Kimodale Inc v. Chevron USA Inc et al

Brief/Memorandum in Support

N.D. Tex.September 19, 2016

1Motion to Dismiss Complaint Joyce W. Lindauer State Bar No. 21555700 Joyce W. Lindauer Attorney, PLLC 12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 625 Dallas, Texas 75230 Telephone: (972) 503-4033 Facsimile: (972) 503-4034 ATTORNEY FOR R&R SULEIMAN, LLC IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION § KIMODALE, INC. d/b/a HUNT § FOOD STORE and HAKIM ALHADDAD § § Plaintiffs, § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-cv- 02133-G § vs. § § CHEVRON USA, INC.; § R&R SULEIMAN, LLC; § ENIGMA ENTERPRISES, INC.; and § JPKP, INC., § § Defendants. § DEFENDANT R&R SULEIMAN, LLC’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(6) Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 1 of 17 PageID 348 2Motion to Dismiss Complaint Table of Contents TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... 3 I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................................................... 6 II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ 6 Count 1: Negligence................................................................................................................... 8 Count 2: Negligence Per Se....................................................................................................... 8 Count 3 Gross Negligence ......................................................................................................... 9 Count 4: Private Nuisance ....................................................................................................... 9 Count 5: Trespass to Real Property ...................................................................................... 10 Count 6: Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations ................................ 10 Count 7: Common Law Contribution ................................................................................... 11 Count 8: Strict Liability & Contribution -SWDA § 361.444 .............................................. 12 Count 9: Declaratory Judgment ............................................................................................ 12 Count 10: Quantum Meruit ................................................................................................... 13 Count 11: Attorneys Fees ....................................................................................................... 14 Statute of Limitations.............................................................................................................. 14 III. PRAYER ........................................................................................................................... 16 Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 2 of 17 PageID 349 3Motion to Dismiss Complaint Table of Authorities Cases Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................... 6 Bennet v. Reynolds, 242 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ...................................... 8 Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1995)........................................................... 6 Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001)............................................................................ 10 City of San Antonio v. Johnson 103 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) ........ 11 Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013)......................... 10 Collin County, Tex. v. Homeowners Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods, (HAVEN), 915 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990)..................................................................................................... 12 Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1455, 2016 Tex. LEXIS 580, 40 (June 24, 2016)............................................................................................................................ 8 D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450 (Tex. 2002).................................................................... 7 Dallas Cnty., Tex. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 3:11-CV-02733-0, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 840016, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014).................................................................................... 11 Davis v. W. Cmty. Hosp., 755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985). .............................................................. 10 El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987) .................................................................. 7 Etan Indus v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2011).................................................................. 14 Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2011) ........................................................ 12 Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993)........................................ 6 First Nat’l Bank v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1986) ............................................................. 14 Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1997, pet. denied) ................... 10 Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2003)................................................................ 8 Hues v. Warren Petro. Co., 814 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) ................................................................................................................................................... 13 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007) ......................................... 6 Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 3 of 17 PageID 350 4Motion to Dismiss Complaint In re Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2005)................................................... 13 KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1999)............. 14 Matysek v. Medders, 443 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ........... 14 MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009)....................... 12, 13 Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1997)...................................................................... 14 Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. 2009)........................................... 7 R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2005) ............................ 11 Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) ............................................................................................................ 10 Schmidt v. Rodriguez (In re Rodriguez), 524 B.R. 111 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014)........................... 9 Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004) .......................................... 14 Southern Pacific Company v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973).............................................. 7 Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S.A. Glass, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Tex. 1996)............. 6 Thompson v. Bank Of America Nat. Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022 (5th Cir. 2015).................................... 7 U-Haul Int’l v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.118 (Tex. 2012)........................................................................ 