.F.R. 51.23. Thus, even if
10 See generally Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-259; Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999); Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (“Unless it is
evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully
operative as a law.”) (citation omitted).
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subsections (b)-(d) were struck down, Section 5(a) affords plaintiffs no opportunity to remove
the Attorney General’s objection. They cannot seek this Court’s de novo review of the voting
change, nor can they seek the Attorney General’s reconsideration of his objection. 42 U.S.C.
1973c(a); 28 C.F.R. 51.45(a). In any event, plaintiffs have disavowed any intention to seek
review of the Attorney General’s objection in this litigation.
Speculation by the plaintiffs that Kinston would apply for de novo review or seek
reconsideration is insufficient to show that the injury is “likely” to be redressed, particularly in
light of Kinston’s decision not to pursue either course. See Def. SMF ¶ 5. Such speculation
about Kinston’s actions is compounded by the fact that relief could only be afforded if the voting
change were entitled to preclearance under the pre-amendment Section 5 standard. As
previously noted, plaintiffs do not assert the Attorney General would have precleared the Kinston
submission under the pre-amendment standard. Any reconsideration by the Attorney General
would result in the plaintiffs’ desired relief only if the Attorney General would have made a
different determination under the pre-amendment standard. Otherwise the objection would
remain regardless of the constitutionality of subsections (b)-(d) and regardless of Kinston
seeking reconsideration. Therefore, it is “not likely,” but “merely speculative” that a finding by
this Court that the Amendments are invalid will redress plaintiffs alleged injury. America’s
Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Finally, if this Court were to strike down the 2006 Amendments, while leaving Section
5(a) intact, the Court would lack jurisdiction to overturn the Attorney General’s objection. As
noted, subsection (a) would remain in place and with it the Attorney General’s objection made
pursuant to it. The Attorney General’s administrative determinations under Section 5 are not
subject to judicial review. See Morris, 432 U.S. at 501-507 & n.24. This is so even where
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plaintiffs have alleged that the Attorney General misinterpreted his authority under Section 5, see
Morris, 432 U.S. at 497-507, or alleged that the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion
violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, see County Council of Sumter Cnty. v. United States,
555 F. Supp. 694, 700, 706 (D.D.C. 1983); City of Rome v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 378, 382
n.3 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d 446 U.S. 156 (1980). Of course, in this case, plaintiffs are not
challenging the Attorney General’s application of Section 5 to the Kinston submission.
Thus, because the Court cannot overturn the Attorney General’s objection and because
plaintiffs have no avenue to seek the Attorney General’s reconsideration or this Court’s de novo
review, there is no avenue for relief. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot show that their alleged
injury caused by the Amendments is likely to be redressed with a finding that subsections (b)-(d)
are unconstitutional.
Because plaintiffs cannot establish their standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
2006 Amendments, this Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim.
C. The Challenge To The 2006 Amendments Is Not Ripe For Review
Determining whether a claim is ripe for review requires a court to “evaluate both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300-301 (1998) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). Plaintiffs’ claim that the 2006 Amendments are
unconstitutional is not ripe for review.
First, in its present posture, this claim is not fit for decision. As the Court explained in
Texas, 523 U.S. at 301 (citation omitted):
The operation of the statute is better grasped when viewed in light of a particular
application. Here, as is often true, “[d]etermination of the scope ... of legislation
in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case
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involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial
function.”
The issue in Texas was whether particular provisions of state law were subject to Section 5
preclearance. See id. at 297-300. But the Court’s reasoning is no less applicable to plaintiffs’
contention here that the 2006 Amendments violate the Constitution. It is apparent that plaintiffs
and the Attorney General have quite different views as to the import of the Amendments.
According to plaintiffs, Section 5(c) will authorize the Attorney General “to coerce covered
jurisdictions to increase future minority electoral success” in violation of Equal Protection. Pl.
