42 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 236,991 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 216,978 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar
570 U.S. 338 (2013) Cited 5,243 times 78 Legal Analyses
Holding that application of the " ‘because’ of" requirement of Title VII's antiretaliation provision requires proof of "but-for" causation
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 52,355 times 95 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) Cited 12,382 times 23 Legal Analyses
Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"
Faragher v. Boca Raton
524 U.S. 775 (1998) Cited 9,314 times 100 Legal Analyses
Holding that, to be actionable, the alleged conduct "must be extreme" and "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing" are not enough
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,277 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 19,988 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.
523 U.S. 75 (1998) Cited 5,168 times 50 Legal Analyses
Holding that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive . . . connotations"
Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.
281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) Cited 2,812 times
Holding that summary judgment was appropriate even where the decision-maker's reason is "foolish or trivial or even baseless"
Rule 56 - Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Cited 329,861 times 158 Legal Analyses
Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
Section 2000e-3 - Other unlawful employment practices
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 Cited 14,484 times 43 Legal Analyses
Prohibiting retaliation against employees who "oppos[e] any [unlawful] practice"
Section 2000e-16 - Employment by Federal Government
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 Cited 4,950 times 20 Legal Analyses
Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"

Jenkins v. Kerry

42 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that application of the " ‘because’ of" requirement of Title VII's antiretaliation provision requires proof of "but-for" causation

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"

Holding that, to be actionable, the alleged conduct "must be extreme" and "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing" are not enough

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive . . . connotations"

Holding that summary judgment was appropriate even where the decision-maker's reason is "foolish or trivial or even baseless"

Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

Prohibiting retaliation against employees who "oppos[e] any [unlawful] practice"

Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"