8 Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1997) .......................................... 13 Vortt Exploration Co., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1990)...................... 12 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001) ..................................................... 10 Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied)...................... 9 Statutes TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003............................................................................... 14 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003.5............................................................................ 14 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §41.001.................................................................................. 8 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.003(36) ..................................................................... 11 Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 4 of 17 PageID 351 5Motion to Dismiss Complaint TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.344............................................................................ 11 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 12............................................................................................................................ 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.............................................................................................................................. 6 Treatises Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965) ............................................................................... 7 Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 5 of 17 PageID 352 6Motion to Dismiss Complaint TO THE HONORABLE DAVID GODBEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: COMES NOW R&R Suleiman, LLC, a Defendant in the instant proceeding and file this its Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint (the “Motion”), and would respectfully show the Court as follows: I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1. Plaintiffs are owners and operators of Hunt Food Store, located at 7932 Great Trinity Forest Way, Dallas, Texas 75217. 2. Defendant R&R Suleiman owns contiguous real property located at 8000 Great Trinity Forest Way, Dallas, Texas 75217. 3. Defendant R&R Suleiman operates a gas station with underground fuel storage tanks on its property. One of those tanks leaked in 2011, and R&R Suleiman engaged the services of a remediation specialist to remediate and contain the contamination. While engaged in the remediation, R&R Suleiman discovered fuel containing MBTE and lead was contaminating its property. Since R&R Suleiman’s fuel tanks were installed in the early 2000s, and fuel contained MBTE and lead was outlawed in 1996, R&R Suleiman cannot be the source of the contamination on its or Plaintiffs’ properties. II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 4. Under FRCP 12(b)(6), the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff has not plead a claim upon which relief can be granted 5. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6. When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 6 of 17 PageID 353 7Motion to Dismiss Complaint 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). Id. 7. Plaintiff has not plead the bare minimum of facts to raise a plausible claim for relief. Plaintiff has not plead what statements were made, when they were made, to whom they were made, or how Plaintiff relied upon those statements. 8. While the allegations need not be overly detailed, a plaintiff’s pleadings must still provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions,” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” “[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)). 9. Moreover, demonstrating the facial plausibility of a claim requires a plaintiff to establish “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), 129 S.Ct.1937 at 1949. It is not enough that a plaintiff allege the mere possibility of misconduct; it is incumbent to “show that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. The court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) if either the complaint fails to assert a cognizable legal theory or the facts asserted are insufficient to support relief under a cognizable legal theory. See Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S.A. Glass, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 1996). 10. Plaintiffs cannot show that the contaminants on their property are the result of Defendant R&R Suleiman’s actions. Plaintiffs make only vague allegations that Defendant’s own Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 7 of 17 PageID 354 8Motion to Dismiss Complaint release “went unmitigated for numerous years and migrated onto and polluted Plaintiffs’ Property.” Count 1: Negligence 11. A negligence claim requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009) (citing D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. 2002) and El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987)). Texas substantive law applies where, as here, the Court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Thompson v. Bank Of America Nat. Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 2015). 12. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which establish the claim. Plaintiffs have not established what facts, if any, show the negligence of Defendant R&R Suleiman with respect to a leaking storage tank, a remediation effort, or any other actions or inactions which constitute negligence. Count 2: Negligence Per Se 13. Texas follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965) relating to negligence per se, which provides the following rule for this claim: The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself. Southern Pacific Company v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1973). 14. There is no evidence to which Plaintiff can cite to make a showing supporting this claim. 15. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which establish the claim of negligence per se Plaintiffs have not established what facts, if any, show the negligence of Defendant R&R Suleiman Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 8 of 17 PageID 355 9Motion to Dismiss Complaint with respect to a leaking storage tank, a remediation effort, or any other actions or inactions which constitute negligence per se. Plaintiffs do not identify when, or how, Defendant R&R Suleiman violated the statutes they complain of. Count 3 Gross Negligence 16. To prove gross negligence, a plaintiff must show: (1) an act or omission, when viewed objectively from the defendant’s standpoint at the time it occurred, involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and (2) the defendant had actual, subjective awareness of the risk but proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §41.001(11)(B); U-Haul Int’l v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.118, 137 (Tex. 2012).To prove the defendant had actual, subjective awareness of the risk but proceeded with conscious indifference, the plaintiff must show the defendant knew about the risk but acted anyway. Bennet v. Reynolds, 242 S.W.3d 247, 259-60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.). 17. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which establish the claim. Plaintiffs have not established what facts, if any, show the negligence of Defendant R&R Suleiman with respect to a leaking storage tank, a remediation effort, or any other actions or inactions which constitute gross negligence. Count 4: Private Nuisance 18. A nuisance is a “condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.” Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1455, 2016 Tex. LEXIS 580, 40 (June 24, 2016) (citing Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003)). A nuisance is actionable where a defendant has engaged in: (1) the intentional Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 9 of 17 PageID 356 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint invasion of another’s interests; (2) negligent invasion of another’s interests; or (3) other conduct, culpable because abnormal and out of place in its surroundings, that invades another’s interests See Crosstex, 59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1455, at 52-66 (“retain[ing] the three general categories of conduct that may support liability for creating a nuisance….”) 19. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which establish the claim. Plaintiffs have not established what facts, if any, show the negligence of Defendant R&R Suleiman with respect to a leaking storage tank, a remediation effort, or any other actions or inactions which constitute a private nuisance. There is no time, place, reference to an action or inaction, or description of how Defendant R&R Suleiman “unreasonably interfered with and invaded Plaintiffs’ Property.” Count 5: Trespass to Real Property 20. An action for trespass requires a plaintiff to show: (1) the plaintiff owned or had a lawful right to possess real property; (2) the defendant entered the plaintiff’s land, and entry was physical, intentional, and voluntary; and (3) the defendant’s trespass caused injury to the plaintiff’s right of possession. Schmidt v. Rodriguez (In re Rodriguez), 524 B.R. 111, 122 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014) (italics in original omitted) (citing Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791, 798 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied)). 21. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which establish the claim. Plaintiffs have not established what facts with respect to a leaking storage tank, a remediation effort, or any other actions or inactions which constitute trespass to real property by Defendant R&R Suleiman. Defendant R&R Suleiman did not enter Plaintiffs’ Property, intentionally or voluntarily, at any time and Plaintiff has not even alleged when, how or where this trespass happened, let alone whether it was intentional or voluntary. Count 6: Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 10 of 17 PageID 357 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint 22. A tortious interference claim requires a plaintiff to establish: (1) there was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered into a business relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant either acted with a conscious desire to prevent the relationship from occurring or knew the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of the conduct; (3) the defendant’s conduct was independently tortious or unlawful; (4) the interference proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (5) the plaintiff suffered actual damage or loss as a result. Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 923 (Tex. 2013) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726 (Tex. 2001); Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001); Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 115 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1997, pet. denied)). 23. As it relates to the second element, it is required that “the tortfeasor[] […] had knowledge of the prospective business relationship that they allegedly interfered with. Davis v. W. Cmty. Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1985). 24. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which establish the claim. Plaintiffs have not established what facts, if any, show the interference or knowledge of Defendant R&R Suleiman with respect to a business relationship. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant R&R Suleiman knew of a prospective sale, nor do they identify how or when Defendant R&R Suleiman interfered with this prospective business relationship. Count 7: Common Law Contribution 25. The court in City of San Antonio v. Johnson explained that “[a] contribution claim is not a separate cause of action but is a method of determining each defendant’s liability with regard to a claim. A defendant’s claim of contribution is derivative of the plaintiff’s right to recover Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 11 of 17 PageID 358 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint from the joint defendant against whom contribution is sought.” Accordingly, Plaintiff has improperly brought an independent claim for contribution which should be dismissed. City of San Antonio v. Johnson 103 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citing Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1992) Count 8: Strict Liability & Contribution -SWDA § 361.444 26. The elements of a cost recovery action under the TSWDA are: (1) a defendant is a “person responsible for solid waste” as defined in section 361.271; (2) the TCEQ approved the plaintiff’s removal or remedial action; (3) the action was necessary to address a release or threatened release of solid waste; (4) the costs of the action were reasonable and necessary; and (5) the plaintiff made reasonable attempts to notify the defendant of both the release and the plaintiff’s intent to take steps to eliminate the release. R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. 2005) (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.344). A “solid waste facility” is defined as “all contiguous land, including structures, appurtenances, and other improvements on the land, used for processing, storing, or disposing of solid waste.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.003(36). A former owner or operator of such a facility may be considered a “person responsible for solid waste” if it “owned or operated a solid waste facility at the time of processing, storage, or disposal of any solid waste.” Id. § 361.271(a)(2). Count 9: Declaratory Judgment 27. A declaratory judgment is not a "cause of action." Rather, it "is merely a vehicle that allows a party to obtain early adjudication of an actual controversy arising under other substantive law." Dallas Cnty., Tex. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 3:11-CV-02733-0, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 840016, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Mobile USA, L.P., 3:08-CV-1658-D, 2009 WL 3075205, at *19 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2009 (citing Collin County, Tex. v. Homeowners Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods, Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 12 of 17 PageID 359 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint (HAVEN), 915 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory judgment is duplicative and redundant of other claims, and therefore should be dismissed. 28. Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action is improper and should be dismissed because it is duplicative of Plaintiff’s common law and statutory claims and is merely an attempt to recover otherwise impermissible attorney fees. It is well-settled that simply re-pleading a claim that does not permit an attorney fees award as one for declaratory judgment cannot serve as a basis for a fee award, “since such a maneuver would abolish the American Rule and make fees ‘available for all parties in all cases.’” Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (quoting MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009)). “When a claim for declaratory relief is merely ‘tacked onto’ statutory or common-law claims that do not permit fees, allowing the [Declaratory Judgment Act] to serve as a basis for fees ‘would violate the rule that specific provisions should prevail over general ones.’” Id. (quoting MBM Fin. Corp, 292 S.W.3d at 670). “The declaratory judgment claim must do more ‘than merely duplicate the issues litigated’ via the contract or tort claims” Id. Count 10: Quantum Meruit 29. A claim for quantum meruit requires a plaintiff to prove that: (1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the person sought to be charged; (3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be charged, used and enjoyed by him; and (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged. Vortt Exploration Co., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990) (quoting City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). “Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy that ‘is based upon the promise implied by law to pay for Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 13 of 17 PageID 360 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint beneficial services rendered and knowingly accepted.’” See In re Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005). 30. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which establish the claim. Plaintiffs have not established what valuable services or materials they have provided to or for the benefit of Defendant R&R Suleiman. They have not even alleged what services or materials have occurred at all, let alone whether they constitute valuable and that they benefit Defendant R&R Suleiman in some way. Count 11: Attorneys Fees 31. Claims for attorney fees awards under Texas’ Declaratory Judgment Act, Section 37.001 et seq. of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code are prohibited when the prevailing party’s declaratory relief claim is duplicative of a claim that does not permit an attorney fees award. MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669-70 (Tex. 2009) (denying attorney fees award because the prevailing party’s declaratory relief claim was duplicative of a claim that did not permit an attorney fees award, and explaining that “the rule is that a party cannot use the [Declaratory Judgment] Act as a vehicle to obtain otherwise impermissible attorney’s fees”). This claim should be dismissed. Statute of Limitations 32. Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Actions for damage to real property must be brought within two years of the injury. Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. 1997); Hues v. Warren Petro. Co., 814 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (negligence, trespass, and nuisance claims based on alleged gas leaks and improper brine disposal subject to two-year statute of limitations); Matysek v. Medders, 443 S.W.2d 929, 929-30 (Tex.Civ.App.- Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 14 of 17 PageID 361 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint Amarillo 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (two-year statute of limitations applicable to cause of action for damages caused by pollution of sub-surface strata of freshwater); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003.5. 33. Under Texas law, claims for negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, nuisance, trespass, and tortious interference with business relationships have a two year statute of limitations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (dictating that “a person must bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to the property of another […] not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues.”). See also KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. 1999) (holding that “negligence claims, […], must be brought ‘not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues.’”); Etan Indus v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 622-23 (Tex. 2011) (applying a two year statute of limitations to a claim for trespass); First Nat’l Bank v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287, 288-89 (Tex. 1986) (holding that a suit for tortious interference with business relations has a two year statute of limitations); Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 270 (Tex. 2004) (“The limitations period for a private nuisance claim is two years.). 34. With no limitations period included in the TSWDA, such actions also appear most aptly governed by the two-year limitations period for property damage claims. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). Generally, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex. 1997). 35. Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because the wrongful acts that they complain of occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the original petition. The Chevron property had a leak in an underground fuel storage tank in 1995, and the leak in Defendant R&R Suleiman’s Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 15 of 17 PageID 362 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint tank occurred in 2011. Plaintiffs’ admit these facts in the complaint. Thus, their claims are barred by the various statutes of limitations and should be dismissed. III. PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Defendant respectfully requests the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, and for such other and further relief, both at law and in equity, to which Defendant may show itself to be justly entitled. Dated: September 19, 2016 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Joyce W. Lindauer Joyce W. Lindauer State Bar No. 21555700 Joyce W. Lindauer Attorney, PLLC 12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 625 Dallas, Texas 75230 Telephone: (972) 503-4033 Facsimile: (972) 503-4034 joyce@joycelindauer.com ATTORNEY FOR R&R SULEIMAN, LLC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on September 19, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via email pursuant to the Court’s ECF system upon the parties listed below. Bradford J. Gilde 5535 Memorial Drive | Suite F #154 Houston | TX | 77007 BJG@GildeLawFirm.com Attorney for Plaintiffs Jackson Walker, LLP Christopher A. Thompson Peter K. Wahl Shelisa E. Brock 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 600 Dallas, Texas 75201 cthompson@jw.com pwahl@jw.com sbrock@jw.com Attorneys for Chevron USA Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 16 of 17 PageID 363 1Motion to Dismiss Complaint Carmen S. Mitchell 50 North Saint Paul St. | Suite 1800 Dallas | TX | 75201 CMitchell@mitchellgoff.com Attorney for Plaintiffs John J. Gitlin, Esq. 16901 Park Hill Drive Dallas, Texas 75254 johngitlin@gmail.com Attorney for Enigma Enterprises, Inc. and JPKP, Inc. /s/ Joyce W. Lindauer Joyce W. Lindauer Case 3:16-cv-02133-N Document 19 Filed 09/19/16 Page 17 of 17 PageID 364