Mem. 44; see also Complaint ¶¶ 26, 36-37. As explained below, however, Section 5(c), in the
Attorney General’s view, merely denies preclearance to jurisdictions that are intentionally
discriminating, in violation of the Constitution. See pp. 34-38, infra. Similarly, plaintiffs
contend that Section 5(b) will result in “more race-based decision making than [Section 5] ever
did before” and that “every majority-minority district in the covered jurisdictions must be
preserved until 2031.” Pl. Mem. 39. As explained below, however, in the Attorney General’s
view, Section 5(b) is merely designed to protect the gains achieved by minority voters, and will
not require covered jurisdictions to disregard traditional districting principles, maximize minority
electoral success, or maintain every majority-minority district, in violation of the constitution.
See pp. 38-43, infra. Seeking to resolve this “remote and abstract” dispute is not a “proper
exercise of the judicial function.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 301 (citation omitted). Rather, plaintiffs’
challenge to the 2006 Amendments is best left to “a particular application” of the Amendments.
Ibid. Because plaintiffs have disavowed such an as-applied challenge in this case, Claim Two is
not fit for decision.
Similarly, withholding judicial review of the Amendments at this time will not result in
harm to the plaintiffs. See Texas, 523 U.S. at 300-301. As explained above, plaintiffs have not
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alleged facts demonstrating that the application of the 2006 Amendments has caused them any
injury. See pp. 22-25, supra. If, in the future, the Department misapplies the Amendments and
demands that a jurisdiction violate the Constitution, the jurisdiction can obtain complete relief by
seeking judicial preclearance in this Court. 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a). If such a jurisdiction were to
choose to submit to such an improper demand, a private party could sue the jurisdiction for the
constitutional violation – just as private plaintiffs successfully sued Georgia and North Carolina
in the 1990’s round of redistricting.
The challenge to the constitutionality of the 2006 Amendments is thus not ripe for
review.
D. The 2006 Amendments To Section 5 Do Not Violate The Constitution On Their Face
“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), or at a minimum,
that the provision lacks “a plainly legitimate sweep.” Washington State Grange v. Washington
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “The fact that [a statute] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set
of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
Moreover, courts adjudicating a facial challenge to a statute “must be careful not to go beyond
the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.”
Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450.
Thus, because plaintiffs have limited their claims to a facial challenge to the 2006
Amendments, they cannot rely upon allegations about the manner in which the Attorney General
has applied Section 5 in the past, the way in which it was applied to the Kinston referendum, or
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how they speculate the Attorney General will apply Section 5 in the future. In short, they cannot
prevail by showing that Section 5 “might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set
of circumstances.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. Rather, they must demonstrate that the “facial
requirements” of the 2006 Amendments are unconstitutional. Washington State Grange, 552
U.S. at 450.
1. The Amendment To Section 5’s Purpose Prong Is Valid Enforcement
Legislation And Does Not Violate Equal Protection
Section 5(c), which amended Section 5’s purpose prong, provides that Section 5
preclearance should be denied to a voting change that was motivated by “any discriminatory
purpose.” The language of this provision is not facially race-conscious, let alone
unconstitutional. It simply incorporates the Supreme Court’s own standard for identifying
unconstitutional racial discrimination. Indeed, by its terms, this provision would require the
Attorney General, or a court in a declaratory judgment action, to deny preclearance if a particular
voting change was adopted with a purpose to discriminate against white voters.
In Bossier II, the Supreme Court held that a voting change must be precleared – even if it
reflected purposeful discrimination on the basis of race and was thus unconstitutional – so long
as the covered jurisdiction did not intend to make things worse for minority voters than before
the change. As plaintiffs themselves point out, to satisfy Bossier II’s purpose test, a jurisdiction
“had the discrete and relatively ‘trivial’ task of confirming it was not an ‘incompetent
retrogressor’ that had haplessly adopted a change that did not backslide from the status quo.” Pl.
Mem. 27 (quoting Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 331-332).
