Jane Doe v. Rhode Island School of Design

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

E.D. Pa.June 13, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JANE DOE Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-cv-1659 DEFENDANT RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER VENUE Defendant Rhode Island School of Design moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue. The legal authority and arguments supporting Rhode Island School of Design’s motion are set forth in the memorandum of law filed concurrently with this motion. Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8 Filed 06/13/17 Page 1 of 3 Respectfully submitted, SAUL EWING LLP Date: June 13, 2017 /s/ Joshua W. B. Richards Joshua W. B. Richards, Esquire/204315 Centre Square West 1500 Market Street, 38th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 972-7777 jrichards@saul.com Of Counsel: Steven Richard, Esquire (admitted phv) Nixon Peabody LLP One Citizens Plaza Providence, RI 02903-1345 (401) 454-1020 srichard@nixonpeabody.com Attorneys for Defendant Rhode Island School of Design Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8 Filed 06/13/17 Page 2 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss, along with the accompanying memorandum of law and declaration, was served on the following counsel via electronic filing: Nadeem A. Bezar, Esq. David C. Williams, Esq. Kline & Specter, P.C. 1525 Locust Street, 19th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorneys for Plaintiff /s/ Joshua W. B. Richards Joshua W. B. Richards, Esquire Date: June 13, 2017 Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8 Filed 06/13/17 Page 3 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JANE DOE Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-cv-1659 DEFENDANT RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER VENUE Defendant Rhode Island School of Design submits this Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue. Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 1 of 17 -i- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ....................................................................................... 2 LEGAL STANDARDS .................................................................................................................. 3 ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 3 I. This Action Should be Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction ................................. 3 a. There Is No General Jurisdiction over RISD in this District. .................................... 4 b. There Is No Specific Jurisdiction over RISD in this District..................................... 5 c. Abundant Authority Demonstrates the Lack of Specific Jurisdiction under Analogous Circumstances.......................................................................................... 8 II. This Action Should Also Be Dismissed for Improper Venue Because RISD Does not Reside in this District and no Part of the Events Giving Rise to Plaintiff’s Claim Happened Here. ............................................................................................................... 11 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 12 Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 2 of 17 -ii- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE Bockman v. First Am. Mktg. Corp., 459 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2012) ...........................................................................................3, 5 BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2000).......................................................................................................5 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)......................................................................................................... passim Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981).......................................................................................................................9 Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 836 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2016).......................................................................................................4 Corr. Med. Care, Inc. v. Gray, No. 07-2840, 2008 WL 248977 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) .........................................................2 Corrales Martin v. Clemson Univ., No. 07-536, 2007 WL 4531028 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2007).....................................................8, 9 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)...........................................................................................................4, 10 Dawes-Lloyd v. Weisbrot, No. 09-2388, 2010 WL 3463293 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2010) ......................................................2 Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996).............................................3 Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 746 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1984).......................................................................................................5 Driscoll v. Matt Blatt Auto Sales, No. 95-cv-5314, 1996 WL 156366 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 1996)......................................................6 Duchesneau v. Cornell Univ., No. 08-4856, 2009 WL 3152125 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009) ....................................................10 Farber v. Tennant Truck Lines, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 421 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ...........................................................................................4 Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 3 of 17 -iii- Gallant v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 111 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Pa. 2000) .......................................................................................10 Gehling v. St. George’s School of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1985).................................................................................................9, 10 Gonzalez v. City of Norwich Conn., 646 F. App’x 288 (3d Cir. 2016) ...............................................................................................5 Grainer v. Smallboard, Inc., No. 16-4866, 2017 WL 736718 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2017) .....................................................3, 6 Isaacs v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 608 F. App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................8 Jaipaul v. Pliant Corp., No. 07-4031, 2008 WL 2746291 