The 2006 Amendments overturned the Court’s statutory interpretation of Section 5 in
Bossier II. As amended, the statute now provides that “any discriminatory purpose” behind a
voting change, and not just a retrogressive purpose, requires the denial of preclearance. 42
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U.S.C. 1973c(c). “Discriminatory purpose,” of course, is the Supreme Court’s test for
identifying unconstitutional discrimination. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-268 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1980). In other words, to obtain
preclearance under the amended purpose prong, a covered jurisdiction must no longer merely
show that “it was not an ‘incompetent retrogressor,’” but also that it did not violate the
Constitution.
Because the amended purpose prong authorizes denial of preclearance only when the
covered jurisdiction violates the Constitution by engaging in intentional discrimination, it clearly
has “a rational relationship to preventing or remedying intentional discrimination,” Pl. Mem. 25,
and is valid legislation to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See United States
v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006) (Congress may provide remedies for actual constitutional
violations). The amended purpose prong imposes on covered jurisdictions no substantive
requirements beyond those that the Constitution itself imposes. The only difference between
administration of the amended purpose prong and ordinary litigation to enforce the Constitution
is procedural: Section 5 shifts the burden of proof to the submitting jurisdiction. But shifting the
burden of proof to jurisdictions with a significant history of discrimination is appropriate in light
of Congress’s “wide berth in devising appropriate remedial and preventative measures for
unconstitutional actions.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004). See City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 181-182 (1980) (holding that shifting the burden of proof to
covered jurisdictions properly responds to their history of discrimination).
Plaintiffs nonetheless assert that Congress’s decision to incorporate the Supreme Court’s
own standard for unconstitutional discrimination exceeds Congress’s authority and violates
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Equal Protection because it will “unleash[] the Justice Department to once again coerce covered
jurisdictions into increasing, or even maximizing, minority electoral success.” Pl. Mem. 41.
Plaintiffs can point to nothing in the amended purpose prong that purports to authorize or even
permit the Attorney General to engage in such coercion. Instead, they simply assert that, before
Bossier II was decided in 2000, “the Justice Department frequently objected on ‘discriminatory
purpose’ grounds in order to compel the adoption of racially gerrymandered changes.” Pl. Mem.
29.
Even as to history, plaintiffs cannot support the charge that the Attorney General
employed Section 5’s purpose prong to demand unconstitutional racial gerrymandering “until
Bossier II foreclosed that practice by holding that Section 5 was limited to retrogression.” Pl.
Mem. 28. This contention relies upon a limited number of instances in which redistricting plans
subject to Section 5 review in the immediate wake of the 1990 Census were ruled to be
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. Not coincidentally, the cases arising from the 1990’s
round of redistricting in Georgia and North Carolina were the cases in which the Supreme Court
first set forth the standards for unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. See Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). The Court made it clear in Miller and
Shaw – several years before the 2000 decision in Bossier II – that when a jurisdiction adheres to
traditional districting principles, its failure to create additional majority-minority districts does
not constitute intentional discrimination and does not violate Section 5. See Miller, 515 U.S. at
924; Shaw, 517 U.S. at 911-913. The Attorney General acknowledges that principle and has
consistently applied it, since the decisions in Miller and Shaw, in enforcing Section 5. See e.g.,
Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
66 Fed. Reg. 5412, 5413 (Jan. 18, 2001). In applying the purpose prong, the Department of
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Justice utilizes the familiar Arlington Heights factors for determining whether official action was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-268; see 2006 House
Report 68; see also Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,239, 21,248-21,249 (April 15, 2011) (28 C.F.R. 51.54,
51.57).
Plaintiffs point to no evidence that the Attorney General has applied Section 5’s purpose
prong to demand that a covered jurisdiction violate the rulings in Miller or Shaw. And nothing in
the new Section 5(c) purports to alter those rulings. Because this provision does nothing more
than prohibit preclearance of intentionally discriminatory voting changes, its enactment is well
within Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and does not
itself violate the Constitution – certainly not on its face.
Plaintiffs nonetheless contend, based upon objections interposed by the Attorney General
in the early 1990’s, that the amended purpose provision will authorize the Attorney General “to
coerce covered jurisdictions to increase future minority electoral success” in violation of Equal
Protection. Pl. Mem. 44; see also Complaint ¶¶ 26, 36-37. They thus ask this Court to declare
the new Section 5(c) of the Voting Rights Act facially unconstitutional because the Department
of Justice was found to have incorrectly applied its predecessor provision nearly 20 years ago
and allegedly might misapply the new provision at some point in the future. Plaintiffs’
speculation that the Attorney General might misapply Section 5(c) in the future provides no basis
for declaring that provision facially unconstitutional. On a facial challenge, it would be improper
for this Court to presume that a coordinate branch of government will apply the new purpose
prong unconstitutionally and in a manner inconsistent with its plain text. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (“A possibility always exists, of course, that the legitimate
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objectives of any law or legislative program may be subverted by conscious design or lax
enforcement. There is nothing new in this argument. But judicial concern about these
possibilities cannot, standing alone, warrant striking down a statute as unconstitutional.”); see
Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22,
(1960) (“The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be
exercised with reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined.”)). To do so would be to “short
circuit the democratic process by preventing [a] law[] embodying the will of the people from
being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.” Washington State Grange,
552 U.S. at 451; see also Sumter Cnty., 565 F. Supp. at 706 (court has no authority “to anticipate
or rule on” Attorney General’s future application of the statute).
2. The Amendment To Section 5’s Retrogression Prong Is Valid Enforcement
Legislation And Does Not Violate Equal Protection
Plaintiffs also contend that the amended effects prong in Section 5(b) exceeds Congress’s
authority and denies equal protection. Pl. Mem. 30-41, 44-45. They argue that the totality of the
circumstances test adopted by Ashcroft is necessary to ensure that Section 5 operates to do
nothing more than “ferret[] out facially neutral laws where ‘the risk of purposeful discrimination’
is high but proving that motive would be ‘inordinately difficult.’” Pl. Mem. 30 (citing City of
Rome 446 U.S. at 177; Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986)). The Supreme Court,
however, has imposed no requirement that discriminatory-effects provisions be strictly construed
to come within Congress’s enforcement power. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 520 (“When Congress
seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact
prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to
carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.”). As the Court wrote in City of
Rome, “Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by
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jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the
risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory
impact.” 446 U.S. at 177 (footnote omitted). When the prohibition is limited to changes with a
retrogressive impact – those that demonstrably undo the gains minority voters have won in the
past – there is all the more reason to suspect discriminatory intent. Accordingly, the amended
retrogression prong is proper legislation to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Plaintiffs’ contentions that the amended effects prong is insufficiently flexible and does
not permit sufficiently broad defenses is also without merit. Although Section 5(b) overturned
the Ashcroft test for determining whether a change is retrogressive, it did not overturn the
established Section 5 case law, which long predates Ashcroft, that even a retrogressive change
must nonetheless be precleared in certain circumstances. Thus, the statement in the 2006
legislative history expressing an intent to “reject[] all that logically follows from [that case],”
2006 House Report 71 (quoted in Pl. Mem. 40), is of no moment.
In Beer, 425 U.S. at 141, the Supreme Court interpreted the discriminatory-effect
provision in the original Section 5 to require “that no voting-procedure changes would be made
that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” The original Section 5 effects provision, like the
2006 provision, on its face did not appear to permit any “defense or justification” for voting
change with such a discriminatory effect. Pl. Mem. 40. But the Supreme Court had already
recognized that the statute could not be read as imposing an utterly inflexible prohibition on
retrogression. In City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975), the Court held that an
annexation that reduced the black population percentage in a covered city from 52% to 42% did
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not violate the effects prohibition, so long as the City’s election plan “fairly reflect[ed] the
strength of the Negro community as it exist[ed] after the annexation.” Id. at 370-372.