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2008) .......................................................2 Jarzynka v. St. Thomas Univ. Sch. of Law, 323 F. Supp. 2d 660 (W.D. Pa. 2004)........................................................................................9 Kendall v. Trs. of Amherst Coll., No. 06 4983, 2007 WL 172396 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2007) ..........................................................9 Locke v. Ethicon Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 757 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ........................................................................................4 Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1992)........................................................................................... passim Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 695 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983).............................................3 Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2002).......................................................................................................3 Rodi v. S. New England Sch. of Law, 255 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2003) ............................................................................................9 Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1984).........................................................................................................3 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014)...........................................................................................................5, 6 Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 4 of 17 -iv- STATUTES AND RULES 28 U.S.C. § 1391............................................................................................................................11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) ...............................................................................................3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) ................................................................................1, 2, 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) ..............................................................................1, 3, 11 Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 5 of 17 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff Jane Doe is a student at Rhode Island School of Design (“RISD”), a private college located in Providence, Rhode Island. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10. Plaintiff alleges that in June 2016, while she was studying abroad, a fellow RISD student sexually assaulted her in student housing in Ireland. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 18, 26. The crux of plaintiff’s claim against RISD is her contention that RISD had a duty to protect her from her assailant in Ireland, and that RISD’s alleged failure to do so entitles her to damages. RISD strongly disagrees with the legal premise of plaintiff’s case. Irrespective of the merits of plaintiff’s claims, however, this Court is not the proper forum to adjudicate them. First, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over RISD because RISD is neither “at home” in this District (for general jurisdiction purposes) nor are any of RISD’s alleged contacts with this District remotely connected to the conduct plaintiff contends caused her harm (for specific jurisdiction purposes). Second, venue is improper in this Court because RISD does not reside in this District and no part of the events forming the basis of this lawsuit took place here. Apart from plaintiff being from here, this case and RISD have no connection to Pennsylvania. As a result, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over RISD and venue here is improper, so this Court is bound by Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) to dismiss this action. Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 6 of 17 2 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS1 Plaintiff is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Compl. ¶ 2. As a student at RISD, plaintiff studied abroad in Ireland where another student participant in her study abroad program sexually assaulted her. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 18, 26. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the material events underlying her claim took place in Pennsylvania. Defendant RISD is a nonprofit corporation located in Providence, Rhode Island and organized under Rhode Island law. Compl. ¶ 5. RISD’s principal place of business, and the location of virtually all of its operations, is also in Providence, Rhode Island. See Declaration of Samuel Solomon (“Solomon Decl.”) at ¶ 2. RISD has no offices in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 3. RISD maintains no registered agent for service of process in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 4. RISD does not advertise in any Pennsylvania-based publication. Id. at ¶ 5. RISD does not maintain a bank account, post-office box, or phone listing in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 6. RISD does not obtain revenue from any services rendered in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 7. With respect to the jurisdictional issues presented by this motion, plaintiff alleges that in 2010, RISD formed a partnership with a magazine publisher to develop internship programs in Philadelphia, New York, and Providence. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff does not allege that RISD actually offered any internship programs in Philadelphia, and she does not allege that she participated in any such program. More to the point, and as demonstrated in the Solomon 1 RISD’s Statement of Facts is drawn from plaintiff’s complaint and from the Declaration of Samuel Solomon filed concurrently with RISD’s motion to dismiss. The facts set forth in the Solomon Declaration are properly before the Court on this motion because when a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), it may support its motion with factual matter pertaining to its contacts with the forum for purposes of defeating personal jurisdiction. See Dawes-Lloyd v. Weisbrot, No. 09-2388, 2010 WL 3463293, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2010) (defendant permitted to submit sworn factual material along with motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)); Jaipaul v. Pliant Corp., No. 07-4031, 2008 WL 2746291, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2008) (“to defeat a defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion where the defendant has produced an affidavit or other competent evidence that asserts facts contrary to the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, the burden is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence that the jurisdictional facts exist.”) (quoting Corr. Med. Care, Inc. v. Gray, No. 07-2840, 2008 WL 248977, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008)). Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 7 of 17 3 Declaration, RISD’s alleged “partnership” with Stitches Magazine/ASI resulted in no internships in Philadelphia (or anywhere in Pennsylvania). See Solomon Decl. at ¶ 8. RISD was not in 2010, and is not now, a partner, shareholder, or member of any legal partnership or incorporated entity with ASI. Id. at ¶ 9. LEGAL STANDARDS On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state. See Grainer v. Smallboard, Inc., No. 16-4866, 2017 WL 736718, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2017) (citing Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat.’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992)). While a court must generally accept the allegations of the complaint as true, once a defendant has raised a jurisdictional defense, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996); Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). On a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), a defendant has the burden of proving that venue in the selected district is improper. See Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 695 F.2d 716, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983); see also Bockman v. First Am. Mktg. Corp., 459 F. App’x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Myers, 695 F.2d at 724-25). ARGUMENT I. This Action Should be Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) allows a district court to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident only to the extent allowed by the law of the state in which it sits. See Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984). Pennsylvania’s long- arm statute authorizes “jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the constitutional limits of the Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 8 of 17 4 due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.” Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221. As demonstrated below, RISD’s contacts with Pennsylvania are insufficient to sustain general or specific jurisdiction in line with constitutional due process. a. There Is No General Jurisdiction over RISD in this District. The constitutional limits of general jurisdiction were explained by the Third Circuit in Chavez v. Dole Food Company, Inc., 836 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2016). In order for a plaintiff to establish general jurisdiction over a defendant in a given state, the defendant must either maintain its principal place of business there or have contacts so “continuous and systematic” so as to render the defendant “essentially at home” in the forum. Id. at 223 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)). A “corporation is not ‘at home’ in ‘every state in which it engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.’” Farber v. Tennant Truck Lines, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Locke v. Ethicon Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 757, 762 (S.D. Tex. 2014)). Instead, only in an “exceptional case” will a corporation be subject to personal jurisdiction in a state other than its principal place of business. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. It is undisputed that RISD’s principal place of business is not in Pennsylvania. As a result, the only question is whether this is an “exceptional case” in which RISD’s contacts with Pennsylvania are so overwhelmingly “continuous and systematic” so as to justify a finding of general jurisdiction. It is abundantly clear that this is not such a case. Under no plausible reading of the complaint could one conclude that RISD’s contacts with Pennsylvania render it “essentially at home” in Pennsylvania - indeed, the complaint contains only the barest allegation of a single RISD contact with Pennsylvania that occurred some six years before the incident on which this suit is based. More importantly, and as set forth in the Solomon Declaration, RISD Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 9 of 17 5 conducts virtually all of its business and operations in Rhode Island. As a result, RISD does not have sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania to support general jurisdiction. b. There Is No Specific Jurisdiction over RISD in this District. Specific jurisdiction arises when a plaintiff’s claims both (1) arise from defendant’s contacts with the forum and (2) “the relationship among the defendant, the cause of action, and the forum falls within the ‘minimum contacts’ framework.” Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221; see also Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984). That is, a prerequisite for specific jurisdiction is sufficient “suit-related conduct” to “create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Gonzalez v. City of Norwich Conn., 646 F. App’x 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014)). Accordingly, specific jurisdiction is established only where the defendant “purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate[ ] to’ those activities.” BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985)). As the Supreme Court explained in Walden, moreover, specific jurisdiction arises only based on the defendant’s own affirmative, intentional affiliation with the state, not based on “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts the defendant makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the forum state. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). Plaintiff has not carried this burden of production. First, and dispositive here, plaintiff’s alleged injuries do not arise in any way from RISD’s alleged contact with Pennsylvania. The only such contact alleged is a partnership RISD purportedly formed with a magazine publisher to develop internship programs in Philadelphia, New York, and Providence. See Compl. ¶ 6. Even if it were true, this allegation has no nexus whatsoever with plaintiff’s alleged injuries. As a result, the allegation of a RISD internship Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 10 of 17 6 program does not go to the question of specific jurisdiction because that program is not alleged to have caused plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Accord Driscoll v. Matt Blatt Auto Sales, No. 95-cv- 5314, 1996 WL 156366, at *2-3, *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 1996) (although relevant for general jurisdiction, payments to forum government did not compute into “specific contacts” analysis as they were not causally linked to plaintiff’s claim). Second, RISD’s alleged contact with Pennsylvania - a partnership intended to provide internships and career programs in