Similarly, the Attorney General took the position, well before the decision in Ashcroft,
that the prohibition on retrogression does not “require the reflexive imposition of objections in
total disregard of the circumstances involved or the legitimate justifications in support of
changes that incidentally may be less favorable to minority voters.” Revision of Procedures for
the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 488 (Jan. 6,
1987). In particular, the Department of Justice has long recognized that retrogression can be
justified when a plan that maintains preexisting minority voting strength would violate the
Constitution: “in the redistricting context, there may be instances occasioned by demographic
changes in which reductions of minority percentages in single-member districts are unavoidable,
even though ‘retrogressive,’ i.e., districts where compliance with the one person, one vote
standard necessitates the reduction of minority voting strength.” Ibid. Even before Ashcroft, the
Department publicly explained that a retrogressive redistricting plan must nonetheless be
precleared if the only alternative is a plan that subordinates traditional districting principles and
violates the principles articulated in Shaw and Miller. See Guidance Concerning Redistricting
and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 66 Fed. Reg. at 5413 (explaining
that “preventing retrogression under Section 5 does not require jurisdictions to violate Shaw v.
Reno and related cases”). The 2006 Amendments do not purport to alter these principles.
Plaintiffs contend that the amended effects prong will result in “more race-based decision
making than [Section 5] ever did before” and that “every majority-minority district in the
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covered jurisdictions must be preserved until 2031.” Pl. Mem. 39.11 But nothing in the language
of Section 5(b) requires that it be applied as plaintiffs predict. As it has been since its enactment,
a major purpose of Section 5 is “to insure that [the gains thus far achieved in minority political
participation] shall not be destroyed through new [discriminatory] procedures and techniques.”
Beer, 425 U.S. at 140-141 (quoting S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975)). The new
Section 5(b) has not changed that purpose. Rather, the addition of this provision simply clarifies,
in the wake of Ashcroft, that a covered jurisdiction may not destroy existing gains achieved by
minority voters by reducing the number of districts from which those voters are able to elect the
candidates of their choice and replacing them with districts in which those voters may do nothing
more than potentially influence the outcome of an election. As the House Report explained,
“Section 5, if left uncorrected [after Ashcroft], would now allow States to turn black and other
minority voters into second class voters who can influence elections of white candidates, but
who cannot elect their preferred candidates, including candidates of their own race.” 2006
House Report 70.
Plaintiffs fundamentally misconstrue what the 2006 Amendment changed about prior
retrogression law and what it left intact. First, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, nothing in the
amended retrogression provision requires that “minority groups in covered jurisdictions” retain
the same “level of electoral success that they possessed in 2006.” Pl. Mem. 38. Section 5(b)
11 Of course, the non-retrogression principle of Section 5 has always been race-conscious
in that it denies preclearance only to voting changes that “would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. Plaintiffs, however, do not assert that the retrogression principle itself is
unconstitutional. Cf., LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 517-519 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (compliance with non-retrogression mandate is
justified to remedy past discrimination). Rather, they contend that the addition of Sections 5(b)
and (d) have rendered the retrogression standard unconstitutional, particularly as they speculate it
will be applied by the Attorney General. See Complaint ¶¶ 25, 30; Pl. Mem. 12-13. 44-45.
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identifies a change as retrogressive if it diminishes minority voters’ “ability * * * to elect their
preferred candidates of choice.” 42 U.S.C. 1973c(b). But ability does not invariably lead to
success. To guarantee voters’ continued “ability” to elect candidates of their choice is not to
ensure that they will in fact do so. The amended retrogression prong thus leaves intact the settled
principle that “[n]onretrogression is not a license for the State to do whatever it deems necessary
to ensure continued electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority’s opportunity to elect
representatives of its choice not be diminished.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996)
(opinion of O’Connor, J.) (plurality). Thus, the amended retrogression provision does not
impose a “quota floor on past minority electoral successes,” or impose a “ceiling on other
groups’ representation” in a “zero-sum game” as plaintiffs suggest. Pl. Mem. 31.