Philadelphia - does not fall within the “minimum contacts” framework described in Walden and Mellon. Read carefully, plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that RISD actually developed internship or career programs in Pennsylvania - only that a website reported that “Stitches” and RISD had entered into a partnership to potentially do so in the future. In any event, RISD and Stitches Magazine did not offer any internship or career programs in Pennsylvania at all. See Solomon Decl. at ¶ 8. As a result, plaintiff’s allegation does not approach her burden of “establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Grainer, 2017 WL 736718, at *1 (citing Mellon, 960 F.2d at 1223). And even if plaintiff’s allegation were entitled to the assumption of truth (which it is not, see Dayhoff, 86 F.3d at 1302), plaintiff’s allegation suggests no more than the sort of narrow, limited contact with the forum that courts have consistently held did not rise to the level of “minimum contacts” necessary to satisfy the due process clause because they are too “random, fortuitous, [and] attenuated.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). Separately, even if RISD’s alleged contact did reach the lowest “minimum contacts” threshold, the Court has the discretion to decline jurisdiction if doing so “would comport with Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 11 of 17 7 ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1222 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (1985)). In Mellon, the Third Circuit explained that factors a court should consider as part of this analysis include: “the burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). Each of these factors (the “Burger King Factors”) is either neutral or weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction:  The Burden on the Defendant. To the extent any employee or agent of RISD breached a purported duty owed to plaintiff, that official is located in Providence, Rhode Island, as are virtually all RISD personnel. The burden for RISD to litigate this matter in Pennsylvania is high and needless. This factor weighs heavily in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction.  The Forum State’s Interest in Adjudicating the Dispute. No alleged act in the complaint occurred in Pennsylvania, and no injury alleged in the complaint occurred in Pennsylvania. Apart from the plaintiff, no witness is resident here, and for the years immediately preceding and after her alleged injuries, plaintiff was - and remains - a student living at RISD, in Rhode Island. To the extent that any state has a substantial interest in deterring any purported wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint, that state is Rhode Island. This factor weighs heavily in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction.  Plaintiff’s Interest in Obtaining Convenient and Effective Relief. Plaintiff alleges that she is a Pennsylvania citizen, but she has resided in Rhode Island for her entire post-secondary education, with the exception of the time she spent in Ireland, and she continues to do so. See Solomon Decl. ¶ 10. Rhode Island is, as a result, not some far-flung, unfamiliar locale to plaintiff. There is no reason to believe plaintiff cannot obtain effective relief in Rhode Island. This factor is neutral.  The Interstate Judicial System’s Interest in Obtaining the Most Efficient Resolution of Controversies. As with the interest in adjudicating the dispute, this factor weighs heavily in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction. There is literally no connection between this dispute and Pennsylvania other than the fact that plaintiff - and her Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 12 of 17 8 counsel - are from here. The efficient resolution of this civil action would be best served by permitting a court in Rhode Island, where all witnesses, documents, and the defendant are located, to adjudicate this dispute.  The Shared Interest of the Several States in Furthering Fundamental Substantive Social Policies. This factor weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction because filing this civil action in this district suggests forum shopping without regard to the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant. All states have an equal interest in discouraging forum shopping and encouraging litigants to file civil actions in courts of competent jurisdiction in the first instance. Taken together, the Burger King Factors strongly advise that even if plaintiff had established a causal relationship between RISD’s contacts and her claims (she has not) and had established minimum contacts with Pennsylvania (which she also has not), the Court should, in its discretion, decline to exercise personal jurisdiction over RISD and dismiss this action. c. Abundant Authority Demonstrates the Lack of Specific Jurisdiction under Analogous Circumstances. Cases decided by other courts in this Circuit bear out the lack of specific jurisdiction in situations, like this one, in which litigants have attempted to sue their out-of-state educational institutions in their home state. In Isaacs v. Arizona Board of Regents, the Third Circuit affirmed a decision by Judge Tucker concluding that Dartmouth College lacked sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania to justify a finding of personal jurisdiction where there were no specific allegations linking Dartmouth’s relationship with Pennsylvania to the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. See 608 F. App’x 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2015) (“to the extent that [plaintiff] was harmed, Pennsylvania is not the focal point of the harm, nor did Dartmouth College expressly aim tortious conduct at Pennsylvania.”). In Corrales Martin v. Clemson University, the plaintiff contended that she had been wrongfully denied tenure while an employee at Clemson. In arguing for personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, she alleged that the harm of the denial actually befell her in Pennsylvania, where she was a resident, because she suffered the emotional harm associated with the adverse Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 13 of 17 9 decisions here. See No. 07-536, 2007 WL 4531028, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2007). Rejecting this argument, and finding no basis for personal jurisdiction, Judge Baylson explained that “the proper focus is on the time of the [harmful] act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful.” Id. at *8 (quoting Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)). Judge Baylson went on to explain that “the state of a plaintiff’s residence does not on its own create jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Jurisdiction is proper [only] when the state of a plaintiff’s residence is the focus of the activities