Nor, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, does that provision require the preservation of
“every existing majority-minority district” and “every existing ‘coalition’ or ‘influence’ district
in the covered jurisdictions.” Pl. Mem. 39. Under the amended statute, a voting change is
retrogressive only if it diminishes minority voters’ ability to elect their candidates of choice. If
racially polarized voting comes to play less of a role in elections in covered jurisdictions,
minorities in existing districts in which they currently have the ability to elect their candidates of
choice will be able to retain their current ability to do so with progressively smaller percentages
of the population. Further, as the Attorney General recognized before the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ashcroft, “in examining whether [a] new [districting] plan is retrogressive, the
inquiry must encompass the entire statewide plan as a whole.” Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 479. Thus
even if the plan results in a “diminution of a minority group’s effective exercise of the electoral
franchise in one or two districts,” the plan may not violate Section 5 if “the gains in the plan as a
whole offset the loss in a particular district.” Ibid.; cf. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 427-442
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(2006) (for purpose of Section 2 vote dilution inquiry, State cannot remedy dismantling of
compact opportunity district through creation of a noncompact district elsewhere in the state).
Moreover, where “natural demographic shifts” weaken a majority-minority district, so that
maintaining such a district would require a jurisdiction to “abandon traditional districting
principles,” Pl. Mem. 40, the amended Section 5 effects provision – like the unamended
provision as interpreted in Beer and Richmond – would not require preservation of the district,
even if the failure to do so would diminish minority voters’ ability to elect their candidates of
choice. That is because plaintiffs are simply incorrect that the amended effects provision permits
no “defense or justification” for a retrogressive change. Pl. Mem. 40. The amended effects
prohibition changes the definition of retrogression to be applied in certain cases involving
districting, not the defenses that have existed since the Supreme Court decided Richmond more
than 35 years ago.
In any event, because plaintiffs’ challenge to the amended retrogression provision rests,
like their challenge to the amended purpose provision, on speculation that the statute will be
applied in an unconstitutional manner in the future, it is not a proper basis for a facial challenge.
Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449-450; Raines, 362 U.S. at 22.
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CONCLUSION
The Attorney General’s cross motion for summary judgment should be granted and
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be denied.
Date: August 1, 2011 Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. MACHEN, JR. THOMAS E. PEREZ
United States Attorney Assistant Attorney General
District of Columbia
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS
JULIE A. FERNANDES
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
s/ Linda F. Thome
T. CHRISTIAN HERREN, JR.
DIANA K. FLYNN
RICHARD DELLHEIM (lead counsel)
LINDA F. THOME
ERNEST A. MCFARLAND
JARED M. SLADE
JUSTIN WEINSTEIN-TULL
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
NWB-Room 7264
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 305-1734
Facsimile: (202) 307-3961
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 55 of 56
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 1, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
via the Court’s ECF system, to the following counsel of record:
Michael A. Carvin
D.C. Bar No. 366784
Noel J. Francisco
D.C. Bar No. 464752
Hashim M. Mooppan
D.C. Bar No. 981758
David J. Strandness
D.C. Bar No. 987194
Jones Day
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Michael E. Rosman
D.C. Bar No. 454002
Michelle A. Scott
D.C. Bar No. 489097
Center for Individual Rights
1233 20th Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036
Joseph Gerald Hebert
191 Somervelle Street, #405
Alexandria, VA 22304
Arthur Barry Spitzer
American Civil Liberties Union
1400 20th Street, N.W., Suite 119
Washington, DC 20036
Anita Earls
Southern Coalition for Social Justice
115 Market Street
Suite 470
Durham, NC 27701
Laughlin McDonald
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation,
Inc.
230 Peachtree Street, NW
Suite 1440
Atlanta, GA 30303
/s/ Richard Dellheim
RICHARD DELLHEIM
Attorney, Voting Section
Case 1:10-cv-00561-JDB Document 55 Filed 08/01/11 Page 56 of 56