of the defendant out of which the suit arises.”2 Id. at *9 (internal marks and citations omitted). Such is decidedly not the case here, particularly as the plaintiff lives most of the year in Rhode Island. Likewise, in Jarzynka v. St. Thomas University School of Law, Judge Conti dismissed a student’s ADA claims against his Florida law school because, although plaintiff alleged that he had been recruited to attend the law school, his claims - under the Americans with Disabilities Act - did not relate to or arise from that recruitment to attend. See 323 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (W.D. Pa. 2004). In Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, Judge Rodriguez dismissed a claim in which the plaintiff, a prospective student, asserted specific jurisdiction arose based on (1) an acknowledgment letter in response to the plaintiff’s inquiries about the school, and (2) an acceptance letter sent to the plaintiff in New Jersey. See 255 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350-51 (D.N.J. 2003). Plaintiff here alleges less still than this. 2 Judge Baylson also rejected an allegation of general jurisdiction in Clemson, observing, as had the court in Dartmouth, that there were not sufficient continuous and substantial business interactions with Pennsylvania. See 2007 WL 4531028, at *7; see also Kendall v. Trs. of Amherst Coll., No. 06 4983, 2007 WL 172396, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2007) (rejecting application of general jurisdiction where plaintiff had also “admit[ted] that specific jurisdiction does not exist in this case because Plaintiff’s injuries [did] not arise out of Defendant’s contacts with Pennsylvania.”) Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 14 of 17 10 Finally, in Gehling v. St. George’s School of Medicine, Ltd., the Third Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s argument that a Pennsylvania court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign medical school based on advertising in Pennsylvania and based on the school reaching out directly to the plaintiff with an acceptance letter. 773 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he fact that St. George’s may be said to derive some percentage of its revenues from [forum] residents in return for services provided in Grenada does not subject it to in personam jurisdiction.”). The Third Circuit ultimately found personal jurisdiction in Gehling because the chancellor of the college personally delivered the plaintiff’s decedent’s body to Pennsylvania and, while here, fraudulently misrepresented the cause of death. Id. at 544. Plaintiff’s allegations in this case do not remotely approach this standard. See also Gallant v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 111 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641-42 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“While the plaintiff here has presented more contacts than those considered . . . in Gehling, none of these additional contacts demonstrate that Columbia has purposefully directed its activities to, or availed itself of, Pennsylvania. Rather, these contacts are the result of Columbia’s general participation in the type of interstate activity in which any nationally prominent educational institution would engage.”) (internal marks omitted).3 Taken together, these cases demonstrate that in the Third Circuit, as elsewhere, a student may not sue her out-of-state college or university in her home state by simply alleging that the 3 To the extent plaintiff may rely on this Court’s opinion in Duchesneau v. Cornell University, No. 08-4856, 2009 WL 3152125, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009), that opinion is distinguishable insofar as it (a) relates to general, not specific jurisdiction; (b) predates the Supreme Court’s opinion in Daimler, and so does not apply the principal place of business analysis that is now the governing standard, and (c) can, in any case, be readily distinguished on its facts related to Cornell’s business activities in Pennsylvania. Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 15 of 17 11 institution had minimal contacts with the state and no more. Plaintiff has not met her burden, and her claims should be dismissed. II. This Action Should Also Be Dismissed for Improper Venue Because RISD Does not Reside in this District and no Part of the Events Giving Rise to Plaintiff’s Claim Happened Here. When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For purposes of determining where a defendant resides for § 1391(a)(1), an organizational defendant resides in any district in which it is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. See id. at § 1391(c)(2). Venue is not proper under any prong of § 1391(b). Under (b)(1), venue is improper because RISD does not reside in Pennsylvania because, as discussed above, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over RISD. Nor, under (b)(2), did any part of the events giving rise to the claim occur here. And finally, (b)(3) cannot provide a basis for proper venue because there is another district in which this action could have been brought where RISD does reside - Rhode Island. As a result, venue is not proper in this District and the Court should, in the alternative, dismiss this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 16 of 17 12 CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, RISD respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Doe’s claims against RISD for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. RISD further requests that the Court award it such further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted, SAUL EWING LLP Date: June 13, 2017 /s/ Joshua W. B. Richards Joshua W. B. Richards, Esquire/204315 Centre Square West 1500 Market Street, 38th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 972-7777 jrichards@saul.com Of Counsel: Steven Richard, Esquire (admitted phv) Nixon Peabody LLP One Citizens Plaza Providence, RI 02903-1345 (401) 454-1020 srichard@nixonpeabody.com Attorneys for Defendant Rhode Island School of Design Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 17 of 17 Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-2 Filed 06/13/17 Page 1 of 2 Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-2 Filed 06/13/17 Page 2 of 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JANE DOE Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-cv-1659 O R D E R AND NOW, this ____ day of __________________________, 2017, having considered Defendant Rhode Island School of Design’s motion to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue (Doc. No. 8), and all responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s claim is DISMISSED. BY THE COURT: ____________________________ Hon. C. Darnell Jones, II Case 2:17-cv-01659-CDJ Document 8-3 Filed 06/13/17 Page 1 of 1